US20210360471A1 - Schemes and methods of integrity protection in mobile communication - Google Patents
Schemes and methods of integrity protection in mobile communication Download PDFInfo
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- US20210360471A1 US20210360471A1 US17/284,893 US201917284893A US2021360471A1 US 20210360471 A1 US20210360471 A1 US 20210360471A1 US 201917284893 A US201917284893 A US 201917284893A US 2021360471 A1 US2021360471 A1 US 2021360471A1
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- integrity protection
- user plane
- plane data
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/0001—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff
- H04L1/0002—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff by adapting the transmission rate
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W28/00—Network traffic management; Network resource management
- H04W28/02—Traffic management, e.g. flow control or congestion control
- H04W28/04—Error control
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/0001—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff
- H04L1/0023—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff characterised by the signalling
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/12—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received by using return channel
- H04L1/16—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received by using return channel in which the return channel carries supervisory signals, e.g. repetition request signals
- H04L1/1607—Details of the supervisory signal
- H04L1/1671—Details of the supervisory signal the supervisory signal being transmitted together with control information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/20—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received using signal quality detector
- H04L1/203—Details of error rate determination, e.g. BER, FER or WER
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
- H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/22—Processing or transfer of terminal data, e.g. status or physical capabilities
- H04W8/24—Transfer of terminal data
Definitions
- the present disclosure relates to a communication system.
- the disclosure has particular but not exclusive relevance to wireless communication systems and devices thereof operating according to the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standards or equivalents or derivatives thereof.
- 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project
- the disclosure has particular although not exclusive relevance to integrity protection in the so-called ‘5G’ (or ‘Next Generation’) systems.
- Confidentiality protection refers to the mechanism in which the content is being concealed from the unintended recipient by use of ciphering (or encryption).
- Integrity protection refers to the mechanism in which the original content is protected by use of techniques to detect changes in the content when it is received by the intended receiver, thus preventing man-in-the-middle attack.
- AS Access Stratum
- NAS Non-Access Stratum
- AS refers to the segment in the mobile system where distinct radio technology is used between the base station and the User Equipment (UE).
- the radio technology used depends on the generation.
- NAS refers to the end-to-end connection between the UE and the Core Network (CN) which is independent from the AS (i.e., independent from the underlying radio technology being used).
- voice communication requires constant stream of voice information in real-time manner with rather strict time-bound in order to make the voice communication usable. Excessive delay makes the voice communication often unusable. In this context, re-transmission usually does not help. Also, voice communication can often tolerate occasional error or packet loss as human voice information is inherently redundant. In this context, use of integrity protection does not add value.
- DRB Data Radio Bearer
- SRB Signaling Radio Bearer
- UE is known to have hardware limitation in terms of data rate (b/s) where integrity protection of the entire PDCP PDU payload can be done.
- data rate exceeds this threshold, either the integrity protection needs to be turned off or partial protection needs to be employed where only a subset of the PDCP payload is integrity protected. This implies that there needs to be a mechanism in place to: 1) determine the threshold for a given UE, 2) measure and determine the data rate, and 3) switch the integrity protection scheme.
- a user equipment includes: a memory configured to store instructions; and a processor configured to execute the instructions to: receive, from a network device, user plane data having integrity protection; send an error indication indicating an integrity protection error relating to the user plane data; and receive retransmitted user plane data from the network device with a reduced data rate, based on the error indication.
- a method includes: receiving, by a user equipment and from a network device, user plane data having integrity protection; sending, by the UE, an error indication indicating an integrity protection error relating to the user plane data; and receiving, by the UE, retransmitted user plane data from the network device with a reduced data rate, based on the error indication.
- a network device includes: a memory configured to store instructions; and a processor configured to execute the instructions to: send, to a user equipment (UE), user plane data having integrity protection; receive an error indication indicating an integrity protection error relating to the user plane data; and send, to the UE, retransmitted user plane data with a reduced data rate, based on the error indication.
- UE user equipment
- a method includes: sending, by a network device and to a user equipment (UE), user plane data having integrity protection; receiving, by the network device, an error indication indicating an integrity protection error relating to the user plane data; and sending, by the network device and to the UE, retransmitted user plane data with a reduced data rate, based on the error indication.
- UE user equipment
- the present disclosure can provide the UE, the network device, the method that solves the problem as mentioned above.
- FIG. 1 shows an example of determination of UE's supported data rate.
- FIG. 2 shows an example of determination of UE's supported data rate.
- FIG. 3 illustrates several possible procedures for the UE to indicate its capability or rule indication to the RAN and/or CN.
- FIG. 4 illustrates several possible procedures for the RAN node to indicate its rule to the UE.
- FIG. 5 shows an example of RAN's indication on integrity protection scheme.
- FIG. 6 illustrates the procedures for the CN to indicate its rule to the RAN node.
- FIG. 7 illustrates the procedures for the end-to-end integrity protection rule.
- FIG. 8 describes the procedure in the transmitting side.
- FIG. 9 illustrates one example of the use of reserved bits.
- FIG. 10 describes the procedure in the receiving side.
- FIG. 11 shows the general components of the User Equipment.
- FIG. 12 shows the general components of the base station.
- FIG. 13 shows the general components of the network element.
- FIG. 14 schematically illustrates a mobile telecommunication system to which the above embodiments are applicable.
- FIG. 15 is a block diagram illustrating, in more detail, the main components of the UE shown in FIGS. 11 and 14 .
- FIG. 16 is a block diagram illustrating, in more detail, the main components of an exemplary (R)AN node shown in FIGS. 12 and 14 .
- FIG. 17 is a block diagram illustrating, in more detail, the main components of a generic core network node shown in FIGS. 13 and 14 .
- This variant describes the mechanism in which the network determines the UE's capability with respect to the data rate the UE 300 can support full integrity protection.
- the DL UP data rate adjustment is done at the RAN node 500 .
- the RAN node 500 determines the UE's capability with respect to the DL UP data rate for which it can perform full integrity protection, this capability information for this UE 300 is shared with the CN 700 .
- Connection is established between the UE 300 and the CN 700 .
- DL UP traffic e.g., web browsing
- the UE 300 does the integrity protection check on all received packets.
- the UE 300 indicates that the UE 300 is not able to process integrity protection for all DL UP packets (error indication) to the RAN node 500 , by AS signaling, for example. 5.
- the RAN node 500 Upon receiving the indication from the UE 300 for not being able to process integrity protection for all DL UP packets, the RAN node 500 adjusts the data rate of the DL UP traffic. In some aspects, the RAN node 500 throttles down the data rate of the DL UP traffic using a method such as a predetermined value or other heuristic mechanism. 6. The RAN node 500 re-transmits the DL UP packets to the UE 300 with the reduced DL data rate and with full integrity protection. 7. (optional) If necessary, steps 3 through 6 are repeated with additional reduction of the DL UP data rate. 8. Due to the reduction in the data rate, the UE 300 can successfully execute the integrity protection for all DL UP packets. 9.
- the UE 300 indicates to the RAN node 500 that the UE 300 can successfully execute the integrity protection for all DL UP packets, by AS signaling, for example. Alternatively, the UE 300 does not send any indication to the RAN node 500 , in case the absence of error indication from the UE 300 implies successful handling of integrity protection checking in the UE 300 of all DL UP packets. 10.
- the RAN node 500 stores the last adjusted DL UP data rate for which the UE 300 successfully executed the integrity protection of all DL UP packets.
- the RAN node 500 indicates the UE's capability information to the CN 700 .
- the CN 700 queries the RAN node 500 for the UE's capability information. 12. The RAN node 500 responds with the UE's capability information to the CN 700 . 13. The CN 700 stores the UE's capability information.
- This variant describes the mechanism in which the network determines the UE's capability with respect to the data rate the UE 300 can support full integrity protection.
- the DL UP data rate adjustment is done at the CN 700 .
- the CN 700 determines the UE's capability with respect to the DL UP data rate for which it can perform full integrity protection, this capability information for this UE 300 is shared with the RAN node 500 .
- Connection is established between the UE 300 and the CN 700 .
- DL UP traffic e.g., web browsing
- the UE 300 does the integrity protection check on all received packets.
- the UE 300 indicates that the UE 300 is not able to process integrity protection for all DL UP packets (error indication) to the CN 700 , by AS signaling, for example.
- the CN 700 adjusts the data rate of the DL UP traffic.
- the RAN node 500 throttles down the data rate of the DL UP traffic using a method such as a predetermined value or other heuristic mechanism. 6.
- the CN 700 re-transmits the DL UP packets to the UE 300 with the reduced DL data rate and with full integrity protection. 7. (optional) If necessary, steps 3 through 6 are repeated with additional reduction of the DL UP data rate. 8. Due to the reduction in the data rate, the UE 300 can successfully execute the integrity protection for all DL UP packets. 9. (optional) The UE 300 indicates to the CN 700 that the UE 300 can successfully execute the integrity protection for all DL UP packets, by AS signaling, for example.
- the UE 300 does not send any indication to the CN 700 , in case the absence of error indication from the UE 300 implies successful handling of integrity protection checking in the UE 300 of all DL UP packets. 10.
- the CN 700 stores the last adjusted DL UP data rate for which the UE 300 successfully executed the integrity protection of all DL UP packets.
- the CN 700 indicates the UE's capability information to the RAN node 500 .
- the RAN node 500 queries the CN 700 for the UE's capability information. 12. The CN 700 responds with the UE's capability information to the RAN node. 13. The RAN node stores the UE's capability information.
- This embodiment describes the mechanisms of how the integrity protection between the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 is controlled.
- the UE 300 indicates its capability or rule (or its preference) in terms of the use of integrity protection, and the network determines the integrity protection mechanism accordingly under various conditions.
- the UE 300 indicates its preference of the use of integrity protection under different conditions. This is illustrated in Table 2.
- threshold A and “threshold B” indicate a certain condition for which the UE 300 is under.
- the threshold can indicate data rate, such as specific to DL traffic, specific to UL traffic, or both DL and UL traffic.
- these thresholds can represent metric other than data rate, such as UE device type, type of services the UE uses, etc.
- the following description is based on the data rate being used as the threshold.
- Condition 1 indicates the data rate is below a certain threshold for which the UE 300 can perform full integrity protection on all UP traffic.
- Condition 2 indicates the data rate is in the “border line zone” where the full integrity protection on all UP traffic may not be possible. Under this condition, the UE 300 uses either full or partial integrity protection depending on factors such as the actual traffic rate at the time of transmission or reception, etc.
- Condition 3 indicates the data rate is above the threshold where the UE 300 can no longer perform full integrity protection on all UP traffic.
- Threshold A and threshold B in this indication can be determined by the UE 300 or pre-configured in the UE 300 and the network.
- the UE 300 indicates this information to the network (RAN 500 and/or CN 700 ) so that the network side becomes aware of the UE's capability or rule in terms of the data rate it can perform for full integrity protection.
- FIG. 3 illustrates several possible procedures for the UE 300 to indicate its capability or rule indication to the RAN 500 and/or CN 700 .
- the UE 300 sends the UE capability indication to the RAN node 500 , and the RAN node 500 optionally forwards this information to the CN 700 .
- the UE 300 sends the UE capability indication to the CN 700 , and the CN 700 optionally forwards this information to the RAN node 500 .
- the UE 300 sends the UE capability indication to both RAN node 500 and the CN 700 .
- the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 execute the UP traffic transfer using the integrity protection rule provided by the UE 300 .
- the RAN node 500 indicates its rule (or preference) to the UE 300 for the integrity protection rule.
- the integrity protection rule consists of similar type of information as described in variant 1 in the preceding section. But instead of this information being sent by the UE 300 , in this variant, the RAN node 500 provides the rule to the UE 300 .
- the integrity protection rule can be represented in Table 3.
- threshold A and “threshold B” indicate a certain condition for which the UE 300 is under.
- the threshold can indicate data rate, such as specific to DL traffic, specific to UL traffic, or both DL and UL traffic.
- these thresholds can represent some other metric other than data rate.
- the following description is based on the data rate being used as the threshold.
- Condition 1 indicates the data rate is below a certain threshold for which the UE 300 is requested to perform full integrity protection on all UP traffic.
- Condition 2 indicates the data rate is in the “border line zone” where the full integrity protection on all UP traffic may not be possible. Under this condition, the RAN node 500 uses either full or partial integrity protection depending on factors such as the actual traffic rate at the time of transmission or reception, etc.
- Condition 3 indicates the data rate is above the threshold where the UE 300 is no longer requested to perform full integrity protection on all UP traffic.
- Threshold A and threshold B in this indication can be determined by the RAN node 500 or pre-configured in the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 .
- the RAN node 500 indicates this rule to the UE 300 so that the UE 300 becomes aware of the integrity protection scheme to be used based on the defined thresholds.
- FIG. 4 illustrates several possible procedures for the RAN node 500 to indicate its rule (or preference) to the UE 300 .
- the RAN node 500 determines the integrity protection rule. 2. The RAN node 500 informs the rule to the UE 300 , by sending AS message including the integrity protection rule, for example. 3. (optional) the UE 300 responds to the RAN node 500 to indicate whether it agrees with the rule or not by sending AS message, for example. In one example, no response indicates that UE 300 agrees with the provided rule. 4. (optional) if necessary, the steps 1 through 3 are repeated by the RAN node 500 by adjusting the integrity protection rule until the UE 300 indicates its agreement. 5. (optional) the RAN node 500 informs to the CN 700 regarding the integrity protection rule with the UE 300 . 6. The UE 300 and the RAN node 500 execute the UP traffic transfer using the integrity protection rule provided by the RAN node 500 .
- FIG. 5 illustrates this procedure.
- the UE 300 sends its capability of the integrity protection for the UP traffic.
- the RAN node 500 indicates its rule (or preference) for the integrity protection for the UP traffic. 3. Based on the information exchanged in step 1 and 2, both sides reach agreement in the rule for the integrity protection. 4.
- the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 execute the UP traffic transfer using the integrity protection rule established in step 3.
- the CN 700 indicates the rule (or preference) to the RAN node 500 for the integrity protection rule.
- the integrity protection rule consists of similar type of information as described in variant 1 in the preceding section. But instead of this information being sent by the UE 300 , in this variant, the CN 700 provides the rule to the RAN node 500 .
- the integrity protection rule can be represented in Table 4.
- threshold A and “threshold B” indicate a certain condition for which the UE 300 is under.
- the threshold can indicate data rate, such as specific to DL traffic, specific to UL traffic, or both DL and UL traffic.
- these thresholds can represent some other metric other than data rate.
- the following description is based on the data rate being used as the threshold.
- Condition 1 indicates the data rate is below a certain threshold for which the RAN node 500 is requested to perform full integrity protection on all UP traffic between the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 .
- Condition 2 indicates the data rate is in the “border line zone” where the full integrity protection on all UP traffic may not be possible. Under this condition, the CN 700 requests the RAN node 500 to use either full or partial integrity protection depending on factors such as the actual traffic rate at the time of transmission or reception, etc.
- Condition 3 indicates the data rate is above the threshold where the RAN node 500 is no longer requested to perform full integrity protection on all UP traffic between the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 .
- Threshold A and threshold B in this indication can be determined by the CN 700 or pre-configured in the CN 700 .
- the CN 700 indicates this rule to the RAN node 500 so that the RAN node 500 becomes aware of the integrity protection scheme to be used between the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 based on the defined thresholds.
- FIG. 6 illustrates the procedures for the CN 700 to indicate its rule (or preference) to the RAN node 500 .
- the CN 700 determines the integrity protection rule. 2. The CN 700 informs the rule to the RAN node 500 . 3. (optional) the UE 300 responds to the RAN node 500 to indicate that the RAN node 500 has accepted the rule from the CN 700 . In one example, no response indicates that RAN node 500 agrees with the provided rule. 4. The UE 300 and the RAN node 500 execute the UP traffic transfer using the integrity protection rule provided by the CN 700 .
- the CN 700 first notifies the rule (or preference) to the RAN node 500 . Then based on the rule provided by the CN 700 , the RAN node 500 and the UE 300 establish the integrity protection rule for the UP traffic.
- the integrity protection rule provided by the CN 700 to the RAN node 500 is considered as a guideline for the RAN node 500 to take into account upon negotiating the rule between the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 .
- the integrity protection rule provided by the CN 700 to the RAN node 500 is considered as a mandatory rule for the RAN node 500 and the UE 300 to use; in this case, the negotiation step between the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 is skipped. In this sense, the negotiation step between the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 is optional.
- FIG. 7 illustrates the procedures for the end-to-end integrity protection rule.
- the CN 700 and the RAN node 500 establish the integrity protection rule to be used between the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 . This is based on variant 4 described in the earlier section. 2. (optional) based on the rule established in step 1 above, the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 establish the integrity protection rule to be used between the UE 300 and the RAN node 500 . This is based on either variant 3 described in the earlier section. This step is skipped if the rule provided by the CN 700 in step 1 is indicated as a mandatory for the RAN node 500 to follow. 3. The UE 300 and the RAN node 500 execute the UP traffic transfer using the integrity protection rule established in step 1 and 2.
- This embodiment describes the mechanism in which the transmitter side determines the integrity protection scheme to be used based on a given condition.
- the transmitting side refers to either the UE 300 or the RAN node 500 depending on the direction of the UP traffic—the UE 300 for the UL traffic, and the RAN node 500 for DL traffic.
- FIG. 8 describes the procedure in the transmitting side.
- the transmitter side checks the ongoing data rate for the DRB for the UE 300 (Step 12). Based on the measured data rate, the transmitter determines which integrity protection scheme (full or partial) or no protection is applied to the outgoing traffic (step 13). Depending on this selection, the transmitter applies the selected integrity protection scheme to the outgoing traffic (Step 14 or Step 15) and transmits it to the receiving side (Step 16).
- the transmitter side periodically or continuously monitors the data rate.
- This information collected over a period of time gives indication of the trend in the dynamic change in the data rate.
- This monitored data can be saved for a certain period and used for analysis of the traffic trend. Older ones may be replaced by the newly collected data.
- This information further can be used as a basis to determine the hysteresis upon determining whether a threshold is crossed or not. Use of hysteresis reduces the potential frequent changes in the use of integrity protection or change between the period of integrity protection and the period without integrity protection.
- the transmitter side monitors more than one DRB for a given UE 300 .
- the aggregate data rate for all DRBs may be used to determine the threshold where the integrity protection scheme is changed, turned on or off.
- the transmitter side adjusts the integrity protection scheme to match the corresponding criteria in the rule.
- the transmitter may apply different integrity protection to the UP traffic. For example, depending on the established rule, if the data rate goes above the threshold, then the integrity protection may change from full to partial. Likewise, if the data rate goes down below the threshold, then the integrity protection may change from partial to full. This is depending on the established rule and threshold value.
- information on which type of integrity protection is applied in a given packet can be indicated at the PDCP PDU level.
- one or more reserve bit in the PDCP header can be used to indicate whether the PDCP PDU contains whether full or partial integrity protection is used in the PDU. Using this information, receiving side knows which integrity protection scheme (or no integrity protection) is used in the PDCP PDU.
- FIG. 10 describes the procedure in the receiving side.
- the lower layer indicates the arrival of incoming packet (Step 21).
- the receiving side determines the type of integrity protection used in the received PDCP PDU based on the indication as described above in FIG. 9 as an example (Step 22).
- the receiver check if integrity protection is applied to the received PDU or not, and if so, whether it is a full integrity protection or partial integrity protection (Step 23). Depending on the checking in Step 23, the receiver verifies the integrity of the received PDU using either full integrity protection (Step 24) or partial integrity protection (Step 25).
- the receiver checks if the integrity check is successful or not (Step 26). If it is successful, then the received PDU is passed to the upper layer for further processing (Step 27). If it is a failure, then the received PDU is discarded, and optionally, an error indication is sent to the transmitter side (Step 28).
- the receiving side refers to either the UE 300 or the RAN node 500 depending on the direction of the UP traffic—the UE 300 for the DL traffic, and the RAN node 500 for UL traffic.
- the receiver side determines the type of integrity protection used in the received PDCP PDU based on the information indicated in the PDCP header as described in FIG. 9 .
- the receiver side determines the type of integrity protection used in the received PDCP PDU based on its own measurement of the ongoing data rate.
- the network nodes such as eNB, MME, gNB and AMF in the source or the target system before deciding to accept or reject the mobility request, e.g., handover request or TAU update request.
- the relevant mobility scenarios include interworking between different systems, e.g., between EPS and 5GS in either direction. If the integrity protection capabilities or the mechanism used by the UE 300 are not supported by the target nodes in the target system, the handover or TAU procedure in the target system is either rejected or accepted with changes in UE's integrity protection mechanisms to conform to the supported integrity protection functionalities in the target system.
- the UE's integrity protection capabilities or mechanisms that are verified in these inter-system mobility scenarios include the value or range of the parameters or conditions used for the integrity protection schemes described in this disclosure.
- mapping of the security capabilities is necessary in order to maintain the same integrity protection mechanism being used for the UE 300 , or to derive the alternate integrity protection mechanism for the UE 300 in the target system. If the functionalities in this disclosure are supported in the 5GS system but not in EPS system, then the mapped capabilities to the EPS system is applied to determine whether integrity protection is used for the UE 300 or not as the UE 300 moves to the target system.
- integrity protection for UP data traffic is not used in EPS system and is optional in 5GS system. However it may be used for security reasons. If integrity protection for UP data is required but it's not used or not supported in the target system, then the UE's mobility to the target system is either rejected or the integrity protection mechanism is changed to allow the UE's mobility to the target system.
- mobility to the target system is allowed if the UE 300 accepts the change in integrity protection mechanism supported in the target system.
- the decision in the UE 300 is determined by factors such as the type of service or services the UE 300 is using at the time of the mobility event and their sensitivity of the information or type of communication.
- different type of services is characterized by different level of sensitivity in such a way that integrity protection may or may not be needed. If the UE 300 is using the type of services which does not strictly require the use of integrity protection or reduction or loss of integrity protection is tolerable to the UE 300 , then the mobility to the target system is allowed.
- the mobility to the target system is denied if the UE 300 does not accept, or not able to cope with, the change in the integrity protection mechanism supported in the target system as the result of the mobility event.
- One scenario is where, as the result of the mobility even to the target system, the UE 300 has to incur either loss or reduction in the level of integrity protection for the type of service it uses.
- FIG. 11 shows the general components of the User Equipment (UE 300 ). It consists of memory unit, application processor unit, baseband processor unit, and RF transceiver unit.
- UE 300 User Equipment
- RF transceiver is configured to transmit packet in uplink or receive packet in downlink, and does the radio layer processing such as modulation, de-modulation, radio transmission, reception, etc.
- Baseband processor unit is configured to handle physical layer processing such as configuration, allocation, management, and usage of radio resources, such as physical channels, logical channels, and transport channels.
- Application processor unit is configured to process communication protocol stack, CP signaling, UP traffic handling, application layer message handling, configuration management, fault management, etc.
- Memory unit is configured to store information for the UE 300 .
- FIG. 12 shows the general components of the base station.
- Base station is a generic terminology to refer to the RAN infrastructure and has specific terminology for different generation of mobile systems. For example, it is called gNB in 5G system and eNB in 4G (LTE) system. It consists of memory unit, application processor unit, baseband processor unit, and RF transceiver unit.
- FIG. 13 shows the general components of the network element, such as AMF in the 5G Core Network (CN 700 ). It consists of memory unit, processing unit, and communication unit.
- the above described exemplary embodiments include, although they are not limited to, one or more of the following functionalities:
- the RAN node/CN can determine the maximum data rate for which the UE can perform full integrity protection for the UP traffic. 2) No explicit capability indication from the UE is necessary. 3) Can handle all 3GPP release UEs (irrespective of whether or not the UE supports capability indication of the maximum data rate support for full integrity protection).
- the UE and RAN node can determine the integrity protection rule for UP traffic based on one or more information: 1) UE indication, 2) RAN node indication, 3) CN node indication, 4) combination of multiple indications. 2)
- the RAN node can determine the integrity protection rule based on the UE's capability. 3)
- the RAN node can instruct the integrity protection rule to the UE based on either: 1) RAN node's own rule (or preference) or CN's rule (or preference).
- the UE and the RAN node can negotiate and agree on the integrity protection rule by exchanging capability and rule (or preference).
- the CN can instruct the integrity protection rule to the RAN node based on its own rule (or preference). 6)
- the UE, the RAN node, and the CN can collectively negotiate and agree on the integrity protection rule by exchanging capability and rule (or preference).
- the transmitting side (either the RAN node for DL or the UE for UL) can dynamically determine the type of integrity protection scheme to be used in the PDCP PDU based on the determined criteria. 2)
- the transmitter side (either the RAN node for DL or the UE for UL) can change the integrity protection scheme dynamically based on the rule and threshold. 3)
- the transmitting side (either the RAN node for DL or the UE for UL) can indicate the type of integrity protection used in the PDCP PDU. 4)
- the receiving side can apply the correct integrity protection check to the received PDCP PDU.
- the CN transmit DL UP traffic to the UE with full integrity protection.
- the UE responds to the RAN node or CN if the UE is not able to process full integrity protection to all received DL UP traffic.
- the RAN node or the CN adjusts the DL UP traffic data rate.
- the UE determines it can process full integrity protection to all received DL UP traffic.
- the RAN node or the CN stores the data rate for which the UE is able to process full integrity protection to all received DL UP traffic.
- the UE indicates it integrity protection capability or rule (or preference) to the RAN node or CN.
- the RAN node or the CN uses the received capability information to determine the threshold to determine the integrity protection rule.
- the RAN node indicates its integrity protection rule (or preference) to the UE. 2) The UE uses the received rule (or preference) upon transmitting or receiving the UP traffic.
- the UE and the RAN node exchange the integrity protection capability or rule with each other. 2) The UE and the RAN node agrees on the integrity protection rule to be used.
- the CN indicates its integrity protection rule (or preference) to the RAN node. 2)
- the RAN node uses the received rule (or preference) upon transmitting or receiving the UP traffic to the UE.
- the CN and the RAN node determine the integrity protection rule. 2) The RAN node and UE determine the integrity protection rule. 3) The UE, RAN node, and the CN transmits or receives the UP traffic.
- the transmitter side determines which integrity protection scheme to be used or no integrity protection at all, upon transmitting the UP traffic based on the rule. 2) The transmitter side indicates the type of integrity protection used or not integrity protection at all in the PDCP header. 3) The receive side applies the appropriate integrity protection check to the received PDCP PDU.
- the RAN node or CN can determine the maximum data rate for which the UE can process full integrity protection without explicit indication from the UE itself based on the empirical information driven from the course or normal UP traffic handling.
- the UE, the RAN node, and the CN can determine the integrity protection rule based on threshold values (e.g., data rate).
- threshold values e.g., data rate
- the transmitting side (either the RAN node for DL or the UE for UL) can dynamically determine or change the integrity protection used in the PDCP PDU based on a set of criteria (threshold).
- the transmitting side (either the RAN node for DL or the UE for UL) can indicate the type of integrity protection used in the PDCP PDU.
- FIG. 14 schematically illustrates a mobile (cellular or wireless) telecommunication system 1 to which the above embodiments (and variants thereof) are applicable.
- UEs users of mobile devices 3
- UEs can communicate with each other and other users via respective base stations 5 and a core network 7 using an appropriate 3GPP radio access technology (RAT), for example, an E-UTRA and/or 5G RAT.
- RAT 3GPP radio access technology
- a number of base stations 5 form a (radio) access network or (R)AN.
- R radio access network
- Each base station 5 controls one or more associated cells (either directly or via other nodes such as home base stations, relays, remote radio heads, distributed units, and/or the like).
- a base station 5 that supports E-UTRA/4G protocols may be referred to as an ‘eNB’ and a base station 5 that supports Next Generation/5G protocols may be referred to as a ‘gNBs’. It will be appreciated that some base stations 5 may be configured to support both 4G and 5G, and/or any other 3GPP or non-3GPP communication protocols.
- the mobile device 3 and its serving base station 5 are connected via an appropriate air interface (for example the so-called ‘Uu’ interface and/or the like).
- Neighbouring base stations 5 are connected to each other via an appropriate base station to base station interface (such as the so-called ‘X2’ interface, ‘Xn’ interface and/or the like).
- the base station 5 is also connected to the core network nodes via an appropriate interface (such as the so-called ‘S1’, ‘N1’, ‘N2’, ‘N3’ interface, and/or the like).
- the core network 7 typically includes logical nodes (or ‘functions’) for supporting communication in the telecommunication system 1 .
- the core network 7 of a ‘Next Generation’/5G system will include, amongst other functions, control plane functions (CPFs) 10 and user plane functions (UPFs) 11 .
- CPFs control plane functions
- UPFs user plane functions
- This system 1 is configured to perform the above described exemplary embodiments.
- UE User Equipment
- FIG. 15 is a block diagram illustrating, in more detail, the main components of the UE (mobile device 3 ) shown in FIGS. 11 and 14 .
- the UE 3 includes a transceiver circuit 31 which is operable to transmit signals to and to receive signals from the connected node(s) via one or more antenna 33 .
- the UE will of course have all the usual functionality of a conventional mobile device (such as a user interface 35 ) and this may be provided by any one or any combination of hardware, software and firmware, as appropriate.
- a controller 37 controls the operation of the UE in accordance with software stored in a memory 39 .
- the software may be pre-installed in the memory 39 and/or may be downloaded via the telecommunication network 1 or from a removable data storage device (RMD), for example.
- the software includes, among other things, an operating system 41 and a communications control module 43 .
- the communications control module 43 is responsible for handling (generating/sending/receiving) signalling messages and uplink/downlink data packets between the UE 3 and other nodes, including (R)AN nodes 5 and core network nodes.
- FIG. 16 is a block diagram illustrating, in more detail, the main components of an exemplary (R)AN node 5 (base station) shown in FIGS. 12 and 14 .
- the (R)AN node 5 includes a transceiver circuit 51 which is operable to transmit signals to and to receive signals from connected UE(s) 3 via one or more antenna 53 and to transmit signals to and to receive signals from other network nodes (either directly or indirectly) via a network interface 55 .
- the network interface 55 typically includes an appropriate base station—base station interface (such as X2/Xn) and an appropriate base station—core network interface (such as S1/N1/N2/N3).
- a controller 57 controls the operation of the (R)AN node 5 in accordance with software stored in a memory 59 .
- the software may be pre-installed in the memory 59 and/or may be downloaded via the telecommunication network 1 or from a removable data storage device (RMD), for example.
- the software includes, among other things, an operating system 61 and a communications control module 63 .
- the communications control module 63 is responsible for handling (generating/sending/receiving) signalling between the (R)AN node 5 and other nodes, such as the UE 3 and the core network nodes/network element s.
- FIG. 17 is a block diagram illustrating, in more detail, the main components of a generic core network node (network element or function) shown in FIGS. 13 and 14 .
- the core network node includes a transceiver circuit 71 which is operable to transmit signals to and to receive signals from other nodes (including the UE 3 and the (R)AN node 5 ) via a network interface 75 .
- a controller 77 controls the operation of the core network node in accordance with software stored in a memory 79 .
- the software may be pre-installed in the memory 79 and/or may be downloaded via the telecommunication network 1 or from a removable data storage device (RMD), for example.
- RMD removable data storage device
- the software includes, among other things, an operating system 81 and at least a communications control module 83 .
- the communications control module 83 is responsible for handling (generating/sending/receiving) signaling between the core network node and other nodes, such as the UE 3 , (R)AN node 5 , and other core network nodes.
- Such signaling includes appropriately formatted requests and responses (PDUs) in accordance with one of the above described embodiments.
- the UE, the (R)AN node, and the core network node are described for ease of understanding as having a number of discrete modules (such as the communication control modules). Whilst these modules may be provided in this way for certain applications, for example where an existing system has been modified to implement the disclosure, in other applications, for example in systems designed with the inventive features in mind from the outset, these modules may be built into the overall operating system or code and so these modules may not be discernible as discrete entities. These modules may also be implemented in software, hardware, firmware or a mix of these.
- Each controller may comprise any suitable form of processing circuitry including (but not limited to), for example: one or more hardware implemented computer processors; microprocessors; central processing units (CPUs); arithmetic logic units (ALUs); input/output (TO) circuits; internal memories/caches (program and/or data); processing registers; communication buses (e.g. control, data and/or address buses); direct memory access (DMA) functions; hardware or software implemented counters, pointers and/or timers; and/or the like.
- processing circuitry including (but not limited to), for example: one or more hardware implemented computer processors; microprocessors; central processing units (CPUs); arithmetic logic units (ALUs); input/output (TO) circuits; internal memories/caches (program and/or data); processing registers; communication buses (e.g. control, data and/or address buses); direct memory access (DMA) functions; hardware or software implemented counters, pointers and/or timers; and/or the like.
- the software modules may be provided in compiled or un-compiled form and may be supplied to the UE, the (R)AN node, and the core network node as a signal over a computer network, or on a recording medium. Further, the functionality performed by part or all of this software may be performed using one or more dedicated hardware circuits. However, the use of software modules is preferred as it facilitates the updating of the UE, the (R)AN node, and the core network node in order to update their functionalities.
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EP18204190 | 2018-11-02 | ||
PCT/JP2019/043081 WO2020091056A1 (fr) | 2018-11-02 | 2019-11-01 | Schémas et procédés de protection d'intégrité dans des communications mobiles |
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PCT/JP2019/043081 A-371-Of-International WO2020091056A1 (fr) | 2018-11-02 | 2019-11-01 | Schémas et procédés de protection d'intégrité dans des communications mobiles |
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Cited By (2)
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---|---|---|---|---|
WO2023160347A1 (fr) * | 2022-02-25 | 2023-08-31 | 华为技术有限公司 | Procédé et appareil de protection d'intégrité pour paquet de données, et support de stockage |
WO2023179608A1 (fr) * | 2022-03-25 | 2023-09-28 | 维沃移动通信有限公司 | Procédé et appareil de commande d'information, dispositif de communication et moyen de stockage |
Families Citing this family (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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EP4193671A2 (fr) * | 2020-08-06 | 2023-06-14 | Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) | Protection de l'intégrité d'un plan utilisateur lors d'un transfert d'interfonctionnement entre eps et 5gs |
Family Cites Families (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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JP2008278339A (ja) * | 2007-05-01 | 2008-11-13 | Ntt Docomo Inc | 基地局装置及び通信制御方法 |
KR101831448B1 (ko) * | 2010-02-02 | 2018-02-26 | 엘지전자 주식회사 | 이동 통신 시스템에서 pdcp 기능을 선택적으로 적용하는 방법 |
US10122628B2 (en) * | 2016-05-10 | 2018-11-06 | Intel IP Corporation | Station (STA), access point (AP) and method for rate adaptation |
US10820192B2 (en) * | 2017-06-16 | 2020-10-27 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Downlink transmission in a RAN inactive mode |
US11632676B2 (en) | 2018-01-09 | 2023-04-18 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Service-based access stratum (AS) security configuration |
US20200037165A1 (en) * | 2018-07-30 | 2020-01-30 | Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. | Security protection for user plane traffic |
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- 2019-11-01 WO PCT/JP2019/043081 patent/WO2020091056A1/fr active Application Filing
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Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2023160347A1 (fr) * | 2022-02-25 | 2023-08-31 | 华为技术有限公司 | Procédé et appareil de protection d'intégrité pour paquet de données, et support de stockage |
WO2023179608A1 (fr) * | 2022-03-25 | 2023-09-28 | 维沃移动通信有限公司 | Procédé et appareil de commande d'information, dispositif de communication et moyen de stockage |
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US11910232B2 (en) | 2024-02-20 |
US20220095158A1 (en) | 2022-03-24 |
WO2020091056A1 (fr) | 2020-05-07 |
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