WO2023198583A1 - Étiquette électronique de protection - Google Patents

Étiquette électronique de protection Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023198583A1
WO2023198583A1 PCT/EP2023/059110 EP2023059110W WO2023198583A1 WO 2023198583 A1 WO2023198583 A1 WO 2023198583A1 EP 2023059110 W EP2023059110 W EP 2023059110W WO 2023198583 A1 WO2023198583 A1 WO 2023198583A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
tamper
area
electronic tag
protective
sub
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2023/059110
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Dejan Milenovic
Matteo Panzavolta
Milosz Tokarski
Original Assignee
Authena Ag
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Authena Ag filed Critical Authena Ag
Publication of WO2023198583A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023198583A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/077—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier
    • G06K19/07749—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card
    • G06K19/07798—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card part of the antenna or the integrated circuit being adapted for rupturing or breaking, e.g. record carriers functioning as sealing devices for detecting not-authenticated opening of containers
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/077—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/077—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier
    • G06K19/07749—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/077—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier
    • G06K19/07749—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card
    • G06K19/07758—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card arrangements for adhering the record carrier to further objects or living beings, functioning as an identification tag
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/077—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier
    • G06K19/07749—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card
    • G06K19/07758—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card arrangements for adhering the record carrier to further objects or living beings, functioning as an identification tag
    • G06K19/0776—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card arrangements for adhering the record carrier to further objects or living beings, functioning as an identification tag the adhering arrangement being a layer of adhesive, so that the record carrier can function as a sticker
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09F—DISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00—Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02—Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/03—Forms or constructions of security seals
    • G09F3/0305—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used
    • G09F3/0329—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used having electronic sealing means
    • G09F3/0335—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used having electronic sealing means using RFID tags

Definitions

  • the present disclosure broadly encompasses an electronic tag for monitoring a portable product.
  • the present disclosure relates to a protective electronic tag applied to a seal or blister of a pharmaceutical product or capsule of a bottle for detecting tampering attempts.
  • Tags are known which are attached to a product container or products themselves, for example by a tie, or by using an adhesive (i.e. a tag in the form of a label).
  • Simple tags are used to record information about the product, for example a product name, product manufacturer, instructions related to the use of the product, certifications related to the product, etc.
  • Tags can also display a machine-readable visual code, for example in the form of a barcode or a QR code, which enables a barcode scanner, for example, to identify the product.
  • These types of tags are typically made from die-cut plastics, papers, metals, or other materials and have information printed on them. Such tags are in everyday use, from food items to cardboard shipping boxes.
  • RFID tags have some advantages over machine-readable visual code, for example they do not require a line of sight with a scanner, and they are able to store more data. Such tags are gaining widespread use, for example in the airline industry, where luggage is typically tracked using an adhesive tag containing an RFID circuit.
  • Tamper-evident labels are also known, which have one or more indicators or barriers to entry, which, if breached or missing, provide visible evidence that tampering has occurred. Items such as over-the-counter drugs and packaging materials use these types of labels on their products. Tamper-evident labels are attached to the product or container in such a way as to prevent access to the product or container without leaving visible evidence. For example, tamper-evident labels feature slits or weakened portions, or particular types of adhesive, such that attempted removal of the tamper-evident label results in visible damage.
  • EP3734513 A1 discloses a tamper detection device comprising an integrated-circuit chip, an antenna, a tamper loop, and a light emitting diode which is activated upon a signal received by the antenna and depending on the condition whether the tamper loop is open or closed.
  • the tamper loop is formed by a conductor shaped as an open circle with two ends which are electrically connected to terminals of the integrated-circuit chip.
  • the tamper signal is generated.
  • the LED is activated to allow visual indication of either tampered products or non-tampered products.
  • the LEDs allow quick visual surveillance of the tamper status of a multitude of products.
  • US2018/0040220 A1 discloses an electronic tamper detection device comprising a radio frequency antenna, a tamper loop, a power determination unit and a tamper measurement unit.
  • the tamper measurement unit is configured to generate a measurement signal through the tamper loop, and further to adapt the measurement signal depending on an external RF power level.
  • the tamper loop extends from the tamper measurement unit as a conductive wire that is shaped in rectangular form circumscribing the tamper-prone area of the product. Upon mechanical breakage of the tamper loop, the tamper signal is generated.
  • the shape and dimensions of the tamper loop have at best been designed to reduce or avoid inductive or capacitive antenna effects.
  • the shape of the tamper loop has been kept simple by providing a forward and backward wire segment, eventually bent in round shape.
  • such tamper loops may fail to register tampering, when thin instruments would penetrate the seal or coverage without breaking the tamper loop.
  • US2017/0195120 A1 discloses a near field magnetically coupled anti-counterfeiting tag preserving reduced functionality after use or tamper attack.
  • the tag comprises a control microcircuit to implement a basic function and a cryptographic function, a sacrificial conductive track or capacitor located across a sacrificial tag area and forming part of a circuit for detecting continuity of the sacrifical track or capacitor, and an antenna connected in series with the sacrifical track or capacitor. If the sacrifical track or capacitor is tampered, the circuit comprising the antenna is detuned and can only implement the basic function.
  • the sacrificial elements in particular sacrificial capacitor, is part of the antenna loop, i.e. the capacitor and antenna form an oscillating circuit which is detunable by a tampering or similar event.
  • the invention relates to a protective electronic tag for protecting a tamper-protection area of a product, in particular a seal, blister or capsule, the protective electronic tag comprising an electronic tamper-detecting circuit, an antenna, and a tamper-detection loop, wherein a) the tamper-protection area comprises a first sub-area and a second sub-area, b) the tamper-detection loop comprises first electric elements which are exposed to the first sub-area of the tamper-protection area, and c) the tamper-detection loop further comprises additional protective means, which are exposed to the second sub-area.
  • Such electronics tags have the advantage that a better area coverage of the tamperprotection area, which shall be protected against tampering attempts, can be achieved.
  • tampering attempts through seals using pointed objects can be detected, because the additional protective means are also present in the additional second subarea, and can generate a tamper detection signal by being damaged at least partially.
  • a needle or syringe is used to penetrate the capsule and cork of a bottle for extracting the valuable liquid inside, such as spirits, liqueurs, wine or similar, such needle attack can be detected irrespective of where the penetration hole is located within the tamper-protection area.
  • the tamper-protection area comprises the first electric elements in the first sub-area and the additional protective means in the second sub-area. This allows to cover the tamperprotection area with damage-sensing elements, which when at least partially damaged change an electrical characteristic, e.g. an electrical resistance, a broken wire resulting in loss of voltage potential and/or a change in capacitance, e.g. an undershooting of a threshold capacitive value.
  • the detection unit on the integrated-circuit chip can be adapted such that the required measurement sensitivity is achieved.
  • the electrical measurement may be performed using DC or AC signals to test the tamper-detection loop.
  • the damage or partial damage of the seal or tamper-protection area can trigger the tamper-detection loop to generate a tamper signal which may be communicated through any means, such as an RFID circuit and RFID antenna or also by using optical means such as an optical drive circuit and an LED or similar light source functioning as the antenna.
  • the detection unit or electronic tamper-detecting circuit comprises: means for testing the tamper-detection loop for damage or partial damage of the seal or tamper-protection area, means for generating a tamper signal, and means for communicating the tamper signal through antenna means, whether electric, magnetic, optical or other, to inform about a tamper status, in particular about a damage that occurred.
  • the electronic tamper-detecting circuit comprises first terminals providing connection to the tamper-detection loop and second terminals providing connection to the antenna.
  • the electronic tamper-detecting circuit comprises an integrated-circuit chip, which has first circuit means connected to the first terminals for identifying tamper attacks, and has second circuit means connected to the second terminals for communicating identified tamper attacks via the antenna to the outside.
  • the second circuit means are operable independently from whether a tamper attack has occurred in the tamper-detection loop.
  • the tamper-protection area is divided into the first sub-area and the second sub-area. This allows to cover the whole tamper-protection area with damagesensing elements.
  • the additional protective means comprise a protective disk, which covers at least a part of the first sub-area and at least a part of the second subarea and is designed to extend a damage from any attempted tampering in the tamperprotection area such that at least a part of the first sub-area with the first electric elements and preferably both the first sub-area and the second sub-area are affected by the damage.
  • a conventional tamper-loop consisting of one forward tamper wire segment and one backward tamper wire segment can be sufficient to protect the whole tamper-protection area, even against attacks by pointed objects such as needles.
  • This is achieved by the combination of the mechanical protective disk covering at least the second sub-area and the first electric elements functioning as damage-sensing elements at least in the first sub-area.
  • the additional protective means comprise tamper capacitive plates, which are designed to cover at least partly both the first sub-area and the second sub-area, and preferably cover the whole first and second sub-area.
  • the tamper-detecting circuit or integrated-circuit chip in particular first circuit means comprised therein, enable the tamper-detection loop to measure the change in electrical characteristics of the capacitor plates - or similar tamper wire segments - and to trigger generation of a tamper detection signal; and the tamperdetecting circuit or integrated-circuit chip, in particular second circuit means comprised therein, enable generation of the tamper detection signal and its transmission to the antenna for communicating the tamper detection signal to the outside.
  • the second circuit means maintain unchanged communication capability also when an element or part of the tamper-detection loop is destroyed or functionally reduced by a tamper attack or similar event.
  • the first circuit means of the electronic or integrated-circuit chip are configured for measuring, in particular detecting changes of, a capacitance of the tamper capacitive plates
  • the second circuit means of the integrated-circuit chip are configured to communicating such changes of the capacitance, in particular a tamper detection signal, via the antenna to a receiver.
  • the receiver may e.g. be a mobile phone, a computer, a reader, or similar.
  • the tamper capacitive plates are not part of the electronic or integrated-circuit chip, e.g. are not for energy storage, but can instead be configured to store some charge, which is changed after a tampering or similar event.
  • tamper wire segments can be measured, changes thereof can be detected, and such changes can be communicated, in particular in form of a tamper detection signal, via the antenna to a receiver.
  • At least one of the capacitive plates can be formed by a metal part of a capsule, seal label or blister of the product, in particular aluminum seal label or aluminum blister.
  • the additional protective means comprise second electric elements which are exposed to the second sub-area.
  • the second electric elements comprise a plurality of tamper wire segments which are densely distributed in a regular or irregular path pattern at least over the second sub-area, preferably over the whole tamper-protection area.
  • dense- wire tags have the advantage that - similar to the capacitor plates - an or any attack also with pointed objects causes a measurable change in electrical characteristics of the dense-wire tamper-detection-loop, which can directly be measured electrically and can trigger the tamper-detection loop to generate and possibly communicate a tamper detection signal.
  • the second electric elements can comprise tamper wire segments which are arranged concentrically at least partly over the second sub-area, preferably over the whole tamper-protection area.
  • the second electric elements can comprise tamper wire segments which are arranged in a meandering form at least partly over the second sub-area, preferably over the whole tamper-protection area.
  • the meandering can be along more regular tamper wire paths, e.g. mainly straight tamper wire paths, or can be along irregular tamper wire paths.
  • the second electric elements can comprise first tamper wire segments that can form a top path covering parts of the second sub-area, and the second electric elements can comprise second tamper wire segments that can form a bottom path covering additional parts of the second sub-area.
  • the first tamper wire segments can be arranged in a first layer and the second tamper wire segments can be arranged in a second layer of the tamper-protection area, and the first tamper wire segments can be connected to the second tamper wire segments by at least one vertical connecting wire segment.
  • the first tamper wire segments and the second tamper wire segments can comprise paths with different orientations which cross each other when viewed from top.
  • the first layer can comprise the first tamper wire segments oriented mainly in a first direction
  • the second layer can comprise the second tamper wire segments oriented mainly in a second direction
  • the first and second directions can be oriented under an angle to one another, in particular under 45° or 90°
  • the electronic tamper detecting circuit and the antenna can be arranged on a third annular or substantially annular area adjoining the tamper-protection area, in particular encircling the tamper-protection area. This allows for a very compact design of the protective electronic tag and can also simplify integration of the protective electronic tag in the seal, in particular capsule, seal label or blister, and to simplify subsequent application of the seal to the packaged or bottled consumer product.
  • At least one of the second electric elements is formed in or on a metal part of a capsule, seal or blister of the consumer product, in particular in or on an aluminum seal label or aluminum blister of the consumer product.
  • the protective electronic tag comprises at least one tail, which comprises a section of the tamper-detection loop and extends beyond the tamperprotection area for supporting adhesion of the protective electronic tag to the consumer product and for protecting against removal of the protective electronic tag from the consumer product.
  • the combination of the tamper-protection area with at least one tail extending beyond it has the advantage that both attacks with pointed or other objects for penetrating into the consumer product and attempts to remove the protective electronic tag can be detected and communicated to surveillance personnel.
  • the invention in another aspect, relates to a consumer product comprising a seal which comprises a protective electronic tag as disclosed herein.
  • the consumer product can be any product, e.g. a pharmaceutical product packaged in a box or blister, or a bottled product, wherein such consumer products have a penetrable opening or packaging which is protected by the protective electronic tag as disclosed herein.
  • the protective electronic tag can itself be protected against removal by extending the tamper-detection loop into tails which extend beyond the tamper-protection area.
  • Figure 1 shows a first embodiment of a protective electronic tag for a portable product: a) in a top view cross section, b) in a side view, and c) in a detail view;
  • Figure 2 shows an example of a dense-tamper-wire loop comprising tamper wire segments in a first (top) plane and in a second (bottom) plane: a) in a top view cross section showing the top plane, b) showing the top and bottom plane, c) in a side view, and d) in a side view cross section of detail A;
  • Figure 3 shows a second embodiment of a protective electronic tag for a portable product a) in a top view partially broken away, b) in a side view, and c) in a detail view;
  • Figure 4 shows a third embodiment of a protective electronic tag for a portable product in a top view cross section
  • Figure 5 shows a fourth embodiment of a protective electronic tag for a portable product: a) in a top view partially broken away, and b) in a side view;
  • Figure 6 shows a capacitive embodiment of a protective capacitive tag: a) in a side view cross section in an initial state, and b) in a damaged state; c) in a perspective view, partially cut away; and d) in a detail view A;
  • Figure 7 shows a bottle plastic cap with a protective coin tag before encapsulation onto the bottle top and neck: a) in a top view, and b) in a side view
  • Figure 8 shows the bottle plastic cap with a protective coin tag after encapsulation onto the bottle top and neck: a) in a top view, and b) in a side view;
  • Figure 9 shows an embodiment illustrating a protective electronic tag attached to a packaged product.
  • Figure 10 shows an embodiment illustrating a protective electronic tag attached to a bottled product.
  • Figure 1 shows schematically a first embodiment of a protective electronic tag 1 comprising an electronic tamper-detecting circuit 2, in particular electronic or integrated- circuit chip 2, an antenna 3, and a tamper-detection loop 4, which can be mounted on a bottom layer 5 and can have tails 40 on one or both sides and a tail section 41 comprising the antenna 3.
  • the tamper-detection loop 4 functions in such a manner that a damage in the tamper-protection area 11 can cause a measurable change in electrical characteristics such that a (e.g. first) tamper signal can be generated, for example by the electronic tamper-detecting circuit 2 and/or additional circuitry, and eventually be communicated to surveillance personnel.
  • the electronic or integrated-circuit chip 2 comprises first circuit means (not shown) for detecting a tamper attempt or tamper attack and second circuit means (not shown) for generating a tamper detection signal and for feeding it to the antenna means 3.
  • first circuit means and the second circuit means are operable independently from one another such that tamper detection and tamper status communication can be performed independently from one another.
  • the tails 40, 41 comprise feed or connecting conductor segments 2a, 2b, 2c that connect the tamper-detecting circuit 2 and the antenna 3 with the tamper-detection loop 4 and with the other tail 40 and that can themselves form part and participate in the tamperdetecting function; i.e. a change in their electrical characteristic can also cause a (e.g. second) tamper signal to be generated, for example by the electronic tamper-detecting circuit 2 and/or additional circuitry, and eventually be communicated to surveillance personnel.
  • a (e.g. second) tamper signal to be generated, for example by the electronic tamper-detecting circuit 2 and/or additional circuitry, and eventually be communicated to surveillance personnel.
  • the first tamper signal can indicate that a tamper attempt has occurred in the tamper-protection area 11 and that the consumer product is most likely corrupted; and the second tamper signal can indicate that an attempt to remove the protective electronic tag 1 has been made, which may also corrupt the integrity of the consumer product.
  • the first and second tamper signal may or may not be distinguishable by the tamper-detection loop 4.
  • the electronic tamper-detecting circuit 2 includes an radio-frequency identification (RFID) circuit configured to transmit the first and/or the second tamper signal, using the antenna 3, to an RFID reader (not shown).
  • RFID radio-frequency identification
  • the RFID circuit is integrated with the electronic tamper detecting circuit 2 or is implemented as a separate integrated circuit.
  • the RFID circuit can be passively powered, for example by an interrogation signal received from the RFID reader, or actively powered, for example by a battery included in, or connected to, the electronic tamper detecting circuit 2.
  • the tamper-protection area 11 comprises a first sub-area
  • Such dense tamper-wire paths 4a, 4b largely cover the second sub-area 111 and allow to generate damage for almost all cases of tamper attempts even with pointed objects. This improves the safety and reliability of the tamper-detection loop 4 over the prior art solutions.
  • the tamper wire paths 4a, 4b (or 4c, 4d) arranged in the second sub-area 111 are arranged such that a distance between any given point in the tamper-protection area 11 and the tamper wire paths 4a, 4b (or 4c, 4d) is below a pre-determined minimal distance threshold.
  • the winding back and forth tamper-wire paths 4a, 4b show such an arrangement, which, due to avoiding overlapping of the tamper-wire paths 4a, 4b, is particularly efficient.
  • Figure 2 shows schematically another embodiment of a dense-tamper-wire loop 4 which forms part of a protective electronic tag 1.
  • Figure 2a shows a first layer, e.g. top layer, of dense tamper wire segments 4c, which may be arranged in regular or irregular paths, e.g. in meandering form, at least partly over the second sub-area 111 , preferably over the whole tamper-protection area 11.
  • Figure 2b) shows that a second layer, e.g. bottom layer, of dense tamper wire segments 4d, can be arranged in regular or irregular paths, e.g. in meandering form, at least partly over the second sub-area 111 , preferably over the whole tamper-protection area 11.
  • the first layer or top paths can comprise first tamper wire segments 4c oriented mainly in a first (straight) direction, e.g. north-south direction or under 0°
  • the second layer or bottom paths can comprise second wire segments 5d oriented mainly in a second (straight) direction, e.g. under 45° or other angle, such as 90° (not shown).
  • the first tamper wire segments 4c are connected to the second tamper wire segments 4d by at least one vertical connecting wire segment 4e, which can e.g. be arranged in the center of the tamper protection area 11.
  • Figures 2c) and 2d) illustrate in a side view and detailed side view cross section the duallayer or multiple-layer dense tamper wire arrangement 4c, 4d.
  • at least one separating layer 6, e.g. interstitial electrically insulating layer 6, is present between the first layer 4c and second layer 4d; and eventually between further layers (not shown).
  • Reference numeral 7 designates an input-terminal e.g. on the top layer 4c and 8 an output-terminal e.g. on the bottom layer 4d.
  • Figure 3 shows schematically another embodiment of a dense-tamper-wire loop 4’ which forms part of a protective electronic tag 1.
  • an electronic tamperdetecting circuit 2 an antenna 3, a tamper-detection loop 4’, e.g. mounted to a bottom layer 5, and tails 40 on one or both sides and a tail section 41 comprising the antenna 3 are present.
  • the tails 40, 41 comprise feed or connecting conductor segments 2a, 2b, 2c that connect the tamper-detection circuit 2 and antenna 3 with the tamperdetection loop 4’ and themselves can form part and participate in the tamper-detecting function by protecting against removal of the protective electronic tag 1.
  • the tamper-protection area 11 is divided into a first sub-area 110, which is located in the two rectangular portions between the dashed borderlines l la, 11b and is protected by a first tamper wire segment 4a’ and a second tamper wire segment 4b’ only.
  • first sub-area 110 located in the two rectangular portions between the dashed borderlines l la, 11b and is protected by a first tamper wire segment 4a’ and a second tamper wire segment 4b’ only.
  • Such dual wire segment coverage with tamper wire segments 4a’, 4b’ has been found to be insufficient for protection against attacks by pointed objects targeting into the second sub-area 111 which is located outside the borderlines 11a and l l b.
  • an additional protective means is present in the form of a mechanical protective disk 9, which covers at least a part of the first sub-area 110 and also a part of the second sub-area 111 and extends a damage from an or any attempted tampering in the tamper-protection area 11 such that at least a part of the first sub-area 110 with the first electric elements 4a’, 4b’, or also tamper capacitive plates 4a”, 4b” as shown in Figure 6, is affected by the damage.
  • the protective disk 9 can be designed to extend a damage from an or any attempted tampering in the tamper-protection area 11 such that at least a part of the first sub-area 110 and at least a part of the second subarea 111 are affected by the damage.
  • Figure 4 shows schematically another embodiment of a dense-tamper-wire loop 4 which forms part of a protective electronic coin tag 1a.
  • the dense- tamper-wire loop 4 comprises regular, mainly straight meandering paths 4c, here mainly in west-east orientation or under an angle of 90°.
  • the electronic tamper-detecting circuit 2 and the antenna 3 are arranged on a third annular or substantially annular area adjoining the tamper-protection area 11 , in particular encircling the tamper-protection area 11. This allows for a very compact design of the protective electronic tag 1a in a coin form, which is typically without tails and fits e.g. onto an opening or cork of a bottle.
  • Figure 5 shows schematically another embodiment of a dense-tamper-wire loop 4 which forms part of a protective electronic coin tag 1a comprising a mechanical protective disk 9, as discussed in Figure 3, here in combination with a dense-tamper-wire loop 4 with mainly straight meandering paths 4c, as discussed in Figure 4.
  • the combination of the dense-tamper-wire loop 4 with the protective disk 9 further improves safety and reliability of detecting tampering attempts.
  • Figure 6 shows schematically another embodiment of a tamper-detection loop 4” comprising tamper capacitive plates 4a”, 4b”, which are designed to cover at least a part of the first sub-area 110 and at least a part of the second sub-area 111 , and preferably cover the whole tamper-protection area 11.
  • Figure 6a) shows the capacitance with first capacitive plate 4a”, dielectric layer 4c” and second capacitive plate 4b” intact, and Figure 6b) after a tamper attempt resulting in a penetration hole 10 which causes a measurable change in electrical characteristics of the capacitive tamper-detection loop 4”. This may e.g.
  • FIG. 6c shows a protective tag 1 as a whole in a perspective view for the case that the additional protective means comprise tamper capacitive plates 4a”, 4b”, which are separated by a dielectric layer 4c”.
  • the bottom layer 5 can be an adhesive layer 5.
  • the tamper capacitive plates 4a”, 4b” are connected via conductor segments 2a, 2b to the first terminals 21 , in particular input terminals 21 , of the electronic or integrated-circuit chip 2.
  • the electronic or integrated-circuit chip 2 has further second terminals 22, in particular output terminals 22, connected to the antenna means 3, e.g.
  • the first terminals 21 are connected to the first circuit means (not shown) for measuring capacitance values, in particular capacitance changes, and eventually for triggering generation of a tamper detection signal; and the second terminals 22 are connected to the second circuit means (not shown) for generating a tamper detection signal (e.g. no tampering, tampering trial, tampering successful) and for communicating the tamper detection signal via antenna 3 to the outside, e.g. a receiver.
  • a tamper detection signal e.g. no tampering, tampering trial, tampering successful
  • Figure 6d shows detail A of Figure 6c) in an enlarged top view, also partially cut away.
  • the adhesive or bottom layer 5 can be used to attach the protective tag 1 to a product.
  • the first tamper capacitive plate layer 4a” can be used to identify a tamper action; it can be etched onto one side of the dielectric layer or plastic element 4c”.
  • the dielectric layer or plastic element 4c can have the tamper detection loop 4” (here tamper capacitive plates 4a”, 4b”; alternatively or in addition tamper wire segments, e.g. 2a, 2b) etched thereon and/or can have the electronic or integrated-circuit chip 2 placed thereon.
  • the top layer 4d” can be used as additional protection for the dielectric layer 4c” on which printing could be done, and/or as protection for the electronic or integrated-circuit chip 2.
  • the electronic or integrated-circuit 2 separates the tamperdetection loop 4, 4’, 4” from the antenna or antenna loop 3. As shown in Fig. 1 and Fig.
  • this separation can be implemented by the first (input) terminals 21 being physically separate form the second (output) terminals 22, and by the first (input) terminals 21 serving for connecting first electrical signals (measurement signals from the tamper-detection loop 4, 4’, 4”) to the first circuit means for tamper detection, and the second circuit means serving for generating second electrical signals (communication signals) and being connected to the second (output) terminals 22 for feeding the second electrical signals (communication signals) to the antenna 3 or antenna loop 3.
  • the tamper-detection loop 4, 4’, 4 eventually connecting conductor segments 2a, 2b, the first (input) terminals 21 and the first circuit means 2 can form a detection circuit 4, 4’, 4”; 2a, 2b, 21 ; 2 of the protective electronic tag 1.
  • the second circuit means 2, the second terminals 22 and the antenna 3 can form a communication circuit 2, 22, 3 of the protective electronic tag 1.
  • the first electrical signals can be measurement signals
  • the second electrical signals can be communication signals generated or derived therefrom.
  • the measurement signals are different and separate from the communication signals, which improves reliability, usefulness and failure resistance of the protective electronic tag 1.
  • FIG. 7 and 8 show schematic embodiments of a protective electronic tag 1 or coin tag 1a that is integrated in a capsule 12a, 12b shown a) in a top view and b) in a side view.
  • the capsule 12a, 12b can e.g. be a plastic bottle cap or an aluminum bottle cap.
  • Figure 7 shows the capsule 12a before encapsulation and Figure 8 the capsule 12b after encapsulation onto the top and neck of the bottle.
  • the tamper-protection area 11 can be covered by a protective disk 9 and/or by a tamper-detection loop 4, 4’, 4”, in particular dense-tamper-wire loop 4, 4’, 4”, as discussed herein, specifically with any of the first electric elements 4a’, 4b’, and/or second electric elements 4a-4e and/or tamper capacitive plates 4a”, 4b”.
  • the antenna 3 can be integrated in the coin tag 1a, as discussed herein.
  • Figure 9 shows schematically a packaged consumer product 13, e.g. a pharmaceutical container 13, which comprises a protective electronic tag 1 or coin tag 1a that is integrated in a seal 12c.
  • the protective electronic tag 1 comprises a tamper-detection loop 4, 4’, 4”, in particular dense-tamper-wire loop 4, 4’, 4”, as discussed herein.
  • the protective electronic tag 1 provides the tamper-protection area 11 , with the first and second sub-area (not shown), for protection against unallowed opening of or penetration into the pharmaceutical product packaging 13, and provides the tails 40 for protection against unallowed removal of the protective electronic tag 1.
  • Figure 10 shows schematically a bottled consumer product 14, e.g. a wine bottle 14, which comprises a protective electronic tag 1 or coin tag 1a that is covering a corked or otherwise closed, but penetrable opening of the bottle 14, and in particular that could be integrated in a capsule 12b covering the corked or otherwise closed, but penetrable opening and the neck of the bottle 14.
  • the protective electronic tag 1 comprises a tamper-detection loop 4, 4’, 4”, in particular dense-tamper-wire loop 4, 4’, 4”, as discussed herein.
  • the protective electronic tag 1 provides the tamper-protection area 11 , with first and second sub-area (not shown), for protection against unallowed opening of or penetration into the bottle 14, and provides the tails 40 for protection against unallowed removal of the protective electronic tag 1.
  • antenna antenna, antenna means (electric, magnetic, optical, RFID)

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne une étiquette électronique de protection (1) pour protéger une zone d'inviolabilité (11) d'un produit de consommation (13, 14), en particulier une étiquette électronique de protection (1) comprise dans une capsule (12a, 12b), un joint d'étanchéité (12c) ou un blister du produit de consommation (13, 14), l'étiquette électronique de protection (1) comprenant un circuit électronique de détection d'effraction (2), une antenne (3) et une boucle d'inviolabilité (4, 4', 4''), la zone d'inviolabilité (11) comprenant une première sous-zone (110) et une seconde sous-zone (111), la boucle d'inviolabilité (4, 4', 4'') comprenant des premiers éléments électriques (4a', 4b', 4a'', 4b'') qui sont exposés à la première sous-zone (110) de la zone d'inviolabilité (11), et la boucle d'inviolabilité (4, 4', 4'') comprenant en outre des moyens de protection supplémentaires (4a - 4e ; 4a'', 4b'' ; 9), qui sont exposés à la seconde sous-zone (111).
PCT/EP2023/059110 2022-04-14 2023-04-06 Étiquette électronique de protection WO2023198583A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CH4492022 2022-04-14
CHCH000449/2022 2022-04-14

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2023198583A1 true WO2023198583A1 (fr) 2023-10-19

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WO (1) WO2023198583A1 (fr)

Citations (13)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4711368A (en) * 1986-04-11 1987-12-08 Leon Simons Tamper proof package with electrical circuit
US20050225445A1 (en) * 2002-10-25 2005-10-13 Intelligent Devices, Inc. Electronic tampering detection system
US20070210173A1 (en) * 2006-03-13 2007-09-13 Nagel Andreas R System, method and device to detect product tampering
US20080061153A1 (en) * 2001-05-21 2008-03-13 Scott Laboratories, Inc. Smart supplies, components and capital equipment
US20090267729A1 (en) * 2008-04-25 2009-10-29 Harry Rowe Anti-counterfeiting system
CN104217241A (zh) * 2014-08-21 2014-12-17 安徽云盾信息技术有限公司 一种电子防伪标签及实现方法
US20150178614A1 (en) * 2013-12-19 2015-06-25 Smart Approach Co., Ltd. Security Label
US20170195120A1 (en) 2014-05-21 2017-07-06 Wisekey Semiconductors Anti-counterfeiting label preserving functionality after use
US20180040220A1 (en) 2016-08-02 2018-02-08 Nxp B.V. Electronic tamper detection device
US20180197060A1 (en) * 2015-09-08 2018-07-12 Toppan Printing Co., Ltd. Sticker with ic tag
US20180276522A1 (en) * 2015-01-21 2018-09-27 Mickael CORONADO Authentication of a bottle and of its content
JP2020013194A (ja) * 2018-07-13 2020-01-23 凸版印刷株式会社 Ｉｃタグラベルシートおよびｉｃタグラベル
EP3734513A1 (fr) 2019-04-30 2020-11-04 EM Microelectronic-Marin SA Dispositif de détection de fraudes

Patent Citations (13)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4711368A (en) * 1986-04-11 1987-12-08 Leon Simons Tamper proof package with electrical circuit
US20080061153A1 (en) * 2001-05-21 2008-03-13 Scott Laboratories, Inc. Smart supplies, components and capital equipment
US20050225445A1 (en) * 2002-10-25 2005-10-13 Intelligent Devices, Inc. Electronic tampering detection system
US20070210173A1 (en) * 2006-03-13 2007-09-13 Nagel Andreas R System, method and device to detect product tampering
US20090267729A1 (en) * 2008-04-25 2009-10-29 Harry Rowe Anti-counterfeiting system
US20150178614A1 (en) * 2013-12-19 2015-06-25 Smart Approach Co., Ltd. Security Label
US20170195120A1 (en) 2014-05-21 2017-07-06 Wisekey Semiconductors Anti-counterfeiting label preserving functionality after use
CN104217241A (zh) * 2014-08-21 2014-12-17 安徽云盾信息技术有限公司 一种电子防伪标签及实现方法
US20180276522A1 (en) * 2015-01-21 2018-09-27 Mickael CORONADO Authentication of a bottle and of its content
US20180197060A1 (en) * 2015-09-08 2018-07-12 Toppan Printing Co., Ltd. Sticker with ic tag
US20180040220A1 (en) 2016-08-02 2018-02-08 Nxp B.V. Electronic tamper detection device
JP2020013194A (ja) * 2018-07-13 2020-01-23 凸版印刷株式会社 Ｉｃタグラベルシートおよびｉｃタグラベル
EP3734513A1 (fr) 2019-04-30 2020-11-04 EM Microelectronic-Marin SA Dispositif de détection de fraudes

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