CN109818729A - Secret protection average distance querying method based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography - Google Patents
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Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of secret protection average distance querying method based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography, is related to field of information security technology.Including average distance query processing agreement and client-based average distance query processing agreement based on server end; optimize position selection according to average distance inquiry; using two kinds of secret protection query processing agreement; use part homomorphic cryptography as structure block; the sensitive data of server and client side is encrypted; and further camouflage operation is carried out to encryption data; to protect the privacy of both sides; it is not necessarily to client and other enterprise's shared datas; without access sensitive information, so that it may answer location-based inquiry.This method facilitates in the case where not invading customer privacy, effectivelys share sensitive data between the entity and Conjoint Analysis of various application programs, substantially increases the quality of service, while also can reduce the logistics cost of enterprise.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to field of information security technology, and in particular to a kind of secret protection based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography
Average distance querying method.
Background technique
With the rapid development of network technology, database all over the world has collected and analyzed a large amount of location information.Come
It provides convenience from the development that more and more position datas such as Information Mobile Service, application program and network operator are some enterprises
With new chance.These position datas owner can clearly grasp the location information of user, and enterprise also want to by
The location information that the position data owner is possessed is applied in the development of oneself, and the new branch of for example, enterprise finds most
Best placement.But the location information of client is as a kind of highly important individual privacy data, it is careless slightly to reveal individual
Identity, than as can deriving the relevant information of its family or work by the location information of client.Therefore due to laws and regulations
It is required that the limitation with privacy concern, the position data owner cannot share such specific information with other enterprises.Enterprise starts to seek
Seek a kind of method that location-based analysis inquiry can be run in the case where not invading customer privacy.In addition to this, we
Need the service provider for preventing from possessing Customer Location information individually to track user, they are possible to and business tie-up, by for
Its mode for obtaining useful information is recompensed.Similarly, enterprise is also not intended to maximize itself advantages for development
Its customer list possessed is shared with location based service provider.Under based on the above circumstances, it would be desirable to develop a kind of high
The secret protection place information inquiry processing protocol of effect facilitates under the premise of considering Customer Location Information Security, according to
The case where position distribution, finds the optimal location of new branch.
Optimal location selection is a kind of common location-based analysis, it seeks to find the optimum position of new facility,
Optimization object function in the case where given one group of existing utility and one group of client.A kind of common method is assuming that known to position
Under the premise of on Customer Location use corresponding geometry calculation method.However, since enterprise can not understand their visitor in real time
The position at family, third party enterprise and analyst cannot use these geometry calculation methods in real life.In order to successfully hold
The location-based inquiry of row, enterprise are required to that (such as mobile operator and location based service are mentioned from the position data owner
For quotient) latest position that is collected into.Although they can also for example, retail shop or bank may know that the address of their clients
It can wish that certain periods in one day understand their position.However the work address of client may lose, change or
Expired in its database, the data of real-time update do not affect the selection of optimum position largely.Therefore it needs from number
The location information of user is collected according to owner there, while retaining some sensitive informations of data owner and the phase of client
Privacy is closed, including their identity and address etc..
For secret protection solution, the user list of mutually hiding client computer and the user list of server are needed,
Also need to hide the answer of inquiry from server.Otherwise, server will grasp the optimal candidate of new facility, and may be with competition pair
Hand shares this information.Therefore the secret protection solution of aggregate query is particularly significant, and inquiry allows the position in Analysis server
It sets data and selects optimal facility locations.Through the solution of proposition, the case where not sharing user list with server
Under, the aggregation information of the available relevant user position of client computer.Given one group of existing utility and one group of user, optimal location are looked into
Inquiry be to influence maximum new facility and finding a position, method first is that using Paillier homomorphic cryptography secret protection most
Average distance between each user of smallization and its nearest equipment.Average distance is an of great value letter for the customer
Breath, can be minimized, to improve user benefit to the maximum extent.There are many actual application programs for this technology, it is intended to
Improve service quality also or can reduce the logistics cost of enterprise.
Summary of the invention
In view of the problems of the existing technology, it is flat to provide a kind of secret protection based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography by the present invention
Equal Distance query method optimizes position selection according to average distance inquiry, using two kinds of secret protection query processing
Agreement uses part homomorphic cryptography as structure block, encrypts to the sensitive data of server and client side, and to encryption number
According to further camouflage operation is carried out, to protect the privacy of both sides.
To achieve the goals above, a kind of secret protection average distance querying method based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography,
Including average distance query processing agreement and client-based average distance query processing agreement based on server end；
(1) the average distance query processing agreement based on server end, comprising the following steps:
S1: the setting position data owner is server S, the business of request inquiry is client C, wherein server S has
nSA userClient C has nCA userSet U=US∪UC=
{U1, U2..., Un, set UI=US∩UC={ U1..., Ui..., Um, section is each use to server in different times
Family SjLocation information is provided；
S2: the essential information of average distance query processing agreement of the setting based on server end；
S2.1: server end selection set U is simultaneously sent to client, thus hidden server user U in the clientS；
S2.2: server generates public key PK with Paillier homomorphic cryptography systemSWith private key SKS；
S2.3: by set U and public key PKSIssue client；
S3: facility locations F and inquiry request are sent to server by client；
S4: server calculates facility and user U in FSThe distance between, determine each user Ui∈USTo nearest facility
Distance di, construct set D={ d1, d2..., dn}；
S5: the secret value of each element obtains encrypted result [T] in server set of computations DSAnd it is sent to client, from
And hidden server user U in the clientSWith server user USPosition；
S6: client utilizes the multiplicative homomorphic property of Paillier cryptographic system, calculates each facility locations F ∈ F's
Query result obtains ciphertext [X]S；
S7: client selects two random value v1And v2To ciphertext [X]SPretended, obtains ciphertext [X ']SAnd it is sent to
Server, to hide U on the serverCAnd UCQuery result；
S8: the camouflage result of encryption is decrypted in server, obtains decrypted result X " and is sent to client；
S9: client carries out camouflage to ciphertext X " and calculates, and obtains required query result z；
(2) client-based average distance query processing agreement, comprising the following steps:
C1: the setting position data owner is server S, the business of request inquiry is client C, wherein server S has
nSA userClient C has nCA userSet U=US∪UC=
{U1, U2..., Un, set UI=US∩UC={ U1..., Ui..., Um, section is each use to server in different times
Family SjLocation information is provided；
C2: the essential information of client-based average distance query processing agreement is set；
C2.1: server selection set U is simultaneously sent to client, thus hidden server user U in the clientS；
C2.2: the property of client Paillier homomorphic cryptography system generates public key PKCWith private key SKC, client and clothes
Be engaged in the shared PK of deviceC；
C2.3: random nonzero integer r is selectediWith the modulus m of the group generated by client CCIt is relatively prime, then
C2.4: client is according to user list UCIt calculates encrypted result [T]C；
C2.5: client is by [T]C, public key PKC, r and client user's number ncIt is sent to server；
C3: server authentication encrypted result, thus in client hidden user UCQuery result；
C4: facility locations F and inquiry request are sent to server by client；
C5: server calculates facility and user U in FSThe distance between, determine each user Ui∈USTo nearest facility
Distance di, construct set D={ d1, d2..., dn}；
C6: client utilizes the multiplicative homomorphic property of Paillier cryptographic system, uses [T]CIn value come calculate inquiry
As a result ciphertext [X]C；
C7: server is by ciphertext [X]CIt is multiplied with zero encryption, obtains the encrypted query result [X '] of anonymizationCAnd it sends
To client, prevent server from carrying out position tracking to user by client；
C8: operation is decrypted to the encrypted query result of anonymization in client, obtains query result z.
Further, the mode of server authentication encrypted result is judgement in the step C3It is
It is no to be equal to EC(nC), if so, continuing agreement, if it is not, then termination protocol, whereinFor client user
Number nCEncryption, mCModulus for the group generated by client C, gCFor the generation member of the group generated by client C, r is random
Number.
Beneficial effects of the present invention:
The present invention proposes a kind of secret protection average distance querying method based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography, including is based on
The average distance query processing agreement of server end and client-based average distance query processing agreement, executed in agreement
Cheng Zhong is hidden the user list of client and query result on the server using homomorphic cryptography, and by the user of server
List and position data are hidden has been re-introduced into a kind of client computer (such as enterprise) in database (such as base of server on the client
Service provider in position) on generic service inquire best facility locations, can realize primary demand under the premise of pole
Ensure the safety and reliability of data greatly, there is very high practical value and extending space.In the agreement based on server,
Most of calculating is executed by server, therefore the workload of client is very low, it, can when the computing capability of client is limited
It calculates easily and fast；In client-based agreement, is largely calculated and only occurred once, in certain journey by client executing
Communication overhead is reduced on degree.In querying method provided by the invention, enterprise requires no knowledge about the position of user, but passes through
Request, using the union of potential user's space, returns to the method for aggregation information to analyze position data to hide the use of both sides
Family list helps enterprise to find the optimum position of new facility among several candidates, to improve safety.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the whole of the secret protection average distance querying method based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography in the embodiment of the present invention
Body configuration diagram；
Fig. 2 is the timing diagram of the query processing agreement based on server in the embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 3 is the flow chart of the query processing agreement based on server in the embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 is the timing diagram of client-based query processing agreement in the embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 5 is the flow chart of client-based query processing agreement in the embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
It is right in the following with reference to the drawings and specific embodiments in order to be more clear the purpose of the present invention, technical solution and advantage
The present invention is described in further details.Described herein specific examples are only used to explain the present invention, is not used to limit this
Invention.
A kind of secret protection average distance querying method based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography, framework is as shown in Figure 1, include
Average distance query processing agreement and client-based average distance query processing agreement based on server end；
(1) the average distance query processing agreement based on server end, server S and client C by five wheel interaction come
The process for realizing average distance inquiry, as shown in Fig. 2, detailed process is as shown in Figure 3, comprising the following steps:
S1: the setting position data owner is server S, the business of request inquiry is client C, wherein server S has
nSA userClient C has nCA userSet U=US∪UC=
{U1, U2..., Un, set UI=US∩UC={ U1..., Ui..., Um, section is each use to server in different times
Family SjLocation information is provided.
S2: the essential information of average distance query processing agreement of the setting based on server end.
S2.1: server end selection set U is simultaneously sent to client, thus hidden server user U in the clientS。
S2.2: server generates public key PK with Paillier homomorphic cryptography systemSWith private key SKS。
In the present embodiment, for the public key PK of message x generationS=(gS, mS) and private key SKS=(λS, μS) random selection two
A big prime number p and q meets gcd (pq, (p-1) (q-1))=1, that is, guarantees that two prime lengths are equal, calculating is given birth to by server S
At group modulus mS=pq, λS=1cm (p-1) (q-1) randomly chooses an integer as the group's generated by server S
Generate memberμS=(L (gS λmodmS 2))-1mod mS,Public key PK is generated with thisSWith private key SKS。
S2.3: by set U and public key PKSIssue client.
S3: facility locations F and inquiry request are sent to server by client.
S4: server calculates facility and user U in FSThe distance between, determine each user Ui∈USTo nearest facility
Distance di, construct set D={ d1, d2..., dn}。
S5: the secret value of each element obtains 2 × n matrix [T] in server set of computations DSAnd it is sent to client, from
And hidden server user U in the clientSWith server user USPosition.
2 × the n matrix [T]SFormula it is as follows:
Wherein, [T1i]SFor by public key PKSEncrypt obtained scrambled matrix [T]SThe element of 1st row i-th column, [T2i]SIt serves as reasons
Public key PKSEncrypt obtained scrambled matrix [T]SThe element of 2nd row i-th column, diFor user i to the distance of nearest facility.
S6: client utilizes the multiplicative homomorphic property of Paillier cryptographic system, calculates each facility locations Fj∈ F's
Query result obtains ciphertext [X]S。
It is described to obtain ciphertext [X]SMode it is as follows:
[X]S={ [x1]S, [x2]S}；
Wherein,WithRespectively the 1st row disappears
Breath and the 2nd row are in server S by public key PKSEncryption obtains ciphertext, nIFor set UITotal number of users.
S7: client selects two random value v1And v2To ciphertext [X]SPretended, obtains ciphertext [X ']SAnd it is sent to
Server, to hide U on the serverCAnd UCQuery result.
It is described to obtain ciphertext [X ']SMode it is as follows:
[X′]S={ [x1′]S, [x2′]S}；
Wherein, [x1′]S=[x1]S·ES(v1) and [x2′]S=[x2]S·ES(v2) it is respectively to the 1st row message ciphertext
[x1]SWith the 2nd row message ciphertext [x2]SPretended to obtain ciphertext.
S8: the camouflage result of encryption is decrypted in server, obtains decrypted result X " and is sent to client.
The mode for obtaining decrypted result X " is as follows:
X "={ x1", x2″}；
Wherein, x1 "=DS([x1′]S) and x2"=DS([x2′]S) it is respectively to the 1st row message ciphertext [x1′]SWith the 2nd row
Message ciphertext [x2′]SThe message being decrypted.
S9: client carries out camouflage to ciphertext X " and calculates, and obtains required query result z.
(2) client-based average distance query processing agreement, server S and client C are by four-wheel interaction come real
The process of existing average distance inquiry, as shown in figure 4, process is as shown in Figure 5, comprising the following steps:
C1: the setting position data owner is server S, the business of request inquiry is client C, wherein server S has
nSA userClient C has nCA userSet U=US∪UC=
{U1, U2..., Un, set UI=US∩UC={ U1..., Ui..., Um, section is each use to server in different times
Family SjLocation information is provided.
C2: the essential information of client-based average distance query processing agreement is set.
C2.1: server selection set U is simultaneously sent to client, thus hidden server user U in the clientS。
C2.2: the property of client Paillier homomorphic cryptography system generates public key PKCWith private key SKC, client and clothes
Be engaged in the shared PK of deviceC。
In the present embodiment, for the public key PK of message x generationC=(gC, mC) and private key SKC=(λC, μC) random selection two
A big prime number p and q meets gcd (pq, (p-1) (q-1))=1, that is, guarantees that two prime lengths are equal, calculating is given birth to by client C
At group modulus mC=pq, λC=1cm (p-1) (q-1) randomly chooses an integer as the group's generated by client C
Generate memberμC=(L (gC λmod mC 2))-1mod mC,Public key PK is generated with thisCWith private key SKC。
C2.3: random nonzero integer r is selectediWith the modulus m of the group generated by client CCIt is relatively prime, then
In the present embodiment, in encryption using random value r may insure two identical message encryptions to identical value, but
Possibility can be ignored.
C2.4: client is according to user list UCIt calculates encrypted result [T]C；
Wherein, [Ti]CFor by public key PKSEncrypt i-th of element in obtained message ciphertext set.
C2.5: client is by [T]C, public key PKC, r and client user's number ncIt is sent to server；
C3: server authentication encrypted result, thus in client hidden user UCQuery result；
In the present embodiment, the query result server that can not obtain specific user for guarantee malicious client adds to what is obtained
Close result is verified, and the mode of server authentication encrypted result is judgementWhether E is equal toC(nC), if
It is then to continue agreement, if it is not, then termination protocol, whereinFor client user's number nCEncryption, mCFor
By the modulus of the client C group generated, gCFor the generation member of the group generated by client C, r is random number,Wherein 1
Number is Ui∈UCNumber, should be equal to total client number of users ncIf unequal, illustrate number of users ncAnd encrypted column
Table [T]CIt does not correspond to, there is shown existing mistake.
C4: facility locations F and inquiry request are sent to server by client.
C5: server calculates facility and user U in FSThe distance between, determine each user Ui∈USTo nearest facility
Distance di, construct set D={ d1, d2..., dn}。
C6: client utilizes the multiplicative homomorphic property of Paillier cryptographic system, uses [T]CIn value come calculate inquiry
As a result ciphertext [X]C。
It is described to obtain ciphertext [X]CMode it is as follows:
[X]C={ [x1]C, [x2]C}；
Wherein,WithRespectively the 1st row message
With the 2nd row by public key PK on client CCEncryption obtains ciphertext.
C7: server is by ciphertext [X]CIt is multiplied with zero encryption, obtains the encrypted query result [X '] of anonymizationCAnd it sends
To client, prevent server from carrying out position tracking to user by client.It is described to obtain the encrypted inquiry knot of anonymization
Fruit [X ']CMode it is as follows:
[X′]C={ [x1′]C, [x2′]C}；
Wherein, [x1′]C=[x1]C·EC(0) and [x2′]C=[x2]C·ECIt (0) is respectively to the 1st row message in client
Ciphertext [x on C1]CWith ciphertext [x of the 2nd row message on client C2]CCarry out the encrypted query result of anonymization.
In the present embodiment, because be multiplied with zero encryption will not change as a result, therefore for prevent server by client to
Family carries out position tracking, and server with zero encryption by being multiplied result come anonymization encrypted result.
C8: operation is decrypted to the encrypted query result of anonymization in client, obtains query result z.
The mode that operation is decrypted to the encrypted query result of anonymization is as follows:
[X″]C={ [x1″]C, [x2″]C}；
Wherein, x1"=DC([x1′]C)=qnIAnd x2"=DC([x2′]C)=nIRespectively to the 1st row message ciphertext
[x1′]SWith the 2nd row message ciphertext [x2′]SThe message being decrypted.
From the above equation, we can see that the calculation formula of query result z is as follows:
Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are merely illustrative of the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than its limitations；Although
Present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that；It still may be used
To modify to technical solution documented by previous embodiment, or some or all of the technical features are equal
Replacement；Thus these are modified or replaceed, defined by the claims in the present invention that it does not separate the essence of the corresponding technical solution
Range.
Claims (2)
1. a kind of secret protection average distance querying method based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography, which is characterized in that including being based on
The average distance query processing agreement of server end and client-based average distance query processing agreement；
(1) the average distance query processing agreement based on server end, comprising the following steps:
S1: the setting position data owner is server S, the business of request inquiry is client C, wherein server S has nSIt is a
UserClient C has nCA userSet U=US∪UC={ U1,
U2..., Un, set U1=US∩UC={ U1..., Ui..., Um, section is each user S to server in different timesj
Location information is provided；
S2: the essential information of average distance query processing agreement of the setting based on server end；
S2.1: server end selection set U is simultaneously sent to client, thus hidden server user U in the clientS；
S2.2: server generates public key PK with Paillier homomorphic cryptography systemSWith private key SKS；
S2.3: by set U and public key PKSIssue client；
S3: facility locations F and inquiry request are sent to server by client；
S4: server calculates facility and user U in FSThe distance between, determine each user Ui∈USTo the distance of nearest facility
di, construct set D={ d1, d2..., dn}；
S5: the secret value of each element obtains encrypted result [T] in server set of computations DSAnd it is sent to client, thus
Hidden server user U in clientSWith server user USPosition；
S6: client utilizes the multiplicative homomorphic property of Paillier cryptographic system, calculates each facility locations FjThe inquiry of ∈ F
As a result, obtaining ciphertext [X]S；
S7: client selects two random value v1And v2To ciphertext [X]SPretended, obtains ciphertext [X ']SAnd it is sent to service
Device, to hide U on the serverCAnd UCQuery result；
S8: the camouflage result of encryption is decrypted in server, obtains decrypted result X " and is sent to client；
S9: client carries out camouflage to ciphertext X " and calculates, and obtains required query result z；
(2) client-based average distance query processing agreement, comprising the following steps:
C1: the setting position data owner is server S, the business of request inquiry is client C, wherein server S has nSIt is a
UserClient C has nCA userSet U=US∪UC={ U1,
U2..., Un, set UI=US∩UC={ U1..., Ui..., Um, section is each user S to server in different timesj
Location information is provided；
C2: the essential information of client-based average distance query processing agreement is set；
C2.1: server selection set U is simultaneously sent to client, thus hidden server user U in the clientS；
C2.2: the property of client Paillier homomorphic cryptography system generates public key PKCWith private key SKC, client and server
Shared PKC；
C2.3: random nonzero integer r is selectediWith the modulus m of the group generated by client CCIt is relatively prime, then
C2.4: client is according to user list UCIt calculates encrypted result [T]C；
C2.5: client is by [T]C, public key PKC, r and client user's number ncIt is sent to server；
C3: server authentication encrypted result, thus in client hidden user UCQuery result；
C4: facility locations F and inquiry request are sent to server by client；
C5: server calculates facility and user U in FSThe distance between, determine each user Ui∈USTo the distance of nearest facility
di, construct set D={ d1, d2..., dn}；
C6: client utilizes the multiplicative homomorphic property of Paillier cryptographic system, uses [T]CIn value calculate query result
Ciphertext [X]C；
C7: server is by ciphertext [X]CIt is multiplied with zero encryption, obtains the encrypted query result [X '] of anonymizationCAnd it is sent to visitor
Family end prevents server from carrying out position tracking to user by client；
C8: operation is decrypted to the encrypted query result of anonymization in client, obtains query result z.
2. the secret protection average distance querying method according to claim 1 based on Paillier homomorphic cryptography, special
Sign is that the mode of server authentication encrypted result is judgement in the step C3Whether E is equal toC
(nC), if so, continuing agreement, if it is not, then termination protocol, whereinFor client user's number nCPlus
It is close, mCModulus for the group generated by client C, gCFor the generation member of the group generated by client C, r is random number.
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| CN111291406B (en) * | 2020-01-19 | 2022-07-26 | 山东师范大学 | Facility site selection method and system based on encrypted position data |
| CN113505390A (en) * | 2021-07-12 | 2021-10-15 | 东莞理工学院 | Cross-service provider epidemic situation data comparison method based on homomorphic encryption |
| CN114662147A (en) * | 2022-03-24 | 2022-06-24 | 云南电网有限责任公司信息中心 | Private information retrieval method and system suitable for large-scale database |
| CN114662147B (en) * | 2022-03-24 | 2023-04-07 | 云南电网有限责任公司信息中心 | Private information retrieval method and system suitable for large-scale database |
| CN117349898A (en) * | 2023-12-05 | 2024-01-05 | 中国电子科技集团公司第十研究所 | Ciphertext K neighbor query method and system with hidden access mode |
| CN117349898B (en) * | 2023-12-05 | 2024-03-08 | 中国电子科技集团公司第十研究所 | Ciphertext K neighbor query method and system with hidden access mode |
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