GB2472636A - Method and system for corroborating data in an interlocking overlaid with an ERTMS RBC - Google Patents
Method and system for corroborating data in an interlocking overlaid with an ERTMS RBC Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- GB2472636A GB2472636A GB0914218A GB0914218A GB2472636A GB 2472636 A GB2472636 A GB 2472636A GB 0914218 A GB0914218 A GB 0914218A GB 0914218 A GB0914218 A GB 0914218A GB 2472636 A GB2472636 A GB 2472636A
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- GB
- United Kingdom
- Prior art keywords
- safety
- interlocking
- data
- interface
- critical
- Prior art date
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- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 6
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 claims description 11
- 230000008878 coupling Effects 0.000 abstract 1
- 238000010168 coupling process Methods 0.000 abstract 1
- 238000005859 coupling reaction Methods 0.000 abstract 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000013502 data validation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 101100205189 Neurospora crassa (strain ATCC 24698 / 74-OR23-1A / CBS 708.71 / DSM 1257 / FGSC 987) leu-5 gene Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000007787 solid Substances 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L19/00—Arrangements for interlocking between points and signals by means of a single interlocking device, e.g. central control
- B61L19/06—Interlocking devices having electrical operation
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L3/00—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal
- B61L3/02—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control
- B61L3/08—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically
- B61L3/12—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves
- B61L3/121—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves using magnetic induction
- B61L2003/123—French standard for inductive train protection, called "Contrôle de vitesse par balises" [KVB]
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
- B61L2027/202—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
Abstract
A system includes an ERTMS radio block centre which has been overlaid on an existing electronic interlocking comprises a corroborating means. The corroborating means is coupled to receive safety related control data from an interface of the electronic interlocking. A further coupling is made to receive safety critical data from the trackside interface of the interlocking. The corroborator uses the input from the trackside to validate control data before passing to the ERTMS RBC a safety critical version of the data or version having increased safety integrity. Preferably, the corroborator operates in a read only manner.
Description
RAILWAY SIGNALLING SYSTEMS
The present invention relates to railway signalling systems.
There are many existing interlocking systems in railway signalling systems and interlocking systems, even electronic interlocking systems, such as "Solid State Interlocking" (SSI) systems, tend to have a long life of 20 years or more.
According to the "European Rail Traffic Management System" (ERTMS), there is a desire to apply ERTMS systems across whole rail networks, to provide interoperability and standardised interfaces across Europe. However, the older existing electronic interlocking systems do not provide the interfaces required to the trackside component of ERTMS Level 2 systems, namely the "Radio Block Centre" (RBC).
The ERTMS specifications recognise this problem, and have defined ERTMS Level 1, using "Lineside Equipment Units" (LEUs) to collect information from existing signalling systems. However, these systems are distributed, as they feed data into track-mounted Balises. This is shown In Fig. 1, in which (as in all the Figures), safety-related components are shown by broken outlines, safety-critical components are shown by full outlines, safety-related interfaces are shown by broken lines and safety-critical interfaces are shown by full lines. Reference numeral 1 designates an existing control system, reference numeral 2 designates an existing electronic interlocking, reference numeral 3 designates existing trackside input/output circuitry, reference numeral 4 designates existing trackside objects (such as signals, points, track circuits and axle counters), reference numeral 5 designates an ERTMS LEU, reference numeral 6 designates a track mounted Balise whose data is determined by the LEU 5 and reference numeral 7 designates a train which contains train-carried ERTMS components with which the Balise 6 communicates.
Typically, an existing electronic interlocking system (such as an SSI system) will have two main interface areas: a safety-critical trackside interface to the trackside; and a safety-related control interface to the control system.
This results in it being not straightforward to use an existing electronic interlocking system in the case of an ERTMS Level 2 system. Typically, some of the real-time data which is required by the RBC of an ERTMS Level 2 system is only present at the safety-related control interface in the case of an existing electronic interlocking. For example, the concept of a "Route" within the interlocking is only an abstract concept, and thus requires no trackside inputs and outputs. However, whether or not a route is set in the interlocking is an important part of the data transmitted from an interlocking to the RBC of an ERTMS Level 2 system.
By way of example, interfaces available with an SSI system are: * Control interface -which can be 1921A or 17503. This contains the information required for the RBC, which is typically route set information and track occupancy information. However, this interface is not considered a "vital" or "Safety Integrity Level 4" (SIL4) interface, being designed as a control interface.
* Trackside interface -which is SSI Trackside Data Link. This is a custom serial interface, which is a safety interface between the central processor of the SSI and the trackside functional modules (TFM5) used to drive outputs and detect inputs. This contains information about track circuit occupancy, signal aspects, point control and detection. It does not contain route set information.
To install an ERTMS Level 2 system, it has been thought necessary to upgrade the electronic interlocking, to provide a replacement interlocking with the required interface to the RBC. This is shown in Fig. 2, in which items which are the same as in Fig. 1 have the same reference numerals as in Fig. 1 and reference numeral 8 designates a form of electronic interlocking adapted for ERTMS Level 2 and reference numeral 9 designates an ERTMS RBC, which communicates with train 7 via a "Global System for Mobile Communications-Railway" (GSM-R) system for trackside to train communication.
A system which permits the overlay of an ERTMS system on to a system with an existing interlocking would be a simpler and cheaper option than either replacement of the interlocking to create an ERTMS Level 2 system as in Fig. 2, or fitment with LEUs to create an ERTMS Level 1 system as in Fig. 1.
According to the present invention from one aspect, there is provided a method of providing a safety-critical version of, or increasing the safety integrity of, safety-related control data from an interface of an electronic interlocking of a railway system by using safety-critical trackside data from an interface of the interlocking to provide such a safety-critical version of, or to increase the safety integrity of, the safety-related control data.
According to the present invention from another aspect, there is provided a control arrangement for use in a railway system, comprising an electronic interlocking and means for using safety-critical trackside data from an interface of the interlocking to provide a safety-critical version of, or to increase the safety integrity of, safety-related control data from an interface of the interlocking.
According to the present invention from a further aspect, there is provided a railway signalling system comprising an ERTMS radio block centre which has been overlaid on to a signalling system which has an existing electronic interlocking, the system comprising corroborating means coupled to receive safety-related control data from an interface of the interlocking and safety-critical trackside data from an interface of the interlocking and provide to the radio block centre a safety-critical version of the control data, or a version of it with increased safety integrity, using said safety-critical trackside data.
According to the present invention from yet a further aspect, there is provided a method of overlaying an ERTMS radio block centre on to a railway signalling system which has an existing interlocking, comprising providing corroborating means coupled to receive safety-related control data from an interface of the interlocking and safety-critical trackside data from an interface of the interlocking and provide to the radio block centre a safety-critical version of the control data, or a version of it with increased safety integrity, using said safety-critical trackside data.
Preferably, said safety-related control data and said safety-critical trackside data are received by said corroborating means in a read-only manner.
The present invention will now be described, by way of example, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:-Figs. 1 and 2 are block diagrams of ERTMS Level 1 and Level 2 railway signalling systems respectively; Figs. 3 and 4 are diagrams for use in explaining an example of the invention; and Fig. 5 is a block diagram of an example of the invention.
As stated above, typically an electronic interlocking system will have two main interface areas -a safety-critical trackside interface to the trackside and a safety-related control interface to the control system.
The present invention uses both the safety-related control data and the safety-critical trackside data so that if these are taken together, then sufficient confidence can be gained in the safety-related control data to treat it as a safety-critical data, or data with increased integrity.
The connections to the safety-related control interface and safety-critical trackside interface can be made via uni-directional connections which can only listen, not transmit and are therefore non-intrusive so that they are physically incapable of disruption to the existing interlocking. The data received from the safety-related control interface and safety-critical trackside interface are combined in a "corroborator" -see Fig. 3, in which items which are the same as in Fig. 2 have the same reference numerals as in Fig. 2, reference numeral 10 designating the corroborator, Box "X" representing a read-only connection to the existing safety-related control interface and Box "Y" representing a read-only connection to the existing safety-critical trackside interface.
The corroborator 10 uses the data from the safety-critical trackside interface to validate the data from the safety-related control interface, before it is passed to the ERTMS RBC.
Fig. 4 shows the elements of the corroborator 10, a control interface data receiver 11 passing unvalidated control interface data from connection "X" to a data validation element 12 acting as a "safety gate", a trackside interface data receiver 13 passing trackside interface data from connection "Y" to data validation element 12 and validated control interface data from the latter being passed to an RBC data transmitter 14 for transmission to an RBC of an ERTMS Level 2 system.
Fig. 5 (in which items which are the same as in Fig. 2 have the same reference numerals as in Fig. 2) schematically shows in block diagrammatic form an example of the present invention comprising an ERTMS Level 2 system overlaid on to an existing system having an existing electronic interlocking, using a corroborator 10 as described above receiving safety-related control interface data and safety-critical trackside interface data from the interfaces of the existing electronic interlocking 2.
The invention provides a non-intrusive mechanism for determining the data required for an overlay ERTMS system from an existing electronic interlocking, by using related safety-critical trackside data to provide a "safety gate" for safety-related control data, thus providing a safety-critical version of the control data, or a version of it with increased safety integrity. More generally, the invention comprises the principle of using safety-critical trackside data from an interface of an interlocking in conjunction with safety-related control data from an interface of the interlocking, to provide a safety-critical version of the safety-related control data, or to increase the safety integrity of the safety-related control data.
Claims (5)
- CLAI MS: 1. A method of providing a safety-critical version of, or increasing the safety integrity of, safety-related control data from an interface of an electronic interlocking of a railway system by using safety-critical trackside data from an interface of the interlocking to provide such a safety-critical version of, or to increase the safety integrity of, the safety-related control data.
- 2. A control arrangement for use in a railway system, comprising an electronic interlocking and means for using safety-critical trackside data from an interface of the interlocking to provide a safety-critical version of, or to increase the safety integrity of, safety-related control data from an interface of the interlocking.
- 3. A railway signalling system comprising an ERTMS radio block centre which has been overlaid on to a signalling system which has an existing electronic interlocking, the system comprising corroborating means coupled to receive safety-related control data from an interface of the interlocking and safety-critical trackside data from an interface of the interlocking and provide to the radio block centre a safety-critical version of the control data, or a version of it with increased safety integrity, using said safety-critical trackside data.
- 4. A method of overlaying an ERTMS radio block centre on to a railway signalling system which has an existing interlocking, comprising providing corroborating means coupled to receive safety-related control data from an interface of the interlocking and safety-critical trackside data from an interface of the interlocking and provide to the radio block centre a safety-critical version of the control data, or a version of it with increased safety integrity, using said safety-critical trackside data.
- 5. A system according to claim 3 or a method according to claim 4, wherein said safety-related control data and said safety-critical trackside data are received by said corroborating means in a read-only manner.
Priority Applications (3)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| GB0914218.3A GB2472636B (en) | 2009-08-14 | 2009-08-14 | Railway signalling systems |
| AU2010203037A AU2010203037B2 (en) | 2009-08-14 | 2010-07-16 | Railway signalling systems |
| PT105242A PT105242B (en) | 2009-08-14 | 2010-08-09 | SIGNALING SYSTEMS |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| GB0914218.3A GB2472636B (en) | 2009-08-14 | 2009-08-14 | Railway signalling systems |
Publications (3)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| GB0914218D0 GB0914218D0 (en) | 2009-09-30 |
| GB2472636A true GB2472636A (en) | 2011-02-16 |
| GB2472636B GB2472636B (en) | 2015-06-17 |
Family
ID=41171383
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| GB0914218.3A Active GB2472636B (en) | 2009-08-14 | 2009-08-14 | Railway signalling systems |
Country Status (3)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| AU (1) | AU2010203037B2 (en) |
| GB (1) | GB2472636B (en) |
| PT (1) | PT105242B (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GB2623954A (en) * | 2022-10-31 | 2024-05-08 | Siemens Mobility Ltd | Railway interlocking system and method |
Families Citing this family (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RU2771392C1 (en) * | 2021-11-19 | 2022-05-04 | Акционерное общество "Научно-исследовательский и проектно-конструкторский институт информатизации, автоматизации и связи на железнодорожном транспорте" | System for controlling the movement of trains at stations and hauls |
Family Cites Families (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GB0411277D0 (en) * | 2004-05-20 | 2004-06-23 | Balfour Beatty Plc | Railway signalling systems |
| DE202005020802U1 (en) * | 2004-11-15 | 2007-03-15 | Abb As | Control system for rail vehicles |
| GB2429101B (en) * | 2005-08-13 | 2009-06-03 | Westinghouse Brake & Signal | Train control system |
| GB2430528A (en) * | 2005-09-22 | 2007-03-28 | Westinghouse Brake & Signal | Transmitting movement authorities to trains independently of the interlocking controlling lineside signals. |
-
2009
- 2009-08-14 GB GB0914218.3A patent/GB2472636B/en active Active
-
2010
- 2010-07-16 AU AU2010203037A patent/AU2010203037B2/en active Active
- 2010-08-09 PT PT105242A patent/PT105242B/en active IP Right Grant
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GB2623954A (en) * | 2022-10-31 | 2024-05-08 | Siemens Mobility Ltd | Railway interlocking system and method |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| GB0914218D0 (en) | 2009-09-30 |
| GB2472636B (en) | 2015-06-17 |
| AU2010203037A1 (en) | 2011-03-03 |
| PT105242A (en) | 2011-02-14 |
| PT105242B (en) | 2012-01-26 |
| AU2010203037B2 (en) | 2014-10-09 |
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