WO2024068343A1 - Appareil et procédé de destruction d'équipement en mer - Google Patents
Appareil et procédé de destruction d'équipement en mer Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2024068343A1 WO2024068343A1 PCT/EP2023/075695 EP2023075695W WO2024068343A1 WO 2024068343 A1 WO2024068343 A1 WO 2024068343A1 EP 2023075695 W EP2023075695 W EP 2023075695W WO 2024068343 A1 WO2024068343 A1 WO 2024068343A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- equipment
- destruction
- initiator
- offshore
- enclosure
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 15
- 230000006378 damage Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 80
- 239000003999 initiator Substances 0.000 claims abstract description 39
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 16
- 239000003832 thermite Substances 0.000 claims description 42
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000009877 rendering Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 239000002826 coolant Substances 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000001816 cooling Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000004888 barrier function Effects 0.000 description 7
- 238000002485 combustion reaction Methods 0.000 description 7
- 239000000463 material Substances 0.000 description 5
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000001276 controlling effect Effects 0.000 description 4
- 238000005192 partition Methods 0.000 description 4
- 239000000203 mixture Substances 0.000 description 3
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 3
- CURLTUGMZLYLDI-UHFFFAOYSA-N Carbon dioxide Chemical compound O=C=O CURLTUGMZLYLDI-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 2
- QVGXLLKOCUKJST-UHFFFAOYSA-N atomic oxygen Chemical compound [O] QVGXLLKOCUKJST-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 2
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000002360 explosive Substances 0.000 description 2
- 238000002844 melting Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000008018 melting Effects 0.000 description 2
- 239000002184 metal Substances 0.000 description 2
- 229910052760 oxygen Inorganic materials 0.000 description 2
- 239000001301 oxygen Substances 0.000 description 2
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000006479 redox reaction Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000000779 smoke Substances 0.000 description 2
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 1
- 229910002092 carbon dioxide Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 239000001569 carbon dioxide Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000001010 compromised effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000000470 constituent Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000002596 correlated effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003111 delayed effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010438 heat treatment Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 1
- 229910044991 metal oxide Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 150000004706 metal oxides Chemical class 0.000 description 1
- 230000000116 mitigating effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000037361 pathway Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000000843 powder Substances 0.000 description 1
- 239000004065 semiconductor Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000000926 separation method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002459 sustained effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- XLYOFNOQVPJJNP-UHFFFAOYSA-N water Substances O XLYOFNOQVPJJNP-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/86—Secure or tamper-resistant housings
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F03—MACHINES OR ENGINES FOR LIQUIDS; WIND, SPRING, OR WEIGHT MOTORS; PRODUCING MECHANICAL POWER OR A REACTIVE PROPULSIVE THRUST, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- F03D—WIND MOTORS
- F03D13/00—Assembly, mounting or commissioning of wind motors; Arrangements specially adapted for transporting wind motor components
- F03D13/20—Arrangements for mounting or supporting wind motors; Masts or towers for wind motors
- F03D13/25—Arrangements for mounting or supporting wind motors; Masts or towers for wind motors specially adapted for offshore installation
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F03—MACHINES OR ENGINES FOR LIQUIDS; WIND, SPRING, OR WEIGHT MOTORS; PRODUCING MECHANICAL POWER OR A REACTIVE PROPULSIVE THRUST, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- F03D—WIND MOTORS
- F03D80/00—Details, components or accessories not provided for in groups F03D1/00 - F03D17/00
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F03—MACHINES OR ENGINES FOR LIQUIDS; WIND, SPRING, OR WEIGHT MOTORS; PRODUCING MECHANICAL POWER OR A REACTIVE PROPULSIVE THRUST, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- F03D—WIND MOTORS
- F03D13/00—Assembly, mounting or commissioning of wind motors; Arrangements specially adapted for transporting wind motor components
- F03D13/20—Arrangements for mounting or supporting wind motors; Masts or towers for wind motors
- F03D13/201—Towers
- F03D13/202—Access thereto
Definitions
- the present invention concerns offshore equipment destruction apparatus and a method of destroying offshore equipment.
- the present invention concerns an apparatus and method for destroying confidential/commercially sensitive equipment located on offshore structures, such as wind turbines or wind farm substations .
- RECTIFIED SHEET (RULE91)ISA/EP and alarm systems can be overcome, particularly in the face of a sustained access attempt.
- the remote location of offshore structures also means that, even if access by an unauthorised party is detected, the party will often have time to breach any mechanical security measures before security personnel could reach the site to detain them. This is particularly disadvantageous where confidential equipment is replicated at multiple sites. Once unauthorised access to these systems is gained, the security protocols associated with those systems are permanently compromised. This potentially necessitates wholesale replacement of the equipment infrastructure at every site, which would be hugely expensive and may require considerable downtime while site visits are scheduled. Accordingly, the consequences of permitting unauthorised access to confidential/commercially sensitive equipment are significant .
- the present invention therefore seeks to offer solutions to the above problem.
- an offshore equipment destruction apparatus comprising: a secure enclosure for housing equipment; an initiator for triggering a destruction means located within the enclosure to render at least part of the equipment unusable; and a security controller for automatically controlling the initiator to trigger the destruction means in response to the identification of an unauthorised attempt to access the enclosure.
- confidential equipment located in offshore locations may be automatically destroyed before an unauthorised party can gain access. That is, when unauthorised access is detected, for example by one or more security sensors, a destruction sequence may be automatically triggered, resulting in the equipment being rendered unusable/unsalvageable . Accordingly, when equipment that is confidential in nature, such as specialist encryption, encoding and/or processing devices, is in an offshore location, it can be used without requiring a manned presence to guard and restrict access. This therefore allows entities to use highly confidential and proprietary equipment at offshore locations, whilst mitigating the risk of this technology being accessed by unauthorised individuals.
- the offshore equipment destruction apparatus further comprises the destruction means, wherein the destruction means is located within the housing for rendering at least part of the equipment unusable when triggered. In this way, the part which effects the destruction of the equipment is integrated into the apparatus. In other arrangements, the destruction means is provided as a separate consumable.
- the destruction means comprises thermite.
- the equipment may be destroyed by combusting the thermite to thereby melt its components.
- the exothermic reduction-oxidation reaction of the combusting thermite does not require atmospheric oxygen and hence cannot be easily extinguished once initiated.
- Thermite is also not explosive and therefore may be more easily contained within the secure enclosure.
- the initiator comprises an electro- pyrotechnic initiator for triggering the destruction means.
- the destruction of the equipment can be electronically initiated via the security controller.
- the pyrotechnic composition within the initiator can be configured to generate a sufficiently high heat to exceed the ignition temperature where a combustible destruction means is provided.
- the initiator may comprise a detonator for triggering the destruction means. In this way, a smaller quantity of explosive or combustible material may be used to initiate combustion of a larger destruction means.
- the secure enclosure comprises a body surrounding the interior for resisting unauthorised access and containing the effect of the destruction means when triggered.
- the secure enclosure provides a containment housing for preventing the destruction means from damaging other surrounding parts or personnel at the offshore structure.
- the secure enclosure comprises at least one port for connecting the equipment to the exterior. In this way, connections between the equipment and external devices and services can be facilitated.
- the at least one port is for one or more of providing power to the equipment, connecting the equipment to exterior sensors, connecting the equipment to a communications interface, and providing a coolant medium for cooling the equipment.
- the offshore equipment destruction apparatus further comprises an uninterruptable power supply for powering the security controller.
- a backup power reserve may be provided for maintaining power to the security controller and/or the equipment if the input power supply is cut. This may thereby allow operation of the apparatus to be maintained in the event of a power outage.
- the security controller is configured to receive one or more breach indicators, each associated with a different security layer related to the equipment, and wherein the security controller triggers the initiator in response to receiving one or more of the breach indicators.
- the security controller may trigger the destruction of the equipment in the event of a detected security breach at any one of a number of points ahead of the unauthorised party gaining access to the equipment. This may thereby provide a more robust response process for ensuring the integrity of the equipment is maintained .
- the security controller is configured to automatically control the initiator to trigger the destruction means after a predetermined time delay after the identification of an unauthorised attempt to access the enclosure.
- a failsafe may be provided by allowing time for an authorised user who has inadvertently triggered a destruction sequence to abort that sequence before the equipment is destroyed.
- the duration of the predetermined time delay may be set according to which security layer has been breached. In embodiments, the duration of the predetermined time delay may be set such that the equipment will be destroyed, unless aborted, before an unauthorised party can access the secure enclosure.
- the security controller is configured to abort the triggering of the destruction means in response to the receipt of a reset signal.
- an input by, for example, an authorised party at the site or by a remote monitoring system may be used to stop an initiated destruction sequence.
- an offshore equipment destruction method comprising the steps of: housing equipment in a secure enclosure; providing an initiator for triggering a destruction means located within the enclosure to render at least part of the equipment unusable; identifying an unauthorised attempt to access the enclosure; and controlling, using a security controller, the initiator to automatically trigger the destruction means in response to the identification of an unauthorised attempt.
- the method further comprises the steps of: receiving one or more breach indicators, each associated with a different security layer related to the equipment, and wherein the step of controlling the initiator comprises triggering in response to receiving one or more of the breach indicators.
- the step of controlling the initiator comprises triggering the destruction means after a predetermined time delay after the identification of an unauthorised attempt to access the enclosure.
- the method further comprises the step of aborting the triggering of the destruction means in response to the receipt of a reset signal.
- Figure 1 shows an offshore structure supporting a secure housing containing confidential equipment according to a first embodiment
- Figure 2 shows a cross sectional view of the secure housing shown in Figure 1.
- FIG. 1 A first illustrative embodiment of the invention is shown in Figures 1 and 2.
- the offshore structure 1 is provided as a wind turbine, with a monopile foundation supporting a service platform 2 and a wind turbine tower (not shown).
- the service platform 2 is accessed via a ladder 3 down the water level 20.
- a vessel may dock against the ladder 3 to allow personnel to climb up to the service platform.
- the remote location of the offshore structure effectively represents a first security layer to restrict access.
- Personnel sensors may be provided on the platform 2 to identify when people are present. This may be correlated with authorisation approval to determine if such access is authorised.
- the service platform supports a secure housing 4, which is used to house confidential equipment.
- the secure housing may be located on a platform inside the interior of the monopile or wind turbine tower.
- the secure housing 4 is surrounded by fencing 5 which provides a second security layer for restricting access.
- the fencing is provided with a door to permit authorised access.
- a security sensor may be provided to identify if there has been an unauthorised breach of the fence 5 or its door, for example by the fence being cut.
- Figure 2 shows a cross sectional view of the interior of the secure housing 4 shown in Figure 1.
- the interior is accessed through a door 6 which acts as a third security layer.
- the interior of the housing 4 is divided into two chambers by partition 7.
- the outer chamber may be used to house other equipment which has lower security requirements.
- a locked door is provided in the partition 7 to restrict access, and hence this acts as a fourth security layer. Again, if the partition 7 or its door is breached this may be identified by an associated security sensor.
- a security barrier cage 8 Within the inner chamber of the secure housing 4 is a security barrier cage 8, inside of which sits a containment housing 9.
- the security barrier cage 8 provides a fifth security layer.
- the containment housing 9 is provided as a thickwalled metal enclosure for housing the confidential equipment 10.
- the containment housing 9 therefore forms a secure enclosure for restricting access to the equipment and hence provides a sixth security layer. Again, a locked door may be provided for permitting authorised access.
- the confidential equipment 10 is connected to one or more local devices, such as exterior sensors, via local connection port 13, and to one or more remote devices, such as a communications network, via remote connection port 17.
- the equipment may be powered through a power input 15, which extends through an uninterruptable power supply 16 to maintain power if the power input 15 is disrupted.
- the uninterruptable power supply 16 is also connected to a security controller 11 for supplying power thereto.
- the security controller 11 receives inputs from sensors associated with each of the security layers, either via the local connection port 13 or through a direct connection, and processes these inputs to identify a potential security breach.
- the security controller 11 further controls an initiator 12 as an output.
- a layer of thermite 14 which is seated on top of the equipment 10 and forms a destruction means for destroying the equipment 10 when ignited during a destruction sequence, as is described in further detail below.
- the metal powder and metal oxide within the thermite 14 undergoes a redox reaction when ignited to produce a concentrated, intense zone of heat which acts to melt the components of the equipment, thereby rendering the equipment unusable.
- the equipment 10 is destroyed by the combusted thermite 14 in the sense that it is no longer usable or recoverable.
- processing hardware and memory components may be burnt thereby melting the internal vias, conductive pathways and semiconductor parts, and integrated circuits.
- the service platform 2 and/or the equipment 10 is positioned horizontally to ensure an even and effective destruction of the equipment 10 by the thermite 14. In some instances, sloping of the service platform 2 and/or the equipment 10 may result in less efficient or complete destruction, and therefore a horizontal arrangement is preferred.
- the height of the layer of thermite 14 within the containment housing 9 is approximately 20mm. In another example, the height of the layer of thermite 14 is between 15mm and 25mm.
- the layer of thermite 14 is evenly distributed above the equipment 10 to ensure efficient destruction of the equipment 10.
- the layer of thermite 14 is provided directly on top of the equipment with no separation distance.
- the layer of thermite 14 may be concentrated on regions of the equipment 10 to maximise damage to critical components.
- a guide layer may be provided between the thermite 14 and the equipment 10 which includes one or more via windows for directing combusting thermite.
- the initiator 12 comprises means for igniting the thermite 14.
- the initiator 12 comprises an electro-pyrotechnic initiator or electric match.
- an ignition signal is applied by the security controller 11 during the destruction sequence, the voltage and current of the signal causes resistive heating in a bridgewire within the initiator 12. This raises the bridgewire above the ignition temperature of a pyrotechnic composition which forms an igniter. The pyrotechnic composition then burns to a sufficiently hot temperature to ignite the thermite 14.
- a thin piece of thermite may be provided as a detonator to ignite first, which is then used to ensure complete ignition of the main thermite layer 14.
- at least two initiators 12 are provided for redundancy to ensure that the thermite 14 is ignited if one of the initiators 12 miss-fires.
- the initiators 12 are provided in pairs. The initiators 12 being provided at the sides and/or in middle of the main thermite layer 14 to enable complete ignition of the thermite 14.
- an array of initiators 12 are provided, distributed across the thermite 12. By triggering the initiators simultaneously, this may thereby provide for more rapid and complete ignition of the thermite 14 for providing for accelerated destruction.
- the security controller 11 may further include an authorised abort input for disabling or aborting a destruction sequence.
- An input console or mobile unit may be used to input an abort code to the abort input.
- the controller 11 may be connected to a remote monitoring site via the remote connection port 17, which may allow the initiator 12 to be remotely triggered or to allow an abort input to be applied from a remote location.
- the confidential equipment 10 may be used to monitor various sensors or devices located on the offshore structure via the local connection port 13, and to encode this data for transmission via the communication network through the remote connection port 17. Equally, encoded control information may be sent via the remote connection port 17, be decoded by the confidential equipment 10 and used to control a local device via the local connection port 13.
- the security controller 11 will monitor the sensors associated with the various security layers described above and identify if breaches of these security layers occur. Depending on the configuration of the controller 11 in relation to those security layers, the controller 11 may determine that an unauthorised attempt to access the confidential equipment is being made and it trigger a destruction sequence in response thereto. For example, if the fence 5 is breached by, for instance, it being cut, the controller may trigger a destruction sequence ending with the ignition of the thermite 14. As part of this process, the triggering of the initiator 12 by the controller 11 may be delayed by a predetermined period to allow time for an accidental triggering to be aborted via the abort input. For example, if an accident causes the fence 5 to be breached inadvertently, an authorised user may input an abort code associated with the second security layer to prevent the safety controller 11 from igniting the thermite 14.
- the safety controller 11 may escalate the response as higher security layers are breached. For example, if the partition 7 associated with the fourth security layer is breached, a shorter predetermined abort period may be provided in recognition that a potential assailant is nearer to breaching the containment housing 9. Conversely, if the security barrier cage 8 is breached, the controller 11 may trigger the initiator 12 immediately.
- the initiator 12 acts to ignite the thermite 14, which in turn destroys the equipment 10 by melting it under the heat generated.
- the containment housing 9 acts to contain the thermite 14 to prevent it damaging other parts of the offshore structure or personnel.
- thermite 14 also doesn't require atmospheric oxygen to combust and therefore, even if an unauthorised party were to gain access to the interior of the housing 9, they cannot stop the thermite 14 from combusting by, for instance, flooding the region with a carbon dioxide extinguisher.
- the containment housing 9 may withstand the increased internal pressure caused by the combustion of the thermite 14.
- the containment housing 9 may further include a funnel, or other outlet for expelling smoke. As such, the smoke generated by the combustion of the thermite 14 and, often more significantly, from the equipment 10 being destructed may be exhausted from the containment housing 9.
- the containment housing 9 may be formed of a material able to withstand the high temperatures caused by the combustion of the thermite 14.
- the internal portion of the containment housing 9 is provided with a plurality of heat resistant tiles to ensure that the structural integrity of the containment housing 9 is maintained throughout the combustion of the thermite 14.
- thermite 14 and ignition system may be configured such that the time taken from ignition to destroying the equipment 10 is shorter than the time it would take to breach the security barrier cage 8 or containment housing 9.
- the security barrier cage 8 and containment housing 9 are configured such that the time taken to breach them is at least 15 minutes.
- a thermite layer 14 would typically be expected to burn through electronic equipment within 3 minutes, but in some scenarios it can take up to 7 minutes to fully burn through the electronic equipment. As such, once the controller 11 detects an attempted breach of one of these security layers, the destruction of the equipment is triggered and by the time an unauthorized party reaches the equipment, it will have been destroyed.
- the provision of the universal power supply 16 means that the controller 11 remains powered, even if the external supply is disconnected. Consequently, an unauthorized party is prevented from circumventing the system by cutting the power to the controller 11. That is, even if the power input 15 is cut, the controller 11 may still remain operational and if, for instance, the security barrier cage 8 is breached, it may ignite the thermite 14 to destroy the equipment.
- confidential/commercially sensitive equipment located in offshore locations may be automatically destroyed before an unauthorised party can access it. That is, if unauthorised access is detected, a destruction sequence is triggered, which automatically leads to the ignition of thermite 14, and hence the destruction of the equipment, unless aborted. Therefore, such equipment can be used safely in offshore locations, without requiring a manned presence, for instance to guard and restrict access.
- thermite is used as the destruction means, it will be understood that other means may also be used.
- other combustion materials as well as mechanical or electromagnetic mechanisms may be used.
- the equipment may be mechanically broken apart to render it unusable or an electromagnetic pulse device could be used to wipe memory in the equipment and/or physically damage its constituent components.
- the destruction means may be configured to target specific components within the equipment. For example, where stored data presents the security concern, the destruction means may be concentrated to destroy the equipment's storage memory.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Sustainable Energy (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
- Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
- Sustainable Development (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Appareil de destruction d'équipement en mer comprenant : une enceinte sécurisée (9) destinée à loger un équipement (10), un amorceur (12) destiné à déclencher un moyen de destruction (14) situé à l'intérieur de l'enceinte (9) afin de rendre inutilisable au moins une partie de l'équipement (10). Un contrôleur de sécurité (11) commande automatiquement l'amorceur (12) afin qu'il déclenche le moyen de destruction (14) en réponse à l'identification d'une tentative non autorisée d'accès à l'enceinte (9).
Applications Claiming Priority (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DKPA202200869 | 2022-09-26 | ||
DKPA202200869 | 2022-09-26 | ||
EP23163276.1 | 2023-03-21 | ||
EP23163276.1A EP4343602A1 (fr) | 2022-09-26 | 2023-03-21 | Appareil et procédé de destruction d'équipement en mer |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2024068343A1 true WO2024068343A1 (fr) | 2024-04-04 |
Family
ID=88020720
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2023/075695 WO2024068343A1 (fr) | 2022-09-26 | 2023-09-18 | Appareil et procédé de destruction d'équipement en mer |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
WO (1) | WO2024068343A1 (fr) |
Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US3882324A (en) * | 1973-12-17 | 1975-05-06 | Us Navy | Method and apparatus for combustibly destroying microelectronic circuit board interconnections |
US20180276421A1 (en) * | 2015-02-25 | 2018-09-27 | Private Machines Inc. | Anti-tamper system |
-
2023
- 2023-09-18 WO PCT/EP2023/075695 patent/WO2024068343A1/fr unknown
Patent Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US3882324A (en) * | 1973-12-17 | 1975-05-06 | Us Navy | Method and apparatus for combustibly destroying microelectronic circuit board interconnections |
US20180276421A1 (en) * | 2015-02-25 | 2018-09-27 | Private Machines Inc. | Anti-tamper system |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
DONALD L EVANS ET AL: "FIPS PUB 140-2 CHANGE NOTICES (12-03-2002) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES CATEGORY: COMPUTER SECURITY SUBCATEGORY: CRYPTOGRAPHY", 12 March 2002 (2002-03-12), XP055142285, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf> [retrieved on 20140924] * |
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