CN109525327B - Free space quantum secure direct communication method with preset threshold selected in real time - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a free space quantum secure direct communication method with a preset threshold value selected in real time.A sender of communication prepares N pairs of Bell state photon pulses, and sends one of the Bell state photon pulses to a receiver, the receiver randomly selects a part of photons to measure and judge whether an eavesdropper exists, then the sender randomly selects a part of photons as a detection state to perform unitary transformation, then the receiver performs measurement to evaluate the error rate, and finally, the receiver measures the rest coded Bell state and acquires information. The invention has lower quantum bit error rate and higher signal-to-noise ratio.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a free space quantum secure direct communication method with a preset threshold value selected in real time, and belongs to the technical field of quantum secure direct communication technology and quantum mobile communication.
Background
With the construction of energy internet, power system information and communication security are now receiving more and more attention. The unconditional security of quantum communication protocols has attracted attention as compared to traditional communication protocols. There are different forms of quantum communication, such as quantum key distribution, quantum secret sharing, quantum direct secure communication, etc. In these quantum communication protocols, Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) sends secret messages directly over a quantum channel without establishing a private key session. In this protocol, the transmitter and receiver first share a prearranged pair of entangled photons, thereby establishing a communication channel. After the receiver has obtained one photon in the pair, the transmitter operates with four unitary operations I, σz,σx,σiyEncodes the remaining photons, which correspond to encoded information 00,01,10 and 11, respectively. Finally, after the receiver receives another photon, the information is decoded by making a bell state measurement of the photon.
Although QSDC protocols are unconditionally secure in theory, background light and detector noise are inevitable sources of Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) in free space, which limits the range of applications for quantum communication protocols. The perturbation is usually fluctuating and can be described by a probability distribution (called the probability distribution of the transmission coefficients, PDTC),
where p is the probability density, η is the transmittance, η0And σ is the mean and variance. The distribution is formed by two parameters eta0And σ determination, which are inherent to the channel itself,. eta0Is an expected atmospheric transmission, typically 10-3To 10-4(i.e. for a 100km channel, corresponding to a loss of 30-40 dB), whereas σ is typically between 0 and 1, the greater the amount of turbulence, the greater the resistance, under the effect of the amount of turbulence. In this case, the intensity of some optical signals arriving at the far end may be weak, which in turn results in a high QBER selected in the coding process, and the most efficient coding rate cannot be achieved.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to overcome the drawbacks of the prior art by proposing a free space quantum secure direct communication method with a preset threshold value selected in real time, the transmitter transmitting all photons in pulses and the remote receiving of these pulses in response to the optical threshold value calculated by the P-RTS method.
In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
a free space quantum secure direct communication method with a preset threshold value selected in real time comprises the following steps:
1) transmitter A and receiver B measure the expected eta of atmospheric transmission0And its standard deviation σ; then calculating to obtain a preset threshold eta determined by atmospheric conditionsT；
2) Sender A uses two single photon light sources to emit pulses on a micro-photon operation platform to prepare N pairs of Bell states
Then A sends the first pulse in each Bell state to B through free space; wherein, | H>And | V>Respectively representing horizontally polarized and vertically polarized photons;
3) b receiving the pulse and examining the photon passing intensity eta through free space, if eta>ηTIf not, B gives up the received photons and informs A to resend;
4) b, randomly selecting m photons for measurement, and informing A of the photon position and the measurement result, wherein m is less than N;
5) a measures the corresponding photons in the selected m Bell states according to the measurement result published by B, and compares the photons with the measurement result of B; if the measurement results are the same, the communication process is proved to have no eavesdropper, the following steps are continued, otherwise, the eavesdropper is proved to exist, and the communication is stopped;
6) in the rest photons, A randomly selects k photons as detection state, and the rest as message state, and randomly selects unitary transformation I, sigmaz,σx,σiyActs on each detection state, where k<N-m; then, A uses I, σ, respectivelyz,σx,σiyTo encode messages 00,01,10, and 11 into message states; after the coding is finished, A sends the pulse emitted by the other photon light source in all Bell states to B;
7) b receives another photon pulse in Bell state, A tells B the position of the detection state and the selected unitary transformation operation;
8) b, measuring the detection state, then evaluating the error rate, if the error rate is less than the threshold value, measuring each message state and acquiring information, otherwise, Bob considers that an eavesdropper exists and terminates the communication.
The aforementioned predetermined threshold ηTThe calculation is as follows:
wherein, Y0As dark/background count rate of the detector, eT＝11％，edBased on the deviation, ηdIs the detector efficiency.
In the step 2), the Bell state generation process is as follows: two single-photon light sources both emit single-photon pulses with the state of | H ≧ under operation
And
change into Bell state
The two photon pulse sequences are respectively stored in a photon memory.
In the aforementioned step 3), the photon passing intensity η is the ratio of the number of photons passing through the free space to the total number of transmitted photons.
In the step 3), B receives the pulse and stores the photons in the quantum memory in sequence according to the time sequence, and checks that the empty qubit in the quantum memory is a lost photon.
In the foregoing step 4), B is σx-σzThe selected photons are measured.
In the aforementioned step 4), destructive measurement is performed on m photons, and the measurement is not used.
In the aforementioned step 8), the threshold is set by a preset threshold ηTThe transmission in free space and the photon frequency.
The invention achieves the following beneficial effects:
(1) the invention can greatly reduce the data storage capacity in the experiment and save the computing resources;
(2) the invention carries out threshold processing in post-processing without additional resources, thus being easier to be deployed in the existing infrastructure;
(3) the invention has lower quantum bit error rate and higher signal-to-noise ratio.
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Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a free space quantum secure direct communication method based on a preset threshold real-time selection method (P-RTS) according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below. The following examples are only for illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention more clearly, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereby.
The invention provides a free space quantum secure direct communication method based on a preset threshold real-time selection method (P-RTS), wherein the assumption is that: alice and Bob use Bell states
The method is used as an information carrier for communication, wherein | H > and | V > respectively represent horizontally polarized photons and vertically polarized photons, and the method comprises the following specific steps:
the method comprises the following steps: expected eta for sender Alice and receiver Bob to measure atmospheric transmission rate0And its standard deviation σ; then calculating to obtain a preset threshold eta determined by atmospheric conditionsT。
Step two: alice uses a single photon light source to emit pulses to prepare N pairs of Bell states on a micro-photon operation platform
|H>And | V>Representing horizontally polarized and vertically polarized photons, respectively. In operation, Alice sends the first pulse in each Bell state to Bob through free space. Bob receives the pulse and checks the photon passing intensity eta passing through the free space, and stores the photons into the quantum memory in sequence according to time sequence, and if the photons should arrive but not be received at a certain time, the loss of the photons is shown, and the quantum bit (qubit) bit of the memory is empty. The photon passing intensity η in the present invention is the ratio of the number of photons passing through free space to the total number of photons sent. If eta>ηTThen check the empty qubits in memory to determine which photons were lost and continue execution of the protocol, else Bob gives up the received photons and notifies Alice to resend. .
Step three: alice and Bob perform channel security detection. Bob randomly selects m photons to use σx-σzThe basis takes measurements and tells Alice the photon locations and measurements. And measuring the corresponding photons in the selected m Bell states by Alice according to the measurement result published by Bob, and comparing the measured photons with the measurement result of Bob. If the measurement results are the same, the communication process is proved to have no eavesdropper, and the protocol continues, otherwise, the communication process is proved to have the eavesdropper, and the protocol is terminated.
Step four: among the rest photons, Alice randomly selects k photons as detection states, and the rest photons are message states, and randomly selects a unitary transformation I, sigmaz,σx,σiyActing on each detection state.
Then, Alice uses I, σ, respectivelyz,σx,σiyTo encode messages 00,01,10 and 11 into message states.
Upon completion of the encoding, Alice sends another photon in all Bell states to Bob.
Step five: bob receives another photon in the Bell state and Alice tells Bob the position of the detected state and the selected unitary transform operation. Bob measures the detection state to evaluate the error rate, and if the error rate is less than a threshold, then σ is used for each message statex-σzThe base measures and obtains the information, otherwise Bob considers that there is an eavesdropper, and the protocol terminates.
The detailed steps of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to fig. 1, wherein each shape in fig. 1 represents a Bell state, and the shapes of circle, triangle, square, and hexagon represent transmission | φ respectively+>、|φ-＞、|ψ+＞、|ψ-Rhombus represents missing states and pentagonal represents states that have been used for detection.
First, Alice and Bob need to obtain channel information in advance, including the desired η for the atmospheric transmission rate0And its standard deviation sigma, if no measured parameter is available, the transmission rate eta can be calculated using n photons emitted by Alice to Bob, who measures the number of photons n' reaching the receiving endiThis is done m times in total, and can be calculated
Calculating a preset threshold η using the obtained channel informationT. The calculation is as follows:
has a Shor-Preskell rate R of 1-2h2[QBER]And has RS-P＝(Y0+ηsys)(1-2h2(e(ηsys)))，
Wherein the dark count/background count rate of the detector is Y0Eta is the free space photon passing intensity and the detector efficiency is etadTotal system transmission of ηsys＝ηηdThe base deviation isedQBER is
And R isS-P(η) has unique properties for all η<ηTWhen R isS-P(η) is 0 and η ≧ ηTWhen R isS-P(eta) is not less than 0. To thus obtain
Wherein eT11% is e (η)sys) The Shor-Prekill rate of. Substituting each numerical value into a preset threshold eta which can be calculatedTUsing this preset threshold, quantum communication can be started. Here, the preset threshold η is not assumedT＝0.5。
As shown in column a of FIG. 1, a sender Alice prepares 10 pairs of Bell states using two single photon light sources Laser1 and Laser2
Both Laser1 and Laser2 have an emission state of | H>In the passing operation of single photon pulses of
And
change into Bell state
Two-beam photon pulse sequence ScAnd SmRespectively entering into a storage photon memory.
Alice sends a sequence S of photon pulses, shown in column b of FIG. 1c(10-part of Bell State) is sent to Bob over the atmospheric channel, and Bob receives ScChecking the photon passing intensity (i.e. the ratio of the number of passing photons to the total number of transmitted photons) through the atmospheric channel, Bob receives a total of 8 photons, and the channel photon passing intensity η is 0.8>ηTIt was confirmed that the 4 th and 8 th photons were lost due to the satisfactionThe threshold requires that the protocol continue to be executed.
As shown in column c of FIG. 1, Alice and Bob perform channel security detection, and with the security features possessed by the Bell states, Bob randomly selects two photons using σx-σzBased on the measurement, Bob finally selects the 3 rd pair and the 7 th pair of photons for channel safety monitoring, and does not assume that the measured states are | V > and | H%>. Bob tells Alice the photon location and measurement. And measuring corresponding photons in the two selected pairs of Bell states by Alice according to the measurement result published by Bob, and comparing the measured photons with the result of Bob. If the measurement is | V respectively as Bob does>And | H>If not, the protocol is terminated. For the measured Bell state, if destructive measurement is used, the Bell state is invalidated and information is not transmitted, otherwise, the Bell state is used continuously. Destructive measurements are considered to be used in the present invention and will not be used after one measurement of the Bell state.
Of the remaining photons, Alice randomly selects 2 photons as the detection state and the rest as the message state, as shown in column d of fig. 1. Alice selects the 1 st pair and the 5 th pair of photons as detection states, and Alice transforms I, sigma from unitaryz,σx,σiyOn which one of the respective random selections acts: using sigma for the first pair of photonszConvert it into | phi-Using σ for the fifth pair of photonsxConvert it into | ψ+>; the remaining Bell states have pairs of photons 2, 6, 9, 10 available for transmitting messages.
Here Alice uses I, I, σ, respectively, to transmit the message 00001101iy,σzTo encode the message. After the encoding is completed, Alice sends another photon pulse sequence S of all Bell statesmSent to Bob.
After Bob receives the signal, Alice tells Bob the position of the detection state and the selected unitary operation. Bob measures the detected states to estimate the error rate, and Bob measures the states of the 1 st and 5 th pairs of photons as | φ, respectively->And | ψ+>The error rate of the detection state is the ratio of the error bits after the measurement of the detection state, where0, less than the threshold, communication continues. In practical environment, the error rate is not 0 generally, and the setting of the threshold value also needs to be selected according to the practical application environment, not only with the preset threshold value ηTIt also relates to the transmission in free space, photon frequency.
Then, Alice starts to measure each message state and obtains information, wherein 2 nd, 6 th and 9 th photon measurement succeeds, and the message 000011 is transmitted successfully; some of the 10 th pair of photons are lost in the second transmission and information is lost, Bob informs that the information needs to be resent.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, several modifications and variations can be made without departing from the technical principle of the present invention, and these modifications and variations should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. A free space quantum secure direct communication method with a preset threshold value selected in real time is characterized by comprising the following steps:
1) transmitter A and receiver B measure the expected eta of atmospheric transmission0And its standard deviation σ; then calculating to obtain a preset threshold eta determined by atmospheric conditionsT(ii) a The preset threshold etaTThe calculation is as follows:
wherein, Y0As dark/background count rate of the detector, eT＝11％，edBased on the deviation, ηdIs the detector efficiency;
2) sender A uses two single photon light sources to emit pulses on a micro-photon operation platform to prepare N pairs of Bell states
Then A sends the first pulse in each Bell state to B through free space; wherein, | H>And | V>Respectively representing horizontally polarized and vertically polarized photons;
3) b receiving the pulse and examining the photon passing intensity eta through free space, if eta>ηTIf not, B gives up the received photons and informs A to resend;
4) b, randomly selecting m photons for measurement, and informing A of the photon position and the measurement result, wherein m is less than N;
5) a measures the corresponding photons in the selected m Bell states according to the measurement result published by B, and compares the photons with the measurement result of B; if the measurement results are the same, the communication process is proved to have no eavesdropper, the following steps are continued, otherwise, the eavesdropper is proved to exist, and the communication is stopped;
6) in the rest photons, A randomly selects k photons as detection state, and the rest as message state, and randomly selects unitary transformation I, sigmaz,σx,σiyActs on each detection state, where k<N-m; then, A uses I, σ, respectivelyz,σx,σiyTo encode messages 00,01,10, and 11 into message states; after the coding is finished, A sends the pulse emitted by the other photon light source in all Bell states to B;
7) b receives another photon pulse in Bell state, A tells B the position of the detection state and the selected unitary transformation operation;
8) and B, measuring the detection state, then evaluating the error rate, if the error rate is less than a threshold value, measuring each message state and acquiring information, otherwise, considering that an eavesdropper exists and terminating the communication.
2. The free space quantum secure direct communication method of real-time selection by preset threshold as claimed in claim 1, wherein in the step 2), the Bell state generation process is: the emission states of the two single photon light sources are | H>In the passing operation of single photon pulses of
And
change into Bell state
The two photon pulse sequences are respectively stored in a photon memory.
3. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the photon passing intensity η in step 3) is the ratio of the number of photons passing through the free space to the total number of photons transmitted.
4. The free space quantum secure direct communication method of claim 1, wherein in step 3), B receives pulses and sequentially stores photons into the quantum memory according to a time sequence, and checks that the empty quantum bit in the quantum memory is a lost photon.
5. The method for free-space quantum secure direct communication with real-time selection of preset threshold value according to claim 1, wherein in the step 4), B uses σx-σzThe selected photons are measured.
6. The method for free-space quantum secure direct communication with real-time selection of preset threshold value according to claim 1, wherein in the step 4), destructive measurement is adopted for m photons, and the method is not used any more.
7. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the threshold in step 8) is defined by a preset threshold η £TThe transmission in free space and the photon frequency.
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| CN111555867A (en) * | 2020-04-10 | 2020-08-18 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Measuring equipment independent quantum key distribution method based on threshold selection technology |
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