EP2995529A1 - Vorrichtung zur überwachung der kupplung eines schienenfahrzeugs und entsprechendes schienenfahrzeug - Google Patents

Vorrichtung zur überwachung der kupplung eines schienenfahrzeugs und entsprechendes schienenfahrzeug Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2995529A1
EP2995529A1 EP15183690.5A EP15183690A EP2995529A1 EP 2995529 A1 EP2995529 A1 EP 2995529A1 EP 15183690 A EP15183690 A EP 15183690A EP 2995529 A1 EP2995529 A1 EP 2995529A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
beacon
signal
communication medium
extracted
integrity
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP15183690.5A
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English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP2995529B1 (de
Inventor
Frédéric Henry
Brice Andre
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
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Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
Application filed by Alstom Transport Technologies SAS filed Critical Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
Publication of EP2995529A1 publication Critical patent/EP2995529A1/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP2995529B1 publication Critical patent/EP2995529B1/de
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L23/00—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
    • B61L23/34—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains for indicating the distance between vehicles or trains by the transmission of signals therebetween
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61G—COUPLINGS; DRAUGHT AND BUFFING APPLIANCES
    • B61G7/00—Details or accessories
    • B61G7/14—Safety devices
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0054—Train integrity supervision, e.g. end-of-train [EOT] devices
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0081—On-board diagnosis or maintenance
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0036—Conductor-based, e.g. using CAN-Bus, train-line or optical fibres

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a device for confirming the integrity of a hitch of a railway train comprising at least a first car and a second car, the device comprising a communication medium extending between the first car and the second car, a first beacon embedded in one of the cars and connected to the communication medium, a second beacon embedded on board the other cars and connected to the communication medium.
  • the invention applies to the field of railway safety, in particular to the confirmation of integrity of a railway train.
  • the term "confirmation of integrity” means the detection of the non-rupture of a coupling of the railway train, that is to say the non-breaking of the mechanical connection between two wagons or two cars of a railway train, whether it is "screw", automatic or any other type of coupling.
  • a transmitter to generate a signal at a first car of a train convoy, located at the tail of the convoy, and to apply this signal, successively over time and in the form of a signal. acoustic wave, to a pressure line of the railway convoy.
  • a receiver placed on board a second car of the train convoy, located at the head of the convoy, is adapted to receive the acoustic wave generated by the transmitter and propagating in the pressure line.
  • the acoustic wave can not propagate between the transmitter and the receiver along the pressure line.
  • the receiver no longer receiving the acoustic wave generated by the transmitter, then detects a coupling failure within the railway train.
  • the acoustic wave emitted by the transmitter attenuates during its propagation along the pressure line. Because of the length of railway convoys, the power of the acoustic wave reaching the receiver is likely to be at a level similar to that of the random noise present in the pressure line and which is also detected by the detector. It is then not possible to state with a sufficient level of reliability that the signal detected by the detector is the acoustic wave that has been emitted by the onboard transmitter aboard the first car. This means that it is not possible to say, with a sufficient level of reliability, that the railway convoy is always intact.
  • An object of the invention is therefore to propose a device that makes it possible to confirm the integrity of a railway train with better reliability.
  • the subject of the invention is a railway train comprising a device for confirming the integrity of a hitch as defined above, to confirm the integrity of a hitch of said railway train.
  • a railway train 2 comprising a device 4 for confirming integrity according to the invention is represented on the figure 1 .
  • the railway train 2 comprises a plurality of cars 6, including a head car 6A and a car 6B tail.
  • the cars 6 are connected two by two together by a hitch (not shown).
  • the detection device 4 comprises a communication medium 8, a control beacon 10 and a transmitting beacon 12.
  • the communication support 8 extends along the railway train 2. In particular, the communication support 8 extends between the head car 6A and the tail car 6B.
  • the control beacon 10 is aboard the leading car 6A, and the transmitting beacon 12 is on board the car 6B tail. Each of the control and transmitting beacons 12 is connected to the communication medium 8.
  • the communication support 8 is able to break in case of rupture of the coupling between the cars 6A, 6B.
  • the communication medium 8 is for example a general pressure line of the railway train 2, intended to pneumatically control a braking system of the railway train 2.
  • the communication support 8 is an electric cable of the railway train 2.
  • control beacon 10 comprises an information processing unit 14 connected to a receiver 16.
  • the processing unit 14 comprises a memory 18 and a processor 20.
  • the memory 18 stores a reception software 22 and a comparison software 24.
  • the memory 18 further comprises a first storage area 28 of a predetermined code, for example a 256-bit code.
  • the processor 20 is capable of executing the software 22, 24 stored in the memory 18.
  • the receiver 16 is able to pick up signals propagating along the communication medium 8. In the case of a pressure line forming the communication medium 8, the receiver 16 is able to receive acoustic waves. In the case of an electrical cable forming the communication medium 8, the receiver 16 is able to receive electrical signals.
  • the receiving software 22 is able to process the signals picked up by the receiver 16 to extract a code.
  • the comparison software 24 is able to compare each code extracted by the receiving software 22 with the predetermined code.
  • the transmitting beacon 12 includes an information processing unit 32, connected to a transmitter 34.
  • the processing unit 32 includes a memory 36 and a processor 38.
  • the memory 36 stores transmission software 40.
  • the memory 36 further comprises a second storage area 42 of the predetermined code.
  • the transmitter 34 is able to apply signals to the communication medium 8.
  • the emitter 34 is suitable for applying acoustic waves.
  • the transmitter 34 is able to apply electrical signals.
  • the transmission software 40 is able to generate a signal modulated by the predetermined code.
  • the transmission software 40 is further adapted to transmit the signal generated to the transmitter 34.
  • the transmission software 40 of the transmitting beacon 12 generates a signal modulated by the predetermined code which is stored in the second storage area 42.
  • the predetermined code then forms coding data.
  • the transmitter 34 of the transmitting beacon 12 applies the signal to the communication medium 8.
  • the transmitting beacon 12 transmits the signal successively over time at a repetition rate greater than 0.1 Hz, preferably greater than 1 Hz, for example greater than 5 Hz.
  • the receiving software 22 of the control beacon 10 processes said signal to extract a code. Then the comparison software 24 compares the received code with the predetermined code which is stored in the first storage area 28. If the code received is identical to the predetermined code, then the railway train 2 is considered to be intact and the control beacon 10 transmits a signal confirming the integrity of the railway train, for example for an operator or a rail network monitoring system.
  • the control beacon 10 does not receive a signal comprising a code identical to the predetermined code, then the control beacon 10 does not emit a signal confirming the integrity of the railway vehicle.
  • control beacon 10 and the transmitting beacon 12 are further adapted to implement at least one transmission error detection algorithm.
  • control and transmitter beacons 12 are adapted to implement a conventionally known CRC (for "cyclic redundancy check”) transmission error detection algorithm.
  • CRC for "cyclic redundancy check”
  • the algorithm implements a predetermined generator polynomial.
  • the predetermined generator polynomial is adapted to allow detection, with a reliability greater than a predetermined reliability threshold, of possible transmission errors between the control beacon 10 and the transmitting beacon 12.
  • the memory 18 of the processing unit 14 of the control beacon 10 also stores a calculation software 44.
  • the memory 18 further comprises a third storage area 46 of the generator polynomial.
  • the control beacon 10 illustrated by the figure 4 has no first storage area of the predetermined code.
  • the memory 36 of the processing unit 32 of the transmitting beacon 12 also stores a calculation software 48.
  • the memory 36 further comprises a fourth storage area 50 of the generator polynomial.
  • the calculation software 44 is suitable for applying the detection algorithm implementing the generator polynomial stored in the third zone of storage 46, respectively the fourth storage area 50, to a code.
  • the calculation software 48 of the transmitting beacon 12 is suitable for applying the detection algorithm to the predetermined code stored in the second storage area 42.
  • the calculation software 44 of the control beacon 10 is clean. applying the detection algorithm to a code provided by the receiving software 22.
  • the calculation software 48 of the transmitting beacon 12 calculates a control key relating to the predetermined code. Then the transmission software 40 of the transmitting beacon 12 transmits to the transmitter 34 a signal modulated by the predetermined code and the corresponding control key. The control key then forms the encoding data. The transmitter 34 applies said signal to the communication medium 8.
  • the receiver 16 of the control beacon 10 receives a signal conveyed by the communication medium 8
  • the reception software 22 of the control beacon 10 processes said signal to extract a code and a corresponding key.
  • the calculation software 44 calculates a control key relating to the code extracted by the reception software 22, by means of the generator polynomial stored in the third storage area 46.
  • the comparison software 24 compares the key extracted by the software of 22 and the key calculated by the calculation software 44. If the calculated key is identical to the extracted key, then the railway train 2 is considered to be intact and the control beacon 10 emits a signal confirming the integrity of the train convoy for example to an operator or a monitoring system of the rail network.
  • the control beacon 10 does not receive a signal comprising a code identical to the predetermined code, then the beacon of control 10 does not emit a signal confirming the integrity of the railway vehicle.
  • control beacon 10 is aboard the car 6B, and the transmitting beacon 12 is aboard the leading car 6A.
  • the control beacon 10 illustrated by the figure 7 differs from the control tag illustrated by the figure 4 in that it comprises an emitter of electromagnetic waves 52, also called "transmitting antenna".
  • the memory 18 of the control beacon 10 stores transmission software 56, similar to the transmission software 40 described above.
  • the memory 18 of the control beacon 10 does not store comparison software.
  • the transmitter beacon 12 illustrated by the figure 8 differs from the transmitting beacon illustrated by the figure 5 in that it comprises an electromagnetic wave receiver 58, also called “receiving antenna", as illustrated by the figure 8 .
  • the The memory 36 of the transmitting beacon 12 stores a comparison software 60, similar to the comparison software 24 described above.
  • the memory 36 also stores a reception software 62, similar to the reception software 22 described above.
  • the transmitting antenna 52 is able to emit an electromagnetic signal in the air.
  • the transmitting antenna 52 of the control beacon 10 is able to emit an electromagnetic signal either directly towards the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitting beacon 12 or through a communication network. of type GSM-R for example.
  • the receiving antenna 58 is adapted to receive an electromagnetic signal propagating in the air.
  • the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitting beacon 12 is adapted to receive an electromagnetic signal either directly from the transmitting antenna of the control beacon 10, or through a communication network, from type GSM-R for example.
  • the transmission software 40 of the processing unit 32 of the transmitting beacon 12 is able to generate a signal modulated by a code, also called “modulation code", for example the predetermined code or a random code.
  • the third storage area 46 of the control beacon 10 and the fourth storage area 50 of the transmitting beacon 12 store a predetermined function.
  • a function is suitable for associating an image code with a code provided to the function.
  • the calculation software 44 of the control beacon 10 and the calculating software 48 of the transmitting beacon are each adapted to apply the predetermined function stored in the third storage area 46, respectively the fourth storage area 50, to a code.
  • the transmission software 40 of the transmitting beacon 12 generates a signal modulated by the modulation code.
  • the modulation code then forms the coding data.
  • the transmitter 34 of the transmitting beacon 12 applies the generated signal to the communication medium 8.
  • the calculation software 48 of the transmitting beacon 12 applies the predetermined function which is stored in the fourth storage area 50 to the code. modulation to obtain a reference image code.
  • the receiving software 22 of the control beacon 10 processes said signal to extract a code. Then the calculation software 44 calculates the image code, by the predetermined function which is stored in the third storage area 46, of the extracted code. The transmission software 56 of the control beacon 10 then generates a response signal comprising the image code of the extracted code. Then the transmitting antenna 52 of the control beacon 10 emits the response signal in the air in the form of an electromagnetic wave.
  • the transmitting beacon receiving software 62 processes said signal to extract a code from it. picture. Then the comparison software 60 compares the extracted image code and the reference image code. If the extracted image code is identical to the reference image code, then the railway train 2 is considered to be intact and the control beacon 10 transmits a signal confirming the integrity of the railway train, for example to an operator or a railway monitoring system.
  • the receiving antenna 58 of the transmitting beacon 12 does not receive a signal from the transmitting antenna 52 of the control beacon 10, then the control beacon 10 does not emit a signal confirming the integrity of the railway vehicle.
  • the control beacon 10 does not emit a rail vehicle integrity confirmation signal.
  • control beacon 10 is aboard the car 6B, and the transmitting beacon 12 is aboard the leading car 6A.
  • the control beacon 10 illustrated by the figure 11 differs from the control tag illustrated by the figure 7 in that it does not include an emitter of electromagnetic waves. This is replaced by a transmitter 64, similar to the transmitter 34 of acoustic or electrical signals illustrated by the figure 8 , connected to the communication support 8.
  • the transmitter beacon 12 illustrated by the figure 12 differs from the transmitting beacon illustrated by the figure 8 in that it does not include an electromagnetic wave receiver. This is replaced by a receiver 66, similar to the receiver 16 of acoustic or electrical signals illustrated by the figure 7 , connected to the communication support 8.
  • the communication medium 8 is used bidirectionally as shown in FIG. figure 13 , that is, for the transmission of signals transmitter beacon 12 to the control beacon 10, and the control beacon 10 to the transmitting beacon 12.
  • the operation of the device 4 represented on the Figures 10 to 12 is similar to the operation of the device 4 illustrated by the Figures 6 to 8 .
  • the device 4 is able to further transmit in the generated signal a first tag 10, 12 to a second tag 12, 10 via the communication medium 8 additional information, not related to the confirmation integrity of the convoy, this information being in addition to the coding performed on the generated signal, to confirm the integrity of the train.
  • the communication medium 8 is used bidirectionally or not, thus allowing a communication, not necessarily related to the confirmation of integrity, between the first beacon 10, 12 and the second beacon 12, 10.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Biomedical Technology (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
EP15183690.5A 2014-09-10 2015-09-03 Vorrichtung zur überwachung der kupplung eines schienenfahrzeugs und entsprechendes schienenfahrzeug Active EP2995529B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR1458474A FR3025479B1 (fr) 2014-09-10 2014-09-10 Dispositif de confirmation d'integrite d'un attelage d'un convoi ferroviaire et convoi ferroviaire associe

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2995529A1 true EP2995529A1 (de) 2016-03-16
EP2995529B1 EP2995529B1 (de) 2019-06-12

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EP15183690.5A Active EP2995529B1 (de) 2014-09-10 2015-09-03 Vorrichtung zur überwachung der kupplung eines schienenfahrzeugs und entsprechendes schienenfahrzeug

Country Status (8)

Country Link
EP (1) EP2995529B1 (de)
AU (1) AU2015224435B2 (de)
BR (1) BR102015022101B1 (de)
CL (1) CL2015002549A1 (de)
ES (1) ES2744650T3 (de)
FR (1) FR3025479B1 (de)
RU (1) RU2697162C1 (de)
SA (1) SA115360748B1 (de)

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106314481A (zh) * 2016-08-20 2017-01-11 徐州翔和高科电气有限公司 一种矿山机车运输监控***全列车管理装置及方法
CN112124352A (zh) * 2019-06-24 2020-12-25 上海梅山钢铁股份有限公司 一种防止干熄焦电机车断裂事故的方法
CN112158230A (zh) * 2020-09-28 2021-01-01 交控科技股份有限公司 一种列车完整性检测方法、装置及列车控制单元
EP3592625B1 (de) 2017-03-09 2023-06-07 Thales Austria GmbH Zug mit einer anlage zur überwachung der integrität des zuges und entsprechendes verahren

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2580925B (en) * 2019-01-30 2021-06-30 Hitachi Ltd Train protection system
EP3919345A1 (de) 2020-06-05 2021-12-08 ECM S.p.A. Bordvorrichtung und verfahren zur bestimmung der zugintegrität nach länge

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DE19802896A1 (de) * 1998-01-21 1999-07-22 Siemens Ag Einrichtung zur Zugintegritätskontrolle
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EP2050647A1 (de) * 2007-10-19 2009-04-22 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Kommunikationseinheit für ein Schienenfahrzeug und zugehöriges Schienenfahrzeug

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DE19802896A1 (de) * 1998-01-21 1999-07-22 Siemens Ag Einrichtung zur Zugintegritätskontrolle
DE19828906C1 (de) * 1998-06-18 2000-05-04 Abb Daimler Benz Transp Verfahren zur fahrzeugautonomen Feststellung und Überprüfung der Vollständigkeit eines Zuges ohne durchgehende elektrische Leitung
DE19833279A1 (de) * 1998-07-24 2000-02-10 Deutsche Bahn Ag Einrichtung zur Überwachung der Zugvollständigkeit, sowie der Überprüfung der Bremsprobe bei lokbespannten Zügen
DE10107571A1 (de) * 2000-11-09 2002-05-23 Alcatel Sa System zur Überprüfung der Vollständigkeit eines Fahrzeugverbundes
EP2050647A1 (de) * 2007-10-19 2009-04-22 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Kommunikationseinheit für ein Schienenfahrzeug und zugehöriges Schienenfahrzeug

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Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106314481A (zh) * 2016-08-20 2017-01-11 徐州翔和高科电气有限公司 一种矿山机车运输监控***全列车管理装置及方法
CN106314481B (zh) * 2016-08-20 2018-06-01 徐州翔和高科电气有限公司 一种矿山机车运输监控***全列车管理装置及方法
EP3592625B1 (de) 2017-03-09 2023-06-07 Thales Austria GmbH Zug mit einer anlage zur überwachung der integrität des zuges und entsprechendes verahren
CN112124352A (zh) * 2019-06-24 2020-12-25 上海梅山钢铁股份有限公司 一种防止干熄焦电机车断裂事故的方法
CN112124352B (zh) * 2019-06-24 2022-01-14 上海梅山钢铁股份有限公司 一种防止干熄焦电机车断裂事故的方法
CN112158230A (zh) * 2020-09-28 2021-01-01 交控科技股份有限公司 一种列车完整性检测方法、装置及列车控制单元

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
AU2015224435A1 (en) 2016-03-24
ES2744650T3 (es) 2020-02-25
EP2995529B1 (de) 2019-06-12
BR102015022101A2 (pt) 2016-03-15
FR3025479B1 (fr) 2017-10-06
RU2697162C1 (ru) 2019-08-12
CL2015002549A1 (es) 2016-05-13
SA115360748B1 (ar) 2019-08-15
AU2015224435B2 (en) 2019-01-31
FR3025479A1 (fr) 2016-03-11
BR102015022101B1 (pt) 2022-06-21

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