EP0641919B1 - Arrangement des clapets de sécurité - Google Patents

Arrangement des clapets de sécurité Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0641919B1
EP0641919B1 EP94112814A EP94112814A EP0641919B1 EP 0641919 B1 EP0641919 B1 EP 0641919B1 EP 94112814 A EP94112814 A EP 94112814A EP 94112814 A EP94112814 A EP 94112814A EP 0641919 B1 EP0641919 B1 EP 0641919B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
valves
hydraulic valves
valve
hydraulic
valve pair
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP94112814A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0641919A1 (fr
Inventor
Petar Hrelic
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
ABB AG Germany
Original Assignee
ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd
Asea Brown Boveri AB
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd, Asea Brown Boveri AB filed Critical ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd
Publication of EP0641919A1 publication Critical patent/EP0641919A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0641919B1 publication Critical patent/EP0641919B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F01—MACHINES OR ENGINES IN GENERAL; ENGINE PLANTS IN GENERAL; STEAM ENGINES
    • F01D—NON-POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT MACHINES OR ENGINES, e.g. STEAM TURBINES
    • F01D21/00—Shutting-down of machines or engines, e.g. in emergency; Regulating, controlling, or safety means not otherwise provided for
    • F01D21/20—Checking operation of shut-down devices
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F01—MACHINES OR ENGINES IN GENERAL; ENGINE PLANTS IN GENERAL; STEAM ENGINES
    • F01D—NON-POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT MACHINES OR ENGINES, e.g. STEAM TURBINES
    • F01D21/00—Shutting-down of machines or engines, e.g. in emergency; Regulating, controlling, or safety means not otherwise provided for
    • F01D21/16—Trip gear
    • F01D21/18—Trip gear involving hydraulic means
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F15—FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS; HYDRAULICS OR PNEUMATICS IN GENERAL
    • F15B—SYSTEMS ACTING BY MEANS OF FLUIDS IN GENERAL; FLUID-PRESSURE ACTUATORS, e.g. SERVOMOTORS; DETAILS OF FLUID-PRESSURE SYSTEMS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • F15B20/00—Safety arrangements for fluid actuator systems; Applications of safety devices in fluid actuator systems; Emergency measures for fluid actuator systems
    • F15B20/001—Double valve requiring the use of both hands simultaneously

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of mechanical engineering and plant engineering. It relates to a hydraulic safety circuit for a hydraulically controlled and / or regulated machine or system, in particular for the purpose of rapid shutdown of a gas or steam turbine, in which safety circuit several hydraulic valves between a pressure line and one that are electrically actuable by means of a solenoid and closed when the solenoid is energized Pressure relief line are arranged in such a way that, on the one hand, a continuous connection is established between the pressure line and the pressure relief line when one or more valves fall off on the one hand, and on the other hand, if some of the valves fail, the function can be taken over by the other valves, with at least four hydraulic valves being provided by two of which are connected in parallel in a pair of valves, and the parallel pairs of valves are connected in series between the pressure line and the pressure relief line.
  • Such a safety circuit is known, for example, from US Pat. No. 5,133,189 (FIG. 1).
  • the invention further relates to a method for operating such a safety circuit.
  • Safety circuits For machines or systems which are controlled and / or regulated hydraulically by means of servomotors or the like, safety circuits have long been known which ensure immediate pressure release in the hydraulic system in the event of a malfunction. Safety circuits of this type are used in particular in gas or steam turbines in which, in the event of a rapid shutdown (so-called "trip" case), the fuel or steam supply is to be interrupted immediately by means of hydraulically operating actuators.
  • the known safety circuits usually contain several hydraulic valves that are connected to the pressure line of the hydraulic system.
  • the hydraulic valves are usually designed as valves which can be actuated electrically via a solenoid and which operate according to the closed-circuit principle, i.e. are closed when the solenoid is excited.
  • the safety circuit responds, the voltage at the solenoid coils drops, the hydraulic valves open and establish a continuous connection from the pressure line to a pressure relief line, via which the hydraulic medium can flow into a tank or the like until the pressure in the hydraulic system is reduced Has.
  • EP-B1-0 020 892 proposes three hydraulic valves connected in parallel for a safety circuit for a double-acting servo motor, each of which takes pressure relief on its own can effect (1-out-of-3 system).
  • the three valves are also connected to each other by a cross line, so that if one of the valves opens when a safety signal arrives, the other two also open, even if they do not respond to the signal themselves.
  • This solution is problematic because if one of the valves fails, the entire safety circuit is deactivated.
  • DE-C2-30 40 367 proposes a 2-out-of-3 system working with three valves.
  • the three valves are interconnected by special actuating mechanisms so that pressure relief only takes place if at least 2 of the 3 valves respond to the safety signal and drop out.
  • This circuit has the advantage that the faulty drop of a valve cannot yet trigger the relief, and that if one of the valves fails, the circuit remains functional.
  • the disadvantage here is that the reliability changes drastically after the failure of a valve: While only 2 out of 3 valves have to work correctly (2-out-3) without a previous failure, the remaining 2 valves must work after a failure (2- from-2), so that the safety circuit can fulfill its task.
  • a relatively complicated hydraulic circuit is necessary for the interconnection of the valves, which represents an additional safety risk, in particular if, instead of control valves with valve seats, leaky slides are used.
  • FIG. 1 a system with 4 valves in a combined series and series connection is disclosed (FIG. 1), which has a high level of redundancy and at the same time allows simple checking of the valve function during operation .
  • a safety circuit of the type mentioned at the outset in that a monitoring circuit is provided for at least one of the parallel-connected valve pairs, which monitors the function of both hydraulic valves of the valve pair and emits a failure signal if at least one of the hydraulic valves fails, and that a control circuit is provided for the other pair of valves, which is connected to the monitoring circuit and actuates the two hydraulic valves of the pair of valves when it receives a failure signal from the monitoring circuit.
  • the essence of the invention is to provide two identical subsystems connected in series with a parallel valve pair, one of which is active in the safety circuit as a 1-out-of-2 system and the other can serve as a reserve pair. If a valve in the active pair fails, the reserve pair can be switched over so that the same reliability (1-out-2) is achieved again due to the identical configuration of the pairs.
  • a first preferred embodiment of the safety circuit according to the invention is characterized in that the hydraulic valves are each equipped with only one through-channel and are designed as control valves with a valve seat.
  • the method according to the invention for operating the safety circuit in which in the normal operating state the hydraulic valves of a first pair of valves are kept closed by energizing the corresponding solenoid coils, and for establishing a continuous connection between the pressure line and the pressure relief line in the event of a shutdown of at least one of the two hydraulic valves of the first Valve pair is opened, is characterized in that the hydraulic valves of the second valve pair are open in the normal operating state.
  • a first preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention is characterized in that in the event of a failure of one of the hydraulic valves of the first pair of valves, the two hydraulic valves of the second pair of valves are closed, that the other hydraulic valve of the first pair of valves is opened, and in that Shutdown case for establishing a continuous connection between the pressure line and the pressure relief line at least one of the two hydraulic valves of the second valve pair is opened.
  • a pressure line 8 which is pressurized via an inlet 6 with a pressurized hydraulic medium, for example oil, leads via an outlet 7 to a servo motor or a comparable hydraulically operated actuator which switches off the affected machine or system in the event of a fault.
  • a pressure relief line runs 17, via which the pressure existing in the pressure line 8 can be reduced if a continuous connection between the two lines is switched.
  • the pressure relief line 17 can end, for example, in a tank 14 for the hydraulic medium.
  • the safety circuit 1 itself comprises three hydraulic valves 2a-c, the exemplary internal structure of which can be seen from FIG. 2.
  • Each of the hydraulic valves 2 or 2a-c has a solenoid 3 or 3a-c for actuation, which closes the valve against the pressure of a spring 5 or 5a-c when energized. If the voltage at the magnetic coil 3, 3a-c drops when a safety signal arrives, the respective valve opens due to the pressure of the spring 5, 5a-c.
  • the position of the valve can be monitored by means of a built-in limit transmitter (10 in FIG. 2), which outputs the information to the controller (not shown) via suitable signal converters 4a-c.
  • Each of the hydraulic valves 2a-c has two through channels, which are designated with the connections P and A or T and B (P indicates the pressure input, T indicates the tank output).
  • the valves are cyclically connected so that each output A is connected to the input B of the next valve.
  • All inputs P are connected to the pressure line 8 and all outputs T to the pressure relief line 17. In this way, a continuous connection between the pressure line 8 and the pressure relief line 17 is only possible if at least two valves open, ie fall off.
  • the exemplary internal structure of one of the hydraulic valves 2a-c is shown in FIG. 2.
  • the hydraulic valve 2 is shown in FIG. 2a in the closed position, but in FIG. 2b in the open position.
  • the connection of the connections P and A or B and T takes place via a slide 12 accommodated in a valve housing 9, which is moved by the solenoid 3 via a piston 11.
  • This circuit has at least four hydraulic valves 15a, b and 16a, b, two of which, namely 15a, b and 16a, b, are connected in parallel in a pair of valves by means of a connecting line 13.
  • the parallel-connected valve pairs 15a, b and 16a, b in turn are connected in series between the pressure line 8 and the pressure relief line 17.
  • Each of the hydraulic valves 15a-16b has only one through channel 22a-23b, which can be opened against a spring by energizing a solenoid 18a-19b.
  • the hydraulic valves 15a-16b are preferably designed as control valves with a valve seat, which is particularly simple because of the one through-channel.
  • the position of the hydraulic valves 15a, b of the upper pair of valves is sent via signal converters 20a, b as information to a monitoring circuit 24, which in turn is connected to a control circuit 25 for the solenoids 18a-19b.
  • the circuit shown in FIG. 3 operates as follows: In the normal operating state, the hydraulic valves 15a, b of the upper (first) valve pair are kept closed by energizing the corresponding solenoid coils 18a, b. The hydraulic valves 16a, b of the lower (second) pair of valves are open and therefore play no role in the normal operating sequence. If there is a safety signal (shutdown), At least one of the two hydraulic valves 15a, b of the first valve pair is opened to establish a continuous connection between the pressure line 8 and the pressure relief line 17. This corresponds to a 1-out-of-2 system.
  • one of the hydraulic valves 15a, b of the first valve pair fails, e.g. of the valve 15a, which is registered in the monitoring circuit 24, the two hydraulic valves 16a, b of the second valve pair are closed via the control circuit 25 and the other, functional hydraulic valve 15b of the first valve pair is opened.
  • the system therefore still has the same reliability (1-out-2) after normal failure of one of the valves and is therefore clearly superior to the conventional 2-out-3 system.
  • first and second pair of valves can also be interchanged by the first pair of valves 15a, b taking over the role of the reserve pair.
  • the positions of the hydraulic valves 16a, b of the second pair of valves are reported to the monitoring circuit 24 via corresponding signal converters 21a, b.
  • the possibility of a routine function test of all hydraulic valves 15a-16b during normal operation is particularly advantageous in a circuit according to FIG. 3.
  • the sequence of such a complete functional test is as follows: In a first step, the hydraulic valves 15a, b of the first pair of valves are kept closed and the hydraulic valves 16a, b of the second pair of valves are first closed, then opened and then closed again. This completes the check on these valves. In a second step, the hydraulic valves 16a, b of the second valve pair is kept closed and the hydraulic valves 15a, b of the first valve pair are only opened and then closed again. The check of these valves is now complete. Finally, in a third step, the hydraulic valves 16a, b of the second valve pair are opened again, so that the original operating state of the circuit is restored.
  • the invention results in a safety circuit that maintains its reliability even in the event of a valve failure, has a particularly simple design and enables a routine function test of all valves during normal operation.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
  • Analytical Chemistry (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Fluid Mechanics (AREA)
  • Fluid-Pressure Circuits (AREA)
  • Control Of Turbines (AREA)

Claims (6)

  1. Circuit hydraulique de sécurité pour une machine ou une installation à commande et/ou régulation hydraulique, notamment pour l'arrêt d'urgence d'une turbine à gaz ou à vapeur, dans lequel circuit de sécurité (1), entre une conduite sous pression (8) et une conduite de décharge (17), plusieurs soupapes hydrauliques (2a-c; 15a,b; 16a,b) commandées électriquement par un solénoïde (3a-c; 18a,b; 19a,b) et fermées à l'état excité du solénoïde, sont agencées de telle sorte que, d'une part, lors du déclenchement selon le plan établi d'une ou plusieurs soupapes, une liaison directe s'établisse entre la conduite sous pression (8) et la conduite de décharge (17) et, d'autre part, en cas de défaillance d'une partie des soupapes, la fonction puisse être reprise par les autres soupapes, sachant qu'au moins quatre soupapes hydrauliques (15a,b; 16a,b) sont présentes, dont deux (15a,b ou 16a,b) sont à chaque fois montées en parallèle en une paire de soupapes, et que les paires de soupapes montées en parallèle (15a,b; 16a,b) sont montées en série entre la conduite sous pression (8) et la conduite de décharge (17), caractérisé en ce que pour au moins une des paires de soupapes montées en parallèle (15a,b ou 16a,b) est prévu un circuit de contrôle (24), qui contrôle le fonctionnement des deux soupapes hydrauliques de la paire de soupapes et délivre, en cas de défaillance d'au moins une des soupapes hydrauliques, un signal de défaillance, et que pour l'autre paire de soupapes (16a,b ou 15a,b) est prévu un circuit de commande (25) qui est relié au circuit de contrôle (24) et actionne les deux soupapes hydrauliques de la paire de soupapes s'il reçoit un signal de défaillance du circuit de contrôle (24).
  2. Circuit de sécurité suivant la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que les soupapes hydrauliques (15a,b; 16a,b) sont chacune pourvues d'un canal de passage (22a,b; 23a,b) seulement.
  3. Circuit de sécurité suivant la revendication 2, caractérisé en ce que les soupapes hydrauliques (15a,b; 16a,b) se présentent sous la forme de servosoupapes pourvues d'un siège de soupape.
  4. Procédé pour la conduite d'un circuit de sécurité suivant la revendication 1, sachant qu'en fonctionnement normal, les soupapes hydrauliques d'une première paire de soupapes (15a,b ou 16a,b) sont maintenues fermées par l'excitation des solénoïdes correspondants (18a,b ou 19a,b), et que pour établir une liaison directe entre la conduite sous pression (8) et la conduite de décharge (17) en cas d'arrêt, au moins une des deux soupapes hydrauliques de la première paire de soupapes (15a,b ou 16a,b) est ouverte, caractérisé en ce que les soupapes hydrauliques de la deuxième paire de soupapes (16a,b ou 15a,b) sont ouvertes en fonctionnement normal.
  5. Procédé suivant la revendication 4, caractérisé en ce que, en cas de défaillance d'une des soupapes hydrauliques de la première paire de soupapes (15a,b ou 16a,b), les deux soupapes hydrauliques de la deuxième paire de soupapes (16a,b ou 15a,b) sont fermées, que l'autre soupape hydraulique de la première paire de soupapes (15a,b ou 16a,b) est ouverte, et que, en cas d'arrêt, pour établir une liaison directe entre la conduite sous pression (8) et la conduite de décharge (17), au moins une des deux soupapes hydrauliques de la deuxième paire de soupapes (16a,b ou 15a,b) est ouverte.
  6. Procédé suivant l'une quelconque des revendications 4 et 5, caractérisé en ce que pour tester les soupapes hydrauliques des deux paires de soupapes (15a,b; 16a,b) pendant le fonctionnement normal, au cours d'une première étape, les soupapes hydrauliques de la première paire de soupapes (15a,b ou 16a,b) sont maintenues fermées, tandis que les soupapes hydrauliques de la deuxième paire de soupapes (16a,b ou 15a,b) sont fermées, puis ouvertes et ensuite refermées, que, au cours d'une deuxième étape, les soupapes hydrauliques de la deuxième paire de soupapes (16a,b ou 15a,b) sont maintenues fermées tandis que les soupapes hydrauliques de la première paire de soupapes (15a,b ou 16a,b) sont ouvertes puis refermées, et que, au cours d'une troisième étape, les soupapes hydrauliques de la deuxième paire de soupapes (16a,b ou 15a,b) sont à nouveau ouvertes.
EP94112814A 1993-09-06 1994-08-17 Arrangement des clapets de sécurité Expired - Lifetime EP0641919B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE4330038A DE4330038A1 (de) 1993-09-06 1993-09-06 Hydraulische Sicherheitsschaltung
DE4330038 1993-09-06

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0641919A1 EP0641919A1 (fr) 1995-03-08
EP0641919B1 true EP0641919B1 (fr) 1997-06-04

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EP94112814A Expired - Lifetime EP0641919B1 (fr) 1993-09-06 1994-08-17 Arrangement des clapets de sécurité

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EP (1) EP0641919B1 (fr)
JP (1) JP3592377B2 (fr)
DE (2) DE4330038A1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106414907A (zh) * 2014-06-03 2017-02-15 福伊特专利有限公司 用于蒸汽涡轮机的速关阀的液压控制装置和蒸汽涡轮设备

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DE102004042891B3 (de) * 2004-08-31 2005-10-06 Hydac System Gmbh Sicherheitsschaltung für medienbetriebene Verbraucher und Verfahren zum Betrieb derselben
US7874241B2 (en) * 2005-04-19 2011-01-25 Emerson Process Management Power & Water Solutions, Inc. Electronically controllable and testable turbine trip system
US7828008B1 (en) * 2005-04-19 2010-11-09 SafePlex Systems, Inc. Online partial stroke testing system using a modified 2004 architecture
DE102005040039B4 (de) * 2005-08-23 2013-01-31 Abb Technology Ag Ventilanordnung zur Ansteuerung eines Bauelements
US7409965B2 (en) 2006-10-16 2008-08-12 Elliott Company Direct acting hydraulic trip block
DE102009058408A1 (de) * 2009-07-09 2011-01-13 Robert Bosch Gmbh Elektrohydraulische Steuerung
DE202011109158U1 (de) 2011-12-15 2012-01-24 Karl Morgenbesser Elektrohydraulische Sicherheitssteuerung
PH12013000162B1 (en) 2012-06-08 2015-03-16 Emerson process man power and water solutions inc Electronically controllable and testable turbine trip system with redundant bleed manifolds
DE102014207669A1 (de) * 2014-04-23 2015-10-29 Putzmeister Engineering Gmbh Steuerungssystem für eine hydraulische Arbeitsmaschine
JP6581499B2 (ja) * 2015-12-25 2019-09-25 株式会社東芝 蒸気弁駆動装置
WO2017125247A1 (fr) * 2016-01-22 2017-07-27 Hydac System Gmbh Dispositif de commande de sécurité
DE102016000643A1 (de) * 2016-01-22 2017-07-27 Hydac System Gmbh Sicherheitssteuerung
CN112648021B (zh) * 2020-11-30 2022-12-27 华电电力科学研究院有限公司 汽轮机ast电磁阀活动试验的在线检修改造方法

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106414907A (zh) * 2014-06-03 2017-02-15 福伊特专利有限公司 用于蒸汽涡轮机的速关阀的液压控制装置和蒸汽涡轮设备
CN106414907B (zh) * 2014-06-03 2019-03-26 福伊特专利有限公司 用于蒸汽涡轮机的速关阀的液压控制装置和蒸汽涡轮设备
US10480346B2 (en) 2014-06-03 2019-11-19 Voith Patent Gmbh Hydraulic control device for an emergency stop valve of a steam turbine and steam turbine arrangement

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP0641919A1 (fr) 1995-03-08
DE4330038A1 (de) 1995-03-09
JPH0797902A (ja) 1995-04-11
JP3592377B2 (ja) 2004-11-24
DE59402992D1 (de) 1997-07-10

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