CN113505390A - Cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption - Google Patents
Cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention relates to the technical field of epidemic situation data comparison, in particular to a cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption, which comprises the following steps: (1) the user T terminal equipment collects GPS data; (2) after the user T confirms that the user T is the sick user, the user T uploads the GPS data of the user T or only tells the sub-service provider R that the user T is the sick user; the server R marks the user T as a diseased user locally and on the block chain; (3) the user U terminal equipment also carries out GPS data collection through a mobile phone GPS module, and the user U can retrieve the ill user equipment through the block chain; when the user U and the user T perform data comparison: (4) and after the user U receives the returned encryption result, decrypting the data by using the homomorphic encryption private key of the user U, acquiring the distance difference with the user T, and further judging whether the user U contacts with the target user. The invention has better safety and confidentiality.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of epidemic situation data comparison, in particular to a cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption.
Background
During an epidemic situation, the mobile phone plays an increasingly important role and becomes an important device for collecting geographic information by a user. Meanwhile, the server has strong data analysis capacity, and helps a service provider to better position the action track of the user and whether the user is in contact with other dangerous users. But with the continuous development of epidemic situations, the travel location based on a single service provider also exposes problems. Firstly, with the flow of people, when people move across service areas of service providers, data intercommunication between service providers is difficult to effectively carry out, and a user is helped to carry out contact judgment. Secondly, people's privacy awareness is continuously improved, and the geographic information that is collected exposes a large amount of personal daily privacy information. Therefore, for the journey tracing of epidemic situations, a data comparison scheme capable of crossing service domains on the premise of protecting the privacy of users is urgently needed, so as to provide better contact comparison service for users.
The current epidemic tracking system has the following problems:
1. comparison of plaintext data
Many current epidemic tracking services collect, upload and process data in a plaintext manner. And the GPS data reveals excessive user behavior habits. If a malicious service provider collects this data, it can be used for data analysis to reveal more privacy. However, if the data is encrypted, it is difficult for the service provider to perform data analysis on the ciphertext data effectively to complete the user contact judgment.
2. The information between the service providers can not be communicated and becomes an information island
Due to the limitation of objective conditions such as regions, laws and the like, the service providers cannot effectively and safely carry out information interaction. Therefore, the user can hardly carry out cross-platform detection, and the use efficiency of data is reduced. The user is likely to need to use a plurality of epidemic situation tracking apps at the same time to meet the detection requirements of different regions, and great inconvenience is brought to the user.
3. Authority of comparison result
At present, a plurality of epidemic situation tracking services are data comparison at a server side, and if a user contacts an infected user, the information is directly leaked to a service provider. However, as with the privacy data such as medical data, the data authority should belong to the user side and be perceived by the user as whether to be published to another person. Therefore, the tracking service for epidemic situations needs to protect the comparison result of the user, and the result can be obtained and used after the user knows the situation and grants the authority.
In general, the current epidemic situation tracking service can only complete basic data comparison logic, neglect the protection of user privacy data, and hardly make the data available and invisible. Moreover, when a user needs to perform data comparison among multiple service providers, the user data among the service providers are not intercommunicated and cannot be realized. Therefore, a solution for performing data security comparison across service providers on the premise of protecting user data is needed.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption, which can overcome certain defect or defects in the prior art.
The invention discloses a cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption, which comprises the following steps:
(1) the user T terminal equipment collects GPS data through a mobile phone GPS module;
(2) after the user T confirms that the user T is the sick user, the user T can select the plaintext to upload the GPS data of the user T or only tell the son service provider R that the user T is the sick user; the server R marks the user T as a diseased user locally and on the block chain;
(3) the user U terminal equipment also carries out GPS data collection through a mobile phone GPS module, and the user U can retrieve the ill user equipment through the block chain; when the user U and the user T carry out data comparison, the data comparison is carried out in the following two ways:
a) directly communicating with a user T, sending own GPS data to a service provider R where the user T is located together with a homomorphic encryption public key after homomorphic encryption, pushing the data to the user T by the service provider R, carrying out operation on the received encrypted GPS data and the local encrypted GPS data after the local GPS data is encrypted by the homomorphic encryption public key of the user T, and returning an operation result to a user U;
b) if the user T authorizes the data to the service provider R, the GPS data of the user T is sent to the service provider R together with the homomorphic encryption public key after homomorphic encryption, the service provider R encrypts the target user data through the received homomorphic encryption public key, then performs operation on the target user data and the received encrypted data, and returns an operation result to the user U.
(4) And after the user U receives the returned encryption result, decrypting the data by using the homomorphic encryption private key of the user U, acquiring the distance difference with the user T, and further judging whether the user U contacts with the target user.
Preferably, the method for the user T to authorize the data to the service provider R is as follows:
firstly, a user T client collects terminal information;
secondly, after the client finishes information collection, the client encrypts the data information through an agent re-encryption algorithm;
encrypting the message by an encryption algorithm of proxy re-encryption, namely, cipher, capsule ═ Enc (punkey, play), wherein capsule is vertex information on the curve used in the encryption process;
thirdly, after the service provider receives the encrypted information, the service provider locally stores the encrypted information and uploads the data index to the block chain;
fourthly, the user obtains the proxy re-encryption public key of the authorized target, and locally through a ReKey algorithm of proxy re-encryption, ReKey, pubparam ═ ReKey (privkey)a，pubkeyb) Wherein the pubparam is a vertex in a newly generated curve in the process of ReKey operation; the user uploads the rekey and the pubparam generated by the re-encryption to a service provider;
fifthly, the service provider locally converts the encrypted information through ReEnc re-encryption operation, wherein newCapsule is ReEnc (rekey, capsule);
and sixthly, after the service providers finish the re-encryption operation, the service providers communicate with each other to upload the ciphertext cipher, the public parameter pupparam and the newly generated newCapsule to the block chain.
Preferably, in the second step, the key used for encryption is a public key of an asymmetric key generated by the ECDSA algorithm.
Preferably, in step (4), the distance is determined by
(Lat, lon) represents longitude and latitude data, and u and t represent two different users.
The invention has the following advantages:
1. a basic framework for establishing fair links for a plurality of epidemic situation tracking service providers by using block chains is provided, and meanwhile shared indexes are established among the service providers by using the block chains, so that the service providers help users to perform GPS data safety comparison across the service providers on the premise of following protocols.
2. And the GPS data is encrypted by using a homomorphic encryption technology, so that the GPS data of the user is calculated in a ciphertext state, and can be decrypted only by an encryption party. The data is guaranteed to be available with invisible properties.
3. Through the process design, only the authority of the initiator user for decrypting the data is compared, namely the comparison result authority is mastered in the encryption side. When the encryption party does not disclose the decryption right, any third party cannot obtain the comparison result.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption in embodiment 1.
Detailed Description
For a further understanding of the invention, reference should be made to the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and examples. It is to be understood that the examples are illustrative of the invention and not limiting.
Example 1
As shown in fig. 1, the present embodiment provides a cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption, which includes the following steps:
(1) the user T terminal equipment collects GPS data through a mobile phone GPS module;
(2) after the user T confirms that the user T is the sick user, the user T can select the plaintext to upload the GPS data of the user T or only tell the son service provider R that the user T is the sick user; the server R marks the user T as a diseased user locally and on the block chain;
(3) the user U terminal equipment also carries out GPS data collection through a mobile phone GPS module, and the user U can retrieve the ill user equipment through the block chain; when the user U and the user T carry out data comparison, the data comparison is carried out in the following two ways:
a) directly communicating with a user T, sending own GPS data to a service provider R where the user T is located together with a homomorphic encryption public key after homomorphic encryption, pushing the data to the user T by the service provider R, carrying out operation on the received encrypted GPS data and the local encrypted GPS data after the local GPS data is encrypted by the homomorphic encryption public key of the user T, and returning an operation result to a user U;
the homomorphic encryption may be: 1. asymmetric encryption; 2. and encrypting the longitude and latitude data by using the public keys respectively.
b) If the user T authorizes the data to the service provider R, the GPS data of the user T is sent to the service provider R together with the homomorphic encryption public key after homomorphic encryption, the service provider R encrypts the target user data through the received homomorphic encryption public key, then performs operation on the target user data and the received encrypted data, and returns an operation result to the user U.
(4) And after the user U receives the returned encryption result, decrypting the data by using the homomorphic encryption private key of the user U, acquiring the distance difference with the user T, and further judging whether the user U contacts with the target user.
Distance passing
(Lat, lon) represents longitude and latitude data, and u and t represent two different users.
The method for authorizing the data of the user T to the service provider R comprises the following steps:
firstly, a user T client collects terminal information through information collection modules such as a Bluetooth module and a GPS module; the client local collection scheme is independent of the system scheme, and the client can collect data according to a service agreement.
Secondly, after the client finishes information collection, the client encrypts the data information through an agent re-encryption algorithm; the key used for encryption is a public key of an asymmetric key generated by an ECDSA algorithm;
encrypting the message by an encryption algorithm of proxy re-encryption, namely, cipher, capsule ═ Enc (punkey, play), wherein capsule is vertex information on the curve used in the encryption process;
thirdly, after the service provider receives the encrypted information, the service provider locally stores the encrypted information and uploads the data index to the block chain;
fourthly, when the user wants to authorize the data of the user to any third party (the third party can be the original service provider of the user or other third parties), the user obtains the proxy re-encryption public key of the authorization target, and locally, the ReKey and the pubparam are ReKey (privkey) through a ReKey algorithm of proxy re-encryptiona，pubkeyb) Wherein the pubparam is a vertex in a newly generated curve in the process of ReKey operation; the user uploads the rekey and the pubparam generated by the re-encryption to a service provider;
fifthly, the service provider locally converts the encrypted information through ReEnc re-encryption operation, wherein newCapsule is ReEnc (rekey, capsule);
and sixthly, after the service providers finish the re-encryption operation, the service providers communicate with each other to upload the ciphertext cipher, the public parameter pupparam and the newly generated newCapsule to the block chain.
Public key, public key; plaintext is Plaintext; curve is an elliptic Curve; capsule: vertex information on curve; cipher text in Cipher text; privkey is the private key; rekey, generating an agent re-encryption public key function; rekey, namely, re-encrypting the public key by the agent; the pubparam is the vertex on the new curve in the rekey operation process; ReEnc is a proxy re-encryption function; ReDec is used for carrying out proxy re-encryption and decryption functions; Lat/Lon represents longitude and latitude.
A blockchain, also known as a distributed ledger, is an end-to-end decentralized network. Public chains are blockchains that anyone can participate in, with the highest degree of decentralization, usually uncontrolled by any private authority and the entire network operates over a broad consensus of all members in the network. The alliance chain and private chain system is used for solving the problems that the throughput rate of a public chain is low and the system is not controlled, and is only opened for the authenticated participating nodes or individuals. The emerging blockchain technology ensures data consistency of each node on the blockchain through a consensus mechanism by establishing a trust mechanism in an untrusted environment. Different service providers can be effectively linked through the block chain technology, and the index sharing of the encrypted data is completed on the premise that the data does not leave the service providers. And applying a homomorphic encryption algorithm between users and service providers, encrypting the GPS data and then performing comparison operation on the ciphertext. The safety and the usability of the epidemic situation tracking service can be effectively improved.
The present invention and its embodiments have been described above schematically, without limitation, and what is shown in the drawings is only one of the embodiments of the present invention, and the actual structure is not limited thereto. Therefore, if the person skilled in the art receives the teaching, without departing from the spirit of the invention, the person skilled in the art shall not inventively design the similar structural modes and embodiments to the technical solution, but shall fall within the scope of the invention.
Claims (4)
1. A cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps:
(1) the user T terminal equipment collects GPS data through a mobile phone GPS module;
(2) after the user T confirms that the user T is the sick user, the user T can select the plaintext to upload the GPS data of the user T or only tell the son service provider R that the user T is the sick user; the server R marks the user T as a diseased user locally and on the block chain;
(3) the user U terminal equipment also carries out GPS data collection through a mobile phone GPS module, and the user U can retrieve the ill user equipment through the block chain; when the user U and the user T carry out data comparison, the data comparison is carried out in the following two ways:
a) directly communicating with a user T, sending own GPS data to a service provider R where the user T is located together with a homomorphic encryption public key after homomorphic encryption, pushing the data to the user T by the service provider R, carrying out operation on the received encrypted GPS data and the local encrypted GPS data after the local GPS data is encrypted by the homomorphic encryption public key of the user T, and returning an operation result to a user U;
b) if the user T authorizes the data to the service provider R, the GPS data of the user T is sent to the service provider R together with the homomorphic encryption public key after homomorphic encryption, the service provider R encrypts the target user data through the received homomorphic encryption public key, then performs operation on the target user data and the received encrypted data, and returns an operation result to the user U.
(4) And after the user U receives the returned encryption result, decrypting the data by using the homomorphic encryption private key of the user U, acquiring the distance difference with the user T, and further judging whether the user U contacts with the target user.
2. The cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption of claim 1, wherein: the method for authorizing the data of the user T to the service provider R comprises the following steps:
firstly, a user T client collects terminal information;
secondly, after the client finishes information collection, the client encrypts the data information through an agent re-encryption algorithm;
encrypting the message by an encryption algorithm of proxy re-encryption, namely, cipher, capsule ═ Enc (punkey, play), wherein capsule is vertex information on the curve used in the encryption process;
thirdly, after the service provider receives the encrypted information, the service provider locally stores the encrypted information and uploads the data index to the block chain;
fourthly, the user obtains the proxy re-encryption public key of the authorized target, and locally through a ReKey algorithm of proxy re-encryption, ReKey, pubparam ═ ReKey (privkey)a，pubkeyb) Wherein the pubparam is a vertex in a newly generated curve in the process of ReKey operation; the user uploads the rekey and the pubparam generated by the re-encryption to a service provider;
fifthly, the service provider locally converts the encrypted information through ReEnc re-encryption operation, wherein newCapsule is ReEnc (rekey, capsule);
and sixthly, after the service providers finish the re-encryption operation, the service providers communicate with each other to upload the ciphertext cipher, the public parameter pupparam and the newly generated newCapsule to the block chain.
3. The cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption according to claim 2, characterized in that: in the second step, the key used for encryption is the public key of the asymmetric key generated by the ECDSA algorithm.
4. The cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption of claim 1, wherein: in step (4), the distance is passed
(Lat, lon) represents longitude and latitude data, and u and t represent two different users.
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Citations (3)
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN107749865A (en) * | 2017-12-07 | 2018-03-02 | 安徽大学 | A kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography |
| CN109818729A (en) * | 2019-01-28 | 2019-05-28 | 东北大学 | Secret protection average distance querying method based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography |
| CN112135278A (en) * | 2020-10-09 | 2020-12-25 | 成都淞幸科技有限责任公司 | D2D communication privacy protection method facing 5G |
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Patent Citations (3)
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN107749865A (en) * | 2017-12-07 | 2018-03-02 | 安徽大学 | A kind of location privacy querying method based on homomorphic cryptography |
| CN109818729A (en) * | 2019-01-28 | 2019-05-28 | 东北大学 | Secret protection average distance querying method based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography |
| CN112135278A (en) * | 2020-10-09 | 2020-12-25 | 成都淞幸科技有限责任公司 | D2D communication privacy protection method facing 5G |
Non-Patent Citations (2)
| Title |
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| 应作斌 等: "支持位置验证和策略变更的属性加密方案", 《西安电子科技大学学报(自然科学版)》, 30 April 2017 (2017-04-30), pages 57 - 62 * |
| 李莉等: "基于区块链与代理重加密的数据共享方案", 《技术研究》, 31 August 2020 (2020-08-31), pages 16 - 24 * |
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