WO2022238024A1 - Verfahren zum erkennen eines manipulierten steuergeräts eines bussystems eines fahrzeugs durch ein zweites steuergerät des bussystems des fahrzeugs, computerlesbares medium, system, und fahrzeug - Google Patents
Verfahren zum erkennen eines manipulierten steuergeräts eines bussystems eines fahrzeugs durch ein zweites steuergerät des bussystems des fahrzeugs, computerlesbares medium, system, und fahrzeug Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2022238024A1 WO2022238024A1 PCT/EP2022/053559 EP2022053559W WO2022238024A1 WO 2022238024 A1 WO2022238024 A1 WO 2022238024A1 EP 2022053559 W EP2022053559 W EP 2022053559W WO 2022238024 A1 WO2022238024 A1 WO 2022238024A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- message
- vehicle
- control unit
- bus system
- control device
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 38
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000018109 developmental process Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L12/40006—Architecture of a communication node
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
- H04L63/1416—Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
- H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for detecting a manipulated control unit of a bus system of a vehicle using a second control unit of the bus system of the vehicle.
- the invention also relates to a computer-readable medium for detecting a manipulated control unit of a vehicle bus system by a second control unit of the vehicle bus system, a system for detecting a manipulated control unit of a vehicle bus system by a second control unit of the vehicle bus system, and a vehicle comprising the System for detecting a manipulated control unit of a vehicle's bus system by a second control unit of the vehicle's bus system.
- Vehicle control units are connected to one another via bus systems.
- the control units can exchange messages for controlling vehicle functions via a bus system. If a control unit sends unauthorized messages on a bus system, a function of another control unit can be influenced without authorization. There is currently no checking of the legitimacy of a sender of bus messages.
- one object of the invention is to efficiently identify a manipulated control device on a bus system of a vehicle.
- one object of the invention is to efficiently identify a manipulated sender of a message on a bus system by a further control unit of the vehicle's bus system.
- the invention is distinguished by a method for recognizing a manipulated control unit of a bus system of a vehicle by a second control unit of the bus system of the vehicle.
- the method can be a computer-implemented method and/or a controller-implemented method. 2
- the bus system can be a CAN bus.
- the vehicle can be an automobile.
- the method includes sending a first message via the bus system by a transmitting unit of a first control unit of the vehicle, receiving the first message via the bus system by a receiving unit or a transmitting/receiving unit of the second control unit of the vehicle.
- the method further includes determining a message type of the received, first message by the second control unit and determining a reference message by the second control unit of the vehicle, the reference message having a message type that corresponds to the specific message type of the first message.
- the method also includes determining a deviation of the first message from the reference message. If the first message deviates from the reference message, the method recognizes the first control unit as the manipulated control unit by the second control unit and provides an alarm message from the second control unit to a server external to the vehicle.
- the method can efficiently identify a manipulated control unit.
- Messages from the bus system are received by the second control device and compared with a reference message from the second control device in order to determine whether the first control device is an authorized sender of the received message. If the first control device is an unauthorized or manipulated sender of a message on the bus system, the authorized sender of the message, the second control device, can efficiently identify the unauthorized or manipulated sender by means of the reference message. Manipulations of the vehicle's control units can thus be quickly detected and reported to a vehicle-external server.
- the reference message can be the last, successfully sent message from the second control device, which has the message type of the first message received. This allows the reference message to be determined efficiently.
- the reference message can be a message for which the second control unit is the only trustworthy message source on the bus system.
- the second control unit can thus efficiently identify a manipulated control unit.
- the reference message can be sent from the second control unit via the bus system before the first message is received, and the reference message can be stored on the second control unit after the reference message has been successfully sent.
- the second control unit can use this to efficiently determine the reference message.
- the method can also include discarding the first message by the second control device if the first message corresponds to the reference message.
- the second control unit can use this to filter its own messages that are sent and received via the bus system.
- the second control unit can be a gateway control unit of the bus system.
- the second control unit can thus efficiently monitor a large number of messages from other control units of the bus system and quickly identify manipulated control units.
- the bus system can be a CAN bus.
- the invention is characterized by a computer-readable medium for detecting a manipulated control unit of a bus system of a vehicle by a second control unit of the bus system of the vehicle, the computer-readable medium comprising instructions which, when executed from a control unit of a vehicle, the above carry out the procedures described.
- the invention is characterized by a system for detecting a manipulated control unit of a bus system of a vehicle by a second control unit of the bus system of the vehicle, the system being designed to carry out the method described above.
- the invention is characterized by a vehicle comprising the system described above for detecting a manipulated control unit of a bus system of the vehicle by a second control unit of the bus system of the vehicle. 4
- FIG. 1 shows an exemplary method for detecting a manipulated control unit of a bus system of a vehicle
- FIG. 2 shows an exemplary system for detecting a manipulated control device of a bus system of a vehicle.
- FIG. 1 shows in detail an exemplary method 100 for recognizing a manipulated control device of a bus system of a vehicle by a second control device of the bus system of the vehicle.
- the bus system of the vehicle there is preferably only a single control unit, referred to below as the second control unit, which can be an authorized sender of a message, also referred to below as reference message, on the bus system.
- the method 100 can send 102 a first message via the bus system by a transmission unit of a first control unit of the vehicle.
- the first control unit can be a manipulated control unit.
- the first message can include, for example, a signal to adjust a speed limit of the vehicle to a value not authorized by a manufacturer of the vehicle.
- the method 100 can receive the first message via the bus system by a receiving unit or a transceiver unit of the second control unit of the vehicle 104.
- the method 100 can also determine a message type of the received, first message by the second control unit 106.
- the message type can, for example Adjust the vehicle's speed limit. 5
- the method 100 can determine 108 a reference message by the second control unit of the vehicle, the reference message having a message type that corresponds to the specific message type of the first message.
- the reference message can be a last, successfully sent message from the second control device, which has the message type of the first message received. Additionally or alternatively, the reference message can be a message for which the second control device is the only, trustworthy message source on the bus system. Additionally or alternatively, the reference message can be sent from the second control unit via the bus system before the first message is received, and the reference message can be stored on the second control unit after the reference message has been successfully sent. For example, if the message type is adjusting the speed limit of the vehicle, the second control unit can determine the associated reference message using the message type.
- the second control device when the second control device is configured for the first time, the second control device can send a message with the message type Adjusting the speed limit of the vehicle in order to set the speed limit of the vehicle to a value specified by the manufacturer of the vehicle. After successfully sending the message with the message type Adjust vehicle speed limit, the second control unit can store this message. Finally, the stored message serves as a reference message in order to detect a manipulated control unit that is attempting to send an unauthorized message with the message type Adjusting the vehicle's speed limit on the bus system.
- the method 100 can determine 110 a deviation of the first message from the reference message. For example, the method can compare the value of the speed limit of the first message with the value of the speed limit of the reference message in order to determine a deviation. If the first message differs from the reference message, the method 100 can recognize the first control unit as the manipulated control unit by the second control unit 112, and provide an alarm message from the second control unit to a vehicle-external server 114.
- Fig. 2 shows an exemplary system 200 for detecting a manipulated control unit 202 of a bus system 204 of a vehicle by a second control unit 206.
- a first or manipulated control unit 202 can send a first message 208 of a first message type via the bus system 204 by a transmission unit of the first control unit 202 Send 6 of the vehicle.
- the second control device 206 can receive the first message 208 with the first message type via the bus system 204 by a receiving unit or a transceiver unit of the second control device 206 of the vehicle.
- Receiving unit 210 or the transmitting/receiving unit of the second control unit can preferably include a component 210 for detecting a manipulated control unit.
- the second control device 206 in particular the component 210 of the second control device 206, can determine a message type of the received, first message 208.
- the second control device 206 in particular the component 210 of the second control device 206, can determine a reference message, the reference message having a message type that corresponds to the specific message type of the first message. For example, the component 210 can retrieve the reference message from a store 212 that has stored the last successfully sent message 214 with the same message type.
- the second control unit 206 in particular the component 210 of the second control unit 206, can determine a deviation of the first message from the reference message and, if the first message differs from the reference message, recognize the first control unit as the manipulated control unit and send an alarm message 216 provide an off-board server.
- the second control device as an authorized sender of a message, can monitor the bus system for unauthorized messages from manipulated control devices.
- the transmitter for example the second control unit, can trigger an alarm by recognizing an unauthorized message from a manipulated control unit if the authorized transmitter has not sent it itself. In this way, a manipulated control unit can be efficiently identified and reported.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN202280020865.7A CN116982291A (zh) | 2021-05-11 | 2022-02-15 | 用于通过车辆的总线***的第二控制装置识别车辆的总线***的受操纵的控制装置的方法、计算机可读的介质、***和车辆 |
US18/554,327 US20240113912A1 (en) | 2021-05-11 | 2022-02-15 | Method and System For Identifying a Manipulated Control Device of a Bus System |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102021112331.3 | 2021-05-11 | ||
DE102021112331.3A DE102021112331A1 (de) | 2021-05-11 | 2021-05-11 | Verfahren zum Erkennen eines manipulierten Steuergeräts eines Bussystems eines Fahrzeugs durch ein zweites Steuergerät des Bussystems des Fahrzeugs, computerlesbares Medium, System, und Fahrzeug |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2022238024A1 true WO2022238024A1 (de) | 2022-11-17 |
Family
ID=80738755
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2022/053559 WO2022238024A1 (de) | 2021-05-11 | 2022-02-15 | Verfahren zum erkennen eines manipulierten steuergeräts eines bussystems eines fahrzeugs durch ein zweites steuergerät des bussystems des fahrzeugs, computerlesbares medium, system, und fahrzeug |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20240113912A1 (de) |
CN (1) | CN116982291A (de) |
DE (1) | DE102021112331A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2022238024A1 (de) |
Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20180302422A1 (en) * | 2016-01-08 | 2018-10-18 | Panasonic Intellectual Property Corporation Of America | Unauthorized activity detection method, monitoring electronic control unit, and onboard network system |
US20180367546A1 (en) * | 2015-06-17 | 2018-12-20 | Autonetworks Technologies, Ltd. | Vehicle-mounted relay device, vehicle-mounted communication system and relay program |
Family Cites Families (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102012224194B4 (de) | 2012-12-21 | 2018-08-02 | Continental Automotive Gmbh | Steuersystem für ein Kraftfahrzeug |
DE102016224193A1 (de) | 2016-12-06 | 2018-06-07 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Verfahren zur Überwachung eines Steuergeräts für ein Fahrzeug |
CN111344192B (zh) | 2017-08-17 | 2021-06-22 | 雷德本德有限公司 | 禁用恶意电子控制单元的***、方法和计算机程序产品 |
DE102018218902B4 (de) | 2018-11-06 | 2020-06-18 | Zf Friedrichshafen Ag | Sicherheitseinrichtung für Bussysteme in Fahrzeugen |
-
2021
- 2021-05-11 DE DE102021112331.3A patent/DE102021112331A1/de active Pending
-
2022
- 2022-02-15 WO PCT/EP2022/053559 patent/WO2022238024A1/de active Application Filing
- 2022-02-15 US US18/554,327 patent/US20240113912A1/en active Pending
- 2022-02-15 CN CN202280020865.7A patent/CN116982291A/zh active Pending
Patent Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20180367546A1 (en) * | 2015-06-17 | 2018-12-20 | Autonetworks Technologies, Ltd. | Vehicle-mounted relay device, vehicle-mounted communication system and relay program |
US20180302422A1 (en) * | 2016-01-08 | 2018-10-18 | Panasonic Intellectual Property Corporation Of America | Unauthorized activity detection method, monitoring electronic control unit, and onboard network system |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN116982291A (zh) | 2023-10-31 |
US20240113912A1 (en) | 2024-04-04 |
DE102021112331A1 (de) | 2022-11-17 |
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