WO2022263092A1 - Verfahren zum detektieren von gnss-spoofing in einem gnss-empfänger eines lokalisierungssystems - Google Patents
Verfahren zum detektieren von gnss-spoofing in einem gnss-empfänger eines lokalisierungssystems Download PDFInfo
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- WO2022263092A1 WO2022263092A1 PCT/EP2022/063553 EP2022063553W WO2022263092A1 WO 2022263092 A1 WO2022263092 A1 WO 2022263092A1 EP 2022063553 W EP2022063553 W EP 2022063553W WO 2022263092 A1 WO2022263092 A1 WO 2022263092A1
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- gnss
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- spoofing
- receiver
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 42
- 230000004807 localization Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 16
- 230000033001 locomotion Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 57
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000013473 artificial intelligence Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000001133 acceleration Effects 0.000 description 10
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 4
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000010801 machine learning Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000012935 Averaging Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012937 correction Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000009795 derivation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000006073 displacement reaction Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000008054 signal transmission Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013528 artificial neural network Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000006835 compression Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000007906 compression Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000010453 quartz Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000011897 real-time detection Methods 0.000 description 1
- VYPSYNLAJGMNEJ-UHFFFAOYSA-N silicon dioxide Inorganic materials O=[Si]=O VYPSYNLAJGMNEJ-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 238000012358 sourcing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002123 temporal effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for detecting GNSS spoofing using a GNSS receiver of a localization system.
- a global navigation satellite system (abbr.: GNSS) is a system for position determination and navigation on earth and in the air by receiving navigation satellite signals.
- An object provided with the localization system can be positioned and navigated by means of a localization system with a GNSS receiver.
- GNSS spoofing is particularly relevant to autonomous driving.
- autonomous driving places particularly high demands on safety and integrity (or correctness of the location information, e.g. correctness of the accuracy specification).
- the security of GNSS-based positioning is particularly relevant in the context of safety-critical automated driving functions in order to protect positioning from manipulation by forged navigation satellite signals. Real-time detection of GNSS spoofing is therefore considered necessary, especially for autonomous driving.
- GNSS spoofing is based, for example, on the power level of navigation satellite signals, based on encrypted navigation satellite signals, with the help of an inertial measurement unit (IMU), based on the determination of the position of the GNSS receiver using an auxiliary signal, or based on the analysis of the carrier-to-noise values (CNO values) of navigation satellite signals.
- IMU inertial measurement unit
- CNO values carrier-to-noise values
- a fake navigation satellite signal can e.g. B. also have a power level or encryption like an authentic navigation satellite signal.
- the present invention describes a new way of detecting GNSS spoofing based on the Doppler effect. This is because fake navigation satellite signals are usually sent through an antenna and all come from the same direction, whereas the authentic navigation satellite signals come from different directions due to the distribution and movement of navigation satellites. The entry angles of navigation satellite signals are therefore very difficult to simulate using GNSS spoofing methods. This weakness of GNSS spoofing can be used to detect it.
- a method for detecting GNSS spoofing by means of a GNSS receiver of a localization system comprising an antenna for receiving GNSS signals, and the GNSS signals being transmitted by at least one GNSS satellite and in each case around a frequency difference are received by the GNSS receiver, comprising the steps of: a) receiving a GNSS signal by the antenna, b) detecting the frequency difference between the frequency of the GNSS signal transmitted by a GNSS satellite and the frequency of the GNSS signal received by the antenna, c) determining the rate of change of the frequency difference using information about the change in movement of the GNSS receiver, d) checking, whether the determined rate of change corresponds to a rate of change that is characteristic of satellite signal reception, and e) detecting GNSS spoofing if the determined rate of change does not match satellite signal reception.
- autonomous driving means in particular the locomotion of vehicles, mobile robots and driverless transport systems (e.g. motor vehicles, airplanes, ships), which behave largely autonomously using a GNSS receiver and based on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). It is particularly advantageous if a self-driving motor vehicle is provided with a localization system with such a GNSS receiver for carrying out the method described.
- GNSS global navigation satellite systems
- the global navigation satellite systems are an example.
- NAVSTAR GPS Global Positioning System
- GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System
- the GNSS signal here means in particular the signal that is sent by a satellite of a global navigation satellite system (GNSS).
- GNSS global navigation satellite system
- the reception and evaluation of the GNSS signal is firmly connected with a hardware GNSS receiver.
- GNSS spoofing means here in particular the transmission of deliberately manipulated GNSS signals in order to manipulate the calculated time and/or location in a GNSS receiver.
- the GNSS spoofing signal is a decoy signal simulated after the GNSS signal, whose own identity is denoted by a method of deception is concealed. The evaluation of the GNSS spoofing signal therefore provides incorrect positioning.
- the physical basis for carrying out the method described is the Doppler effect, which represents the temporal compression or expansion of a signal when the distance between transmitter and receiver changes during the transmission of the signal.
- the global navigation satellite system is a moving system with the movements of its satellites and also the GNSS receiver
- the received GNSS signal is subject to the Doppler effect due to these movements, so that the transmitted GNSS signal is received shifted by the Doppler frequency.
- This Doppler frequency also changes as the relative motion between the GNSS signal transmitter and the GNSS signal receiver changes.
- the position and movement of a GNSS satellite can be determined, for example, by ephemeris, and the movement of the GNSS receiver can be determined, for example, by motion sensors such as an inertial measuring unit, gyroscope or steering wheel angle sensor, so that the Doppler frequency to be expected and its change due to the determinable movement of the GNSS satellites and the GNSS receiver can also be determined. It therefore reveals possible GNSS spoofing when the Doppler frequency and its change do not behave as expected.
- the Doppler frequency described above is recorded in step b) after receiving a GNSS signal in step a).
- the frequency difference is referred to below as the Doppler frequency.
- the Doppler frequency z. B. with a frequency locked loop (English: Frequency Locked Loop FLL) can be determined.
- the received GNSS signal has a satellite-specific Doppler frequency. This depends on whether the GNSS satellite is approaching or moving away from the GNSS receiver. Since the orbits of GNSS satellites are known, the Doppler frequency can be predicted by the GNSS receiver. It is checked whether the Doppler frequency is plausible. This can be done with knowledge of the approximate position of the GNSS receiver (e.g. deviation of the assumed position from the actual position is less than 1 km) and knowledge of the position of the GNSS satellite over time with the help of the almanac and/or the ephemeris, for example .
- the expected Doppler frequency can be determined, which changes due to the relative movement between the GNSS satellite in the sky or in orbit and the GNSS receiver on earth results.
- step c) the rate of change of the frequency difference is determined using a movement change information of the GNSS receiver.
- the movement change information describes how the movement of the GNSS receiver changes within a time interval.
- a change in movement can mean, for example, the 2nd order derivation of the displacement vector according to time or the 1st order derivation of the displacement vector according to a steering angle with respect to the direction of movement of the GNSS receiver.
- the change in movement can be, for example, an accelerated and/or direction-changing movement of the GNSS receiver.
- the motion change information related to the GNSS receiver is particularly advantageous for protection against GNSS spoofing because the motion change of the GNSS receiver is not (or heavily) simulated by the spoofer. Because it is technically very difficult, as a spoofer, to determine the movement of a specially selected target receiver live in the general case and to accommodate this information appropriately in the spoofed signal.
- step d) a check is made as to whether the determined rate of change corresponds to a rate of change that is characteristic of satellite signal reception.
- the spoofed GNSS signals are typically broadcast from a location. This is fundamentally different from the way the authentic signals are broadcast, since authentic GNSS signals are broadcast via satellites which, from the receiver's point of view, are roughly evenly distributed in the sky. This is desired in order to achieve low DOP values and thus higher positional accuracy through an advantageous satellite geometry.
- Authentic GNSS signals therefore arrive at the GNSS receiver from different directions.
- the GNSS signals spoofed by GNSS spoofing are received from the direction of a radiating antenna. The reception directions of authentic GNSS signals are therefore significantly more diverse. The rate of change of the Doppler frequency in the case of GNSS spoofing is thus different from that in the authentic case.
- the rate of change of Doppler frequency is mathematically, for example, the first order derivative of Doppler frequency with respect to time.
- the real-time rate of change can be detected by a controller according to the received signal.
- the satellites of a GNSS only move according to a specific movement pattern, which can be determined beforehand.
- a target rate of change can be recorded based on the movement pattern of the satellites.
- step e GNSS spoofing is detected if the determined actual rate of change does not match the determined target rate of change. In other words, this means that GNSS spoofing is detected if the determined rate of change does not match satellite signal reception.
- the Doppler frequencies of the received counterfeit GNSS signals can change in approximately the same way if, for example, a motor vehicle equipped with the GNSS receiver accelerates. This is because, as described above, the falsified GNSS signals are all received from the same direction under the influence of the information on the change in movement of the GNSS receiver, and the spoofer does not normally simulate the change in movement of the GNSS receiver. On the other hand, they change Double frequencies of the authentic GNSS signals differ due to their different angles of incidence.
- the frequency difference is determined in step b) and the rate of change of the frequency difference is determined in step c) using an algorithm based on artificial intelligence. It is advantageous if machine learning is used to determine the frequency difference according to the position of the satellites and the GNSS receiver, because machine learning has excellent accuracy in determining the frequency difference and has the potential for constant automatic improvement. It is particularly advantageous if the rate of change of the Doppler frequency is determined by machine learning using the information on the change in movement of the GNSS receiver. In this way, typical Doppler influences can be learned from the changes in movement of the GNSS receiver, so a Doppler reaction detected as atypical when the movement of the GNSS receiver changes can correspondingly indicate a fake GNSS signal.
- the frequency difference is recorded taking into account the clock error of the GNSS receiver and/or the movement of at least one GNSS satellite.
- the positioning and navigation is additionally based on the time synchronization between a GNSS satellite and a GNSS receiver, in that the distance between the GNSS satellite and the GNSS receiver is determined by the propagation time of the GNSS signal transmission.
- a GNSS receiver most often uses a quartz clock whose clock error is significantly larger than the clock error of an atomic clock in the GNSS satellite, which can lead to an error in detecting the expected Doppler frequency of the received GNSS signal. This deviation is taken into account as a disturbance variable.
- the characteristics of the receiver clock error must be known and recorded with sufficient accuracy so that the detection method described here can function robustly from the current perspective.
- the average Doppler rate of change used here for spoofing detection may not be distinguishable from a drift in the receiver clock.
- the additional variances of the GNSS satellite orbit and GNSS satellite clock can affect the accuracy of detecting the expected Doppler frequency. It is preferred if the precise ephemeris or clock corrections can be downloaded from, for example, the International GNSS Service (IGS) and stored in a database. These are used in particular to correct the satellite clock and orbit.
- IGS International GNSS Service
- the received GNSS signals can be processed using artificial intelligence methods, e.g. using a neural network (abbr.: NN).
- NN neural network
- the expected Doppler frequencies can be determined using the GNSS information stored in a database, e.g. B. the precise ephemeris or clock corrections and taking into account the movement information of the GNSS receiver and / or processed.
- the movement information can also be recorded using an inertial measurement unit (IMU).
- IMU inertial measurement unit
- step c) the rate of change of the frequency difference is detected based on an accelerated and/or on a direction-changing movement of the GNSS receiver.
- step c the rate of change of the frequency difference is detected at a point in time and/or averaged over a time interval.
- the point in time corresponds to a point in time before or after the change in movement of the GNSS receiver and/or the time interval corresponds to the duration of the change in movement of the GNSS receiver.
- the rate of change of the frequency difference can be detected, for example, before and after an acceleration of the GNSS receiver.
- the rate of change of the frequency difference can also be detected, for example, when the GNSS receiver is accelerated.
- the Doppler frequencies of the received GNSS signals after subtracting disturbances such as e.g. B. the clock error and the movement of the GNSS satellites as well as the deviation of the GNSS satellite orbits are approximately the same in the result (including the same sign), it is probably a matter of GNSS spoofing.
- the logged values can be evaluated promptly. For example, values before and after acceleration processes are searched for or selected in the logged data, and the difference in the Doppler before and after the acceleration process is formed for the tracked signals.
- the rate of change of the frequency difference can also be detected before and after a direction-changing movement of the GNSS receiver.
- the procedure is analogous to the procedure described above before and after acceleration.
- a relative and/or an absolute direction of movement can be logged, with the relative direction of movement being recorded by a gyroscope or a steering wheel angle sensor, for example, and the absolute direction of movement being recorded by a compass.
- the change of direction of movement is preferably considered when a change angle is over 90° and/or the speed of movement of the GNSS receiver is over 10m/s.
- the deviations described above can be taken into account before, after or during the change in motion of the GNSS receiver (e.g. Doppler drift due to change in satellite position in relation to receiver position with no change in receiver motion state and/or due to clock error).
- the deviations from the logged Doppler-relevant values can be subtracted at the associated relevant times.
- step a) to step c) are repeated several times before step d), at least partially in parallel or successively, and GNSS signals from at least two GNSS satellites are received in step a).
- Each global navigation satellite system has a large number of satellites (e.g. Galileo with 28 satellites, GPS with 24 satellites), which are evenly distributed in the sky or in the orbit and move according to a predetermined movement pattern. If the localization system receives four GNSS signals simultaneously from the same GNSS, direct positioning can be performed without any additional tools.
- today's localization system includes a variety of GNSS receivers, each of which continues to have at least one, e.g. B. include two or three GNSS signal transmission channels.
- today's localization system is capable of receiving and processing GNSS signals (simultaneously) from different GNSS.
- step a) to step c) are carried out at the same time when the GNSS signals are received from the same GNSS. It is also advantageous if step a) to step c) are carried out one after the other if the GNSS signals are received from different GNSS.
- step d) the GNSS spoofing is detected based on an average rate of change and/or on a variance.
- step d It is particularly preferred if GNSS spoofing is detected in step d) if the average rate of change exceeds a predeterminable first reference value.
- step d It is also preferred if GNSS spoofing is detected in step d) if the variance does not exceed a predeterminable second reference value.
- the authentic GNSS signals come from different directions, so the rates of change of the Doppler frequencies of the authentic GNSS signals can be mutually compensated during averaging, and so the average rate of change of the Doppler frequencies of the authentic GNSS signals has a very small value towards zero.
- the fake GNSS signals come from the same direction, so the rates of change of the Doppler frequencies of the fake GNSS signals behave in the same way and cannot be compensated for each other when averaging, and so the average rate of change of the Doppler frequencies of the fake GNSS signals has a relatively large value which is significantly greater than zero.
- a first reference value is determined in advance as a threshold value. If the average rate of change exceeds the first reference value, this exceedance indicates GNSS spoofing. It is also advantageous if the first reference value is determined as a function of the change in speed of the GNSS receiver before and after its acceleration.
- GNSS spoofing can also be detected by determining the variance.
- the variance corresponds to the mean square deviation of the rates of change of the Doppler frequencies of the GNSS signals from their average rate of change. If the variance is a very small value, e.g. B. towards zero, this means that the GNSS signals come from the same direction and GNSS spoofing is thus detected. This means that a possible GNSS spoofing is detected if the variance does not increase, for example in the acceleration of the GNSS receiver, and does not exceed the threshold.
- a second reference value is determined in advance as a threshold value. If the variance does not exceed the second reference value, it shows GNSS spoofing. It is also advantageous if the second reference value is determined as a function of the speed change of the GNSS receiver before and after its acceleration. It is particularly advantageous if GNSS spoofing is detected in step d) if the quotient of the average rate of change to the variance exceeds a third predeterminable reference value.
- the method described can also be used to track the approximate position of the spoofer.
- the position of the spoofer can be narrowed down by means of crowd sourcing in the form of appropriately merged data in a server system or through a motor vehicle cooperation and with the help of the direction of travel of the motor vehicle (e.g. from the compass and longitudinal acceleration). If a significant, similar change in the Doppler frequency is detected for several received GNSS signals from different satellites when the movement of the GNSS receiver changes, the direction of reception of the falsified GNSS signal can be determined from the direction of acceleration of the GNSS receiver and the sign of the Doppler frequency. By measuring the effect on the Doppler frequency change at different positions, the position of the spoofer can be narrowed down.
- a computer program is used to carry out a method described here.
- this relates in particular to a computer program (product), comprising instructions which, when the program is executed by a computer, cause the latter to execute a method described here.
- the machine-readable storage medium is usually a computer-readable data carrier.
- the localization system for a vehicle is set up to carry out a method described here.
- FIG. 1 shows a sequence of a method presented here for detecting GNSS spoofing in a GNSS receiver of a localization system in a regular operating sequence.
- 1 schematically shows a sequence of a method presented here for detecting GNSS spoofing in a GNSS receiver of a localization system in a regular operating sequence.
- a GNSS signal is received by the antenna.
- the frequency difference between the frequency of the GNSS signal transmitted by a GNSS satellite and the frequency of the GNSS signal received by the antenna is detected.
- Rate of change of frequency difference using GNSS receiver motion change information In block 140, a check is made as to whether the determined rate of change corresponds to a rate of change that is characteristic of satellite signal reception. In block 150 there is a detection of GNSS spoofing if the determined
- Rate of change does not match satellite signal reception.
- method steps a) to c) for determining the rate of change of the frequency difference of a plurality of different GNSS signals can run at least several times, partially in parallel or at the same time.
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US20100117899A1 (en) * | 2008-11-13 | 2010-05-13 | Ecole Polytechnique Federale De Lausanne (Epfl) | Method to secure gnss based locations in a device having gnss receiver |
EP3502745A1 (de) * | 2017-12-20 | 2019-06-26 | Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales | Empfängerunabhängige täuschungsdetektionsvorrichtung |
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2021
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- 2022-05-19 WO PCT/EP2022/063553 patent/WO2022263092A1/de active Application Filing
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US20100117899A1 (en) * | 2008-11-13 | 2010-05-13 | Ecole Polytechnique Federale De Lausanne (Epfl) | Method to secure gnss based locations in a device having gnss receiver |
EP3502745A1 (de) * | 2017-12-20 | 2019-06-26 | Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales | Empfängerunabhängige täuschungsdetektionsvorrichtung |
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
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MANESH MOHSEN RIAHI ET AL: "Detection of GPS Spoofing Attacks on Unmanned Aerial Systems", 2019 16TH IEEE ANNUAL CONSUMER COMMUNICATIONS & NETWORKING CONFERENCE (CCNC), IEEE, 11 January 2019 (2019-01-11), pages 1 - 6, XP033524126, DOI: 10.1109/CCNC.2019.8651804 * |
TU JIAXUN ET AL: "Low-complexity GNSS anti-spoofing technique based on Doppler frequency difference monitoring", IET RADAR SONAR NAVIGATION, THE INSTITUTION OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, UK, vol. 12, no. 9, 1 September 2018 (2018-09-01), pages 1058 - 1065, XP006069278, ISSN: 1751-8784, DOI: 10.1049/IET-RSN.2018.5151 * |
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