WO2010140300A1 - 正当性が保証されたidの生成方法及び正当性保証rfidタグ - Google Patents
正当性が保証されたidの生成方法及び正当性保証rfidタグ Download PDFInfo
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- WO2010140300A1 WO2010140300A1 PCT/JP2010/003173 JP2010003173W WO2010140300A1 WO 2010140300 A1 WO2010140300 A1 WO 2010140300A1 JP 2010003173 W JP2010003173 W JP 2010003173W WO 2010140300 A1 WO2010140300 A1 WO 2010140300A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/73—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K17/00—Methods or arrangements for effecting co-operative working between equipments covered by two or more of main groups G06K1/00 - G06K15/00, e.g. automatic card files incorporating conveying and reading operations
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3252—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
- H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a technology for guaranteeing the legitimacy of ID information and electronic signature generation / verification.
- RFID Radio Frequency IDentification
- RFID is to exchange information from a tag embedded with ID information by short-distance wireless communication using radio waves etc., and from the field of distribution management / traceability of food and goods etc. It is used in various fields such as IC ticket, employee ID card and student ID card.
- the online list confirmation method which is one of the conventional ID information guarantee techniques, increases the load on the network as the number of times of RFID tag verification increases, and is not suitable for large scale implementation.
- the MAC method can also be verified off-line, and can solve problems such as network load in a large-scale implementation. In that case, the RFID reader must have a secret key for verification. In addition, the key is common to the entire system, and once the key is leaked, the security of the entire system is reduced.
- the RFID reader or the like does not have secret information on the verifying side, that is, verifies the legitimacy of the ID information off-line, Guarantee the legitimacy of the information.
- the present invention uses part of information for verifying the legitimacy of the ID information (hereinafter also referred to as a verification value or a signature value as needed) as ID information.
- ID information hereinafter also referred to as a verification value or a signature value as needed
- an RFID tag is provided that includes ID information and information for assuring the legitimacy of the ID information while having a small amount of information as a whole.
- the data size of the RFID tag can be reduced by using a part of the signature value as the ID.
- the data size of the RFID tag can be reduced by using a part of the signature value as the ID.
- FIG. 6 is a workflow diagram illustrating a process related to signature verification in an embodiment.
- the information for verifying the legitimacy of the ID information that is, part of the verification value or the signature value is also used as an ID, to guarantee the legitimacy of the ID information with a small amount of information.
- this embodiment will be described using the Schnore signature, which is a typical electronic signature method. By transforming this Schnore signature using remainder operation, it is possible to realize an electronic signature system with a short signature length.
- ID information etc. is uniquely determined. Specifically, the ID issuing device sets each parameter used for the signature scheme, and the ID issuing device calculates the electronic signature of the present invention for a specific message. Then, a part of the signature value is written in the ID information area of the RFID tag as an ID, and the remaining part is written in the control information area.
- the ID issuing device publishes public information including a public key to each verification device, and each verification device uses the ID information from the ID information area of the RFID tag and the verification information from the control information area as described above, Verify using a public key.
- each verification device uses the ID information from the ID information area of the RFID tag and the verification information from the control information area as described above, Verify using a public key.
- the ID issuing device generates an ID or the like that is also a verification value, uniqueness of the ID is secured in comparison with data issued in the past so that the same ID or the like does not exist.
- the corresponding ID is generated from the serial number so that the generated ID can be managed by the serial number.
- uniqueness of control information is secured as compared with data issued in the past.
- the value of r is reduced by taking the mod of one of the signature values r with a specific value p.
- s which is another signature value, is divided according to the RFID tag capacity and handled.
- FIG. 1 is an overall block diagram to which an embodiment of the present invention is applied.
- the ID issuing device 10 first selects a prime number q of (146 + t) bits. Further, the coefficients a and b of the elliptic curve are selected from the finite field Fq, and the elliptic curve E is set. At this time, the order #E of the elliptic curve is set to l ⁇ n (l ⁇ n), and the base point P is selected from the elliptic curve E so as to have the order n. Also select a prime 62 of 62 bits and a message m.
- d is selected from Zn, and this is used as the secret key of the ID issuing device 10.
- h () be a hash function that converts data of an arbitrary length into a fixed length, and here, output of 256 bits.
- the ID issuing device 10 having these values set up publishes E, q, n, P, p, m, Q, h () as public information.
- the ID issuing device 10 includes the public information 104, the secret key 105, ID history information 106 storing ID information and control information generated in the past, an input / output unit 101 for inputting and outputting data, and an electronic signature
- the cryptographic operation unit 103 for generating and a control unit 102 for controlling them generate signature values for verification using the above parameters, and arrange them in the ID information 311 and control information 320 of FIG. Further, the ID issuing device 10 generates the necessary number of ID information 311 and control information 320 including the signature value, and makes a list. Then, the list is sent to the data embedding device 20.
- the data embedding device 20 is a device that writes necessary information to a medium, and writes the ID information 311 and the control information 320 from the list sent from the ID issuing device 10 to the RFID tag 30.
- the RFID tag 30 is a medium in which the ID information 311 and the control information 320 are written, and transmits the ID information 311 and the control information 320 to the verification device 40 in response to a request from the verification device 40.
- the verification device 40 controls the public information 404 storing the public information set by the ID issuing device 10, the input / output unit 401 that inputs / outputs data, the cryptographic operation unit 403 that performs electronic signature verification, and the like It consists of the control unit 402, reads the ID information and verification value from the RFID tag 30, and uses the public information set by the ID issuing device 10 to determine whether the ID issuing device 10 whose ID is valid is generated Check. If the verification is successful, the relevant ID information is delivered to the business application device 50. The business application device 50 requests or receives an ID, and executes a service based on the received ID. The business application device 50 executes a service for the ID delivered from the verification device 40 as necessary. Further, as shown in FIG.
- the ID issuing device 10 and the verification device 40 respectively include a storage medium 67, a reader 61 for the storage medium 67, and a primary storage device (hereinafter referred to as a memory) 62 using a semiconductor.
- I / O device 63, CPU 64, secondary storage device (hereinafter referred to as storage device) 65 such as a hard disk, and communication device 66 are connected by an internal communication line (hereinafter referred to as bus) 68 such as a bus
- the information processing apparatus 60 can be configured.
- the above-described cryptographic operation units 103 and 403, public information 104 and 404, secret keys 105 and 405, ID history information 106, and control units 102 and 402 are programs stored in the memory 62 or the storage device 65 of the respective devices. Is executed by the CPU 64 to be embodied on the device. These programs and public information 104 and 404, secret keys 105 and 405, and ID history information 106 may be stored in the storage unit 65, or may be stored via the removable storage medium 67 when necessary. It may be introduced into the information processing device 60 or may be introduced from the outside via the communication device 66.
- the RFID refers to exchanging information stored in the RFID tag by short-distance wireless communication using an electromagnetic field, radio waves, etc.
- the embedded ID information is described as 128 bits. Do.
- the size of each data, including ID information, verification value, public information, etc. is an example, and the present invention is not limited by this.
- FIG. 3A is an example of a data format for explaining a conventional method using a MAC.
- the RFID tag 30 includes 128-bit ID information 301 and 48-bit control information 302 used for congestion control.
- the ID information 301 includes a header 1303, a service header 304, an ID 305, a MAC 306, and an EDC 1 (Error Detecting Code) 307.
- the header 1-303 is information for identifying version information and the like
- the service header 304 is information for identifying a usage and the like.
- the ID 305 is a true ID for the RFID tag 30.
- the MAC 306 is a tampering detection code (MAC value) for the header 1-303, the service header 304, and the ID 305.
- MAC value tampering detection code
- EDC1-307 are error detection codes for the header 1-303, the service header 304, the ID 305, and the MAC 306.
- the control information 302 comprises congestion control data (random number) 308 and EDC 2-309.
- EDC 2-309 is an error detection code for the congestion control data (random number) 308.
- the congestion control data (random number) 308 is a random number that determines the order when performing congestion control.
- the signature value 315 is also used as an ID. Then, using the signature values 315, 318 and 321 instead of the MAC 306, the legitimacy of the ID is confirmed.
- the header 1-313 is information for identifying version information and the like
- the service header 314 is information for identifying usage and the like.
- EDC 1-317 is an error detection code for the header 1-313, the service header 314, and the ID / signature value 315.
- a header 2320 is information indicating a version number, a data length and the like
- EDC 2-319 is an error detection code for the header 2-320 and the signature values 318 and 321. (Refer FIG.3 (b)).
- each parameter described above is set (see FIG. 4).
- the lower case of the alphabet is written as a number, and the upper case as a point on the elliptic curve.
- the ID issuing device 10 that has received the ID creation / writing instruction generates a random number k in the cryptographic operation unit 103 (S001, S002).
- the secret information (hereinafter referred to as PW) of the ID issuing device 10 is set, and the output value of the hash function h () with the PW and the serial number as input is taken as the random number k to sequentially generate random numbers.
- the PW may be stored in the secret key 105 and managed as needed.
- the remainder operation is performed modulo, and the value is set to one of the signature values r (S004).
- x () indicates the x coordinate of a point on the elliptic curve.
- the ID issuing device 10 divides it into s1 of the upper 100 bits of s and s2 of the lower 46 bits (S006).
- S1 is also treated as an ID, so it is checked whether it is a value used in the past to avoid duplication, by comparing it with the ID history information 106 (S 007), and if it has been used, return to S 002 and the serial number i Update and repeat until s1 not used is generated.
- the control unit of the ID issuing device 10 updates the ID history information 106. Furthermore, since the lower 32 bits of the signature value r are also treated as congestion control data, similarly, to avoid duplication, it is confirmed by comparing with the ID history information 106 whether (r) 32 is not a value used in the past. (S008) If it has been used, the process returns to S002, the serial number i is updated, and the process is repeated until the (r) 32 which is not used is generated.
- the ID history information 106 is updated. Furthermore, a header 1-313, which is header information used for version identification, and a service header 313 for identifying the usage are created, and a simple error is generated for the value combining the header 1-313 and the service header 314 and s1-315.
- the detected symbol EDC1 317 is calculated (S009). Also, a header 2-320 for identifying version information is created, and a simplified error detection symbol EDC2-319 is calculated for the value obtained by combining the header 2-320, s2-316 and r318 (S010).
- the ID issuing device 10 returns to S002, and generates as many sets of values generated in S009 and S010 as the required number of chips (S011).
- each RFID tag 30 has (header 1 ⁇ service header ⁇ s 1 ⁇ DC EDC 1) as ID information 311, and (header 2 ⁇ s 2 ⁇ r ⁇ EDC 2) control information 312 And write to the RFID tag 30 as (S013, S014).
- the verification device 40 transmits 32-bit numerical values in the descending order to the nearby RFID tags 30, and issues a response command (S101).
- the RFID tag 30 checks whether the value sent from the verification device 40 is its own (r) 32 (S102), and if it is its own order, the ID information (header) 1
- the verification device 40 confirms the error detection code EDC1 for the header 1
- r is confirmed from s2
- the RFID tag 30 uses the verification value s1-315, s2-316, and r318 as an identifier with s1315, which is a part of the verification value, as the ID. It becomes possible to confirm the sex.
- the total amount of information of the ID information 311 and the control information 312 is 256 bits, and even a small RFID tag that can transmit only several hundred bits of information can be implemented.
- the verification device 40 manages only the public information 404 and does not have the secret key 105, it is possible to avoid the risk of leakage of the secret key 105 directly from the verification device 40.
- the verification device 40 can locally confirm the legitimacy of the ID only by verifying the electronic signature according to the present method without connecting to a network or the like.
- the present invention is not limited to the above-described one embodiment, and various modes are possible within the scope of the gist.
- ID information 311 and control information 312 are described as discontinuous data in FIG. 3B and a header and EDC are attached to each data, ID information 311 and control information 312 are continuous data
- the header and EDC may be combined into one.
- the control is performed in comparison with the past history so that s1 and (r) 32 do not overlap, but the uniqueness of ID and the uniqueness of congestion control random numbers are unnecessary. If necessary, this step may be skipped.
- the signature value 318 does not have to be used as congestion control data (random numbers).
- the random number for congestion control is described as a partial value of the signature value 318 in this embodiment, it may be a value including the entire signature value 318 or the entire signature value 318.
- ID and signature value 315 is a partial value of the signature value s, but may be the entire signature value s.
- S101 and S102 are steps for performing congestion control, and when congestion control is unnecessary, this step may be skipped.
- the verification device 40 transmits 32-bit numerical values in the descending order to the nearby RFID tags 30 and issues a response command, but the values for 32-bit showing the order May be sent to the RFID tag 30 in ascending order or randomly, and a response command may be issued.
- the value for 32 bits of congestion control data (random number) on the RFID tag 30 side is divided, for example, into four 8-bit portions, and the verification device 40 transmits 8-bit data to the RFID tag 30 in ascending or descending order or randomly.
- the RFID tag 30 determines whether the first 8 bits of the congestion control data (random numbers) divided into four 8 bits each match the value sent from the verification device 40, and responds It is also good.
- the verification device 40 again transmits 8-bit data to the RFID tag 30 in ascending order, descending order or randomly, and the RFID tag 30 makes 8 bits each Of the four divided congestion control data (random numbers), it is determined whether the next 8 bits match the value sent from the verification device 40, and a response is made. Congestion control may be performed by repeating the next 8 bits and so on.
- the verification device 40 transmits necessary information to the business application 50 when the legitimacy of the ID is confirmed in S107, but when verification of EDC in S104 passes, The necessary information may be sent to the business application 50, and then the verification device 40 may continue to perform the signature verification and send the result to the business application 50 again.
- the RFID tag is described as an example, but it is used in a medium printed on paper or the like such as a two-dimensional bar code, or in other devices such as an IC card or a normal PC. It is also good.
- ID issuing device 20: data embedding device, 30: RFID tag, 40: verification device, 50: business application device, 60: information processing device, 61: reading device, 62: memory, 63: input / output device, 64: CPU, 65: storage device, 66: communication device, 67: storage medium, 68: bus, 101, 401: input / output unit, 102, 402: control unit, 103, 403: cryptographic operation unit, 104, 404: Public information 105: Secret key 106: ID history information 301, 311: ID information 302, 312: control information 303, 313, 320: header 304, 314: service header 305: ID 306: MAC , 307, 309, 317, 319: EDC, 308: congestion control data (random number), 315, 318, 321: signature value.
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Abstract
Description
本実施例では、ID情報の正当性を検証する為の情報,すなわち検証値または署名値の一部を,IDとしても利用することにより,少ない情報量でID情報の正当性を保証する。ここで,より少ない情報量で正当性を保障するために本実施例では,電子署名方式の代表的な一つであるSchnore署名を用いて説明する。このSchnore署名を剰余演算を用いて変形させることにより,署名長の短い電子署名方式を実現することができる。
ここで,ID発行装置が,検証値でもあるID等を生成する際,同一のID等が存在しないように,過去に発行したデータと比較して,IDの唯一性を確保する。
図1は,本発明の一実施形態が適用された全体構成図である。
ID発行装置10は,図4に示すように,まず(146+t)bitの素数qを選ぶ。更に楕円曲線の係数a,bを有限体Fqから選び,楕円曲線Eを設定する。このとき,楕円曲線の位数#Eはl・n(l<<n)となるようにし,ベースポイントPを位数nとなるように楕円曲線Eの中から選ぶ。また,62bitの素数pとメッセージmも選ぶ。ここで,dをZnから選び,これをID発行装置10の秘密鍵とする。また楕円曲線E上の点Q=dPを計算し,これをID発行装置10の公開鍵とする。また,h()を任意長のデータを固定長に変換するハッシュ関数とし,ここでは,256bitの出力とする。これらの値を設定したID発行装置10は,E,q,n,P,p,m,Q,h()を公開情報として,公開する。
また,ID発行装置10と,検証装置40は,それぞれ,図2が示すように,記憶媒体67と,記憶媒体67の読取装置61と,半導体を用いた一次記憶装置(以下,メモリという)62と,入出力装置63と,CPU64と,ハードディスクなどの二次記憶装置(以下,記憶装置という)65と,通信装置66とが,バスなどの内部通信線(以下,バスという)68で連結された情報処理装置60上に構成することができる。
Claims (8)
- 正当性が保証されたIDを生成するID生成方法において、
暗号演算部により、
乱数を発生させ、発生させた前記乱数から署名値を作成するステップと、
作成した前記署名値を分割するステップと、
分割した前記署名値のうち一方の署名値について、ID履歴情報データベースに当該一方の署名値と同一のデータがあるか否かを確認するステップと、
前記ID履歴情報データベースに同一のデータが無い場合に、データ埋め込み装置により前記一方の署名値をRFIDタグのIDとして前記RFIDタグに格納するステップと、
を有することを特徴とするID生成方法。 - 請求項1に記載のID生成方法において、
前記ID履歴情報データベースに同一のデータが無い場合に、制御部により、前記一方の署名値を当該ID履歴情報データベースに書き込むステップと、
を更に有することを特徴とするID生成方法。 - 請求項2に記載のID生成方法において,
前記暗号演算部が署名値を分割するステップは、データの容量または用途に応じて,検証情報を分割することを特徴とするID生成方法。 - 請求項3に記載のID生成方法において,
前記署名値を作成するステップは、Schnore署名を用いることを特徴とするID生成方法。 - 請求項1乃至4に記載のID生成方法により生成されたIDを有するRFIDタグ。
- RFIDタグのIDを読み取るRFIDタグ読み取り方法において、
検証装置から前記RFIDタグに応答命令を送信するステップと、
前記RFIDタグから複数の応答信号を返信するステップと、
前記複数の応答信号に基づき署名検証を行うステップと、
前記署名検証の結果、正当な署名であった場合、当該応答信号を正当なIDとして読み取ることを特徴とするRFIDタグ読み取り方法。 - 請求項6に記載のRFIDタグ読み取り方法において、
前記署名検証を行うステップは、前記複数の応答信号と、当該検証装置に格納された公開情報と、に基づいて署名検証を行うことを特徴とするRFIDタグ読み取り方法。 - 請求項6に記載のRFIDタグ読み取り方法において、
前記複数の応答信号にはそれぞれ誤り検知符号EDCが付されていることを特徴とするRFIDタグ読み取り方法。
Priority Applications (3)
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US13/203,967 US20120099725A1 (en) | 2009-06-01 | 2010-05-10 | Method of generating id with guaranteed validity, and validity legitimacy guarantying rfid tag |
CN2010800088489A CN102326355A (zh) | 2009-06-01 | 2010-05-10 | 合法性被保证的id的生成方法及合法性保证rfid标签 |
KR1020117019693A KR101280797B1 (ko) | 2009-06-01 | 2010-05-10 | 정당성이 보증된 id의 생성 방법 및 정당성 보증 rfid 태그 |
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JP2009131708A JP5337582B2 (ja) | 2009-06-01 | 2009-06-01 | 正当性が保証されたidの生成方法及び正当性保証rfidタグ |
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JP (1) | JP5337582B2 (ja) |
KR (1) | KR101280797B1 (ja) |
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US8955086B2 (en) * | 2012-03-16 | 2015-02-10 | Red Hat, Inc. | Offline authentication |
EP2677473A1 (en) * | 2012-06-21 | 2013-12-25 | Nxp B.V. | Production method, rfid transponder, authentication method, reader device and computer program product |
CN103106421B (zh) * | 2013-01-21 | 2016-06-22 | 厦门路桥信息股份有限公司 | 基于18000-6c标准的电子标签加密方法及收费管理*** |
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- 2010-05-10 KR KR1020117019693A patent/KR101280797B1/ko active IP Right Grant
- 2010-05-10 CN CN2010800088489A patent/CN102326355A/zh active Pending
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TW201112722A (en) | 2011-04-01 |
JP5337582B2 (ja) | 2013-11-06 |
KR101280797B1 (ko) | 2013-07-05 |
US20120099725A1 (en) | 2012-04-26 |
CN102326355A (zh) | 2012-01-18 |
JP2010277006A (ja) | 2010-12-09 |
KR20110107399A (ko) | 2011-09-30 |
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