WO2023004788A1 - 一种安全认证方法及装置、终端 - Google Patents

一种安全认证方法及装置、终端 Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2023004788A1
WO2023004788A1 PCT/CN2021/109780 CN2021109780W WO2023004788A1 WO 2023004788 A1 WO2023004788 A1 WO 2023004788A1 CN 2021109780 W CN2021109780 W CN 2021109780W WO 2023004788 A1 WO2023004788 A1 WO 2023004788A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
terminal
network node
token
algorithm
security
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2021/109780
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
王淑坤
许阳
Original Assignee
Oppo广东移动通信有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 filed Critical Oppo广东移动通信有限公司
Priority to PCT/CN2021/109780 priority Critical patent/WO2023004788A1/zh
Publication of WO2023004788A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023004788A1/zh

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Definitions

  • the embodiments of the present application relate to the field of mobile communication technologies, and in particular to a security authentication method, device, and terminal.
  • a zero-power terminal needs to obtain energy before it can drive itself to work.
  • a zero-power terminal obtains energy by collecting energy from radio waves.
  • the zero-power consumption terminal cannot receive signals sent by the network device, nor can it send signals to the network device.
  • zero-power terminals have security requirements. However, zero-power terminals have the characteristics of limited energy supply, small amount of transmitted data, and limited processing capabilities. The current security processing methods are no longer suitable for zero-power terminals. How to optimize The safe processing method of the zero-power terminal is a problem that needs to be solved.
  • Embodiments of the present application provide a security authentication method and device, a terminal, a chip, a computer-readable storage medium, a computer program product, and a computer program.
  • the terminal receives a first command, and the first command carries a first message authentication code (Message Authentication Code, MAC) and security information;
  • MAC Message Authentication Code
  • the terminal generates a second MAC based on the root key and the security information
  • the terminal verifies legality of the network side based on the second MAC and the first MAC.
  • the terminal receives a first command, where the first command carries a first token
  • the terminal processes the first token based on a first algorithm to obtain a first target token
  • the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the network side based on the first target token.
  • the security authentication device provided in the embodiment of this application is applied to a terminal, and the device includes:
  • a receiving unit configured to receive a first command, where the first command carries a first MAC and security information
  • a processing unit configured to generate a second MAC based on the root key and the security information
  • a verification unit configured to verify the legitimacy of the network side based on the second MAC and the first MAC.
  • the security authentication device provided in the embodiment of this application is applied to a terminal, and the device includes:
  • a receiving unit configured to receive a first command, the first command carrying a first token
  • a processing unit configured to process the first token based on a first algorithm to obtain a first target token
  • a verification unit configured to verify the legitimacy of the network side based on the first target token.
  • the terminal provided in the embodiment of the present application includes a processor and a memory.
  • the memory is used to store computer programs, and the processor is used to invoke and run the computer programs stored in the memory to execute the above-mentioned security authentication method.
  • the chip provided in the embodiment of the present application is used to implement the above security authentication method.
  • the chip includes: a processor, configured to invoke and run a computer program from the memory, so that the device installed with the chip executes the above security authentication method.
  • the computer-readable storage medium provided by the embodiment of the present application is used for storing a computer program, and the computer program causes the computer to execute the above-mentioned security authentication method.
  • the computer program product provided by the embodiments of the present application includes computer program instructions, and the computer program instructions cause a computer to execute the above-mentioned security authentication method.
  • the computer program provided by the embodiment of the present application when running on a computer, enables the computer to execute the above security authentication method.
  • the terminal and the network side can perform security authentication based on MAC, or can perform security authentication based on token.
  • This security authentication method is simple and easy to implement, and does not require the terminal to perform complicated security processing procedures, and is suitable for zero-power consumption terminals. Safety requirements.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of zero-power communication provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of energy harvesting provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of backscatter communication provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5 is a circuit schematic diagram of resistive load modulation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 6 is a schematic diagram of the reverse non-return-to-zero encoding provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 7 is a schematic diagram of Manchester coding provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 8 is a schematic diagram of the unipolar return-to-zero encoding provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of differential bi-phase encoding provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 10 is a schematic diagram of Miller encoding provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 11 is an architecture diagram of a zero-power communication system provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 12 is a first schematic flow diagram of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 13 is a second schematic flow diagram of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 14 is a schematic flow diagram three of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 15 is a schematic flow diagram 4 of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 16 is a schematic flow diagram five of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 17 is a schematic flow diagram six of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 18 is a schematic diagram of the structure and composition of the security authentication device provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 19 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 20 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 21 is a schematic block diagram of a communication system provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of an embodiment of the present application.
  • a communication system 100 may include a terminal 110 and a network device 120 .
  • the network device 120 can communicate with the terminal 110 through an air interface. Multi-service transmission is supported between the terminal 110 and the network device 120 .
  • the embodiment of the present application is only described by using the communication system 100 as an example, but the embodiment of the present application is not limited thereto. That is to say, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as: Long Term Evolution (Long Term Evolution, LTE) system, LTE Time Division Duplex (Time Division Duplex, TDD), Universal Mobile Communication System (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System, UMTS), Internet of Things (Internet of Things, IoT) system, Narrow Band Internet of Things (NB-IoT) system, enhanced Machine-Type Communications (eMTC) system, 5G communication system (also known as New Radio (NR) communication system), or future communication systems, etc.
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • LTE Time Division Duplex Time Division Duplex
  • TDD Time Division Duplex
  • Universal Mobile Telecommunication System Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
  • UMTS Universal Mobile Communication System
  • Internet of Things Internet of Things
  • NB-IoT Narrow Band Internet of Things
  • eMTC enhanced Machine-Type Communications
  • the network device 120 may be an access network device that communicates with the terminal 110 .
  • the access network device can provide communication coverage for a specific geographic area, and can communicate with terminals 110 (such as UEs) located in the coverage area.
  • the network device 120 may be an evolved base station (Evolutional Node B, eNB or eNodeB) in a Long Term Evolution (Long Term Evolution, LTE) system, or a Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG RAN) device, Either a base station (gNB) in the NR system, or a wireless controller in a cloud radio access network (Cloud Radio Access Network, CRAN), or the network device 120 can be a relay station, an access point, a vehicle-mounted device, a wearable Devices, hubs, switches, bridges, routers, or network devices in the future evolution of the Public Land Mobile Network (Public Land Mobile Network, PLMN), etc.
  • Evolutional Node B, eNB or eNodeB in a Long Term Evolution (Long Term Evolution, LTE) system
  • NG RAN Next Generation Radio Access Network
  • gNB base station
  • CRAN Cloud Radio Access Network
  • the network device 120 can be a relay station, an access point, a vehicle-mounted device, a wear
  • the terminal 110 may be any terminal, including but not limited to a terminal connected to the network device 120 or other terminals by wire or wirelessly.
  • the terminal 110 may refer to an access terminal, a user equipment (User Equipment, UE), a subscriber unit, a subscriber station, a mobile station, a mobile station, a remote station, a remote terminal, a mobile device, a user terminal, a terminal, a wireless communication device , User Agent, or User Device.
  • Access terminals can be cellular phones, cordless phones, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) phones, IoT devices, satellite handheld terminals, Wireless Local Loop (WLL) stations, Personal Digital Assistant , PDA), handheld devices with wireless communication functions, computing devices or other processing devices connected to wireless modems, vehicle-mounted devices, wearable devices, terminals in 5G networks or terminals in future evolution networks, etc.
  • SIP Session Initiation Protocol
  • WLL Wireless Local Loop
  • PDA Personal Digital Assistant
  • the terminal 110 can be used for device-to-device (Device to Device, D2D) communication.
  • D2D Device to Device
  • the wireless communication system 100 may also include a core network device 130 that communicates with the base station.
  • the core network device 130 may be a 5G core network (5G Core, 5GC) device, for example, Access and Mobility Management Function (Access and Mobility Management Function , AMF), and for example, authentication server function (Authentication Server Function, AUSF), and for example, user plane function (User Plane Function, UPF), and for example, session management function (Session Management Function, SMF).
  • the core network device 130 may also be a packet core evolution (Evolved Packet Core, EPC) device of the LTE network, for example, a data gateway (Session Management Function+Core Packet Gateway, SMF+PGW- C) equipment.
  • EPC packet core evolution
  • SMF+PGW-C can realize the functions of SMF and PGW-C at the same time.
  • the above-mentioned core network equipment may be called by other names, or a new network entity may be formed by dividing functions of the core network, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • Various functional units in the communication system 100 may also establish a connection through a next generation network (next generation, NG) interface to implement communication.
  • NG next generation network
  • the terminal establishes an air interface connection with the access network device through the NR interface to transmit user plane data and control plane signaling; the terminal can establish a control plane signaling connection with the AMF through the NG interface 1 (N1 for short); the access network device
  • a next-generation wireless access base station gNB
  • UPF can establish a user plane data connection with UPF through NG interface 3 (N3 for short); an access network device can establish a control plane signaling connection with AMF through NG interface 2 (N2 for short);
  • UPF can establish control plane signaling connection with SMF through NG interface 4 (abbreviated as N4);
  • UPF can exchange user plane data with data network through NG interface 6 (abbreviated as N6);
  • AMF can establish with SMF through NG interface 11 (abbreviated as N11)
  • Control plane signaling connection the SMF can establish a control plane signaling connection with the PCF through the NG interface 7 (N7 for short).
  • FIG. 1 exemplarily shows a base station, a core network device, and two terminals.
  • the wireless communication system 100 may include multiple base station devices and each base station may include other numbers of terminals within the coverage area. This embodiment of the present application does not limit it.
  • FIG. 1 is only an illustration of a system applicable to this application, and of course, the method shown in the embodiment of this application may also be applicable to other systems.
  • system and “network” are often used interchangeably herein.
  • the term “and/or” in this article is just an association relationship describing associated objects, which means that there can be three relationships, for example, A and/or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, and there exists alone B these three situations.
  • the character "/" in this article generally indicates that the contextual objects are an "or” relationship.
  • the "indication” mentioned in the embodiments of the present application may be a direct indication, may also be an indirect indication, and may also mean that there is an association relationship.
  • A indicates B, which can mean that A directly indicates B, for example, B can be obtained through A; it can also indicate that A indirectly indicates B, for example, A indicates C, and B can be obtained through C; it can also indicate that there is an association between A and B relation.
  • the "correspondence” mentioned in the embodiments of the present application may mean that there is a direct correspondence or an indirect correspondence between the two, or that there is an association between the two, or that it indicates and is indicated. , configuration and configured relationship.
  • predefined or “predefined rules” mentioned in the embodiments of this application can be used to indicate related information, and this application does not limit its specific implementation. For example, pre-defined may refer to defined in the protocol.
  • the "protocol” may refer to a standard protocol in the communication field, for example, it may include the LTE protocol, the NR protocol, and related protocols applied to future communication systems, and this application does not limit this .
  • Zero Power (Zero Power) communication uses energy harvesting and backscatter communication technology.
  • the zero-power communication system consists of network devices and zero-power terminals, as shown in Figure 2.
  • the network device is used to send an energy supply signal (that is, a radio wave) and a downlink communication signal to the zero-power terminal, and receive backscattered signals from the zero-power terminal.
  • the zero-power terminal includes an energy harvesting module, a backscatter communication module, and a low-power computing module.
  • the zero-power terminal can also be equipped with memory and/or sensors, the memory is used to store some basic information (such as item identification, etc.), and the sensor is used to obtain sensing data such as ambient temperature and ambient humidity.
  • FIG 3 is a schematic diagram of energy harvesting.
  • the energy harvesting module realizes the collection of space electromagnetic wave energy based on the principle of electromagnetic induction, and then obtains the energy required to drive the zero-power consumption terminal to drive the load circuit (such as drivers for low-power computing modules, sensors, etc.). Therefore, the zero-power terminal does not need a traditional battery, and realizes battery-free communication.
  • the energy collection module refers to a radio frequency energy collection module, and the radio frequency energy collection module can collect energy carried by radio waves in space to realize the collection of space electromagnetic wave energy.
  • Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of backscatter communication.
  • the zero-power terminal receives the wireless signal sent by the network device (that is, the carrier wave in Figure 4), and modulates the wireless signal, that is, loads the wireless signal on the wireless signal.
  • the information that needs to be sent and the modulated signal is radiated from the antenna. This information transmission process is called backscatter communication.
  • load modulation is a method often used by zero-power terminals to load information.
  • Load modulation adjusts and controls the circuit parameters of the oscillation circuit of the zero-power terminal according to the beat of the data flow, so that the magnitude and/or phase of the impedance of the zero-power terminal changes accordingly, thereby completing the modulation process.
  • the load modulation technology mainly includes resistive load modulation and capacitive load modulation.
  • a resistor is connected in parallel with the load, which is called a load modulation resistor.
  • the resistor is turned on or off based on the control of the binary data flow.
  • Amplitude keying modulation ASK
  • signal modulation is realized by adjusting the amplitude of the backscattered signal of the zero-power terminal.
  • capacitive load modulation a capacitor is connected in parallel with the load, which is called a load modulation capacitor. This capacitor replaces the load modulation resistor in Figure 5.
  • the circuit resonant frequency can be changed by switching the capacitor on and off, thus realizing frequency keying modulation.
  • (FSK) that is, the modulation of the signal is realized by adjusting the working frequency of the backscattered signal of the zero-power terminal.
  • the zero-power terminal performs information modulation on the incoming signal by means of load modulation, thereby realizing the backscatter communication process. Therefore, the zero-power terminal has the following significant advantages: On the one hand, the zero-power terminal does not actively transmit signals, so it does not require complex radio frequency links, such as power amplifiers and radio frequency filters. On the other hand, zero-power terminals do not need to actively generate high-frequency signals, so high-frequency crystal oscillators are not required. On the other hand, the zero-power terminal communicates through backscattering, and the transmission process does not need to consume the energy of the zero-power terminal itself.
  • the data transmitted by the zero-power terminal can use different forms of codes to represent binary "1" and "0".
  • Radio frequency identification systems usually use one of the following encoding methods: reverse non-return zero (NRZ) encoding, Manchester encoding, unipolar RZ encoding, differential biphase ( DBP) coding, Miller coding, and differential coding.
  • NRZ reverse non-return zero
  • DBP differential biphase
  • Using different forms of codes to represent binary "1” and "0” can also be understood as representing 0 and 1 with different pulse signals.
  • the reverse non-return-to-zero encoding uses a high level to represent a binary "1”, and a low level to represent a binary "0", as shown in Figure 6.
  • Manchester encoding is also known as Split-Phase Coding.
  • the value of a certain bit is represented by the change (rise/fall) of the level during half a bit period within the bit length, and a negative transition during half a bit period represents a binary "1".
  • a positive transition at half a bit period represents a binary "0", as shown in Figure 7.
  • Manchester encoding is usually used for data transmission from a zero-power terminal to a network device when carrier load modulation or backscatter modulation is used, because it is beneficial to discover errors in data transmission. This is because the "no change" state is not allowed within the bit length. When the data bits sent by multiple zero-power terminals at the same time have different values, the rising and falling edges of the reception cancel each other out, resulting in an uninterrupted carrier signal within the entire bit length. Since this state is not allowed, the network device uses This error can determine the specific location of the collision.
  • the high level of the unipolar return-to-zero code in the first half bit period represents a binary "1", and the low level signal that lasts for the entire bit period represents a binary "0", as shown in Figure 8.
  • Unipolar return-to-zero coding can be used to extract bit synchronization signals.
  • Any edge of the differential biphase encoding in half a bit period represents a binary "0", and no edge is a binary "1", as shown in FIG. 9 .
  • the levels are inverted at the beginning of each bit period. Therefore, bit beats are relatively easy to reconstruct for the receiving end.
  • Any edge of the Miller code in half a bit period represents a binary "1", and a constant level in the next bit period represents a binary "0".
  • a level transition occurs at the beginning of a bit period, as shown in Figure 10. Thus, bit beats are easier for the receiver to reconstruct.
  • each binary "1" to be transmitted causes a change in signal level, whereas for a binary "0" the signal level remains unchanged.
  • zero-power terminals can be divided into the following types:
  • the zero-power terminal does not need a built-in battery.
  • the zero-power terminal When the zero-power terminal is close to the network device, the zero-power terminal is within the near-field range formed by the antenna radiation of the network device. Therefore, the antenna of the zero-power terminal generates an induced current through electromagnetic induction.
  • the current drives the low-power computing module (that is, the low-power chip circuit) of the zero-power terminal to work, to realize the demodulation of the forward link signal and the signal modulation of the backward link.
  • the zero-power terminal uses the backscatter implementation to transmit signals.
  • the passive zero-power terminal does not need a built-in battery to drive it, whether it is a forward link or a reverse link, and is a real zero-power terminal.
  • the radio frequency circuit and baseband circuit of the passive zero-power terminal are very simple, such as no low-noise amplifier (LNA), power amplifier (PA), crystal oscillator, ADC, etc., so It has many advantages such as small size, light weight, cheap price and long service life.
  • the semi-passive zero-power terminal itself does not install a conventional battery, but can use an energy harvesting module to collect radio wave energy, and store the collected energy in an energy storage unit (such as a capacitor). After the energy storage unit obtains energy, it can drive the low-power computing module (that is, the low-power chip circuit) of the zero-power terminal to work, realize the demodulation of the forward link signal, and the signal modulation of the backward link, etc. Work. For the backscatter link, the zero-power terminal uses the backscatter implementation to transmit signals.
  • an energy harvesting module to collect radio wave energy, and store the collected energy in an energy storage unit (such as a capacitor). After the energy storage unit obtains energy, it can drive the low-power computing module (that is, the low-power chip circuit) of the zero-power terminal to work, realize the demodulation of the forward link signal, and the signal modulation of the backward link, etc. Work.
  • the zero-power terminal uses the backscatter implementation to transmit signals.
  • the semi-passive zero-power terminal does not need a built-in battery to drive either the forward link or the reverse link.
  • the energy stored in the capacitor is used in the work, the energy comes from the radio collected by the energy harvesting module. Wave energy, so it is also a true zero-power consumption terminal.
  • Semi-passive zero-power terminals inherit many advantages of passive zero-power terminals, so they have many advantages such as small size, light weight, cheap price, and long service life.
  • the zero-power consumption terminal used in some scenarios can also be an active zero-power consumption terminal, and this type of terminal can have a built-in battery.
  • the battery is used to drive the low-power computing module (that is, the low-power chip circuit) of the zero-power terminal to realize the demodulation of the forward link signal and the signal modulation of the backward link.
  • the zero-power terminal uses the backscatter implementation to transmit the signal. Therefore, the zero power consumption of this type of terminal is mainly reflected in the fact that the signal transmission of the reverse link does not require the power of the terminal itself, but uses backscattering.
  • the built-in battery supplies power to the RF chip to increase the communication distance and improve the reliability of communication. Therefore, it can be applied in some scenarios that require relatively high communication distance and communication delay.
  • passive IoT devices can be based on zero-power communication technology, such as radio frequency identification (Radio Frequency Identification, RFID) technology, and extended on this basis to be suitable for cellular IoT.
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • Zero-power terminals need to collect the energy of radio waves sent by network devices, and can drive themselves to work after obtaining energy. Therefore, before obtaining energy, the zero-power terminal is in the "off" state, that is, it cannot receive signals sent by network devices at this time, nor can it send signals to network devices.
  • the zero-power terminal Since the zero-power terminal has the characteristics of limited energy supply, small amount of transmitted data, and limited processing capacity, the requirements of the communication system are simple and applicable. However, the current communication systems (such as LTE system and NR system) are too complex to meet the requirements of zero-power terminal communication.
  • zero-power terminals have the characteristics of limited energy supply, small amount of transmitted data, and limited processing capabilities
  • zero-power terminals also have security requirements, such as security authentication of zero-power terminals on the network side, and The security authentication of the zero-power terminal on the network side and the security protection of data communication between the zero-power terminal and the network side, etc.
  • the traditional security authentication process (such as the security authentication process defined by the LTE/NR system) and security protection algorithms are no longer suitable for zero-power terminals. , it is necessary to consider the characteristics of the zero-power terminal and redesign a security processing solution for the zero-power terminal that meets its security requirements.
  • Fig. 11 is an architecture diagram of a zero-power communication system provided by an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Fig. 11, the system includes at least one of the following: a zero-power terminal, an access network node, a core network node, a data center node, and service control node; where,
  • the zero-power consumption terminal is capable of communicating with the access network node
  • the access network node is capable of communicating with at least one of the zero-power consumption terminal and the access network node;
  • the core network node is capable of communicating with at least one of the access network node, the data center node, and the service control node;
  • the data center node is capable of communicating with at least one of the core network node and the service control node;
  • the service control node is capable of communicating with at least one of the core network node and the data center node.
  • the zero-power consumption communication system may include all the above-mentioned function nodes, or may include some of the above-mentioned function nodes. Not limited thereto, the zero-power communication system may include other functional nodes in addition to all or part of the above-mentioned functional nodes.
  • the zero-power consumption terminal includes: an energy collection module and a communication module; wherein, the energy collection module is configured to collect radio wave energy and provide energy to the communication module; the A communication module, configured to perform signal transmission between the zero-power consumption terminal and the access network node.
  • the energy harvesting module is an RF energy harvesting module.
  • the zero-power terminal can collect the energy of radio waves by using the RF energy harvesting module, and drive the zero-power terminal to work through the collected energy.
  • the communication module is configured to use backscatter communication to perform signal transmission between the zero-power consumption terminal and the access network node.
  • the communication module may be a backscatter communication module, and the zero-power consumption terminal may use the backscatter communication module to transmit signals in a backscatter communication manner.
  • the zero-power consumption terminal further includes: a low-power computing module.
  • the low-power computing module may include a low-power demodulation module and/or a low-power modulation module.
  • the zero-power consumption terminal further includes: a sensor, configured to acquire sensing data.
  • the sensor may be a temperature sensor, a humidity sensor, or the like.
  • the zero-power consumption terminal may be an RFID tag.
  • the access network node is also a radio access network node (RAN node).
  • RAN node radio access network node
  • an access network node may be a base station node.
  • the access network node may be, but not limited to, a 5G access network node or a 6G access network node.
  • the access network node is configured to: send radio waves to the zero-power consumption terminal, where the radio waves are used to power the zero-power consumption terminal; and/or, to The zero-power consumption terminal provides a communication link, and the communication link is used for signal transmission between the zero-power consumption terminal and the access network node.
  • the core network node may be, but not limited to, a 5G core network node or a 6G core network node.
  • the core network node may include at least one of the following network elements: AMF, UDP.
  • the core network node is configured to perform at least one of the following: receiving data of zero-power consumption terminals; processing data of zero-power consumption terminals; controlling services of zero-power consumption terminals; managing zero-power consumption terminal business.
  • the core network node is configured to provide functions such as a gateway.
  • the data center node may be a unified data management network element (Unified Data Management, UDM).
  • UDM Unified Data Management
  • the data center node is configured to store at least one of the following: subscription data of the zero-power consumption terminal, and communication-related configuration of the zero-power consumption terminal.
  • the communication-related configuration includes at least one of the following: bearer configuration, zero-power consumption terminal identification, security configuration, and service identification.
  • the service control node may be a Cellular Internet of Things service (Cellular Internet of Things service, CIoT service) control node.
  • Cellular Internet of Things service Cellular Internet of Things service, CIoT service
  • the service control node is configured to perform at least one of the following: configure the service-related configuration of the zero-power terminal; manage the zero-power terminal identification of the zero-power terminal; manage the zero-power terminal business.
  • the managing the service of the zero-power terminal includes at least one of the following: enabling the service of the zero-power terminal; disabling the service of the zero-power terminal.
  • the service control node may be a service server or a third party providing services.
  • the interface between the zero-power consumption terminal and the access network node is the first interface.
  • the first interface may be called a Uu interface.
  • the interface between the access network node and the core network node is the second interface.
  • the second interface may be called an NG interface.
  • the number of the above functional nodes in the zero-power communication system may be one or multiple.
  • the number of zero-power terminals in the zero-power communication system may be one or more, which is not limited in this application.
  • the security authentication method of the embodiment of the present application is based on the zero-power communication system shown in FIG. 11 , and the security authentication of the embodiment of the present application will be described below.
  • terminal described in the embodiment of the present application may be a zero-power consumption terminal. But not limited thereto, other types of terminals can also apply the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application.
  • the core network node described in the embodiments of the present application essentially refers to the core network, which is not limited to one core network node, and may include one or more core network nodes.
  • the core network may be a 5G core network or a 6G core network, or other types of core networks, and this application does not limit the type of the core network (and core network nodes).
  • access network node may be a 5G base station or a 6G base station, or other types of access network nodes, and this application does not limit the type of access network nodes.
  • Fig. 12 is a first schematic flow diagram of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application. As shown in Fig. 12, the security authentication method includes the following steps:
  • Step 1201 The terminal receives a first command, where the first command carries a first MAC and security information.
  • Step 1202 The terminal generates a second MAC based on the root key and the security information.
  • Step 1203 The terminal verifies legality of the network side based on the second MAC and the first MAC.
  • the terminal is assigned one or more root keys before performing security authentication and secure communication. It is explained below.
  • the root key is generated and/or configured by one of the following nodes: a core network node, a data center node, and a service control node. Wherein, the root key is stored on the terminal side and/or the data center node side.
  • the root key is configured for a terminal; or, the root key is configured for a service; or, the root key is configured for a terminal group; or, the Root keys are configured for business groups.
  • the terminal side stores multiple root keys, and each root key in the multiple root keys corresponds to a key index; the terminal receives the first indication information, and the The first indication information is used to indicate a first key index; the terminal determines a root key for generating the second MAC based on the first key index.
  • the terminal may determine the root key to be used according to the first key index, and the root key is also the root key used to generate the second MAC.
  • the root key of the terminal may be generated and/or configured by a core network node, a service center node or a service control node. No matter which node generates and/or configures the root key of the terminal, the root key will be stored in the terminal and in the data center node. Further, in order to enhance the security of the terminal, multiple root keys can be assigned to the terminal, and a key index is configured for each root key. The network side can notify the terminal which root key to use by indicating a key index to the terminal. key.
  • the network side generates a first MAC based on the root key and security information of the terminal, and sends the first MAC and security information to the terminal through a first command.
  • the terminal receives the first command sent by the network side, where the first command carries the first MAC and security information.
  • the terminal generates a second MAC based on the root key and the security information carried in the first command, and compares the second MAC with the first MAC carried in the first command, thereby verifying the legitimacy of the network side.
  • the verification result is that the network side is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second MAC is inconsistent with the first MAC, the verification result is The network side is illegal (that is, the authentication fails).
  • the authentication of the terminal on the network side may be a terminal authentication access network node, a terminal authentication core network node, or a terminal authentication service control node. Each of them will be described below.
  • the network side is an access network node.
  • the terminal receives a first command, where the first command carries a first MAC and security information.
  • the terminal generates a second MAC based on the root key and the security information.
  • the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the access network node based on the second MAC and the first MAC.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the security authentication input parameter is generated by one of the following nodes: a service control node, a core network node, and an access network node. Further, optionally, the security authentication input parameters include at least one of the following: random numbers, service identifiers, service identifiers, and service categories.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the security authentication input parameter; sent by the core network node to The second command of the access network node carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the security authentication input parameter; sent by the core network node
  • the security authentication input parameter is carried in the second command to the access network node.
  • the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the security authentication input parameter; the core network node
  • the second command sent to the access network node does not carry the security authentication input parameter.
  • the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the security algorithm is selected by one of the following nodes: a service control node, a core network node, and an access network node.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the selected security algorithm;
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the second command of the network node.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries a first security algorithm list, and the first security algorithm list is used for the security algorithm selected by the core network node.
  • the first security algorithm list is the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the service joined by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group described by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the first security algorithm list;
  • the second command of the network node carries the first security algorithm list; wherein, the first security algorithm list is used for the security algorithm selected by the access network node.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the first security algorithm list is the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the service joined by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group described by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group.
  • the first MAC is generated by the access network node based on the root key and the security information, and the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the first MAC a MAC and the security information.
  • the terminal after receiving the first command, the terminal generates a second MAC based on the root key and the security information carried in the first command; the terminal compares the second MAC with the first MAC, And determine whether the access network node is legal based on the comparison result.
  • the security authentication process ends.
  • the method further includes:
  • the terminal calculates a first authentication response (authentication Response, RES for short), and sends the first RES to the access network node; the first RES is used for the second authentication response generated by the access network node itself.
  • the RES verifies the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the terminal generates the first RES according to the root key. Further, optionally, the terminal generates the first RES according to the root key and the random number carried in the first command.
  • the access network node before sending the first MAC, the access network node generates a random number and generates the second RES according to the random number and the root key.
  • the access network node After receiving the first RES, the access network node compares the first RES with the second RES, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result. Specifically, if the second RES is consistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second RES is inconsistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is invalid (that is, the verification fails).
  • the access network node when the first MAC is generated by the access network node, what the terminal verifies is the legitimacy of the access network node. Further, optionally, for two-way authentication, the access network node will also verify the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the network side is a core network node.
  • the terminal receives a first command, where the first command carries a first MAC and security information.
  • the terminal generates a second MAC based on the root key and the security information.
  • the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the core network node based on the second MAC and the first MAC.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the security authentication input parameters are generated by one of the following nodes: a service control node and a core network node. Further, optionally, the security authentication input parameters include at least one of the following: random numbers, service identifiers, service identifiers, and service categories.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the security authentication input parameter; sent by the core network node to The second command of the access network node carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the security authentication input parameter; sent by the core network node
  • the security authentication input parameter is carried in the second command to the access network node.
  • the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the security algorithm is selected by one of the following nodes: a service control node, a core network node, and an access network node.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the selected security algorithm;
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the second command of the network node.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries a first security algorithm list, and the first security algorithm list is used for the security algorithm selected by the core network node.
  • the first security algorithm list is the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the service joined by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group described by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the first security algorithm list;
  • the second command of the network node carries the first security algorithm list; wherein, the first security algorithm list is used for the security algorithm selected by the access network node.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the first security algorithm list is the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the service joined by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group described by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group.
  • the first MAC is generated by the core network node based on the root key and the security information
  • the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node carries the first MAC address.
  • MAC and the security information; the first MAC and the security information are carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the terminal after receiving the first command, the terminal generates a second MAC based on the root key and the security information carried in the first command; the terminal compares the second MAC with the first MAC, And determine whether the core network node is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the security authentication process ends.
  • the method further includes:
  • the terminal calculates a first RES, and sends the first RES to the core network node through an access network node; the first RES is used by the core network node to verify the identity of the terminal according to the second RES generated by itself legality.
  • the terminal generates the first RES according to the root key. Further, optionally, the terminal generates the first RES according to the root key and the random number carried in the first command.
  • the core network node before sending the first MAC, the core network node generates a random number and generates the second RES according to the random number and the root key.
  • the core network node After receiving the first RES, the core network node compares the first RES with the second RES, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result. Specifically, if the second RES is consistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second RES is inconsistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is invalid (that is, the verification fails).
  • the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the core network node. Further, optionally, for two-way authentication, the core network node will also verify the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the network side is a service control node.
  • the terminal receives a first command, where the first command carries a first MAC and security information.
  • the terminal generates a second MAC based on the root key and the security information.
  • the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the service control node based on the second MAC and the first MAC.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the security authentication input parameter is generated by one of the following nodes: a service control node. Further, optionally, the security authentication input parameters include at least one of the following: random numbers, service identifiers, service identifiers, and service categories.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the security authentication input parameter; sent by the core network node to The second command of the access network node carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the security algorithm is selected by one of the following nodes: a service control node, a core network node, and an access network node.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the selected security algorithm;
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the second command of the network node.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries a first security algorithm list, and the first security algorithm list is used for the security algorithm selected by the core network node.
  • the first security algorithm list is the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the service joined by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group described by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the first security algorithm list;
  • the second command of the network node carries the first security algorithm list; wherein, the first security algorithm list is used for the security algorithm selected by the access network node.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the first security algorithm list is the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the service joined by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group described by the terminal or the list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group.
  • the first MAC is generated by the service control node based on the root key and the security information
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the first MAC.
  • the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node carries the first MAC and the security information;
  • the command sent by the access network node to the terminal The first command carries the first MAC and the security information.
  • the terminal after receiving the first command, the terminal generates a second MAC based on the root key and the security information carried in the first command; the terminal compares the second MAC with the first MAC, And determine whether the service control node is legal based on the comparison result.
  • the security authentication process ends.
  • the method further includes:
  • the terminal calculates the first RES, and sends the first RES to the service control node through the access network node and the core network node; the first RES is used for verification by the service control node according to the second RES generated by itself The legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the terminal generates the first RES according to the root key. Further, optionally, the terminal generates the first RES according to the root key and the random number carried in the first command.
  • the service control node before sending the first MAC, the service control node generates a random number and generates a second RES according to the random number and the root key. After receiving the first RES, the service control node compares the first RES with the second RES, and determines whether the terminal is legal based on the comparison result. Specifically, if the second RES is consistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second RES is inconsistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is invalid (that is, the verification fails).
  • the terminal verifies the legality of the service control node. Further, optionally, for two-way authentication, the service control node will also verify the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the terminal can transmit data with the network side.
  • data transmission between the terminal and the network side has a security requirement, and the following solutions can meet the security requirement.
  • Solution I In some optional implementation manners, if the terminal and the network side have performed one-way authentication, the data transmitted between the terminal and the network side needs to be integrity protected.
  • the terminal has performed one-way authentication with the network side
  • the terminal authenticates the legitimacy of the network side
  • the data sent by the terminal to the network side needs to be integrity protected, so as to ensure data security transmission.
  • the terminal and the network side have performed two-way authentication
  • the terminal has authenticated the legitimacy of the network side
  • the network side has also authenticated the legitimacy of the terminal
  • the data transmitted between the terminal and the network side can already be secured. Therefore, the data transmitted between the terminal and the network side does not need to be integrity protected.
  • the terminal side and the network side store at least one code stream and at least one algorithm
  • the at least one code stream includes a first code stream
  • the at least one algorithm includes a first code stream an algorithm.
  • the data carries a first target code stream, and the first target code stream is generated by the sending end of the data based on the first code stream and the first algorithm; wherein, the first target code stream is used for the The receiving end of the data verifies the validity of the first target code stream based on the first code stream and the first algorithm.
  • the terminal selects a used code stream (called the first code stream) from at least one stored code stream, and selects a used code stream (called the first code stream) from the stored at least one Select an algorithm (called the first algorithm) to use in the algorithm, and the terminal uses the first algorithm to process the first code stream to obtain the first target code stream, and sends the data and the first target code stream to the network side;
  • the network After the side receives the data and the first target code stream, it uses the first algorithm to process the first target code stream to obtain a code stream, compares the code stream with the first code stream, and if the code stream is consistent with the first code stream If they are consistent, it is considered that the data sent by the terminal is valid (or correct), and if the code stream is inconsistent with the first code stream, it is considered that the data sent by the terminal is invalid (or wrong).
  • the terminal may use the first algorithm to perform operations on the first code stream to obtain the first target code stream.
  • the network side may use the first algorithm to perform an inverse operation on the first target code stream to obtain the first code stream.
  • the first algorithm is eg an exclusive OR operation.
  • the terminal and the network side need to negotiate the used code stream and the used algorithm.
  • the network side can select the first code stream and the first algorithm, and combine the first code stream and the first
  • the algorithm is indicated to the terminal. For example, a code stream index and an algorithm index are sent to the terminal, where the code stream index is used to indicate the first code stream, and the algorithm index is used to indicate the algorithm index.
  • an indication message is sent to the terminal, and the value of the indication information may jointly indicate a code stream index and an algorithm index.
  • the size of the first code stream is much smaller than the size of the data, so the processing of the first code stream by the terminal will not consume too much processing resources and energy consumption of the terminal.
  • the data is safely encrypted through the first key and/or the first algorithm.
  • the first key is a root key or a key derived based on the root key.
  • the input parameters of the first algorithm include the first key and the data.
  • the sending end of the data uses the first key to encrypt the data, and sends the encrypted data to the receiving end.
  • the input parameters of the first algorithm include the data.
  • the sender of the data does not use any key, and can process the data to be transmitted according to a preset or pre-configured algorithm, and the receiver can recover the data by inversely calculating the received data.
  • the security encryption process is performed on the network side by a core network node or by a service control node or by a packet data convergence protocol (Packet Data Convergence Protocol, PDCP) layer of an access network node.
  • the security encryption process is performed by the terminal at the terminal side, and optionally, may be performed by a PDCP layer of the terminal.
  • FIG 13 is a second schematic flow diagram of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 13, the security authentication method includes the following steps:
  • Step 1301 The terminal receives a first command, where the first command carries a first token.
  • Step 1302 The terminal processes the first token based on a first algorithm to obtain a first target token.
  • Step 1303 The terminal verifies the legitimacy of the network side based on the first target token.
  • the network side processes the first original token based on the first algorithm to obtain the first token, and sends the first token to the terminal through the first command.
  • the terminal receives the first command sent by the network side, where the first command carries the first token.
  • the terminal processes the first token carried in the first command based on the first algorithm to obtain the first target token.
  • the terminal compares the first target token with the first original token, thereby verifying the legitimacy of the network side. Specifically, if the first target token is consistent with the first original token, the verification result is that the network side is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the first target token is consistent with the first original token If the tokens are inconsistent, the verification result is that the network side is illegal (that is, the verification fails).
  • the network side processes token a based on the first algorithm to obtain token A, and sends token A to the terminal through the first command.
  • the terminal processes token A based on the first algorithm to obtain a token, compares the token with token a, and if they are consistent, verify that the network side is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if not, verify that the network side is invalid (that is, the verification fails).
  • the authentication of the terminal on the network side may be a terminal authentication access network node, a terminal authentication core network node, or a terminal authentication service control node. Each of them will be described below.
  • the network side is an access network node.
  • the terminal receives a first command, where the first command carries a first token.
  • the terminal processes the first token based on the first algorithm to obtain the first target token.
  • the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the access network node based on the first target token.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a first original token and a first algorithm, wherein the first token is used by the access network node based on the first original token A token and the first algorithm are generated; and the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the first token.
  • the terminal after receiving the first command, processes the first token carried in the first command based on the first algorithm to obtain the first target token; the terminal compares the first target token and the first original token, and determine whether the access network node is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the security authentication process ends.
  • the network side also needs to verify the legitimacy of the terminal, specifically:
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token and a second algorithm; based on the second algorithm and the second original token, the terminal, Generate a second token; the terminal sends the second token to the access network node, and the second token is used by the access network node according to the second algorithm and the second original
  • the token verifies the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the way the access network node verifies the legitimacy of the terminal is similar to the way the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the access network node. Specifically, after receiving the second token sent by the terminal, the access network node The second token is processed to obtain a second target token; the access network node compares the second target token with the second original token, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token; the terminal generates a second token based on the first algorithm and the second original token card; the terminal sends the second token to the access network node, and the second token is used by the access network node to verify the obtained token according to the first algorithm and the second original token The legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the way the access network node verifies the legitimacy of the terminal is similar to the way the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the access network node. Specifically, after receiving the second token sent by the terminal, the access network node uses the first algorithm to The second token is processed to obtain a second target token; the access network node compares the second target token with the second original token, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the network side is a core network node.
  • the terminal receives a first command, where the first command carries a first token.
  • the terminal processes the first token based on the first algorithm to obtain the first target token.
  • the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the core network node based on the first target token.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a first original token and a first algorithm, wherein the first token is used by the core network node based on the first original command card and the first algorithm generation; the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node carries the first token; the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carrying the first token.
  • the terminal after receiving the first command, processes the first token carried in the first command based on the first algorithm to obtain the first target token; the terminal compares the first target token and the first original token, and determine whether the core network node is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the security authentication process ends.
  • the network side also needs to verify the legitimacy of the terminal, specifically:
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token and a second algorithm; based on the second algorithm and the second original token, the terminal, generating a second token; the terminal sends the second token to the core network node through the access network node, and the second token is used by the core network node according to the second algorithm and the The second original token verifies the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the way the core network node verifies the legitimacy of the terminal is similar to the way the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the core network node. Specifically, after the core network node receives the second token sent by the terminal, it performs The second token is processed to obtain a second target token; the core network node compares the second target token with the second original token, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token; the terminal generates a second token based on the first algorithm and the second original token card; the terminal sends the second token to the core network node through the access network node, and the second token is used by the core network node according to the first algorithm and the second original order card to verify the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the way the core network node verifies the legitimacy of the terminal is similar to the way the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the core network node. Specifically, after the core network node receives the second token sent by the terminal, it performs The second token is processed to obtain a second target token; the core network node compares the second target token with the second original token, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the network side is a service control node.
  • the terminal receives a first command, where the first command carries a first token.
  • the terminal processes the first token based on the first algorithm to obtain the first target token.
  • the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the service control node based on the first target token.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a first original token and a first algorithm, wherein the first token is used by the service control node based on the first original command card and the first algorithm generation; the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the first token; the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node The command carries the first token; the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the first token.
  • the terminal after receiving the first command, processes the first token carried in the first command based on the first algorithm to obtain the first target token; the terminal compares the first target token and the first original token, and determine whether the service control node is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the security authentication process ends.
  • the network side also needs to verify the legitimacy of the terminal, specifically:
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token and a second algorithm; based on the second algorithm and the second original token, the terminal, Generate a second token; the terminal sends the second token to the service control node through the access network node and the core network node, and the second token is used by the service control node according to the second The algorithm and the second original token verify the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the manner in which the service control node verifies the legitimacy of the terminal is similar to the manner in which the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the service control node. Specifically, after receiving the second token sent by the terminal, the service control node performs The second token is processed to obtain a second target token; the service control node compares the second target token with the second original token, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token; the terminal generates a second token based on the first algorithm and the second original token card; the terminal sends the second token to the service control node through the access network node and the core network node, and the second token is used by the service control node according to the first algorithm and the The second original token verifies the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the manner in which the service control node verifies the legitimacy of the terminal is similar to the manner in which the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the service control node. Specifically, after receiving the second token sent by the terminal, the service control node The second token is processed to obtain a second target token; the service control node compares the second target token with the second original token, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the terminal may be a zero-power UE (ZP-UE) (referred to as UE), wherein the ZP-UE may further be a UE label (referred to as a label), and the access network node may be a zero-power RAN node (ZP-UE).
  • ZP-UE zero-power UE
  • UE label UE label
  • ZP-UE zero-power RAN node
  • the core network node can be a zero-power core network (ZP-CN)
  • the data center node can be a UDM
  • the service control node can be an IoT service (IoT service) server or a third-party server.
  • the business can be, but not limited to, an IoT business.
  • the terminal authenticates the access network node, thereby completing the one-way authentication process. Further, optionally, the access network node authenticates the terminal, thereby completing a two-way authentication process.
  • the node that generates and/or configures the root key may be a core network node, or may be a data center node, or may be a service control node. No matter which node generates and/or configures the root key, the root key will be stored inside the terminal and data center nodes. In some optional implementation manners, the root key may be configured per terminal, per service, per terminal group, or per service group. In addition, security algorithms are also stored in terminals and data center nodes respectively.
  • Fig. 14 is a schematic flow diagram three of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application. As shown in Fig. 14, the security authentication method includes the following steps:
  • Step 1401 The service control node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the core network node, optionally carrying security information.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • the information carried in the request terminal to report data command is used to instruct the core network node which terminals are requested to report data.
  • Step 1402 The core network node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the access network node, optionally carrying security information.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • the information carried in the request terminal to report data command is used to instruct the access network node which terminals are requested to report data.
  • Step 1403 the access network node sends a response requesting the terminal to report data to the core network node.
  • Step 1404 The core network node sends a response requesting the terminal to report data to the service control node.
  • the core network node may send a response to step 1401 to the service control node, that is, request the terminal to report a data response.
  • Step 1405 the access network node calculates a MAC (called the first MAC) according to the root key and security information.
  • the access network node calculates the MAC according to the root key and security authentication input parameters after receiving the requesting terminal to report data command from the core network node.
  • Step 1406 the access network node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the terminal, carrying the first MAC and security information.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • Step 1407 The terminal calculates a MAC (called the second MAC) according to the root key and security information, compares the calculated second MAC with the first MAC from the network, and determines whether the access network node is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the second MAC a MAC
  • the terminal After receiving the command requesting the terminal to report data, the terminal calculates the MAC on the terminal side (that is, the second MAC) according to the security authentication input parameters and the stored root key, and compares the MAC calculated on the terminal side with the MAC issued by the network side. comparison, and determine whether the access network node is legitimate according to the comparison result.
  • the terminal calculates the MAC on the terminal side (that is, the second MAC) according to the security authentication input parameters and the stored root key, and compares the MAC calculated on the terminal side with the MAC issued by the network side. comparison, and determine whether the access network node is legitimate according to the comparison result.
  • the verification result is that the access network node is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second MAC is inconsistent with the first MAC, the verification The result is that the access network node is not legal (that is, the verification fails).
  • the terminal if the terminal verifies that the access network node is illegal, then the terminal discards the command and/or configuration from the network side, and the process ends. If the terminal verifies that the access network node is legal, then, if it is a one-way authentication process, that is, only the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the network side, the security authentication process ends. If it is a two-way authentication process, that is, the network side also needs to verify the legitimacy of the terminal, the terminal will then perform the following step 1408 .
  • Step 1408 the terminal calculates an RES (referred to as the first RES), and sends a data report request command to the access network node, carrying the data reported by the terminal and the first RES.
  • the first RES an RES
  • Step 1408 the terminal calculates an RES (referred to as the first RES), and sends a data report request command to the access network node, carrying the data reported by the terminal and the first RES.
  • the terminal can calculate the RES according to the root key and the random number, which is called the first RES.
  • the random number can come from the network side.
  • the data report request command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • Step 1409 The access network node compares the calculated second RES with the first RES from the terminal, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the access network node can calculate the RES according to the root key and the random number, which is called the second RES. After receiving the first RES, the access network node compares the first RES with the second RES, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result. Specifically, if the second RES is consistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second RES is inconsistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is invalid (that is, the verification fails).
  • the access network node if the access network node verifies that the terminal is illegal, then the access network node will reject and discard the data from the terminal, and the process ends. If the access network node verifies that the terminal is legal, then the access network node will then perform the following step 1410 .
  • Step 1410 the access network node forwards the data reported by the terminal to the core network node.
  • the access network node when forwards the data reported by the terminal to the core network node, it also carries at least one of the following information: terminal identifier, service identifier, terminal group identifier, and service group identifier.
  • Step 1411 The core network node sends an acknowledgment message to the access network node, where the acknowledgment message is used to confirm receipt of the data reported by the terminal.
  • Step 1412 The core network node sends the data of the terminal and the corresponding terminal identifier to the service control node.
  • the security authentication input parameter may be generated by the service control node, or by the core network node, or by the access network node.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the security authentication input parameter; in the above step 1402, the core The request terminal report data command sent by the network control node to the access network node carries security authentication input parameters.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the security authentication input parameter; in the above step 1402, The request terminal report data command sent by the core network node to the access network node carries security authentication input parameters.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the security authentication input parameter; in the above step 1402 , the request terminal to report data command sent by the core network node to the access network node does not carry security authentication input parameters.
  • the security algorithm may be selected by the service control node, or by the core network node, or by the access network node.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the selected security algorithm; in the above step 1402, the core network The selected security algorithm is carried in the request terminal report data command sent by the node to the access network node.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the selected security algorithm.
  • the service control node The request terminal report data command sent to the core network node may carry a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or service or terminal group or service group; in the above step 1402, the request terminal report data command sent by the core network node to the access network node carry the selected security algorithm.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the selected security algorithm.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the node to the core network node may carry a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or service or terminal group or service group; in the above step 1402, the request terminal report data sent by the core network node to the access network node The selected security algorithm is not carried in the command.
  • the request terminal to report data command sent by the core network node to the access network node may carry a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or service or terminal group or service group.
  • step 1407 if it is a one-way authentication process, that is, only the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the network side, after step 1407 is executed, the security authentication process ends. If it is a two-way authentication process, that is, the network side also needs to verify the legitimacy of the terminal, then after step 1407 is executed, step 1408 is executed, that is, the terminal calculates RES (called the first RES) and sends the RES to the receiving terminal. The network access node and the access network node compare the RES generated by themselves (called the second RES) with the RES sent by the terminal to confirm whether the RES sent by the terminal is valid. If it is valid, the terminal is considered legal, otherwise it is considered Terminal is not legal.
  • the first RES the first RES
  • step 1408 the terminal calculates RES (called the first RES) and sends the RES to the receiving terminal.
  • the network access node and the access network node compare the RES generated by themselves (called the second RES) with the RES sent by the terminal to confirm whether
  • step 1410 If the access network node confirms that the terminal is legal, then proceed to step 1410 to complete the data communication process; if the access network node confirms that the terminal is illegal, then after step 1409 is performed, the access network node terminates the data transmission, Data already received is discarded.
  • the security authentication input parameters may include but not limited to the following parameters: random number, security algorithm, service identifier, and service category.
  • the terminal authenticates the core network node, thereby completing the one-way authentication process. Further, optionally, the core network node authenticates the terminal, thereby completing a two-way authentication process.
  • the node that generates and/or configures the root key may be a core network node, or may be a data center node, or may be a service control node. No matter which node generates and/or configures the root key, the root key will be stored inside the terminal and data center nodes. In some optional implementation manners, the root key may be configured per terminal, per service, per terminal group, or per service group. In addition, security algorithms are also stored in terminals and data center nodes respectively.
  • Fig. 15 is a schematic flow diagram four of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application. As shown in Fig. 15, the security authentication method includes the following steps:
  • Step 1501 The service control node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the core network node, optionally carrying security information.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • the information carried in the request terminal to report data command is used to instruct the core network node which terminals are requested to report data.
  • Step 1502 The core network node calculates a MAC (referred to as the first MAC) according to the root key and security information.
  • the core network node calculates the MAC according to the root key and security authentication input parameters after receiving the requesting terminal to report data command from the service control node.
  • Step 1503 The core network node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the access network node, carrying the first MAC and security information.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • the information carried in the request terminal to report data command is used to instruct the access network node which terminals are requested to report data.
  • Step 1504 the access network node sends a response requesting the terminal to report data to the core network node.
  • Step 1505 The core network node sends a request terminal to report data response to the service control node.
  • the core network node may send a response to step 1501 to the service control node, that is, request the terminal to report a data response.
  • Step 1506 the access network node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the terminal, carrying the first MAC and security information.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • Step 1507 The terminal calculates a MAC (called the second MAC) according to the root key and security information, compares the calculated second MAC with the first MAC from the network, and determines whether the core network node is legal based on the comparison result.
  • the second MAC a MAC
  • the terminal After receiving the command requesting the terminal to report data, the terminal calculates the MAC on the terminal side (that is, the second MAC) according to the security authentication input parameters and the stored root key, and compares the MAC calculated on the terminal side with the MAC issued by the network side. Compare, and determine whether the core network node is legitimate according to the comparison result.
  • the terminal calculates the MAC on the terminal side (that is, the second MAC) according to the security authentication input parameters and the stored root key, and compares the MAC calculated on the terminal side with the MAC issued by the network side. Compare, and determine whether the core network node is legitimate according to the comparison result.
  • the verification result is that the core network node is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second MAC is inconsistent with the first MAC, the verification result is If it is a core network node, it is illegal (that is, the verification fails).
  • the terminal if the terminal verifies that the core network node is illegal, then the terminal discards the command and/or configuration from the network side, and the process ends. If the terminal verifies that the core network node is legal, then, if it is a one-way authentication process, that is, only the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the network side, the security authentication process ends. If it is a two-way authentication process, that is, the network side also needs to verify the legitimacy of the terminal, the terminal will then perform the following step 1508 .
  • Step 1508 the terminal calculates an RES (referred to as the first RES), and sends a data report request command to the access network node, carrying the data reported by the terminal and the first RES.
  • the first RES an RES
  • Step 1508 the terminal calculates an RES (referred to as the first RES), and sends a data report request command to the access network node, carrying the data reported by the terminal and the first RES.
  • the terminal can calculate the RES according to the root key and the random number, which is called the first RES.
  • the random number can come from the network side.
  • the data report request command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • Step 1509 the access network node forwards the data reported by the terminal and the first RES to the core network node.
  • the access network node when forwards the data reported by the terminal to the core network node, it also carries at least one of the following information: terminal identifier, service identifier, terminal group identifier, and service group identifier.
  • Step 1510 The core network node compares the calculated second RES with the first RES from the terminal, and determines whether the terminal is legal based on the comparison result.
  • the core network node can calculate the RES according to the root key and the random number, which is called the second RES. After receiving the first RES, the core network node compares the first RES with the second RES, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result. Specifically, if the second RES is consistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second RES is inconsistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is invalid (that is, the verification fails).
  • the core network node will reject and discard the data from the terminal, and the process ends. If the core network node verifies that the terminal is legal, then the core network node will then perform the following step 1511 .
  • Step 1511 The core network node sends an acknowledgment message to the access network node, where the acknowledgment message is used to confirm receipt of the data reported by the terminal.
  • Step 1512 The core network node sends the data of the terminal and the corresponding terminal identifier to the service control node.
  • the security authentication input parameter may be generated by the service control node, or by the core network node.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the security authentication input parameter; in the above step 1502, the core The request terminal report data command sent by the network control node to the access network node carries security authentication input parameters.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the security authentication input parameter; in the above step 1502, The request terminal report data command sent by the core network node to the access network node carries security authentication input parameters.
  • the security algorithm may be selected by the service control node, or by the core network node, or by the access network node.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the selected security algorithm; in the above step 1502, the core network The selected security algorithm is carried in the request terminal report data command sent by the node to the access network node.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the selected security algorithm.
  • the service control node The request terminal report data command sent to the core network node may carry a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or service or terminal group or service group; in the above step 1502, the core network node sends the request terminal report data command to the access network node carry the selected security algorithm.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the selected security algorithm.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the node to the core network node may carry a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or service or terminal group or service group; in the above step 1502, the core network node sends the request terminal report data to the access network node The selected security algorithm is not carried in the command.
  • the request terminal to report data command sent by the core network node to the access network node may carry a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or service or terminal group or service group.
  • the MAC calculated by the core network node (that is, the first MAC) is transmitted to the terminal through steps 1503 and 1506 .
  • the RES calculated by the terminal (that is, the first RES) is delivered to the core network node through steps 1508 and 1509 .
  • step 1507 if it is a one-way authentication process, that is, only the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the network side, after step 1507 is executed, the security authentication process ends. If it is a two-way authentication process, that is, the network side also needs to verify the legitimacy of the terminal, then after step 1507 is executed, step 1508 is executed, that is, the terminal calculates RES (called the first RES) and sends the RES to the receiving terminal.
  • the network access node and the access network node send the first RES to the core network node through step 1509, and the core network node compares the RES generated by itself (called the second RES) with the RES sent by the terminal to confirm the RES sent by the terminal.
  • RES Whether RES is valid, if valid, the terminal is considered legal, otherwise, the terminal is considered illegal. If the core network node confirms that the terminal is legal, then continue to execute step 1511 to complete the data communication process; if the core network node confirms that the terminal is illegal, then after performing step 1510, the core network node terminates the data transmission and discards to the data.
  • the security authentication input parameters may include but not limited to the following parameters: random number, security algorithm, service identifier, and service category.
  • the terminal authenticates the service control node, thereby completing the one-way authentication process. Further, optionally, the service control node authenticates the terminal, thereby completing the two-way authentication process.
  • the node that generates and/or configures the root key may be a core network node, or may be a data center node, or may be a service control node. No matter which node generates and/or configures the root key, the root key will be stored inside the terminal and data center nodes. In some optional implementation manners, the root key may be configured per terminal, per service, per terminal group, or per service group. In addition, security algorithms are also stored in terminals and data center nodes respectively.
  • Fig. 16 is a schematic flow diagram five of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application. As shown in Fig. 16, the security authentication method includes the following steps:
  • Step 1601 The service control node calculates a MAC (called the first MAC) according to the root key and security information.
  • Step 1602 the service control node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the core network node, carrying the first MAC and security information.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • the information carried in the request terminal to report data command is used to instruct the core network node which terminals are requested to report data.
  • Step 1603 The core network node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the access network node, carrying the first MAC and security information.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • the information carried in the request terminal to report data command is used to instruct the access network node which terminals are requested to report data.
  • Step 1604 the access network node sends a response requesting the terminal to report data to the core network node.
  • Step 1605 The core network node sends a response requesting the terminal to report data to the service control node.
  • the core network node may send a response to step 1601 to the service control node, that is, request the terminal to report a data response.
  • Step 1606 the access network node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the terminal, carrying the first MAC and security information.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters and security algorithms.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • Step 1607 The terminal calculates a MAC (called the second MAC) according to the root key and security information, compares the calculated second MAC with the first MAC from the network, and determines whether the service control node is legal based on the comparison result.
  • the second MAC a MAC
  • the terminal After receiving the command requesting the terminal to report data, the terminal calculates the MAC on the terminal side (that is, the second MAC) according to the security authentication input parameters and the stored root key, and compares the MAC calculated on the terminal side with the MAC issued by the network side. Comparison, according to the comparison result to determine whether the service control node is legal.
  • the verification result is that the service control node is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second MAC is inconsistent with the first MAC, the verification result is It is illegal for the service control node (that is, the verification fails).
  • the terminal if the terminal verifies that the service control node is illegal, then the terminal discards the command and/or configuration from the network side, and the process ends. If the terminal verifies that the service control node is legal, then, if it is a one-way authentication process, that is, only the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the network side, the security authentication process ends. If it is a two-way authentication process, that is, the network side also needs to verify the legitimacy of the terminal, the terminal will then perform the following step 1608 .
  • Step 1608 the terminal calculates an RES (referred to as the first RES), and sends a data report request command to the access network node, carrying the data reported by the terminal and the first RES.
  • the first RES an RES
  • Step 1608 the terminal calculates an RES (referred to as the first RES), and sends a data report request command to the access network node, carrying the data reported by the terminal and the first RES.
  • the terminal can calculate the RES according to the root key and the random number, which is called the first RES.
  • the random number can come from the network side.
  • the data report request command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • Step 1609 the access network node forwards the data reported by the terminal and the first RES to the core network node.
  • the access network node when forwards the data reported by the terminal to the core network node, it also carries at least one of the following information: terminal identifier, service identifier, terminal group identifier, and service group identifier.
  • Step 1610 The core network node forwards the data reported by the terminal and the first RES to the service control node.
  • the core network node when forwards the data reported by the terminal to the service control node, it also carries at least one of the following information: terminal identifier, service identifier, terminal group identifier, and service group identifier.
  • Step 1611 The core network node sends an acknowledgment message to the access network node, where the acknowledgment message is used to confirm receipt of the data reported by the terminal.
  • Step 1612 The service control node compares the calculated second RES with the first RES from the terminal, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the service control node can calculate the RES according to the root key and the random number, which is called the second RES. After receiving the first RES, the service control node compares the first RES with the second RES, and determines whether the terminal is legal based on the comparison result. Specifically, if the second RES is consistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second RES is inconsistent with the first RES, the verification result is that the terminal is invalid (that is, the verification fails).
  • the service control node if the service control node verifies that the terminal is illegal, then the service control node will reject and discard the data from the terminal, and the process ends. If the service control node verifies that the terminal is legal, then the service control node will accept the data from the terminal.
  • the security authentication input parameters may be generated by the service control node.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the security authentication input parameter; in the above step 1602, the core The request terminal report data command sent by the network control node to the access network node carries security authentication input parameters.
  • the security algorithm may be selected by the service control node, or by the core network node, or by the access network node.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the selected security algorithm; in the above step 1602, the core network The selected security algorithm is carried in the request terminal report data command sent by the node to the access network node.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the selected security algorithm.
  • the service control node The request terminal report data command sent to the core network node may carry a terminal or service or a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group or service group; in the above step 1602, the core network node sends the request terminal report data command to the access network node carry the selected security algorithm.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the selected security algorithm.
  • the request terminal report data command sent by the node to the core network node may carry a terminal or service or a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group or service group; in the above step 1602, the core network node sends the request terminal report data to the access network node The selected security algorithm is not carried in the command.
  • the request terminal to report data command sent by the core network node to the access network node may carry a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or service or terminal group or service group.
  • the MAC calculated by the service control node (namely the first MAC) is delivered to the terminal through steps 1602, 1603 and 1606.
  • the RES calculated by the terminal is delivered to the service control node through steps 1608, 1609 and 1610.
  • step 1607 if it is a one-way authentication process, that is, only the terminal verifies the legitimacy of the network side, after step 1607 is executed, the security authentication process ends. If it is a two-way authentication process, that is, the network side also needs to verify the legitimacy of the terminal, then after step 1607 is executed, step 1608 is executed, that is, the terminal calculates RES (called the first RES) and sends the RES to the receiving terminal.
  • RES RES
  • the network access node and the access network node send the first RES to the core network node through step 1609, and the core network node sends the first RES to the service control node through step 1610, and the service control node generates the RES (referred to as the first RES)
  • Two RES are compared with the RES sent by the terminal to confirm whether the RES sent by the terminal is valid, if valid, the terminal is considered legal, otherwise, the terminal is considered illegal. If the service control node confirms that the terminal is legal, it accepts the data of the terminal; if the service control node confirms that the terminal is illegal, it terminates the data transmission and discards the received data.
  • the security authentication input parameters may include but not limited to the following parameters: random number, security algorithm, service identifier, and service category.
  • the terminal authenticates the network side, thereby completing the one-way authentication process. Further, optionally, the network side authenticates the terminal, thereby completing a two-way authentication process.
  • This application example is similar to the above application example 1, application example 2, and application example 3, and the network side may be an access network node, a core network node, or a service control node.
  • the terminal authenticates the access network node, thereby completing a one-way authentication process. Further, optionally, the access network node authenticates the terminal, thereby completing a two-way authentication process.
  • the terminal authenticates the core network node, thereby completing the one-way authentication process. Further, optionally, the core network node authenticates the terminal, thereby completing a two-way authentication process.
  • the terminal authenticates the service control node, thereby completing the one-way authentication process. Further, optionally, the service control node authenticates the terminal, thereby completing the two-way authentication process.
  • both the network side and the terminal are configured with one or two tokens and one or two algorithms.
  • the access network node or core network node or service control node on the network side is responsible for calculating the first token based on the first original token and the first algorithm, and sending the first token to the terminal; the terminal uses the configured first algorithm Perform reverse operation on the received first token to obtain the first target token, compare the first target token with the first original token, and determine whether the network side is legal based on the comparison result.
  • the security authentication process ends.
  • the terminal will calculate the second token based on the second original token and the first algorithm or the second algorithm, and send the second token to the network
  • the access network node or the core network node or the service control node on the side the access network node or the core network node or the service control node uses the first algorithm or the second algorithm to perform an inverse operation on the received second token to obtain the second
  • the target token compares the second target token with the second original token, and determines whether the terminal is legitimate based on the comparison result.
  • the network side is a service control node as an example, and the case where the network side is a core network node or an access network node is similar.
  • Fig. 17 is a schematic flow diagram VI of the security authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application. As shown in Fig. 17, the security authentication method includes the following steps:
  • Step 1701 The service control node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the core network node, carrying the first token.
  • the service control node processes the first original token according to the first algorithm to obtain the first token.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • the information carried in the request terminal to report data command is used to instruct the core network node which terminals are requested to report data.
  • Step 1702 The core network node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the access network node, carrying the first token.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • the information carried in the request terminal to report data command is used to instruct the access network node which terminals are requested to report data.
  • Step 1703 the access network node sends a response requesting the terminal to report data to the core network node.
  • Step 1704 the core network node sends a request terminal to report data response to the service control node.
  • the core network node may send a response to step 1701 to the service control node, that is, request the terminal to report a data response.
  • Step 1705 the access network node sends a command requesting the terminal to report data to the terminal, carrying the first token.
  • the requesting terminal to report data command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • Step 1706 The terminal performs an inverse operation on the first token according to the first algorithm to obtain the first target token; the terminal compares the first target token with the first original token, and determines whether the network side is legal based on the comparison result.
  • the verification result is that the network side is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the first target token is consistent with the first original token If the tokens are inconsistent, the verification result is that the network side is illegal (that is, the verification fails).
  • the terminal if the terminal verifies that the network side is illegal, then the terminal will discard the command and/or configuration from the network side, and the process ends. If the terminal verifies that the network side is legal, then, if it is a one-way authentication process, that is, only the terminal verifies the legality of the network side, the security authentication process ends. If it is a two-way authentication process, that is, the network side also needs to verify the legitimacy of the terminal, the terminal will then perform the following step 1707 .
  • Step 1707 The terminal processes the second original token according to the first algorithm or the second algorithm to obtain the second token, and sends a data report request command to the access network node, carrying the data reported by the terminal and the second token.
  • the data report request command carries at least one of the following information: a terminal identifier, a service identifier, a terminal group identifier, and a service group identifier.
  • Step 1708 the access network node forwards the data and the second token reported by the terminal to the core network node.
  • the access network node when forwards the data reported by the terminal to the core network node, it also carries at least one of the following information: terminal identifier, service identifier, terminal group identifier, and service group identifier.
  • Step 1709 The core network node forwards the data and the second token reported by the terminal to the service control node.
  • the core network node when forwards the data reported by the terminal to the service control node, it also carries at least one of the following information: terminal identifier, service identifier, terminal group identifier, and service group identifier.
  • Step 1710 the core network node sends an acknowledgment message to the access network node, where the acknowledgment message is used to confirm receipt of the data reported by the terminal.
  • Step 1711 The service control node performs an inverse operation on the second token according to the first algorithm or the second algorithm to obtain the second target token; the service control node compares the second target token with the second original token, and determines based on the comparison result Whether the terminal is legal.
  • the verification result is that the terminal is legal (that is, the verification is passed); if the second target token is consistent with the second original token If the cards are inconsistent, the verification result is that the terminal is illegal (that is, the verification fails).
  • the service control node if the service control node verifies that the terminal is illegal, then the service control node will reject and discard the data from the terminal, and the process ends. If the service control node verifies that the terminal is legal, then the service control node will accept the data from the terminal.
  • This application example can be implemented in combination with any application example in the foregoing application example 1 to application example 4.
  • the data sender can implement integrity protection on the data to be transmitted, so as to realize the legitimacy verification of the sender by the receiver.
  • the data transmitted between the terminal and the network side may not be integrity protected.
  • each data carries a code stream
  • the code stream is a code stream configured by the terminal and is written on the side of the terminal and the data center node.
  • the data uploaded by the terminal carries the code stream processed by the algorithm, and the base station determines whether the data is safe and valid by inversely processing the code stream.
  • the algorithm may be a simple security algorithm configured for the terminal and written on the side of the terminal and the data center node. That is to say, both the code stream and the algorithm are configurations known by the network side and the terminal.
  • security processing is performed on the data to be transmitted.
  • security processing may be performed by the service control node or the core network node.
  • the air interface transmits security-protected ciphertext, and the security execution is transparent to the air interface.
  • security processing may also be performed by the PDCP layer on the node side of the access network.
  • security processing is performed by the terminal. It should be noted that, for the data receiving end, secure processing refers to secure encryption, and for the data receiving end, secure processing refers to secure decryption.
  • the key used to perform security processing can be the root key or a key derived from the root key and specified parameters, or, the security process is not based on any key, and the sending end
  • the data to be transmitted is processed according to a preset or pre-configured algorithm, and the receiving end performs inverse processing on the received data.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application considers the characteristics of the zero-power terminal with small memory, limited power, and limited data processing capability, and proposes a security processing method that is characteristic of the zero-power terminal. Specifically, a security authentication method and process between nodes in a zero-power communication system is defined, and a method for data security processing is defined.
  • sequence numbers of the above-mentioned processes do not mean the order of execution, and the order of execution of the processes should be determined by their functions and internal logic, and should not be used in this application.
  • the implementation of the examples constitutes no limitation.
  • the terms “downlink”, “uplink” and “sidelink” are used to indicate the transmission direction of signals or data, wherein “downlink” is used to indicate that the transmission direction of signals or data is sent from the station The first direction to the user equipment in the cell, “uplink” is used to indicate that the signal or data transmission direction is the second direction sent from the user equipment in the cell to the station, and “side line” is used to indicate that the signal or data transmission direction is A third direction sent from UE1 to UE2.
  • “downlink signal” indicates that the transmission direction of the signal is the first direction.
  • the term “and/or” is only an association relationship describing associated objects, indicating that there may be three relationships. Specifically, A and/or B may mean: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, and B exists alone. In addition, the character "/" in this article generally indicates that the contextual objects are an "or” relationship.
  • Figure 18 is a schematic diagram of the structure and composition of the security authentication device provided by the embodiment of the present application, which is applied to a terminal.
  • the security authentication device includes:
  • a receiving unit 1801 configured to receive a first command, where the first command carries a first MAC and security information
  • a processing unit 1802 configured to generate a second MAC based on the root key and the security information
  • the verifying unit 1803 is configured to verify the legitimacy of the network side based on the second MAC and the first MAC.
  • the root key is generated and/or configured by one of the following nodes: a core network node, a data center node, and a service control node.
  • the root key is configured for a terminal; or, the root key is configured for a service; or, the root key is configured for a terminal group; or, the Root keys are configured for business groups.
  • the root key is stored on the terminal side and/or the data center node side.
  • multiple root keys are stored on the terminal side, and each root key in the multiple root keys corresponds to a key index;
  • the receiving unit 1801 is further configured to receive first indication information, where the first indication information is used to indicate a first key index;
  • the apparatus further includes: a determining unit configured to determine a root key for generating the second MAC based on the first key index.
  • the network side is an access network node.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters, security algorithms; wherein,
  • the security authentication input parameters are generated by one of the following nodes: a service control node, a core network node, and an access network node;
  • the security algorithm is selected by one of the following nodes: a service control node, a core network node, and an access network node.
  • the first MAC is generated by the access network node based on the root key and the security information, and the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the The first MAC and the security information.
  • the verification unit 1802 is configured to compare the second MAC with the first MAC, and determine whether the access network node is legitimate based on a comparison result.
  • the processing unit 1802 is also configured to calculate the first RES;
  • the apparatus further includes: a sending unit 1804, configured to send the first RES to the access network node; the first RES is used by the access network node to verify the terminal according to the second RES generated by itself legality.
  • the network side is a core network node.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters, security algorithms; wherein,
  • the security authentication input parameters are generated by one of the following nodes: a service control node, a core network node;
  • the security algorithm is selected by one of the following nodes: a service control node, a core network node, and an access network node.
  • the first MAC is generated by the core network node based on the root key and the security information
  • the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node carries the The first MAC and the security information; the first MAC and the security information are carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the verification unit 1802 is configured to compare the second MAC with the first MAC, and determine whether the core network node is legitimate based on a comparison result.
  • the processing unit 1802 is also configured to calculate the first RES;
  • the apparatus further includes: a sending unit 1804, configured to send the first RES to the core network node through an access network node; the first RES is used for verification by the core network node according to the second RES generated by itself The legitimacy of the terminal.
  • a sending unit 1804 configured to send the first RES to the core network node through an access network node; the first RES is used for verification by the core network node according to the second RES generated by itself The legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the network side is a service control node.
  • the security information includes at least one of the following: security authentication input parameters, security algorithms; wherein,
  • the security authentication input parameter is generated by one of the following nodes: a service control node;
  • the security algorithm is selected by one of the following nodes: a service control node, a core network node, and an access network node.
  • the first MAC is generated by the service control node based on the root key and the security information
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the The first MAC and the security information
  • the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node carries the first MAC and the security information
  • sent by the access network node to the The first command of the terminal carries the first MAC and the security information.
  • the verification unit 1802 is configured to compare the second MAC with the first MAC, and determine whether the service control node is legal based on a comparison result.
  • the processing unit 1802 is also configured to calculate the first RES;
  • the apparatus further includes: a sending unit 1804, configured to send the first RES to the service control node through an access network node and a core network node; the first RES is used for the service control node generated by itself The second RES verifies the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • a sending unit 1804 configured to send the first RES to the service control node through an access network node and a core network node; the first RES is used for the service control node generated by itself
  • the second RES verifies the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the security authentication input parameter;
  • the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the security authentication input parameter;
  • the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node carries the security authentication input parameter.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node does not carry the security authentication input parameter;
  • the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node does not carry the security authentication input parameter.
  • the security authentication input parameters include at least one of the following: random numbers, service identifiers, service identifiers, and service categories.
  • the selected security algorithm when the security algorithm is selected by the service control node, the selected security algorithm is carried in the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node; The selected security algorithm is carried in the second command sent by the node to the access network node.
  • the selected security algorithm is carried in the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node.
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries a first security algorithm list, and the first security algorithm list is used for the security algorithm selected by the core network node .
  • the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries a first security algorithm list; the core network The second command sent by the node to the access network node carries the first security algorithm list; wherein the first security algorithm list is used for the security algorithm selected and used by the access network node.
  • the first security algorithm list is a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal or a list of security algorithms supported by services joined by the terminal or a list of security algorithms supported by the terminal group described by the terminal Or a list of security algorithms supported by the service group to which the service joined by the terminal belongs.
  • the device further includes: a communication unit, configured to transmit data with the network side.
  • the terminal and the network side have performed one-way authentication, the data transmitted between the terminal and the network side needs to be integrity protected.
  • the terminal and the network side have performed mutual authentication, the data transmitted between the terminal and the network side does not need to be integrity protected.
  • the terminal side and the network side store at least one code stream and at least one algorithm, the at least one code stream includes a first code stream, and the at least one algorithm includes a first algorithm.
  • the data carries a first target code stream
  • the first target code stream is generated by the sender of the data based on the first code stream and the first algorithm; wherein, the The first target code stream is used by the receiving end of the data to verify the validity of the first target code stream based on the first code stream and the first algorithm.
  • the data is securely encrypted through a first key and/or a first algorithm.
  • the first key is a root key or a key derived based on the root key.
  • the input parameters of the first algorithm include the first key and the data; or, the input parameters of the first algorithm include the data.
  • the security encryption process is performed on the network side by a core network node, or by a service control node, or by a PDCP layer of an access network node.
  • Figure 18 is a schematic diagram of the structure and composition of the security authentication device provided by the embodiment of the present application, which is applied to a terminal.
  • the security authentication device includes:
  • a receiving unit 1801 configured to receive a first command, where the first command carries a first token
  • a processing unit 1802 configured to process the first token based on a first algorithm to obtain a first target token
  • the verification unit 1803 is configured to verify the legitimacy of the network side based on the first target token.
  • the network side is an access network node.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a first original token and a first algorithm, wherein the first token is used by the access network node based on the first original token token and said first algorithm generation;
  • the first token is carried in the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal.
  • the verification unit 1803 is configured to compare the first target token with the first original token, and determine whether the access network node is legitimate based on a comparison result.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token and a second algorithm
  • the processing unit 1802 is further configured to generate a second token based on the second algorithm and the second original token;
  • the apparatus further includes: a sending unit 1804, configured to send the second token to the access network node, where the second token is used by the access network node according to the second algorithm and the The second original token verifies the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • a sending unit 1804 configured to send the second token to the access network node, where the second token is used by the access network node according to the second algorithm and the The second original token verifies the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token
  • the processing unit 1802 is further configured to generate a second token based on the first algorithm and the second original token;
  • the apparatus further includes: a sending unit 1804, configured to send the second token to the access network node, where the second token is used by the access network node according to the first algorithm and the The second original token verifies the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • a sending unit 1804 configured to send the second token to the access network node, where the second token is used by the access network node according to the first algorithm and the The second original token verifies the legitimacy of the terminal.
  • the network side is a core network node.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a first original token and a first algorithm, wherein the first token is used by the core network node based on the first original command card and the first algorithm generation; the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node carries the first token; the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carrying the first token.
  • the verification unit 1803 is configured to compare the first target token with the first original token, and determine whether the core network node is legitimate based on a comparison result.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token and a second algorithm
  • the processing unit 1802 is further configured to generate a second token based on the second algorithm and the second original token;
  • the apparatus further includes: a sending unit 1804, configured to send the second token to the core network node through an access network node, and the second token is used by the core network node according to the second algorithm verifying the legitimacy of the terminal with the second original token.
  • a sending unit 1804 configured to send the second token to the core network node through an access network node, and the second token is used by the core network node according to the second algorithm verifying the legitimacy of the terminal with the second original token.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token
  • the processing unit 1802 is further configured to generate a second token based on the first algorithm and the second original token;
  • the apparatus further includes: a sending unit 1804, configured to send the second token to the core network node through an access network node, and the second token is used by the core network node according to the first algorithm verifying the legitimacy of the terminal with the second original token.
  • a sending unit 1804 configured to send the second token to the core network node through an access network node, and the second token is used by the core network node according to the first algorithm verifying the legitimacy of the terminal with the second original token.
  • the network side is a service control node.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a first original token and a first algorithm, wherein the first token is used by the service control node based on the first original command card and the first algorithm generation; the third command sent by the service control node to the core network node carries the first token; the second command sent by the core network node to the access network node The command carries the first token; the first command sent by the access network node to the terminal carries the first token.
  • the verification unit 1803 is configured to compare the first target token with the first original token, and determine whether the service control node is legitimate based on a comparison result.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token and a second algorithm
  • the processing unit 1802 is further configured to generate a second token based on the second algorithm and the second original token;
  • the apparatus further includes: a sending unit 1804, configured to send the second token to the service control node through the access network node and the core network node, and the second token is used by the service control node according to the specified verifying the legitimacy of the terminal using the second algorithm and the second original token.
  • a sending unit 1804 configured to send the second token to the service control node through the access network node and the core network node, and the second token is used by the service control node according to the specified verifying the legitimacy of the terminal using the second algorithm and the second original token.
  • the terminal side and the network side store a second original token
  • the processing unit 1802 is further configured to generate a second token based on the first algorithm and the second original token;
  • the apparatus further includes: a sending unit 1804, configured to send the second token to the service control node through the access network node and the core network node, and the second token is used by the service control node according to the specified verifying the legitimacy of the terminal using the first algorithm and the second original token.
  • a sending unit 1804 configured to send the second token to the service control node through the access network node and the core network node, and the second token is used by the service control node according to the specified verifying the legitimacy of the terminal using the first algorithm and the second original token.
  • the device further includes: a communication unit, configured to transmit data with the network side.
  • the terminal and the network side have performed one-way authentication, the data transmitted between the terminal and the network side needs to be integrity protected.
  • the terminal and the network side have performed mutual authentication, the data transmitted between the terminal and the network side does not need to be integrity protected.
  • the terminal side and the network side store at least one code stream and at least one algorithm, the at least one code stream includes a first code stream, and the at least one algorithm includes a first algorithm.
  • the data carries a first target code stream, and the first target code stream is generated by the sender of the data based on the first code stream and the first algorithm;
  • the first target code stream is used by the receiving end of the data to verify the validity of the first target code stream based on the first code stream and the first algorithm.
  • the data is securely encrypted through a first key and/or a first algorithm.
  • the first key is a root key or a key derived based on the root key.
  • the input parameters of the first algorithm include the first key and the data; or, the input parameters of the first algorithm include the data.
  • the security encryption process is performed on the network side by a core network node, or by a service control node, or by a PDCP layer of an access network node.
  • FIG. 19 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device 1900 provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device may be a terminal device (such as a zero-power consumption terminal), or a network device (such as an access network node, a core network node, a data center node, or a service control node).
  • the communication device 1900 shown in FIG. 19 includes a processor 1910, and the processor 1910 can invoke and run a computer program from a memory, so as to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device 1900 may further include a memory 1920 .
  • the processor 1910 can invoke and run a computer program from the memory 1920, so as to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the memory 1920 may be an independent device independent of the processor 1910 , or may be integrated in the processor 1910 .
  • the communication device 1900 may further include a transceiver 1930, and the processor 1910 may control the transceiver 1930 to communicate with other devices, specifically, to send information or data to other devices, or receive other Information or data sent by the device.
  • the transceiver 1930 may include a transmitter and a receiver.
  • the transceiver 1930 may further include antennas, and the number of antennas may be one or more.
  • the communication device 1900 may specifically be the network device of the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 1900 may implement the corresponding process implemented by the network device in each method of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, details are not repeated here. .
  • the communication device 1900 may specifically be the zero-power consumption terminal of the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 1700 may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the zero-power consumption terminal in each method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device 1900 may specifically be the zero-power consumption terminal of the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 1700 may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the zero-power consumption terminal in each method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device 1900 may specifically be the zero-power consumption terminal of the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 1700 may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the zero-power consumption terminal in each method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device 1900 may specifically be the zero-power consumption terminal of the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 1700 may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the zero-power consumption terminal in each method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 20 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the chip 2000 shown in FIG. 20 includes a processor 2010, and the processor 2010 can call and run a computer program from a memory, so as to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the chip 2000 may further include a memory 2020 .
  • the processor 2010 can invoke and run a computer program from the memory 2020, so as to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the memory 2020 may be a separate device independent of the processor 2010 , or may be integrated in the processor 2010 .
  • the chip 2000 may also include an input interface 2030 .
  • the processor 2010 can control the input interface 2030 to communicate with other devices or chips, specifically, can obtain information or data sent by other devices or chips.
  • the chip 2000 may also include an output interface 2040 .
  • the processor 2010 can control the output interface 2040 to communicate with other devices or chips, specifically, can output information or data to other devices or chips.
  • the chip can be applied to the network device in the embodiment of the present application, and the chip can implement the corresponding processes implemented by the network device in the methods of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the chip can implement the corresponding processes implemented by the network device in the methods of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the chip can be applied to the zero-power terminal in the embodiment of the present application, and the chip can implement the corresponding process implemented by the zero-power terminal in each method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the chip can implement the corresponding process implemented by the zero-power terminal in each method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • no more repeat for the sake of brevity, no more repeat.
  • the chip mentioned in the embodiment of the present application may also be called a system-on-chip, a system-on-chip, a system-on-a-chip, or a system-on-a-chip.
  • Fig. 21 is a schematic block diagram of a communication system 2100 provided by an embodiment of the present application. As shown in FIG. 21 , the communication system 2100 includes a terminal device 2110 and a network device 2120 .
  • the terminal device 2110 can be used to realize the corresponding functions realized by the zero-power terminal in the above method
  • the network device 2120 can be used to realize the corresponding functions realized by the network device in the above method. Let me repeat.
  • the processor in the embodiment of the present application may be an integrated circuit chip, which has a signal processing capability.
  • each step of the above-mentioned method embodiment may be completed by an integrated logic circuit of hardware in a processor or an instruction in the form of software.
  • the above-mentioned processor can be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (Digital Signal Processor, DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (Application Specific Integrated Circuit, ASIC), an off-the-shelf programmable gate array (Field Programmable Gate Array, FPGA) or other available Program logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components.
  • DSP Digital Signal Processor
  • ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
  • FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
  • a general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor, or the processor may be any conventional processor, or the like.
  • the steps of the method disclosed in connection with the embodiments of the present application may be directly implemented by a hardware decoding processor, or implemented by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor.
  • the software module can be located in a mature storage medium in the field such as random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory or electrically erasable programmable memory, register.
  • the storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory, and completes the steps of the above method in combination with its hardware.
  • the memory in the embodiments of the present application may be a volatile memory or a nonvolatile memory, or may include both volatile and nonvolatile memories.
  • the non-volatile memory can be read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM), programmable read-only memory (Programmable ROM, PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (Erasable PROM, EPROM), electronically programmable Erase Programmable Read-Only Memory (Electrically EPROM, EEPROM) or Flash.
  • the volatile memory can be Random Access Memory (RAM), which acts as external cache memory.
  • RAM Static Random Access Memory
  • SRAM Static Random Access Memory
  • DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
  • SDRAM double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory
  • Double Data Rate SDRAM, DDR SDRAM enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory
  • Enhanced SDRAM, ESDRAM synchronous connection dynamic random access memory
  • Synchlink DRAM, SLDRAM Direct Memory Bus Random Access Memory
  • Direct Rambus RAM Direct Rambus RAM
  • the memory in the embodiment of the present application may also be a static random access memory (static RAM, SRAM), a dynamic random access memory (dynamic RAM, DRAM), Synchronous dynamic random access memory (synchronous DRAM, SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (double data rate SDRAM, DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (enhanced SDRAM, ESDRAM), synchronous connection Dynamic random access memory (synch link DRAM, SLDRAM) and direct memory bus random access memory (Direct Rambus RAM, DR RAM), etc. That is, the memory in the embodiments of the present application is intended to include, but not be limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing computer programs.
  • the computer-readable storage medium can be applied to the network device in the embodiment of the present application, and the computer program enables the computer to execute the corresponding process implemented by the network device in each method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the computer program enables the computer to execute the corresponding process implemented by the network device in each method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the computer-readable storage medium can be applied to the zero-power consumption terminal in the embodiment of the present application, and the computer program enables the computer to execute the corresponding process implemented by the zero-power consumption terminal in each method of the embodiment of the present application, in order It is concise and will not be repeated here.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product, including computer program instructions.
  • the computer program product can be applied to the network device in the embodiment of the present application, and the computer program instructions cause the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the network device in the methods of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the Let me repeat For the sake of brevity, the Let me repeat.
  • the computer program product can be applied to the zero-power consumption terminal in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program instructions cause the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the zero-power consumption terminal in the various methods of the embodiments of the present application.
  • the computer program instructions cause the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the zero-power consumption terminal in the various methods of the embodiments of the present application.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program.
  • the computer program can be applied to the network device in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the computer program executes the corresponding process implemented by the network device in each method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the computer program executes the corresponding process implemented by the network device in each method of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the computer program can be applied to the zero-power consumption terminal in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the computer program executes the corresponding functions implemented by the zero-power consumption terminal in the various methods in the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, the process will not be repeated here.
  • the disclosed systems, devices and methods may be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are only illustrative.
  • the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods.
  • multiple units or components can be combined or May be integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored, or not implemented.
  • the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Part or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.
  • each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, each unit may exist separately physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the functions described above are realized in the form of software function units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.
  • the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including Several instructions are used to make a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application.
  • the aforementioned storage media include: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (Read-Only Memory,) ROM, random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), magnetic disk or optical disc, etc., which can store program codes. .

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

一种安全认证方法及装置、终端，该方法包括：终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一MAC和安全信息；所述终端基于根密钥和所述安全信息，生成第二MAC；所述终端基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证网络侧的合法性；或者，终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌；所述终端基于第一算法对所述第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌；所述终端基于所述第一目标令牌，验证网络侧的合法性。

Description

一种安全认证方法及装置、终端 技术领域
本申请实施例涉及移动通信技术领域，具体涉及一种安全认证方法及装置、终端。
背景技术
零功耗终端需要获得能量后才可以驱动自身进行工作，一般，零功耗终端通过采集无线电波的能量来获得能量。在零功耗终端获得能量之前，零功耗终端不能接收网络设备发送的信号，也不能向网络设备发送信号。
零功耗终端的通信有安全方面的需求，然而，零功耗终端具有供能受限、传输数据量小、处理能力有限等特点，目前的安全处理方式不再适用零功耗终端，如何优化零功耗终端的安全处理方式是个需要解决的问题。
发明内容
本申请实施例提供一种安全认证方法及装置、终端、芯片、计算机可读存储介质、计算机程序产品、计算机程序。
本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法，包括：
终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一消息验证码(Message Authentication Code，MAC)和安全信息；
所述终端基于根密钥和所述安全信息，生成第二MAC；
所述终端基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证网络侧的合法性。
本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法，包括：
终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌；
所述终端基于第一算法对所述第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌；
所述终端基于所述第一目标令牌，验证网络侧的合法性。
本申请实施例提供的安全认证装置，应用于终端，所述装置包括：
接收单元，用于接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一MAC和安全信息；
处理单元，用于基于根密钥和所述安全信息，生成第二MAC；
验证单元，用于基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证网络侧的合法性。
本申请实施例提供的安全认证装置，应用于终端，所述装置包括：
接收单元，用于接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌；
处理单元，用于基于第一算法对所述第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌；
验证单元，用于基于所述第一目标令牌，验证网络侧的合法性。
本申请实施例提供的终端，包括处理器和存储器。该存储器用于存储计算机程序，该处理器用于调用并运行该存储器中存储的计算机程序，执行上述的安全认证方法。
本申请实施例提供的芯片，用于实现上述的安全认证方法。
具体地，该芯片包括：处理器，用于从存储器中调用并运行计算机程序，使得安装有该芯片的设备执行上述的安全认证方法。
本申请实施例提供的计算机可读存储介质，用于存储计算机程序，该计算机程序使得计算机执行上述的安全认证方法。
本申请实施例提供的计算机程序产品，包括计算机程序指令，该计算机程序指令使得计算机执行上述的安全认证方法。
本申请实施例提供的计算机程序，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述的安全认证方法。
通过上述技术方案，终端和网络侧可以基于MAC进行安全认证，或者可以基于令牌进行安全认证，这种安全认证方式简单易于实现，无需终端进行复杂的安全处理流程，适用于零功耗终 端的安全需求。
附图说明
此处所说明的附图用来提供对本申请的进一步理解，构成本申请的一部分，本申请的示意性实施例及其说明用于解释本申请，并不构成对本申请的不当限定。在附图中：
图1是本申请实施例的一个应用场景的示意图；
图2是本申请实施例提供的零功耗通信的原理图；
图3是本申请实施例提供的能量采集的原理图；
图4是本申请实施例提供的反向散射通信的原理图；
图5是本申请实施例提供的电阻负载调制的电路原理图；
图6是本申请实施例提供的反向不归零编码的示意图；
图7是本申请实施例提供的曼彻斯特编码的示意图；
图8是本申请实施例提供的单极性归零编码的示意图；
图9是本申请实施例提供的差动双相编码的示意图；
图10是本申请实施例提供的米勒编码的示意图；
图11是本申请实施例提供的零功耗通信***的架构图；
图12是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图一；
图13是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图二；
图14是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图三；
图15是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图四；
图16是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图五；
图17是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图六；
图18是本申请实施例提供的安全认证装置的结构组成示意图；
图19是本申请实施例提供的一种通信设备示意性结构图；
图20是本申请实施例的芯片的示意性结构图；
图21是本申请实施例提供的一种通信***的示意性框图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本申请实施例中的附图，对本申请实施例中的技术方案进行描述，显然，所描述的实施例是本申请一部分实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于本申请中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都属于本申请保护的范围。
图1是本申请实施例的一个应用场景的示意图。
如图1所示，通信***100可以包括终端110和网络设备120。网络设备120可以通过空口与终端110通信。终端110和网络设备120之间支持多业务传输。
应理解，本申请实施例仅以通信***100进行示例性说明，但本申请实施例不限定于此。也就是说，本申请实施例的技术方案可以应用于各种通信***，例如：长期演进(Long Term Evolution，LTE)***、LTE时分双工(Time Division Duplex，TDD)、通用移动通信***(Universal Mobile Telecommunication System，UMTS)、物联网(Internet of Things，IoT)***、窄带物联网(Narrow Band Internet of Things，NB-IoT)***、增强的机器类型通信(enhanced Machine-Type Communications，eMTC)***、5G通信***(也称为新无线(New Radio，NR)通信***)，或未来的通信***等。
在图1所示的通信***100中，网络设备120可以是与终端110通信的接入网设备。接入网设备可以为特定的地理区域提供通信覆盖，并且可以与位于该覆盖区域内的终端110(例如UE)进行通信。
网络设备120可以是长期演进(Long Term Evolution，LTE)***中的演进型基站(Evolutional Node B，eNB或eNodeB)，或者是下一代无线接入网(Next Generation Radio Access Network，NG RAN)设备，或者是NR***中的基站(gNB)，或者是云无线接入网络(Cloud Radio Access Network，CRAN)中的无线控制器，或者该网络设备120可以为中继站、接入点、车载设备、可穿戴设备、集线器、交换机、网桥、路由器，或者未来演进的公共陆地移动网络(Public Land Mobile Network，PLMN)中的网络设备等。
终端110可以是任意终端，其包括但不限于与网络设备120或其它终端采用有线或者无线连接的终端。
例如，所述终端110可以指接入终端、用户设备(User Equipment，UE)、用户单元、用户站、移动站、移动台、远方站、远程终端、移动设备、用户终端、终端、无线通信设备、用户代理或用户装置。接入终端可以是蜂窝电话、无绳电话、会话启动协议(Session Initiation Protocol，SIP)电话、IoT设备、卫星手持终端、无线本地环路(Wireless Local Loop，WLL)站、个人数字处理(Personal Digital Assistant，PDA)、具有无线通信功能的手持设备、计算设备或连接到无线调制解调器的其它处理设备、车载设备、可穿戴设备、5G网络中的终端或者未来演进网络中的终端等。
终端110可以用于设备到设备(Device to Device，D2D)的通信。
无线通信***100还可以包括与基站进行通信的核心网设备130，该核心网设备130可以是5G核心网(5G Core，5GC)设备，例如，接入与移动性管理功能(Access and Mobility Management Function，AMF)，又例如，认证服务器功能(Authentication Server Function，AUSF)，又例如，用户面功能(User Plane Function，UPF)，又例如，会话管理功能(Session Management Function，SMF)。可选地，核心网络设备130也可以是LTE网络的分组核心演进(Evolved Packet Core，EPC)设备，例如，会话管理功能+核心网络的数据网关(Session Management Function+Core Packet Gateway，SMF+PGW-C)设备。应理解，SMF+PGW-C可以同时实现SMF和PGW-C所能实现的功能。在网络演进过程中，上述核心网设备也有可能叫其它名字，或者通过对核心网的功能进行划分形成新的网络实体，对此本申请实施例不做限制。
通信***100中的各个功能单元之间还可以通过下一代网络(next generation，NG)接口建立连接实现通信。
例如，终端通过NR接口与接入网设备建立空口连接，用于传输用户面数据和控制面信令；终端可以通过NG接口1(简称N1)与AMF建立控制面信令连接；接入网设备例如下一代无线接入基站(gNB)，可以通过NG接口3(简称N3)与UPF建立用户面数据连接；接入网设备可以通过NG接口2(简称N2)与AMF建立控制面信令连接；UPF可以通过NG接口4(简称N4)与SMF建立控制面信令连接；UPF可以通过NG接口6(简称N6)与数据网络交互用户面数据；AMF可以通过NG接口11(简称N11)与SMF建立控制面信令连接；SMF可以通过NG接口7(简称N7)与PCF建立控制面信令连接。
图1示例性地示出了一个基站、一个核心网设备和两个终端，可选地，该无线通信***100可以包括多个基站设备并且每个基站的覆盖范围内可以包括其它数量的终端，本申请实施例对此不做限定。
需要说明的是，图1只是以示例的形式示意本申请所适用的***，当然，本申请实施例所示的方法还可以适用于其它***。此外，本文中术语“***”和“网络”在本文中常被可互换使用。本文中术语“和/或”，仅仅是一种描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，A和/或B，可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B这三种情况。另外，本文中字符“/”，一般表示前后关联对象是一种“或”的关系。还应理解，在本申请的实施例中提到的“指示”可以是直接指示，也可以是间接指示，还可以是表示具有关联关系。举例说明，A指示B，可以表示A直接指示B，例如B可以通过A获取；也可以表示A间接指示B，例如A指示C，B可以通过C获取；还可以表示A和B之间具有关联关系。还应理解，在本申请的实施例中提到的“对应”可表示两者之间具有直接对应或间接对应的关系，也可以表示两者之间具有关联关系，也可以是指示与被指示、配置与被配置等关系。还应理解，在本申请的实施例中提到的“预定义”或“预定义规则”可以通过在设备(例如，包括终端和网络设备)中预先保存相应的代码、表格或其他可用于指示相关信息的方式来实现，本申请对于其具体的实现方式不做限定。比如预定义可以是指协议中定义的。还应理解，本申请实施例中，所述"协议"可以指通信领域的标准协议，例如可以包括LTE协议、NR协议以及应用于未来的通信***中的相关协议，本申请对此不做限定。
为便于理解本申请实施例的技术方案，以下对本申请实施例的相关技术进行说明，以下相关技术作为可选方案与本申请实施例的技术方案可以进行任意结合，其均属于本申请实施例的保护范围。
零功耗通信技术原理
零功耗(Zero Power)通信采用能量采集和反向散射通信技术。零功耗通信***由网络设备和零功耗终端构成，如图2所示。其中，网络设备用于向零功耗终端发送供能信号(也即无线电波)、下行通信信号以及接收零功耗终端的反向散射信号。作为示例，零功耗终端包括能量采集模块，反向散射通信模块以及低功耗计算模块。此外，零功耗终端还可具备存储器和/或传感器，存储器用于存 储一些基本信息(如物品标识等)，传感器用于获取环境温度、环境湿度等传感数据。
以下对零功耗通信的关键技术做进一步说明。
(1)能量采集(Power Harvesting)
图3是能量采集的原理图，如图3所示，能量采集模块基于电磁感应原理实现对空间电磁波能量的采集，进而获得驱动零功耗终端工作所需的能量，实现对负载电路的驱动(如对低功耗计算模块、传感器等的驱动)。因此，零功耗终端无需传统电池，实现了免电池通信。
作为示例，能量采集模块是指射频能量采集模块，射频能量采集模块可以采集空间中的无线电波携带的能量，实现对空间电磁波能量的采集。
(2)反向散射通信(Back Scattering)
图4是反向散射通信的原理图，如图4所示，零功耗终端接收网络设备发送的无线信号(即图4中的载波)，对该无线信号进行调制，即在无线信号上加载需要发送的信息，并将调制后的信号从天线辐射出去，这一信息传输过程称之为反向散射通信。
反向散射通信和负载调制功能密不可分，负载调制是零功耗终端经常使用的加载信息的方法。负载调制通过对零功耗终端的振荡回路的电路参数按照数据流的节拍进行调节和控制，使零功耗终端的阻抗的大小和/或相位随之改变，从而完成调制的过程。负载调制技术主要包括电阻负载调制和电容负载调制两种方式。
如图5所示，在电阻负载调制中，负载并联一个电阻，称为负载调制电阻，该电阻基于二进制数据流的控制接通或断开，电阻的通断会导致电路电压的变化，因此实现幅度键控调制(ASK)，即通过调整零功耗终端的反向散射信号的幅度大小实现信号的调制。类似地，在电容负载调制中，负载并联一个电容，称为负载调制电容，该电容取代了图5中负载调制电阻，通过电容的通断可以实现电路谐振频率的变化，因此实现频率键控调制(FSK)，即通过调整零功耗终端的反向散射信号的工作频率实现信号的调制。
可见，零功耗终端借助于负载调制的方式，对来波信号进行信息调制，从而实现反向散射通信过程。因此，零功耗终端具有以下显著的优点：一方面，零功耗终端不主动发射信号，因此不需要复杂的射频链路，如功率放大器、射频滤波器等。另一方面，零功耗终端不需要主动产生高频信号，因此不需要高频晶振。再一方面，零功耗终端借助反向散射通信，其传输过程不需要消耗零功耗终端自身的能量。
零功耗通信的编码方式
零功耗终端传输的数据，可以用不同形式的代码来表示二进制的“1”和“0”。无线射频识别***通常使用下列编码方法中的一种：反向不归零(Non Return Zero，NRZ)编码、曼彻斯特(Manchester)编码、单极性归零(Unipolar RZ)编码、差动双相(DBP)编码、米勒(Miller)编码以及差动编码。用不同形式的代码来表示二进制的“1”和“0”，也可以理解为，用不同的脉冲信号表示0和1。以下对几种编号方式进行说明。
(1)反向不归零编码
反向不归零编码用高电平表示二进制的“1”，低电平表示二进制的“0”，如图6所示。
(2)曼彻斯特编码
曼彻斯特编码也被称为分相编码(Split-Phase Coding)。在曼彻斯特编码中，某位的值是由该位长度内半个位周期时电平的变化(上升/下降)来表示的，在半个位周期时的负跳变表示二进制的“1”，半个位周期时的正跳变表示二进制的“0″，如图7所示。
曼彻斯特编码在采用载波的负载调制或者反向散射调制时，通常用于从零功耗终端到网络设备的数据传输，因为这有利于发现数据传输的错误。这是因为在位长度内，“没有变化”的状态是不允许的。当多个零功耗终端同时发送的数据位有不同值时，接收的上升边和下降边互相抵消，导致在整个位长度内是不间断的载波信号，由于该状态不允许，所以网络设备利用该错误就可以判定碰撞发生的具***置。
(3)单极性归零编码
单极性归零编码在第一个半个位周期中的高电平表示二进制的“1”，而持续整个位周期内的低电平信号表示二进制的“0”，如图8所示。单极性归零编码可用来提取位同步信号。
(4)差动双相编码
差动双相编码在半个位周期中的任意的边沿表示二进制的“0”，而没有边沿就是二进制的“1”，如图9所示。此外，在每个位周期开始时，电平都要反相。因此，对接收端来说，位节拍比较容易重建。
(5)米勒(Miller)编码
米勒编码在半个位周期内的任意边沿表示二进制的“1”，而经过下一个位周期中不变的电平表示二进制的“0”。位周期开始时产生电平交变，如图10所示。因此，对接收器来说，位节拍比较容易重建。
(6)差动编码
在差动编码中，每个要传输的二进制“1”都会引起信号电平的变化，而对于二进制“0”，信号电平保持不变。
零功耗终端的分类
基于零功耗终端的能量来源以及使用方式可以将零功耗终端分为如下类型：
(1)无源零功耗终端
零功耗终端不需要内装电池，零功耗终端接近网络设备时，零功耗终端处于网络设备天线辐射形成的近场范围内，因此，零功耗终端的天线通过电磁感应产生感应电流，感应电流驱动零功耗终端的低功耗计算模块(也即低功耗芯片电路)工作，实现对前向链路信号的解调，以及后向链路的信号调制等工作。对于反向散射链路，零功耗终端使用反向散射实现方式进行信号的传输。
可以看出，无源零功耗终端无论是前向链路还是反向链路都不需要内置电池来驱动，是一种真正意义的零功耗终端。
由于无源零功耗终端不需要电池，因而无源零功耗终端的射频电路以及基带电路都非常简单，例如不需要低噪声放大器(LNA)、功率放大器(PA)、晶振、ADC等，因此具有体积小、重量轻、价格便宜、使用寿命长等诸多优点。
(2)半无源零功耗终端
半无源零功耗终端自身也不安装常规电池，但可使用能量采集模块采集无线电波能量，同时将采集的能量存储于一个储能单元(如电容)中。储能单元获得能量后，可以驱动零功耗终端的低功耗计算模块(也即低功耗芯片电路)工作，实现对前向链路信号的解调，以及后向链路的信号调制等工作。对于反向散射链路，零功耗终端使用反向散射实现方式进行信号的传输。
可以看出，半无源零功耗终端无论是前向链路还是反向链路都不需要内置电池来驱动，虽然工作中使用了电容储存的能量，但能量来源于能量采集模块采集的无线电波的能量，因此也是一种真正意义的零功耗终端。
半无源零功耗终端继承了无源零功耗终端的诸多优点，因此具有体积小、重量轻、价格便宜、使用寿命长等诸多优点。
(3)有源零功耗终端
有些场景下使用的零功耗终端也可以为有源零功耗终端，该类终端可以内置电池。电池用于驱动零功耗终端的低功耗计算模块(也即低功耗芯片电路)工作，实现对前向链路信号的解调，以及后向链路的信号调制等工作。但对于反向散射链路，零功耗终端使用反向散射实现方式进行信号的传输。因此，这类终端的零功耗主要体现于反向链路的信号传输不需要终端自身功率，而是使用反向散射的方式。
有源零功耗终端，内置电池向射频芯片供电，以增加通信距离，提高通信的可靠性。因此在一些对通信距离，通信时延等方面要求相对较高的场景得以应用。
蜂窝无源物联网
随着行业应用增加，连接物的种类和应用场景越来越多，对通信终端的价格和功耗也将有更高要求。免电池、低成本的无源物联网设备的应用成为蜂窝物联网的关键技术，充实了网络链接终端类型和数量，真正实现万物互联。其中，无源物联网设备可以基于零功耗通信技术，如无线射频识别(Radio Frequency Identification，RFID)技术，并在此基础上进行延伸，以适用于蜂窝物联网。
零功耗终端需要采集网络设备发送的无线电波的能量，在获得能量后才可以驱动自身进行工作。因此，在获得能量之前，零功耗终端是处于“关机”状态的，即此时不能接收网络设备发送的信号，也不能向网络设备发送信号。
由于零功耗终端具有供能受限、传输数据量小、处理能力有限等特点，所以通信***要求简单且适用。而目前的通信***(如LTE***和NR***)过于复杂，不能满足零功耗终端通信的要求。
此外，虽然零功耗终端具有供能受限、传输数据量小、处理能力有限等特点，但零功耗终端也会有安全方面的需求，例如零功耗终端对网络侧的安全认证，以及网络侧对零功耗终端的安全认证以及零功耗终端和网络侧进行数据通信的安全保护等。
由于零功耗终端具有供能受限、传输数据量小、处理能力有限等特点，传统的安全认证过程(如 LTE/NR***定义的安全认证过程)以及安全保护算法不再适用零功耗终端，需要考虑零功耗终端的特点重新为零功耗终端设计符合其安全需求的安全处理方案。
为此，提出了本申请实施例的以下技术方案。需要说明的是，本申请实施例的技术方案可以应用于5G，也可以应用于6G，或者未来通信***。
为便于理解本申请实施例的技术方案，以下通过具体实施例详述本申请的技术方案。以上相关技术作为可选方案与本申请实施例的技术方案可以进行任意结合，其均属于本申请实施例的保护范围。本申请实施例包括以下内容中的至少部分内容。
图11是本申请实施例提供的零功耗通信***的架构图，如图11所示，该***包括以下至少之一：零功耗终端、接入网节点、核心网节点、数据中心节点以及业务控制节点；其中，
所述零功耗终端，能够与所述接入网节点进行通信；
所述接入网节点，能够与所述零功耗终端和所述接入网节点中的至少之一进行通信；
所述核心网节点，能够与所述接入网节点、所述数据中心节点和所述业务控制节点中的至少之一进行通信；
所述数据中心节点，能够与所述核心网节点和所述业务控制节点中的至少之一进行通信；
所述业务控制节点，能够与所述核心网节点和所述数据中心节点中的至少之一进行通信。
需要说明的是，零功耗通信***可以包括上述全部的功能节点，也可以包括上述部分的功能节点。不局限于此，零功耗通信***除了包括上述全部或部分功能节点以外，还可以包括其他的功能节点。
以下对零功耗通信***中的各个功能节点进行描述。
1)零功耗终端
在一些可选实施方式中，所述零功耗终端包括：能量采集模块和通信模块；其中，所述能量采集模块，用于采集无线电波的能量，将能量提供给所述通信模块；所述通信模块，用于进行所述零功耗终端与所述接入网节点之间的信号传输。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述能量采集模块为RF能量采集模块。零功耗终端可以通过使用RF能量采集模块采集无线电波的能量，通过采集的能量驱动零功耗终端进行工作。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述通信模块，用于使用反向散射通信的方式，进行所述零功耗终端与所述接入网节点之间的信号传输。这里，所述通信模块可以是反向散射通信模块，零功耗终端可以使用反向散射通信模块按照反向散射通信的方式进行信号的传输。
进一步，可选地，所述零功耗终端还包括：低功耗计算模块。这里，作为示例，低功耗计算模块可以包括低功耗解调模块和/或低功耗调制模块。
进一步，可选地，所述零功耗终端还包括：传感器，用于获取传感数据。这里，作为示例，传感器可以是温度传感器、湿度传感器等。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述零功耗终端可以是RFID标签。
需要说明的是，零功耗终端的理解可以参照前述有关“零功耗终端”的描述。
2)接入网节点
接入网节点也即是无线接入网节点(RAN node)。作为示例，接入网节点可以是基站节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述接入网节点可以但不局限于是5G接入网节点或者6G接入网节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述接入网节点，用于：向所述零功耗终端发送无线电波，所述无线电波用于为所述零功耗终端供能；和/或，为所述零功耗终端提供通信链路，所述通信链路用于所述零功耗终端与所述接入网节点之间的信号传输。
3)核心网节点
在一些可选实施方式中，所述核心网节点可以但不局限于是5G核心网节点或者6G核心网节点。
以5G核心网节点为例，所述核心网节点可以包括以下至少一种网元：AMF、UDP。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述核心网节点，用于执行以下至少之一：接收零功耗终端的数据；处理零功耗终端的数据；控制零功耗终端的业务；管理零功耗终端的业务。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述核心网节点，用于提供网关等功能。
4)数据中心节点
在一些可选实施方式中，所述数据中心节点可以是统一数据管理网元(Unified Data Management，UDM)。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述数据中心节点，用于存储以下至少之一：零功耗终端的签约数据、零功耗终端的通信相关配置。
进一步，可选地，所述通信相关配置包括以下至少之一：承载配置、零功耗终端标识、安全配置、业务标识。
5)业务控制节点
在一些可选实施方式中，所述业务控制节点可以是蜂窝物联网业务(Cellular Internet of Things service，CIoT service)控制节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述业务控制节点，用于执行以下至少之一：配置零功耗终端的业务相关配置；管理零功耗终端的零功耗终端标识；管理零功耗终端的业务。
进一步，可选地，所述管理零功耗终端的业务包括以下至少之一：开启零功耗终端的业务；关闭零功耗终端的业务。
这里，业务控制节点可以是业务服务器或者提供业务的第三方。
本申请实施例中，零功耗终端与接入网节点之间的接口为第一接口。在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一接口可以称为Uu接口。
本申请实施例中，接入网节点与核心网节点之间的接口为第二接口。在一些可选实施方式中，所述第二接口可以称为NG接口。
需要说明的是，零功耗通信***中的以上功能节点的数目可以是一个，也可以是多个。例如，零功耗通信***中的零功耗终端的数目可以是一个或者多个，本申请对此不做限定。
本申请实施例的安全认证方法基于图11所示的零功耗通信***，以下对本申请实施例的安全认证进行说明。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中描述的“终端”可以是零功耗终端。但不局限于此，其他类型的终端也同样可以应用本申请实施例的技术方案。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中描述的“核心网节点”实质是指核心网，其并不局限于一个核心网节点，可以包括一个或多个核心网节点。此外，核心网可以是5G核心网或者6G核心网，或者其他类型的核心网，本申请对核心网(以及核心网节点)的类型不做限制。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中描述的“接入网节点”可以是5G基站或者6G基站，或者其他类型的接入网节点，本申请对接入网节点的类型不做限制。
图12是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图一，如图12所示，所述安全认证方法包括以下步骤：
步骤1201：终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一MAC和安全信息。
步骤1202：所述终端基于根密钥和所述安全信息，生成第二MAC。
步骤1203：所述终端基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证网络侧的合法性。
本申请实施例中，终端在进行安全认证以及安全通信之前，被分配了一个或多个根密钥。以下对其进行说明。
根密钥分配
本申请实施例中，所述根密钥由以下其中一种节点产生和/或配置：核心网节点、数据中心节点、业务控制节点。其中，所述根密钥存储在所述终端侧和/或数据中心节点侧。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述根密钥是针对终端配置的；或者，所述根密钥是针对业务配置的；或者，所述根密钥是针对终端组配置的；或者，所述根密钥是针对业务组配置的。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧存储有多个根密钥，所述多个根密钥中的每个根密钥对应一个密钥索引；所述终端接收第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示第一密钥索引；所述终端基于所述第一密钥索引确定用于生成所述第二MAC的根密钥。这里，终端可以根据第一密钥索引确定需要使用的根密钥，该根密钥也即是用于生成所述第二MAC的根密钥。
上述方案中，终端的根密钥可以由核心网节点或者业务中心节点或者业务控制节点产生和/或配置。无论终端的根密钥由哪个节点产生和/或配置，根密钥会被存储在终端内和数据中心节点内。进一步，为了加强终端的安全性，可以给终端分配多个根密钥，并且为每个根密钥配置一个密钥索引，网络侧可以通过向终端指示一个密钥索引的方式通知终端使用哪个根密钥。
本申请实施例中，网络侧基于终端的根密钥和安全信息生成第一MAC，通过第一命令将该第一MAC和安全信息发送给终端。终端接收网络侧发送的第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一MAC和安全信息。终端基于根密钥和所述第一命令中携带的安全信息生成第二MAC，将所述第二MAC和所述第一命令中携带的第一MAC进行比较，从而验证网络侧的合法性。具体地，若所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC一致，则验证结果是网络侧是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC不一致，则验证结果是网络侧是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
本申请实施例中，终端对于网络侧的认证，可以是终端认证接入网节点、或者终端认证核心网节点、或者终端认证业务控制节点。以下对其分别进行说明。
方案一：终端认证接入网节点
本申请实施例中，所述网络侧为接入网节点。终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一MAC和安全信息。所述终端基于根密钥和所述安全信息，生成第二MAC。所述终端基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证接入网节点的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全认证输入参数由以下其中一种节点产生：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点。进一步，可选地，所述安全认证输入参数包括以下至少之一：随机数、业务标识、业务标识、业务类别。
选项1)所述安全认证输入参数由业务控制节点产生的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。
选项2)所述安全认证输入参数由核心网节点产生的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中不携带所述安全认证输入参数；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。
选项3)所述安全认证输入参数由接入网节点产生的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中不携带所述安全认证输入参数；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中不携带所述安全认证输入参数。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全算法由以下其中一种节点选择：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点。
选项A)所述安全算法由业务控制节点选择的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述选择的安全算法；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
选项B)所述安全算法由核心网节点选择的情况下，由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
进一步，可选地，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带第一安全算法列表，所述第一安全算法列表用于所述核心网节点选择使用的安全算法。
这里，作为示例，所述第一安全算法列表为所述终端支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端所述的终端组支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务所属的业务组支持的安全算法列表。
选项C)所述安全算法由接入网节点选择的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带第一安全算法列表；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一安全算法列表；其中，所述第一安全算法列表用于所述接入网节点选择使用的安全算法。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
这里，作为示例，所述第一安全算法列表为所述终端支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端所述的终端组支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务所属的业务组支持的安全算法列表。
本申请实施例中，所述第一MAC由所述接入网节点基于根密钥和所述安全信息生成，由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息。
本申请实施例中，终端接收到第一命令后，基于根密钥和所述第一命令中携带的安全信息生成第二MAC；所述终端比较所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，并基于比较结果确定接入网节点是否合法。
本申请实施例中，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。
本申请实施例中，如果是双向认证过程，即终端验证网络侧的合法性后，网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则所述方法还包括：
所述终端计算第一认证响应(authentication Response，简称为RES)，向所述接入网节点发送所述第一RES；所述第一RES用于所述接入网节点根据自身生成的第二RES验证所述终端的合法性。
这里，终端根据根密钥生成第一RES，进一步，可选地，终端根据根密钥和携带在第一命令中的随机数生成第一RES。在一些可选实施方式中，接入网节点在发送第一MAC之前，生成随机数并根据该随机数和根密钥生成第二RES。接入网节点接收到第一RES后，比较所述第一RES和所述第二RES，并基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。具体地，若所述第二RES和所述第一RES一致，则验证结果是终端是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二RES和所述第一RES不一致，则验证结果是终端是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
需要说明的是，第一MAC由接入网节点产生的情况下，终端验证的是接入网节点的合法性。进一步，可选地，对于双向认证来说，接入网节点也会验证终端的合法性。
方案二：终端认证核心网节点
本申请实施例中，所述网络侧为核心网节点。终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一MAC和安全信息。所述终端基于根密钥和所述安全信息，生成第二MAC。所述终端基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证核心网节点的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全认证输入参数由以下其中一种节点产生：业务控制节点、核心网节点。进一步，可选地，所述安全认证输入参数包括以下至少之一：随机数、业务标识、业务标识、业务类别。
选项1)所述安全认证输入参数由业务控制节点产生的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。
选项2)所述安全认证输入参数由核心网节点产生的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中不携带所述安全认证输入参数；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全算法由以下其中一种节点选择：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点。
选项A)所述安全算法由业务控制节点选择的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述选择的安全算法；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
选项B)所述安全算法由核心网节点选择的情况下，由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
进一步，可选地，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带第一安全算法列表，所述第一安全算法列表用于所述核心网节点选择使用的安全算法。
这里，作为示例，所述第一安全算法列表为所述终端支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端所述的终端组支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务所属的业务组支持的安全算法列表。
选项C)所述安全算法由接入网节点选择的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带第一安全算法列表；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一安全算法列表；其中，所述第一安全算法列表用于所述接入网节点选择使用的安全算法。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
这里，作为示例，所述第一安全算法列表为所述终端支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端所述的终端组支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务所属的业务组支持的安全算法列表。
本申请实施例中，所述第一MAC由所述核心网节点基于根密钥和所述安全信息生成，由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息；由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息。
本申请实施例中，终端接收到第一命令后，基于根密钥和所述第一命令中携带的安全信息生成第二MAC；所述终端比较所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，并基于比较结果确定核心网节点是否 合法。
本申请实施例中，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。
本申请实施例中，如果是双向认证过程，即终端验证网络侧的合法性后，网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则所述方法还包括：
所述终端计算第一RES，通过接入网节点向所述核心网节点发送所述第一RES；所述第一RES用于所述核心网节点根据自身生成的第二RES验证所述终端的合法性。
这里，终端根据根密钥生成第一RES，进一步，可选地，终端根据根密钥和携带在第一命令中的随机数生成第一RES。在一些可选实施方式中，核心网节点在发送第一MAC之前，生成随机数并根据该随机数和根密钥生成第二RES。核心网节点接收到第一RES后，比较所述第一RES和所述第二RES，并基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。具体地，若所述第二RES和所述第一RES一致，则验证结果是终端是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二RES和所述第一RES不一致，则验证结果是终端是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
需要说明的是，第一MAC由核心网节点产生的情况下，终端验证的是核心网节点的合法性。进一步，可选地，对于双向认证来说，核心网节点也会验证终端的合法性。
方案三：终端认证业务控制节点
本申请实施例中，所述网络侧为业务控制节点。终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一MAC和安全信息。所述终端基于根密钥和所述安全信息，生成第二MAC。所述终端基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证业务控制节点的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全认证输入参数由以下其中一种节点产生：业务控制节点。进一步，可选地，所述安全认证输入参数包括以下至少之一：随机数、业务标识、业务标识、业务类别。
选项1)所述安全认证输入参数由业务控制节点产生的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全算法由以下其中一种节点选择：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点。
选项A)所述安全算法由业务控制节点选择的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述选择的安全算法；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
选项B)所述安全算法由核心网节点选择的情况下，由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
进一步，可选地，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带第一安全算法列表，所述第一安全算法列表用于所述核心网节点选择使用的安全算法。
这里，作为示例，所述第一安全算法列表为所述终端支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端所述的终端组支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务所属的业务组支持的安全算法列表。
选项C)所述安全算法由接入网节点选择的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带第一安全算法列表；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一安全算法列表；其中，所述第一安全算法列表用于所述接入网节点选择使用的安全算法。由所述接入网节点发送给终端的第一命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
这里，作为示例，所述第一安全算法列表为所述终端支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端所述的终端组支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务所属的业务组支持的安全算法列表。
本申请实施例中，所述第一MAC由所述业务控制节点基于根密钥和所述安全信息生成，由所述业务控制节点发送给所述核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息；由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息。
本申请实施例中，终端接收到第一命令后，基于根密钥和所述第一命令中携带的安全信息生成第二MAC；所述终端比较所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，并基于比较结果确定所述业务控制节点是否合法。
本申请实施例中，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。
本申请实施例中，如果是双向认证过程，即终端验证网络侧的合法性后，网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则所述方法还包括：
所述终端计算第一RES，通过接入网节点和核心网节点向所述业务控制节点发送所述第一RES；所述第一RES用于所述业务控制节点根据自身生成的第二RES验证所述终端的合法性。
这里，终端根据根密钥生成第一RES，进一步，可选地，终端根据根密钥和携带在第一命令中的随机数生成第一RES。在一些可选实施方式中，业务控制节点在发送第一MAC之前，生成随机数并根据该随机数和根密钥生成第二RES。业务控制节点接收到第一RES后，比较所述第一RES和所述第二RES，并基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。具体地，若所述第二RES和所述第一RES一致，则验证结果是终端是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二RES和所述第一RES不一致，则验证结果是终端是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
需要说明的是，第一MAC由业务控制节点产生的情况下，终端验证的是业务控制节点的合法性。进一步，可选地，对于双向认证来说，业务控制节点也会验证终端的合法性。
通过上述技术方案实现单向认证或者双向认证后，所述终端可以与所述网络侧之间传输数据。这里，所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输数据具有安全需求，以下几种方案均可以满足该安全需求。
方案I)在一些可选实施方式中，若所述终端与所述网络侧进行了单向认证，则所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输的数据需要经过完整性保护。
这里，所述终端与所述网络侧进行了单向认证的情况下，例如终端认证了网络侧的合法性的情况下，终端向网络侧发送的数据需要经过完整性保护，从而保障数据的安全传输。
方案II)在一些可选实施方式中，若所述终端与所述网络侧进行了双向认证，则所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输的数据不需要经过完整性保护。
这里，所述终端与所述网络侧进行了双向认证的情况下，终端认证了网络侧的合法性，网络侧也认证了终端的合法性，终端与网络侧之间传输的数据已经可以得到安全保障，因此终端与网络侧之间传输的数据不需要经过完整性保护。
方案III)在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有至少一个码流和至少一个算法，所述至少一个码流包括第一码流，所述至少一个算法包括第一算法。所述数据携带第一目标码流，所述第一目标码流由所述数据的发送端基于所述第一码流和所述第一算法生成；其中，所述第一目标码流用于所述数据的接收端基于所述第一码流和所述第一算法验证所述第一目标码流的有效性。
这里，以数据的发送端为终端，数据的接收端为网络侧为例，终端从存储的至少一个码流中选择一个使用的码流(称为第一码流)，以及从存储的至少一个算法中选择一个使用的算法(称为第一算法)，终端使用第一算法对第一码流进行处理得到第一目标码流，将数据以及第一目标码流一并发送给网络侧；网络侧接收到数据以及第一目标码流后，使用第一算法对第一目标码流进行处理得到一个码流，将该码流与第一码流进行比较，若该码流与第一码流一致，则认为终端发送的数据是有效的(或者说是正确的)，若该码流与第一码流不一致，则认为终端发送的数据是无效的(或者说是错误的)。
上述方案中，终端可以使用第一算法对第一码流进行运算，得到第一目标码流。网络侧可以使用第一算法对第一目标码流进行逆运算，得到第一码流。作为示例，第一算法例如为异或操作。
上述方案中，终端与网络侧需要协商好使用的码流以及使用的算法，在一些可选实施方式中，网络侧可以选择第一码流和第一算法，并将第一码流和第一算法指示给终端。例如向终端发送一个码流索引和一个算法索引，其中，码流索引用于指示第一码流，算法索引用于指示算法索引。再例如向终端发送一个指示信息，该指示信息的取值可以联合指示一个码流索引和一个算法索引。
需要说明的是，第一码流的大小远远小于数据的大小，因而终端对于第一码流的处理不会消耗终端过多的处理资源以及能耗。
方案IV)在一些可选实施方式中，所述数据经过第一密钥和/或第一算法进行安全加密处理。这里，所述第一密钥为根密钥或者基于根密钥衍生出的密钥。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一算法的输入参数包括所述第一密钥和所述数据。这种情况下， 数据的发送端使用第一密钥对数据进行加密处理，将加密后的数据发送给接收端。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一算法的输入参数包括所述数据。这种情况下，数据的发送端不使用任何密钥，可以根据预先设定或者预先配置的算法对要传输数据进行处理，接收端对接收到的数据进行逆运算即可恢复出数据。
对于方案IV)来说，所述安全加密处理在网络侧，由核心网节点执行或者由业务控制节点执行或者由接入网节点的分组数据汇聚协议(Packet Data Convergence Protocol，PDCP)层执行。所述安全加密处理在终端侧由终端执行，可选地，可以由终端的PDCP层执行。
图13是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图二，如图13所示，所述安全认证方法包括以下步骤：
步骤1301：终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌。
步骤1302：所述终端基于第一算法对所述第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌。
步骤1303：所述终端基于所述第一目标令牌，验证网络侧的合法性。
本申请实施例中，网络侧基于第一算法对第一原始令牌进行处理得到第一令牌，通过第一命令将该第一令牌发送给终端。终端接收网络侧发送的第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌。终端基于第一算法对所述第一命令中携带的第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌。终端将所述第一目标令牌和第一原始令牌进行比较，从而验证网络侧的合法性。具体地，若所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌一致，则验证结果是网络侧是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌不一致，则验证结果是网络侧是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
举个例子：网络侧基于第一算法对令牌a进行处理得到令牌A，通过第一命令将令牌A发送给终端。终端基于第一算法对令牌A进行处理得到一个令牌，将该令牌与令牌a进行比较，若一致，则验证网络侧是合法的(即验证通过)，若不一致，则验证网络侧是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
本申请实施例中，终端对于网络侧的认证，可以是终端认证接入网节点、或者终端认证核心网节点、或者终端认证业务控制节点。以下对其分别进行说明。
方案一：终端认证接入网节点
本申请实施例中，所述网络侧为接入网节点。终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌。所述终端基于第一算法对第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌。所述终端基于第一目标令牌，验证接入网节点的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第一原始令牌和第一算法，其中，所述第一令牌由所述接入网节点基于所述第一原始令牌和所述第一算法生成；由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一令牌。
本申请实施例中，终端接收到第一命令后，基于第一算法对所述第一命令中携带的第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌；所述终端比较所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述接入网节点是否合法。
本申请实施例中，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。
本申请实施例中，如果是双向认证过程，即终端验证网络侧的合法性后，网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，具体地：
选项1)在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌和第二算法；所述终端基于所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；所述终端向所述接入网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述接入网节点根据所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
这里，接入网节点验证终端的合法性的方式与终端验证接入网节点的合法性的方式类似，具体地，接入网节点接收到终端发送的第二令牌后，基于第二算法对所述第二令牌进行处理，得到第二目标令牌；所述接入网节点比较所述第二目标令牌和所述第二原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述终端是否合法。
选项2)在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌；所述终端基于所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；所述终端向所述接入网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述接入网节点根据所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
这里，接入网节点验证终端的合法性的方式与终端验证接入网节点的合法性的方式类似，具体地，接入网节点接收到终端发送的第二令牌后，基于第一算法对所述第二令牌进行处理，得到第二 目标令牌；所述接入网节点比较所述第二目标令牌和所述第二原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述终端是否合法。
方案二：终端认证核心网节点
本申请实施例中，所述网络侧为核心网节点。终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌。所述终端基于第一算法对第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌。所述终端基于第一目标令牌，验证核心网节点的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第一原始令牌和第一算法，其中，所述第一令牌由所述核心网节点基于所述第一原始令牌和所述第一算法生成；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一令牌；由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述所述第一令牌。
本申请实施例中，终端接收到第一命令后，基于第一算法对所述第一命令中携带的第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌；所述终端比较所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述核心网节点是否合法。
本申请实施例中，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。
本申请实施例中，如果是双向认证过程，即终端验证网络侧的合法性后，网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，具体地：
选项1)在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌和第二算法；所述终端基于所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；所述终端通过接入网节点向所述核心网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述核心网节点根据所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
这里，核心网节点验证终端的合法性的方式与终端验证核心网节点的合法性的方式类似，具体地，核心网节点接收到终端发送的第二令牌后，基于第二算法对所述第二令牌进行处理，得到第二目标令牌；所述核心网节点比较所述第二目标令牌和所述第二原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述终端是否合法。
选项2)在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌；所述终端基于所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；所述终端通过接入网节点向所述核心网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述核心网节点根据所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
这里，核心网节点验证终端的合法性的方式与终端验证核心网节点的合法性的方式类似，具体地，核心网节点接收到终端发送的第二令牌后，基于第一算法对所述第二令牌进行处理，得到第二目标令牌；所述核心网节点比较所述第二目标令牌和所述第二原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述终端是否合法。
方案三：终端认证业务控制节点
本申请实施例中，所述网络侧为业务控制节点。终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌。所述终端基于第一算法对第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌。所述终端基于第一目标令牌，验证业务控制节点的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第一原始令牌和第一算法，其中，所述第一令牌由所述业务控制节点基于所述第一原始令牌和所述第一算法生成；由所述业务控制节点发送给所述核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述第一令牌；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一令牌；由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述所述第一令牌。
本申请实施例中，终端接收到第一命令后，基于第一算法对所述第一命令中携带的第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌；所述终端比较所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述业务控制节点是否合法。
本申请实施例中，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。
本申请实施例中，如果是双向认证过程，即终端验证网络侧的合法性后，网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，具体地：
选项1)在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌和第二算法；所述终端基于所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；所述终端通过接入网节点和核心 网节点向所述业务控制节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述业务控制节点根据所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
这里，业务控制节点验证终端的合法性的方式与终端验证业务控制节点的合法性的方式类似，具体地，业务控制节点接收到终端发送的第二令牌后，基于第二算法对所述第二令牌进行处理，得到第二目标令牌；所述业务控制节点比较所述第二目标令牌和所述第二原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述终端是否合法。
选项2)在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌；所述终端基于所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；所述终端通过接入网节点和核心网节点向所述业务控制节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述业务控制节点根据所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
这里，业务控制节点验证终端的合法性的方式与终端验证业务控制节点的合法性的方式类似，具体地，业务控制节点接收到终端发送的第二令牌后，基于第一算法对所述第二令牌进行处理，得到第二目标令牌；所述业务控制节点比较所述第二目标令牌和所述第二原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述终端是否合法。
以下结合具体应用实例对本申请实施例的技术方案进行举例说明。需要说明的是，以下应用实例中的部分步骤可以省略或者也可以增加其他步骤，其均属于本申请的保护范围。
需要说明的是，以下应用实例中，终端、接入网节点、核心网节点、数据中心节点以及业务控制节点位于零功耗通信***，零功耗通信***可以参照前述图11的相关描述。其中，终端可以是零功耗UE(ZP-UE)(简称为UE)，其中，ZP-UE进一步可以是UE标签(简称为标签)，接入网节点可以是零功耗RAN节点(ZP-RAN node)，核心网节点可以是零功耗核心网(ZP-CN)，数据中心节点可以是UDM，业务控制节点可以是IoT业务(IoT service)服务器或者第三方服务器。此外，业务可以但不局限于是IoT业务。
应用实例一
本应用实例中，终端认证接入网节点，从而完成单向认证过程。进一步，可选地，接入网节点认证终端，从而完成双向认证过程。
本应用实例中，产生和/或配置根密钥的节点可以是核心网节点，或者可以是数据中心节点，或者可以是业务控制节点。无论哪个节点产生和/或配置根密钥，根密钥都会存储在终端和数据中心节点内部。在一些可选实施方式中，根密钥可以是per终端配置的，也可以是per业务配置的，也可以是per终端组配置的，也可以是per业务组配置的。此外，安全算法也会分别存储在终端和数据中心节点内部。
图14是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图三，如图14所示，所述安全认证方法包括以下步骤：
步骤1401：业务控制节点向核心网节点发送请求终端上报数据命令，可选地，携带安全信息。
这里，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。这里，请求终端上报数据命令中携带的这些信息用于指示核心网节点请求哪些终端上报数据。
步骤1402：核心网节点向接入网节点发送请求终端上报数据命令，可选地，携带安全信息。
这里，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。这里，请求终端上报数据命令中携带的这些信息用于指示接入网节点请求哪些终端上报数据。
步骤1403：接入网节点向核心网节点发送请求终端上报数据响应。
步骤1404：核心网节点向业务控制节点发送请求终端上报数据响应。
这里，核心网节点可以在步骤1403之后，向业务控制节点发送针对步骤1401的响应，即请求终端上报数据响应。
步骤1405：接入网节点根据根密钥和安全信息计算MAC(称为第一MAC)。
这里，接入网节点接收到来自核心网节点的请求终端上报数据命令后，根据根密钥和安全认证输入参数计算MAC。
步骤1406：接入网节点向终端发送请求终端上报数据命令，携带第一MAC和安全信息。
这里，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1407：终端根据根密钥和安全信息计算MAC(称为第二MAC)，终端比较计算的第二MAC和来自网络的第一MAC，基于比较结果确定接入网节点是否合法。
这里，终端接收到请求终端上报数据命令后，根据安全认证输入参数和存储的根密钥计算终端侧的MAC(即第二MAC)，并将终端侧计算的MAC和网络侧下发的MAC进行比较，根据比较结果确定接入网节点是否合法。
具体地，若所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC一致，则验证结果是接入网节点是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC不一致，则验证结果是接入网节点是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
这里，若终端验证接入网节点是不合法的，那么，终端会丢弃来自网络侧的命令和/或配置，流程结束。若终端验证接入网节点是合法的，那么，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。如果是双向认证过程，即网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则终端会接着执行以下步骤1408。
步骤1408：终端计算RES(称为第一RES)，向接入网节点发送数据上报请求命令，携带终端上报的数据和第一RES。
这里，终端可以根据根密钥和随机数计算RES，称为第一RES。可选地，随机数可以来自网络侧。
这里，可选地，所述数据上报请求命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1409：接入网节点比较计算的第二RES和来自终端的第一RES，基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。
这里，接入网节点可以根据根密钥和随机数计算RES，称为第二RES。接入网节点接收到第一RES后，比较所述第一RES和所述第二RES，并基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。具体地，若所述第二RES和所述第一RES一致，则验证结果是终端是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二RES和所述第一RES不一致，则验证结果是终端是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
这里，若接入网节点验证终端是不合法的，那么，接入网节点会拒绝并丢弃来自终端的数据，流程结束。若接入网节点验证终端是合法的，那么，接入网节点会接着执行以下步骤1410。
步骤1410：接入网节点向核心网节点转发终端上报的数据。
这里，可选地，接入网节点向核心网节点转发终端上报的数据的同时，还携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1411：核心网节点向接入网节点发送确认消息，该确认消息用于确认收到终端上报的数据。
步骤1412：核心网节点将终端的数据和对应的终端标识发送给业务控制节点。
上述方案中，安全认证输入参数可以由业务控制节点产生，或者由核心网节点产生，或者由接入网节点产生。
选项1)安全认证输入参数由业务控制节点产生的情况下，在上述步骤1401中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带安全认证输入参数；在上述步骤1402中，核心网控制节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带安全认证输入参数。
选项2)安全认证输入参数由核心网节点产生的情况下，在上述步骤1401中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带安全认证输入参数；在上述步骤1402中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带安全认证输入参数。
选项3)安全认证输入参数由接入网节点产生的情况下，在上述步骤1401中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带安全认证输入参数；在上述步骤1402中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带安全认证输入参数。
上述方案中，安全算法可以由业务控制节点选择，或者由核心网节点选择，或者由接入网节点选择。
选项A)安全算法由业务控制节点选择的情况下，在上述步骤1401中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带已经选择的安全算法；在上述步骤1402中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带已经选择的安全算法。
选项B)安全算法由核心网节点选择的情况下，在上述步骤1401中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带已经选择的安全算法，可选地，业务控制节点向核心网节 点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中可以携带终端或者业务或者终端组或者业务组支持的安全算法列表；在上述步骤1402中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带已经选择的安全算法。
选项C)安全算法由接入网节点选择的情况下，在上述步骤1401中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带已经选择的安全算法，可选地，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中可以携带终端或者业务或者终端组或者业务组支持的安全算法列表；在上述步骤1402中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带已经选择的安全算法，可选地，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中可以携带终端或者业务或者终端组或者业务组支持的安全算法列表。
需要说明的是，上述方案中，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则在执行完步骤1407后，安全认证过程结束。如果是双向认证过程，即网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则在执行完步骤1407后，还要接着执行步骤1408，即终端计算RES(称为第一RES)并将该RES发送给接入网节点，接入网节点根据之前自己生成的RES(称为第二RES)和终端发送的RES进行比较，以确认终端发送的RES是否有效，如果有效则认为终端是合法的，否则则认为终端是不合法的。如果接入网节点确认终端是合法的，则继续执行步骤1410，完成数据通信过程；如果接入网节点确认终端是不合法的，则在执行完步骤1409后，接入网节点终止数据传输，丢弃已经收到的数据。
上述方案中，安全认证输入参数可以包含但不限于如下参数：随机数、安全算法、业务标识、业务类别。
应用实例二
本应用实例中，终端认证核心网节点，从而完成单向认证过程。进一步，可选地，核心网节点认证终端，从而完成双向认证过程。
本应用实例中，产生和/或配置根密钥的节点可以是核心网节点，或者可以是数据中心节点，或者可以是业务控制节点。无论哪个节点产生和/或配置根密钥，根密钥都会存储在终端和数据中心节点内部。在一些可选实施方式中，根密钥可以是per终端配置的，也可以是per业务配置的，也可以是per终端组配置的，也可以是per业务组配置的。此外，安全算法也会分别存储在终端和数据中心节点内部。
图15是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图四，如图15所示，所述安全认证方法包括以下步骤：
步骤1501：业务控制节点向核心网节点发送请求终端上报数据命令，可选地，携带安全信息。
这里，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。这里，请求终端上报数据命令中携带的这些信息用于指示核心网节点请求哪些终端上报数据。
步骤1502：核心网节点根据根密钥和安全信息计算MAC(称为第一MAC)。
这里，核心网节点接收到来自业务控制节点的请求终端上报数据命令后，根据根密钥和安全认证输入参数计算MAC。
步骤1503：核心网节点向接入网节点发送请求终端上报数据命令，携带第一MAC和安全信息。
这里，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。这里，请求终端上报数据命令中携带的这些信息用于指示接入网节点请求哪些终端上报数据。
步骤1504：接入网节点向核心网节点发送请求终端上报数据响应。
步骤1505：核心网节点向业务控制节点发送请求终端上报数据响应。
这里，核心网节点可以在步骤1504之后，向业务控制节点发送针对步骤1501的响应，即请求终端上报数据响应。
步骤1506：接入网节点向终端发送请求终端上报数据命令，携带第一MAC和安全信息。
这里，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1507：终端根据根密钥和安全信息计算MAC(称为第二MAC)，终端比较计算的第二MAC和来自网络的第一MAC，基于比较结果确定核心网节点是否合法。
这里，终端接收到请求终端上报数据命令后，根据安全认证输入参数和存储的根密钥计算终端侧的MAC(即第二MAC)，并将终端侧计算的MAC和网络侧下发的MAC进行比较，根据比较结果确定核心网节点是否合法。
具体地，若所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC一致，则验证结果是核心网节点是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC不一致，则验证结果是核心网节点是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
这里，若终端验证核心网节点是不合法的，那么，终端会丢弃来自网络侧的命令和/或配置，流程结束。若终端验证核心网节点是合法的，那么，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。如果是双向认证过程，即网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则终端会接着执行以下步骤1508。
步骤1508：终端计算RES(称为第一RES)，向接入网节点发送数据上报请求命令，携带终端上报的数据和第一RES。
这里，终端可以根据根密钥和随机数计算RES，称为第一RES。可选地，随机数可以来自网络侧。
这里，可选地，所述数据上报请求命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1509：接入网节点向核心网节点转发终端上报的数据和第一RES。
这里，可选地，接入网节点向核心网节点转发终端上报的数据的同时，还携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1510：核心网节点比较计算的第二RES和来自终端的第一RES，基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。
这里，核心网节点可以根据根密钥和随机数计算RES，称为第二RES。核心网节点接收到第一RES后，比较所述第一RES和所述第二RES，并基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。具体地，若所述第二RES和所述第一RES一致，则验证结果是终端是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二RES和所述第一RES不一致，则验证结果是终端是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
这里，若核心网节点验证终端是不合法的，那么，核心网节点会拒绝并丢弃来自终端的数据，流程结束。若核心网节点验证终端是合法的，那么，核心网节点会接着执行以下步骤1511。
步骤1511：核心网节点向接入网节点发送确认消息，该确认消息用于确认收到终端上报的数据。
步骤1512：核心网节点将终端的数据和对应的终端标识发送给业务控制节点。
上述方案中，安全认证输入参数可以由业务控制节点产生，或者由核心网节点产生。
选项1)安全认证输入参数由业务控制节点产生的情况下，在上述步骤1501中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带安全认证输入参数；在上述步骤1502中，核心网控制节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带安全认证输入参数。
选项2)安全认证输入参数由核心网节点产生的情况下，在上述步骤1501中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带安全认证输入参数；在上述步骤1502中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带安全认证输入参数。
上述方案中，安全算法可以由业务控制节点选择，或者由核心网节点选择，或者由接入网节点选择。
选项A)安全算法由业务控制节点选择的情况下，在上述步骤1501中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带已经选择的安全算法；在上述步骤1502中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带已经选择的安全算法。
选项B)安全算法由核心网节点选择的情况下，在上述步骤1501中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带已经选择的安全算法，可选地，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中可以携带终端或者业务或者终端组或者业务组支持的安全算法列表；在上述步骤1502中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带已经选择的安全算法。
选项C)安全算法由接入网节点选择的情况下，在上述步骤1501中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带已经选择的安全算法，可选地，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中可以携带终端或者业务或者终端组或者业务组支持的安全算法列表；在上述步骤1502中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带已经选择的安全算法，可选地，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中可以携带终端或者 业务或者终端组或者业务组支持的安全算法列表。
需要说明的是，上述方案中，核心网节点计算的MAC(即第一MAC)，通过步骤1503和步骤1506传递给终端。终端计算的RES(即第一RES)，通过步骤1508和步骤1509传递给核心网节点。
需要说明的是，上述方案中，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则在执行完步骤1507后，安全认证过程结束。如果是双向认证过程，即网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则在执行完步骤1507后，还要接着执行步骤1508，即终端计算RES(称为第一RES)并将该RES发送给接入网节点，接入网节点通过步骤1509将第一RES发送给核心网节点，核心网节点根据之前自己生成的RES(称为第二RES)和终端发送的RES进行比较，以确认终端发送的RES是否有效，如果有效则认为终端是合法的，否则则认为终端是不合法的。如果核心网节点确认终端是合法的，则继续执行步骤1511，完成数据通信过程；如果核心网节点确认终端是不合法的，则在执行完步骤1510后，核心网节点终止数据传输，丢弃已经收到的数据。
上述方案中，安全认证输入参数可以包含但不限于如下参数：随机数、安全算法、业务标识、业务类别。
应用实例三
本应用实例中，终端认证业务控制节点，从而完成单向认证过程。进一步，可选地，业务控制节点认证终端，从而完成双向认证过程。
本应用实例中，产生和/或配置根密钥的节点可以是核心网节点，或者可以是数据中心节点，或者可以是业务控制节点。无论哪个节点产生和/或配置根密钥，根密钥都会存储在终端和数据中心节点内部。在一些可选实施方式中，根密钥可以是per终端配置的，也可以是per业务配置的，也可以是per终端组配置的，也可以是per业务组配置的。此外，安全算法也会分别存储在终端和数据中心节点内部。
图16是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图五，如图16所示，所述安全认证方法包括以下步骤：
步骤1601：业务控制节点根据根密钥和安全信息计算MAC(称为第一MAC)。
步骤1602：业务控制节点向核心网节点发送请求终端上报数据命令，携带第一MAC和安全信息。
这里，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。这里，请求终端上报数据命令中携带的这些信息用于指示核心网节点请求哪些终端上报数据。
步骤1603：核心网节点向接入网节点发送请求终端上报数据命令，携带第一MAC和安全信息。
这里，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。这里，请求终端上报数据命令中携带的这些信息用于指示接入网节点请求哪些终端上报数据。
步骤1604：接入网节点向核心网节点发送请求终端上报数据响应。
步骤1605：核心网节点向业务控制节点发送请求终端上报数据响应。
这里，核心网节点可以在步骤1604之后，向业务控制节点发送针对步骤1601的响应，即请求终端上报数据响应。
步骤1606：接入网节点向终端发送请求终端上报数据命令，携带第一MAC和安全信息。
这里，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1607：终端根据根密钥和安全信息计算MAC(称为第二MAC)，终端比较计算的第二MAC和来自网络的第一MAC，基于比较结果确定业务控制节点是否合法。
这里，终端接收到请求终端上报数据命令后，根据安全认证输入参数和存储的根密钥计算终端侧的MAC(即第二MAC)，并将终端侧计算的MAC和网络侧下发的MAC进行比较，根据比较结果确定业务控制节点是否合法。
具体地，若所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC一致，则验证结果是业务控制节点是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC不一致，则验证结果是业务控制节点是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
这里，若终端验证业务控制节点是不合法的，那么，终端会丢弃来自网络侧的命令和/或配置，流程结束。若终端验证业务控制节点是合法的，那么，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。如果是双向认证过程，即网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则终端会接着执行以下步骤1608。
步骤1608：终端计算RES(称为第一RES)，向接入网节点发送数据上报请求命令，携带终端上报的数据和第一RES。
这里，终端可以根据根密钥和随机数计算RES，称为第一RES。可选地，随机数可以来自网络侧。
这里，可选地，所述数据上报请求命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1609：接入网节点向核心网节点转发终端上报的数据和第一RES。
这里，可选地，接入网节点向核心网节点转发终端上报的数据的同时，还携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1610：核心网节点向业务控制节点转发终端上报的数据和第一RES。
这里，可选地，核心网节点向业务控制节点转发终端上报的数据的同时，还携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1611：核心网节点向接入网节点发送确认消息，该确认消息用于确认收到终端上报的数据。
步骤1612：业务控制节点比较计算的第二RES和来自终端的第一RES，基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。
这里，业务控制节点可以根据根密钥和随机数计算RES，称为第二RES。业务控制节点接收到第一RES后，比较所述第一RES和所述第二RES，并基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。具体地，若所述第二RES和所述第一RES一致，则验证结果是终端是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二RES和所述第一RES不一致，则验证结果是终端是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
这里，若业务控制节点验证终端是不合法的，那么，业务控制节点会拒绝并丢弃来自终端的数据，流程结束。若业务控制节点验证终端是合法的，那么，业务控制节点会接受来自终端是数据。
上述方案中，安全认证输入参数可以由业务控制节点产生。
选项1)安全认证输入参数由业务控制节点产生的情况下，在上述步骤1601中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带安全认证输入参数；在上述步骤1602中，核心网控制节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带安全认证输入参数。
上述方案中，安全算法可以由业务控制节点选择，或者由核心网节点选择，或者由接入网节点选择。
选项A)安全算法由业务控制节点选择的情况下，在上述步骤1601中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带已经选择的安全算法；在上述步骤1602中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带已经选择的安全算法。
选项B)安全算法由核心网节点选择的情况下，在上述步骤1601中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带已经选择的安全算法，可选地，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中可以携带终端或者业务或者终端组或者业务组支持的安全算法列表；在上述步骤1602中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中携带已经选择的安全算法。
选项C)安全算法由接入网节点选择的情况下，在上述步骤1601中，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带已经选择的安全算法，可选地，业务控制节点向核心网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中可以携带终端或者业务或者终端组或者业务组支持的安全算法列表；在上述步骤1602中，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中不携带已经选择的安全算法，可选地，核心网节点向接入网节点发送的请求终端上报数据命令中可以携带终端或者业务或者终端组或者业务组支持的安全算法列表。
需要说明的是，上述方案中，业务控制节点计算的MAC(即第一MAC)，通过步骤1602、步骤1603和步骤1606传递给终端。终端计算的RES(即第一RES)，通过步骤1608、步骤1609和步骤1610传递给业务控制节点。
需要说明的是，上述方案中，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则在执行完步骤1607后，安全认证过程结束。如果是双向认证过程，即网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则在执行完步骤1607后，还要接着执行步骤1608，即终端计算RES(称为第一RES)并将该RES发 送给接入网节点，接入网节点通过步骤1609将第一RES发送给核心网节点，核心网节点通过步骤1610将第一RES发送给业务控制节点，业务控制节点根据之前自己生成的RES(称为第二RES)和终端发送的RES进行比较，以确认终端发送的RES是否有效，如果有效则认为终端是合法的，否则则认为终端是不合法的。如果业务控制节点确认终端是合法的，则接受终端的数据；如果业务控制节点确认终端是不合法的，则终止数据传输并丢弃已经收到的数据。
上述方案中，安全认证输入参数可以包含但不限于如下参数：随机数、安全算法、业务标识、业务类别。
应用实例四
本应用实例中，终端认证网络侧，从而完成单向认证过程。进一步，可选地，网络侧认证终端，从而完成双向认证过程。本应用实例，和上述应用实例一、应用实例二、应用实例三是类似的，网络侧可以是接入网节点、或者核心网节点、或者业务控制节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，终端认证接入网节点，从而完成单向认证过程。进一步，可选地，接入网节点认证终端，从而完成双向认证过程。
在一些可选实施方式中，终端认证核心网节点，从而完成单向认证过程。进一步，可选地，核心网节点认证终端，从而完成双向认证过程。
在一些可选实施方式中，终端认证业务控制节点，从而完成单向认证过程。进一步，可选地，业务控制节点认证终端，从而完成双向认证过程。
本应用实例中，网络侧和终端都配置一个或两个令牌(token)，以及一个或两个算法。网络侧的接入网节点或者核心网节点或者业务控制节点负责基于第一原始令牌和第一算法来计算第一令牌，并将第一令牌发送给终端；终端使用配置的第一算法对接收到的第一令牌进行逆运算，获得第一目标令牌，对第一目标令牌和第一原始令牌进行比较，基于比较结果确定网络侧是否合法。这里，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。如果是双向认证过程，即网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则终端会基于第二原始令牌和第一算法或第二算法来计算第二令牌，并将第二令牌发送给网络侧的接入网节点或者核心网节点或者业务控制节点，接入网节点或者核心网节点或者业务控制节点使用第一算法或第二算法对接收到的第二令牌进行逆运算，获得第二目标令牌，对第二目标令牌和第二原始令牌进行比较，基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。
以下以网络侧为业务控制节点为例进行说明，网络侧为核心网节点或者接入网节点的情况类似。
图17是本申请实施例提供的安全认证方法的流程示意图六，如图17所示，所述安全认证方法包括以下步骤：
步骤1701：业务控制节点向核心网节点发送请求终端上报数据命令，携带第一令牌。
这里，业务控制节点根据第一算法对第一原始令牌进行处理，获得第一令牌。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。这里，请求终端上报数据命令中携带的这些信息用于指示核心网节点请求哪些终端上报数据。
步骤1702：核心网节点向接入网节点发送请求终端上报数据命令，携带第一令牌。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。这里，请求终端上报数据命令中携带的这些信息用于指示接入网节点请求哪些终端上报数据。
步骤1703：接入网节点向核心网节点发送请求终端上报数据响应。
步骤1704：核心网节点向业务控制节点发送请求终端上报数据响应。
这里，核心网节点可以在步骤1603之后，向业务控制节点发送针对步骤1701的响应，即请求终端上报数据响应。
步骤1705：接入网节点向终端发送请求终端上报数据命令，携带第一令牌。
这里，可选地，所述请求终端上报数据命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1706：终端根据第一算法对第一令牌进行逆运算，获得第一目标令牌；终端比较第一目标令牌和第一原始令牌，基于比较结果确定网络侧是否合法。
具体地，若所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌一致，则验证结果是网络侧是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌不一致，则验证结果是网络侧是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
这里，若终端验证网络侧是不合法的，那么，终端会丢弃来自网络侧的命令和/或配置，流程结 束。若终端验证网络侧是合法的，那么，如果是单向认证过程，即只有终端验证网络侧的合法性，则安全认证过程结束。如果是双向认证过程，即网络侧也要验证终端的合法性，则终端会接着执行以下步骤1707。
步骤1707：终端根据第一算法或第二算法对第二原始令牌进行处理，得到第二令牌，向接入网节点发送数据上报请求命令，携带终端上报的数据和第二令牌。
这里，可选地，所述数据上报请求命令中携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1708：接入网节点向核心网节点转发终端上报的数据和第二令牌。
这里，可选地，接入网节点向核心网节点转发终端上报的数据的同时，还携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1709：核心网节点向业务控制节点转发终端上报的数据和第二令牌。
这里，可选地，核心网节点向业务控制节点转发终端上报的数据的同时，还携带如下至少一种信息：终端标识、业务标识、终端组标识、业务组标识。
步骤1710：核心网节点向接入网节点发送确认消息，该确认消息用于确认收到终端上报的数据。
步骤1711：业务控制节点根据第一算法或第二算法对第二令牌进行逆运算，获得第二目标令牌；业务控制节点比较第二目标令牌和第二原始令牌，基于比较结果确定终端是否合法。
具体地，若所述第二目标令牌和所述第二原始令牌一致，则验证结果是终端是合法的(即验证通过)；若所述第二目标令牌和所述第二原始令牌不一致，则验证结果是终端是不合法的(即验证不通过)。
这里，若业务控制节点验证终端是不合法的，那么，业务控制节点会拒绝并丢弃来自终端的数据，流程结束。若业务控制节点验证终端是合法的，那么，业务控制节点会接受来自终端是数据。
应用实例五
本应用实例可以与前述应用实例一至应用实例四中的任意应用实例进行结合来实施。
在一些可选实施方式中，如果终端与网络侧进行了单向认证，那么，数据发送端可以通过对待传输的数据进行完整性保护，从而实现接收端对发送端的合法性验证。
在一些可选实施方式中，如果终端与网络侧进行了双向认证，那么，终端与网络侧之间传输的数据可以不进行完整性保护。
在一些可选实施方式中，针对待传输的数据，每个数据都携带一个码流，所述码流为终端配置的码流，并写在终端和数据中心节点侧。终端上传的数据都携带经过算法处理的码流，基站通过对该码流的逆操作处理来确定所述数据是否安全有效。所述算法可以是简单的安全算法，并配置给终端，且写在终端和数据中心节点侧。也就是说，码流和算法都是网络侧和终端已知的配置。
在一些可选实施方式中，针对待传输的数据进行安全处理。其中，在网络侧，可以由业务控制节点或者核心网节点执行安全处理，这种情况下，空口传输的是经过安全保护的密文，安全执行对于空口来说透明的。在网络侧，也可以由接入网节点侧的PDCP层执行安全处理。在终端侧，由终端执行安全处理。需要说明的是，对于数据接收端来说，安全处理是指安全加密，对于数据接收端来说，安全处理是指安全解密。无论哪一个节点执行安全处理，执行安全处理所依据的密钥可以是根密钥或者也可以是根据根密钥和指定参数衍生的密钥，或者，执行安全处理不依据任何密钥，发送端根据预先设定或者预先配置的算法对待传输的数据进行处理，接收端对接收到的数据进行逆处理。
本申请实施例的技术方案，考虑了零功耗终端内存小、电力有限、数据处理能力有限的特点，提出了为零功耗终端特性的安全处理方式。具体地，定义了零功耗通信***中的节点之间的安全认证方法和流程，以及定义了对于数据安全处理的方法。
以上结合附图详细描述了本申请的优选实施方式，但是，本申请并不限于上述实施方式中的具体细节，在本申请的技术构思范围内，可以对本申请的技术方案进行多种简单变型，这些简单变型均属于本申请的保护范围。例如，在上述具体实施方式中所描述的各个具体技术特征，在不矛盾的情况下，可以通过任何合适的方式进行组合，为了避免不必要的重复，本申请对各种可能的组合方式不再另行说明。又例如，本申请的各种不同的实施方式之间也可以进行任意组合，只要其不违背本申请的思想，其同样应当视为本申请所公开的内容。又例如，在不冲突的前提下，本申请描述的各个实施例和/或各个实施例中的技术特征可以和现有技术任意的相互组合，组合之后得到的技术方案也应落入本申请的保护范围。
还应理解，在本申请的各种方法实施例中，上述各过程的序号的大小并不意味着执行顺序的先 后，各过程的执行顺序应以其功能和内在逻辑确定，而不应对本申请实施例的实施过程构成任何限定。此外，在本申请实施例中，术语“下行”、“上行”和“侧行”用于表示信号或数据的传输方向，其中，“下行”用于表示信号或数据的传输方向为从站点发送至小区的用户设备的第一方向，“上行”用于表示信号或数据的传输方向为从小区的用户设备发送至站点的第二方向，“侧行”用于表示信号或数据的传输方向为从用户设备1发送至用户设备2的第三方向。例如，“下行信号”表示该信号的传输方向为第一方向。另外，本申请实施例中，术语“和/或”，仅仅是一种描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系。具体地，A和/或B可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B这三种情况。另外，本文中字符“/”，一般表示前后关联对象是一种“或”的关系。
图18是本申请实施例提供的安全认证装置的结构组成示意图，应用于终端，在一些可选实施方式中，如图18所示，所述安全认证装置包括：
接收单元1801，用于接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一MAC和安全信息；
处理单元1802，用于基于根密钥和所述安全信息，生成第二MAC；
验证单元1803，用于基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证网络侧的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述根密钥由以下其中一种节点产生和/或配置：核心网节点、数据中心节点、业务控制节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述根密钥是针对终端配置的；或者，所述根密钥是针对业务配置的；或者，所述根密钥是针对终端组配置的；或者，所述根密钥是针对业务组配置的。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述根密钥存储在所述终端侧和/或数据中心节点侧。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧存储有多个根密钥，所述多个根密钥中的每个根密钥对应一个密钥索引；
所述接收单元1801，还用于接收第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示第一密钥索引；
所述装置还包括：确定单元，用于基于所述第一密钥索引确定用于生成所述第二MAC的根密钥。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述网络侧为接入网节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法；其中，
所述安全认证输入参数由以下其中一种节点产生：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点；
所述安全算法由以下其中一种节点选择：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一MAC由所述接入网节点基于根密钥和所述安全信息生成，由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述验证单元1802，用于比较所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，并基于比较结果确定所述接入网节点是否合法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述处理单元1802，还用于计算第一RES；
所述装置还包括：发送单元1804，用于向所述接入网节点发送所述第一RES；所述第一RES用于所述接入网节点根据自身生成的第二RES验证所述终端的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述网络侧为核心网节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法；其中，
所述安全认证输入参数由以下其中一种节点产生：业务控制节点、核心网节点；
所述安全算法由以下其中一种节点选择：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一MAC由所述核心网节点基于根密钥和所述安全信息生成，由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息；由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述验证单元1802，用于比较所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，并基于比较结果确定所述核心网节点是否合法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述处理单元1802，还用于计算第一RES；
所述装置还包括：发送单元1804，用于通过接入网节点向所述核心网节点发送所述第一RES；所述第一RES用于所述核心网节点根据自身生成的第二RES验证所述终端的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述网络侧为业务控制节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法；其中，
所述安全认证输入参数由以下其中一种节点产生：业务控制节点；
所述安全算法由以下其中一种节点选择：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一MAC由所述业务控制节点基于根密钥和所述安全信息生成，由所述业务控制节点发送给所述核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息；由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述验证单元1802，用于比较所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，并基于比较结果确定所述业务控制节点是否合法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述处理单元1802，还用于计算第一RES；
所述装置还包括：发送单元1804，用于通过接入网节点和核心网节点向所述业务控制节点发送所述第一RES；所述第一RES用于所述业务控制节点根据自身生成的第二RES验证所述终端的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全认证输入参数由业务控制节点产生的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全认证输入参数由核心网节点产生的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中不携带所述安全认证输入参数；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全认证输入参数由接入网节点产生的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中不携带所述安全认证输入参数；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中不携带所述安全认证输入参数。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全认证输入参数包括以下至少之一：随机数、业务标识、业务标识、业务类别。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全算法由业务控制节点选择的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述选择的安全算法；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全算法由核心网节点选择的情况下，由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
在一些可选实施方式中，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带第一安全算法列表，所述第一安全算法列表用于所述核心网节点选择使用的安全算法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全算法由接入网节点选择的情况下，由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带第一安全算法列表；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一安全算法列表；其中，所述第一安全算法列表用于所述接入网节点选择使用的安全算法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一安全算法列表为所述终端支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端所述的终端组支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务所属的业务组支持的安全算法列表。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述装置还包括：通信单元，用于与所述网络侧之间传输数据。
在一些可选实施方式中，若所述终端与所述网络侧进行了单向认证，则所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输的数据需要经过完整性保护。
在一些可选实施方式中，若所述终端与所述网络侧进行了双向认证，则所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输的数据不需要经过完整性保护。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有至少一个码流和至少一个算法，所述至少一个码流包括第一码流，所述至少一个算法包括第一算法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述数据携带第一目标码流，所述第一目标码流由所述数据的发送端基于所述第一码流和所述第一算法生成；其中，所述第一目标码流用于所述数据的接收端基于所述第一码流和所述第一算法验证所述第一目标码流的有效性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述数据经过第一密钥和/或第一算法进行安全加密处理。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一密钥为根密钥或者基于根密钥衍生出的密钥。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一算法的输入参数包括所述第一密钥和所述数据；或者，所述第一算法的输入参数包括所述数据。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全加密处理在网络侧，由核心网节点执行或者由业务控制节点执行或者由接入网节点的PDCP层执行。
本领域技术人员应当理解，本申请实施例的上述安全认证装置的相关描述可以参照本申请实施例的安全认证方法的相关描述进行理解。
图18是本申请实施例提供的安全认证装置的结构组成示意图，应用于终端，在一些可选实施方式中，如图18所示，所述安全认证装置包括：
接收单元1801，用于接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌；
处理单元1802，用于基于第一算法对所述第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌；
验证单元1803，用于基于所述第一目标令牌，验证网络侧的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述网络侧为接入网节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第一原始令牌和第一算法，其中，所述第一令牌由所述接入网节点基于所述第一原始令牌和所述第一算法生成；
由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一令牌。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述验证单元1803，用于比较所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述接入网节点是否合法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌和第二算法；
所述处理单元1802，还用于基于所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
所述装置还包括：发送单元1804，用于向所述接入网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述接入网节点根据所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌；
所述处理单元1802，还用于基于所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
所述装置还包括：发送单元1804，用于向所述接入网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述接入网节点根据所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述网络侧为核心网节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第一原始令牌和第一算法，其中，所述第一令牌由所述核心网节点基于所述第一原始令牌和所述第一算法生成；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一令牌；由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述所述第一令牌。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述验证单元1803，用于比较所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述核心网节点是否合法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌和第二算法；
所述处理单元1802，还用于基于所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
所述装置还包括：发送单元1804，用于通过接入网节点向所述核心网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述核心网节点根据所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌；
所述处理单元1802，还用于基于所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
所述装置还包括：发送单元1804，用于通过接入网节点向所述核心网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述核心网节点根据所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述网络侧为业务控制节点。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第一原始令牌和第一算法，其中，所述第一令牌由所述业务控制节点基于所述第一原始令牌和所述第一算法生成；由所述业务控制节点发送给所述核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述第一令牌；由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一令牌；由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述所述第一令牌。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述验证单元1803，用于比较所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述业务控制节点是否合法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌和第二算法；
所述处理单元1802，还用于基于所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
所述装置还包括：发送单元1804，用于通过接入网节点和核心网节点向所述业务控制节点发 送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述业务控制节点根据所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌；
所述处理单元1802，还用于基于所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
所述装置还包括：发送单元1804，用于通过接入网节点和核心网节点向所述业务控制节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述业务控制节点根据所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述装置还包括：通信单元，用于与所述网络侧之间传输数据。
在一些可选实施方式中，若所述终端与所述网络侧进行了单向认证，则所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输的数据需要经过完整性保护。
在一些可选实施方式中，若所述终端与所述网络侧进行了双向认证，则所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输的数据不需要经过完整性保护。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有至少一个码流和至少一个算法，所述至少一个码流包括第一码流，所述至少一个算法包括第一算法。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述数据携带第一目标码流，所述第一目标码流由所述数据的发送端基于所述第一码流和所述第一算法生成；
其中，所述第一目标码流用于所述数据的接收端基于所述第一码流和所述第一算法验证所述第一目标码流的有效性。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述数据经过第一密钥和/或第一算法进行安全加密处理。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一密钥为根密钥或者基于根密钥衍生出的密钥。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述第一算法的输入参数包括所述第一密钥和所述数据；或者，所述第一算法的输入参数包括所述数据。
在一些可选实施方式中，所述安全加密处理在网络侧，由核心网节点执行或者由业务控制节点执行或者由接入网节点的PDCP层执行。
本领域技术人员应当理解，本申请实施例的上述安全认证装置的相关描述可以参照本申请实施例的安全认证方法的相关描述进行理解。
图19是本申请实施例提供的一种通信设备1900示意性结构图。该通信设备可以终端设备(如零功耗终端)，也可以是网络设备(如接入网节点、核心网节点、数据中心节点、业务控制节点)。图19所示的通信设备1900包括处理器1910，处理器1910可以从存储器中调用并运行计算机程序，以实现本申请实施例中的方法。
可选地，如图19所示，通信设备1900还可以包括存储器1920。其中，处理器1910可以从存储器1920中调用并运行计算机程序，以实现本申请实施例中的方法。
其中，存储器1920可以是独立于处理器1910的一个单独的器件，也可以集成在处理器1910中。
可选地，如图19所示，通信设备1900还可以包括收发器1930，处理器1910可以控制该收发器1930与其他设备进行通信，具体地，可以向其他设备发送信息或数据，或接收其他设备发送的信息或数据。
其中，收发器1930可以包括发射机和接收机。收发器1930还可以进一步包括天线，天线的数量可以为一个或多个。
可选地，该通信设备1900具体可为本申请实施例的网络设备，并且该通信设备1900可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由网络设备实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
可选地，该通信设备1900具体可为本申请实施例的零功耗终端，并且该通信设备1700可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由零功耗终端实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
图20是本申请实施例的芯片的示意性结构图。图20所示的芯片2000包括处理器2010，处理器2010可以从存储器中调用并运行计算机程序，以实现本申请实施例中的方法。
可选地，如图20所示，芯片2000还可以包括存储器2020。其中，处理器2010可以从存储器2020中调用并运行计算机程序，以实现本申请实施例中的方法。
其中，存储器2020可以是独立于处理器2010的一个单独的器件，也可以集成在处理器2010中。
可选地，该芯片2000还可以包括输入接口2030。其中，处理器2010可以控制该输入接口2030与其他设备或芯片进行通信，具体地，可以获取其他设备或芯片发送的信息或数据。
可选地，该芯片2000还可以包括输出接口2040。其中，处理器2010可以控制该输出接口2040与其他设备或芯片进行通信，具体地，可以向其他设备或芯片输出信息或数据。
可选地，该芯片可应用于本申请实施例中的网络设备，并且该芯片可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由网络设备实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
可选地，该芯片可应用于本申请实施例中的零功耗终端，并且该芯片可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由零功耗终端实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
应理解，本申请实施例提到的芯片还可以称为***级芯片，***芯片，芯片***或片上***芯片等。
图21是本申请实施例提供的一种通信***2100的示意性框图。如图21所示，该通信***2100包括终端设备2110和网络设备2120。
其中，该终端设备2110可以用于实现上述方法中由零功耗终端实现的相应的功能，以及该网络设备2120可以用于实现上述方法中由网络设备实现的相应的功能为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
应理解，本申请实施例的处理器可能是一种集成电路芯片，具有信号的处理能力。在实现过程中，上述方法实施例的各步骤可以通过处理器中的硬件的集成逻辑电路或者软件形式的指令完成。上述的处理器可以是通用处理器、数字信号处理器(Digital Signal Processor，DSP)、专用集成电路(Application Specific Integrated Circuit，ASIC)、现成可编程门阵列(Field Programmable Gate Array，FPGA)或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件。可以实现或者执行本申请实施例中的公开的各方法、步骤及逻辑框图。通用处理器可以是微处理器或者该处理器也可以是任何常规的处理器等。结合本申请实施例所公开的方法的步骤可以直接体现为硬件译码处理器执行完成，或者用译码处理器中的硬件及软件模块组合执行完成。软件模块可以位于随机存储器，闪存、只读存储器，可编程只读存储器或者电可擦写可编程存储器、寄存器等本领域成熟的存储介质中。该存储介质位于存储器，处理器读取存储器中的信息，结合其硬件完成上述方法的步骤。
可以理解，本申请实施例中的存储器可以是易失性存储器或非易失性存储器，或可包括易失性和非易失性存储器两者。其中，非易失性存储器可以是只读存储器(Read-Only Memory，ROM)、可编程只读存储器(Programmable ROM，PROM)、可擦除可编程只读存储器(Erasable PROM，EPROM)、电可擦除可编程只读存储器(Electrically EPROM，EEPROM)或闪存。易失性存储器可以是随机存取存储器(Random Access Memory，RAM)，其用作外部高速缓存。通过示例性但不是限制性说明，许多形式的RAM可用，例如静态随机存取存储器(Static RAM，SRAM)、动态随机存取存储器(Dynamic RAM，DRAM)、同步动态随机存取存储器(Synchronous DRAM，SDRAM)、双倍数据速率同步动态随机存取存储器(Double Data Rate SDRAM，DDR SDRAM)、增强型同步动态随机存取存储器(Enhanced SDRAM，ESDRAM)、同步连接动态随机存取存储器(Synchlink DRAM，SLDRAM)和直接内存总线随机存取存储器(Direct Rambus RAM，DR RAM)。应注意，本文描述的***和方法的存储器旨在包括但不限于这些和任意其它适合类型的存储器。
应理解，上述存储器为示例性但不是限制性说明，例如，本申请实施例中的存储器还可以是静态随机存取存储器(static RAM，SRAM)、动态随机存取存储器(dynamic RAM，DRAM)、同步动态随机存取存储器(synchronous DRAM，SDRAM)、双倍数据速率同步动态随机存取存储器(double data rate SDRAM，DDR SDRAM)、增强型同步动态随机存取存储器(enhanced SDRAM，ESDRAM)、同步连接动态随机存取存储器(synch link DRAM，SLDRAM)以及直接内存总线随机存取存储器(Direct Rambus RAM，DR RAM)等等。也就是说，本申请实施例中的存储器旨在包括但不限于这些和任意其它适合类型的存储器。
本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，用于存储计算机程序。
可选的，该计算机可读存储介质可应用于本申请实施例中的网络设备，并且该计算机程序使得计算机执行本申请实施例的各个方法中由网络设备实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
可选地，该计算机可读存储介质可应用于本申请实施例中的零功耗终端，并且该计算机程序使得计算机执行本申请实施例的各个方法中由零功耗终端实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机程序产品，包括计算机程序指令。
可选的，该计算机程序产品可应用于本申请实施例中的网络设备，并且该计算机程序指令使得计算机执行本申请实施例的各个方法中由网络设备实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
可选地，该计算机程序产品可应用于本申请实施例中的零功耗终端，并且该计算机程序指令使得计算机执行本申请实施例的各个方法中由零功耗终端实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机程序。
可选的，该计算机程序可应用于本申请实施例中的网络设备，当该计算机程序在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行本申请实施例的各个方法中由网络设备实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再 赘述。
可选地，该计算机程序可应用于本申请实施例中的零功耗终端，当该计算机程序在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行本申请实施例的各个方法中由零功耗终端实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
本领域普通技术人员可以意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，能够以电子硬件、或者计算机软件和电子硬件的结合来实现。这些功能究竟以硬件还是软件方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，为描述的方便和简洁，上述描述的***、装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的***、装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个***，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各个单元单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。
所述功能如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(Read-Only Memory，)ROM、随机存取存储器(Random Access Memory，RAM)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应所述以权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (70)

  1. 一种安全认证方法，所述方法包括：
    终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一消息验证码MAC和安全信息；
    所述终端基于根密钥和所述安全信息，生成第二MAC；
    所述终端基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证网络侧的合法性。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述根密钥由以下其中一种节点产生和/或配置：核心网节点、数据中心节点、业务控制节点。
  3. 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法，其中，
    所述根密钥是针对终端配置的；或者，
    所述根密钥是针对业务配置的；或者，
    所述根密钥是针对终端组配置的；或者，
    所述根密钥是针对业务组配置的。
  4. 根据权利要求1至3中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述根密钥存储在所述终端侧和/或数据中心节点侧。
  5. 根据权利要求1至4中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧存储有多个根密钥，所述多个根密钥中的每个根密钥对应一个密钥索引；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述终端接收第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示第一密钥索引；
    所述终端基于所述第一密钥索引确定用于生成所述第二MAC的根密钥。
  6. 根据权利要求1至5中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述网络侧为接入网节点。
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的方法，其中，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法；其中，
    所述安全认证输入参数由以下其中一种节点产生：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点；
    所述安全算法由以下其中一种节点选择：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点。
  8. 根据权利要求6或7所述的方法，其中，所述第一MAC由所述接入网节点基于根密钥和所述安全信息生成，
    由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息。
  9. 根据权利要求6至8中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述终端基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证网络侧的合法性，包括：
    所述终端比较所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，并基于比较结果确定所述接入网节点是否合法。
  10. 根据权利要求6至9中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端计算第一认证响应RES，向所述接入网节点发送所述第一RES；
    所述第一RES用于所述接入网节点根据自身生成的第二RES验证所述终端的合法性。
  11. 根据权利要求1至5中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述网络侧为核心网节点。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其中，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法；其中，
    所述安全认证输入参数由以下其中一种节点产生：业务控制节点、核心网节点；
    所述安全算法由以下其中一种节点选择：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点。
  13. 根据权利要求11或12所述的方法，其中，所述第一MAC由所述核心网节点基于根密钥和所述安全信息生成，
    由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息；
    由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息。
  14. 根据权利要求11至13中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述终端基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证网络侧的合法性，包括：
    所述终端比较所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，并基于比较结果确定所述核心网节点是否合法。
  15. 根据权利要求11至14中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端计算第一RES，通过接入网节点向所述核心网节点发送所述第一RES；
    所述第一RES用于所述核心网节点根据自身生成的第二RES验证所述终端的合法性。
  16. 根据权利要求1至5中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述网络侧为业务控制节点。
  17. 根据权利要求16所述的方法，其中，所述安全信息包括以下至少之一：安全认证输入参数、安全算法；其中，
    所述安全认证输入参数由以下其中一种节点产生：业务控制节点；
    所述安全算法由以下其中一种节点选择：业务控制节点、核心网节点、接入网节点。
  18. 根据权利要求16或17所述的方法，其中，所述第一MAC由所述业务控制节点基于根密钥和所述安全信息生成，
    由所述业务控制节点发送给所述核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息；
    由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息；
    由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一MAC和所述安全信息。
  19. 根据权利要求16至18中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述终端基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证网络侧的合法性，包括：
    所述终端比较所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，并基于比较结果确定所述业务控制节点是否合法。
  20. 根据权利要求16至19中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端计算第一RES，通过接入网节点和核心网节点向所述业务控制节点发送所述第一RES；
    所述第一RES用于所述业务控制节点根据自身生成的第二RES验证所述终端的合法性。
  21. 根据权利要求7、12、17中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述安全认证输入参数由业务控制节点产生的情况下，
    由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数；
    由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。
  22. 根据权利要求7或12所述的方法，其中，所述安全认证输入参数由核心网节点产生的情况下，
    由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中不携带所述安全认证输入参数；
    由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述安全认证输入参数。
  23. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其中，所述安全认证输入参数由接入网节点产生的情况下，
    由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中不携带所述安全认证输入参数；
    由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中不携带所述安全认证输入参数。
  24. 根据权利要求7、12、17、21至23中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述安全认证输入参数包括以下至少之一：随机数、业务标识、业务标识、业务类别。
  25. 根据权利要求7、12、17中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述安全算法由业务控制节点选择的情况下，
    由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述选择的安全算法；
    由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
  26. 根据权利要求7、12、17中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述安全算法由核心网节点选择的情况下，
    由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述选择的安全算法。
  27. 根据权利要求25所述的方法，其中，
    由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带第一安全算法列表，所述第一安全算法列表用于所述核心网节点选择使用的安全算法。
  28. 根据权利要求7、12、17中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述安全算法由接入网节点选择的情况下，
    由所述业务控制节点发送给核心网节点的第三命令中携带第一安全算法列表；
    由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一安全算法列表；
    其中，所述第一安全算法列表用于所述接入网节点选择使用的安全算法。
  29. 根据权利要求26或27所述的方法，其中，所述第一安全算法列表为所述终端支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务支持的安全算法列表或者所述终端所述的终端组支持的安 全算法列表或者所述终端加入的业务所属的业务组支持的安全算法列表。
  30. 根据权利要求1至29中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输数据。
  31. 根据权利要求30所述的方法，其中，若所述终端与所述网络侧进行了单向认证，则所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输的数据需要经过完整性保护。
  32. 根据权利要求30所述的方法，其中，若所述终端与所述网络侧进行了双向认证，则所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输的数据不需要经过完整性保护。
  33. 根据权利要求30所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有至少一个码流和至少一个算法，所述至少一个码流包括第一码流，所述至少一个算法包括第一算法。
  34. 根据权利要求33所述的方法，其中，所述数据携带第一目标码流，所述第一目标码流由所述数据的发送端基于所述第一码流和所述第一算法生成；
    其中，所述第一目标码流用于所述数据的接收端基于所述第一码流和所述第一算法验证所述第一目标码流的有效性。
  35. 根据权利要求30至34中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述数据经过第一密钥和/或第一算法进行安全加密处理。
  36. 根据权利要求35所述的方法，其中，所述第一密钥为根密钥或者基于根密钥衍生出的密钥。
  37. 根据权利要求35所述的方法，其中，
    所述第一算法的输入参数包括所述第一密钥和所述数据；或者，
    所述第一算法的输入参数包括所述数据。
  38. 根据权利要求35至37中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述安全加密处理在网络侧，由核心网节点执行或者由业务控制节点执行或者由接入网节点的PDCP层执行。
  39. 一种安全认证方法，所述方法包括：
    终端接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌；
    所述终端基于第一算法对所述第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌；
    所述终端基于所述第一目标令牌，验证网络侧的合法性。
  40. 根据权利要求39所述的方法，其中，所述网络侧为接入网节点。
  41. 根据权利要求40所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第一原始令牌和第一算法，其中，所述第一令牌由所述接入网节点基于所述第一原始令牌和所述第一算法生成；
    由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述第一令牌。
  42. 根据权利要求41所述的方法，其中，所述终端基于所述第一目标令牌，验证网络侧的合法性，包括：
    所述终端比较所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述接入网节点是否合法。
  43. 根据权利要求41或42所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌和第二算法；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述终端基于所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
    所述终端向所述接入网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述接入网节点根据所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
  44. 根据权利要求41或42所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述终端基于所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
    所述终端向所述接入网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述接入网节点根据所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
  45. 根据权利要求39所述的方法，其中，所述网络侧为核心网节点。
  46. 根据权利要求45所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第一原始令牌和第一算法，其中，所述第一令牌由所述核心网节点基于所述第一原始令牌和所述第一算法生成；
    由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一令牌；
    由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述所述第一令牌。
  47. 根据权利要求46所述的方法，其中，所述终端基于所述第一目标令牌，验证网络侧的合法性，包括：
    所述终端比较所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述核心网节点是否合法。
  48. 根据权利要求46或47所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌和第二算法；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述终端基于所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
    所述终端通过接入网节点向所述核心网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述核心网节点根据所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
  49. 根据权利要求46或47所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述终端基于所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
    所述终端通过接入网节点向所述核心网节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述核心网节点根据所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
  50. 根据权利要求39所述的方法，其中，所述网络侧为业务控制节点。
  51. 根据权利要求50所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第一原始令牌和第一算法，其中，所述第一令牌由所述业务控制节点基于所述第一原始令牌和所述第一算法生成；
    由所述业务控制节点发送给所述核心网节点的第三命令中携带所述第一令牌；
    由所述核心网节点发送给接入网节点的第二命令中携带所述第一令牌；
    由所述接入网节点发送给所述终端的第一命令中携带所述所述第一令牌。
  52. 根据权利要求51所述的方法，其中，所述终端基于所述第一目标令牌，验证网络侧的合法性，包括：
    所述终端比较所述第一目标令牌和所述第一原始令牌，基于比较结果确定所述业务控制节点是否合法。
  53. 根据权利要求51或52所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌和第二算法；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述终端基于所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
    所述终端通过接入网节点和核心网节点向所述业务控制节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述业务控制节点根据所述第二算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
  54. 根据权利要求51或52所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有第二原始令牌；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述终端基于所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌，生成第二令牌；
    所述终端通过接入网节点和核心网节点向所述业务控制节点发送所述第二令牌，所述第二令牌用于所述业务控制节点根据所述第一算法和所述第二原始令牌验证所述终端的合法性。
  55. 根据权利要求39至54中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输数据。
  56. 根据权利要求55所述的方法，其中，若所述终端与所述网络侧进行了单向认证，则所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输的数据需要经过完整性保护。
  57. 根据权利要求55所述的方法，其中，若所述终端与所述网络侧进行了双向认证，则所述终端与所述网络侧之间传输的数据不需要经过完整性保护。
  58. 根据权利要求55所述的方法，其中，所述终端侧和所述网络侧存储有至少一个码流和至少一个算法，所述至少一个码流包括第一码流，所述至少一个算法包括第一算法。
  59. 根据权利要求58所述的方法，其中，所述数据携带第一目标码流，所述第一目标码流由所述数据的发送端基于所述第一码流和所述第一算法生成；
    其中，所述第一目标码流用于所述数据的接收端基于所述第一码流和所述第一算法验证所述第一目标码流的有效性。
  60. 根据权利要求55至59中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述数据经过第一密钥和/或第一算 法进行安全加密处理。
  61. 根据权利要求60所述的方法，其中，所述第一密钥为根密钥或者基于根密钥衍生出的密钥。
  62. 根据权利要求60所述的方法，其中，
    所述第一算法的输入参数包括所述第一密钥和所述数据；或者，
    所述第一算法的输入参数包括所述数据。
  63. 根据权利要求60至62中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述安全加密处理在网络侧，由核心网节点执行或者由业务控制节点执行或者由接入网节点的PDCP层执行。
  64. 一种安全认证装置，应用于终端，所述装置包括：
    接收单元，用于接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一MAC和安全信息；
    处理单元，用于基于根密钥和所述安全信息，生成第二MAC；
    验证单元，用于基于所述第二MAC和所述第一MAC，验证网络侧的合法性。
  65. 一种安全认证装置，应用于终端，所述装置包括：
    接收单元，用于接收第一命令，所述第一命令携带第一令牌；
    处理单元，用于基于第一算法对所述第一令牌进行处理，得到第一目标令牌；
    验证单元，用于基于所述第一目标令牌，验证网络侧的合法性。
  66. 一种终端，包括：处理器和存储器，该存储器用于存储计算机程序，所述处理器用于调用并运行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，执行如权利要求1至38中任一项所述的方法、或者权利要求39至63中任一项所述的方法。
  67. 一种芯片，包括：处理器，用于从存储器中调用并运行计算机程序，使得安装有所述芯片的设备执行如权利要求1至38中任一项所述的方法、或者权利要求39至63中任一项所述的方法。
  68. 一种计算机可读存储介质，用于存储计算机程序，所述计算机程序使得计算机执行如权利要求1至38中任一项所述的方法、或者权利要求39至63中任一项所述的方法。
  69. 一种计算机程序产品，包括计算机程序指令，该计算机程序指令使得计算机执行如权利要求1至38中任一项所述的方法、或者权利要求39至63中任一项所述的方法。
  70. 一种计算机程序，所述计算机程序使得计算机执行如权利要求1至38中任一项所述的方法、或者权利要求39至63中任一项所述的方法。
PCT/CN2021/109780 2021-07-30 2021-07-30 一种安全认证方法及装置、终端 WO2023004788A1 (zh)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CN2021/109780 WO2023004788A1 (zh) 2021-07-30 2021-07-30 一种安全认证方法及装置、终端

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CN2021/109780 WO2023004788A1 (zh) 2021-07-30 2021-07-30 一种安全认证方法及装置、终端

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2023004788A1 true WO2023004788A1 (zh) 2023-02-02

Family

ID=85087454

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/CN2021/109780 WO2023004788A1 (zh) 2021-07-30 2021-07-30 一种安全认证方法及装置、终端

Country Status (1)

Country Link
WO (1) WO2023004788A1 (zh)

Citations (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN103096317A (zh) * 2011-11-08 2013-05-08 中国电信股份有限公司 一种基于共享加密数据的双向鉴权方法及***
US20140051394A1 (en) * 2011-03-24 2014-02-20 Cassidian Finland Oy Authentication in a Communications System
WO2017034103A1 (ko) * 2015-08-26 2017-03-02 엘지전자(주) 무선 통신 시스템에서 단말의 데이터 송수신 방법 및 장치
CN106656488A (zh) * 2016-12-07 2017-05-10 百富计算机技术（深圳）有限公司 一种pos终端的密钥下载方法和装置
US20170264439A1 (en) * 2016-03-10 2017-09-14 Futurewei Technologies, Inc. Authentication Mechanism for 5G Technologies
US20180013568A1 (en) * 2016-03-10 2018-01-11 Futurewei Technologies, Inc. Authentication Mechanism for 5G Technologies
CN108989318A (zh) * 2018-07-26 2018-12-11 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 一种面向窄带物联网的轻量化安全认证及密钥交换方法

Patent Citations (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20140051394A1 (en) * 2011-03-24 2014-02-20 Cassidian Finland Oy Authentication in a Communications System
CN103096317A (zh) * 2011-11-08 2013-05-08 中国电信股份有限公司 一种基于共享加密数据的双向鉴权方法及***
WO2017034103A1 (ko) * 2015-08-26 2017-03-02 엘지전자(주) 무선 통신 시스템에서 단말의 데이터 송수신 방법 및 장치
US20170264439A1 (en) * 2016-03-10 2017-09-14 Futurewei Technologies, Inc. Authentication Mechanism for 5G Technologies
US20180013568A1 (en) * 2016-03-10 2018-01-11 Futurewei Technologies, Inc. Authentication Mechanism for 5G Technologies
CN106656488A (zh) * 2016-12-07 2017-05-10 百富计算机技术（深圳）有限公司 一种pos终端的密钥下载方法和装置
CN108989318A (zh) * 2018-07-26 2018-12-11 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 一种面向窄带物联网的轻量化安全认证及密钥交换方法

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US10015720B2 (en) System and method for digital communication between computing devices
US9338638B1 (en) Method, apparatus, and computer program product for wireless device and service discovery
CN113785532B (zh) 用于管理和验证证书的方法和装置
JP2018524865A (ja) ワイヤレスデバイスの柔軟な構成および認証
US11178716B2 (en) Method and apparatus for establishing connection between devices by using bluetooth low energy technology
WO2018219181A1 (zh) 确定终端设备的标识的方法和装置
WO2023283789A1 (zh) 一种安全通信方法及装置、终端设备、网络设备
KR20230125301A (ko) 인증 방법 및 통신 장치
Chen et al. Reliable and practical bluetooth backscatter with commodity devices
US20240171269A1 (en) Wireless communication method and apparatus, and communication device
US20220116774A1 (en) Methods and systems for authentication and establishment of secure connection for edge computing services
US11233588B2 (en) Devices, systems and methods for determining a proximity of a peripheral BLE device
WO2023004788A1 (zh) 一种安全认证方法及装置、终端
US11425656B2 (en) Method and device for handling wake-up signals
CN111989942A (zh) 用于无线通信中信息安全的装置和方法
WO2023050043A1 (zh) 一种资源配置方法及装置、终端、网络设备
CN114930769B (zh) 本地通信的方法、装置和***
WO2023004769A1 (zh) 一种数据传输方法及装置、终端、网络设备
WO2023050051A1 (zh) 一种接入网络的方法及装置、终端、网络设备
WO2023004791A1 (zh) 一种零功耗通信***及其通信方法
WO2023044911A1 (zh) 一种信息上报方法及装置、终端、网络设备
CN117337614A (zh) 一种报文传输方法以及相关装置
WO2023044895A1 (zh) 一种移动性管理方法及装置、终端
WO2022227739A1 (zh) 数据的加密方法、解密方法、装置、设备及存储介质
WO2024067047A1 (zh) 一种通信方法及装置

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 21951378

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE