WO2006043446A1 - 通信装置および認証方法 - Google Patents
通信装置および認証方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2006043446A1 WO2006043446A1 PCT/JP2005/018759 JP2005018759W WO2006043446A1 WO 2006043446 A1 WO2006043446 A1 WO 2006043446A1 JP 2005018759 W JP2005018759 W JP 2005018759W WO 2006043446 A1 WO2006043446 A1 WO 2006043446A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- authentication
- state
- communication device
- duplicate
- predetermined time
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a communication apparatus and an authentication method for performing communication by performing mutual authentication in connection between communication apparatuses.
- PLC power line communication
- FIG. 1 is a sequence diagram of this authentication method.
- the authentication request 11 is transmitted from the terminal (STA) 1 to the radio base station (AP) 2.
- the radio base station (AP) 2 Upon receiving the authentication request 11, the radio base station (AP) 2 creates a challenge plaintext (CT) 12 and sends it back to the terminal (STA) 1.
- the terminal (STA) 1 encrypts the received challenge plaintext 12 with its own common key PSK and returns a challenge ciphertext (PSK (CT)) 13 to the radio base station (AP) 2.
- PSK challenge ciphertext
- the wireless base station (AP) 2 decrypts the received challenge ciphertext 13 with its own common key PSK, and the decrypted one matches the challenge in the challenge plaintext 12 sent to the terminal (STA) 1. If it does not match, an authentication response (success) 14 is returned to the terminal (STA) 1.
- the common key PSK of the terminal (STA) 1 and the radio base station (AP) 2 must be preset or distributed and must be the same here.
- Non-Patent Document 1 IEEE Std 802. Hi-2004, Chapter 8, pages 39-41
- misauthentication avoidance is taken into account! Because it is !!, the same common key in the interference range (for example, a neighboring house) using wireless LAN or power line communication is used.
- the two devices that are selected may be mis-authenticated and connected. Also, if a mischief or deliberate attack is performed, mis-authentication and connection can be made simply by selecting the same common key, and it is possible to easily eavesdrop on or impersonate a device in the neighboring house.
- the present invention has been made in view of the above circumstances, and provides a communication device and an authentication method capable of preventing erroneous authentication at the time of initial authentication in connection between communication devices. Objective.
- a communication apparatus performs authentication with the other communication apparatus after performing authentication for connection with the other communication apparatus.
- a state management means for managing a state in the authentication operation as one of a plurality of states determined in advance, and in a predetermined state among the plurality of states, Communication device power Duplicate detection means for detecting that duplicate messages related to authentication are received, and in the predetermined state, duplicate reception of the messages related to authentication is detected by the duplicate detection means within a predetermined time.
- Authentication means for continuing the authentication operation when one message to be received is received, and stopping the authentication operation when the duplicate detection means detects duplicate reception of the message within the predetermined time. It is characterized by providing.
- the plurality of states are an authentication start enabled state, an authentication start disabled state, an authentication start state, an authentication in progress state, an authentication success state, an authentication failure state, and an authentication completion state
- the state in the authentication operation is one of the authentication start possible state, the authentication start impossible state, the authentication start state, the authentication in progress state, the authentication success state, the authentication failure state, and the authentication completion state. It is preferable to manage as either state.
- the communication device further includes an authentication start receiving unit that receives an authentication start operation when the state is an authentication start enabled state, and the state management unit is configured to perform the authentication start receiving unit by the authentication start receiving unit.
- the state is shifted from the authentication start enabled state to the authentication start state, and the authentication unit receives a message regarding the authentication when the state is the authentication start state.
- the communication device further includes an authentication completion receiving unit that receives an authentication completion operation when the state is an authentication successful state, and the state management unit is configured to perform the authentication completion receiving unit by the authentication completion receiving unit.
- the state is shifted from the authentication success state to the authentication completion state.
- an authentication completion process is performed. You can do this.
- the communication device may further include the authentication start enabled state, the authentication start disabled state, the authentication start state, the authentication in progress state, the authentication successful state, the authentication failure state, and the Displays the status when at least one of the authentication completion status It should be equipped with a display means.
- the communication device further includes, for each of the authentication start impossible state, the authentication start state, the authentication in progress state, the authentication success state, the authentication failure state, and the authentication completion state.
- timer management means for managing the predetermined time with different timers according to an initial value set in advance and adjusting the initial value of the timer after the start of authentication. Thereby, the efficiency of authentication can be improved.
- the duplication detection means receives the predetermined authentication-related message in duplicate.
- a collision notification including a time value indicating a time length that should be set in the authentication start disabled state in the other communication device may be transmitted to the other communication device that has transmitted the message regarding authentication. This makes it possible to control the authentication restart time in other communication devices.
- the present invention can be realized as an authentication method that can be realized as such a communication device, and has the characteristic means included in such a communication device as a step, or the steps. It can also be realized as a program executed by a computer. Needless to say, such a program can be distributed via a recording medium such as a CD-ROM or a transmission medium such as the Internet.
- the present invention is a wired * wireless network (for example, other than wireless LAN and power line communication)
- Bluetooth, ECHONET can also be applied, and the effect of the present invention of avoiding false authentication can be obtained.
- FIG. 1 is a conventional authentication sequence diagram.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a communication apparatus according to the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a state transition diagram common to communication devices.
- FIG. 4 is an authentication sequence diagram according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram showing timer settings according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 6 is an authentication sequence diagram according to the second embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 7 is a diagram showing timer setting according to the second embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 8 is an authentication sequence diagram according to the third embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 9 is an authentication sequence diagram according to the third embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 10 is a diagram showing a collision notification format.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the communication apparatus according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- the communication device 1 is a device for performing communication with another communication device after performing initial authentication for connection with another communication device. As shown in FIG. Processing unit 20, Hue Management unit 21, input unit 22, display unit 23, timer management unit 24, collision detection unit 25, message buffer 26, communication processing unit 27, encryption key storage unit 28, and encryption algorithm unit 29.
- the authentication processing unit 20 controls connection “management of authentication processing sequence”, and instructs the communication processing unit 27 to transmit / receive a message related to authentication (hereinafter also referred to as an authentication message).
- the authentication processing unit 20 obtains a common encryption key (common key) necessary for encryption or decryption of the challenge from the encryption key storage unit 28, and uses the encryption algorithm unit 29 to perform encryption of the challenge or encryption. Decrypt.
- the authentication processing unit 20 changes the state in accordance with the phase switching instruction from the phase management unit 21, instructs the timer management unit 24 to set or start the timer, receives a notification of the passage of time, and performs predetermined processing. Do. Further, the authentication processing unit 20 receives a notification about duplicate reception of authentication messages in the message buffer 26 from the collision detection unit 25 and performs collision processing.
- the communication processing unit 27 transmits and receives messages in accordance with instructions from the authentication processing unit 20.
- the encryption key storage unit 28 stores a common key necessary for encryption or decryption of a challenge.
- the phase management unit 21 receives a command from the input unit 22 and instructs the authentication processing unit 20 to switch phases.
- the timer management unit 24 monitors the elapse of a predetermined time for the designated time force, and communicates to the authentication processing unit 20 when the predetermined time elapses.
- the collision detection unit 25 receives an instruction from the authentication processing unit 20, acquires a message from the communication processing unit 27, stores it in the message buffer 26, and notifies the authentication processing unit 20 when there are a plurality of messages.
- the input unit 22 receives an authentication start operation or an authentication completion operation, which is an instruction from the outside (user).
- the input unit 22 is basically a button.
- the status switch from authentication start enabled to authentication start is performed by pressing this button.
- the status switch from authentication success to authentication completion is also realized by pressing this button.
- the button is pressed according to the length or number of times it is pressed.
- the display unit 23 displays each status of authentication start enabled, authentication start disabled, authentication started, authentication in progress, authentication success, authentication failure, and authentication completion.
- Display 23 is LED1, LED2, and LED3 3 Consists of two LEDs. Authentication start is possible, LED1 is lit and authentication cannot be started, LED1 is blinking, authentication start is LED2 is lit, LED2 is blinking during authentication, authentication is successful, LED3 is blinking, and authentication failure is LED3 is lit Then, when the authentication is complete, LED1, LED2, and LED3 are all lit. Note that the number of LEDs constituting the display unit 23 is not limited to three, and any LED that can sufficiently display the state may be used. For example, one LED and three colors can be used.
- voice display as an auxiliary
- the communication device is provided with other types of display means (for example, liquid crystal), the status may be displayed with characters or symbols.
- the master communication device and the slave device may use different display methods as long as they have different types of display units. If a predetermined message or command is not received before the timer expires, it may be displayed as one state, for example, LED1, LED2, and LED3 all blinking to inform the user.
- a message transmitted to the master communication device includes a connection information request, an authentication request, and a challenge ciphertext.
- the connection information request is a message for requesting an ID and communication parameters from the master communication device.
- the authentication request is a message for requesting authentication from the master communication device and includes HD information of the slave communication device.
- the challenge ciphertext is a message for proving having a common key, and includes information in which the challenge is encrypted with the common key.
- the message transmitted from the master communication device to the slave communication device includes broadcast information, connection information response, challenge plaintext, and authentication response.
- the broadcast information is a message for reporting the master communication device ID and communication parameters to the slave communication device.
- the connection information response is a message for notifying the slave communication device of the ID and communication parameters of the master communication device as a response to the connection information request from the slave communication device. It is.
- the challenge plaintext is a message for testing whether the slave communication device has the same common key, and includes, for example, 128 bytes of random text information.
- the authentication response is a message for notifying whether or not the authentication is successful.
- the connection information request and the broadcast information are transmitted by broadcast communication. All other messages are sent by unicast communication.
- the format of these messages may be the same message format already defined in the IEEE 801 .l li standard. For implementation, it is not necessary to comply with the IEEE 801.lli standard specification format, especially in cases other than wireless LAN.
- the authentication can be started as a normal state. Authentication can be started from the input unit 22 by button operation (E21). S11 state force Authentication start Transition to S12 state. Authentication start Sends or receives no authentication iE ⁇ messages unless in S12 state. Authentication start allowed In the S11 state, when a connection information request or broadcast information transmitted by broadcast communication is received (E22), the authentication start impossible S13 state is entered. Authentication cannot be started After entering the S13 state, when the predetermined time set in the timer management unit 24 has elapsed (E23), the authentication can be started.
- the authentication start S12 state broadcast information or a connection information request and a connection information response are transmitted and received between the master communication device and the slave communication device.
- the timer management unit 24 E24
- all of these messages are discarded, and the state changes to the authentication start impossible S13 state.
- the process proceeds to the S14 state during authentication.
- four messages are exchanged between the master communication device and the slave communication device: authentication request, challenge plaintext, challenge ciphertext, and authentication response.
- the authentication failure S16 state returns to the authentication start enabled S11 state after the elapse of a predetermined time set by the timer management unit 24 (E31).
- the authentication completion S17 state also returns to the authentication start ready S11 state after a predetermined time (E32) set by the timer management unit 24.
- FIG. 4 shows an authentication sequence according to the first embodiment.
- the master communication device la receives a button force command from its own input unit 22a, it starts its timer 1.
- the slave communication device lb receives the command of the button force of its input unit 22b and transmits the connection information request 11 by broadcast communication, and at the same time starts its timer 5.
- Master communication device la that has entered the authentication start state first receives connection information request 11 and returns connection information response 12 to slave communication device lb.
- the master communication device la that sent the connection information response 12 starts its timer 2.
- the authentication processing unit 2 Oa stops the authentication and changes to an authentication start impossible state.
- the slave communication device lb that has transmitted the connection information request 11 waits for the connection information response 12 while the timer 5 is valid, and receives not only the master communication device la but also a plurality of connection information responses 12. Then, the authentication processing unit 20b cancels the authentication, and shifts to an authentication start impossible state. When only one connection information response 12 is received, the slave communication device lb returns the authentication request 13 to the master communication device la and starts the timer 6 at the same time.
- the master communication device la waits for the authentication request 13 while the timer 2 is valid, and receives the authentication request 13 not only from the slave communication device lb, but the authentication processing unit 20a stops the authentication. Then, the state changes to an authentication start impossible state.
- the master communication device la returns the challenge plaintext 14 including the challenge to the slave communication device 1 and starts timer 3 at the same time.
- the slave communication device lb waits for the challenge plaintext 14 while the timer 6 is valid, and if the slave communication device lb receives a plurality of challenge plaintexts 14 not only from the master communication device la, The certificate processing unit 20b cancels the authentication, and changes to a state where authentication cannot be started.
- the slave communication device lb encrypts the challenge with the common key stored in the encryption key storage unit 28b and returns the challenge ciphertext 15 to the master communication device la. At the same time, timer 6 is started.
- the authentication processing unit 20a Authentication is canceled and the state changes to a state where authentication cannot be started.
- the master communication device 1a takes out the ciphertext encrypted from the challenge ciphertext 15 and stores it in the encryption key storage unit 28a. If the decrypted challenge matches the challenge sent in the challenge plaintext 14, the authentication response (success) 16 is sent to the slave communication device lb and timer 4 is started at the same time. Otherwise, the authentication response (failure) 16 is transmitted to the slave communication device lb, and at the same time, the state changes to the authentication failure state.
- the slave communication device lb waits for the authentication response 16 while the timer 7 is valid, and when receiving a plurality of authentication responses 16 not only from the master communication device la, the authentication processing unit 20b cancels the authentication. Then, the state changes to an authentication start impossible state. If only one authentication response (success) 16 is received, the slave communication device lb starts timer 8. If only one authentication response (failure) 16 is received, the state changes to the authentication failure state.
- the master communication device la when the master communication device la receives the input of the buttoner of its input unit 22a while the timer 4 is valid, the master communication device la transitions to the authentication completion state, assuming that the authentication is successful.
- the slave communication device lb receives the input from the button of its own input unit 22b while the timer 8 is valid, the slave communication device lb transitions to the authentication completion state, assuming that the authentication is successful. Note that if the specified message is not received by the other party before the timer expires, the message is not retransmitted, authentication is canceled as it is, and the authentication start enabled state is returned.
- the master communication device and the slave communication device in the authentication success state wait for the button force external command of the input unit 22 until the timer 4 and the timer 8 expire, respectively. If an approval instruction (for example, pressing a button once) is received, the state transitions to an authentication completion state. If you receive a disapproval command (for example, press the button continuously), or if you do not receive any command, the authentication is not complete When it is finished, it returns to the authentication start enabled state.
- timers 1 to 3 and timers 5 to 7 are all set to the same value (tO).
- tO is set to a value larger than the time required to move between the two in order for the user to press the button on the input unit 22 when the master communication device la and the slave communication device lb are separated and installed! .
- the value is within a few seconds to 1 minute.
- the tO value can also be changed by an external force operation by the user.
- the timer management unit 24a Change the initial value of timer 3 to (tl + ⁇ ).
- the timer management unit 24b sets the initial values of the timer 6 and the timer 7 to ( Change to t2 + ⁇ ).
- ⁇ is the maximum back-off time for avoiding frame transmission collision in the MAC layer.
- timer 4 and the timer 8 are set to the same value as tO or different values in consideration of the state confirmation by the user and the moving time.
- the user performs authentication by pressing the button in the master communication device la before the slave communication device lb to shift to the authentication start state.
- the feature of this method is that the master communication device la does not receive broadcast information even if it is transmitted as a slave communication device lb that does not need to transmit broadcast information by broadcast communication. Therefore, the occurrence of impersonation using the notification information can be suppressed.
- connection information request 11 is transmitted by broadcast communication. Therefore, when broadcast communication is received in another message, the authentication processing unit 20 stops authentication and authenticates. It does not matter even if it shifts to a start impossible state.
- the communication processing unit 27 performs transmission / reception of an authentication message using a modulation / demodulation method that is weak against noise such as a 16PAM (Pulse Amplitude Modulation) pulse amplitude modulation method. It doesn't matter. This allows other communication devices to demodulate. Therefore, erroneous authentication can be prevented.
- a modulation / demodulation method that is weak against noise
- 16PAM Pulse Amplitude Modulation
- FIG. 6 shows an authentication sequence according to the second embodiment.
- the configuration of the communication device, the message used, and the common state in the authentication of the master communication device and the slave communication device are the same as those in the first embodiment, and the description is omitted.
- the master communication device la When the master communication device la receives the button force command of its own input unit 22a, the master communication device la starts its timer 2 at the same time as sending out the notification information 10 by broadcast communication.
- the slave communication device lb starts its timer 5 and waits for the notification information 10 from the master communication device la.
- the authentication processing unit 20b stops the authentication and shifts to an authentication start impossible state.
- the slave communication device lb returns the authentication request 13 to the master communication device la and starts the timer 6 at the same time.
- timer setting changing method in the present embodiment will be described. Note that the setting of the initial value of timer 1 is the same as that of the first embodiment, and thus description thereof is omitted.
- the timer management The unit 24a changes the initial value of the timer 3 to (tl + ⁇ ).
- the timer management unit 24b sets the initial values of the timer 6 and the timer 7 as follows. Change to (t2 + ⁇ ). ⁇ is the maximum backoff time to avoid frame transmission collision in the MAC layer.
- the slave communication device lb does not receive connection request information even if it is transmitted as a master communication device la that does not need to send connection request information by broadcast communication. Therefore, it is possible to suppress spoofing using connection request information. Togashi.
- FIGS. 8 and 9 are diagrams showing an authentication sequence of the third embodiment.
- the configuration of the communication device, the message to be used, and the common state in the authentication of the master communication device and the slave communication device are the same as those in the first embodiment, and the description is omitted.
- the master communication device la When the master communication device la receives the button force command of its input unit 22a, it immediately sends the notification information 10 by broadcast communication. On the other hand, when the slave communication device lb receives the button force command of its own input unit 22b, it immediately sends out the connection information request 11 by broadcast communication.
- FIG. 8 shows an authentication sequence when the master communication device la receives an input from the button of the input unit 22 before the slave communication device lb. In this case, even if the notification information 10 is transmitted from the master communication device la by broadcast communication, the notification information 10 is ignored because the slave communication device lb is not yet in the authentication start state. Since the subsequent steps are the same as the steps described in the first embodiment, description thereof is omitted here.
- FIG. 9 shows an authentication sequence when the slave communication device lb receives an input from the button 22 of the input unit prior to the master communication device la.
- the connection information request 11 is ignored.
- the master communication device la receives one authentication request 13 while the timer 1 is valid, the timer 3 is started instead of the timer 2. Since the subsequent steps are the same as those described in the first embodiment, description thereof is omitted here.
- timer initial value can also be changed in the present embodiment in the same manner as in the first and second embodiments.
- authentication can be reliably performed even if the user presses the button first in either the master communication device la or the slave communication device lb to shift to the authentication start state. it can.
- the format of collision notification 17 normally uses the MAC layer frame format, with a special field of time value (Tb) 102.
- the communication device that has received the collision notification 17 immediately stops the authentication, and shifts itself to the authentication start impossible state.
- the time length of the authentication start impossible state is determined by the time value (Tb) 102 included in the collision notification 17, and when Tb passes, the state returns to the authentication start ready state. By doing so, the communication device that has received a plurality of messages can control the authentication resumption time of the other party.
- Each functional block in the block diagram shown in FIG. 2 is typically realized as an LSI which is an integrated circuit.
- This LSI may be single-chip or multiple chips. (For example, a functional block other than a memory may be integrated on a single chip.)
- IC system LSI, super LSI, or ultra LSI due to the difference in power integration as LSI.
- the method of circuit integration is not limited to LSI's, and implementation using dedicated circuitry or general purpose processors is also possible. It is also possible to use a field programmable gate array (FPGA) that can be programmed after LSI manufacturing, or a reconfigurable processor that can reconfigure the connection and settings of circuit cells inside the LSI.
- FPGA field programmable gate array
- the communication device can prevent erroneous authentication and erroneous connection due to signal interference with a communication device other than the predetermined communication device partner, for example, at the time of initial connection between devices for home wireless LAN or power line communication. This is useful as an authentication method. It can also be applied to authentication between devices of other types of wired 'wireless networks (for example, Bluetooth, ECHONET, etc.).
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JP2006542922A JP4495167B2 (ja) | 2004-10-19 | 2005-10-12 | 通信装置および認証方法 |
US11/579,691 US7822981B2 (en) | 2004-10-19 | 2005-10-12 | Communication apparatus and authenticating method |
CN2005800207434A CN1973483B (zh) | 2004-10-19 | 2005-10-12 | 通信装置及认证方法 |
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JP2004-304092 | 2004-10-19 | ||
JP2004304092 | 2004-10-19 |
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WO2006043446A1 true WO2006043446A1 (ja) | 2006-04-27 |
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US (1) | US7822981B2 (ja) |
JP (2) | JP4495167B2 (ja) |
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US11924634B2 (en) * | 2019-01-21 | 2024-03-05 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Methods providing authentication using a request commit message and related user equipment and network nodes |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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CN1973483B (zh) | 2011-01-12 |
JP4495167B2 (ja) | 2010-06-30 |
JP5430120B2 (ja) | 2014-02-26 |
US20080126804A1 (en) | 2008-05-29 |
JPWO2006043446A1 (ja) | 2008-05-22 |
JP2009055631A (ja) | 2009-03-12 |
CN1973483A (zh) | 2007-05-30 |
US7822981B2 (en) | 2010-10-26 |
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