HRP970160A2 - Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method - Google Patents
Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this methodInfo
- Publication number
- HRP970160A2 HRP970160A2 HR96200907.2A HRP970160A HRP970160A2 HR P970160 A2 HRP970160 A2 HR P970160A2 HR P970160 A HRP970160 A HR P970160A HR P970160 A2 HRP970160 A2 HR P970160A2
- Authority
- HR
- Croatia
- Prior art keywords
- decoder
- conditional access
- key
- access module
- encrypted message
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 28
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 title claims description 12
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 claims description 15
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000006837 decompression Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
- H04N21/436—Interfacing a local distribution network, e.g. communicating with another STB or one or more peripheral devices inside the home
- H04N21/4367—Establishing a secure communication between the client and a peripheral device or smart card
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
- H04N21/418—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
- H04N21/4181—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access for conditional access
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N7/00—Television systems
- H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
- H04N7/162—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing
- H04N7/163—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing by receiver means only
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N7/00—Television systems
- H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
- H04N7/167—Systems rendering the television signal unintelligible and subsequently intelligible
- H04N7/1675—Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Multimedia (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Communication Control (AREA)
- Paper (AREA)
- Electrotherapy Devices (AREA)
- Mechanical Treatment Of Semiconductor (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
Description
Postupak kojim se omogućava sigurna komunikacija između dva uređaja i primjena navedenog postupka.
Ovaj izum odnosi se na postupak kojim se omogućava sigurna komunikacija između dva uređaja, posebice između uređaja koji se koriste u TV sustavu s karticom.
U TV sustavu s karticom, svaki korisnik općenito posjeduje dekoder za dešifriranje izvornog signala, pri čemu taj dekoder sadrži modul za uvjetovani pristup te inteligentnu karticu za dešifriranje poruka za kontrolu i upravljanje ovlaštenjem. Kako bi se spriječilo neovlašteno korištenje dekodera za dešifriranje izvornog signala, važno je na primjer, spriječiti prespajanje između ovlaštene i neovlaštene inteligentne kartice.
Svrha je izuma osigurati postupak gore navedenog tipa gdje je komunikacija između dva uređaja, npr. modula za kontrolu pristupa i inteligentne kartice ili dekodera i modula za uvjetovani pristup, uspostavljena na takav način da je prespajanje između ovlaštenih i neovlaštenih uređaja nemoguće.
U skladu s izumom, osigurava se postupak naznačen time da prvi uređaj generira slučajan ključ (Ci) i prenosi navedeni ključ drugom uređaju u prvoj poruci šifriranoj javnim ključem pri čemu navedeni drugi uređaj dešifrira prvu šifriranu poruku pomoću odgovarajućeg tajnog ključa kako bi rekonstruirao navedeni slučajni ključ (Ci) koji se koristi za daljnje šifriranje i dešifriranje poruka između tih dvaju uređaja.
U skladu s izumom ovaj postupak se može primijeniti u dekoderu za TV sustav s karticom gdje se navedeni dekoder sastoji od modula za uvjetovani pristup i inteligentne kartice a pri čemu je navedeni postupak primijenjen kako bi se osigurala sigurna komunikacija između modula za kontrolu pristupa i inteligentne kartice ili između dekodera i modula za uvjetovani pristup.
Izum nadalje određuje dekoder za TV sustav s karticom koji se sastoji od modula za uvjetovani pristup i inteligentne kartice pri čemu navedeni modul za uvjetovani pristup ima sposobnost generiranja slučajnog ključa (Ci), šifriranja navedenog ključa u prvoj šifriranoj poruci metodom javnog ključa, prenošenja prve šifrirane poruke do inteligentne kartice koja ima sposobnost primiti i dešifrirati prvu šifriranu poruku kako bi rekonstruirala navedeni slučajni ključ, šifrirati prijenos podataka prema modulu za uvjetovani pristup korištenjem navedenog slučajnog ključa a pri čemu je navedeni modul za uvjetovani pristup u stanju dešifrirati podatke primljene od inteligentne kartice.
U daljnjem izlaganju izuma navedeni dekoder sastoji se od modula za uvjetovani pristup te inteligentne kartice pri čemu je dekoder sposoban generirati slučajan ključ (Ci), šifrirati taj ključ u prvoj kodiranoj poruci korištenjem tehnike javnog ključa, prenijeti tu šifriranu poruku do modula za uvjetovani pristup, a pri čemu je navedeni modul za uvjetovani pristup sposoban prihvatiti i dešifrirati tu prvu šifriranu poruku kako bi na taj način rekonstruirao navedeni slučajni ključ te nadalje šifrirati prijenos podataka prema dekoderu korištenjem istog slučajnog ključa, a pri čemu navedeni dekoder ima sposobnost dešifrirati podatke primljene na taj način od modula za uvjetovani pristup.
Izum će nadalje biti potkrijepljen nacrtima u kojima je tehnika izuma izložena u primjeni na IV sustav s karticom.
Slika 1 prikazuje blok dijagram realizacije dekodera u skladu s ovim izumom.
Slika 2 prikazuje slijed koraka u realizaciji tehnike ovog izuma.
Na sl. 1 prikazan je u shematskom obliku blok dijagram dekodera za TV sustav s karticom, gdje se signali koji nose digitalnu informaciju šifriraju korištenjem kontrolne riječi u skladu s npr. Eurocrypt standardom. U ovoj realizaciji dekoder se sastoji od demodulatora 1, demultipleksera 2, i jedinice za dekompresiju 3. Dekoder sadrži nadalje modul za uvjetovani pristup ili CAM 4 i inteligentnu karticu 5 koja se može utaknuti u priključni utor modula za uvjetovani pristup 4. Nadalje, dekoder je opremljen mikroprocesorom 6 u svrhu konfiguracije i upravljanja.
Modul za uvjetovani pristup 4 opremljen je jedinicom za dešifriranje 7 i mikroprocesorom 8 s memorijom 9. Inteligentna kartica 5 sadrži mikroprocesor 10 s memorijom 11.
Kako način rada gore navedenih dijelova dekodera nije predmet ovog izuma, to se on neće ovdje detaljno opisivati. Tipično, signal primljen na demodulatoru 1 je modulirani slijed podataka između 950 MHz i 2050 MHz. Izlaz iz demodulatora 1 je šifrirani slijed digitalnih podataka koji se privode do CAM 4 a jedinici za dešifriranje 7 će biti dozvoljeno da dešifrira ovaj šifrirani slijed podataka pod uvjetom da je utaknuta autorizirana inteligentna kartica odnosno da je korisnik ovlašten za prijem programa. Dešifrirani slijed podataka demultipleksira se demultiplekserom 2 te dekomprimira i pretvara u originalni analogni tonski i video signal pomoću jedinice za dekompresiju 3.
Kod TV sustava s karticom, kontrolna riječ potrebna za dešifriranje prenosi se do korisnika u tzv. porukama za kontrolu ovlaštenja koje sadrže kontrolnu riječ šifriranu korištenjem servisnog ključa.
Ovaj servisni ključ upisuje se u memoriju 11 inteligentne kartice 5 npr. pomoću tzv. poruke za upravljanje ovlaštenjem. Za vrijeme svog rada CAM 4 prenosi poruke za kontrolu ovlaštenja do mikroprocesora 10 u inteligentnoj kartici 5 kako bi mikroprocesor 10 mogao obraditi poruku za upravljanje ovlaštenjem te izlučiti kontrolnu riječ. Nakon toga, inteligentna kartica 5 vraća dešifriranu kontrolnu riječ cio CAM 4 tako da je sada dozvoljeno jedinici za dešifriranje 7 da dešifrira digitalni slijed podataka dobiven od demodulatora 1.
Kako bi se spriječilo korištenje neovlaštene inteligentne kartice 5 u kombinaciji s CAM 4 važno je osigurati sigurnu komunikaciju između CAM 4 i inteligentne kartice 5. U skladu s ovim izumom koristi se slijedeći postupak za osiguranje takve sigurne komunikacije. Koraci pri realizaciji ovog postupka prikazani su na slici 2. Kada je inteligentna kartica utaknuta u dekoder, mikroprocesor 8 u CAM 4 proizvest će dva slučajna broja Ci i A. Mikroprocesor 8 će u prvoj poruci šifrirati slučajne brojeve Ci i A korištenjem javnog ključa iz CAM 4. Tako dobivena prva poruka prenosi se do inteligentne kartice 5 a mikroprocesor 10 će dešifrirati tu prvu poruku korištenjem tajnog ključa iz CAM 4. Nakon toga, mikroprocesor 10 vratiti će drugu poruku do CAM 4 pri čemu je sadržaj te poruke slučajni broj A šifriran brojem Ci korištenim kao ključ za šifriranje. Mikroprocesor 8 iz CAM 4 dešifrira ovu drugu poruku i provjerava ispravnost broja A. Ako je slučajni broj A zaista ispravan, može se dakle pretpostaviti da je utaknuta inteligentna kartica ovlaštena, pa će CAM 4 prosljeđivati poruke za upravljanje ovlaštenjem koje sadrže šifriranu riječ za kontrolu ovlaštenja do inteligentne kartice 5 koja će obraditi poruku za kontrolu ovlaštenja i izlučiti kontrolnu riječ na konvencionalan način. Međutim u povratnoj poruci do CAM 4 inteligentna kartica će proslijediti izlučenu kontrolnu riječ šifriranu ključem Ci a ove kontrolne riječi dešifrirat će mikroprocesor 8 korištenjem istog ključa Ci. Čim netko pokuša zamijeniti utaknutu inteligentnu karticu 5 drugom karticom, na primjer zamjenom ovlaštene inteligentne kartice 5 neovlaštenom karticom, CAM 4 će trenutno ustanoviti ovu promjenu jer Ci neće biti poznat novoj inteligentnoj kartici pa CAM 4 više neće moći dešifrirati povratne poruke koje sadrže kontrolnu riječ. Prema tome jedinica za dešifriranje 7 biti će onemogućena.
Opisani postupak može se na isti način koristiti za osiguranje sigurne komunikacije između CAM 4 i dekodera pri čemu se koristi isti protokol kako je prikazano na slici 2. Konačno, podrazumijeva se da će u slučaju da je novi CAM 4 priključen na ostale dijelove dekodera, mikroprocesor 6 dekodera generirati dva slučajna broja Ci i A te da će čim mikroprocesor 6 dešifrira drugu poruku primljenu od mikroprocesora 8 iz CAM 4 i utvrdi da je slučajni broj A ispravan, ključ Ci biti nadalje korišten u svim prijenosima podataka između CAM 4 i mikroprocesora 6.
Ovaj izum nije ograničen gore navedenim implementacijama koje mogu varirati na više načina unutar opsega patentnih zahtjeva. Kao primjer daljnje implementacije, CAM (modul za uvjetovani pristup odn. jedinica za dešifriranje) može biti dio dekodera. Dekoder će tada zahtijevati od inteligentne kartice da se autorizira kako bi se ostvarila sigurna komunikacija između inteligentne kartice i dekodera.
Claims (12)
1. Postupak kojim se omogućava sigurna komunikacija između dva uređaja, naznačen time, da prvi uređaj generira slučajan ključ (Ci) i prenosi navedeni ključ drugom uređaju u prvoj poruci šifriranoj korištenjem javnog ključa, pri čemu navedeni drugi uređaj dešifrira prvu šifriranu poruku pomoću odgovarajućeg tajnog ključa kako bi pribavio navedeni slučajni ključ (Ci) a gdje se spomenuti slučajni ključ koristi za šifriranje prijenosa podataka između navedenih uređaja.
2. Postupak u skladu sa zahtjevom 1, naznačen time, da nakon dešifriranja navedene poruke, navedeni drugi uređaj najprije vraća navedeni slučajan ključ (Ci) u drugoj šifriranoj poruci s autorizacijom navedenom prvom uređaju.
3. Postupak u skladu sa zahtjevom 2, naznačen time, da za omogućavanje navedene autorizacije navedeni prvi uređaj nadalje generira slučajan broj (A) te prenosi navedeni slučajan broj (A) zajedno s navedenim slučajnim ključem (Ci) u navedenoj prvoj šifriranoj poruci do drugog uređaja, a pri četnu drugi uređaj koristi navedeni slučajan broj (A) za autorizaciju u drugoj šifriranoj poruci,
4. Postupak u skladu sa zahtjevom 3, naznačen time, da navedeni drugi uređaj šifrira navedeni slučajni broj (A) navedenim slučajnim ključem (Ci) kako bi izveo navedenu drugu šifriranu poruku.
5. Primjena postupka iz bilo kojeg od prethodnih zahtjeva u dekoderu za TV sustav s karticom, naznačenog time, da spomenuti dekoder sadrži modul za uvjetovani pristup (CAM) te inteligentnu karticu (SC), pri čemu se navedeni postupak primjenjuje kako bi se omogućila sigurna komunikacija između modula za kontrolu pristupa i inteligentne kartice.
6. Primjena postupka iz bilo kojeg od zahtjeva 1 do 4 u dekoderu za TV sustav s karticom, naznačenog time, da spomenuti dekoder sadrži modul za uvjetovani pristup (CAM) te inteligentnu karticu (SC), pri čemu se navedeni postupak primjenjuje kako bi se omogućila sigurna komunikacija između dekodera i modula za uvjetovani pristup.
7. Dekoder za TV sustav s karticom, naznačen time, da sadrži modul za uvjetovani pristup i inteligentnu karticu pri čemu navedeni modul za uvjetovani pristup ima sposobnost generirati slučajan ključ (Ci), šifrirati navedeni ključ u prvoj šifriranoj poruci metodom javnog ključa, prenijet; navedenu prvu šifriranu poruku do inteligentne kartice pri čemu spomenuta inteligentna kartica ima sposobnost prihvatiti i dešifrirati navedenu prvu šifriranu poruku kako bi pribavila navedeni slučajni ključ, šifrirati prijenos podataka do modula za uvjetovani pristup navedenim slučajnim ključem, pri čemu navedeni modul za uvjetovani pristup ima sposobnost dešifrirati navedene podatke prihvaćene od inteligentne kartice.
8. Dekoder u skladu sa zahtjevom 7, naznačen time, da navedena inteligentna kartica ima sposobnost vratiti navedeni slučajan ključ modulu za uvjetovani pristup u drugoj šifriranoj poruci s autorizacijom.
9. Dekoder u skladu sa zahtjevom 8, naznačen time, da navedena svojstva modula za uvjetovani pristup nadalje uključuju generiranje slučajnog broja koji je uključen u navedenu prvu šifriranu poruku, pri čemu je inteligentna kartica prilagođena za korištenje navedenog slučajnog broja kao autorizacije u drugoj šifriranoj poruci.
10. Dekoder za TV sustav s karticom, naznačen time, da sadrži modul za uvjetovani pristup i inteligentnu karticu, pri čemu navedeni dekoder ima sposobnost generirati slučajan ključ (Ci), šifrirati navedeni ključ u prvoj šifriranoj poruci metodom javnog ključa, prenijeti navedenu prvu šifriranu poruku do modula za uvjetovani pristup pri čemu spomenuti modul za uvjetovani pristup ima sposobnost prihvatiti i dešifrirati navedenu prvu šifriranu poruku kako bi pribavio navedeni slučajni ključ, šifrirati prijenos podataka do dekodera navedenim slučajnim ključem, pri čemu navedeni dekoder ima sposobnost dešifrirati navedene podatke prihvaćene od modula za uvjetovani pristup.
11. Dekoder u skladu sa zahtjevom 10, naznačen time, da navedeni modul za uvjetovani pristup ima sposobnost vratiti navedeni slučajan ključ dekoderu u drugoj šifriranoj poruci s autorizacijom.
12. Dekoder u skladu sa zahtjevom 11, naznačen time, da navedena svojstva dekodera nadalje uključuju generiranje slučajnog broja koji je uključen u navedenu prvu šifriranu poruku, pri čemu je modul za uvjetovani pristup prilagođen za korištenje navedenog slučajnog broja kao autorizacije u drugoj šifriranoj poruci.
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP96200907 | 1996-04-03 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
HRP970160A2 true HRP970160A2 (en) | 1998-02-28 |
Family
ID=8223844
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
HR96200907.2A HRP970160A2 (en) | 1996-04-03 | 1997-03-19 | Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method |
Country Status (17)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (2) | US6385317B1 (hr) |
EP (1) | EP0891670B2 (hr) |
JP (1) | JP4633202B2 (hr) |
CN (1) | CN1134161C (hr) |
AT (1) | ATE193963T1 (hr) |
AU (1) | AU2506397A (hr) |
BR (1) | BR9708500A (hr) |
DE (1) | DE69702310T3 (hr) |
DK (1) | DK0891670T3 (hr) |
ES (1) | ES2149585T5 (hr) |
GR (1) | GR3034392T3 (hr) |
HK (1) | HK1019683A1 (hr) |
HR (1) | HRP970160A2 (hr) |
PT (1) | PT891670E (hr) |
TW (1) | TW369778B (hr) |
WO (1) | WO1997038530A1 (hr) |
ZA (1) | ZA972786B (hr) |
Families Citing this family (101)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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HRP970160A2 (en) | 1996-04-03 | 1998-02-28 | Digco B V | Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method |
US7039802B1 (en) | 1997-06-06 | 2006-05-02 | Thomson Licensing | Conditional access system for set-top boxes |
CN1147148C (zh) * | 1997-06-06 | 2004-04-21 | 汤姆森消费电子有限公司 | 机顶盒的有条件访问*** |
HUP0100232A3 (en) * | 1997-10-02 | 2001-10-29 | Canal Plus Sa | Method and apparatus for encrypted data stream transmission |
RU2000111530A (ru) | 1997-10-02 | 2002-05-27 | Каналь+Сосьетэ Аноним | Способ и устройство для шифрованной трансляции потока данных |
FR2770065B1 (fr) * | 1997-10-17 | 1999-12-03 | Thomson Multimedia Sa | Procede de transfert de cle d'embrouillage |
EP0912057A3 (en) * | 1997-10-27 | 2000-01-26 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Digital broadcast receiver |
WO1999038325A2 (en) * | 1998-01-23 | 1999-07-29 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Conditional access |
DE29802270U1 (de) * | 1998-02-10 | 1998-04-30 | Scm Microsystems Gmbh | Multimediales System, tragbare Bedieneinrichtung und Kommunikationsmodul zur Verwendung in diesem System |
EP1057299B1 (en) | 1998-02-20 | 2013-07-03 | Google, Inc. | Information access control system and method |
EP0952733B1 (en) * | 1998-04-24 | 2006-11-02 | Sony United Kingdom Limited | Digital multimedia receiver and network including such receiver with IEEE 1394 serial bus interface |
US6154206A (en) * | 1998-05-06 | 2000-11-28 | Sony Corporation Of Japan | Method and apparatus for distributed conditional access control on a serial communication network |
TW412909B (en) * | 1998-05-07 | 2000-11-21 | Kudelski Sa | Mechanism of matching between a receiver and a security module |
JO2117B1 (en) * | 1998-07-15 | 2000-05-21 | كانال + تيكنولوجيز سوسيته انونيم | A method and device for the secure communication of information between a group of audio-visual devices that operate with numbers |
ES2270494T3 (es) | 1998-09-01 | 2007-04-01 | Irdeto Access B.V. | Sistema de comunicacion de datos. |
DE69834396T2 (de) | 1998-09-01 | 2007-02-22 | Irdeto Access B.V. | Sicheres Datensignalübertragungssystem |
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1997
- 1997-03-19 HR HR96200907.2A patent/HRP970160A2/hr not_active Application Discontinuation
- 1997-03-21 DK DK97916402T patent/DK0891670T3/da active
- 1997-03-21 AT AT97916402T patent/ATE193963T1/de not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1997-03-21 PT PT97916402T patent/PT891670E/pt unknown
- 1997-03-21 AU AU25063/97A patent/AU2506397A/en not_active Abandoned
- 1997-03-21 JP JP53579397A patent/JP4633202B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1997-03-21 ES ES97916402T patent/ES2149585T5/es not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1997-03-21 US US09/155,782 patent/US6385317B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1997-03-21 WO PCT/EP1997/001557 patent/WO1997038530A1/en active IP Right Grant
- 1997-03-21 BR BR9708500A patent/BR9708500A/pt not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1997-03-21 DE DE69702310T patent/DE69702310T3/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1997-03-21 EP EP97916402A patent/EP0891670B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1997-03-21 CN CNB971935653A patent/CN1134161C/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1997-04-02 ZA ZA9702786A patent/ZA972786B/xx unknown
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- 2000-09-13 GR GR20000402082T patent/GR3034392T3/el not_active IP Right Cessation
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ZA972786B (en) | 1997-10-23 |
JP4633202B2 (ja) | 2011-02-16 |
CN1134161C (zh) | 2004-01-07 |
DK0891670T3 (da) | 2000-10-30 |
DE69702310D1 (de) | 2000-07-20 |
US6385317B1 (en) | 2002-05-07 |
ATE193963T1 (de) | 2000-06-15 |
US7171553B2 (en) | 2007-01-30 |
EP0891670B1 (en) | 2000-06-14 |
TW369778B (en) | 1999-09-11 |
CN1215528A (zh) | 1999-04-28 |
PT891670E (pt) | 2000-12-29 |
WO1997038530A1 (en) | 1997-10-16 |
JP2000508482A (ja) | 2000-07-04 |
DE69702310T3 (de) | 2008-11-13 |
GR3034392T3 (en) | 2000-12-29 |
US20020126844A1 (en) | 2002-09-12 |
ES2149585T3 (es) | 2000-11-01 |
EP0891670B2 (en) | 2008-05-14 |
AU2506397A (en) | 1997-10-29 |
HK1019683A1 (en) | 2000-02-18 |
BR9708500A (pt) | 1999-08-03 |
ES2149585T5 (es) | 2008-08-01 |
EP0891670A1 (en) | 1999-01-20 |
DE69702310T2 (de) | 2001-01-18 |
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