EP0472528A1 - Sender-empfänger-system. - Google Patents
Sender-empfänger-system.Info
- Publication number
- EP0472528A1 EP0472528A1 EP90905435A EP90905435A EP0472528A1 EP 0472528 A1 EP0472528 A1 EP 0472528A1 EP 90905435 A EP90905435 A EP 90905435A EP 90905435 A EP90905435 A EP 90905435A EP 0472528 A1 EP0472528 A1 EP 0472528A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- transmitter
- code
- receiver
- original code
- receiver system
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/21—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass having a variable access code
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00238—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmittted data signal containing a code which is changed
- G07C2009/00253—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmittted data signal containing a code which is changed dynamically, e.g. variable code - rolling code
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
- G07C2209/06—Involving synchronization or resynchronization between transmitter and receiver; reordering of codes
Definitions
- the transmitter-receiver system according to the invention was developed for remote control of the central locking system of a motor vehicle and thus relates to a locking system actuated electronically or optically by means of coded signals. In principle, however, it is also suitable for remote controls in which a control code, which is generally difficult to copy, is transmitted from a transmitter to a receiver.
- the invention is therefore also suitable for actuation e.g. of (garage) gates and other locking or opening devices, but also e.g. for remote-controlled starting, stopping, switching, ignition, steering etc. of basically any objects.
- the invention relates to a problem in initializing and re-initializing the transmitter-receiver system as soon as the code that enables the operation of the device is to be finally determined.
- the code specified should be sufficiently complicated and as difficult as possible to reproduce by unauthorized persons.
- the invention relates to a further development of the special transmitter-receiver system, which is defined in the preamble of claim 1 and is known in particular by - DE-Al-32 25 754.
- the user of the system or an authorized specialist generates and stores a master code in a largely automatically controlled dialog between the transmitter and the receiver for the initial initialization or later for a (re) initialization.
- the manufacturer can supply related sets of transmitters (e.g. keys) and receivers with correspondingly rigid pre-programming, but this requires careful storage, and generally. always buying a complete set, even if e.g. only one transmitter or one receiver has to be replaced due to defects.
- transmitters e.g. keys
- receivers with correspondingly rigid pre-programming
- start code represents the fixed code that is continuously used by the authorized person to operate the device.
- code representing the authorization is constantly changed while the transmitter is in operation. Receiver system changed according to a stored algorithm, so that the original code then specifies in particular that start code which represents the first code that can be used by an authorized user to operate the device.
- the following qualifying codes are sometimes called continuation codes.
- a change code with constantly new, never repeating continuation codes offers a much greater protection against misuse of the object, e.g. of the vehicle as a fixed code.
- the object of the invention is to allow that not only a high level of security against unauthorized use of the system can be achieved by sufficiently arbitrary determination of the codes authorizing use, but also that any authorized user of the transmitter can, in principle, at any time in a very simple manner How the system can be initialized and / or reinitialized, that is, can define a new code authorizing use, although the technical effort required for this is particularly low and although there is no automatic dialog between see sender and receiver needed for initialization:
- the invention is not restricted to the fact that only the buyer can initialize, or that either only a change code or only a fixed code can be initialized.
- the invention also allows a mixed code in that both a fixed code and an alternate code can be initialized: namely, the invention allows the initialization to be carried out, if necessary, by e.g. the manufacturer of the system or the object and / or by an authorized person, e.g. the dealer, for a fixed or changing or even mixed code, - for which the person concerned e.g. the sender-receiver system can initially enter a start code individually assigned to the object in question and / or the additional code described later - then possibly even fixed - into the sender and receiver, e.g.
- the invention is therefore also suitable for the (re) initialization of a transmitter-receiver system with a fixed code by the authorized transmitter user.
- it is also particularly well suited for (re) initializing a transmitter-receiver system with a change code, and in principle the algorithm according to which the code is changed can in principle be practically arbitrary.
- the original code can even change the algorithm according to which the code is changed to further increase the protection against misuse, for example by converting one or more bits of the original code into an add instruction of the algorithm in a multiply instruction.
- the original code can differ from the start code, for example in order to increase the security that no unauthorized person can operate the device without further ado, even if he was able to record the original code by listening to it.
- the transmitter thus contains a random generator that forms the original code all at once or in stages, or that forms a code (eg the start code itself), or a series of code fragments, from which the first the original code to be transmitted is formed by converting / encrypting.
- This master code is then transmitted - as a whole or in stages - to the recipient, the recipient being able to use this master code, or a code derived therefrom according to a decryption algorithm, as the start code.
- this start code thus represents the fixed code - or, in the case of an alternating code, a first authorizing code from the set of authorizing codes - which an authorized person is entitled to use the object (eg motor vehicle) by means of a transmitter ( electronic key).
- the measures according to claim 2 allow a very small outlay for the random generator, without having to do without it, through a very long original code consisting of several fragments, or a very long one Convert from several fragments derived original code to be able to use, the security against unauthorized use of the object is greater, the more complicated, that is also the longer, the original code to be transmitted, 3 to achieve reliable user guidance, especially when Clock is very irregular - protects against the fact that accidental actuations of the control element (s) unintentionally emit an original code from the transmitter, 4 to achieve a high level of security that no authorized user can accidentally get fragments and thus an original code If, inadvertently, it actuates operating elements, this measure also specifies the minimum number of operations required for (re) initialization, 5 to further increase security against unauthorized or unintentional incorrect operation,
- a power-saving LCD display is already on the transmitter for other reasons is appropriate, for example, to indicate its operational readiness, by such, from Menu guidance displayed to the receiver to prevent an unwanted (re) initialization of the system, since transmissions of an original code not initiated by the transmitter have no (re) initializing effects, as well as to avoid the weight and the effort for attaching an advertisement in the transmitter and moreover, to share a display, often for other reasons, on the receiver, e.g.
- a single transmitter simultaneously for several receivers for example for receivers to be able to use it in a motor vehicle and on a garage door and in a front door, that is to be able to avoid a large number of transmitters for receivers of different objects
- 30 to be able to use a single receiver at the same time for several transmitters for example for the large number of transmitters / keys from several authorized users of a motor vehicle, that is to be able to avoid a large number of receivers in the object for the different users, especially when the receiver can be initialized by each of the transmitters by means of the original code assigned to only one transmitter in each case, in that the receiver separately stores the different original codes of the different transmitters, or codes derived therefrom, and separately to determine the usage authorization used.
- FIG. 1 a user who actuates a transmitter and an object / motor vehicle in which a receiver is mounted, which is to be controlled by the transmitter, the transmitter-receiver system having to be initialized or re-initialized beforehand
- 2 schematically shows a transmitter and an associated receiver of the system according to the invention
- FIG. 3 shows a scheme for the time slots for transmitting the original code, together with an example for the time slots for transmitting an additional code, which indicates / signals to the receiver that a (Re-) initialization is present, so that there is no normal transmission of a start code or continuation code - instead of (re) initialization.
- FIG. 2 shows, by way of example and schematically, important components of a receiver E and a transmitter S, which a user according to FIG. 1, for remote control of the receiver E installed in a motor vehicle 0 and thus for actuating the central locking device ST of the motor vehicle 0, in the hand holds.
- the transmitter S here is an electronic motor vehicle key S which contains a transmission element SE which emits waves - for example an FM antenna, an ultrasound emitter and / or an infrared emitter.
- the car key S contains two examples SB buttons as transmitter controls SB, which in turn the
- serial - in this example serial - can send coded signals SI.
- the code of these signals SI indicates the authorization to use the vehicle 0.
- This transmitter S also contains at least one single ROM and / or RAM as transmitter memory SS
- a logic unit calculates from such data or correlating values, e.g. a program-controlled microprocessor ⁇ P, in each case the start code to be sent that proves the authorization or - in the case of a change code - the next continuation codes SI.
- a change code e.g. an alternating code linked to the time - for storing values which ultimately correlate with the last transmitted original code and / or continuation code (and possibly for storing bits of program steps of the associated algorithm);
- a logic unit calculates from such data or correlating values, e.g. a program-controlled microprocessor ⁇ P, in each case the start code to be sent that proves the authorization or - in the case of a change code - the next continuation codes SI.
- the receiver E mounted under the motor vehicle roof contains, among other things, a receiving element EE, for example an ultrasound microphone and / or an infrared photodiode, cf. Figure 2, so that the broadcast coded signals SI can be received.
- a receiver memory ES serves to store data - possibly also to store bits of data representing program steps - the data stored in the receiver memory and the data stored in the transmitter memory correcting so that the receiver E has the authorization or Not being able to determine received codes SI:
- a logic circuit for example likewise a program-controlled microprocessor ⁇ P, checks the code SI received in each case by means of the data stored in the receiver memory ES, after which this logic circuit ⁇ P is a device ST, namely here the motor vehicle Central locking ST and / or, for example, a car burglar alarm system ST, actuated or not actuated, depending on the test result.
- Such transceiver systems especially if they have one
- Use switch code - have to be initialized, maybe even occasionally re-initialized later, i.e. Initially, or occasionally later, a re-adjustment must be carried out between a code SI that will be sent by the transmitter S in the future and the code SI that will be accepted by the receiver E in the future as authorized.
- Convert formed start code SC so it is stored as data - usually in an identical manner - not only in the transmitter memory SS, but also in the receiver memory ES.
- the original code UC is transmitted unidirectionally from the transmitter S to the receiver E, that is to say without a dialog running automatically bidirectionally between the transmitter S and the receiver E.
- the transmitter S additionally contains a random generator Z for the preparation of the new start code / code quantity SI which it will use itself in the future and which the receiver will accept in the future, which generator, by actuating at least one of the transmitter operating elements SB, each generated a random number.
- the user of the transmitter S can therefore operate the system in a very simple manner by means of a corresponding Activate or re-initialize transmitter control elements SB, although the technical effort, in particular for the random generator Z, is low, and although there is no automatic dialogue between the transmitter S and the receiver E, and accordingly no effort for an auxiliary receiver in the Transmitter S is required for (re) initializing; in addition, in spite of the simplicity of operation and the technical construction of the invention, it is in principle not always necessary to use additional special devices, not even on the part of the selling car dealer, for the first time in order to use the transceiver system, or initialize again later.
- the transmitter S thus contains a random generator Z, which at one time as a whole - or in stages - forms the original code UC to be transmitted, or forms a (new) code or fragments of the new code from which the original code to be transmitted is only converted by conversion UC is formed.
- This code itself generated by the random number generator Z, or a code derived therefrom in the transmitter S by conversion / encryption, is transmitted as the original code UC to the receiver E, the latter, analogously to the operation in the transmitter S, directly this original code UC, or a of which code derived from an algorithm, used as start code SC.
- the effort for the random generator Z is particularly small, even if a very long original code UC is broadcast,
- the random generator Z successively generates a plurality of random numbers, each of which represents fragments B ... from which the original code UC is formed, cf. the original code time slot scheme example in FIG. 3 with the fragments B1, B2,
- the random generator Z e.g. by multiple actuations of at least one of the operating elements SB, preferably preferably in a special rhythm specified by a clock generator CL, step by step all of the fragments B. required for the original code radiation are generated.
- the logic unit ⁇ P installed in the transmitter S converts the converted fragments B according to an algorithm into the original code UC to be transmitted,
- the original code UC thus formed - or the start code SC formed therefrom - is based on several, i.e. at least two, interleaved or non-interleaved, and / or logically / algebraically linked or unlinked, each for itself by means of the Random generator Z generated fragments B, which in turn consist of, for example there are eight bits each.
- the more or less long - e.g. 64 bit long - original code UC or start code SC can be formed from any number and any length of fragments B ... by means of the random generator Z contained in the transmitter S - e.g. from 8 fragments, which in turn consist of e.g. There are 8 bits each - the security against unauthorized use of the object / vehicle can advantageously be made all the greater, the more complicated, i.e. also the longer, the original code UC to be transmitted and the start code SC correlating to it, although only a small random generator Z is used for this can be used, which is only able to generate small fragments B ... from relatively few bits.
- a clock generator CL-controlled display L for example a lamp L or a power-saving LCD display L, is attached, which, for operator guidance during initialization or re-initialization, has a cycle for actuation - for example for pressing and / or releasing - of/ of the transmitter control elements / SB concerned specifies in order to generate the fragments B - and thus finally the original code UC or start code SC - in stages during these cycles by means of the random generator Z and by means of the logic circuit ⁇ P which processes the fragments B. .
- the original code UC is at least three - e.g. on five or eight - fragments B of several - e.g. at least eight bits - is based, and if in addition the clock CL and thus the display L in the transmitter S, or a clock CL and a display EL in the receiver E, specifies in a non-uniform (I) cycle those periods in which a fragment B by means of corresponding actuation of the relevant control element (s) and / or can be transmitted, the security is increased that no unauthorized person (eg playing children) and no authorized user (i) accidentally breaks and thus generating a master code if he accidentally actuates corresponding transmitter operating elements, whereby this measure can also be used to specify a minimum number of the actuations required for (re) initialization that is not too small.
- this period CL - or by a further clock generator - these periods are limited to a maximum duration of three seconds, for example.
- the transmitter control element (s) in question is / are operated incorrectly, the generation of the original code UC or the start code SC is preferably terminated in this case; -
- a timer may additionally be used to generate each fragment for a certain duration, e.g. for 10 minutes, prevented.
- the transmitter S can either directly store the generated different fragments B, or one or more values formed from these fragments B according to an algorithm, prophylactically in its transmitter memory SS for later determination of a new code / code quantity SI by means of these fragments B or values, if necessary, to transmit the original code UC formed therefrom, started by a corresponding actuation of at least one of its transmitter operating elements SB.
- the user can gradually and gradually, even during normal actuations of the central locking ST, or any device ST, cf.
- FIG. 2 all preparations for the transmission of the original code are made in order to be able to quickly transmit the original code to the recipient later if required.
- the security against unauthorized eavesdropping on the transmitted or transmitted original code can also be increased in that an unauthorized third party can intercept at most parts of the original code, but not easily, the entire original code in a manner which is not very useful for him.
- the original code UC can be broadcast in stages and each stage can be triggered by actuating the transmitter control element / s SB concerned.
- the transmitter S can also be designed and operated in such a way that it transmits the original code UC as a whole in a single block when at least one of its transmitter operating elements SB is actuated, cf. also Figure 3.
- This can increase security against incorrect operation of the transmitter, which also increases the likelihood that, depending on the standard used, at least all 1 bits of the original code, if not also the O bits, are transmitted to the receiver E with approximately the same power.
- the display L or another, e.g. display EL mounted in receiver E - e.g. by flashing - indicate that all fragments B have been generated or sent.
- the transmitter control element SB used for generating and the transmitter control element SB used in normal operation for sending out the start code or continuation code are identical, for example it is there is only a single one instead of the two transmitter operating elements SB shown in FIG. 2, so that a new fragment B is generated each time the respective transmitter operating element SB is actuated.
- the fragment B generated in each case is then immediately, that is, before the next actuation of the transmitter control element SB in question - as such or recoded - in the transmitter memory SS, e.g. in its RAM, temporarily stored.
- the transmitter memory SS contains only one RAM, a new initialization is always necessary when changing the battery - the transmitter S usually requires a battery - before this System can be operated normally.
- the transmitter S - at least in addition to a RAM - also contains a ROM, for example an EEPROM, as the transmitter memory SS, reinitialization when changing the battery can also be avoided.
- the functional reliability of the transmitter-receiver system during the (re) initialization can be increased by adding a more or less long additional code ZC to the original code UC, which indicates the initialization or re-initialization - e.g. only six or perhaps well over forty specific additional bits ZC - has been added in order to inform the receiver that an original code UC is now being transmitted.
- This additional code ZC can e.g. 3 are broadcast immediately before the original code UC.
- This additional code ZC mentioned above can also be used on its own, e.g. In order to increase security against unauthorized (re) initializations and thus against theft, the relevant receiver and sender of the system as well, differing from system to system, but then fixed additional code ZC for the system in question, e.g. by the dealer.
- This individual additional code ZC which is initially permanently assigned to the system, allows later to reinitialize the system by means of the random generator in the manner according to the invention, with strangers no longer forbidden to initialize the system with their third-party transmitters, due to the lack of identity of their additional code ZC, and then can also operate as it were in normal operation.
- the outlay on components can also be reduced in this way - especially if, for other reasons, a display
- a power-saving LCD display is attached to the transmitter, for example to indicate its operational readiness, - that the clock generator CL and the display L are attached in the transmitter S, cf. FIG. 2, and that the display L specifies the cycle with which the fragments B are to be generated in stages.
- the clock generator CL and the display EL are mounted in the receiver E and the display EL specifies the cycle with which a master code fragment B is to be removed in stages by actuating the transmitter control element (s) SB in question is to be sent, the weight and the effort for the attachment of a display in the transmitter S can be avoided and, in addition, a display on the receiver, which is often attached for other reasons, for example share the display of an anti-theft alarm system.
- the menu navigation performed by the receiver E instead of the transmitter S then enables the person who carries out the (re) initialization to make it very small that the system is inadvertently (re) initialized, e.g.
- control elements SB are accidentally operated by children according to a rhythm which is specified by the display / by the lamp L of the transmitter S. Unintentional (re) initialization of the system is avoided particularly reliably if the receiver E is only ready to receive the original code UC if the operator in question also took another measure. He can e.g. to do this, also insert the ignition key in the ignition lock and have to turn it to a specific position so that the receiver E is even ready to receive the original code UC.
- a transmitter control element SB is used for sending out the original code UC - and / or for finally storing the original code UC or start code SC in a transmitter memory SS - is to be actuated, a mini button SB to be actuated only with a pointed object and which is embedded in the transmitter housing S.
- the transmitter S can contain a clock and / or a counter ZR in order to count the total duration and / or the number of repeated transmissions of the original code UC or its fragments B.
- the clock and / or the counter ZR can prevent the transmissions as soon as a maximum time and / or maximum number of transmissions has been exceeded. This further increases security against unauthorized eavesdropping on the original code, because the broadcasting must be ended as soon as the original code has been broadcast completely or sufficiently often.
- the security against unauthorized eavesdropping can be increased even further if the transmitter S, after a corresponding actuation of at least one of its transmitter operating elements SB, allows further transmission of the original code UC to be prevented.
- the transmitter S and the receiver E then only use the previously or previously valid original code UC or start code SC, or a continuation code SI derived therefrom, for the next codes SI to be transmitted in normal operation for actuating the device ST , as far as such a master code UC or start code SC was previously generated in it or entered into it.
- This further increases the security against faulty (re) initializations and, above all, enables faultless continued operation of the transmitter-receiver system even after faulty re-initializations.
- the transmitter S contains a conversion unit ⁇ P, by means of which the transmitter S encrypts the original code UC or its fragments B - possibly together with the additional code ZC - in order to transmit the original code UC in encrypted form
- the receiver E contains a conversion unit ⁇ P, by means of which the receiver E forms the unencrypted original code UC or the start code SC from the received coded signal SI.
- the transmitter S and the receiver E each contain an arithmetic unit ⁇ P which, in normal operation, calculates the next continuation code SI to be transmitted from case to case according to one of several algorithms that are possible in principle, the calculated code SI in each case being one is the permissible code quantity SI, and if, in addition, the original code UC contains not only a specification of the start code SC to be used in the future, but also a specification of the alternative of the algorithm to be used in the future, an unauthorized third party will receive the simulation or the calculation or the guessing of justifying continuation codes SI further complicates.
- this unit rapidly counts again and again from zero to a high number - for example up to the number 255, and it repeats this count as often and until a corresponding, non-rhythmic one Actual actuation - for example by timely releasing - of the relevant control element (s) the counting result then achieved is generated as a fragment B of the original code UC or start code SC.
- the duration of a single counting cycle lasting from zero to zero is at most one tenth of a second, and if the maximum duration of the relevant time period and thus the maximum duration permitted for the generation of a fragment B and thus for the corresponding actuation of at least one operating element SB concerned is, at most ten seconds, the duration of the (re) initialization process can be shortened in a particularly user-friendly manner without risking that the generated fragment B is no longer a very arbitrary random number.
- a further development of the invention also uses two different power levels for transmitting the codes, but in other operating cases:
- the unidirectional (re) Initialize (I) uses a much lower power level than during normal operation.
- normal operation that is to say to transmit the code SI, for example in order to actuate the door lock of the motor vehicle - for example when transmitting a continuation code SI when an alternating code is used - a relatively high power is thus used in the further development according to the invention for transmitting the code SI.
- the object 0 is a motor vehicle and if the transmitter-receiver system is a system with an electronic key S and with a receiver E attached in or on the motor vehicle 0, in normal operation, e.g. to open and close the vehicle door, transmit the codes SI with such high power that these actuations of the door locks are possible even from a greater distance away from the car.
- the system is to be (re) initialized, the original code UC, or at least parts / fragments of this original code UC, are only transmitted with relatively little power, namely with so little power that an unauthorized third party from a greater distance can no longer listen to these weak code signals.
- the transmission power of the transmitter S, as well as the sensitivity of the receiver E, can be reduced with particularly little effort by placing one in the transmitter S and / or in the receiver E in series with the transmitting element SE or in series with the receiving element EE only during the ( Re-) initializing not bridged resistance - e.g. a lamp L indicating this operating mode
- the transmission power can be reduced ( additionally or by itself) during (re) initialization in that the transmitter element SE in normal operation has a power stage or power stage with relatively high power, ie relatively high operating current is operated, but this transmission element SE is operated in (re) initialization mode with the relatively low operating current of the display L attached to the transmitter, for example an LED display L.
- a transmitter-receiver system in which the transmitter S is an electronic vehicle key S, and in which the receiver E is installed in or on the vehicle 0, in which the receiver element EE of the receiver E is additionally installed in the interior of the vehicle 0, it is particularly advantageous to reduce the transmission power so much during the (re) initialization, that is to say for the transmission of the code UC or for the transfer of fragments of this code UC, that With this power when the vehicle 0 is locked, (re) initialization from outside the locked vehicle 0 is no longer possible.
- the (re) initialization is therefore only possible if the transmission element SE of the electronic key S is kept close enough to the reception element EE of the receiver E inside the vehicle 0. As a result, the security against unauthorized listening by third parties during initialization is particularly high.
- a transmitter S can also transmit its original code UC to several receivers E for (re) initializing these receivers E.
- a single electronic key S / transmitter S can then be used simultaneously for several locking mechanisms.
- the same key can then e.g. the receiver E in a motor vehicle 0, another receiver E on a garage door (0), and another receiver e.g. (Re) initialize at a front door, according to which all these locking mechanisms can be operated remotely with the same key - in principle with the same security and simplicity as if only a single receiver E were used.
- transmitters S can also have their respective current, individually assigned original code UC to a single receiver E for (re) initialization of this receiver E.
- receiver E can also additionally store the original codes UC (or data derived therefrom) in its receiver memory ES.
- Each transmitter S (re) initializes and then controls the receiver E independently of the other transmitters S. It can also be provided that the above-mentioned additional code ZC must then be identical for all transmitters S so that no further transmitters S from unauthorized persons can (re) initialize the recipient E.
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- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
- Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE3916175 | 1989-05-18 | ||
DE3916175 | 1989-05-18 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP0472528A1 true EP0472528A1 (de) | 1992-03-04 |
EP0472528B1 EP0472528B1 (de) | 1994-02-09 |
Family
ID=6380878
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP90905435A Expired - Lifetime EP0472528B1 (de) | 1989-05-18 | 1990-04-06 | Sender-empfänger-system |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US5365225A (de) |
EP (1) | EP0472528B1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP2875019B2 (de) |
AU (1) | AU5358190A (de) |
DE (1) | DE59004565D1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO1990014484A1 (de) |
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- 1990-04-06 US US07/773,635 patent/US5365225A/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1990-04-06 WO PCT/DE1990/000276 patent/WO1990014484A1/de active IP Right Grant
- 1990-04-06 EP EP90905435A patent/EP0472528B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1990-04-06 JP JP2505307A patent/JP2875019B2/ja not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1990-04-06 AU AU53581/90A patent/AU5358190A/en not_active Abandoned
- 1990-04-06 DE DE90905435T patent/DE59004565D1/de not_active Expired - Fee Related
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US5365225A (en) | 1994-11-15 |
JP2875019B2 (ja) | 1999-03-24 |
AU5358190A (en) | 1990-12-18 |
DE59004565D1 (de) | 1994-03-24 |
JPH04505193A (ja) | 1992-09-10 |
WO1990014484A1 (de) | 1990-11-29 |
EP0472528B1 (de) | 1994-02-09 |
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