NZ624024B2 - Safety brake with resetting means - Google Patents
Safety brake with resetting means Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- NZ624024B2 NZ624024B2 NZ624024A NZ62402412A NZ624024B2 NZ 624024 B2 NZ624024 B2 NZ 624024B2 NZ 624024 A NZ624024 A NZ 624024A NZ 62402412 A NZ62402412 A NZ 62402412A NZ 624024 B2 NZ624024 B2 NZ 624024B2
- Authority
- NZ
- New Zealand
- Prior art keywords
- brake
- safety
- lift
- travel
- travel direction
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 claims description 57
- 230000000977 initiatory Effects 0.000 claims description 7
- 230000003213 activating Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000000875 corresponding Effects 0.000 description 8
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 7
- 150000002500 ions Chemical class 0.000 description 5
- 230000001702 transmitter Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000004913 activation Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000033228 biological regulation Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000002104 routine Effects 0.000 description 2
- 241000112708 Vates Species 0.000 description 1
- 230000003466 anti-cipated Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010276 construction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000007689 inspection Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000014759 maintenance of location Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000979 retarding Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002441 reversible Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B66—HOISTING; LIFTING; HAULING
- B66B—ELEVATORS; ESCALATORS OR MOVING WALKWAYS
- B66B5/00—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators
- B66B5/02—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators responsive to abnormal operating conditions
- B66B5/16—Braking or catch devices operating between cars, cages, or skips and fixed guide elements or surfaces in hoistway or well
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B66—HOISTING; LIFTING; HAULING
- B66B—ELEVATORS; ESCALATORS OR MOVING WALKWAYS
- B66B5/00—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators
- B66B5/02—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators responsive to abnormal operating conditions
- B66B5/16—Braking or catch devices operating between cars, cages, or skips and fixed guide elements or surfaces in hoistway or well
- B66B5/18—Braking or catch devices operating between cars, cages, or skips and fixed guide elements or surfaces in hoistway or well and applying frictional retarding forces
Abstract
this lift system, a lift car (2) is arranged such that it can be moved along guide rails, and the lift car (2) is equipped with a brake system with preferably two safety brakes. The safety device is actuated via control devices which can trigger the safety device on the basis of critical or non-critical events. Furthermore, the control devices contain a function for automatic resetting (A) of the safety brake when an event which is evaluated as non-critical is specified as reason for the triggering of the safety brake. The resetting of the safety brake takes place by carrying out predefined resetting steps (R) of the lift car (2). ritical events. Furthermore, the control devices contain a function for automatic resetting (A) of the safety brake when an event which is evaluated as non-critical is specified as reason for the triggering of the safety brake. The resetting of the safety brake takes place by carrying out predefined resetting steps (R) of the lift car (2).
Description
PCT/EP2012/O71991
Safety brake with resetting means
Description
The invention relates to a method for resetting a safety brake, which is released for
braking, of a travel body of a lift installation and to a safety device in a lift installation.
The lift installation is installed in a building. it substantially consists of a cage which is
connected by way of support means with a counterweight or with a second cage. The
cage is moved along substantially vertical guide rails by means of a drive which acts
selectably on the support means or directly on the cage or the counterweight. The lift
installation is used in order to convey persons and objects within the ng over
individual or several storeys. The lift installation includes devices in order to safeguard the
lift cage in the case failure of the drive or of the support means. For that e, use is
usually made of safety brakes which in the case of need can brake the lift cage on the
guide rails.
Safety brakes with an electromechanical retaining device are currently known, which
device in an activated state can hold the safety brake in a readiness setting and which in a
deactivated state releases the safety brake for g. EP 1930282 discloses a safety
brake of that kind. In order to reset this safety brake the electromechanical retaining
device has to exert an namic force in order to overcome an air gap. For resetting,
overcoming of the air gap obliges an appropriately dimensioned electromechanical device.
Other safety brakes are equipped with electromechanical trigger devices. In that regard,
the safety brake is held, for example mechanically , in the readiness setting and it is
released by means of an activation signal for braking. The safety brake is automatically
set into a braking setting by a subsequent movement of the lift cage or of the travel body.
EP 1733992 shows, for example, a safety brake of that kind. This device requires a
secure energy supply, which s le triggering of the safety brake even in the
case of a longer interruption of an energy mains.
The invention has the object of providing a method and a corresponding safety device in
order to place a safety brake back in operation, for example in the case of a more lengthy
interruption of energy or also after another switching-off not due to safety . The
method shall obviously guarantee safety of the lift installation at all times.
The solutions described in the ing allow fulfilment of this object.
in a first , the t invention provides a method of resetting a safety brake, which
is released for braking, of a travel body of a lift installation with a retaining device which in
a deactivated state releases the safety brake for braking, the method comprising at least
the resetting steps of:
- activating the retaining device of the safety brake in order to prepare it for holding
the safety brake in a ess setting,
- moving the travel body in a first travel direction in order to at least partly tighten or
re-tighten the safety brake and
— moving the travel body in a second travel direction opposite the first travel direction
in order to bring the safety brake into the readiness g where it is held by the
activated retaining device,
wherein the retaining device is activated before movement of the travel body in the second
travel direction.
In a further aspect, the present invention provides a safety device in a lift installation,
comprising
- a safety brake with a retaining device which in a deactivated state releases the
safety brake for braking,
- a lift l which initiates an automatic resetting of the safety brake when the
safety brake as a consequence of an event evaluated as non-critical has been
released for braking, wherein the automatic resetting comprises return g of
the safety brake released for braking and this return setting takes place in
accordance with the first aspect of the invention.
According to the invention, the lift installation is equipped with a safety device. This
comprises a safety brake which is provided with a safety switch which interrupts a brake
safety circuit when the safety brake is ed for braking. The safety device further
comprises a brake safety control which when required es the safety brake for
braking if on the one hand a fault or a critical event is detected in the lift installation or also
if on the other hand an event ted as non—critical occurs. An event assessed as non—
al is, for e, an energy uption in the building or switching-off of a lift over a
longer period of time or also an event carried out for the purpose of a test. The brake
safety control stores, in the case of releasing of the safety brake for braking, preferably the
cause, or the event, of releasing the safety brake. As soon as the lift control on the hand
recognises that a lift safety circuit or the brake safety circuit is interrupted and on the other
hand a non-critical cause for releasing the safety brake is reported by the brake safety
control, the lift l initiates an automatic resetting of the safety brake. Automatic
means that the process of resetting the safety brake is initiated substantially without
human assistance.
According to the invention, the safety brake of a travel body of the lift installation is
provided with a preferably electromechanical retaining device, which in a deactivated state
releases the safety brake for braking. After releasing of the safety brake the safety brake
is preferably reset in that in a first step the travel body is moved in a first travel ion.
The safety brake is thereby at least partly stressed or at most re—stressed. At the same
time or in the time period before or after this first movement the retaining device of the
safety brake is activated in order to prepare it for retention of the safety brake in its
readiness setting. The travel body is subsequently moved in a second travel ion
opposite the first travel direction. The safety brake is thereby brought into the readiness
setting where it is held by the activated retaining device. The safety brake is thus again in
its readiness setting. Advantageously, this resetting can be carried out in an at least partly
automated process. The procedure has the effect that the safety brake initially comes into
a ng region independently of an instantaneous engagement state. in the clamping
region a bias is generated in the safety brake, which enables return guidance of the
retaining device and the braking elements of the safety brake into the readiness setting.
PCT/EP2012/O71991
If, for example, the safety brake as a consequence of a lengthy energy failure in the
ng has been activated, i.e. the retaining device deactivated, then, for example, a
braking element of the safety brake has been adjusted relative to the rail. Since, however,
no cage movement or no movement of a travel body takes place - since, of course, no
energy is present in the building ~ the safety bake is not actually engaged. Accordingly,
the safety brake is also not stressed. Since, however, in the case of safety brakes of the
kind described in the preceding a ing of the holding or safety brake into the readiness
setting can take place by a ve nt between safety brake and brake rail, this
resetting cannot act, since the safety brake is still not stressed. Through the selective
travel movements carried out in accordance with this aspect of the invention the safety
brake is stressed in a first movement and reset into the readiness setting in a second
movement.
For preference, a downward travel ion is used as first travel direction and
correspondingly an upward travel direction is used as second travel direction. This is
advantageous, since many lift installations are provided merely with a safety brake for
safeguarding against crashing down of the travel body. With selection of the downward
travel direction as first travel direction a selection is thus defined which is appropriately
usable for all lift installations. in addition, a maximum breakaway force is then available for
movement in the second travel direction, since usually in an operating situation of that kind
the lift cage is empty and thus an excess weight of the counterweight is available for the
movement.
The retaining device of the safety brake is preferably activated prior to nt of the
travel body in the second travel direction. Due to this ing tion of the ing
device an accurate determination of the time of activation is superfluous. Since the
retaining device attains its activated state some time in the course of the cage movement it
is directly held in the case of preceding switching on. It is particularly advantageous if the
retaining device of the safety brake is activated already before movement of the travel
body in the first travel direction. A preparatory testing and ing algorithm is thereby
able to be of simple design.
The movement of the travel body in the first travel direction is preferably carried out until
the safety brake at least partly clamps on a brake surface provided for the braking. The
brake surface provided for the braking is usually a brake rail or a guide web of a guide rail,
which is at the same time the brake rail. It is ensured by this first nt of the travel
body that the safety brake has a minimum g or that it is at least partly clamped on
the brake rail.
The at least partial clamping, which is carried out, of the safety brake on the brake surface
provided for braking is preferably detected in that either a travel path of the travel body is
ascertained, preferably by means of measuring a rotational movement of the drive pulley,
and compared with a travel target . As soon as the travel body has covered a
defined travel path, which is usually determined experimentally, it can be assumed
therefrom that a partial clamping of the safety brake has taken place. Usual lift drives
already have measuring systems such as tachometers or incremental transmitters on the
drive shaft in order to ascertain a travel path on the basis of the rotational nt of the
drive pulley. This embodiment is accordingly advantageous.
Alternatively or additionally a drive torque of the drive engine can be detected, preferably
by means of measurement of the drive current, n this drive torque is compared with
a target torque. As soon as the drive torque reaches or exceeds a pre-defined value it can
be d therefrom that an at least partial clamping of the safety brake has taken
place. This embodiment is particularly reliable, since the drive torque provides a direct
nce to the clamping that has taken place.
Alternatively, a time duration for the movement of the travel body in the first travel direction
can also be ascertained and compared with a limit time value. Here, too, the ed time
duration can preferably be determined experimentally. This embodiment is a particularly
economic embodiment, since no special sensors are required.
For preference, subsequently to the first movement of the travel body the movement of the
travel body in the second travel direction is carried out. This second movement is carried
out until the brake safety circuit is closed and the travel body has covered a ined
travel path. Closing of the brake safety circuit usually indicates that the safety brake is
again in its readiness setting. In on, it is d by the travel path which is covered
that all components of the safety brake and at most the entire travel body are free.
Alternatively or additionally, the drive torque of the drive engine is also monitored and the
PCT/EP2012/O71991
movement of the travel body in the second travel ion is ended it the drive torque
attains an indicator value. A substantial drive torque is usually required for movement of
the travel body in the second travel direction, since the safety brake has to be moved out
of its clamping position. It can now be established by the measurement if the drive torque
or the start-off torque exceeds a peak value and then returns to a substantially constant
value or into the range of the indicator value.
For preference, termination criteria are defined which terminate or at least interrupt the
movement of the travel body in the second travel direction if, for example, the drive torque
of the drive engine reaches or s a maximum limit value. A time limit can be
attached to this limit value. This means that the movement of the travel body in the
second travel direction is terminated if the drive torque of the drive engine exceeds a
working limit value during a pre-defined time limit. Alternatively, a time limit duration can
also be ermined for time limitation of the second movement.
The movement of the travel body in the second travel direction is preferably similarly
terminated if a limit position of the travel body in the lift shaft is passed or obviously also if
an unsafe state of the lift installation is detected. For e, if on occasion an electronic
speed limiter ains an excessive speed the retaining device of the safety brake is
deactivated again which in every case leads to directly actuation of the brake less of
the taneous reset . Thus, special events can be taken into consideration in the
resetting. Thus, for e, an energy failure in the building can coincidentally take place
when the lift cage or the travel body is entirely at the top or at the bottom in an extreme
position or in a limit position near a shaft end in the lift shaft. Since the lift cage in this
situation can already be located near the shaft end it is obviously not possible for a large
movement to take place in one of the travel directions. In individual cases of that kind
possible damage is prevented by the termination ia.
The resetting steps are preferably selectively repeated if after conclusion or after
termination of the movement of the travel body in the second travel direction has taken
place the brake safety circuit is not closed. This can be helpful if, for example, in the case
of a first resetting attempt a start-off torque is not sufficient to break loose the travel body
or the safety brake. The ing process can then selectively be initiated again. This
can, for example, be repeated two to three times. To the extent that after these multiple
attempts the resetting cannot be successfully concluded, automatic resetting is preferably
PCT/EP2012/O71991
terminated. The resetting procedure can then be initiated again, for example, only by an
authorised person such as a service engineer.
The readiness setting of the safety brake is preferably monitored and a brake safety circuit
of the lift installation is closed it the safety brake in the readiness g thereof and the
retaining device are activated. The brake safety circuit of the lift installation ise is or
remains interrupted as long as the safety brake or the retaining device is not in the
readiness setting thereof. it is thus ensured that the lift installation cannot transition into
normal operation as long as the safety brake is not in its readiness setting.
The lift safety circuit is preferably checked before movement of the travel body in the first
travel direction and the movement in the first travel direction is ed only when
predetermined parts of the lift safety circuit have been found to be in order. Safety of the
lift installation and any users in the environment of the lift installation is y ensured.
The lift safety circuit is, for example, opened when accesses to the lift shaft are not closed
or if important functional parts such as, for example, a cable tension, a buffer device, a
on detection device or the speed measuring device, etc., are not functionally capable.
The predetermined parts of the lift safety circuit preferably include, with the exception of
the brake safety circuit, all remaining parts of the lift safety circuit. The brake safety circuit
is preferably bridged over, since it is obviously open, because the safety brake is no longer
in the readiness g thereof when the retaining device is deactivated. Thus, it is
necessary to exclude this part of the lift safety t for the ment for starting the
resetting.
For preference, in a first step prior to performance of the ing steps a fault status of a
brake control is interrogated and the appropriate procedure is selected in ence on
the fault status.
The resetting steps can, for example, be automatically initiated if the retaining device as a
consequence of the event evaluated as non—critical was deactivated and at the same time
the safety circuit of the lift installation designates the icant parts of the lift installation
as safe. Non—critical events are, for example, an intentional deactivation of the retaining
device as a consequence of an energy failure in order to save energy when the lift
installation is at a standstill or if as a uence of a self-test a deactivation of the
retaining device takes place. Automatic initiation of the resetting steps signifies that a
control, for example a lift control, generates and executes an appropriate travel command
by the drive of the lift installation being appropriately controlled.
The resetting steps can on the other hand also be manually initiated if the ing device
was not deactivated as a consequence of an event evaluated as non-critical or if the safety
t of the lift installation does not designate the installation as safe. This means that
assessment by a qualified or an authorised person is required. This person assesses the
state of the lift, ates necessary s or on on even carries these out himself
or herself. After the state of the lift lation has been assessed by the authorised
person as safe, he or she can by way of appropriate commands initiate resetting of the
safety device or the safety brake, wherein then these resetting steps are selectably directly
carried out by the authorised person or that person merely gives release for automatic
initiation of the resetting steps. Through this method the safety of the lift installation is
guaranteed to the best possible extent at any time and at the same time the lift installation
is not unnecessarily taken out of operation.
Manual initiation of the resetting steps is, as explained in the preceding, preferably carried
out by an authorised . In this regard, advantageously an authorisation of the
authorised person is d in order to ish whether the person is actually
authorised to perform the required actions competently. For this purpose, for example, an
authorisation code has to be input into the brake l or into the lift control. In a simple
check the control can establish whether this authorisation code corresponds with the
presets. This authorisation code can be a code recorded in the service documents or it
can correspond with a part of an identification number of the brake control.
Alternatively, a pre-defined d and action cycle for checking the authorisation can
also be used. This is, for example, a double actuation of a lift call button followed by an
actuation of a control button within a predetermined time.
Alternatively, a preferably personal key can also be connected with the brake control or the
lift control. The key can be a mechanical key by which access to specific functions of the
lift is made possible. It can also be an electronic key such as an electronic card, etc., by
which access to specific functions of the lift is made le. The s solutions allow
attainment of a level of safety and serviceability matched to the lift installation.
PCT/EP2012/O71991
Manual initiation of the resetting steps preferably includes manual actuation of the status
of the brake control. This means that the authorised person has to acknowledge the
status or fault status stored in the brake control, obviously after an exert ment and
repair. Subsequently, a manual movement of the travel body is carried out, preferably
directly by the authorised person, by means of actuation of the lift drive in a first travel
direction and a subsequent manual movement of the travel body in the second travel
direction te the first travel direction. in this regard, the authorised person has
complete control over the nt state. The person can immediately terminate the
travels at any time if larities are ascertained.
The required control functions are preferably divided up between the lift control and the
brake control. Thus, the brake control, which advantageously also includes a so-termed
electronic speed limiter or is connected with such, for example the control of the retaining
device, includes a device for bridging over the brake safety circuit and a communications
interface with respect to the lift control. The brake control deactivates the ing device
of the safety brake in a fault case, for example excess speed, and opens the associated
part of the safety circuit of the lift. However, it deactivates, for example, the retaining
device of the safety brake also when the energy supply is upted over a
predetermined longer period of time or when other events assessed as non-critical occur.
The brake control stores this trigger event as non-critical in a non—volatile memory.
The lift control includes the parts ed for control of the lift, in particular it is in a
on of activating the lift drive for movement of the travel body of the lift and in a
position of icating with the brake control. After ing-off of the entire lift, for
example if an energy mains of the building is switched off, the entire lift is in a current-free
state and the brake control deactivates, in accordance with definition, the retaining device
of the safety brake. After switching back on of the energy supply to the lift the lift control
ascertains an interruption of the safety circuit at the safety brake, whereby starting—off of
the lift is prevented. The brake control checks the actual safety status and on the one
hand establishes — for example by means of a est function - that the function of the
l and of the, for example integrated, electronic speed limiter is available and r
establishes that the cause of switching—off was non-critical, since a corresponding entry
was filed in the non-volatile memory. The brake control passes on this information to the
lift control, which now initiates ing of the safety brake. The lift control checks the
status of the rest of the safety circuit and then triggers the corresponding resetting steps.
The aforesaid method and the corresponding safety device enable provision of a safer lift
installation which can operate with minimum energy resources and which is nevertheless
rapidly serviceable again in the case of ic events or after specific events.
The ned embodiments and solutions can be varied and supplemented by the expert.
The expert selects the solutions preferred for a specific installation and combines them.
Exemplifying embodiments are explained in the following by way of examples and
schematic ments, in which:
Fig. 1 shows a schematic view of a lift installation in side view,
Fig. 2 shows a schematic view of the lift installation in section,
Fig. 3 shows a schematic flow chart of resetting of a safety brake,
Fig. 4 shows a schematic flow chart for initiation of resetting,
Fig. 5 shows a schematic flow chart for manual initiation of resetting,
Fig. 6 shows a schematic ration of an electrically linked safety system,
Fig. 75 shows a side view of am embodiment of a safety brake in a first, unactuated
position,
Fig. 7f shows a front view of the safety brake of Fig. 7s
Fig. 83 shows a side view of the safety brake of Fig. 73 in a second, actuated
position and
Fig. 8f shows a front view of the safety brake of Fig. 85.
The same references are used in the figures for equivalent parts in all figures.
2012/O71991
Fig. 1 shows a lift lation 1 in an overall view. The lift installation 1 is installed in a
building and serves for the ort for persons or es within the building. The lift
installation comprises a lift cage 2 which can move upwardly and downwardly along guide
rails 6. The lift cage 2 is for that purpose provided with guide shoes 8 which guide the lift
cage as accurately as possible along a ermined travel path. The lift cage 2 is
accessible from the building by way of shaft doors 12. A drive 5 serves for driving and
holding the lift cage 2. The drive 5 is arranged in, for e, the upper region of the
building and the cage 2 hangs by support means 4, for example support cables or support
belts, at the drive 5. The support means 4 are led by way of the drive 5 onward to a
counterweight 3. The counterweight compensates for a mass component of the lift cage 2
so that the drive 5 primarily merely has to compensate for an imbalance between cage 2
and counterweight 3. In the example, the drive 5 is arranged in the upper region of the
building. It could obviously also be ed at another location in the ng or in the
region of the cage 2 or the countenNeight 3.
The lift installation 1 is controlled by a lift control 10. The lift l 10 receives user
requests, optimises the operational course of the lift installation and controls, usually by
way of a drive control 9, the drive 5. The drive 5 is equipped with an encoder or
incremental itter 14. A rotational movement of an axle of the drive can thus be
detected and communicated to the drive control 9 for the purpose of regulation of the
drive. This incremental transmitter 14 can also be used for detecting the travel path of the
lift cage 2 and thus for regulation and control thereof. The lift control 10 additionally
monitors the safety state of the lift installation and interrupts the travel operation if an
unsafe operational state arises. This monitoring is usually performed with use of a lift
safety circuit in which all safety-relevant functions are integrated. In monitoring of that kind
or in this lift safety circuit there are also incorporated, for example, shaft door contacts 13,
which monitor correct closing of the shaft doors 12 and, for example, also limit positions of
the travel body 2, 3 in the lift shaft are monitored by means of upper and lower limit
switches 16, 17.
The lift cage 2 and, if required, also the rweight 3 are further equipped with a brake
system suitable for safeguarding and/or retarding the lift cage 2 in the case of an
unexpected movement or in the case of excess speed. In the example, the brake system
comprises two cal safety brakes 20, 20' which are installed on the travel body 2, 3 at
both sides thereof. The safety brakes 20, 20' are, in the example, arranged below the
cage 2 and they are electrically activated by way of a brake control 11. This brake control
11 preferably also includes an onic speed or travel plot limiter which monitors travel
movements of the lift cage 2. A speed limiter, as is usually used, can ingly be
eliminated.
Fig. 2 shows the lift installation of Fig. 1 in a schematic plan view. The brake system
comprises the two safety brakes 20, 20'. The two safety brakes 20, 20' are, in this
example, coupled by means of a synchronisation rod 15 so that the two safety brakes 20,
' are arily actuated together. An unintended one—sided braking can thus be
avoided. The two safety brakes 20, 20' are preferably constructed to be identical or in
mirror symmetry and they act on the brake rails 7 arranged on either side of the cage 2.
The brake rails 7 are, in the example, identical with the guide rails 6.
It is also possible to dispense with the synchronisation rod 15. However, electrical
synchronisation means, which ensure aneous triggering of safety brakes 20, 20'
arranged on either side of the lift cage, are then recommended.
One possible e of the safety brake 20, 20' is shown in Figs. 7 and 8 and explained
in the following. The two safety brakes 20, 20' are functionally identical, for which reason
there is discussion in the following merely of the safety brake 20. The safety brake 20
comprises a brake housing 21 with a brake element 22. The brake housing 21 is held by a
retaining device 28 in a readiness setting (Figs. 73, 7f). The retaining device 28 is for that
purpose fixed by means of a ing magnet 29. This position of the retaining magnet 28
is controlled by a first brake t 24. In the example, the first brake contact 24
comprises a t bridge 25 and contact locations 26, which are led to a brake safety
circuit 23. Alternatively or additionally, the readiness setting of the safety brake 20 can
also be checked by way of a second brake contact 27. This second brake contact 27
monitors, in the example, the brake element 22 and this second brake contact 27 is also
connected, on occasion in series with the first brake contact 24, with the brake safety
circuit 23. The retaining magnet 29 is connected with the brake control 11 and with
corresponding energy sources 30 and is controlled by the brake control 11.
As soon as the brake control 11 vates the retaining magnet 29 (Figs. 83, 8f) the
safety brake 20 is displaced into its braking position, wherein the brake element 22 is
brought into contact with the brake or guide rail 6, 7. Insofar as the lift cage continues to
move in relation to the brake or guide rail 6, 7, this leads to a further engagement of the
safety brake 20 and ultimately to secure braking of the lift cage 2. With deactivation of the
retaining magnet 29 or of the retaining device 28 the first brake contact 24 is interrupted,
the optional second brake contact 27 is also upted h the movement of the
brake housing 21 and the brake element 22 and the brake safety circuit 23 is interrupted,
whereby operation of the lift installation 1 is discontinued.
Fig. 6 shows a possible circuit diagram of an electrically coupled brake system. The brake
contacts 24, 27 of the two safety brakes 20, 20' are, in the e, connected in series
and led as brake safety circuit 23 to the brake control 11. The state of the brake safety
t 23 is evaluated in the brake control 11 and integrated in the lift safety circuit 19.
The brake control 11 includes an electronic speed limiter 18 which on the one hand
monitors travel operation and a general state of the list installation. The retaining magnets
29 of the two safety brakes 20, 20' are, in the example, similarly connected in series and
led to the brake control 11, from wherein the retaining magnets 29 can be controlled and
caused to t current by an energy source 30. Through the series t it is
achieved that in the case of interruption of the electrical line both or all retaining magnets
29 of the safety brakes 20 are necessarily deactivated. The series circuit is preferably
executed in the brake control 11. This means that the retaining magnets 29 of the two
safety brakes 20, 20' are separately connected with the brake l and the series circuit
is executed in the brake control 11.
The electronic speed limiter 18 can now, if required, interrupt not only the lift safety circuit
19, but also the holding current t of the ing magnets 29, whereby the safety
brake 20 is released for braking.
If the speed limiter 18 in a first case ascertains, for example, an excessive travel speed it
interrupts the holding current circuit of the retaining magnet 29, whereby the lift cage 2 is
braked. At the same time it interrupts, through opening of a first upter 31, the lift
safety circuit 19, whereupon the lift control 10 brakes and shuts down the drive 5 of the lift
lation. The speed r 18 stores the cause of the actuation as relevant or critical
and provides the appropriate fault status signal 81 in a non-volatile memory.
If, in another case, the speed limiter 18 ascertains that the brake safety circuit 23 has, for
example, opened without obvious reason, it interrupts the holding current circuit of the
PCT/EP2012/O71991
retaining magnet 29 and the lift safety circuit 19 and thus stops the lift installation. it is
thus ed that in the case of an erroneous triggering of one of the safety brakes 20,
' the second safety brake 20‘, 20 is also immediately ed. A ded braking is
thus prevented. The speed limiter 18 stores the cause of the actuation as relevant or
critical and provides the appropriate fault status signal St in the non-volatile memory.
If, in a r case, the speed limiter 18 ascertains that, for example, the stopped lift
installation is or is to be at standstill over a longer period of time it similarly interrupts the
holding t circuit of the retaining magnet 29, although no relevant fault is present in
the lift installation. The retaining device 28 is thereby released and the safety brake 20 is
moved into the g position without, however, braking, since the lift cage is at standstill
and thus the safety brake 20 is not re-tightened. The speed limiter 18 stores the cause of
the actuation as non-relevant or as non-critical and es the appropriate fault status
signal 81 in the non-volatile memory.
Moreover, the electronic speed limiter 18 can, on corresponding request, bridge over the
brake safety circuit 23 by a bridge contact 32 in order to enable, in accordance with need,
a controlled movement of the lift cage 2.
In this last—illustrated case, the safety brake 20 is correspondingly adjusted into a brake
readiness position and the retaining device 28 is deactivated. Correspondingly, the brake
safety circuit 23 is also interrupted and the lift safety circuit 19 is obviously also interrupted,
on the one hand by the brake safety circuit 23, but also by opening the first interrupter 31.
If in this case the energy supply of the building or the lift installation is switched back on,
the lift control 10 ascertains, after possible self-testing and initialisation routines have been
run through, that the lift safety circuit 19 is upted, in particular in the region of the
cage safety system. The lift l now starts, as illustrated in Fig. 4, an event analysis F.
At the same time with the switching-on of the t supply, the brake control 11 has also
run through possible internal tests and initialisation routines and has ascertained that in
accordance with the stored fault status signal 81 the cause of the actuation was
ined to be non-relevant or non—critical and that a function of the brake control 82
itself is evaluated as . The lift control ogates the fault status signal S1 and the
function readiness report 82 in the event analysis F and determines the further procedure
therefrom. To the extent that the signal 81 communicates the report "non—critical" and the
PCT/EP2012/O71991
signal 82 communicates the report " onal test passed" the lift control 10 starts,
insofar as remaining parts of the lift safety circuit 19 are in order, an automatic ing A,
which is explained in more detail in the following under Fig. 3. ise, further operation
of the lift installation remains interrupted until a manual resetting M is carried out, as is
explained later with reference to Fig. 5.
After start of the automatic resetting A (Fig. 3), in the example the functional integrity 82 of
the brake l 11 as well as remaining parts of the lift safety circuit 19 is checked RO.1
and, in the case of a positive result "yes" an optional indication D2 or notification in the
region of storeys or in the cage 2 is, for example, , which indicates that a resetting
travel will shortly be carried out. Subsequently, the brake control 11 closes, after
corresponding instruction by the lift control 10, the first interrupter 31 of the lift safety circuit
19 and temporarily bridges over the brake safety circuit 23. At the same time, the retaining
device 28 of the safety brake is activated R1 in that a second interrupter 33 of the retaining
device is closed and the retaining magnet 29 is current-conducting in order to prepare the
retaining device 28 for holding the safety brake 20 in the readiness setting.
The lift control 10 uently gives corresponding travel commands in order to move R2
the cage 2 or on occasion the counterweight 3 in a first travel direction at a ably low
speed. The safety brake, which before the movement was merely adjusted t the
rails 6, 7, but not actually clamped, is thus at least partly tightened or re—tightened. This
movement in the first travel direction is preferably carried out until the safety brake at least
partly clamps R21 on the brake surface, which is provided for braking, of a brake or guide
rail. The clamping R2.1 which has been carried out can, for e, be ascertained in
that a travel path of the travel body is ained, possibly by means of the s of the
incremental transmitter 14, and compared with a travel target preset. Alternatively or
additionally a drive torque of the drive motor can also be ascertained, preferably by means
of measuring the drive current, and compared with a target torque or also a time on
for the movement of the travel body in the first travel direction can simply be ascertained
and compared with a limit time value.
Subsequently to the first movement R2 in the first travel direction the lift control 10
predetermines a reversal of the travel direction and the drive 5 correspondingly moves the
lift cage or the counterweight in the opposite, second travel direction R3.
2012/O71991
Through the movement R2 in the first travel direction the safety brake was brought into
place for clamping with the rail. On occasion, ing on the respective form of
construction of the safety brake 20, the retaining device 28 could also thereby be already
t into the holding position. The safety brake is reset into the actual operating
on by the second movement R3. This second movement R3 in the second travel
direction is basically continued until the safety brake has been reset R3.1. This can
usually be ascertained in simple manner in that, for example, it is checked whether the
safety brake Circuit 23 is closed, thus the safety brake 20 is in the readiness setting, or in
that a travel path is measured or, as a particularly reliable possibility, in that the drive
torque of the drive motor is measured. As soon as the drive torque has attained an
indicator value, which usually corresponds with the constant movement moment of the
empty cage, the safety brake 20 is free, thus no longer in ng state.
in the sequence according to Fig. 3 there is ring, by way of example, above all of
the movement in the second travel direction in that every journey is interrupted R32 if an
unsafe state of the lift installation is recognised. This monitoring preferably applies during
every travel movement. Thus, in particular, the travel is interrupted if, for example, the
drive torque of the drive motor reaches a maximum limit value, if the drive torque of the
drive motor exceeds a working limit value during a time limit, if a limit time period is
reached, if limit positions of the travel body in the lift shaft are passed or if the lift safety
t 19 detects another unsafe state. In these cases, usually a manual resetting M is
initiated or demanded.
The significant steps of the resetting R of the safety brake 20 thus include activating R1 of
the retaining device of the safety brake in order to prepare it for g the safety brake in
a readiness setting, a movement of the travel body in a first travel direction R2 in order to
at least partly tighten or re-tighten the safety brake and a movement of the travel body in a
second travel direction R3, which is opposite the first travel direction, in order to bring the
safety brake into the readiness setting, where it is held by the activated retaining device.
In the example of Fig. 3 the resetting steps R are possibly selectively repeated R4 is after
conclusion of the movement of the travel body in the second travel direction the brake
safety circuit is still not , but no fault in the lift installation has been ascertained.
Since safety brakes can certainly require a high level of resetting energy or force, a first
start~off is possibly not sufficient.
PCT/EP2012/O71991
As already mentioned, the detection of unsafe states or departures from anticipated
our lead to termination or arting of the automatic resetting A. In these cases,
manual resetting M has to be d out, as is schematically illustrated in Fig. 5. For this
purpose, an authorised person 35 is summoned. This summons is carried out by way of
known service channels, either electronically targeted by the lift control or, for example,
telephonically by persons concerned. The authorised person in a first step undertakes
requisite expert diagnoses of the lift installation and instigates possible repairs M1. As
soon as at least the primary functions and safety of the lift installation are given, the
authorised person performs, for example, the resetting steps R by manual control. The
person switches on the holding current circuit of the retaining device 28 and possibly
bridges over the brake safety circuit 23. He or she subsequently moves the lift cage, for
example through use of a so—called inspection control, in the first travel direction until he or
she ascertains a small ng resistance. He or she subsequently moves the lift cage
downwardly against the first travel ion until the lift cage runs freely. He or she
subsequently performs obviously appropriate final checks on the lift installation before
releasing the lift installation again for normal use.
Alternatively, the ised person 35 starts resetting h input of an authorisation
code 36 into the lift control. The authorisation code 36 signals to the lift control 10 that the
person 35 is, in fact, authorised to initiate an appropriate chain of commands. The
authorisation code 36 can, for example, correspond with a part of an fication number
of the brake control. atively, a pre—defined command and action cycle can also be
ed in agreement. This is, for example, a command by way of a control keyboard of
the lift control followed by a reset command of the lift control within a time window of, for
example, 10 seconds. These isation checks prevent spurious manipulations by the
Alternatively, the authorisation code 36 includes a preferably personal key 34 which is
connected with the brake l 11 or the lift control 10. The key can be a mechanical
key by which access to specific functions of the lift is made possible. It can also be an
electronic key, such as an electronic card, etc., by which access to specific functions of the
lift is made possible. Through use of the key 34 the bearer thereof is identifiable.
After input of the authorisation code 36 the brake control it or the lift control 10 checks the
PCT/EP2012/O71991
authorisation M3 and in the case of a successful check initiates automatic resetting A as
previously described. In every case a negative check result also here leads back to
termination of automatic resetting.
The illustrated ments and sequences can be varied by the expert. The association
of dual functions with the lift control 10 or brake l 11 can be exchanged or all
functions can be combined in a control group. The authorisation check M3 can also be
used for other part steps of the lift maintenance such as, for example, for authorising
performance of test activities at the brake control 11 or the safety brakes 20.
WHAT WE
Claims (18)
1. Method of resetting a safety brake, which is released for braking, of a travel body of a lift installation with a retaining device which in a deactivated state releases the safety brake for braking, the method comprising at least the ing steps of: - activating the retaining device of the safety brake in order to prepare it for g the safety brake in a readiness setting, — moving the travel body in a first travel direction in order to at least partly tighten or re-tighten the safety brake and - moving the travel body in a second travel direction opposite the first travel direction in order to bring the safety brake into the readiness setting where it is held by the activated retaining device, wherein the retaining device is activated before movement of the travel body in the second travel direction.
2. Method according to claim 1, wherein the retaining device is an electromechanical retaining device.
3. Method ing to claim 1 or claim 2, wherein a downward travel direction is used as first travel direction and correspondingly an upward travel direction is used as second travel direction.
4. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the retaining device is activated before movement of the travel body in the first travel direction.
5. Method according to claim 4, wherein the movement of the travel body in the first travel direction is performed until the safety brake at least partly clamps on a brake surface, which is ed for the g, of a brake rail or guide rail.
6. Method according to claim 5, wherein the executed at least partial clamping of the safety brake on the brake surface provided for the braking is ained in that - a travel path of the travel body is detected, preferably by means of measuring a rotational movement of the drive pulley, and compared with a travel target preset and/or — a drive torque of the drive engine is detected, preferably by means of measuring a drive current, and is compared with a target torque or — a time on for movement of the travel body in the first travel direction is detected and compared with a limit time value.
7. Method according to any one of claims 4 to 6, wherein the movement of the travel body is carried out in the second travel direction until the safety brake is reset, wherein this is ascertained when a brake safety circuit is closed, and - the travel body has covered a pre-defined travel path and/or - the drive torque of the drive engine attains an indicator value.
8. Method according to claim 7, wherein the movement of the travel body in the second travel direction is terminated when - the drive torque of the drive motor has reached a maximum limit value or - the drive torque of the drive motor has exceeded a working limit value during a time limit or - a limit time period is reached or — limit positions of the travel body in the lift shaft are passed or ~ a lift safety circuit detects an unsafe state.
9. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein resetting steps are selectively repeated if after conclusion of the movement of the travel body in the second travel direction the brake safety t is not closed.
10. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein the readiness setting of the safety brake is monitored and the brake safety circuit of the lift installation is closed if the safety brake is in its readiness g and the ing device is activated and the brake safety circuit of the lift installation is interrupted if the safety brake or the ing device is not in the readiness setting thereof.
11. Method ing to any one of claims 1 to 10, wherein prior to nt of the travel body in the first travel direction the lift safety circuit is checked and the movement in the first travel direction is performed only if predetermined parts of the lift safety circuit are found to be in order, n the predetermined parts of the lift safety circuit preferably include, with the exception of the brake safety circuit, all remaining parts of the lift safety circuit.
12. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 11, wherein the ing steps are tically ted when the retaining device was deactivated as a consequence of an event evaluated as non-critical, a functional readiness report of a brake control is present and the safety circuit of the lift installation designates the installation as safe, and the resetting steps are manually initiated when the retaining device has not been deactivated as a consequence of an event evaluated as non—critical, the functional readiness report of the brake control is not t or the safety circuit of the lift installation does not designate the installation as safe, wherein the onal readiness report of the brake control is interrogated in a first step prior to performance of the resetting steps.
13. Method according to claim 12, wherein the manual initiation of the resetting steps is performed by an authorised person, wherein an authorisation is checked in that a authorisation code is input into the brake control or into the lift control, wherein this isation code corresponds with, for example, a part of an identification number of the brake control, or a predefined command and action cycle is performed or a preferably personal key is connected with the brake control or the lift control.
14. Method according to claim 12 or claim 13, wherein the manual tion of the resetting steps es: manual confirmation of the status of the brake control and a subsequent manual movement of the travel body in a first travel direction and a subsequent manual movement of the travel body in a second travel direction opposite to the first travel direction, wherein the manual movement is performed by means of actuation of a lift drive.
15. Safety device in a lift installation, sing a safety brake with a retaining device which in a deactivated state releases the safety brake for braking, a lift control which initiates an automatic resetting of the safety brake when the safety brake as a consequence of an event evaluated as non—critical has been released for braking, wherein the automatic resetting comprises return setting of the safety brake ed for braking and this return setting takes place in accordance with any one of the methods of claims 1 to 11.
16. Safety device according to claim 15, wherein the retaining device is an electromechanical retaining device.
17. A method according to claim 1, substantially as herein described or exemplified with reference to the accompanying drawings.
18. A safety device substantially as herein described with reference to and as shown in the anying drawings.
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP11191102.0 | 2011-11-29 | ||
EP11191102 | 2011-11-29 | ||
PCT/EP2012/071991 WO2013079288A1 (en) | 2011-11-29 | 2012-11-07 | Safety brake with resetting means |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
NZ624024A NZ624024A (en) | 2015-06-26 |
NZ624024B2 true NZ624024B2 (en) | 2015-09-29 |
Family
ID=
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