EP0825316B1 - Verfahren und System zum Einschreiben einer Schlüsselinformation - Google Patents
Verfahren und System zum Einschreiben einer Schlüsselinformation Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP0825316B1 EP0825316B1 EP97202546A EP97202546A EP0825316B1 EP 0825316 B1 EP0825316 B1 EP 0825316B1 EP 97202546 A EP97202546 A EP 97202546A EP 97202546 A EP97202546 A EP 97202546A EP 0825316 B1 EP0825316 B1 EP 0825316B1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- information
- identification information
- key
- data carrier
- encrypted
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Lifetime
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Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
- G07C2009/0088—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed centrally
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method and a system for writing one of key information transmitted to a central location secured to a remote location into an existing data carrier.
- the disk is a key for a motor vehicle
- the key issued by a dealer to the rightful owner of the motor vehicle should be, for example because it additionally requires a key or lost a key originally received when purchasing the motor vehicle Has.
- the method or system according to the invention is also suitable for other applications, for example for keys for access controls to certain rooms or areas.
- the method or system can generally be selected Information is securely written into a data carrier.
- EP 0 723 896 A2 describes a method for theft protection of motor-driven vehicles Motor vehicles described using an anti-theft system a control unit containing the immobilizer function, at least one further one theft-relevant system components and transmission links for bidirectional Communication between the theft-relevant system components, an external one Central office, as well as a transmission unit for data transmission between the theft-relevant system components and the central office.
- all theft-relevant system components of the anti-theft system one before the first start-up for the respective one System component characteristic identification number and one from outside of the system component, non-readable, individual secret number in one stored non-volatile data memory of the system component, provided.
- the central office provides the identification numbers and the secret numbers the theft-relevant system components are registered. To identify the respective theft-relevant system components serving identification numbers are within the anti-theft system and between the anti-theft system and transmitted to the central office in plain text. Those not transmitted in plain text Secret numbers of the theft-relevant system components serve as Communication key for layptological protocols during data transmission of the theft-relevant system components within the anti-theft system or / and with the central office.
- a key information stored in a central location in a disk to be written in a remote location must be at conventional systems prevent the transmission of key information can be eavesdropped on to the remote location without authorization, otherwise a fraudster write the unauthorized eavesdropping of key information into your own data carrier can and thus, for example, gain unauthorized access to secured Can create spaces or areas.
- the other way in the central Place the key information in the disk and write it then shipping to the remote location is also inconvenient because of the disk can be stolen during transportation.
- the object of the invention is to provide a method for securely registering a Specify key information in a disk in another location as the location where the key information is generated or stored, is issued.
- the key identifying information stored contains that cannot be read from outside and is therefore secret and that the key information is in the central location with this identification information encrypted and the encrypted information on the disk at the Issuing point is transferred. This is encrypted in the data carrier Key information decrypted and saved again.
- This method has the advantage that the data carriers can be sent freely, since they do not contain any key information, so that a possible thief will Can not use disk.
- the unauthorized eavesdropping on a broadcast encrypted key information is also not for a fraudster Use if he does not have a data medium with the correct identification information in that he could write the encrypted key information.
- each data carrier has additional, open identification information contains that can be read out. It is then possible for each data carrier to have one individual, different identification information from other data carriers contains stored by the assignment between the further, open identification information and the secret identification information is stored at the central location becomes. With this measure, encrypted key information can be obtained decrypted only from one, the correct data carrier become.
- the key information to be transmitted to the data carrier is at least one individual object, for example clearly assigned to a motor vehicle. If a data medium is to be assigned to such an individual object, the object information characterizing this object must go to the central location be transmitted. In order to secure this transmission path too, it is It is advisable to use the object information before transferring it to the central location the further, open identification information to be encrypted.
- Encryption methods are used, with the encryption of the Object information or the encrypted object information is the open key is used, while the decryption with the secret key of the asymmetrical encryption process performed becomes.
- the invention further relates to a system for writing one from a central one Secured key information transmitted to a remote location in a location data carriers available there as well as a data carrier and a terminal for Use in such a system.
- a central location 20 contains two memories 21 and 25
- Memory 21 contains two groups 22 and 23 of memory locations, each are assigned to one another in pairs.
- Data carriers with identical ident information in groups will become associated Ident information is read out from the allocated storage space of group 22.
- the memory 25 in this example comprises three groups 26, 27 and 28 of memory locations.
- group 26 In the storage locations of group 26 are Object information is saved, and each of these locations is a certain storage space assigned to group 27, the one of this object contains associated key information.
- each memory location is the Group 26 preferably assigned several storage locations to group 28 Number of identification numbers included. Their meaning will be closer later explained.
- a data carrier 10 is located at another point Of course, there are many data carriers, which are constructed identically to one another are and for which the data carrier 10 indicated here is representative.
- This Data carrier 10 contains a processing unit 11 and four storage locations 12 to 15.
- the storage space 12 serves to store identification information, which is only can be processed internally in data carrier 10 and in no case externally is delivered.
- the storage space 13 contains the individual data carrier characteristic further, open identification information, which is read outwards can be.
- These two pieces of information are preferably from the central Point 20 is delivered where these two pieces of information are assigned in two Memory locations of groups 22 and 23 of memory 21 are written, and this information is also at the further point where the Data carrier 10 is initially located in the memory locations 12 and 13.
- the further location can be identical to the central station 20.
- This writing in memory locations 12 and 13 takes place for a large number of Data carriers, and these data carriers are then via a transport route 19 transported to a remote location.
- This transport route runs at least to the Part over an unprotected area, which is shown by the dash-dotted line 39 is indicated.
- the media can possibly be stolen. However, no one can do this through theft Significant damage occurs because the data media does not yet contain any key information included and therefore cannot be used on any object.
- the part 42 of the encryption device is here as an exclusive-OR link executed.
- the linked information that is, the one with the open identification information represents encrypted object information becomes part 44 supplied, the asymmetrical encryption, for example according to the RSA method, with a fixed key, which here as an input 45 supplied is indicated.
- This key need not be secret, since with decryption is not possible.
- the additional encryption with the open identification information brings one significant improvement in security.
- a workshop transmitted data namely encrypted object information and open Identity information is listened to by a fraudster who pre-programmed himself Owns the key. If this scammer has the same encrypted object information transmits, but with the open identification information of its key, without the encryption with the open identification information he would Key information for the object obtained with the secret identification information his key is encrypted and therefore correct in the key is decrypted so that a valid key for the object is unlawful is obtained.
- the additional encryption with the open identification information the encrypted object information transmitted by the fraudster the central position is not decrypted correctly, so that the desired one Key information is not read from the memory 25.
- the encrypted information provided by part 44 via line 47 becomes now as well as the open identification information via line 43 of the central location 20 fed. This transmission can take place via an unsecured path, since the encrypted information on line 47 without knowing the secret Key of asymmetrical encryption cannot be decrypted and the open identification information does not directly indicate that in the data carrier contains the required key information.
- the encrypted information is on the line 47 in the central location 20 to a decryption device comprising parts 32 and 34.
- the Part 34 becomes a decryption of the information transmitted via line 47 carried out, with the help of a secret key, which is here over a Input 35 supplied is indicated.
- a secret key which is here over a Input 35 supplied is indicated.
- the decryption device then has the same information as at the exit the exclusive-OR link 42 in the terminal 40. However, this is not yet the Object information supplied via the input 41 of the terminal 40. Hence leads the line 37 to an exclusive-OR link 32, which is connected to another Received the open identification information on line 43.
- the exclusive-OR link 32 now contains the decrypted object information with which the memory 25 is controlled.
- group 26 the Storage location selected that contains this object information and from which The key information is read out from the associated storage location in group 27. Furthermore, with the help of the open identification information on line 43, the memory 21 controlled by visiting the memory location of group 23, the latter Contains ident information, and the associated storage space of group 22, which the contains secret identification information is read out.
- the information read out from the memory 21 and the memory 25 becomes one Encryption arrangement 30 supplied, which also here as an exclusive OR link is executed.
- the information appearing at its output 31 becomes now transfer to the remote location, the transmission path being unsafe must, since the decrypted key information from the information on the line 31 can only be obtained with the help of the correct secret identification information that however, it is hidden in the data carrier and is not transferred directly.
- the memory 25 also becomes a assigned storage location of group 28 read an identification number and transmitted over line 38 to the remote location, also a unsecured way can be used.
- the information on line 31 and Line 38 is supplied via the terminal 40 to the data carrier 10 '.
- the Identification number on line 38 is in the data carrier 10 'directly in the Storage space 15 'registered while the encrypted key information on line 31 is supplied to a decryption device 17 which is on the secret identification information from the memory location 12 'to a further input receives.
- This decryption device is again an exclusive-OR link executed and thus outputs the decrypted key information at the exit, which is written into the memory location 14 '.
- the data carrier 10 'thus contains now all for its use with a certain object, for example with a Motor vehicle, necessary information without the crucial important Key information during transmission can be determined in an unauthorized manner can.
- the identification number in memory location 15 ' is for the described method not absolutely necessary and serves if the disk is a key for one Motor vehicle is, in that in the motor vehicle first through this Identification number is checked whether it is a permissible key, before the key information is used to check whether it is a authorized key. If with an unauthorized Key, i.e. with wrong key information, a number of start attempts have been carried out, all functions of the motor vehicle become permanent blocked, the blocking only with a certain, secret procedure can be canceled. The identification number thus prevents with a wrong key, e.g. belongs to another motor vehicle and thus naturally contains other key information than recognized as valid Failed attempts can be made.
- Each key authorized for a motor vehicle expediently contains a different one Identification number, and there are in memory 25 for each object information and a number of identification numbers are also stored in the associated object.
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- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
Description
Claims (15)
- Verfahren zum Einschreiben einer von einer zentralen Stelle gesichert zu einer entfernten Stelle übertragenen Schlüsselinformation in einen dort vorhandenen Datenträger, der nach dem Einschreiben einem ausgewählten von mehreren Objekten über die Schlüsselinformation eindeutig zugeordnet ist und der eine nach außen nicht abgebbare Ident-Information sowie eine weitere, offene Ident-Information, die auslesbar ist, gespeichert enthält, die einander zugeordnet auch in der zentralen Stelle gespeichert sind, wobei zunächst eine das individuelle Objekt kennzeichnende Objekt-Information sowie die weitere, offene Ident-Information zur zentralen Stelle übertragen werden, dort die zur Objekt-Information gespeicherte Schlüsselinformation ausgelesen und mit der zur übertragenen weiteren, offenen Ident-Information gespeicherten Ident-Information verschlüsselt und die verschlüsselte Schlüsselinformation zum Datenträger übertragen und im Datenträger mit der darin gespeicherten Ident-Information entschlüsselt und die entschlüsselte Schlüsselinformation gespeichert wird.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei in den Datenträger an einer weiteren Stelle, die über eine geschützte Informationsübertragungsverbindung mit der zentralen Stelle gekoppelt ist, die Ident-Information und die weitere, offene Ident-Information vor dem Transport des Datenträgers zur entfernten Stelle eingeschrieben wird und diese Ident-Information auch an der zentralen Stelle gespeichert wird.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, wobei die Objekt-Information vor der Übertragung zur zentralen Stelle mit der offenen Ident-Information verschlüsselt wird.
- Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 3, wobei die Verschlüsselung und Entschlüsselung der Schlüsselinformation und der Objekt-Information durch eine Exclusiv-Oder-Verknüpfung mit der weiteren,offenen Ident-Information erfolgt.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 3, wobei die verschlüsselte Objekt-Information vor der Übertragung durch ein unsymmetrisches Verschlüsselungsverfahren mit den diesem zugeordneten öffentlichen Schlüssel zusätzlich verschlüsselt wird und in der zentralen Stelle mit dem geheimen Schlüssel des Verschlüsselungsverfahrens entschlüsselt wird.
- System zum Einschreiben einer von einer zentralen Stelle gesichert zu einer entfernten Stelle übertragenen Schlüsselinformation in einen dort vorhandenen Datenträger, der nach dem Einschreiben einem ausgewählten von mehreren Objekten über die Schlüsselinformation eindeutig zugeordnet ist, wobei die zentrale Stelle einen ersten Speicher, der wenigstens eine Ident-Information und eine zugeordnete weitere Ident-Information sowie für jedes der mehreren Objekte eine das Objekt kennzeichnende Objekt-Information und die dem Objekt zugeordnete Schlüsselinformation enthält, und eine Verschlüsselungsanordnung zum Verschlüsseln einer aus dem ersten Speicher ausgelesenen Schlüsselinformation mit der Ident-Information sowie eine Übertragungsanordnung zum Übertragen der verschlüsselten Schlüsselinformation an die entfernte Stelle umfaßt, und wobei der Datenträger einen zweiten Speicher, der einen ersten Speicherplatz für eine Ident-Information, einen zweiten Speicherplatz für eine Schlüsselinformation und einen dritten Speicherplatz für eine den Datenträger kennzeichnende weitere Ident-Information enthält, sowie eine Entschlüsselungsvorrichtung umfaßt, die mit einem Informationseingang des Datenträgers und mit dem ersten Speicherplatz verbunden ist zum Abgeben einer entschlüsselten Schlüsselinformation nach Empfang einer verschlüsselten Schlüsselinformation und zum Einschreiben der entschlüsselten Schlüsselinformation in den zweiten Speicherplatz.
- System nach Anspruch 6, wobei an der entfernten Stelle ein Terminal vorgesehen ist, mit dem der Datenträger koppelbar ist, um das Auslesen der weiteren Ident-Information auszulösen und diese weitere Ident-Information an die zentrale Stelle zu übertragen und die danach von der zentralen Stelle übertragene verschlüsselte Schlüsselinformation zu empfangen und an den Datenträger zu übertragen.
- System nach Anspruch 7, wobei das Terminal eine Verschlüsselungsvorrichtung enthält, um eine eingegebene Objekt-Information mit der weiteren Ident-Information zu verschlüsseln und an die zentrale Stelle zu übertragen, und die zentrale Stelle eine Entschlüsselungsvorrichtung enthält, um die empfangene verschlüsselte Objekt-Information mittels der ebenfalls übertragenen weiteren Ident-Information zu entschlüsseln und mit der entschlüsselten Objekt-Information den ersten Speicher anzusteuern und die zugeordnete Schlüsselinformation auszulesen.
- System nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 8, wobei die Verschlüsselungsvorrichtung in der zentralen Stelle und die Entschlüsselungsvorrichtung im Datenträger als Exclusiv-Oder-Verknüpfungselement aufgebaut sind.
- System nach Anspruch 8 oder 9, wobei die Verschlüsselungsvorrichtung im Terminal eingerichtet ist, die verschlüsselte Objekt-Information zusätzlich mit dem öffentlichen Schlüssel einer unsymmetrischen Verschlüsselung zusätzlich zu verschlüsseln und an die zentrale Stelle zu übertragen und die Entschlüsselungsvorrichtung in der zentralen Stelle eingerichtet ist, um die empfangene zusätzlich verschlüsselte Objekt-Information mit dem geheimen Schlüssel der unsymmetrischen Verschlüsselung und mit der ebenfalls empfangenen weiteren Ident-Information zu entschlüsseln und die entschlüsselte Objekt-Information an den ersten Speicher abzugeben.
- Datenträger zur Verwendung in einem System nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 10, mit einer Entschlüsselungsvorrichtung und einem Speicher mit einem ersten Speicherplatz zum Speichern einer Ident-Information und einem zweiten Speicherplatz zum Aufnehmen einer Schlüsselinformation, wobei die Entschlüsselungsvorrichtung mit dem ersten Speicherplatz gekoppelt ist, um eine empfangene verschlüsselte Schlüsselinformation mittels der aus dem ersten Speicherplatz ausgelesenen Ident-Information zu entschlüsseln und die entschlüsselte Schlüsselinformation in den zweiten Speicherplatz einzuschreiben, und wobei das Ausgeben der Ident-Information aus dem Datenträger gesperrt ist.
- Datenträger nach Anspruch 11, wobei der Speicher einen dritten Speicherplatz zum Aufnehmen einer weiteren Ident-Information aufweist, und der Speicher von außerhalb des Datenträgers ansteuerbar ist, um die weitere Ident-Information aus dem Speicher nach außen abzugeben.
- Datenträger nach einem der Ansprüche 11 oder 12, wobei die Entschlüsselungsvorrichtung als Exclusiv-Oder-Verknüpfungselement ausgebildet ist.
- Terminal zur Verwendung in einem System nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 10, mit einer Koppelvorrichtung für einen Datenträger, einer Übertragungsvorrichtung für Informationen, einer Eingabevorrichtung zum Eingeben von Informationen und einer Verschlüsselungsvorrichtung mit zwei Eingängen, die mit der Eingabevorrichtung und der Koppelvorrichtung verbunden sind, und einem Ausgang, der mit der Übertragungsvorrichtung verbunden ist, um eine über die Eingabevorrichtung eingegebene Objekt-Information mit einer über die Koppelvorrichtung zugeführte Ident-Information zu verschlüsseln und die verschlüsselte Objekt-Information an die Übertragungsvorrichtung abzugeben.
- Terminal nach Anspruch 14, wobei die Verschlüsselungsvorrichtung dazu eingerichtet ist, die verschlüsselte Objekt-Information zusätzlich mit dem öffentlichen Schlüssel einer unsymmetrischen Verschlüsselung zu verschlüsseln und nur die zusätzlich verschlüsselte Objekt-Information an die Übertragungsvorrichtung abzugeben.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE19633802A DE19633802A1 (de) | 1996-08-22 | 1996-08-22 | Verfahren und System zum Einschreiben einer Schlüsselinformation |
DE19633802 | 1996-08-22 |
Publications (4)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP0825316A2 EP0825316A2 (de) | 1998-02-25 |
EP0825316A3 EP0825316A3 (de) | 2001-05-16 |
EP0825316B1 true EP0825316B1 (de) | 2004-07-28 |
EP0825316B2 EP0825316B2 (de) | 2008-02-06 |
Family
ID=7803302
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP97202546A Expired - Lifetime EP0825316B2 (de) | 1996-08-22 | 1997-08-19 | Verfahren und System zum Einschreiben einer Schlüsselinformation |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US6337912B2 (de) |
EP (1) | EP0825316B2 (de) |
JP (1) | JP4065347B2 (de) |
DE (2) | DE19633802A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE19901277A1 (de) * | 1999-01-15 | 2000-07-20 | Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag | Verfahren zum Authentisieren eines Ersatzschlüssels zum Benutzen eines Fahrzeugs |
DE19934098A1 (de) * | 1999-07-21 | 2001-01-25 | Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd | Verfahren zum eingabefreien Starten eines gegen unbefugte Nutzung mit einer PIN geschützten Geräts |
JP2004519876A (ja) * | 2000-08-24 | 2004-07-02 | シーメンス ヴィディーオー オートモーティヴ コーポレイション | 伝送同定コードを有する遠隔入力用送信機 |
US7490348B1 (en) * | 2003-03-17 | 2009-02-10 | Harris Technology, Llc | Wireless network having multiple communication allowances |
US7664966B2 (en) * | 2004-05-17 | 2010-02-16 | Microsoft Corporation | Secure storage on recordable medium in a content protection system |
DE102006010821B4 (de) * | 2006-03-07 | 2011-12-22 | Joachim Becker | Selbstzielsuchendes Datenübertragungssystem und Verfahren hierzu |
US20080250251A1 (en) * | 2007-04-04 | 2008-10-09 | Cyberlink Corp. | Systems and Methods for Hardware Driven Program Execution |
ITPN20070040A1 (it) * | 2007-05-29 | 2008-11-30 | Bianchi 1770 S P A | "metodo per la duplicazione di chiavi con codice elettronico" |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE4123666A1 (de) * | 1991-01-04 | 1992-07-09 | Inteleplex Corp | Sicherheitssystem fuer einen mobilen ausruestungsgegenstand |
DE4441415A1 (de) * | 1994-11-22 | 1996-05-23 | Audi Ag | Verfahren für die Handhabung von Ersatzschlüsseln |
EP0788946B1 (de) * | 1995-08-31 | 2001-10-24 | DaimlerChrysler AG | Verfahren und Einrichtung zur Einprogrammierung von Betriebsdaten in Fahrzeugbauteile |
Family Cites Families (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB8705892D0 (en) * | 1987-03-12 | 1987-04-15 | Security Services Plc | Keys |
JPH04213242A (ja) * | 1990-12-07 | 1992-08-04 | Hitachi Ltd | 限定同報通信システム |
CA2133200C (en) * | 1992-03-30 | 1998-08-11 | Edward Andrew Zuk | A cryptographic communications method and system |
JP3568970B2 (ja) * | 1993-04-12 | 2004-09-22 | 株式会社東芝 | Icカード発行装置 |
WO1995016238A1 (en) * | 1993-12-06 | 1995-06-15 | Telequip Corporation | Secure computer memory card |
DE4342641A1 (de) * | 1993-12-14 | 1995-06-22 | Siemens Ag | Verfahren zur Authentifikation zwischen einem mobilen Datenträger und einer stationären Datenstation |
DE19502373C2 (de) * | 1995-01-26 | 1997-07-03 | Telefunken Microelectron | Verfahren zur Diebstahlsicherung motorangetriebener Kraftfahrzeuge |
-
1996
- 1996-08-22 DE DE19633802A patent/DE19633802A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
1997
- 1997-08-19 DE DE59711801T patent/DE59711801D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1997-08-19 EP EP97202546A patent/EP0825316B2/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1997-08-19 US US08/914,444 patent/US6337912B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1997-08-20 JP JP22339097A patent/JP4065347B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE4123666A1 (de) * | 1991-01-04 | 1992-07-09 | Inteleplex Corp | Sicherheitssystem fuer einen mobilen ausruestungsgegenstand |
DE4441415A1 (de) * | 1994-11-22 | 1996-05-23 | Audi Ag | Verfahren für die Handhabung von Ersatzschlüsseln |
EP0788946B1 (de) * | 1995-08-31 | 2001-10-24 | DaimlerChrysler AG | Verfahren und Einrichtung zur Einprogrammierung von Betriebsdaten in Fahrzeugbauteile |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP0825316A3 (de) | 2001-05-16 |
DE19633802A1 (de) | 1998-02-26 |
DE59711801D1 (de) | 2004-09-02 |
EP0825316A2 (de) | 1998-02-25 |
US6337912B2 (en) | 2002-01-08 |
JP4065347B2 (ja) | 2008-03-26 |
EP0825316B2 (de) | 2008-02-06 |
JPH10107789A (ja) | 1998-04-24 |
US20010040966A1 (en) | 2001-11-15 |
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