WO2021012728A1 - 一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法 - Google Patents
一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2021012728A1 WO2021012728A1 PCT/CN2020/085959 CN2020085959W WO2021012728A1 WO 2021012728 A1 WO2021012728 A1 WO 2021012728A1 CN 2020085959 W CN2020085959 W CN 2020085959W WO 2021012728 A1 WO2021012728 A1 WO 2021012728A1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F13/00—Interconnection of, or transfer of information or other signals between, memories, input/output devices or central processing units
- G06F13/38—Information transfer, e.g. on bus
- G06F13/42—Bus transfer protocol, e.g. handshake; Synchronisation
- G06F13/4282—Bus transfer protocol, e.g. handshake; Synchronisation on a serial bus, e.g. I2C bus, SPI bus
- G06F13/4286—Bus transfer protocol, e.g. handshake; Synchronisation on a serial bus, e.g. I2C bus, SPI bus using a handshaking protocol, e.g. RS232C link
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/004—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received by using forward error control
- H04L1/0056—Systems characterized by the type of code used
- H04L1/0061—Error detection codes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
- H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2213/00—Indexing scheme relating to interconnection of, or transfer of information or other signals between, memories, input/output devices or central processing units
- G06F2213/0002—Serial port, e.g. RS232C
Definitions
- the invention belongs to the field of information technology, and in particular relates to a field bus channel encryption method in a water conservancy automation control system.
- Field Bus Field Bus
- PLC programmable logic controller
- the present invention proposes a fieldbus channel encryption method in a water conservancy automation control system to realize the functions of automatic control equipment identity verification, fieldbus communication data confidentiality, and protocol packet integrity verification.
- the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: a hardware encryption gateway for fieldbus channel encryption, consisting of two serial communication modules, encryption modules, key storage modules, and power supply modules .
- the two serial communication modules are respectively connected to the network physical interface of the automation control equipment and the field bus for receiving or sending serial communication protocol packets.
- the two serial communication modules are respectively connected to the encryption module through a high-speed serial data bus interface.
- the network physical interface used by the serial communication module includes, but is not limited to, an electrical interface that conforms to the RS485/232 standard.
- the high-speed serial data bus interface used by the serial communication module includes, but is not limited to, bus interfaces that comply with UART, I2C, and SPI standards.
- the encryption module is a single chip microcomputer system (SOC), which can realize asymmetric encryption algorithms, symmetric encryption algorithms, hash algorithms, and random key generation algorithms through software codes with built-in registers or arithmetic logic unit hardware devices.
- SOC single chip microcomputer system
- asymmetric encryption algorithms include but are not limited to SM2, ECC, and RSA algorithms
- symmetric encryption algorithms include but are not limited to SM1, RC4, and AES algorithms
- hash algorithms include but are not limited to SM3, MD5, and SHA-1 algorithms.
- the encryption module is connected to the serial communication module through its high-speed serial data bus interface, is connected to the key storage module through its data bus and address bus interface, and is connected to the power supply module through its power cord interface.
- the key storage module is a flash-write read-only memory.
- the gateway stores the destination address code, and the corresponding public key and private key through the key storage module.
- the key storage module is connected to the encryption module through its data bus and address bus interface, and the interface includes but is not limited to an expansion bus interface that conforms to eMMC and UFS standards.
- the power supply module is a DC power supply.
- the gateway is powered by a power supply module, and the power supply module converts the wide-voltage DC power input on the field bus into voltage and current that meet the requirements of the gateway's working conditions.
- the power supply module is connected to the encryption module through a two-core (VCC, GND) power cord interface, and the input voltage is 12V to 24V.
- the two serial communication modules of the hardware encryption gateway are respectively connected to the network physical interface of the automation control device and the field bus.
- the serial communication module connected to the network physical interface of the automation control device is called the device end, and the serial communication module connected to the field bus network physical interface is called It is the field bus terminal.
- the automation control equipment includes but not limited to PLC, lower computer, sensor, and controller.
- step S2 After the power supply module of the hardware encryption gateway starts working, the hardware encryption gateway starts and initializes the key storage module of the hardware encryption gateway; if the initialization process is completed, go to step S3; if the initialization process is terminated, no subsequent operations are performed; the initialization process as follows:
- At least one destination address code and the corresponding private key are stored in the key storage module; judge whether the number of private key records is unique, if the number of private key records is unique, go to step (2-3); otherwise , The initialization process is terminated and subsequent operations are not performed;
- At least one destination address code and the corresponding public key are stored in the key storage module; judge whether the number of public key records is greater than or equal to 1, if the number of public key records is greater than or equal to 1, the initialization process is completed ; Otherwise, the initialization process is terminated and subsequent operations are not performed.
- the monitoring process starts; the monitoring process includes two parts: one, on the serial communication module connected to the fieldbus side, for all serial communication application data incoming to the hardware encryption gateway Unit ADU monitors; second, monitor all serial communication application data unit ADUs incoming to the hardware encryption gateway on the serial communication module of the connected device; the steps are as follows:
- (3-1) Monitor all the serial communication application data units ADUs incoming to the hardware encryption gateway on the serial communication module connected to the fieldbus end;
- serial communication module of the hardware encryption gateway connected to the fieldbus side receives the incoming serial communication application data unit ADU, it sends an interrupt request to the encryption module.
- the encryption module responds to the interrupt and enters the interrupt processing process, using the check code CRC at the end of the application data unit ADU to check the remaining part of the data in the unit except the CRC.
- the check algorithm uses the hash algorithm preset in the encryption module , Including but not limited to SM3, MD5, SHA-1 algorithms.
- ADDR hexadecimal
- the encryption module interrupts and returns, and does not respond to the application data unit ADU; if the private key PRK or public key PUK exists, use the private key PRK or public key PUK , Decrypt the symmetric key ciphertext CK located at the header of the protocol data unit (Protocol Data Unit, PDU) in the application data unit ADU through the built-in asymmetric encryption algorithm in the encryption module to obtain the symmetric key RK.
- Asymmetric encryption algorithms include but are not limited to SM2, ECC, and RSA algorithms.
- the encryption module uses the data plaintext PD in the EP header, calculates the plaintext hash value PH through the built-in hash algorithm, and compares it with the hash data DH at the end of the EP.
- Hash algorithms include but are not limited to SM3, MD5, and SHA-1 algorithms.
- the encryption module interrupts and returns, discards the application data unit ADU, and does not respond; if the plaintext hash value PH is the same as the hash data DH, The data plaintext PD is used as the new protocol data unit PDU2.
- the destination address code ADDR is appended to the header of PDU2, and the check code CRC2 of PDU2 is calculated and appended to the end of PDU2 as a new application data unit ADU2.
- the verification algorithm uses the internal hash algorithm preset in the encryption module, including but not limited to SM3, MD5, and SHA-1 algorithms.
- ADDR hexadecimal
- the encryption module interrupts and returns, and does not respond to the application data unit ADU; if the public key PUK or private key PRK exists, use the application data unit ADU
- the protocol data unit PDU is used as the data plaintext PD, the plaintext hash value PH is calculated through the built-in hash algorithm, and the PH is appended to the end of the data plaintext PD to form the encapsulated data payload EP.
- Hash algorithms include but are not limited to SM3, MD5, and SHA-1 algorithms.
- (3-2-4) Generate a random symmetric key RK through the built-in random key generation algorithm, use RK to encrypt the encapsulated data payload EP through the built-in symmetric encryption algorithm, and obtain the encapsulated data payload ciphertext EC.
- Symmetric encryption algorithms include but are not limited to SM1, RC4, and AES algorithms.
- Asymmetric encryption algorithms include but are not limited to SM2, ECC, and RSA algorithms.
- (3-2-6) Attach the symmetric key ciphertext CK to the header of the encapsulated data payload ciphertext EC as a new protocol data unit PDU2.
- the destination address code ADDR is appended to the header of PDU2, the check code CRC2 of PDU2 is calculated and appended to the end of PDU2 as a new application data unit ADU2.
- the check algorithm uses the hash algorithm preset in the encryption module, including but not limited to SM3, MD5, SHA-1 algorithm.
- step S4 After the hardware encryption gateway starts to execute the monitoring process, the monitoring process is terminated if and only when the power supply module stops supplying power. Otherwise, the monitoring process is always performed. After the power supply module stops supplying power, the hardware encryption gateway re-executes the initialization process in step S2 and the monitoring process in step S3 if and only when the power supply is performed again.
- the present invention realizes the protocol data unit by deploying a hardware encryption gateway between the upper computer, lower computer and other automation control equipment of the water conservancy automation control system and the field bus, using public key encryption, private key encryption, random encryption and data hashing algorithms to realize the protocol data unit ( Protocol Data Unit (PDU) transparent encryption provides automatic control equipment authentication, fieldbus communication data confidentiality, and protocol packet integrity verification functions, which can effectively prevent unauthorized devices from monitoring and intercepting on the fieldbus channel , Tampering with data monitoring and control information, has a high resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks, and reduces the security risk caused by the intrusion of the field bus channel in the water conservancy automation control system.
- PDU Protocol Data Unit
- the invention Compared with the link layer plaintext data transmission method adopted in the existing fieldbus, it can provide reliable safety guarantee for the water conservancy automation control system as a key infrastructure in the national economy.
- the invention has higher compatibility and versatility, does not need to change the field bus network topology and the physical layer transmission media, and can realize the low-cost transformation of the existing water conservancy automation control system.
- Figure 1 is a structural diagram of a hardware encryption gateway
- Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of device connection
- Figure 3 is the communication packet data structure from the fieldbus end to the device end during the monitoring process
- Figure 4 is the data structure of the communication packet from the device end to the fieldbus end during the monitoring process
- FIG. 5 is a flowchart of the initialization process
- Figure 6 is a flow chart of the fieldbus terminal monitoring process
- Figure 7 is a flowchart of the device-side monitoring process.
- the hardware encryption gateway used for field bus channel encryption of the present invention is composed of two serial communication modules, an encryption module, a key storage module, and a power supply module.
- the gateway structure is shown in Figure 1, and the fieldbus and device connections are shown in Figure 2.
- Each serial communication module is composed of a serial communication chip, the chip model is ADM485, which is connected to the encryption module through the UART bus interface, and the external device is connected through the RS485 interface;
- the encryption module consists of a single-chip microcomputer system based on the ACH512 chip.
- the hardware implementation of the internal preset SM1, SM2, SM3, SM4 algorithms is connected to the serial communication module through the UART bus interface, and the key storage module is connected through the address bus interface.
- the VCC, GND) power cord interface is connected to the power supply module.
- the key storage module is composed of a Flashrom chip, which is connected to the encryption module through the NAND Flash interface.
- the power supply module is composed of a regulated DC circuit, which takes power from the field bus through the RS485 interface, and is connected to the encryption module through the two-core (VCC, GND) power cord interface to provide the standard working voltage and current of the encryption module.
- D1 is the upper computer, set to master mode, and the address is 0x01; D2, D3 are lower computer, set to slave mode , The addresses are 0x02 and 0x03 respectively.
- S1 Use the burning program in advance to write the key to the key storage module of the hardware encryption gateway G1, G2, G3 according to the following rules:
- G2 write the address 0x02 of D2 and the private key of D2; write address 0x01 of D1 and the public key of D1.
- G3 write the address 0x03 of D3 and the private key of D3; write address 0x01 of D1 and the public key of D1.
- the device side serial communication module of G1 is connected to D1, the bus side serial communication module of G1 is connected to the field bus; the device side serial port of G2 The communication module is connected to D2, the bus end serial communication module of G2 is connected to the field bus; the device end serial communication module of G3 is connected to D3, and the bus end serial communication module of G3 is connected to the field bus.
- step S1 Since the key written in the above step S1 meets the requirements of the initialization process, the initialization process is completed, and G1, G2, and G3 start to perform the monitoring process.
- G2 When G2 receives the above-mentioned encrypted ADU sent by G1, G2's bus terminal serial communication module generates an interrupt, and its encryption module responds to the interrupt and begins to enter the interrupt processing process, as shown in Figure 6. Since the private key of D2 is written in G2, the ADU sent by G1 is processed by G2 and then restored to plaintext and transmitted to D2.
- the communication packet data structure is shown in Figure 3. At this time, D2 receives the serial communication application data unit ADU sent by D1, can perform related operations, and can feed data back to D1.
- the device-side serial communication module of G2 Since the ADU destination address returned by the slave device to the master in the Modbus protocol is always the device address, and the returned packet destination address is 0x02, the device-side serial communication module of G2 generates an interrupt, and its encryption module responds to the interrupt and begins to enter the interrupt processing process. As shown in Figure 7. Since the private key of D2 is written in G2, the original ADU sent by D2 is processed by G2 and becomes an encrypted ADU, which enters the field bus through the G2 terminal serial communication module. The communication packet data structure is shown in Figure 4. .
- G1 When G1 receives the above-mentioned encrypted ADU sent by G2, G1's bus terminal serial communication module generates an interrupt, and G1's encryption module responds to the interrupt and begins to enter the interrupt processing process, as shown in Figure 6. Since the public key of D2 is written in G1, the ADU sent by G2 is processed by G1 and restored to plaintext, and transmitted to D1 through the device-side serial communication module of G1.
- the communication packet data structure is shown in Figure 3.
- the malicious attacker directly connects the malicious device D4 to the field bus without a hardware encryption gateway, and the address of D4 is 0x04.
- the attacker knows that the address of the master device D1 is 0x01, and tries to send a malicious packet P to D1.
- the ADU destination address returned by the slave device to the master is always the device address, and the destination address of P is 0x04.
- G1 After G1 receives P, it checks whether the address 0x04 and its corresponding public key exist in the key storage module. Because the address and public key do not exist, G1 discards P and the attack fails.
- a malicious attacker tries to use D4 to pretend to be D3 and send a malicious packet PP to D1. Because the ADU destination address returned by the slave device to the master in the Modbus protocol is always the device address, the destination address of PP is 0x03. After G1 receives the PP, it checks whether the address 0x03 and its corresponding public key exist in the key storage module. Because the address and public key exist, G1 uses D3's public key to decrypt PP. Since D4 cannot obtain the private key of D3 in the G3 key storage module, PP will inevitably fail in the verification process of G1, and G1 discards PP and the attack fails.
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Abstract
本发明公开了一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法,通过在自动化控制设备与现场总线之间部署硬件加密网关,实现协议数据单元的透明加密。在硬件加密网关中,通过国产对称加密算法与非对称加密算法结合的混合加密方案,实现自动化控制设备身份验证、现场总线通信数据保密、协议分组完整性校验功能,有效预防未经授权的非法设备在现场总线的信道上监听、拦截、篡改数据监测及控制信息,对于中间人攻击具有较高的抵抗能力,降低在水利自动化控制***中因现场总线信道受到侵入而产生的安全风险。所述硬件加密网关能够无缝接入目前现有的水利自动化控制***现场总线,具有较高的设备兼容性和通用性。
Description
本发明属于信息技术领域,尤其涉及一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法。
在我国目前部署的水利自动化控制***中,绝大多数采用现场总线(Field Bus)网络对可编程逻辑控制器(PLC)与下位机进行组网。其原因是,计算机网络所使用的物理层媒体,如STP、单模或多模光纤等,其物理性质不能满足高耐候性、高强度的工业应用场景。RS232/485电缆以其优异的性能及价格优势,在工业自动化控制***中具有二十余年的应用历史,短时间内无法被替代。而要对现有物理层进行更换,实施改造成本过高,甚至将高于当初部署***的成本。如果使用无线组网,则会降低网络的可靠性与稳定性,且在信号屏蔽的场景中无法实施,具有较高的局限性。
目前水利自动化控制***所使用的PLC大多数不具备计算机网络通信能力,必须为其搭配相配套的硬件接口。对于现有设备的改造同样存在实施成本过高的情况,且要考虑不同厂家之间电气、接口规范的不同需求,性价比低。虽然Modbus TCP协议支持在计算机网络中实现透明传输,但是由于其实现较为简单,无法支持TCP/IP协议中的网络层、传输层安全特性,需要对网络模块进行特殊改造,通用性不强。
电气工程师大多数仅具备现场总线网络中数据通信的开发经验,若使用计算机网络替代现场总线,必须具备足够的人员支撑,这意味着首先需要建立相关知识体系、培训教材、课程、实务、流程。由于目前电气工程师的培训周期较长,尚不具备实施计算机网络化改造的人员基础。
综上所述,复用计算机网络中相关理论及技术,用以解决水利自动化控制***中现场总线网络安全性问题的思路,在目前人员及技术条件下,具有相当高的局限性。
因此,如何在降低改造成本的前提下,针对现场总线信道提出一套低成本、高适用性的加密方案,通过国产对称加密算法与非对称加密算法结合的混合加密方案(Hybrid Encryption Scheme),实现自动化控制设备身份验证、现场总线通信数据保密、协议分组完整性校验功能,是一个具有较高研究及应用价值的课题。
发明内容
发明目的:针对以上问题,本发明提出一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法,实现自动化控制设备身份验证、现场总线通信数据保密、协议分组完整性校验功能。
技术方案:为实现本发明的目的,本发明所采用的技术方案是:一种用于现场总线信道加密的硬件加密网关,由两个串口通信模块、加密模块、密钥存储模块、供电模块组成。
两个串口通信模块分别连接自动化控制设备和现场总线的网络物理接口,用于接收或发送串口通信协议分组。两个串口通信模块分别通过高速串行数据总线接口与加密模 块连接。所述串口通信模块使用的网络物理接口包括但不限于符合RS485/232标准的电气接口。串口通信模块使用的高速串行数据总线接口包括但不限于符合UART、I2C、SPI标准的总线接口。
加密模块为一个单片机***(SOC),能够通过内置寄存器的软件代码或算术逻辑单元硬件设备实现非对称加密算法、对称加密算法、散列算法、随机密钥生成算法。其中,非对称加密算法包括但不限于SM2、ECC、RSA算法,对称加密算法包括但不限于SM1、RC4、AES算法,散列算法包括但不限于SM3、MD5、SHA-1算法。加密模块通过其高速串行数据总线接口连接串口通信模块,通过其数据总线与地址总线接口连接密钥存储模块,通过其电源线接口连接供电模块。
密钥存储模块为一个快速擦写只读存储器。该网关通过密钥存储模块,存储目的地址编码,以及与之相对应的公钥、私钥。密钥存储模块通过其数据总线与地址总线接口与加密模块连接,接口包括但不限于符合eMMC、UFS标准的扩展总线接口。
供电模块为一个直流电源。该网关通过供电模块进行供电,供电模块将现场总线上的宽压直流电源输入转换为符合网关工况需求的电压、电流。供电模块通过二芯(VCC,GND)电源线接口与加密模块连接,输入电压为12V至24V。
硬件加密网关的两个串口通信模块分别连接自动化控制设备和现场总线的网络物理接口,其中连接自动化控制设备网络物理接口的串口通信模块称为设备端,连接现场总线网络物理接口的串口通信模块称为现场总线端。
一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法,包括以下步骤:
S1:在连接至现场总线的每一台自动化控制设备与现场总线的网络物理接口之间,分别连接一台硬件加密网关,并在硬件加密网关的密钥存储模块中预先写入对应的密钥和目的地址编码。所述自动化控制设备包括但不限于PLC、下位机、传感器、控制器。
S2:硬件加密网关的供电模块开始工作后,硬件加密网关启动,对硬件加密网关的密钥存储模块执行初始化;若初始化过程完成,进入步骤S3;若初始化过程终止,不执行后继操作;初始化过程如下:
(2-1)查找密钥存储模块中所有已存储的目的地址编码,以及与之相对应的公钥、私钥记录;
(2-2)密钥存储模块中至少存储一条目的地址编码,以及与之相对应的私钥;判断私钥记录数是否唯一,若私钥记录数唯一,进入步骤(2-3);否则,初始化过程终止,不执行后继操作;
(2-3)密钥存储模块中至少存储一条目的地址编码,以及与之相对应的公钥;判断公钥记录数是否大于或等于1,若公钥记录数大于或等于1,初始化过程完成;否则,初始化过程终止,不执行后继操作。
S3:对硬件加密网关的密钥存储模块初始化完成后,开始执行监听过程;监听过程包括两部分:其一,在连接现场总线端的串口通信模块上对于所有传入硬件加密网关的串口通信应用数据单元ADU进行监听;其二,在连接设备端的串口通信模块上对于所有传入硬件加密网关的串口通信应用数据单元ADU进行监听;步骤如下:
(3-1)在连接现场总线端的串口通信模块上对于所有传入硬件加密网关的串口通信应用数据单元ADU进行监听;
(3-1-1)当硬件加密网关连接现场总线端的串口通信模块收到传入的串口通信应用数据单元ADU时,向加密模块发送中断请求。加密模块响应中断,进入中断处理过程,使用应用数据单元ADU尾部的校验码CRC对于该单元中除CRC以外剩余部分的数据进行校验,校验算法使用加密模块中内部预置的散列算法,包括但不限于SM3、MD5、SHA-1算法。
(3-1-2)若校验失败,加密模块中断返回,对于应用数据单元ADU不进行响应。若校验成功,加密模块通过应用数据单元ADU首部的目的地址编码ADDR,在密钥管理模块中查找与目的地址编码ADDR对应的私钥PRK或公钥PUK。ADDR为大于或等于1个字节的十六进制(HEX)数据。
(3-1-3)若私钥PRK或公钥PUK不存在,加密模块中断返回,对于应用数据单元ADU不进行响应;若私钥PRK或公钥PUK存在,使用私钥PRK或公钥PUK,通过加密模块中内置的非对称加密算法,解密位于应用数据单元ADU中协议数据单元(Protocol Data Unit,PDU)首部的对称密钥密文CK,获得对称密钥RK。非对称加密算法包括但不限于SM2、ECC、RSA算法。
(3-1-4)使用对称密钥RK,通过加密模块中内置的对称加密算法,解密协议数据单元PDU中除首部以外部分的封装数据载荷密文EC,获得封装数据载荷EP。封装数据载荷EP由其首部的数据明文PD与其尾部的散列数据DH组成。对称加密算法包括但不限于SM1、RC4、AES算法。
(3-1-5)加密模块使用EP首部的数据明文PD,通过内置的散列算法计算明文散列值PH,并与EP尾部的散列数据DH进行比较。散列算法包括但不限于SM3、MD5、SHA-1算法。
(3-1-6)若明文散列值PH与散列数据DH不同,加密模块中断返回,将应用数据单元ADU舍弃,不进行响应;若明文散列值PH与散列数据DH相同,将数据明文PD作为新的协议数据单元PDU2。将目的地址编码ADDR附加到PDU2首部,计算PDU2的校验码CRC2并附加到PDU2尾部,作为新的应用数据单元ADU2。校验算法使用加密模块中内部预置的散列算法,包括但不限于SM3、MD5、SHA-1算法。
(3-1-7)将ADU2通过设备端的串口通信模块进行发送。
(3-2)在连接设备端的串口通信模块上对于所有传入硬件加密网关的串口通信应用数据单元ADU进行监听;
(3-2-1)当该网关连接设备端的串口通信模块收到传入的串口通信应用数据单元ADU时,向加密模块发送中断请求。加密模块响应中断,进入中断处理过程,使用应用数据单元ADU尾部的校验码CRC对于该单元中除CRC以外剩余部分的数据进行校验,校验算法使用加密模块中内部预置的散列算法,包括但不限于SM3、MD5、SHA-1算法。
(3-2-2)若校验失败,加密模块中断返回,对于应用数据单元ADU不进行响应。若校验成功,加密模块通过应用数据单元ADU首部的目的地址编码ADDR,在密钥管理模块中查找与该目的地址编码ADDR对应的公钥PUK或私钥PRK。其中ADDR为大于或等于1个字节的十六进制(HEX)数据。
(3-2-3)若公钥PUK或私钥PRK不存在,加密模块中断返回,对于该应用数据单元ADU不进行响应;若公钥PUK或私钥PRK存在,使用应用数据单元ADU中的协议数据单元PDU作为数据明文PD,通过内置的散列算法计算明文散列值PH,并将PH附加到数据明文PD尾部,形成封装数据载荷EP。散列算法包括但不限于SM3、MD5、SHA-1算法。
(3-2-4)通过内置的随机密钥生成算法,生成一个随机对称密钥RK,使用RK通过内 置的对称加密算法,加密封装数据载荷EP,获得封装数据载荷密文EC。对称加密算法包括但不限于SM1、RC4、AES算法。
(3-2-5)使用公钥PUK或私钥PRK,通过内置的非对称加密算法加密随机对称密钥RK,获得对称密钥密文CK。非对称加密算法包括但不限于SM2、ECC、RSA算法。
(3-2-6)将对称密钥密文CK附加到封装数据载荷密文EC首部,作为新的协议数据单元PDU2。将目的地址编码ADDR附加到PDU2首部,计算PDU2的校验码CRC2并附加到PDU2尾部,作为新的应用数据单元ADU2,校验算法使用加密模块中内部预置的散列算法,包括但不限于SM3、MD5、SHA-1算法。
(3-2-7)将ADU2通过现场总线端的串口通信模块进行发送。
S4:硬件加密网关开始执行监听过程之后,当且仅当供电模块停止供电时,监听过程终止。否则,始终执行监听过程。供电模块停止供电后,当且仅当再次进行供电时,硬件加密网关重新执行一次步骤S2所述初始化过程,以及步骤S3所述监听过程。
有益效果:与现有技术相比,本发明的技术方案具有以下有益的技术效果:
本发明通过在水利自动化控制***的上位机、下位机等自动化控制设备与现场总线之间部署硬件加密网关,利用公钥加密、私钥加密、随机加密及数据散列算法实现了协议数据单元(Protocol Data Unit,PDU)的透明加密,提供了自动化控制设备身份验证、现场总线通信数据保密、协议分组完整性校验功能,能够有效预防未经授权的非法设备在现场总线的信道上监听、拦截、篡改数据监测及控制信息,对于中间人攻击具有较高的抵抗能力,降低在水利自动化控制***中因现场总线信道受到侵入而产生的安全风险。与现有的现场总线中采用的链路层明文数据传输方式相比,能够对于作为国民经济领域中关键性基础设施的水利自动化控制***提供可靠的安全保障。本发明具有较高兼容性与通用性,不需要改变现场总线网络拓扑及物理层传输媒体,能够实现现有水利自动化控制***的低成本改造。
图1是硬件加密网关结构图;
图2是设备连接示意图;
图3是监听过程中现场总线端到设备端的通信分组数据结构;
图4是监听过程中设备端到现场总线端的通信分组数据结构;
图5是初始化过程流程图;
图6是现场总线端监听过程流程图;
图7是设备端监听过程流程图。
下面结合附图和实施例对本发明的技术方案作进一步的说明。
本发明所述的一种用于现场总线信道加密的硬件加密网关,由两个串口通信模块、加密模块、密钥存储模块、供电模块组成。网关结构如图1所示,现场总线与设备连接如图2所示。
每个串口通信模块都由一个串行通信芯片组成,芯片型号为ADM485,分别通过 UART总线接口连接加密模块,使用RS485接口连接外部设备;
加密模块由一个基于ACH512芯片的单片机***组成,内部预置SM1、SM2、SM3、SM4算法的硬件实现,通过UART总线接口连接串口通信模块,通过地址总线接口连接密钥存储模块,通过二芯(VCC,GND)电源线接口连接供电模块。
密钥存储模块由一块Flashrom芯片组成,通过NAND Flash接口连接加密模块。
供电模块由一个稳压直流电路组成,通过RS485接口从现场总线上取电,通过二芯(VCC,GND)电源线接口与加密模块连接,提供加密模块的标准工作电压与电流。
设某水利自动化控制***中,同一条现场总线上分别存在自动化控制设备D1、D2、D3,其中D1为上位机,设为master模式,地址为0x01;D2、D3为下位机,设为slave模式,地址分别为0x02、0x03。
本发明所述的一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法,包括以下步骤:
S1:预先使用烧录程序按照以下规则向硬件加密网关G1、G2、G3的密钥存储模块写入密钥:
在G1中,写入D1的地址0x01、D1的私钥;写入D2的地址0x02、D2的公钥;写入D3的地址0x03、D3的公钥。
在G2中,写入D2的地址0x02、D2的私钥;写入D1的地址0x01、D1的公钥。
在G3中,写入D3的地址0x03、D3的私钥;写入D1的地址0x01、D1的公钥。
分别将硬件加密网关G1、G2、G3部署在设备D1、D2、D3与现场总线之间:G1的设备端串口通信模块连接D1,G1的总线端串口通信模块连接现场总线;G2的设备端串口通信模块连接D2,G2的总线端串口通信模块连接现场总线;G3的设备端串口通信模块连接D3,G3的总线端串口通信模块连接现场总线。
S2:G1、G2、G3的供电模块开始工作后,G1、G2、G3启动,开始对G1、G2、G3的密钥存储模块执行初始化过程,其过程如图5所示。初始化过程如下:
查找密钥存储模块中所有已存储的目的地址编码,以及与之相对应的公钥、私钥记录;判断私钥记录数是否唯一,若不唯一,初始化过程终止,不执行后继操作;若唯一,判断公钥记录数是否大于或等于1,若公钥记录数大于或等于1,初始化过程完成;否则,初始化过程终止,不执行后继操作。
由于上述步骤S1写入的密钥符合初始化过程的要求,因此初始化过程完成,G1、G2、G3开始执行监听过程。
S3:当D1向D2发送串口通信应用数据单元ADU时,设该ADU目的地址编码为0x02,G1的设备端串口通信模块产生中断,其加密模块响应该中断,开始进入中断处理过程,如图7所示。由于G1中写入了D2的公钥,因此D1发出的原始ADU经过G1处理后,成为加密后的ADU,进入现场总线,其通信分组数据结构如图4所示。
G2接收到G1发出的上述加密后的ADU时,G2的总线端串口通信模块产生中断,其加密模块响应该中断,开始进入中断处理过程,如图6所示。由于G2中写入了D2的私钥,因此G1发出的ADU经过G2处理后,恢复为明文,传输至D2,其通信分组数据结构如图3所示。此时,D2收到了D1发送串口通信应用数据单元ADU,可执行相关操作,并可将数据反馈至D1。
由于Modbus协议中slave设备向master返回的ADU目的地址总是为设备地址,返回 的分组目的地址为0x02,G2的设备端串口通信模块产生中断,其加密模块响应该中断,开始进入中断处理过程,如图7所示。由于G2中写入了D2的私钥,因此D2发出的原始ADU经过G2处理后,成为加密后的ADU,通过G2的总线端串口通信模块进入现场总线,其通信分组数据结构如图4所示。
G1接收到G2发出的上述加密后的ADU时,G1的总线端串口通信模块产生中断,G1的加密模块响应该中断,开始进入中断处理过程,如图6所示。由于G1中写入了D2的公钥,因此G2发出的ADU经过G1处理后,恢复为明文,通过G1的设备端串口通信模块传输至D1,其通信分组数据结构如图3所示。
设恶意攻击者将恶意设备D4不通过硬件加密网关直接连接至该现场总线,D4地址为0x04。攻击者已知master设备D1的地址为0x01,试图向D1发送恶意分组P,由于Modbus协议中slave设备向master返回的ADU目的地址总是为设备地址,P的目的地址为0x04。G1收到P后,检查密钥存储模块中是否存在地址0x04及其对应的公钥。由于该地址及公钥不存在,G1将P舍弃,攻击失败。
恶意攻击者试图使用D4伪装为D3,向D1发送恶意分组PP,由于Modbus协议中slave设备向master返回的ADU目的地址总是为设备地址,PP的目的地址为0x03。G1收到PP后,检查密钥存储模块中是否存在地址0x03及其对应的公钥。由于该地址及公钥存在,G1使用D3的公钥解密PP。由于D4无法获取G3密钥存储模块中D3的私钥,PP在G1的校验过程中必然失败,G1将PP舍弃,攻击失败。
恶意攻击者将D3从G3上拆除后,使用D4连接G3的设备端串口通信模块,向D1发送恶意分组PPP。由于D3与D4的地址不同,G3在密钥存储模块中无法找到地址0x04及其对应的私钥,G3将PPP舍弃,攻击失败。
实施例仅为说明本发明的技术思想,不能以此限定本发明的保护范围,凡是按照本发明提出的技术思想,在技术方案基础上所做的任何改动,均落入本发明保护范围之内。
Claims (9)
- 一种用于现场总线信道加密的硬件加密网关,其特征在于:该网关由两个串口通信模块、加密模块、密钥存储模块、供电模块组成;两个串口通信模块分别连接自动化控制设备和现场总线的网络物理接口;两个串口通信模块分别通过高速串行数据总线接口与加密模块连接;加密模块为一个单片机***(SOC),通过其数据总线与地址总线接口连接密钥存储模块,通过其电源线接口连接供电模块;密钥存储模块为一个快速擦写只读存储器,通过其数据总线与地址总线接口与加密模块连接;供电模块为一个直流电源,通过二芯(VCC,GND)电源线接口与加密模块连接。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种用于现场总线信道加密的硬件加密网关,其特征在于:所述串口通信模块使用的网络物理接口包括但不限于符合RS485/232标准的电气接口,串口通信模块使用的高速串行数据总线接口包括但不限于符合UART、I2C、SPI标准的总线接口;所述密钥存储模块的数据总线与地址总线接口包括但不限于符合eMMC、UFS标准的扩展总线接口。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种用于现场总线信道加密的硬件加密网关,其特征在于:所述加密模块通过内置寄存器的软件代码或算术逻辑单元硬件设备实现非对称加密算法、对称加密算法、散列算法、随机密钥生成算法;其中,非对称加密算法包括但不限于SM2、ECC、RSA算法,对称加密算法包括但不限于SM1、RC4、AES算法,散列算法包括但不限于SM3、MD5、SHA-1算法。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种用于现场总线信道加密的硬件加密网关,其特征在于:每个串口通信模块都由一个串行通信芯片组成,芯片型号为ADM485,分别通过UART总线接口连接加密模块,使用RS485接口连接外部设备;加密模块由一个基于ACH512芯片的单片机***组成;密钥存储模块由一块Flashrom芯片组成,通过NAND Flash接口连接加密模块。
- 根据权利要求1-4任一所述的硬件加密网关实现的一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法,其特征在于:该方法包括以下步骤:S1:在连接至现场总线的每一台自动化控制设备与现场总线的网络物理接口之间,分别连接一台硬件加密网关,并在硬件加密网关的密钥存储模块中预先写入对应的密钥和目的地址编码;S2:硬件加密网关的供电模块开始工作后,硬件加密网关启动,对硬件加密网关的密钥存储模块执行初始化;若初始化过程完成,进入步骤S3;若初始化过程终止,不执行后继操作;S3:对硬件加密网关的密钥存储模块初始化完成后,开始执行监听过程;S4:硬件加密网关开始执行监听过程之后,当且仅当供电模块停止供电时,监听过程终止;否则,始终执行监听过程;供电模块停止供电后,当且仅当再次进行供电时,硬件加密网关重新执行步骤S2所述初始化过程,以及步骤S3所述监听过程。
- 根据权利要求5所述的一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法,其特征在于:步骤S2所述初始化过程如下:(2-1)查找密钥存储模块中所有已存储的目的地址编码,以及与之相对应的公钥、私钥记录;(2-2)判断私钥记录数是否唯一,若私钥记录数唯一,进入步骤(2-3);否则,初始化过程终止,不执行后继操作;(2-3)判断公钥记录数是否大于或等于1,若公钥记录数大于或等于1,初始化过程完成;否则,初始化过程终止,不执行后继操作。
- 根据权利要求5所述的一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法,其特征在于:步骤S3所述监听过程包括两部分:其一,在连接现场总线端的串口通信模块上对于所有传入硬件加密网关的串口通信应用数据单元ADU进行监听;其二,在连接设备端的串口通信模块上对于所有传入硬件加密网关的串口通信应用数据单元ADU进行监听。
- 根据权利要求7所述的一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法,其特征在于:在连接现场总线端的串口通信模块上对于所有传入硬件加密网关的串口通信应用数据单元ADU进行监听;步骤如下:(3-1-1)当硬件加密网关连接现场总线端的串口通信模块收到传入的串口通信应用数据单元ADU时,向加密模块发送中断请求;加密模块响应中断,进入中断处理过程,使用应用数据单元ADU尾部的校验码CRC对于该单元中除CRC以外剩余部分的数据进行校验,校验算法使用加密模块中内部预置的散列算法;(3-1-2)若校验失败,加密模块中断返回,对于应用数据单元ADU不进行响应;若校验成功,加密模块通过应用数据单元ADU首部的目的地址编码ADDR,在密钥管理模块中查找与目的地址编码ADDR对应的私钥PRK或公钥PUK;ADDR为大于或等于1个字节的十六进制(HEX)数据;(3-1-3)若私钥PRK或公钥PUK不存在,加密模块中断返回,对于应用数据单元ADU不进行响应;若私钥PRK或公钥PUK存在,使用私钥PRK或公钥PUK,通过加密模块中内置的非对称加密算法,解密位于应用数据单元ADU中协议数据单元(Protocol Data Unit,PDU)首部的对称密钥密文CK,获得对称密钥RK;(3-1-4)使用对称密钥RK,通过加密模块中内置的对称加密算法,解密协议数据单元PDU中除首部以外部分的封装数据载荷密文EC,获得封装数据载荷EP;封装数据载荷EP由其首部的数据明文PD与其尾部的散列数据DH组成;(3-1-5)加密模块使用EP首部的数据明文PD,通过内置的散列算法计算明文散列值PH,并与EP尾部的散列数据DH进行比较;(3-1-6)若明文散列值PH与散列数据DH不同,加密模块中断返回,将应用数据单元ADU舍弃,不进行响应;若明文散列值PH与散列数据DH相同,将数据明文PD作为新的协议数据单元PDU2;将目的地址编码ADDR附加到PDU2首部,计算PDU2的校验码CRC2并附加到PDU2尾部,作为新的应用数据单元ADU2;校验算法使用加密模块中内部预置的散列算法;(3-1-7)将ADU2通过设备端的串口通信模块进行发送。
- 根据权利要求7所述的一种水利自动化控制***中现场总线信道加密方法,其特征在于:在连接设备端的串口通信模块上对于所有传入硬件加密网关的串口通信应用数据单元ADU进行监听;步骤如下:(3-2-1)当该网关连接设备端的串口通信模块收到传入的串口通信应用数据单元ADU时,向加密模块发送中断请求;加密模块响应中断,进入中断处理过程,使用应用数据单元ADU尾部的校验码CRC对于该单元中除CRC以外剩余部分的数据进行校验,校验算法使用加密模块中内部预置的散列算法;(3-2-2)若校验失败,加密模块中断返回,对于应用数据单元ADU不进行响应;若校验成 功,加密模块通过应用数据单元ADU首部的目的地址编码ADDR,在密钥管理模块中查找与该目的地址编码ADDR对应的公钥PUK或私钥PRK;其中ADDR为大于或等于1个字节的十六进制(HEX)数据;(3-2-3)若公钥PUK或私钥PRK不存在,加密模块中断返回,对于该应用数据单元ADU不进行响应;若公钥PUK或私钥PRK存在,使用应用数据单元ADU中的协议数据单元PDU作为数据明文PD,通过内置的散列算法计算明文散列值PH,并将PH附加到数据明文PD尾部,形成封装数据载荷EP;(3-2-4)通过内置的随机密钥生成算法,生成一个随机对称密钥RK,使用RK通过内置的对称加密算法,加密封装数据载荷EP,获得封装数据载荷密文EC;(3-2-5)使用公钥PUK或私钥PRK,通过内置的非对称加密算法加密随机对称密钥RK,获得对称密钥密文CK;(3-2-6)将对称密钥密文CK附加到封装数据载荷密文EC首部,作为新的协议数据单元PDU2;将目的地址编码ADDR附加到PDU2首部,计算PDU2的校验码CRC2并附加到PDU2尾部,作为新的应用数据单元ADU2,校验算法使用加密模块中内部预置的散列算法;(3-2-7)将ADU2通过现场总线端的串口通信模块进行发送。
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