WO2009036619A1 - Procédé de génération de crêtes dermiques aléatoires de marque de crédit - Google Patents

Procédé de génération de crêtes dermiques aléatoires de marque de crédit Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009036619A1
WO2009036619A1 PCT/CN2007/003395 CN2007003395W WO2009036619A1 WO 2009036619 A1 WO2009036619 A1 WO 2009036619A1 CN 2007003395 W CN2007003395 W CN 2007003395W WO 2009036619 A1 WO2009036619 A1 WO 2009036619A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
credit
pattern
digital
random
identification
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2007/003395
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
Jianming Wu
Original Assignee
Jianming Wu
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Application filed by Jianming Wu filed Critical Jianming Wu
Publication of WO2009036619A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009036619A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a credit document anti-counterfeiting technology, in particular to a digital signature credit identification random ridge generation method in the implementation of e-government and e-commerce. Background technique
  • the seals, emblems, or personal signatures described above are collectively referred to as the “trust identifiers”.
  • the traditional seal and personal signature credit identification method can be incorporated into the computer information technology of modern office, using the electronic signature technology of image processing, the seal, the emblem, the individual Signed electronic image file Insert into an electronic file, and then print the electronic file with the seal, emblem, and personal signature together using a digital graphic printing device (such as a color printer) under computer control.
  • a digital graphic printing device such as a color printer
  • a computer electronic file can provide valid evidence through digital signature technology.
  • the security authentication technology supports the identification of authenticity of paper documents using physical, chemical, and pattern recognition methods.
  • judicial practice there are often cases where the credit identification of a document is difficult to distinguish, such as:
  • the seals in the two contracts cannot be judged under the pattern recognition, but the contents of the contract are inconsistent, in one file.
  • the personal signature also triggers a true and false argument.
  • a seal, emblem, or personal signature is a credit mark of a legal person or natural person.
  • the forgery of a credit mark infringes upon the interests of others and undermines the normal operation of state management and social economy. Summary of the invention
  • the present invention provides a credit identification random ridge generation method, which can enable a digital signature signed on a paper to carry a digital signature random digital ridge with a unique pattern feature, thereby effectively preventing and identifying And crack down on criminal acts of forging credit documents.
  • a credit identification random ridge generation method :
  • the hash value obtains a binary digital signature value
  • the set of digital signature values are arranged in a digital pattern according to the geometric shape of the credit identification pattern, and are superimposed on the credit logo graphic pattern, the digital strokes and credits of the digital pattern
  • the overlapping intersections of the graphics in the logo pattern are used as ridge tracks to form a digital signature credit identifier random ridge.
  • the long digital signature value is calculated again by using a hash function to obtain a short hash value, and the set of hash values are arranged in a digital pattern according to the geometric pattern of the credit identification pattern, and are superimposed on the credit logo graphic pattern.
  • the overlapping intersection of the digital stroke digital drawing and the credit identification graphic is used as a trajectory to form a digital signature credit identification random ridge.
  • the visual color of the stroke in which the digital stroke in the generated digital signature random tiling pattern and the credit identification graphic do not overlap, is consistent with the background color of the credit identification graphic pattern; the digital stroke and the credit identifier in the generated random ridge pattern
  • the overlap of the intersecting strokes of the graphic Color forming a visual color difference with the primary color of the credit logo graphic pattern.
  • the visual color of the digital stroke in the generated digital signature random tiling pattern is consistent with the background color of the credit identification graphic pattern.
  • a system for generating a credit identification random line includes the following devices:
  • the input and computing device is configured to prepare an electronic file to be signed in the computer system, select a format file or plain text as a data source, input a hash function to calculate a hash value, and use an asymmetric key (The public key encryption algorithm) encrypts the hash value to obtain a binary digital signature value;
  • a random ridge generating device is configured to form a hash value or a digital signature value to form a credit identification random ridge.
  • the random ridge generation device further includes the following devices:
  • the overlapping intersection of the middle picture and the text is used as a trajectory to form a digital signature credit identification random ridge.
  • the random ridge generation device further includes the following devices:
  • a device for recalculating a longer digital signature value using a hash function to obtain a shorter hash value arranging the set of binary hash values in a digital pattern according to a credit identifier pattern geometry, Above the credit logo graphic pattern, the overlapping portion of the digital stroke digital signature and the credit identification graphic is used as a trajectory, and the digital signature credit identifier is a random ridge.
  • the random ridge generating device further includes the following devices: arranged in a digital pattern according to the geometric shape of the credit identification pattern, and superimposed on the credit identification pattern, the overlapping portion of the digital stroke of the digital pattern and the graphic in the credit identification pattern as a pattern Line trajectory, forming a random line of credit identification.
  • the random ridge generation device further includes the following devices:
  • a device for converting a binary value into a decimal or hexadecimal number arranged in a digital pattern according to the geometric shape of the credit identification pattern, and stacked on the letter On the top of the logo pattern, the overlapping portion of the digital stroke of the digital pattern and the graphic image in the credit logo pattern serves as a trajectory to form a credit line random ridge.
  • the random ridge generation device further includes the following devices:
  • the digital stroke in the digital signature random ridge pattern is not overlapped on the credit identification graphic, and the visual color of the intersecting stroke is consistent with the background color of the credit identification graphic pattern; the digital stroke in the generated random ridge pattern
  • the color of the overlapping intersecting strokes on the credit identification graphic forms a visualized color difference with the credit identification graphic pattern primary colors.
  • the random ridge generation device further includes the following devices:
  • a device for visual color of a digital stroke in a generated digital signature random tiling pattern that coincides with a background color of a credit identification graphic pattern
  • the random ridge generation system also includes the following devices:
  • Step 1 Digitally scan a document printed on a medium such as a paper with a credit mark.
  • Step 2 Zoom in to see the image of the credit mark (such as seal) obtained by scanning, to see if there is a trajectory, if it is not, it is forged; if it is, continue.
  • the credit mark such as seal
  • Step 3 Obtain the hash value of the electronic document or the plain text of the document in the format of the credit identification file, use the digital certificate of the credit identifier signer, and regenerate according to the generation parameters and rules of the original credit identifier "random digital line" The credit identification of "random digital lines,,.
  • Step 4 Make this set of “random digital lines” and overlay them on the credit mark to be verified. Observe the coincidence of the track traces. If the line tracks overlap, the credit mark (such as seal stamp) is true.
  • a system for inspecting a method for generating a credit line random ridge line comprising the following means: an input device for digitally scanning a document printed by a shield such as a paper with a credit mark.
  • the identification device is used to enlarge the image of the credit mark (such as stamp) obtained by scanning, to see if there is a trajectory, and if it is not, it is regarded as forgery; if there is, continue.
  • a generating device configured to obtain a hash value of a format electronic file of the credit identification file or a plain text of the file, and encrypt the hash with an asymmetric key of the digital certificate of the credit identification unit Value, according to the credit parameter "random number line” generation parameter and 'rule, regenerate the "random number line” for this credit.
  • the identification device is used to make the set of "random digital lines" and is superimposed on the credit mark to be verified to observe the coincidence of the track traces, and the credit marks (such as seal stamps) are true when the track tracks are coincident.
  • 1 is a flow chart of generating a credit signature digital signature random ridge line
  • Figure 2 is a credit identification pattern or graphic diagram to be used
  • Figure 3 is a diagram of a visible credit identification of a complete random digital line overlay
  • Figure 4 is a complete digital signature random line credit identification map
  • Figure 5 is a cross-sectional representation of a truncated random digital line overlay
  • Figure 6 is a truncated digital signature random line credit identification.
  • the invention relates to a method for generating a random identification line of credit identifiers.
  • Preparing a computer electronic file to be signed in step 111 in the computer system Preparing a computer electronic file to be signed in step 111 in the computer system; preparing an electronic image of the pending credit identification pattern (such as an overprint stamp) step 112; using the electronic file content of step 111 as a data source, inputting The column function computes a hash value step 120; encrypting this hash value step 130 using an asymmetric key in the RSA or ECC digital signature technology architecture; obtaining a digital signature value step 140.
  • RSA signature value is 1024bit. Due to the limited geometric area of the credit logos (such as seals) we use every day, the data generated by the digital pattern is too long, and there are many characters. The more characters in the limited geometric area of the seal, the smaller the character size, resulting in a trajectory. Unclear, or will destroy the integrity of the credit logo graphic, in order to not destroy the integrity of the effective content of the credit logo and improve the clarity of the trajectory, you can use the hash function to calculate the set of longer digital signature values. A shorter hash value step 150, such as 160 bits.
  • the digital signals generated in step 140 or step 150 are arranged in a digital signature digital pattern in accordance with the credit identifier geometry, and an electronic image step 112 is performed using the ready-to-use credit identification pattern (such as an overprint stamp).
  • Step 160 The generated digital signature digital pattern is superimposed on the electronic image of the credit identification pattern in step 112, 171 of FIG. 3, and 173 of FIG. 5, so that the strokes in the digital signature digital pattern are cut through the visible text of the credit identification, forming
  • the credit identification digital signature random ridge, 172 of FIG. 4, 174 of FIG. 6, generates a digital signature random ridge credit identification step 170.
  • Figure 3 is a visible credit identification diagram of a complete random digital line overlay. As shown, the digital digits of the digital pattern in the figure are 40 hexadecimal numbers.
  • Figure 4 is a credit map of the complete random digital line cut. As shown in the figure, the non-red line in the figure is the intersection of random digital lines.
  • Figure 5 is a simplified credit identification diagram of a truncated random digital line overlay. As shown, the digital digits of the digital pattern in the figure are 20 hexadecimal digits.
  • Figure 6 is a diagram of the credit identification of the truncated random digital line cut. As shown, the non-red line in the figure is the intersection of the random digital lines.
  • a visible ridge track is formed on the logo image, such as a purple color similar to the red color of the seal stamp of FIGS. 3 to 6.
  • the background color of the credit logo graphic is white, which can be considered as colorless, and the digital pattern stroke is defined as colorless; for example, part of Europe
  • the country uses black paper to print documents,
  • the background color of the credit logo graphic is black, and the digital pattern stroke is defined as black; this method forms a visual chromatic aberration, which is beneficial for observation and comparison check.
  • the digital font should be thinner to avoid damage to the credit logo.
  • CA company legal digital certification company
  • a document requiring a credit identification must have a hash value of the content of the document, and the credit identifier must have a digital signature random number line.
  • the counterfeiter forges a credit identification document, and must also forge a set of digital signature random digital lines in the credit identification.
  • the contents of the file are unchangeable; digital signatures using a valid digital certificate are undeniable, and the order in which the numbers are arranged is unique and non-repeatable.
  • the digital signature digital and digital signature random digital lines generated by the real file must be coincident; the digital signature character lines in the fake document credit identifier must not coincide.
  • the anti-counterfeiting test steps are as follows
  • Step 1 Set the normal scanner 600DPI and above, RGB color scan stamp printing.
  • Step 2 Zoom in to view the scanned image obtained by scanning to see if there is a trajectory. If it is not, it is regarded as forgery; if it is, continue.
  • Step 3 Obtain the hash value of the electronic document or the plain text content of the credit identification document, use the digital certificate of the credit identifier signer, and regenerate the credit according to the generation parameters and rules of the credit identifier "random digital line" The "random digital line" of the logo.
  • Step 4 Make this set of "random digital lines" and stack them on the credits that need to be verified. W recognize the above, observe the coincidence of the trajectory of the ridge, and the credit mark (such as the seal) is true when the trajectory of the ridge is coincident.
  • the digital signature system composed of a hash function and an asymmetric key (public key encryption algorithm) is applied to the effective authentication of paper documents, and unified in the era of computer information.
  • the electronic document and paper document authentication method of the document solves the problem that the computer-edited printed paper documents that are ubiquitous in the world are difficult to be authenticated.
  • the technical scheme of the invention forms a set of random ridge pattern formed by a digital signature digital having a unique data relationship with the document content on the credit identifier of the paper document, and maintains the original graphic features of the credit logo, so that the credit logo displays the legal person
  • the basic characteristics of institutions and natural persons are closely combined with the contents of the documents, reaching one text, one standard, one grain and one code.
  • the exclusive evidence chain of the document content is not modifiable and the identity of the signer is undeniable.
  • the digital signature technology system conducts effective technical inspection of credit marks, which can prevent criminal acts of pseudo-paper quality credit documents, strengthen social management, and safeguard the interests of legitimate holders of credit labels.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
  • Editing Of Facsimile Originals (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé de génération de crêtes dermiques aléatoires de marque de crédit. Le procédé comprend : préparer un fichier électronique nécessitant de souscrire à un motif de marque de crédit dans un système informatique (111), considérer le contenu du fichier électronique comme une ressource de données, calculer des valeurs de hachage en entrant une fonction de hachage (120), crypter les valeurs de hachage par une clé secrète asymétrique (à savoir par un algorithme de cryptage par clé publique) (130) de façon à obtenir des valeurs numériques de signature (140), agencer et répartir les valeurs numérique de signature dans un motif de numéro en fonction de la géométrie du motif de marque de crédit (160), masquer le motif de nombre sur le motif de marque de crédit, considérer la partie masquée entre les segments saisis de nombres du motif du nombre et le contexte graphique de la marque de crédit sous forme de suivi de crêtes dermiques de façon à former la crête dermique aléatoire de marque de crédit de la signature numérique (170).
PCT/CN2007/003395 2007-09-17 2007-11-30 Procédé de génération de crêtes dermiques aléatoires de marque de crédit WO2009036619A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CNB2007101218456A CN100518064C (zh) 2007-09-17 2007-09-17 信用标识随机纹线生成方法
CN200710121845.6 2007-09-17

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2009036619A1 true WO2009036619A1 (fr) 2009-03-26

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PCT/CN2007/003395 WO2009036619A1 (fr) 2007-09-17 2007-11-30 Procédé de génération de crêtes dermiques aléatoires de marque de crédit

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CN (1) CN100518064C (fr)
WO (1) WO2009036619A1 (fr)

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US20030196086A1 (en) * 2002-04-12 2003-10-16 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Information processing apparatus, information processing system, information processing method, storage medium and program
CN1635533A (zh) * 2003-12-30 2005-07-06 刘瑞祯 数字******
CN2782387Y (zh) * 2005-03-22 2006-05-24 李锦� 重叠底纹防伪***
CN1829149A (zh) * 2006-02-08 2006-09-06 于蕾 电子防伪***的制作方法

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CN103106442A (zh) * 2013-01-22 2013-05-15 北京印刷学院 单变量参数递变多元加密防伪信息存储商标
CN103106442B (zh) * 2013-01-22 2015-07-15 北京印刷学院 单变量参数递变多元加密防伪信息存储商标

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