EP1295207A1 - Watermark detector - Google Patents

Watermark detector

Info

Publication number
EP1295207A1
EP1295207A1 EP01956462A EP01956462A EP1295207A1 EP 1295207 A1 EP1295207 A1 EP 1295207A1 EP 01956462 A EP01956462 A EP 01956462A EP 01956462 A EP01956462 A EP 01956462A EP 1295207 A1 EP1295207 A1 EP 1295207A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
data units
external memory
verification
processing
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP01956462A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Petrus J. Lenoir
Johan C. Talstra
Johan P. M. G. Linnartz
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Koninklijke Philips NV
Original Assignee
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV filed Critical Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV
Priority to EP01956462A priority Critical patent/EP1295207A1/en
Publication of EP1295207A1 publication Critical patent/EP1295207A1/en
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G11INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11BINFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/10Digital recording or reproducing
    • GPHYSICS
    • G11INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11BINFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00884Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a watermark, i.e. a barely perceptible transformation of the original data which can nevertheless be recognised by an algorithm
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F12/00Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
    • G06F12/14Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
    • G06F12/1408Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by using cryptography
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06TIMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
    • G06T1/00General purpose image data processing
    • G06T1/0021Image watermarking
    • GPHYSICS
    • G11INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11BINFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • GPHYSICS
    • G11INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11BINFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method of outsourcing intermediate results of an internal data processing to an external memory, a device for processing data having an interface for outsourcing intermediate results of an internal data processing, a disk drive having a corresponding device for processing data and a cellular phone having a device for processing data.
  • Detectors can be cost effectively deployed in hardware or software to meet real-time play and record control requirements in a wide range of platforms like DND. With an efficient detector implementation and robust watermark encoding the watermark can survive a wide variety of professional and consumer analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog transformations and video processing.
  • a watermark detector When reading the multimedia content with an embedded watermark the water- mark needs to be detected and processed to determine the copyright status of the multimedia content. During the watermark detection processing several intermediate results of different processing steps are stored or buffered until the respective data is needed in a subsequent processing step. Hence a conventional watermark detector must comprise some kind of memory. The complexity of a watermark detector is increasingly dominated by the RAM necessary to do its computations. A watermark detector is for example known from US 5 933 798.
  • a watermark detector could be lowered proportionally if memory space already available in a player and recorder system in which the watermark detector is implemented, could be used to temporally store intermediate results of the data processing.
  • a MPEG decoder has 2-4 MBytes of RAM for PC-buffering and image reconstruction.
  • the bandwidth on a data bus to a buffer memory is also critical. There is already frequent access on the bus between the original hardware in for example a DVD-player and the external memory.
  • the advantage of watermark detection is that it can be done in the background. A watermark detection delayed by 200 msec does not decrease the effectiveness of watermarks as copy-control measures.
  • Integrity problem The external RAM is reasonably easy to access, and a hacker wanting to obstruct the watermark detection function could replace the data stored by the detector through zeroes or dummy data before it is retrieved again by that detector.
  • the invention is based on the recognition that the outsourcing of intermediate results of an internal data processing to an external memory is done by providing a first data signal constituted by first verification data and first intermediate result data.
  • the first data signal is encrypted and stored or buffered temporarily in the external memory.
  • a respective data signal is read from the external memory.
  • This read data signal is decrypted resulting in second intermediate result data and second verification data.
  • the second verification data are authenticated with said first verification data. Through this authentication it can be made sure that the intermediate result data have not been manipulated while they were stored in the external memory or while they were transferred to and from the external memory.
  • the present invention allows a secure "borrowing" of an external memory which is used as scratchpad memory.
  • the step of encrypting is being done using a key which is generated in a random number generator.
  • Said key can be generated every time when intermediate result data units are to be outsourced to an external memory. This means that the key is locally generated, is only used once and becomes invalid after use, so that it becomes impossible to manipulate the key or to learn anything about the key from the outsourcing of data.
  • the key can alternatively be fixed instead of being generated regularly or during each step of encryption.
  • a check is made to see if the first and second verification data units correspond to each other by comparing them in the verification step.
  • the verification data units can be calculated internally according to an algorithm.
  • the same algorithm can be used for generating the first and second verification data units.
  • this algorithm shall be kept secret.
  • the verification data units are address data units.
  • the first address data units preferably correspond to the r least significant bits of addresses of the external memory at which the intermediate result data units are stored in the step of storing.
  • the actual addresses of the intermediate result data units in the external memory are compared to the second address data units which are read out of the external memory and which correspond to the first address data units if the content of the external memory has not been manipulated.
  • functions of the address data can be used as verification data.
  • the usage of address data as verification data has the advantage that no specific verification calculation of the data needs to be carried out since the address data is readily available.
  • the external memory is a m-bit memory
  • the length of the intermediate result data units is n-bits
  • the length of the address data units is r-bits with m being a multiple of eight and n not necessarily being a multiple of eight.
  • the usage of this structure allows to fully exhaust an external memory which is usually a 8-, 16-, 32-, 64-bit, 128-bit, ... memory. Since the length of the n-bit intermediate result data units is usually not a multiple of eight they are filled up with r-bit address data units so that the sum of the length of the intermediate result data units and the length of the address data units is a multiple of eight, in order to allow additional redundant information to be incorporated into the information signal.
  • intermediate results of a watermark detection processing are outsourced to an external memory.
  • a device for processing data having an interface for outsourcing intermediate results of an internal data processing to an external memory comprises combining means for providing a first data signal constituted by first verification data and first intermediate result data, encrypting means for encrypting the first data signal, storing means for storing or buffering temporarily the first data signal in the external memory, reading means for reading a data signal from the external memory, when the internal data processing needs the stored intermediate results, decrypting means for decrypting the read data signal resulting in second intermediate result data and second verification data, and verification means for verifying the second verification data with said first verification data.
  • the device for processing data having an interface for outsourcing intermediate results is a watermark detector and intermediate results are outsourced to an external memory.
  • the watermark detector is implemented in an optical disk drive, a SDMI-player or a MPEG decoder.
  • a disk drive comprises a device for processing data having an interface for outsourcing intermediate results of an internal data processing to an external memory.
  • a cellular phone comprises a device for processing data having an interface for outsourcing intermediate results of an internal data processing to an external memory.
  • Fig. 1 shows an optical disk drive according to a first embodiment
  • Fig. 2 shows the architecture of storing intermediate results from a watermark detector in an external memory according to the first embodiment
  • Fig. 3 shows a flow chart of the method according to the invention
  • Fig. 4 shows a simplified block diagram of the device according to the invention.
  • Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of an optical disk drive 6.
  • a disk like a DVD or a CD is used as an optical recording medium 1.
  • An optical pick-up unit (OPU) 2 controls a laser and detects the reflection of the disk. The intensity of this reflection is turned into a bitstream.
  • a block decoder 3 error-corrects these bits and orders the result in a buffer memory 5 into logical blocks that can be read for example by a PC.
  • the buffer memory 5 is referred to as "external RAM" or external memory in this disclosure.
  • a watermark detector 4 would typically be integrated with the block decoder 3.
  • the watermark detector 4 typically collects some video or audio material in the buffer 5, performs some signal processing on this buffer 5, correlates the contents of the buffer 5 with a watermark and performs some further signal processing.
  • the usage of the buffer 5 makes the system vulnerable to attacks by a hacker.
  • the hacker could try to destroy or manipulate the intermediate results stored in the buffer 5 in a way that it is advantageous to him.
  • the correlation of the content of the buffer 5 with a watermark is also very sensitive to attacks in which a hacker wants to learn any information from the intermediate results in order to gather information about the watermark, since after the correlation some information about the watermark is contained in the buffer 5.
  • a watermark detector can be implemented in an optical drive, a
  • MPEG video card an audio decoder card, a SDMI-Player, a HD-drive or the like.
  • the watermark detector 4 typically collects data from every frame of a video sequence and accumulates these in a tile of size 128 by 128 pixels.
  • the image (720 x 480 pixels per frame) is folded into a tile of 128 by 128 pixels per frame, i.e. about 5 x 3,75 times. This process takes about one second of video sequences, i.e. for about 25 to 30 frames.
  • a FFT is performed on this tile.
  • the tile content is multiplied after FFT by a secret watermark pattern, and then an I-FFT is performed. Then two peak values are searched for in the tile.
  • This tile is a main piece of data that needs to be stored temporally in the RAM 5.
  • the data is stored in the RAM 5 for about one second but there are about 500 to 600 additions performed on each entry during this one second. Then the FFT, the multiplication and the IFFT are executed on the RAM data. After the peak search the memory is cleared, i.e. reset to zero.
  • An external RAM 5 is usually made of m-bits words, where m is a multiple of 8.
  • the intermediate result data II to be stored in the external m-bit RAM 5 is usually constituted by n-bit words, where n is generally not a multiple of 8. This leads to a potential inefficient way of storing intermediate result data I in the external RAM 5.
  • r is zero, because n happens to be a multiple of 8, spare bits can be artificially created by arbitrarily setting r to 8.
  • n equals 18 and m equals 8.
  • FIG. 2 shows the architecture of the outsourcing of intermediate results from the watermark detector 4 to an external RAM 5.
  • the area 17 inside the dash box contains all the hardware added for handling the security of the outsourcing of the data.
  • the watermark detector 4 is usually inside an IC package 18 that has no or little RAM 5.
  • RNG is a random number generator 9, which is clocked by the watermark detector 4.
  • the watermark detector 4 clocks the random number generator 9 to yield a random key Kn. If the watermark detector 4 wants to store a n-bit intermediate result data word II in the m-bit external RAM 5 at an address A, the r least significant bits of address A are padded as address data to the n-bit intermediate result data word I in order to give an m-bit data signal S 1.
  • the m-bit data signal is encrypted in the encryptor 8 with a key Kn.
  • the encrypted data signal El is stored in the external RAM 5 with a starting address at address A.
  • the read m-bit data signal is sent to a decryptor 7 in order to be decrypted with key Kn.
  • n-bit intermediate result data words 12 and r- bit address data words V2 are obtained. It must now be verified that the read and decrypted intermediate result data words 12 correspond to the initial intermediate result data words II. This verification is being done by comparing the read and decrypted r-bit address data words V2 with the address data of the actual address of the intermediate result data word as read from the external RAM 5. If these data correspond to each other, the data as read from the external RAM 5 correspond to the data as stored previously into the external RAM 5, i.e. the data has not been manipulated with and can hence be used in further watermark detection processing.
  • the caret-symbol 12 in Fig. 2 represents the verification operation, i.e. the test if the least significant bits from an address bus 1.1 and the least significant bits V2 of the decryptor 7 are equal. If they are not equal an alarm flag is sent to the Data_valid input of the watermark detector 4.
  • the data input and output (Data in and Data out) of the watermark detector 4 can be multiplexed together, so the encryptor 8 and the decryptor 9 can be a single device.
  • a major advantage of this method is that there are no global secrets like keys which have to be put in in a factory. Instead the keys are generated locally, i.e. in the RNG 9, and do not leave the IC package and expire after being used once.
  • the method according to the invention catches shuffling attacks.
  • a shuffling attack the attacker moves bytes around in the external RAM 5 but here the addresses will not match any longer.
  • Kn can be fixed at the manufacturing time but otherwise be completely random and even different for every IC to make key scheduling cheaper.
  • the address is EXORed with a random number Rn taken from the RNG 9.
  • Rn is also changed before every subsequent calculation.
  • the check at read-back is then once more EXORed with Rn.
  • the result is compared with the r least significant bits of address A.
  • the key is not generated by the RNG 9, but is fixed during processing. This is not optimal from the security point of view but may decrease production cost.
  • encryption/decryption algorithm e.g. "3-Way” can be used, which is a highly regarded algorithm.
  • the encryption/decryption method is a block-cipher which operates with 96 bits data block and 96 bit keys. 40 bits in the key may be dropped to avoid export problems.
  • 3-Way has a round function which is recommended to be iterated 11 times. This round function is cheap in both hard- and software.
  • a simple r-bit function of the address A can be used as address data instead of using the r least significant bits of address A.
  • the method of outsourcing intermediate results of an internal data processing can be for example applied to a mobile phone, MPEG decoders, a DVD audio decoder, a SDMI-player or the like.
  • the second embodiment is not limited to a watermark detector.
  • Other general security devices may use the method of outsourcing intermediate result data whereever confidential data is processed but needs to store intermediate results externally to it for example because no memory resides on the particular processing chip.
  • This can be for example a mobile phone, MPEG decoders, a DVD audio decoder, a SDMI-player or the like.
  • the method of outsourcing intermediate results can be used during public key computation like for signature verification or the like.
  • Fig. 3 shows a flow chart of an outsourcing method
  • Fig. 4 a simplified block diagram of a data processing device according to the flow chart of Fig. 3.
  • Intermediate result data II is combined with verification data VI using a combining means 13 in order to form a data signal SI .
  • the data signal SI is encrypted El by an encrypting means 8 and then stored in the external memory 5 by a storing means 15.
  • the stored data signal E2 is read-out by a reading means 16 and is decrypted by a decrypting means 7.
  • the decryption second intermediate result data 12 and second verification data V2 is yielded.
  • the second verification data V2 is verified with the first verification data V 1.
  • the verification data can be generated using an algorithm.
  • the algorithm can be applied to the intermediate result data or to a part of these data, wherein the data generated by the algorithm are used as verification data.
  • this algorithm needs to be stored in a decoder which is requesting the outsourcing of the intermediate result data.
  • this algorithm shall be kept secret.
  • the outsourced intermediate result data is read from the external RAM 5 it is decrypted resulting in intermediate result data 12 and verification data V2.
  • the algorithm is applied both to the read and the decrypted intermediate result data, and the output of this operation is compared to the verification data V2 read and decrypted from the external RAM 5.
  • the method of outsourcing intermediate results the device for processing data having an interface for outsourcing intermediate results, the disk drive having a corresponding device for data processing, and a cellular phone having a corresponding device for processing data as set forth in the claims can be developed further in the same or a corresponding way as described above and as set forth in the subclaims with reference to the method of outsourcing intermediate results.
  • the method according to the invention is not limited to outsourcing intermediate results which are related to a watermark detection process, but can be used for outsourcing all kinds of intermediate results relating to internal data processing.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Signal Processing For Digital Recording And Reproducing (AREA)
  • Television Systems (AREA)
EP01956462A 2000-06-16 2001-06-07 Watermark detector Withdrawn EP1295207A1 (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP01956462A EP1295207A1 (en) 2000-06-16 2001-06-07 Watermark detector

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP00202094 2000-06-16
EP00202094 2000-06-16
EP01956462A EP1295207A1 (en) 2000-06-16 2001-06-07 Watermark detector
PCT/EP2001/006454 WO2001098908A1 (en) 2000-06-16 2001-06-07 Watermark detector

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1295207A1 true EP1295207A1 (en) 2003-03-26

Family

ID=8171641

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP01956462A Withdrawn EP1295207A1 (en) 2000-06-16 2001-06-07 Watermark detector

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US6671806B2 (zh)
EP (1) EP1295207A1 (zh)
JP (1) JP2003536110A (zh)
KR (1) KR20020038724A (zh)
CN (1) CN1388929A (zh)
WO (1) WO2001098908A1 (zh)

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US7224995B2 (en) * 1999-11-03 2007-05-29 Digimarc Corporation Data entry method and system
EP1440535B1 (en) * 2001-10-03 2011-01-05 Nxp B.V. Memory encrytion system and method
JP2003132622A (ja) * 2001-10-22 2003-05-09 Victor Co Of Japan Ltd 記録装置、再生装置及び記録媒体
US7519819B2 (en) 2002-05-29 2009-04-14 Digimarc Corporatino Layered security in digital watermarking
EP1514422A1 (en) * 2002-06-04 2005-03-16 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Watermark detection
US9342662B2 (en) * 2003-09-16 2016-05-17 Media Rights Technologies, Inc. Method and system for controlling video media
US8423775B2 (en) * 2003-09-30 2013-04-16 Microsoft Corporation Circumvention of dynamic, robust, embedded-signal detection
US8407752B2 (en) * 2004-03-18 2013-03-26 Digimarc Corporation Synchronizing broadcast content with corresponding network content
WO2006038197A1 (en) * 2004-10-07 2006-04-13 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Detecting and reacting to protected content material in a display or video drive unit
JP5011959B2 (ja) * 2006-11-01 2012-08-29 富士ゼロックス株式会社 認証代行装置、認証代行プログラム、及び認証代行システム
US20090125562A1 (en) * 2007-11-08 2009-05-14 International Business Machines Corporation Methods and systems involving checking memory integrity
DE102017111993A1 (de) * 2016-05-31 2017-11-30 Maxim Integrated Products, Inc. Vorrichtung und verfahren zum schützen sicherheits- und absicherungsrelevanter echtzeit-videodaten
US10546585B2 (en) 2017-12-29 2020-01-28 Comcast Cable Communications, Llc Localizing and verifying utterances by audio fingerprinting

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5081675A (en) * 1989-11-13 1992-01-14 Kitti Kittirutsunetorn System for protection of software in memory against unauthorized use
JP3747520B2 (ja) * 1996-01-30 2006-02-22 富士ゼロックス株式会社 情報処理装置及び情報処理方法
WO1998003014A1 (en) 1996-07-16 1998-01-22 Philips Electronics N.V. Detecting a watermark embedded in an information signal
US6061449A (en) * 1997-10-10 2000-05-09 General Instrument Corporation Secure processor with external memory using block chaining and block re-ordering

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
JP2003536110A (ja) 2003-12-02
US20020049569A1 (en) 2002-04-25
WO2001098908A1 (en) 2001-12-27
KR20020038724A (ko) 2002-05-23
US6671806B2 (en) 2003-12-30
CN1388929A (zh) 2003-01-01

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