WO2021196913A1 - 一种终端参数更新的保护方法和通信装置 - Google Patents
一种终端参数更新的保护方法和通信装置 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2021196913A1 WO2021196913A1 PCT/CN2021/077280 CN2021077280W WO2021196913A1 WO 2021196913 A1 WO2021196913 A1 WO 2021196913A1 CN 2021077280 W CN2021077280 W CN 2021077280W WO 2021196913 A1 WO2021196913 A1 WO 2021196913A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W48/00—Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
- H04W48/18—Selecting a network or a communication service
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W60/00—Affiliation to network, e.g. registration; Terminating affiliation with the network, e.g. de-registration
- H04W60/005—Multiple registrations, e.g. multihoming
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/02—Processing of mobility data, e.g. registration information at HLR [Home Location Register] or VLR [Visitor Location Register]; Transfer of mobility data, e.g. between HLR, VLR or external networks
- H04W8/08—Mobility data transfer
- H04W8/12—Mobility data transfer between location registers or mobility servers
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- H04W8/18—Processing of user or subscriber data, e.g. subscribed services, user preferences or user profiles; Transfer of user or subscriber data
- H04W8/186—Processing of subscriber group data
Definitions
- the first AUSF has the authentication result of the terminal in multiple service networks, and the multiple service networks include the first service network; or, the terminal is in multiple service networks, and the multiple service networks include the first service network.
- the parameter update information of the terminal includes roaming processing (steering of roaming, SoR) information.
- roaming processing steering of roaming, SoR
- the communication device includes, for example, a processing module and a transceiver module that are coupled to each other, where the transceiver module is used to send a protection request message to the first AUSF, and receive a response to the protection request message sent by the first AUSF Message, the protection request message is used to request the parameter update information of the protection terminal, the protection request message carries the parameter update information and the first service network information; the processing module is used to control the transceiver module to send through the AMF corresponding to the first service network The parameter update information.
- the first service network information includes the name of the first service network; or,
- a communication device for example, the communication device is the aforementioned AUSF.
- the communication device has the function of realizing the behavior in the method embodiment of the second aspect described above.
- the function can be realized by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
- the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above-mentioned functions.
- the communication device includes, for example, a processing module and a transceiver module that are coupled to each other, wherein the transceiver module is used to receive a protection request message sent by UDM, and the protection request message is used to request parameter update information of the protection terminal.
- the first key used when registering in the first service network where the first AMF is located is the first AUSF is the AUSF that the terminal authenticates when registering in the first service network; the processing module is used to determine that the terminal is in a single registration state In the case, it is determined to send the parameter update information of the terminal through the second AMF.
- the transceiver module is specifically configured to send the first AMF to the first AMF when the second message is sent to the first AMF or the third message sent by the first AMF is received. Message, where the second message is used to delete the registration information of the terminal, and the third message is a response message to the second message.
- a communication device for example, the communication device is the AUSF as described above.
- the communication device has the function of realizing the behavior in the method embodiment of the fourth aspect described above.
- the function can be realized by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
- the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above-mentioned functions.
- FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of another method for protecting terminal parameter updates according to an embodiment of the application.
- Entities in HPLMN can communicate with each other through interfaces, and can also communicate with entities between VPLMN through interfaces.
- the HPLMN needs to send parameters to the terminal, such as the preferred PLMN and other home network parameters or subscription data that needs to be updated.
- the entity in HPLMN such as UDM, needs to send these parameters to the terminal through the entity of VPLMN, such as AMF.
- the PCF entity of HPLMN needs to send policy information to the terminal through the PCF entity of the VPLMN and the AMF entity of the VPLMN in turn. Due to the security level of these parameters, HPLMN needs to prevent VPLMN and others from tampering with these parameters.
- the embodiments of the present application are suitable for protecting the parameter update information sent by the HPLMN to the terminal through the AMF.
- it can be adapted to the SoR process or the UPU process.
- the parameter update information of the terminal is SoR information as an example.
- the UDM sends a first message to the first AUSF, and the first AUSF receives the first message.
- the first message is used to instruct the first AUSF to delete the first secret generated when the terminal is registered in the first SN where the first AMF is located.
- the first AUSF is the AUSF that the terminal performs authentication when it registers with the first SN.
- the UDM sends a second message to the first AMF, for example, the message for deleting the registration information of the terminal (Nudm_UECM_DeregistrationNotify message), the first message is sent to the first AUSF; or the UDM receives the second message sent by the first AMF.
- the response message of the message that is, the third message (Nudm_SDM_Unsubscribe message)
- the first message is sent to the first AUSF.
- UDM specifies AUSF to protect SoR or UPU information.
- AUSF at only unique key K AUSF or for the same service network has only one K AUSF, thus guaranteeing key key agreement AUSF selected terminal selection.
- UDM returns a UE authentication acquisition response to AUSF, carrying the first K AUSF .
- the AUSF receives the UE authentication acquisition response returned by the UDM, it returns the UE authentication response to the security anchor function SEAF (may be co-deployed with the AMF), carrying the authentication token AUTN.
- SEAF may be co-deployed with the AMF
- the SEAF initiates an authentication request to the UE, carrying the AUTN.
- AUSF will send the authentication result confirmation request of the terminal to UDM, and after receiving the authentication result confirmation response of the terminal returned by UDM, delete the stored old K AUSF (if any) .
- This allows the UE and the AUSF side to delete the stored old K AUSF in the main authentication process, the security mode command SMC process and the authentication result confirmation process, thereby ensuring that only the first and second K AUSF exist on the UE and the AUSF side.
- the first service network information includes the name of the first service network; or,
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Abstract
Description
Claims (30)
- 一种终端参数更新的保护方法,其特征在于,包括:统一数据管理UDM向第一认证服务功能AUSF发送保护请求消息,所述保护请求消息用于请求保护终端的参数更新信息;所述保护请求消息携带所述参数更新信息和第一服务网络信息;所述UDM接收所述第一AUSF发送的所述保护请求消息的响应消息;所述UDM通过所述第一服务网络对应的接入和移动性管理功能AMF发送所述参数更新信息。
- 如权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述UDM在向所述第一AUSF发送所述保护请求消息之前,所述UDM根据本地策略确定所述第一服务网络信息。
- 如权利要求2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述UDM在确定存在多个服务网络的情况下,确定进行终端的参数更新的所述第一服务网络。
- 如权利要求2或3所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述UDM根据所述第一服务网络信息确定所述第一AUSF。
- 如权利要求1-4任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述UDM在向所述第一AUSF发送保护请求消息之前,所述UDM确定:所述第一AUSF有所述终端在多个服务网络的认证结果,所述多个服务网络包括所述第一服务网络;或者,所述终端在多个服务网络,所述多个服务网络包括所述第一服务网络;或者,所述终端处于双注册状态。
- 如权利要求1-5任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述第一服务网络的名称;或者,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述第一服务网络的公共陆地移动网络PLMN的标识ID或所述第一服务网络的ID;或者,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述终端的认证事件的标识。
- 如权利要求1-6任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述参数更新信息包括漫游处理SoR信息。
- 一种终端参数更新的保护方法,其特征在于,包括:第一认证服务功能AUSF接收统一数据管理UDM发送的保护请求消息,所述保护请求消息用于请求保护终端的参数更新信息,所述保护请求消息携带所述参数更新信息和第一服务网络信息;所述第一AUSF根据所述第一服务网络信息确定第一密钥,所述第一密钥用于保护所述参数更新信息;所述第一AUSF根据所述第一密钥对所述参数更新信息进行安全保护。
- 如权利要求8所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一服务网络信息为所述UDM存储 的多个第一服务网络信息中的一个服务网络信息。
- 如权利要求8或9所述的方法,其特征在于,存在多个AUSF,所述第一AUSF为与所述第一服务网络信息对应的AUSF。
- 如权利要求8或9所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一AUSF有所述终端在多个服务网络的认证结果,所述多个服务网络包括所述第一服务网络;或者,所述终端在多个服务网络,所述多个服务网络包括所述第一服务网络;或者,所述终端处于双注册状态。
- 如权利要求8-11任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述第一服务网络的名称;或者,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述第一服务网络的公共陆地移动网络PLMN标识;或者,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述终端的认证事件的标识。
- 如权利要求8-12任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述参数更新信息包括漫游处理SoR信息。
- 一种通信装置,其特征在于,包括处理模块和收发模块,其中:所述收发模块,用于向第一认证服务功能AUSF发送保护请求消息,所述保护请求消息用于请求保护终端的参数更新信息;所述保护请求消息携带所述参数更新信息和第一服务网络信息;所述收发模块,用于接收所述第一AUSF发送的所述保护请求消息的响应消息;所述处理模块,用于控制所述收发模块通过所述第一服务网络对应的接入和移动性管理功能AMF发送所述参数更新信息。
- 如权利要求14所述的通信装置,其特征在于,所述收发模块还用于:在向所述第一AUSF发送所述保护请求消息之前,根据本地策略确定所述第一服务网络信息。
- 如权利要求15所述的通信装置,其特征在于,所述处理模块具体用于:在确定存在多个服务网络的情况下,确定进行终端的参数更新的所述第一服务网络。
- 如权利要求15或16所述的通信装置,其特征在于,所述处理模块具体用于:根据所述第一服务网络信息确定所述第一AUSF。
- 如权利要求14-17任一所述的通信装置,其特征在于,所述处理模块具体用于在向所述第一AUSF发送保护请求消息之前,确定:所述第一AUSF有所述终端在多个服务网络的认证结果,所述多个服务网络包括所述第一服务网络;或者,所述终端在多个服务网络,所述多个服务网络包括所述第一服务网络;或者,所述终端处于双注册状态。
- 如权利要求14-18任一所述的通信装置,其特征在于,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述第一服务网络的名称;或者,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述第一服务网络的公共陆地移动网络PLMN的标识ID或所述第一服务网络的ID;或者,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述终端的认证事件的标识。
- 如权利要求14-19任一所述的通信装置,其特征在于,所述参数更新信息包括漫游处理SoR信息。
- 一种通信装置,其特征在于,包括处理模块和收发模块,其中:所述收发模块,用于接收统一数据管理UDM发送的保护请求消息,所述保护请求消息用于请求保护终端的参数更新信息,所述保护请求消息携带所述参数更新信息和第一服务网络信息;所述处理模块,用于根据所述第一服务网络信息确定第一密钥,所述第一密钥用于保护所述参数更新信息;所述处理模块,用于根据所述第一密钥对所述参数更新信息进行安全保护。
- 如权利要求21所述的通信装置,其特征在于,所述第一服务网络信息为所述UDM存储的多个第一服务网络信息中的一个服务网络信息。
- 如权利要求21或22所述的通信装置,其特征在于,存在多个AUSF,所述第一AUSF为与所述第一服务网络信息对应的AUSF。
- 如权利要求21或22所述的通信装置,其特征在于,所述第一AUSF有所述终端在多个服务网络的认证结果,所述多个服务网络包括所述第一服务网络;或者,所述终端在多个服务网络,所述多个服务网络包括所述第一服务网络;或者,所述终端处于双注册状态。
- 如权利要求21-24任一所述的通信装置,其特征在于,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述第一服务网络的名称;或者,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述第一服务网络的公共陆地移动网络PLMN标识;或者,所述第一服务网络信息包括所述终端的认证事件的标识。
- 如权利要求21-25任一所述的通信装置,其特征在于,所述参数更新信息包括漫游处理SoR信息。
- 一种通信装置,其特征在于,所述通信装置包括处理器和存储器,所述存储器用于存储计算机程序,所述处理器用于执行存储在所述存储器上的计算机程序,使得所述装置执行如权利要求1~7或8~13中任一项所述的通信方法。
- 一种通信***,其特征在于,包括如权利要求14~20之一的通信装置,和如权利要求21~26之一的通信装置。
- 一种计算机可读存储介质,其特征在于,所述计算机可读存储介质存储有计算机程序,所述计算机程序当被计算机执行时,使所述计算机执行如权利要求1~7或8~13中任意一项所述的方法。
- 一种计算机程序产品,其特征在于,所述计算机程序产品存储有计算机程序,所述计算机程序当被计算机执行时,使所述计算机执行如权利要求1~7或8~13中任意一项所述的方法。
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KR1020227037668A KR20220159455A (ko) | 2020-03-31 | 2021-02-22 | 단말 파라미터 업데이트를 보호하는 방법 및 통신 장치 |
EP21779741.4A EP4132113A4 (en) | 2020-03-31 | 2021-02-22 | TERMINAL PARAMETER UPDATE PROTECTION METHOD AND COMMUNICATION DEVICE |
BR112022019885A BR112022019885A2 (pt) | 2020-03-31 | 2021-02-22 | Método para proteger atualização de parâmetro de terminal e aparelho de comunicação e sistema de comunicação e meio de armazenamento legível por computador |
CA3178449A CA3178449A1 (en) | 2020-03-31 | 2021-02-22 | Method for protecting terminal parameter update and communication apparatus |
AU2021247219A AU2021247219B2 (en) | 2020-03-31 | 2021-02-22 | Terminal parameter updating protection method and communication device |
JP2022559719A JP2023519997A (ja) | 2020-03-31 | 2021-02-22 | 端末パラメータ更新を保護するための方法および通信装置 |
US17/936,634 US20230035970A1 (en) | 2020-03-31 | 2022-09-29 | Method for Protecting Terminal Parameter Update and Communication Apparatus |
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AU (1) | AU2021247219B2 (zh) |
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CA (1) | CA3178449A1 (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2021196913A1 (zh) |
Cited By (3)
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US20230239280A1 (en) * | 2022-01-21 | 2023-07-27 | Dell Products L.P. | Method and system for a conditional key storage using network information of a key management service |
WO2023165407A1 (zh) * | 2022-03-02 | 2023-09-07 | 华为技术有限公司 | 认证方法、发送信息的方法、处理方法及通信装置 |
US12026291B2 (en) | 2022-01-21 | 2024-07-02 | Dell Products L.P. | Method and system for a conditional key storage in a hardware resource manager |
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- 2021-02-22 BR BR112022019885A patent/BR112022019885A2/pt not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2021-02-22 CA CA3178449A patent/CA3178449A1/en active Pending
- 2021-02-22 AU AU2021247219A patent/AU2021247219B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2021-02-22 JP JP2022559719A patent/JP2023519997A/ja active Pending
- 2021-02-22 KR KR1020227037668A patent/KR20220159455A/ko not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2021-02-22 WO PCT/CN2021/077280 patent/WO2021196913A1/zh unknown
- 2021-02-22 EP EP21779741.4A patent/EP4132113A4/en active Pending
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2022
- 2022-09-29 US US17/936,634 patent/US20230035970A1/en active Pending
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CN108848495A (zh) * | 2018-05-18 | 2018-11-20 | 兴唐通信科技有限公司 | 一种使用预置密钥的用户身份更新方法 |
CN109041054A (zh) * | 2018-07-27 | 2018-12-18 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | 一种网络侧发起号码变更的隐私保护方法 |
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Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US20230239280A1 (en) * | 2022-01-21 | 2023-07-27 | Dell Products L.P. | Method and system for a conditional key storage using network information of a key management service |
US12026291B2 (en) | 2022-01-21 | 2024-07-02 | Dell Products L.P. | Method and system for a conditional key storage in a hardware resource manager |
WO2023165407A1 (zh) * | 2022-03-02 | 2023-09-07 | 华为技术有限公司 | 认证方法、发送信息的方法、处理方法及通信装置 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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EP4132113A4 (en) | 2023-08-16 |
US20230035970A1 (en) | 2023-02-02 |
CA3178449A1 (en) | 2021-10-07 |
EP4132113A1 (en) | 2023-02-08 |
KR20220159455A (ko) | 2022-12-02 |
JP2023519997A (ja) | 2023-05-15 |
AU2021247219B2 (en) | 2024-02-15 |
AU2021247219A1 (en) | 2022-11-17 |
BR112022019885A2 (pt) | 2022-12-13 |
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