CN105575448B - Nuclear power plant reactor protects system and method for controlling security therein - Google Patents
Nuclear power plant reactor protects system and method for controlling security therein Download PDFInfo
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- CN105575448B CN105575448B CN201510944814.5A CN201510944814A CN105575448B CN 105575448 B CN105575448 B CN 105575448B CN 201510944814 A CN201510944814 A CN 201510944814A CN 105575448 B CN105575448 B CN 105575448B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
- G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
- G21D3/04—Safety arrangements
- G21D3/06—Safety arrangements responsive to faults within the plant
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
- Y02E30/30—Nuclear fission reactors
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Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of nuclear power plant reactor protection system and method for controlling security therein, is related to nuclear power station field, can reduce protection system maintenance, the scheme complexity of routine test.Protection system possesses：It is divided into the emergency shut-down system of N number of protection passage, each protection passage obtains Protection parameters from signal pre-processing system, carries out threshold value comparison；With N number of channel attached ad hoc drive system of protection; receive threshold value comparative result; and ad hoc driving logical process is carried out according to threshold value comparative result, the first ad hoc driving instruction of output is used to drive after the generation of design of nuclear power plant basis accident, and reactor, which reaches, needs the executing agency of operation before controllable state；The Safety Automation System being connected by safe level looped network with ad hoc drive system, producing the first device level control instruction is used for after design of nuclear power plant basis accident occurs, and reactor needs the executing agency of operation to be controlled from controllable state into safe shutdown state procedure.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to nuclear power station field, more particularly to a kind of nuclear power plant reactor protection system and security control therein
Method.
Background technology
In order to ensure nuclear power plant reactor safe operation, protection system need to be set.The structure design and nuclear power of protection system
The master-plan stood, safety classification, core level DCS (Digital Control System, digital computer control system) are put down
Platform design is closely related.
In the case where design basis accident occurs for nuclear power station, protection system is used to bring reactor to safe stopping stack
State.Wherein, design basis accident refers to, nuclear power station is taken the accident of specific aim measure by the design criteria of determination in the design
Operating mode.Safe shutdown state refers to the state that reactor stops in a controlled manner.In addition, before safe shutdown state, instead
Heap is answered to be introduced into controllable state, controllable state here refers to, the fission chain reaction of reactor is in controllable state.
Within a protection system, the process for reaching controllable state after design basis accident to reactor occurs from nuclear power station, with
And reactor is from controllable state to the process of safe shutdown state, in addition to reactor automatic emergency shutdown function is realized, on the one hand,
Need to automatically control processing according to Protection parameters progress is system-level to engineered safeguards features progress, on the other hand, in addition it is also necessary to right
Engineered safeguards features carry out the manually operated processing of device level.Wherein, engineered safeguards features refer to, nuclear power plant is under accident conditions
Come into operation and perform security function, to control damage sequence, make reactor reach stable, receptive phase after accident and
The general name of the various security systems specially set.
During stating existing protection system in realization, inventor has found that at least there are the following problems in the prior art：
In existing protection system, system-level ad hoc driving function is mingled in same subsystem with the ad hoc driving function of device level
Realize, in such subsystem, for control process of Protection parameters etc. used in system-level ad hoc driving function, and it is right
In control process of user input instruction etc. used in the ad hoc driving function of device level, much realized by same equipment, that is,
Registration is higher between realizing the system of two kinds of functions, and this causes to protect the scheme of system maintenance, routine test complex.
The content of the invention
The present invention provides the security control in a kind of nuclear power plant reactor protection system and nuclear power plant reactor protection system
Method, can reduce protection system maintenance, the scheme complexity of routine test.
To reach above-mentioned purpose, embodiments of the invention are adopted the following technical scheme that：
First aspect protects system there is provided a kind of nuclear power plant reactor, possesses：
Emergency shut-down system RTS, it is divided into N number of protection passage, and N is even number and N >=2, and each protection passage, which is corresponded to, to be connected
A column signal pretreatment system is connect, wherein, each protection passage obtains protection from the corresponding signal pre-processing system
Parameter, and threshold value comparison is carried out according to the Protection parameters, obtain threshold value comparative result；
Ad hoc drive system ESFAS, it is connected with N number of protection passage, the threshold value for receiving each protection passage
Comparative result, and ad hoc driving logical process is carried out according to the threshold value comparative result, the first ad hoc driving instruction is exported, it is described
First ad hoc driving instruction is used to drive reactor to reach the executing agency before controllable state；
Safety Automation System SAS, it is connected by safe level looped network with the ad hoc drive system ESFAS, for producing
Raw first device level control instruction, the first device level control instruction is used for reaching controllable state to safe stopping from reactor
The executing agency of heap state is controlled.
Second aspect comprises the following steps there is provided the method for controlling security in a kind of nuclear power plant reactor protection system：
Threshold value comparison step, wherein, emergency shut-down system RTS multiple protection passages are from corresponding Signal Pretreatment system
System obtains Protection parameters, and carries out threshold value comparison to the Protection parameters, obtains threshold value comparative result；
Ad hoc actuation step, wherein, ad hoc drive system ESFAS receives the threshold value comparative result of each protection passage, and
Ad hoc driving logical process is carried out according to the threshold value comparative result, the first ad hoc driving instruction, the first ad hoc drive is exported
Dynamic instruction needs the executing agency of operation for driving reactor to reach before controllable state；
Safety automation step, wherein, Safety Automation System SAS produces the first device level control instruction, described first
Device level control instruction is used to need the executing agency of operation to be controlled from controllable state to safe shutdown state in reactor.
In the nuclear power plant reactor protection system and its method of controlling security that the present invention is provided, reactor is reached controllable
With reaching that the defencive function of controllable state to safe shutdown state makes a distinction processing before state, specifically, pass through safe level ring
Net, to the ad hoc drive system for realizing important system-level automatic control function, and for realizing that equipment level security is auxiliary
Help, support the Safety Automation System of function to be implemented separately, relative to do not distinguish in the prior art ad hoc drive system with peace
Fully automatic system and drop both functions and be mingled in same subsystem, the present invention can reduce protection system maintenance, fixed
The scheme complexity of phase experiment.
Brief description of the drawings
, below will be to embodiment or existing for the clearer explanation embodiment of the present invention or technical scheme of the prior art
The accompanying drawing used required for having in technology is briefly described, it should be apparent that, drawings in the following description are only the present invention
Some embodiments, for those of ordinary skill in the art, on the premise of not paying creative work, can also basis
These accompanying drawings obtain other accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 protects the structural representation of system for the nuclear power plant reactor that the present invention is provided；
The flow chart of method of controlling security in the nuclear power plant reactor protection system that Fig. 2 provides for the present invention.
Embodiment
The technical scheme to the embodiment of the present invention is clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, it is clear that described
Embodiment is only a part of embodiment of the present invention, rather than whole embodiments.Based on the embodiment in the present invention, ability
The every other embodiment that domain those of ordinary skill is obtained on the premise of creative work is not made, belongs to the present invention
The scope of protection.
Embodiment one
Hereinafter, illustrated with reference to the nuclear power plant reactor protection system that accompanying drawing is provided the present embodiment.Fig. 1 is the present invention
The nuclear power plant reactor that embodiment one is provided protects the structural representation of system.
As shown in figure 1, nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100 mainly possesses emergency shut-down system (Reactor Trip
System, RTS) 10, ad hoc drive system (Engineering Safety Features Actuation System,
ESFAS) 20, Safety Automation System (Safety Automation System, SAS) 30 and safe level looped network SB (Safety
System Bus)40。
Emergency shut-down system 10 has following function：When occurring design basis accident in reactor operation, triggering reaction
Heap shutdown, to realize the control to pile reactivity, primary Ioops Residual heat removal, reactor radioactivity such as contains at the defencive function.
10 points of emergency shut-down system is N number of protection passage of redundancy, has identical structure in each protection passage.Its
In, N is even number and N >=2.In the present embodiment, illustrated by taking N=4 as an example.4 protection passages are respectively RTS IP, RTS
IIP, RTS IIIP and RTS IVP.As described later, each protection passage is main by Reactor trip switch board (Reactor
Protection Cabinet, RPC) composition, as shown in figure 1,4 protection passages correspond to RPC-I, RPC-II, RPC- respectively
III、RPC-IV。
Nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100 also includes N column signal pretreatment system SPS (Signal Processing
System)11.Signal pre-processing system 11 mainly possesses sensor S for gathering Protection parameters and sensor S is gathered
Protection parameters isolated, nursed one's health, being distributed etc. pretreatment Signal Pretreatment cabinet (Signal Processing Cabinet,
SPC).Protection parameters refer to various parameters related to safe condition in nuclear power station, for example, the water level of voltage-stablizer, voltage-stablizer
Pressure etc..
Signal pre-processing system 11 is corresponded with protection passage.In the present embodiment, it is divided into 4 corresponding to protection passage
Individual, signal pre-processing system 11 is equally divided into 4 row, corresponding 4 Signal Pretreatment cabinets be SPC-I, SPC-II, SPC-III,
SPC-IV.Each protection passage corresponds to one column signal pretreatment system 11 of connection.For example, protection passage RTS IP connection signals
The corresponding signal pre-processing systems of cabinet SPC-I are pre-processed, protection passage RTS IIP connection Signal Pretreatment cabinets SPC-II is corresponding
Signal pre-processing system.
It is each to protect passage (RTS IP, RTS IIP, RTS IIIP and RTS IVP) from corresponding signal pre-processing system
11 obtain the Protection parameters after being pretreated.In order to judge whether Protection parameters meet the requirement of safe condition, phase can be set
The threshold value answered.Protection parameters can be compared by protection passage with threshold value, obtain threshold value comparative result.For example, for one
The water level of voltage-stablizer (not shown) in loop, it is safety level to set a threshold value, when the water level of voltage-stablizer is higher than safety level
When, threshold value comparative result " 1 " is obtained, the water level for characterizing voltage-stablizer is in non-secure states；When the water level of voltage-stablizer is less than
During safety level, threshold value comparative result " 0 " is obtained, the water level for characterizing voltage-stablizer is in a safe condition.As described later, threshold
On the one hand value comparative result is handled for ad hoc drive system 20, is on the other hand handled for emergency shut-down system 10.
Ad hoc drive system 20 is used to nuclear power station be brought to controllable state after design basis accident occurs for nuclear power station, specifically
Ground, it can trigger engineered safeguards features action corresponding with design basis accident, such as Safety Injection, startup emergency feedwater.
Ad hoc drive system 20 can be divided into multiple sequences of redundancy, i.e. ESFAS sequences.Each ESFAS sequences have identical
Structure, mainly by it is ad hoc driving cabinet (Engineering Safety Features Actuation Cabinet, ESFAC)
Constitute, ESFAC is used for the function of realizing ad hoc drive system 20, wherein two arithmetic processors.
Here, by taking 3 ESFAS sequences ESFAS A, ESFAS B, ESFAS C as an example.As shown in figure 1,3 ESFAS sequences are corresponded to respectively
ESFAC-A、ESFAC-B、ESFAC-C.ESFAC-A is configured with two arithmetic processor A1, A2, and ESFAC-B is configured with two fortune
Processor B 1, B 2 are calculated, ESFAC-C is configured with two arithmetic processors C1, C2.
Ad hoc drive system 20 is connected with N number of protection passage of emergency shut-down system 10, more specifically, each ESFAS sequences
Row are connected with N number of protection passage by point-to- point communication.For example, the corresponding ESFAS A of ESFAC-A and 4 RPC-I, RPC-
Each self-corresponding RTS IP of II, RPC-III, RPC-IV, RTS IIP, RTS IIIP, RTS IVP are all connected with.Ad hoc drive system
20 can receive the threshold value comparative result that each protection passage is each obtained, i.e., N number of threshold value comparative result.Here, ad hoc drivetrain
The N number of threshold value comparative result of 20 pairs of system carries out ad hoc driving logical process, exports the first ad hoc driving instruction, the first ad hoc drive finger
Make for driving engineered safeguards features (one kind of executing agency) corresponding with design basis accident before controllable state so that anti-
Heap is answered to reach controllable state.Therefore, ad hoc driving logical process refers to, the ad hoc peace for determining to drive according to threshold value comparative result
Full facility and its type of drive.As described later, the first ad hoc driving instruction will be transmitted by safe level looped network 40.
Ad hoc drive system 20 is different from, Safety Automation System 30 is used to from controllable state bring reactor to safe stopping
Heap state.Carry out carrying out system-level drive control to engineered safeguards features moreover, ad hoc drive system 20 is based on Protection parameters,
And manual input operation of the Safety Automation System 30 based on operating personnel carries out the driving control of device level to engineered safeguards features
System.
Safety Automation System 30 can equally be divided into multiple sequences, i.e. SAS sequences.Each SAS sequences have identical knot
Structure, is mainly made up of safety automation cabinet (Safety Automation Cabinet, SAC), and SAC is used to realize safety automation
The function of change system 30, each SAS sequences can configure hot backup redundancy arithmetic processor (not shown).As shown in figure 1, with 3 SAS
Exemplified by sequence SAS A, SAS B, SAS C.Here, the instruction that Safety Automation System 30 is inputted according to operating personnel, output the
One device level control instruction, the first device level control instruction is the control instruction for individual equipment, for reactor from can
Control state needs the executing agency operated to be controlled to safe shutdown state.
It is that the ad hoc drive system 20 of connection and Safety Automation System 30 are set in protection system 100 that safe level looped network 40, which is,
Put, for the first ad hoc driving instruction to be delivered into corresponding executing agency with the first device level control instruction.Corresponding to special
If drive system 20 and the redundant of Safety Automation System 30 are set, safe level looped network 40 can equally carry out redundant and set
Put, i.e. 40 points of safe level looped network is multigroup.As shown in figure 1,40 points of safe level looped network is three groups of safe level subring nets, it is respectively
Train A、Train B、Train C.Every group of safe level subring net is used to connect an ESFAS sequence and a SAS sequence,
That is, each SAS sequences are connected one to one by a safe level subring net with an ESFAS sequence.For example, SAS sequences SAS
A is connected by safe level subring net Train A with ESFAS sequence ESFAS A, and SAS sequence SAS B pass through safe level subring net
Train B are connected with ESFAS sequence ESFAS B.
As known from the above, in the nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100 that the present embodiment is provided, reactor is reached controllable
With reaching that the defencive function of controllable state to safe shutdown state makes a distinction processing before state, specifically, pass through safe level ring
Net 40, to the ad hoc drive system 20 for realizing important system-level automatic control function, and for realizing that device level is pacified
Full auxiliary, the Safety Automation System 30 of function is supported to be implemented separately, relative to not distinguishing ad hoc drivetrain in the prior art
System with Safety Automation System and drop both functions and be mingled in same subsystem, the present invention can reduce protection system dimension
Shield, the scheme complexity of routine test.
Embodiment two
The present embodiment enters traveling one on the basis of embodiment one to nuclear power plant reactor of the prior art protection system
Step is improved.
In the prior art, typically only it is divided into the row of A, B two, core level DCS platforms for two generation pressurized-water reactor nuclear power plant control sequences
Correspondingly do the structure design of the row of A, B two.However, with the introducing of three generations's pressurized-water reactor nuclear power plant, and three generations's pressurized-water reactor nuclear power plant
It is divided into three control sequences, therefore, the two row control sequences design of nuclear power plant reactor protection system of the prior art can not
Meet the requirement of three generations's pressurized-water reactor nuclear power plant.
Therefore, 20 points of the ad hoc drive system that the present embodiment is provided is the ESFAS sequences of more than three, preferably three
ESFAS sequences.As described in embodiment one, each ESFAS sequences are connected with N number of protection passage.
In the present embodiment, by the way that ad hoc drive system 20 is designed as into three ESFAS sequences, it disclosure satisfy that nuclear power station
Technology controlling and process demand.Moreover, three control sequences can further optimize nuclear power station control function compared to two control sequences
Redundancy and independence, and then improve the reliability that protection system instrument control is realized.
As described above, each ESFAS sequences are mainly made up of ESFAC.Arithmetic processor in ESFAC is except for realizing
Outside ad hoc driving logical process, it may also be used for N number of threshold value comparative result of each ESFAS sequential receptions meet at logic
Reason.Meet logical process and take one to meet logic, N including N and take two to meet logic etc..By taking N=4 as an example, each ESFAS meets logic
Circuit can carry out four to 4 threshold value comparative results from 4 protection passages and take two to meet logical process.Meet logical process
Output result carries out ad hoc driving logical process for ad hoc driving logic circuit.
Also, when channel failure is protected in the part in N number of protection passage, according to meeting at logic degeneration principle
Reason.The so-called logic degeneration principle that meets refers to, when some protection channel failure in N number of protection passage, meets logical process
Deteriorate to N-1 and take one to meet logic, N-1 and take two to meet logic etc.；When N-1 some protected in passage protection channel failure
When, meet logical process and further deteriorate to N-2 and take one to meet logic, N-2 and take two to meet logic etc..For example, ESFAS is accorded with
Two are taken to meet logical process to carrying out four from 4 threshold value comparative results from 4 protection passages when combinational logic circuit is initial, when
During some protection channel failure, deteriorate to two from three and meet logical process, when there is a protection channel failure again, further move back
Turning to two takes one to meet logical process.
In addition, though when initial in the above description by N take two meet logic exemplified by illustrate, but can also enter when initial
Row N take one meet logic or N-1 take it is second-class.
In addition, in the present embodiment, by setting ESFAS to meet logic circuit so that in protection channel part failure
In the case of can also ensure that the normal realization of the ad hoc function of drive system 20.
Embodiment three
On the basis of above-described embodiment one or embodiment two, the present embodiment is used to enter traveling one to emergency shut-down system 10
Walk explanation.
Point-to-point connection between N number of protection passage of emergency shut-down system 10, each protection passage is protected from other N-1
Passage obtains threshold value comparative result.As shown in figure 1, RPC-I obtains threshold value comparative result from RPC-II~RPC-IV.
Each protection passage is provided with hot backup redundancy processor (not shown), and hot backup redundancy processor is protected according to from N number of
N number of threshold value comparative result of shield passage obtains the 3rd local shutdown signal.Each protection passage is all connected with shutdown breaker, shutdown
Breaker obtains the 3rd local shutdown signal from each protection passage, and the local shutdown signal control nuclear power station of execution the 3rd stops
Heap.
More specifically, each protection passage of emergency shut-down system 10 is divided into the first subgroup and the second subgroup, in addition to
The RTS or logic processing circuit being connected with the first subgroup, the second subgroup.(do not scheme with hot backup redundancy processor in each subgroup
Show), being referred to as in the first subgroup, is referred to as the second hot backup redundancy processor in the first hot backup redundancy processor, the second subgroup.
Point-to-point connection between point-to-point connection between N number of first subgroup got, N number of second subgroup got.
As shown in figure 1, RPC-I points of protection passage RTS IP Reactor trip switch board is the first subgroup Sub1 and the second subgroup Sub2.
Other protection passage RTS IIP~RTS IVP are equally divided into the first subgroup Sub1 and the second subgroup Sub2.4 the first subgroups
Connect, connected two-by-two between 4 the second subgroup Sub2 two-by-two between Sub1.
According to the relation connected two-by-two, each first subgroup obtains threshold value comparative result from other N-1 the first subgroups.
Pair first hot backup redundancy processor is used to N number of threshold value comparative result from N number of first subgroup is carried out to meet logical process, i.e.,
First RTS meets the N-1 of 1 threshold value comparative result and other N-1 the first subgroup of the first subgroup where logic circuit
Individual threshold value comparative result carries out meeting logical process.Also, when channel failure is protected in the part in N number of protection passage, according to
Meet logic degeneration principle to be handled, the local shutdown signal of output first.Similar to the 3rd local shutdown signal, first is local
Shutdown signal is equally used for controlling nuclear power station shutdown, still, and the first local shutdown signal belongs to M signal.
Similarly, according to the relation connected two-by-two, each second subgroup obtains threshold value ratio from other N-1 the second subgroups
Relatively result.Second hot backup redundancy processor is used to N number of threshold value comparative result from N number of second subgroup is carried out to meet at logic
Reason, and it is N number of protection passage in part protect channel failure when, handled according to logic degeneration principle is met, export
Second local shutdown signal.Second local shutdown signal belongs to M signal.
It should be noted that in the present embodiment, according to design demand, the first subgroup Sub1 and the second subgroup
Sub2 can handle different types of Protection parameters and its threshold value comparative result respectively, perform different defencive functions.
Each protection passage of emergency shut-down system 10 is also provided with RTS or logic processing circuit, and symbol is used in Fig. 1
" >=1 " is represented.RTS or logic processing circuit are connected with the first subgroup Sub1 and the second subgroup Sub2.According to the first subgroup and
The annexation of second subgroup, RTS or logic processing circuit are carried out to the first local shutdown signal and the second local shutdown signal
Or logical process, the local shutdown signal of output the 3rd.
As described above, emergency shut-down system 10 is used to trigger when occurring design basis accident in reactor operation promptly to stop
Heap.Here, the 3rd local shutdown signal can be transmitted by hardwire to shutdown breaker RTB, so as to trigger emergency shut-down.Need
Illustrate, corresponding with the N number of 3rd local shutdown signal, shutdown breaker RTB equally may be configured as N pairs, and N is to shutdown open circuit
Device can realize that N takes two to meet logic etc. by hardwire, i.e., at least two pairs shutdown breakers, which are opened, just can be achieved emergency shut-down.Such as
There is protection channel failure or failure, then shutdown breaker hardwire meets logic and deteriorates to two from three successively, two takes one.
In the present embodiment, the first subgroup Sub1 and the second subgroup Sub2 setting are passed through so that in protection channel part
The normal realization of the function of emergency shut-down system 10 is can also ensure that in the case of failure.
In one of embodiment two and three more specifically embodiment, nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100 can also be set
Put emergency control panel ECP (Emergency Control Panel) 70.The manual ad hoc activation button of emergency control panel 70 with specially
If drive system 20 is connected by hardwire, for exporting the second ad hoc driving instruction according to the operational order of operating personnel.Class
It is similar to the first ad hoc driving instruction, the second ad hoc driving instruction is equally used for driving reactor and reached to need operation before controllable state
Executing agency.
Ad hoc drive system 20 can receive the second ad hoc driving instruction of the output of emergency control panel 70, calculation process therein
Device can also be used to carry out or logical process the first ad hoc driving instruction with the second ad hoc driving instruction, export the 3rd ad hoc driving
Instruction.Similarly, the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction needs the executing agency of operation for driving reactor to reach before controllable state.Can
With understanding, in the case where setting emergency control panel 70, under arithmetic processor or logical process control, first is special
If driving instruction is converted to the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction with the second ad hoc driving instruction, only the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction, which is delivered to, holds
Row mechanism.
In this more specifically embodiment, by the setting of emergency control panel 70, ad hoc drive system 20 can be replaced
Realize the urgent driving to engineered safeguards features.By arithmetic processor or logical process, ad hoc drive system can be coordinated
20 with driving of the emergency control panel 70 to engineered safeguards features.
In addition to realizing the urgent driving to engineered safeguards features instead of ad hoc drive system 20, emergency control panel 70 may be used also
Direct manually implemented emergent control nuclear power station shutdown.Here, emergency control panel 70 is directly connected to shutdown breaker by hardwire
RTB, and export the 4th local shutdown signal to shutdown breaker RTB.Shutdown breaker RTB, which can be obtained and be performed the 4th part, to stop
Heap signal controls nuclear power station shutdown.
Relative with emergency control panel 70, visual safe level control also can be set in nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100
Display device SCID (Safety Control and Information Device) 80, it is used to replace safety automation system
System 30 promptly drives executing agency.Here, 80 points of safe level control display device is three groups, every group passes through a safe level subring
Net connects one to one with an ESFAS sequence and a SAS sequence.For example, group SCID A pass through Train A and ESFAC-A
And SAS A connections.Also, safe level control display device 80 is connected with Safety Automation System 30, for according to operating personnel
Operational order export the second device level control instruction.
Every group exports the second device level control instruction according to the operational order of operating personnel, and corresponding SAS sequential receptions should
Second device level control instruction, and the first device level control instruction to itself carries out or patrols with the second device level control instruction
Processing is collected, the 3rd device level control instruction is exported.Similarly, the 3rd device level control instruction is used for reactor from controllable state
The executing agency operated is needed to be controlled to safe shutdown state.
The setting of display device 80 is controlled by safe level, the urgent driving to engineered safeguards features can be equally realized.
By the setting of SAS or logic processing circuit, Safety Automation System 30 can be coordinated and control 80 pairs of display device with safe level
The driving of engineered safeguards features.
Example IV
In above-described embodiment one into embodiment three on the basis of any embodiment, the present embodiment is to core of the prior art
Power station reactor protection system 100 is further improved.
The present embodiment is related to anticipated transient not reactor shut-off system (Anticipated Transient Without Trip
System, ATWS), ATWS correspondences start the functions such as emergency feedwater and alleviate protection system by diversified shutdown control and chaser
Fail to realize the consequence in the case of emergency shut-down.
In the present embodiment, diversified drive system KDS (Diversity Actuation System) 50 is also set up, its
Function for realizing ATWS systems.Diversified drive system 50 can be connected with each column signal pre-processing system 11, for tight
In the case that common mode failure occurs with ad hoc drive system 20 for jerk shut-down system 10, protection ginseng is obtained from signal pre-processing system 11
Number, and export shutdown control instruction according to the Protection parameters.
Diversified drive system 50 is also connected with rod control system (Full Length Rod Control System, RGL),
Rod control system from diversified drive system 50 receive the shutdown control instruction, and perform the shutdown control instruction control nuclear power station stop
Heap.Therefore, diversified drive system 50 can be in the case of the nuclear power plant reactor protection common mode failure of system 100, it is ensured that crucial
Defencive function realize.
Also, realized because ATWT function is placed in diversified drive system 50, thus need not be individually designed again
A set of ATWT entities rack realizes the diversified function, so as to simplify nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100.
In the above description, diversified drive system 50 is connected with each column signal pre-processing system 11, from Signal Pretreatment
System 11 obtains Protection parameters, but the present invention is not limited only to this, and diversified drive system 50 can be by hardwire and third party
System connection (not shown), directly obtains Protection parameters by hardwire from third party system, or, obtain and protect from field instrument
Parameter.
In addition, diversified drive system 50 can also be used to export the 4th ad hoc driving instruction according to Protection parameters, the 4th is special
If driving instruction is equally used for driving reactor to reach the executing agency for needing to operate before controllable state.3rd ad hoc driving instruction
It can transmit to interface described later and priority block CIM 60.
In addition, when emergency shut-down system 10, ad hoc drive system 20 are normal, the automatic logic of diversified drive system 50
Function is normally run, but manually operated instruction locking.
It should be noted that the function of being realized in diversified drive system 50 typically not belongs to nuclear power plant reactor protection system
The defencive function realized in system 100, still, in the present invention, in view of nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100 drives with variation
The setting of system 50 has close relationship, and ATWS systemic-functions are realized in diversified drive system 50, therefore, can will be many
Sample drive system 50 regards the part that nuclear power plant reactor protects system 100 as.
In addition, in the prior art, design is not made a distinction to ad hoc drive system 20 and Safety Automation System 30,
Therefore, the first ad hoc driving instruction is not also compartmentalized with the first device level control instruction.However, the first ad hoc drive finger
Order is even more important for protection system 100, if not carrying out priority division to two kinds of instructions, will be unable to efficiently realize
The function of protection system 100.
Therefore, nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100 also sets up equipment interface and priority block CIM 60.Equipment interface
And priority block 60 is connected with Safety Automation System 30 and diversified drive system 50.Equipment interface and priority block 60
Three sequences can be divided into, each sequence is mainly made up of equipment interface and priority cabinet CIC.As shown in figure 1, CIM points are CIC
This 3 sequences of A, CIC B, CIC C.Also, 3 sequences connect one to one with 3 SAS sequences SAS A, SAS B, SAS C.
Equipment interface and priority block 60 are used to obtain the first device level control instruction and the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction.In addition, equipment
Interface and priority block 60 also obtain ad hoc drive system 20.First ad hoc driving instruction of output, wherein the first ad hoc drive
Dynamic instruction passes through safe level looped network 40 and Safety Automation System 30.
Although it is understood that in the above description, the first device level control instruction, the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction and
One ad hoc driving instruction is fed directly to corresponding executing agency, still, is setting the situation of equipment interface and priority block 60
Under, these instructions deliver to executing agency again after can first passing through the priority processing for setting equipment interface and priority block 60.
That is, equipment interface and priority block 60 can carry out priority processing to the multiple instruction received, highest priority is determined
Instruction so that executing agency's preferential execution priority highest instruction, therefore, it is possible to efficiently realize the work(of protection system
Energy.
In addition, as seen in Figure 1, pin is not needed in the nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100 that the present embodiment is provided
A set of redundancy relay hard logic is designed in addition to protection system design requirement, that is, not needing large-scale work(
Can redundancy relay rack.
On the other hand, will in order to meet protection system design in existing nuclear power plant reactor protection system
Ask, in addition to the row monitoring function of A, B two is realized using digitizing technique, a set of relay hardwired logic design is designed in addition, it is real
The diverse redundancy design of important system-level control function in existing digital Platform.
As a result of diversified drive system in the nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100 that the present embodiment is provided, therefore,
Protection system 100, which is not required to increase for important defencive function, matches somebody with somebody a set of relay logic, substantially reduce the number safe level relay rack
Quantity, has simplified number of cables, while the arrangement to electrical building reduces difficulty.In addition, the reduction of relay logic is significantly
The requirement of power plant's routine test is simplified, the failure risk that ageing equipment is caused is also reduced.
Embodiment five
The present embodiment provides the method for controlling security in a kind of nuclear power plant reactor protection system, applied to corresponding to above-mentioned
In any nuclear power plant reactor protection system 100 that embodiment one to example IV is provided.As shown in Fig. 2 methods described bag
Include following steps：
Threshold value comparison step S1, it is performed by emergency shut-down system RTS, and emergency shut-down system is divided into N number of protection passage, N
For even number and N >=2, each protection passage, which is corresponded to, connects a column signal pretreatment system, wherein, it is each to protect passage from correspondence
Signal pre-processing system obtain Protection parameters, and according to Protection parameters carry out threshold value comparison, obtain threshold value comparative result；
Ad hoc actuation step S2, it is performed by ad hoc drive system ESFAS, and ad hoc drive system connects with N number of protection passage
Connect, for receiving the threshold value comparative result of each protection passage, and ad hoc driving logical process carried out according to threshold value comparative result,
The first ad hoc driving instruction is exported, the first ad hoc driving instruction needs holding for operation for driving reactor to reach before controllable state
Row mechanism；
Safety automation step S3, it is performed by Safety Automation System SAS, and Safety Automation System passes through safe level ring
Net is connected with ad hoc drive system, produce the first device level control instruction, the first device level control instruction be used for reactor from
Controllable state needs the executing agency operated to be controlled to safe shutdown state.
On illustrating for each step, embodiment one is can refer to the explanation of example IV, be will not be repeated here.According to
The present embodiment provide nuclear power plant reactor protection system in method of controlling security, can reduce protection system maintenance, periodically
The scheme complexity of experiment.
In a more specific embodiment of embodiment five, ad hoc drive system is divided into three ESFAS sequences, each
ESFAS sequences are connected with N number of protection passage by point-to- point communication；
Each ESFAS sequences configure parallel, redundancy two arithmetic processors；
In ad hoc actuation step S2, arithmetic processor is carried out to N number of threshold value comparative result of each ESFAS sequential receptions
Meet logical process, and the part in N number of protection passage is when protecting channel failure, is carried out according to logic degeneration principle is met
Processing.
In another more specific embodiment of embodiment five, nuclear power plant reactor protection system is also equipped with emergency control panel
ECP, emergency control panel ECP manual ad hoc activation button are connected with ad hoc drive system, according to the operational order of operating personnel
Export the second ad hoc driving instruction；
In ad hoc actuation step S2, arithmetic processor is carried out to the first ad hoc driving instruction with the second ad hoc driving instruction
Or logical process, the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction is exported, the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction is used to drive reactor to reach before controllable state
Need the executing agency of operation.
In another more specific embodiment of embodiment five, Safety Automation System is divided into three SAS sequences, safe level
Looped network is divided into three groups of safe level subring nets, and each SAS sequences pass through a pair of a safe level subring net and ESFAS sequence 1
It should connect；
Nuclear power plant reactor protection system is also equipped with safe level control display device SCID, and it is divided into three groups, and every group passes through
One safe level subring net connects one to one with an ESFAS sequence and a SAS sequence, and every group of SCID is according to operating personnel
Operational order export the second device level control instruction；
In safety automation step S3, SAS sequential receptions the second device level control instruction, and the first device level is controlled
Instruction is carried out or logical process with the second device level control instruction, exports the 3rd device level control instruction, the control of the 3rd device level
Instruct for needing the executing agency of operation to be controlled from controllable state to safe shutdown state to reactor.
In another more specific embodiment of embodiment five, point-to-point connection between N number of protection passage, each protection is logical
Road is provided with hot backup redundancy processor, and each protection passage is all connected with shutdown breaker,
Method also includes shutdown rate-determining steps S4, in shutdown rate-determining steps S4, and each protection passage is protected from other N-1
Protect passage and obtain threshold value comparative result, hot backup redundancy processor is obtained according to N number of threshold value comparative result from N number of protection passage
3rd local shutdown signal, shutdown breaker obtains the 3rd local shutdown signal from each protection passage, and it is local to perform the 3rd
Shutdown signal controls nuclear power station shutdown.
Illustrated on each step in each more specific embodiment of embodiment five, equally can refer to embodiment one to
The explanation of example IV, will not be repeated here.
Claims (12)
1. a kind of nuclear power plant reactor protects system, it is characterised in that possess：
Emergency shut-down system RTS, it is divided into N number of protection passage, and N is even number and N >=2, and each protection passage corresponds to connection one
Column signal pre-processes cabinet, wherein, each protection passage obtains Protection parameters, and root from the corresponding Signal Pretreatment cabinet
Threshold value comparison is carried out according to the Protection parameters, threshold value comparative result is obtained；
Ad hoc drive system ESFAS, it is divided into three ESFAS sequences of redundancy, each ESFAS sequences with N number of protection
Passage is connected by point-to- point communication, the threshold value comparative result for receiving each protection passage, and according to N number of threshold value ratio
Relatively result carries out ad hoc driving logical process, exports the first ad hoc driving instruction, and the first ad hoc driving instruction is used to drive
Reactor reaches the executing agency before controllable state；
Safety Automation System SAS, it is used to produce the first device level control instruction, and the first device level control instruction is used for
To reaching that the executing agency of controllable state to safe shutdown state is controlled from reactor；The Safety Automation System SAS
It is divided into three SAS sequences；
Safe level looped network, it is divided into three groups of safe level subring nets, and each SAS sequences pass through a safe level subring net and one
The individual ESFAS sequences connect one to one；
Emergency control panel ECP, its manual ad hoc activation button is connected with the ad hoc drive system ESFAS by hardwire, is used
According to the operational order of operating personnel the second ad hoc driving instruction of output；
Each ESFAS sequences configure parallel, redundancy two arithmetic processors, and the arithmetic processor is used for institute
State the first ad hoc driving instruction to carry out or logical process with the described second ad hoc driving instruction, export the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction,
The 3rd ad hoc driving instruction needs the executing agency of operation for driving reactor to reach before controllable state；
Diversified drive system, the diversified drive system is connected with each column Signal Pretreatment cabinet, and it realizes anticipated transient not
The system ATWS of reactor shut-off system function, it is pre- from the signal in the case of occurring common mode failure in the protection system
Handle cabinet and obtain Protection parameters, and shutdown control instruction, the diversified drive system and rod are exported according to the Protection parameters
Control system is connected, and the rod control system receives the shutdown control instruction from the diversified drive system, and stops described in execution
Heap control instruction controls nuclear power station shutdown；
Equipment interface and priority block CIM, it connects with the Safety Automation System SAS and the diversified drive system
Connect, for obtaining the first device level control instruction and the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction, also pass through the safe level looped network
And the Safety Automation System SAS obtains the described first ad hoc driving instruction of the ad hoc drive system ESFAS outputs, and
Priority processing is carried out to the multiple instruction got.
2. protection system according to claim 1, it is characterised in that
The arithmetic processor is used to N number of threshold value comparative result of each ESFAS sequential receptions meet patrolling
Volume processing, and part in N number of protection passage is when protecting channel failure, according to meeting at logic degeneration principle
Reason.
3. protection system according to claim 1, it is characterised in that
Safe level control display device SCID is also equipped with, it is divided into three groups, and every group of SCID passes through a safe level subring net
Connected one to one with an ESFAS sequence and a SAS sequence；
Every group of SCID exports the second device level control instruction according to the operational order of operating personnel, described in the SAS sequential receptions
Second device level control instruction, and the first device level control instruction is carried out or patrolled with the second device level control instruction
Volume processing, export the 3rd device level control instruction, the 3rd device level control instruction be used for reactor from controllable state to
Safe shutdown state needs the executing agency operated to be controlled.
4. protection system according to claim 1, it is characterised in that
Point-to-point connection between N number of protection passage, each protection passage obtains described from other N-1 protection passage
Threshold value comparative result,
Each protection passage is provided with hot backup redundancy processor, and the hot backup redundancy processor is according to from N number of guarantor
N number of threshold value comparative result of shield passage obtains the 3rd local shutdown signal,
Each protection passage is all connected with shutdown breaker, and the shutdown breaker obtains described from each protection passage
3rd local shutdown signal, and perform the described 3rd local shutdown signal control nuclear power station shutdown.
5. protection system according to claim 4, it is characterised in that
Each protection passage is divided into the first subgroup and the second subgroup, point pair between N number of first subgroup got
Point-to-point connection between point connection, N number of second subgroup got；
Each first subgroup obtains the threshold value comparative result from other N-1 the first subgroups, and each first subgroup is provided with
First hot backup redundancy processor, the first hot backup redundancy processor is used for N number of threshold from N number of first subgroup
Value comparative result carries out meeting logical process, and the part in N number of protection passage is when protecting channel failure, former according to degenerating
Then carry out meeting logical process, the local shutdown signal of output first；
Each second subgroup obtains the threshold value comparative result from other N-1 the second subgroups, and each second subgroup is provided with
Second hot backup redundancy processor, the second hot backup redundancy processor is used for N number of threshold from N number of second subgroup
Value comparative result carries out meeting logical process, and the part in N number of protection passage is when protecting channel failure, former according to degenerating
Then carry out meeting logical process, the local shutdown signal of output second；
Each protection passage of the emergency shut-down system RTS is also provided with RTS or logic processing circuit, the RTS or logic
Process circuit is connected with first subgroup and second subgroup, for the described first local shutdown signal and described second
Local shutdown signal is carried out or logical process, exports the described 3rd local shutdown signal.
6. protection system according to claim 4, it is characterised in that
The manual shutdown control button of the emergency control panel ECP is directly connected to the shutdown breaker by hardwire, and to
The local shutdown signal of the shutdown breaker output the 4th, the shutdown breaker obtains and performs the described 4th local shutdown letter
Number control nuclear power station shutdown.
7. protection system according to claim 1, it is characterised in that
The diversified drive system is additionally operable to export the 4th ad hoc driving instruction according to the Protection parameters, and the described 4th is ad hoc
Driving instruction needs the executing agency of operation for driving reactor to reach before controllable state.
8. protection system according to claim 7, it is characterised in that
When the emergency shut-down system RTS, the ad hoc drive system ESFAS are normal, the diversified drive system from
Dynamic logic function is normally run, manually operated instruction locking.
9. a kind of nuclear power plant reactor protection system using described in claim any one of 1-8 carries out nuclear power plant reactor safety
The method of control, it is characterised in that comprise the following steps：
Threshold value comparison step, wherein, emergency shut-down system RTS multiple protection passages are obtained from corresponding Signal Pretreatment cabinet
Protection parameters, and threshold value comparison is carried out to the Protection parameters, obtain threshold value comparative result；
Ad hoc actuation step, wherein, ad hoc drive system ESFAS points of three ESFAS sequences for redundancy, each ESFAS sequences
It is connected with N number of protection passage by point-to- point communication, and the threshold value comparative result of each protection passage of reception, and according to
N number of threshold value comparative result carries out ad hoc driving logical process, exports the first ad hoc driving instruction, the described first ad hoc driving
Instruct needs the executing agency of operation for driving reactor to reach before controllable state；
Safety automation step, wherein, Safety Automation System SAS produces the first device level control instruction, first equipment
Level control instruction is used to need the executing agency of operation to be controlled from controllable state to safe shutdown state in reactor.
10. method according to claim 9, it is characterised in that
Each ESFAS sequences configure parallel, redundancy two arithmetic processors；
In the ad hoc actuation step, the multiple threshold values of the arithmetic processor to each ESFAS sequential receptions
Comparative result carries out meeting logical process, and the part in the multiple protection passage is when protecting channel failure, according to symbol
Logical degeneration principle is handled.
11. method according to claim 10, it is characterised in that
The nuclear power plant reactor protection system is also equipped with emergency control panel ECP, the emergency control panel ECP manual ad hoc drive
Dynamic button is connected with the ad hoc drive system ESFAS, and the second ad hoc driving instruction is exported according to the operational order of operating personnel；
In the ad hoc actuation step, the arithmetic processor is to the described first ad hoc driving instruction and the described second ad hoc drive
Dynamic instruction is carried out or logical process, exports the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction, and the 3rd ad hoc driving instruction is used to drive reactor
Reaching needs the executing agency of operation before controllable state.
12. method according to claim 10, it is characterised in that
The Safety Automation System SAS points are three SAS sequences, and the safe level looped network is divided into three groups of safe level subring nets,
Each SAS sequences are connected one to one by a safe level subring net with an ESFAS sequence；
The nuclear power plant reactor protection system is also equipped with safe level control display device SCID, and it is divided into three groups, and every group passes through
One safe level subring net connects one to one with an ESFAS sequence and a SAS sequence, every group of SCID
Second device level control instruction is exported according to the operational order of operating personnel；
In the safety automation step, the second device level control instruction described in the SAS sequential receptions, and to described first
Device level control instruction is carried out or logical process with the second device level control instruction, exports the 3rd device level control instruction,
The 3rd device level control instruction is used to need reactor from controllable state to safe shutdown state the executing agency of operation
It is controlled.
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| CN201510944814.5A CN105575448B (en) | 2015-12-15 | 2015-12-15 | Nuclear power plant reactor protects system and method for controlling security therein |
| GB1601229.6A GB2545511B (en) | 2015-12-15 | 2016-01-22 | Reactor Protection System of Nuclear Power plant and Safety Control Method Thereof |
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| CN106598025B (en) * | 2016-12-12 | 2019-01-11 | 中广核工程有限公司 | Test method, system and the nuclear power generating equipment of Nuclear Safety grade I&C system priority block |
| KR20240033106A (en) * | 2016-12-30 | 2024-03-12 | 뉴스케일 파워, 엘엘씨 | Nuclear reactor protection systems and methods |
| CN109001619B (en) * | 2017-06-06 | 2020-10-27 | 苏州热工研究院有限公司 | SIP test signal recovery and visual trend tracking method |
| CN107967953A (en) * | 2017-11-13 | 2018-04-27 | 中国科学院上海应用物理研究所 | Molten salt reactor protects system |
| CN108198638B (en) * | 2017-12-04 | 2019-11-12 | 中国船舶重工集团公司第七一九研究所 | Shutdown breaker routine test system and method based on soft logic |
| CN108831570B (en) * | 2018-05-14 | 2021-04-16 | 中广核研究院有限公司 | Emergency shutdown system and method of subcritical reactor system |
| CN108962405A (en) * | 2018-07-27 | 2018-12-07 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | A kind of PTR water level signal processing method applied to nuclear power plant's protection system |
| CN109861185A (en) * | 2019-01-24 | 2019-06-07 | 许继集团有限公司 | A kind of relay protection device control method and device |
| CN109920562B (en) * | 2019-03-25 | 2020-11-06 | 北京广利核***工程有限公司 | Protection system control device for nuclear power station |
| CN110085333B (en) * | 2019-04-15 | 2020-12-04 | 中广核研究院有限公司 | Protection system suitable for small-size reactor |
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| CN110580965B (en) * | 2019-09-04 | 2021-05-25 | 中广核工程有限公司 | Safety automation system and method for executing safety function of nuclear power station |
| CN112009658A (en) * | 2020-08-31 | 2020-12-01 | 武汉第二船舶设计研究所(中国船舶重工集团公司第七一九研究所) | Nuclear power device integrated control system suitable for ocean nuclear power platform |
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| GB2545511B (en) | 2020-06-10 |
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