EP3931060A1 - Sicherheitssystem und verfahren zum betreiben eines sicherheitssystems - Google Patents
Sicherheitssystem und verfahren zum betreiben eines sicherheitssystemsInfo
- Publication number
- EP3931060A1 EP3931060A1 EP20704505.5A EP20704505A EP3931060A1 EP 3931060 A1 EP3931060 A1 EP 3931060A1 EP 20704505 A EP20704505 A EP 20704505A EP 3931060 A1 EP3931060 A1 EP 3931060A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- information
- channels
- data
- security system
- test
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60L—PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; SUPPLYING ELECTRIC POWER FOR AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES IN GENERAL; MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; MONITORING OPERATING VARIABLES OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRIC SAFETY DEVICES FOR ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES
- B60L3/00—Electric devices on electrically-propelled vehicles for safety purposes; Monitoring operating variables, e.g. speed, deceleration or energy consumption
- B60L3/0092—Electric devices on electrically-propelled vehicles for safety purposes; Monitoring operating variables, e.g. speed, deceleration or energy consumption with use of redundant elements for safety purposes
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60L—PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; SUPPLYING ELECTRIC POWER FOR AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES IN GENERAL; MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; MONITORING OPERATING VARIABLES OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRIC SAFETY DEVICES FOR ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES
- B60L3/00—Electric devices on electrically-propelled vehicles for safety purposes; Monitoring operating variables, e.g. speed, deceleration or energy consumption
- B60L3/0023—Detecting, eliminating, remedying or compensating for drive train abnormalities, e.g. failures within the drive train
- B60L3/0038—Detecting, eliminating, remedying or compensating for drive train abnormalities, e.g. failures within the drive train relating to sensors
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60L—PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; SUPPLYING ELECTRIC POWER FOR AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES IN GENERAL; MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; MONITORING OPERATING VARIABLES OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRIC SAFETY DEVICES FOR ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES
- B60L3/00—Electric devices on electrically-propelled vehicles for safety purposes; Monitoring operating variables, e.g. speed, deceleration or energy consumption
- B60L3/0023—Detecting, eliminating, remedying or compensating for drive train abnormalities, e.g. failures within the drive train
- B60L3/0084—Detecting, eliminating, remedying or compensating for drive train abnormalities, e.g. failures within the drive train relating to control modules
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/22—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received using redundant apparatus to increase reliability
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60L—PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; SUPPLYING ELECTRIC POWER FOR AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES IN GENERAL; MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; MONITORING OPERATING VARIABLES OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRIC SAFETY DEVICES FOR ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES
- B60L2260/00—Operating Modes
- B60L2260/20—Drive modes; Transition between modes
- B60L2260/32—Auto pilot mode
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for operating a security system.
- the invention also relates to a security system.
- the invention also relates to a use of a security system.
- the invention also relates to a computer program product.
- Modern security systems especially for automation systems of mobile and especially automotive applications, require real-time capable, redundant data streams.
- 3D models are continuously synchronized with the real environment using complex sensors such as ⁇ DAR and radar sensors, etc.
- a time delay of approx. 100 ms means at a speed of approx. 100 km / h over 3 m deviation in the model from reality. This means more than the width of a street and can already cause a collision with oncoming traffic in a curve.
- the data streams mentioned In order to discover electronic errors and also to control and correct these errors or to ensure switching to redundant functions, the data streams mentioned must be synchronized so that a timely comparison can take place in the data streams.
- a function is also a chain of various sub-functions that produce intermediate results that then form the basis for further processing. If the interim results are not available in good time or if incorrect information is processed further, massive system errors can result, which can endanger people in safety-relevant systems. Particularly when data is recorded (e.g. by sensors), this data must be checked for correctness and timeliness before it is passed on for processing. Processing with different algorithms also requires a time and content check before an actuator is controlled with the corresponding information.
- DE 100 32 216 A1 discloses a safety system in a motor vehicle and a method in which a main computer controls and diagnoses the sensor and configuration inputs.
- the object is achieved according to a first aspect with a method for operating a security system, comprising the steps:
- the proposed method does not require any complex actions such as idle modes, synchronization steps, etc., as provided in preemptive real-time systems.
- the information can be compared in an advantageous manner at other times at which it was generated.
- the computing capacities of the channels can be used to advantage in the best possible way.
- the object is achieved with a security system, having: two computer devices for the independent generation of information from supplied data in at least two channels, with an associated test key being generated from the information from the at least two channels; and
- test device to which the information from the at least two channels can be fed;
- the information of the at least two channels can be made usable in a defined manner depending on the comparison by means of the test device.
- An advantageous development of the method provides that the generation of the information from the data and the generation of the test key from the information are carried out at defined times. As a result, a multi-stage method is provided which checks the information at different times.
- Another advantageous development of the method provides that in the event of an error in one channel, the information from the other channel is used.
- a security level of the security system is advantageously increased in this way.
- test device uses at least one defined criterion to decide which information can be discarded from which channel. This makes it possible to decide when information is used or when it is discarded as invalid.
- Another advantageous development of the method provides that the information is sent to a vehicle via wireless communication.
- An application is advantageously supported in which, for example, instructions are sent to an automated vehicle (for example in a parking garage) using WiFi.
- Another advantageous development of the method provides that the data are provided by a sensor device. This enables applications of the method that process the sensor data in real time as far as possible.
- Disclosed method features result analogously from corresponding disclosed device features and vice versa. This means in particular that features, technical advantages and statements relating to the method result in an analogous manner from corresponding statements, features and advantages relating to the security system, and vice versa.
- Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a first embodiment of a proposed security system
- Fig. 2 is a block diagram of a further embodiment of a proposed security system.
- Fig. 3 is an illustration of a proposed method for operating ben a security system.
- automated vehicle is used synonymously in the meanings fully automated vehicle, partially automated vehicle, fully autonomous vehicle and partially autonomous vehicle.
- a core idea of the invention is the provision of a monitoring architecture, which in several levels different temporal aspects in a re- redundant safety system is guaranteed without reducing the performance of the redundant system.
- FIG. 1 shows a basic block diagram of a first embodiment of a proposed security system 100.
- One recognizes a first computer device 10 with a first information device 11a to which data D is supplied by a sensor device 1.
- Information 11 is generated from the data D by means of the information device 11a.
- the information 11 is fed to a first encryption device 12a, from which it generates a first verification key S1.
- the security system 100 also has a second computer device 20 to which the data D of the sensor device 1 are also fed. Using a second information device 21a, information 11 is generated from the data D, which information 11 is fed to a second encryption device 22a, from which the second encryption device 22a generates a second test key S2.
- test device 30 which is preferably designed as a safety PLC. It is thus possible for the test device 30 to compare the information 11 independently of the time at which the information 11 was generated by means of the information devices 11a, 12a and to compare them according to defined criteria, e.g. to check for correctness and / or plausibility.
- the two computer devices 10, 20, which may be designed physically differently, can use their respective optimal resources to provide the information 11 without, for example, hindering or using idle, synchronization and security mechanisms to meet real-time requirements. to be slowed down.
- An optimal use the computing power of the two computer devices 10, 20 is advantageously supported in this way.
- the testing device 30 can issue an instruction wirelessly or wired to a downstream device (for example a switching device, not shown) which contain instructions for an automated vehicle (not shown).
- a downstream device for example a switching device, not shown
- an automated vehicle not shown
- the security system 100 provides a redundant signal chain in two channels with time monitoring.
- Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of a second embodiment of the pre-suppression genes security system 100. It can be seen several times t0 ... tn, to de NEN the information li ... l n defined processed from the data D, and to which associated test key S1 .. . Sn from the information li ... l n are generated. Provision is made here to determine the first test key S1 at time to, for example after the sensor data acquisition, a second test key S2 at time h after a logical processing of algorithms and a third test key S3 at time t2 after calculating the actuator variables.
- test device 30 checks whether the respective intermediate status data or information has arrived at the test point, ie at the test device 30, correctly and in good time. If this is the case in each of the two redundant channels, the data stream is reported by the testing device 30 as correct in terms of time and content.
- the number of times shown and the work carried out at these times operations are only exempla driven and that in practice, other, more time can be provided points, in particular essential to which other information li ... l n processed from the data D and corresponding test key generated.
- the data need not necessarily come from a sensor device 1, but can be provided by other devices. Since the data streams in the two channels of the security system 100 are usually at different speeds due to the different computer devices 10, 20, the information from the “guard” in the form of the test device 30 is only available when the redundant data stream also has its test key has reported. Since the test device 30 only tests the test keys S1 ... Sn, the test can advantageously be carried out very quickly. As long as the check is positive, the first data stream of the first channel, for example, can always be used to be processed in the next level. The risk, however, is that the checking device 30 detects an error and has to discard the information in the further processing chain.
- the faulty data stream is blocked before the last functional element, which generally means the activation of the actuator (not shown). However, it only switches off the faulty data stream on the actuator and not the data stream recognized as correct, so there may be a delay in the data stream, but this only relates to the time that the second data stream lags behind the faulty one. With homogeneous redundancy, the times are generally very short.
- the mentioned components of the security system 100 can e.g. be functionally connected to one another via a suitable network connection (e.g. Ethernet).
- a suitable network connection e.g. Ethernet
- a major advantage of the proposed solution is the significantly reduced effort involved in synchronizing the data stream, which increases the performance ability of the proposed safety system 100 approximately reaches values of a non-safety-relevant system in a single-channel implementation.
- the redundancy does not require a second, independent software development, since the nominal function of providing information from the data D can be implemented identically in both paths.
- Another advantage of the proposed method is that errors only lead to a failure of one channel, the time delay can be viewed as low with homogeneous relevance.
- Fig. 3 shows a basic sequence of an embodiment of the proposed method.
- a step 200 data D is supplied to at least two channels.
- a step 210 information li ... l n is generated from the data D in the at least two channels.
- a test key S1... Sn is generated from the information I in the at least two channels.
- a step 230 the information li ... l n and the test key S1 ... Sn of the two channels are supplied to a test device 30.
- the information is used in a defined manner as a function of the comparison of the test keys S1... Sn.
- the proposed method can advantageously be used in a security system for automated parking and / or in an urban environment.
- the proposed method can advantageously be implemented in the form of a software program with suitable program code means which runs on the security system 100 with its components. A simple adaptability of the method is possible in this way.
- the person skilled in the art will modify the features of the invention in a suitable manner and / or combine them with one another without departing from the essence of the invention.
- the number of channels in the security system is also greater than two.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
- Sustainable Development (AREA)
- Sustainable Energy (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Transportation (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
- Traffic Control Systems (AREA)
- Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
- Alarm Systems (AREA)
- Control Of Driving Devices And Active Controlling Of Vehicle (AREA)
- Detection And Prevention Of Errors In Transmission (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102019202527.7A DE102019202527A1 (de) | 2019-02-25 | 2019-02-25 | Sicherheitssystem und Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Sicherheitssystems |
PCT/EP2020/053092 WO2020173682A1 (de) | 2019-02-25 | 2020-02-07 | Sicherheitssystem und verfahren zum betreiben eines sicherheitssystems |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP3931060A1 true EP3931060A1 (de) | 2022-01-05 |
Family
ID=69528835
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP20704505.5A Pending EP3931060A1 (de) | 2019-02-25 | 2020-02-07 | Sicherheitssystem und verfahren zum betreiben eines sicherheitssystems |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20220009353A1 (de) |
EP (1) | EP3931060A1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP7206410B2 (de) |
CN (1) | CN113474230B (de) |
DE (1) | DE102019202527A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2020173682A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102020201140A1 (de) | 2020-01-30 | 2021-08-05 | Robert Bosch Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Automatisieren einer Fahrfunktion |
CN112134729B (zh) * | 2020-09-02 | 2022-11-04 | 上海科技大学 | 一种基于分治的程序高阶功耗侧信道安全性的证明方法 |
DE102021208459B4 (de) | 2021-08-04 | 2023-05-25 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren zur authentischen Datenübertragung zwischen Steuergeräten eines Fahrzeugs, Anordnung mit Steuergeräten, Computerprogramm und Fahrzeug |
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DE2017853C3 (de) * | 1970-04-14 | 1975-12-11 | Standard Elektrik Lorenz Ag, 7000 Stuttgart | Steuerverfahren zur Sicherung der Informationsverarbeitung und -Übertragung |
DE59607113D1 (de) * | 1995-04-13 | 2001-07-26 | Siemens Schweiz Ag Zuerich | Datenübertragungsverfahren und Vorrichtung |
JP2000092033A (ja) | 1998-09-14 | 2000-03-31 | Nec Corp | 高速データ送受信方式 |
DE10032216A1 (de) * | 2000-07-03 | 2002-01-24 | Siemens Ag | Sicherheitssystem in einem Kraftfahrzeug und Verfahren |
JP4223909B2 (ja) * | 2003-09-24 | 2009-02-12 | 三菱電機株式会社 | 車載電子制御装置 |
DE102008008555B4 (de) | 2007-02-21 | 2018-06-28 | Continental Teves Ag & Co. Ohg | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Minimieren von Gefahrensituationen bei Fahrzeugen |
CN103141055A (zh) * | 2011-01-25 | 2013-06-05 | 三洋电机株式会社 | 通信装置 |
DE102013206661A1 (de) * | 2013-04-15 | 2014-10-16 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Kommunikationsverfahren zum Übertragen von Nutzdaten sowie entsprechendes Kommunikationssystem |
JP6190404B2 (ja) | 2014-06-05 | 2017-08-30 | Kddi株式会社 | 受信ノード、メッセージ受信方法およびコンピュータプログラム |
US10298271B2 (en) * | 2015-02-03 | 2019-05-21 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Method and apparatus for providing a joint error correction code for a combined data frame comprising first data of a first data channel and second data of a second data channel and sensor system |
DE102015219933A1 (de) * | 2015-05-07 | 2016-11-10 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren zur Plausibilisierung von Messwerten eines Mobilgeräts |
US9741183B2 (en) | 2015-11-10 | 2017-08-22 | Veniam, Inc | Systems and methods for optimizing data gathering in a network of moving things |
DE102016200964A1 (de) * | 2016-01-25 | 2017-07-27 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren zur Informationsübertragung in einem Kommunikationsnetz |
DE102016201067A1 (de) * | 2016-01-26 | 2017-07-27 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Anordnung zur Kommunikation zwischen einem Fahrzeug und einem automatisierten Parksystem |
JP2018157463A (ja) * | 2017-03-21 | 2018-10-04 | オムロンオートモーティブエレクトロニクス株式会社 | 車載通信システム、通信管理装置、車両制御装置 |
CN115795435A (zh) | 2017-05-15 | 2023-03-14 | 松下电器(美国)知识产权公司 | 验证方法、验证装置和计算机可读取记录介质 |
DE102017210151A1 (de) * | 2017-06-19 | 2018-12-20 | Zf Friedrichshafen Ag | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zur Ansteuerung eines Fahrzeugmoduls in Abhängigkeit eines Zustandssignals |
DE102017210156B4 (de) * | 2017-06-19 | 2021-07-22 | Zf Friedrichshafen Ag | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Ansteuern eines Fahrzeugmoduls |
JP6838211B2 (ja) | 2017-07-31 | 2021-03-03 | 日立Astemo株式会社 | 自律運転制御装置、自律移動車及び自律移動車制御システム |
US10554397B2 (en) * | 2017-09-27 | 2020-02-04 | The Boeing Company | Quantum-based data encryption |
CN108183779B (zh) * | 2017-12-22 | 2021-05-11 | 中国铁道科学研究院通信信号研究所 | 一种铁路信号ctc/tdcs***的双通道冗余数据传输处理方法 |
US10782684B2 (en) * | 2018-04-20 | 2020-09-22 | Lyft, Inc. | Secure communication between vehicle components via bus guardians |
US10243732B1 (en) * | 2018-06-27 | 2019-03-26 | Karamba Security | Cryptographic key management for end-to-end communication security |
-
2019
- 2019-02-25 DE DE102019202527.7A patent/DE102019202527A1/de active Pending
-
2020
- 2020-02-07 CN CN202080016551.0A patent/CN113474230B/zh active Active
- 2020-02-07 WO PCT/EP2020/053092 patent/WO2020173682A1/de unknown
- 2020-02-07 JP JP2021549495A patent/JP7206410B2/ja active Active
- 2020-02-07 EP EP20704505.5A patent/EP3931060A1/de active Pending
- 2020-02-07 US US17/414,566 patent/US20220009353A1/en active Pending
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
WO2020173682A1 (de) | 2020-09-03 |
US20220009353A1 (en) | 2022-01-13 |
CN113474230A (zh) | 2021-10-01 |
JP2022521938A (ja) | 2022-04-13 |
JP7206410B2 (ja) | 2023-01-17 |
CN113474230B (zh) | 2024-07-09 |
DE102019202527A1 (de) | 2020-08-27 |
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