EP2277150A1 - Method for starting a keyboard of a self-service terminal - Google Patents
Method for starting a keyboard of a self-service terminalInfo
- Publication number
- EP2277150A1 EP2277150A1 EP09735757A EP09735757A EP2277150A1 EP 2277150 A1 EP2277150 A1 EP 2277150A1 EP 09735757 A EP09735757 A EP 09735757A EP 09735757 A EP09735757 A EP 09735757A EP 2277150 A1 EP2277150 A1 EP 2277150A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- keyboard
- epp
- security module
- code
- self
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
- G07F19/205—Housing aspects of ATMs
- G07F19/2055—Anti-skimming aspects at ATMs
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code
- G07F7/1091—Use of an encrypted form of the PIN
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for secure startup of a keyboard of a self-service terminal, in particular an ATM.
- the keyboard of such a self-service terminal comprises a so-called security module, which is able to encrypt a PIN entered via the keyboard by means of a PIN key stored in the security module.
- Such keyboards are also called Encrypted PIN Päd (EPP) in English. This prevents an entered PIN (PIN) from being encrypted, e.g. is forwarded to a central data center of a bank.
- This keyboard is arranged in a recess of a cover surface of the operating unit of the self-service terminal.
- This superstructure is a keyboard prepared by the fraudster, through which the key presses are spied out.
- the keyboard can only be put back into operation after a transition from a ready state to a non-operational state when an authorized activation code is entered into the security module of the keyboard and verified by it.
- Fig. 1 is a schematic plan view of a in the covering of the
- FIG. 2 shows a schematic representation of the EPP mounting frame with a switch for manipulation detection arranged thereon and the covering surface of the operating unit arranged above it
- FIG. 3 shows a schematic section through the keyboard with security module
- Fig. 6 is a flowchart for illustrating the method.
- Figure 1 shows a schematic plan view of a built-in a recess of the cover surface of the control unit of the self-service terminal keyboard.
- the EPP keyboard consists of its control buttons and the security module underneath.
- the EPP keyboard has a mounting frame, which is screwed to the cover surface (cover plate) via a screw connection (not shown).
- the sensor which detects whether the keyboard is properly installed in the self-service terminal, is preferably located on the mounting frame, with the sensor signal being interrogated by the security module of the keyboard.
- the sensor may be a mechanical microswitch, whose switch state is electrically interrogated.
- an open switch symbolized by the state: 0
- a closed switch symbolized by the state: 1
- the assignment of the switch states can also be reversed.
- a pin which presses on the switch in the properly installed state can be provided on the side of the cover surface facing the switch.
- the switch In a manipulation where the keyboard is forcibly pressed down against the cover surface, the switch is opened, which in turn results in the security module of the keyboard, where the switch state is queried, causing the keyboard to be automatically disabled (disabled).
- an activation code (FC) generated by an authorization center must be entered into the security module of the keyboard and verified there.
- a random number (RND) is generated in the security module of the keyboard and output to the service technician together with a keyboard identifier (eg serial number) that uniquely identifies the keyboard.
- RID random number
- the service technician starts a software routine in the security module of the keyboard via an appropriate interface.
- the service technician can be approached in various ways, such as be displayed to the service technician visually on a monitor or transmitted to an electronic storage device of the service technician.
- the random number (RND) and the serial no. now transmitted to a remote centrally located authorization authority. This can be done for example in the form of an SMS (Short Message message) via a mobile phone connection. However, a telephone transmission of this data (random number and serial number) or a transmission by fax is also possible. In addition, a transmission of random number (RND) and serial no. to the authorization office through an internet connection possible.
- SMS Short Message message
- FC enc ⁇ (RND).
- FC2 the activation code calculated in the authorization point for distinguishing the activation code calculated in the security module of the keyboard - see below -.
- the activation code (FC2) calculated in this way is now transmitted from the authorization office to the service technician. This can also take place, for example, in the form of an SMS message or via another telephone or Internet connection.
- the unlock code (FC2) thus obtained is now entered by the service technician via a corresponding interface in the security module of the keyboard. He can, for example, for the input also use the control keys of the keyboard itself. In the security module of the keyboard, the entered activation code (FC2) is verified.
- the random number is encrypted according to the same algorithm and with the same key identifier (K) as in the authorization point.
- the activation code (FS2) entered into the security module of the keyboard is compared with the activation code calculated in the security module itself.
- the release code (FS1) is compared. If the two agree, the keyboard can be put back into operation under certain conditions.
- FIG. 6 shows the various states in which a keyboard can be located on the basis of a flowchart, as well as the transitions between these states.
- the enabling procedure according to the invention (see FIG. 5) must be initiated by a service technician (see FIG. 5).
- the security module of the keyboard is prompted to output the random number (RND) and the keyboard identifier (serial number).
- the keyboard after entering an authorized unlock code (FC) in the transport state (S2) is transferred, if the keyboard is in a workshop or an intermediate storage (path Ü5.2).
Landscapes
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Input From Keyboards Or The Like (AREA)
- Telephone Function (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102008021046A DE102008021046A1 (en) | 2008-04-26 | 2008-04-26 | Method of operating a keyboard of a self-service terminal |
PCT/EP2009/002446 WO2009129919A1 (en) | 2008-04-26 | 2009-04-03 | Method for starting a keyboard of a self-service terminal |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2277150A1 true EP2277150A1 (en) | 2011-01-26 |
Family
ID=40847840
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP09735757A Ceased EP2277150A1 (en) | 2008-04-26 | 2009-04-03 | Method for starting a keyboard of a self-service terminal |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8631246B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2277150A1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN102016935B (en) |
DE (1) | DE102008021046A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2009129919A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102010000482A1 (en) * | 2010-02-19 | 2011-08-25 | WINCOR NIXDORF International GmbH, 33106 | Method and procedure for entering PINs with consistent software stack on ATMs |
DE102010060862A1 (en) | 2010-11-29 | 2012-05-31 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Device for reading magnetic stripe and / or chip cards with touch screen for PIN input |
DE102011056191A1 (en) | 2011-12-08 | 2013-06-13 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Device for protecting security tokens against malware |
Family Cites Families (16)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE3877984D1 (en) * | 1987-03-04 | 1993-03-18 | Siemens Nixdorf Inf Syst | DATA EXCHANGE SYSTEM. |
DE3835624A1 (en) * | 1988-10-19 | 1990-04-26 | Afc Technology Gmbh | Keyboard |
DE4244106A1 (en) * | 1992-12-24 | 1994-06-30 | Schrott Harald | Electronic appts. theft prevention device |
CA2271686A1 (en) * | 1996-11-27 | 1998-06-04 | Diebold, Incorporated | Automated banking machine apparatus and system |
US6705517B1 (en) * | 1996-11-27 | 2004-03-16 | Die Old, Incorporated | Automated banking machine system and method |
EP1124206A1 (en) * | 2000-02-08 | 2001-08-16 | Infineon Technologies AG | Method and assembly for the mutual authentication of two data processor units |
US7110986B1 (en) | 2001-04-23 | 2006-09-19 | Diebold, Incorporated | Automated banking machine system and method |
US8100323B1 (en) * | 2002-12-26 | 2012-01-24 | Diebold Self-Service Systems Division Of Diebold, Incorporated | Apparatus and method for verifying components of an ATM |
CN1809848B (en) * | 2003-06-23 | 2010-06-09 | 迪布尔特有限公司 | Automated banking machine with improved resistance to fraud |
DE102005016381A1 (en) | 2005-03-01 | 2006-09-14 | Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh | Method for secure function release of modules |
PL1710760T3 (en) * | 2005-04-06 | 2014-04-30 | Scheidt & Bachmann Gmbh | Secured activation of devices |
CA2578608A1 (en) | 2006-02-15 | 2007-08-15 | Wrg Services Inc. | Central processing unit and encrypted pin pad for automated teller machines |
US8495898B2 (en) * | 2006-05-31 | 2013-07-30 | Security People, Inc. | Cam lock with retractable bolt |
DE102006037167A1 (en) | 2006-08-09 | 2008-02-14 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Method and system for carrying out a payment transaction with a means of payment |
US7751788B2 (en) * | 2007-01-26 | 2010-07-06 | Kyocera Corporation | Tool-less snap-in modular replaceable keypad for wireless communication device and method of assembling same |
US20090119221A1 (en) * | 2007-11-05 | 2009-05-07 | Timothy Martin Weston | System and Method for Cryptographically Authenticated Display Prompt Control for Multifunctional Payment Terminals |
-
2008
- 2008-04-26 DE DE102008021046A patent/DE102008021046A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2009
- 2009-04-03 WO PCT/EP2009/002446 patent/WO2009129919A1/en active Application Filing
- 2009-04-03 US US12/988,743 patent/US8631246B2/en active Active
- 2009-04-03 CN CN200980114795.6A patent/CN102016935B/en active Active
- 2009-04-03 EP EP09735757A patent/EP2277150A1/en not_active Ceased
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
MENEZES ALFRED ET AL: "Handbook of applied cryptography", 1 January 1997, HANDBOOK OF APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY; [CRC PRESS SERIES ON DISCRETE MATHEMATICES AND ITS APPLICATIONS], CRC PRESS, BOCA RATON, FL, US, PAGE(S) 1, 397 - 405, ISBN: 978-0-8493-8523-0, XP002954614 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN102016935B (en) | 2014-11-26 |
WO2009129919A1 (en) | 2009-10-29 |
US20110040984A1 (en) | 2011-02-17 |
CN102016935A (en) | 2011-04-13 |
DE102008021046A1 (en) | 2009-10-29 |
US8631246B2 (en) | 2014-01-14 |
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Legal Events
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AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Extension state: AL BA RS |
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RIN1 | Information on inventor provided before grant (corrected) |
Inventor name: NOLTE, MICHAEL Inventor name: SANDSCHNEIDER, DANIELA Inventor name: RUNOWSKI, MATTHIAS Inventor name: OSTERHOLZ, GERHARD |
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DAX | Request for extension of the european patent (deleted) | ||
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Effective date: 20200609 |