WO2020113546A1 - 一种用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法及*** - Google Patents

一种用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法及*** Download PDF

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WO2020113546A1
WO2020113546A1 PCT/CN2018/119724 CN2018119724W WO2020113546A1 WO 2020113546 A1 WO2020113546 A1 WO 2020113546A1 CN 2018119724 W CN2018119724 W CN 2018119724W WO 2020113546 A1 WO2020113546 A1 WO 2020113546A1
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signature
node
block
domain
transaction
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PCT/CN2018/119724
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English (en)
French (fr)
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李挥
王菡
邬江兴
朱伏生
伊鹏
安辉耀
张昕淳
王子贤
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北京大学深圳研究生院
国家数字交换***工程技术研究中心
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Priority to PCT/CN2018/119724 priority Critical patent/WO2020113546A1/zh
Priority to CN201880036695.5A priority patent/CN110945833B/zh
Publication of WO2020113546A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020113546A1/zh

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
    • G06F16/20—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor of structured data, e.g. relational data
    • G06F16/27—Replication, distribution or synchronisation of data between databases or within a distributed database system; Distributed database system architectures therefor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3255—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using group based signatures, e.g. ring or threshold signatures

Definitions

  • the invention belongs to the field of blockchain technology, and particularly relates to a method for multi-mode identification network privacy protection and identity management.
  • the multi-mode identification network is a new open network architecture proposed to address the inherent defects of the existing Internet control capabilities that are too centralized and lack of international multilateral co-management and co-governance. It specifically refers to the deployment of multi-route identification and coordinated routing addressing in networks with different architectures. Network environment. For example, if a content network is deployed in a traditional network, if data can be shuttled between the two networks, a multi-mode network environment composed of two network systems, with content identification and address identification co-addressing, is formed. By using the advantages of different networks to work together, the multi-mode identification network can enhance the current basic transmission capacity of the Internet, strengthen the utilization of network resources, and enrich network layer functions. More importantly, the multi-mode identification network reduces the dependence and limitations of the existing Internet system on address identification, and provides the possibility of multilateral co-management and co-governance of the Internet.
  • Blockchain that is, a mode of implementing and managing transaction processing through transparent and trusted rules, building a non-forgeable, non-tamperable and traceable blockchain data structure under a peer-to-peer network environment.
  • Blockchain technology is essentially a tamper-proof, shared distributed ledger. All member nodes in the network jointly maintain the ledger. Based on cryptography technology rather than external trust, it can completely record all transaction information with a chained data structure. .
  • the blockchain has three significant characteristics: decentralization, non-tampering, and detrust.
  • identity control needs to be introduced, which forms the alliance chain.
  • the alliance chain refers to a blockchain in which several institutions jointly participate in accounting. Each institution runs one or more nodes, and alliance members reach consensus through mutual trust in multiple centers.
  • the creation of blocks on the chain is determined jointly by the pre-selected accounting nodes, and only ordinary member nodes are allowed to read, write, record, and send transactions.
  • the alliance chain is considered to be "partially decentralized" and to some extent belongs to members within the alliance.
  • the data on the chain is only accessible to institutions and members in the alliance.
  • Part of the decentralized nature of the alliance chain coincides with the concept of multilateral co-management and co-governance of multi-mode identification networks.
  • the alliance chain has more advantages in high availability, high performance, programmability and privacy protection.
  • a simple digital signature mechanism is that if server A sends a message to server B, in order to prove to B that this message can only be sent by A, A uses private key to encrypt message M into a signature S, and B receives message M and signature After S, decrypt S with the public key of A and compare the decrypted message with M. If they are the same, it can prove that the signature is valid.
  • confidentiality is usually required, and a hash algorithm is generally combined in the digital signature mechanism.
  • the sender A uses a Hash function to generate a message digest from the message, and then encrypts the digest into a signature with its own private key, and sends it to the receiver B along with the message.
  • the receiver first uses the same hash function as A to calculate the message digest from the received message, and then uses A's public key to decrypt the attached signature. Compare the two digests, and if they are the same, confirm that the signature belongs to A.
  • the identity management and privacy protection mechanism based on digital signatures is the key core technology to ensure the security and reliability of the alliance chain transactions, and is a necessary condition for the alliance chain to further develop in a virtuous circle.
  • the existing blockchain-oriented privacy protection and identity management methods do not match the scalable hierarchical structure of the identification network, and there are problems of large scale and high verification complexity, which cannot support high-throughput Large-scale network.
  • Monero is an open source cryptocurrency created in April 2014. It uses ring signature technology to protect users' anonymity and transaction privacy, which is the RingCT protocol.
  • Ring signature is a type of digital signature scheme that allows a member of the ring to sign messages on behalf of all members of the ring without revealing their identity.
  • Ordinary ring signatures provide unconditional anonymity, and the verifier cannot determine whether the two signatures are from the same member. However, in some cases, this complete anonymity is not applicable, and the associated ring signature technology came into being.
  • the characteristic of an associatable ring signature is that given any two associative ring signatures, the verifier knows whether they are generated by the same signer, but knows nothing about the identity of the signer unless the verifier and signer are on the same ring .
  • each user may have a number of different accounts, where each account is composed of a one-time address and coins, and is associated with an account key that can be authorized to spend. In each transaction, users can spend their account with the corresponding key.
  • the RingCT protocol is mainly composed of two stages:
  • the consumer first determines multiple input and output accounts so that their cumulative balances are equal, and then forms a ring and signs each input of each sub-transaction separately.
  • a miner uses messages and signatures to jointly verify the validity of the transaction, and packages the valid transaction into a new block.
  • the purpose of the present invention is to provide a method for privacy protection and identity management of a multi-mode identification network, aiming to solve the situation for all participants in the same domain, or relying on services provided by third-party trusted institutions, without traceability , Can not be applied to the problem of hierarchical alliance chain structure of multi-mode identification network.
  • the present invention is implemented in this way, a method for privacy protection and identity management of a multi-mode identification network.
  • the method includes the following steps:
  • the nodes' signatures are combined to form a tree-shaped signature structure through a hierarchical group/ring signature mechanism;
  • the network verifies only the upper-level node signature of the tree-shaped signature structure to implement verification of the lower-level node signature tree with the signature as the root.
  • a further technical solution of the present invention is that: in the step S3, each superior node manages a group of lower-level nodes as leaf nodes, and each upper-level node signature generates a combination of lower-level node signatures and contains all information of the lower-level nodes.
  • step S2 each node signature is divided into two types of signature trees based on the ownership and role of the signatures of each node: voting ring signatures and common group signatures.
  • step S2 includes the following steps:
  • Any ordinary node in the underlying domain generates a transaction and attaches a signature S.
  • the housekeeper node listens to the transactions in the domain and puts valid transactions into the transaction pool;
  • the housekeeper node on duty periodically takes the transaction and encapsulates it into a pre-block, forms a new superior group signature S′ with the ordinary node to which the transaction belongs, and sends it to all committee nodes and housekeeper nodes in the domain together with the pre-block;
  • the committee node After receiving the pre-block, the committee node verifies its affairs and the housekeeper's signature S′ and judges whether it agrees to generate the corresponding formal block. If it agrees to generate the formal block, it will use its own associated ring signature P and time stamp as a vote The message is sent back to the watchkeeper node and the next step is executed, if it does not agree, it is directly discarded;
  • the committee node After receiving the formal block, the committee node verifies the signatures P′ and S′ in the block and deletes the transactions contained in the valid block from the transaction pool.
  • step S21 further includes the following steps:
  • Any ordinary node in the underlying domain also receives the intra-domain transaction and verifies whether the transaction content and signature are correct. If it is correct, the transaction is forwarded to other nodes in the domain. If it is not correct, it is directly discarded.
  • step S25 further includes the following steps:
  • S251. Determine whether the committee node of the receiving block is in the top-level domain. If it is not in the top-level domain, extract the block as a transaction and generate a new superior group signature S′′ based on the attached butler’s signature S′ as the upper-level domain. The ordinary node of the submits the transaction, and other superior nodes continue to verify the signatures P′ and S′′. If the receiving committee node is in the top-level domain, the next step is performed;
  • S252. Determine whether the number of committee nodes that received the official block is greater than the set value. If it is greater than the set value, the block enters a legal state with final confirmation. If it is less than the set value, the block is invalid.
  • a further technical solution of the present invention is: the preset value is greater than or equal to 50%; and the set value is greater than or equal to 50%.
  • Another object of the present invention is to provide a privacy protection and identity management system for a multi-mode identification network.
  • the privacy protection and identity management system for a multi-mode identification network includes
  • the multi-mode identification network generation module is used to register the network identification using blockchain technology to form a multi-mode identification network and perform domain division to construct a hierarchical blockchain system;
  • Hierarchical signature module which is used to form a tree-shaped signature structure through the hierarchical group/ring signature mechanism according to the identity of each node in a multi-mode identification network;
  • the verification module is used for the network to verify only the upper-level node signature of the tree-shaped signature structure so as to implement the verification of the lower-level node signature tree rooted by the signature.
  • each superior node in the verification module manages a group of lower-level nodes as leaf nodes, and each upper-level node signature is generated by combining the lower-level node signatures and contains all information of the lower-level node signatures.
  • each node signature is divided into two types of signature trees, a voting ring signature and an ordinary group signature, according to the ownership and role of each node signature.
  • the hierarchical group/ring signature mechanism in the hierarchical signature module includes
  • the monitoring node signature generation unit is used to generate transactions and attach a signature S to any ordinary node in the underlying domain.
  • the housekeeper node listens to transactions in the domain and puts valid transactions into the transaction pool;
  • the pre-block generation unit is used by the housekeeper node on duty to periodically take the transaction and encapsulate it into a pre-block, generate a new superior group signature S′ with the ordinary node to which the transaction belongs, and send it to all committee nodes and housekeepers in the domain together with the pre-block node;
  • the first judgment unit is used for the committee node to verify its affairs and housekeeper signature S′ after receiving the pre-block and judge whether it agrees to generate the corresponding formal block. If it agrees to generate the formal block, it will sign its own associated ring P The timestamp and timestamp are sent back to the watchkeeper node as a voting message and the second judgment unit is executed. If they do not agree, they are discarded directly;
  • the second judging unit is used to determine whether the number of signatures and timestamps collected by the committee member of the same domain is greater than the preset value before the block generation time, and if the number is greater than the preset value, the watchkeeper node and these signatures belong to
  • the committee nodes form a ring and generate a new superior ring signature P′, add it to the pre-block header to generate a formal block header, and publish to the global domain together with the block body, time stamp, and signature S′ and execute the signature verification unit. If the preset value or the cut-off time is exceeded, the current housekeeper will not generate blocks;
  • the signature verification unit is used to verify the signatures P′ and S′ in the block after the commission node receives the formal block and delete the transactions contained in the valid block from the transaction pool.
  • the monitoring node signature generation unit further includes
  • the third judgment unit is used to judge whether the committee node of the receiving block is in the top-level domain. If it is not in the top-level domain, the block is extracted as a transaction, and a new superior group signature S” is generated according to the attached housekeeper signature S′. As the ordinary node of the upper layer domain submits the transaction, other superior nodes continue to verify the signatures P′ and S′′, and if the receiving committee node is in the top-level domain, the fourth judgment unit is executed;
  • the fourth judging unit is used to judge whether the number of committee nodes received from the formal block is greater than the set value. If it is greater than the set value, the block will enter a legal state with final confirmation. If it is less than the set value, this area The block is invalid.
  • a further technical solution of the present invention is: the preset value is greater than or equal to 50%; and the set value is greater than or equal to 50%.
  • the beneficial effects of the present invention are: the use of group/ring signature technology to achieve privacy protection of member identities.
  • the housekeeper node establishes a group with a common node to generate a superior group signature for multiple transactions; at the same time, it establishes a ring with a committee node to generate a superior ring signature for multiple voting messages.
  • ordinary nodes can only determine the content of the message without knowing the processing flow of the message, thus taking into account the permission control and the open and transparent characteristics of the blockchain.
  • the committee node in the lower-level domain is also an ordinary node in the upper-level domain, and is responsible for making requests to the upper-level domain for transactions in the lower-level domain. Adding a hierarchical signature design to cross-domain nodes can achieve identity tracking, thereby better managing member and block transactions.
  • the group owner can manage the members of a group and identify the specific source of the message, so as to ensure that the members of the group cannot maliciously send messages without receiving the corresponding punishment.
  • the process of group establishment and maintenance between the housekeeper and ordinary nodes is of great significance to the normal operation of the network, and prevents the disturbance of the network by unauthorized nodes.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a hierarchical signature tree structure identity model provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a hierarchical signature mechanism under a new alliance chain architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Step S1 use blockchain technology to register network identification, form a multi-mode identification network and perform domain division to construct a hierarchical blockchain system, and manage each network domain through the PoV voting consensus algorithm.
  • Step S2 in the multi-mode identification network, according to the different identities of each node, the node signatures are combined into a tree-shaped signature structure through a hierarchical group/ring signature mechanism; according to the ownership and role of each node signature, it is divided into voting ring signatures and Two types of signature trees for common group signatures.
  • step S3 the network verifies only the upper-level node signature of the tree-shaped signature structure to implement verification of the lower-level node signature tree with the signature as the root.
  • Each superior node manages a group of subordinate nodes as leaf nodes.
  • Each superior node signature is generated by the combination of the subordinate node signature and contains all the information of the subordinate node signature.
  • the verification of the superior signature also includes the tree rooted at the signature Verification.
  • any third party cannot track the identity of the signature owner when only the signature and verification public key are obtained.
  • the security of the hierarchical group signature scheme requires that group administrators can only track the identity of the signers of their leaf nodes, and cannot open signatures generated by members of other groups. By establishing a group relationship between nodes at different levels and different identities, the group administrator of the upper node can quickly locate the problem group and identify the corresponding malicious user.
  • a privacy protection and identity management method for multi-mode identification networks Based on the structural characteristics of the multi-mode identification alliance chain network, a set of hierarchical signature schemes is designed. By taking advantage of the anonymity and supervisable advantages of group/ring signatures, the present invention achieves the full hiding of node identities between different levels and the effective management of identities within the same level, and better meets the security and management requirements of multi-mode identification networks .
  • the nodes in the domain are divided into ordinary nodes, housekeeper nodes, and committee nodes according to their identities from low to high.
  • the same node can serve multiple identities, as shown in FIG. 1.
  • ordinary nodes only have the right to know and the right to propose, and cannot participate in the consensus process.
  • the housekeeper node has the right to produce blocks.
  • the committee node has the right to verify the block and recommend, verify, evaluate the butler node and participate in the upper level consensus.
  • the committee nodes in the lower domain also serve as identities in the upper domain.
  • the present invention considers the use of a hierarchical group/ring signature mechanism.
  • the node signatures in the network together form a tree structure, and each upper-level node manages a group of lower-level nodes as its leaf nodes.
  • the upper-level signature is generated by the combination of the lower-level signature and contains all the information of the lower-level signature.
  • the verification of the upper-level signature also includes the verification of the tree rooted at the signature. Similar to the common group/ring signature requirements, any third party cannot track the identity of the signer who generated the signature when only the signature and verification public key are obtained.
  • the security of the hierarchical group signature scheme requires that group administrators can only track the identity of the signers of their leaf nodes, and cannot open signatures generated by members of other groups.
  • the group administrator of the upper node can quickly locate the problem group and identify the corresponding malicious user.
  • the present invention uses the following block structure:
  • Any ordinary node in the underlying domain generates a transaction and attaches a signature S. At the same time, it also receives the intra-domain transaction, verifies the correctness of the transaction content and signature, and if correct, forwards the transaction to other nodes in the domain.
  • the housekeeper node listens to transactions in the domain and puts valid transactions into the transaction pool.
  • the on-duty housekeeper node periodically takes out some transactions from the transaction pool, encapsulates them into pre-blocks, forms a group with the ordinary nodes to which these transactions belong, generates a new superior group signature S′, and sends them to all committee nodes in the domain together with the pre-blocks And housekeeper node.
  • the housekeeper node backs up the new superior group signature S′ and the pre-block after receiving it.
  • the committee node After receiving the pre-block, the committee node verifies the transaction and the housekeeper signature S′ in the pre-block, and if it agrees to the generation of this block, it will send its own associated ring signature P and time stamp as a voting message back to the watchkeeper node.
  • the housekeeper on duty Before the block generation time, if the housekeeper on duty has collected more than the preset number of signatures and timestamps of the same-area committee nodes, it will form a ring with the committee nodes to which these signatures belong to generate a new superior ring signature P ', the on-duty housekeeper adds the new signature P'to the pre-block header to generate a formal block header, and publish it to the whole domain together with the block body and signature S'. If it is less than the preset value or exceeds the deadline, the current round of consensus will not generate blocks.
  • the number of signatures and time stamps of the committee nodes received by the housekeeper on duty are also different, which may be more than 50% of the committee nodes, it may be 60% of the committee nodes or 70% of the committee nodes or 80% committee node or 85% committee node or 90% committee node etc.
  • the committee node After receiving the official block, the committee node verifies the signatures P′ and S′ in the block, and deletes the transactions contained in the valid block from the transaction pool. If the committee node is not in the top-level domain at this time, the block is extracted as a transaction, and a new superior group signature S” is generated based on the attached butler’s signature S′, and the transaction is submitted as an ordinary node in the upper-level domain. Other superior nodes continue Verify signatures P'and S". If the committee node is in the top-level domain at this time, when more than a set number of committee nodes confirm receipt, the block enters a legal state and has final confirmation.
  • the number of confirmations may be half of the member nodes or 60% member nodes or 70% member nodes or 80% member nodes or 85% member nodes or 90% member nodes. According to different application scenarios and application environments, the above values can be arbitrarily selected as confirmation points.
  • Another object of the present invention is to provide a privacy protection and identity management system for a multi-mode identification network.
  • the privacy protection and identity management system for a multi-mode identification network includes
  • the multi-mode identification network generation module is used to register the network identification using blockchain technology to form a multi-mode identification network and perform domain division to construct a hierarchical blockchain system;
  • Hierarchical signature module which is used to form a tree-shaped signature structure through the hierarchical group/ring signature mechanism according to the identity of each node in a multi-mode identification network;
  • the verification module is used for the network to verify only the upper-level node signature of the tree-shaped signature structure so as to implement the verification of the lower-level node signature tree rooted by the signature.
  • Each upper-level node in the verification module manages a group of lower-level nodes as leaf nodes, and each upper-level node signature is generated by combining the lower-level node signatures and contains all the information of the lower-level node signatures.
  • the hierarchical signature module divides the signatures of each node into two types of signature trees: voting ring signatures and ordinary group signatures, according to the ownership and role of each node signature.
  • the hierarchical group/ring signature mechanism in the hierarchical signature module includes
  • the monitoring node signature generation unit is used to generate transactions and attach a signature S to any ordinary node in the underlying domain.
  • the housekeeper node listens to transactions in the domain and puts valid transactions into the transaction pool;
  • the pre-block generation unit is used for the housekeeper node on duty to periodically take the transaction and encapsulate it into a pre-block, generate a new superior group signature S′ with the ordinary node to which the transaction belongs, and send it to all committee nodes and housekeepers in the domain together with the pre-block node;
  • the first judgment unit is used for the committee node to verify its affairs and housekeeper signature S′ after receiving the pre-block and judge whether it agrees to generate the corresponding formal block. If it agrees to generate the formal block, it will sign its own associated ring P The timestamp and timestamp are sent back to the watchkeeper node as a voting message and the second judgment unit is executed. If they do not agree, they are discarded directly;
  • the second judging unit is used to determine whether the number of signatures and timestamps collected by the committee member of the same domain is greater than the preset value before the block generation time, and if the number is greater than the preset value, the watchkeeper node and these signatures belong to
  • the committee nodes form a ring and generate a new superior ring signature P′, add it to the pre-block header to generate a formal block header, and publish to the global domain together with the block body, time stamp, and signature S′ and execute the signature verification unit. If the preset value or the cut-off time is exceeded, the current housekeeper will not generate blocks;
  • the signature verification unit is used to verify the signatures P′ and S′ in the block after the commission node receives the formal block and delete the transactions contained in the valid block from the transaction pool.
  • the monitoring node signature generation unit also includes
  • the signature verification unit also includes
  • the third judgment unit is used to judge whether the committee node of the receiving block is in the top-level domain. If it is not in the top-level domain, the block is extracted as a transaction, and a new superior group signature S” is generated according to the attached housekeeper signature S′. The ordinary node as the upper-level domain submits the transaction, and other superior nodes continue to verify the signatures P′ and S′′. If the receiving committee node is in the top-level domain, the fourth judgment unit is executed;
  • the fourth judging unit is used to judge whether the number of committee nodes received from the formal block is greater than the set value. If it is greater than the set value, the block will enter a legal state with final confirmation. If it is less than the set value, this area The block is invalid.
  • the preset value is greater than or equal to 50%; the set value is greater than or equal to 50%.
  • Adopt group/ring signature technology to achieve privacy protection of membership.
  • the housekeeper node establishes a group with a common node to generate a superior group signature for multiple transactions; at the same time, it establishes a ring with a committee node to generate a superior ring signature for multiple voting messages.
  • ordinary nodes can only determine the content of the message without knowing the processing flow of the message, thereby taking into account the permission control and the open and transparent characteristics of the blockchain.
  • the committee node in the lower-level domain is also an ordinary node in the upper-level domain, and is responsible for making requests to the upper-level domain for transactions in the lower-level domain. Adding a hierarchical signature design to cross-domain nodes can achieve identity tracking, thereby better managing member and block transactions.
  • the group owner can manage the members of a group and identify the specific source of the message, so as to ensure that the members of the group cannot maliciously send messages without receiving the corresponding punishment.
  • the process of group establishment and maintenance between the housekeeper and ordinary nodes is of great significance to the normal operation of the network, and prevents the disturbance of the network by unauthorized nodes.

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Abstract

本发明适用于区块链技术领域，提供了用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法,包括：S1、利用区块链技术对网络标识进行注册，形成多模标识网络并进行域划分构建层级化区块链***；S2、在多模标识网络中根据各节点的身份不同通过层次化群/环签名机制将各节点签名共同组成树型签名结构；S3、网络仅验证树形签名结构的上级节点签名从而实现以该签名为根的下级节点签名树验证。采用群/环签名技术实现成员身份的隐私保护。管家节点与普通节点建立群，生成多个事务的上级群签名；同时与委员节点建立环，生成多个投票消息的上级环签名。

Description

一种用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法及*** 技术领域
本发明属于区块链技术领域，尤其涉及用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法。
背景技术
多模标识网络是针对现有互联网控制能力过于集中、缺乏国际性的多边共管共治等本质缺陷而提出的新型开放式网络架构，具体指不同体系结构的网络共同部署多路由标识协同路由寻址的网络环境。例如在传统网络中部署内容网络，如果数据可以在这两种网络间穿梭，便形成了一个由两种网络体系组成的、内容标识和地址标识共同寻址的多模网络环境。通过利用不同网络的优势协同工作，多模标识网络能够提升当前互联网的基础传输能力，加强网络资源的利用率，丰富网络层功能。更重要的是，多模标识网络降低了现有互联网体系对地址标识的依赖性和局限性，为互联网的多边共管共治提供可能。
2008年10月，一位化名为“中本聪”的密码学研究者公开发表了一篇关于比特币的论文，描述了一种无需第三方可信机构介入的点对点电子货币***，首次提出了区块链的概念。区块链，即一种在对等网络环境下，通过透明和可信规则，构建不可伪造、不可篡改和可追溯的块链式数据结构，实现和管理事务处理的模式。区块链技术本质上是一种防篡改的、共享的分布式账本，网络中的所有成员节点共同维护账本，基于密码学技术而非外部信任，能够用链式数据结构完整地记录全部交易信息。因此，区块链拥有三大显著特征：去中心化、不可篡改和去信任化。在某些区块链 应用场景中，需要引入身份控制，这就形成了联盟链。联盟链是指若干个机构共同参与记账的区块链，每个机构运行一个或多个节点，联盟成员之间通过对多中心的互信来达成共识。链上块的创建由预选的记账节点共同决定，而只允许普通成员节点进行读写、记录和发送交易。与公有链不同，联盟链被认为是“部分去中心”的，在某种程度上只属于联盟内部的成员所有，链上的数据仅限联盟里的机构和成员才有权限进行访问。联盟链的部分去中心化特性恰好契合了多模标识网络的多边共管共治理念。且相比于公有链，联盟链在高可用、高性能、可编程和隐私保护上更有优势。
在区块链***中，每一条数据交易都需要签名，以保证信息的完整性和真实性。一个简单的数字签名机制是，若服务器A向服务器B发送一条消息，为了向B证明这条消息只有A才能发出，A用私钥将消息M加密成一个签名S，B收到消息M和签名S后，用A公钥解密S并比对解密后的消息和M，若相同即可证明签名有效。在实际的***中通常要求保密性，一般在数字签名机制中结合散列算法。发送方A用一个Hash函数从消息中生成消息摘要，然后用自己的私钥将这个摘要加密为签名，和消息一起发送给接收方B。接收方首先用与A相同的Hash函数从接收到的消息中计算出消息摘要，再用A的公钥来对附加的签名进行解密。比较这两个摘要，若相同则可确认签名属于A。
可见，基于数字签名的身份管理和隐私保护机制是确保联盟链事务安全可靠的关键核心技术，是联盟链能够进一步良性循环发展的必要条件。然而，现有的面向区块链的隐私保护和身份管理方法与标识网络的可扩展层次化结构的匹配度不高，且存在着规模较大和高验证复杂度的问题，无 法支持高通量的大规模网络。
2013年8月份，Christina Garman等人提出了去中心化的匿名凭证***用来解决互联网身份隐私认证问题。在传统的解决方案中，证书授权中心、DNS设施或者像谷歌在内的登录提供者等大型组织在互联网认证过程中扮演了非常重要的角色。然而，这些中心化的大型组织非常容易成为攻击者攻击的对象，并且一旦这些组织出现异常，容易泄露用户的隐私。Garman等人提出建立由多节点构成的区块链组织来为用户提供身份证明的生成与验证服务，并且借助一定的加密算法实现匿名性，更好地保护了用户隐私。匿名凭证允许用户证明其拥有某个组织颁发的凭证，且***露任何其他个人隐私。在标准安全定义下，即使验证者和凭证发行者串通，他们也无法确定凭证被谁发布及何时将被使用。
由于Garman在方案的构造中使用了比较昂贵的“双层离散对数证明”，生成的凭证规模较大且验证速度较慢，无法满足实际应用的需求。此外，该方案仅仅能实现对于身份隐私的保护，却无法对于身份进行有效的管理，无法满足多模标识网络的实际需要。
门罗币是于2014年4月份创建的开源加密货币，使用环签名技术来保护用户的匿名性和交易的隐私保护，即RingCT协议。
环签名是一类数字签名方案，它允许环内某一成员在不透露自身身份的情况下代表环内所有成员签署消息。普通的环签名提供无条件的匿名性，验证者无法判断两个签名是否来自于同一位成员。然而，在某些情况下这种完备的匿名性并不适用，可关联环签名技术应运而生。可关联环签名的特征是，给定任意两个可关联环签名，验证者知道它们是否由同一签名者 生成，但对签名者的身份一无所知，除非验证者与签名者处于同一环上。
在门罗币***中，每个用户可能拥有一些不同的账户，其中每个账户由一个一次性地址和币组成，与一个可授权支出的账户密钥相关联。在每一笔交易中，用户可以使用相应的密钥花费自己的账户。
RingCT协议主要由两个阶段组成：
1)消费者生成环机密交易：
消费者首先确定多个输入和输出账户，使得它们的累计余额相等，再分别对每笔子交易的输入组建环并进行签名。
2)接收者验证环机密交易：
矿工一旦接收到区块链网络中的交易，则利用消息和签名共同验证交易的有效性，并将有效交易打包进新的区块。
门罗币采用的保护机制虽然对于隐私保护有了很好的解决，但是无法实现对参与节点身份的有效管理和行为的有效追踪，这在存在管理参与方行为需求的多模标识场景中是无法接受的。
发明内容
本发明的目的在于提供用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法，旨在解决针对所有参与方在同域内的情况，或者依赖于第三方可信机构提供的服务，不具备可追溯性，也无法适用于多模标识网络的层次化联盟链结构的问题。
本发明是这样实现的，用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法，所述方法包括以下步骤：
S1、利用区块链技术对网络标识进行注册，形成多模标识网络并进行 域划分构建层级化区块链***；
S2、在多模标识网络中根据各节点的身份不同通过层次化群/环签名机制将各节点签名共同组成树型签名结构；
S3、网络仅验证树形签名结构的上级节点签名从而实现以该签名为根的下级节点签名树验证。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述步骤S3中每个上级节点管理一组下级节点作为叶子节点，每个上级节点签名下级节点签名结合生成且包含了下级的全部信息。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述步骤S2中根据各个节点签名的所属和作用将其分化为投票环签名和普通群签名两类签名树。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述步骤S2中层次化群/环签名机制包括以下步骤：
S21、底层域内任意普通节点生成事务并附上签名S，管家节点监听域内事务并将有效事务放入事务池中；
S22、值班管家节点定期取事务封装成预区块，与事务所属普通节点组成群生成新的上级群签名S′并与预区块一并发送给域内所有委员节点和管家节点；
S23、委员节点收到预区块后验证其事务和管家签名S′并判断是否同意生成对应的正式区块，若同意生成正式区块，则将自己的可关联环签名P和时间戳作为投票消息发回给值班管家节点并执行下一步，若不同意，则直接丢弃；
S24、在区块截止生成时间之前，判断值班管家收集到同域委员节点的签名和时间戳数量是否大于预设值，若大于预设值，则值班管家节点与这些签名所属委员节点组成环并生成新的上级环签名P′，将其加在预区块头后生成正式区块头，和区块体、时间戳、签名S′一起向全域发布并执行下一步，若小于预设值或超过截止时间，则本轮值班管家不生成区块；
S25、委员节点接收到正式区块后验证区块内的签名P′和S′并将有效区块包含的事务从事务池中删除。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述步骤S21中还包括以下步骤：
S211、底层域内任意普通节点还接收域内事务并验证事务内容和签名是否正确，若正确，则向域内其他节点转发该事务，若不正确，则直接丢弃。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述步骤S25还包括以下步骤：
S251、判断接收区块的委员节点是否处于顶层域，若不处于顶层域，则提取区块为一条事务，根据后附的管家签名S′生成新的上级群签名S″，作为上一层域的普通节点提交该事务，其他上级节点继续验证签名P′和S″，若接收委员节点处于顶层域，则执行下一步；
S252、判断收到正式区块的委员节点数量是否大于设定值，若大于设定值，则此区块进入合法状态拥有最终确认性，若小于设定值，则此区块无效。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述预设值大于等于50％；所述设定值大于等于50％。
本发明的另一目的在于提供一种于多模标识网络的隐私保护与身份管理***，所述用于多模标识网络的隐私保护与身份管理***包括
多模标识网络生成模块，用于利用区块链技术对网络标识进行注册，形成多模标识网络并进行域划分构建层级化区块链***；
层次化签名模块，用于在多模标识网络中根据各节点的身份不同通过层次化群/环签名机制将各节点签名共同组成树型签名结构；
验证模块，用于网络仅验证树形签名结构的上级节点签名从而实现以该签名为根的下级节点签名树验证。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述验证模块中每个上级节点管理一组下级节点作为叶子节点，每个上级节点签名由下级节点签名结合生成且包含了下级节点签名的全部信息。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述层次化签名模块中根据各个节点签名的所属和作用将其分化为投票环签名和普通群签名两类签名树。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述层次化签名模块中层次化群/环签名机制包括
监听节点签名生成单元，用于底层域内任意普通节点生成事务并附上签名S，管家节点监听域内事务并将有效事务放入事务池中；
预区块生成单元，用于值班管家节点定期取事务封装成预区块，与事务所属普通节点组成群生成新的上级群签名S′并与预区块一并发送给域内所有委员节点和管家节点；
第一判断单元，用于委员节点收到预区块后验证其事务和管家签名S′并判断是否同意生成对应的正式区块，若同意生成正式区块，则将自己的可关联环签名P和时间戳作为投票消息发回给值班管家节点并执行第二判断单元，若不同意，则直接丢弃；
第二判断单元，用于在区块截止生成时间之前，值班管家判断收集到同域委员节点的签名和时间戳数量是否大于预设值，若大于预设值，则值班管家节点与这些签名所属委员节点组成环并生成新的上级环签名P′，将其加在预区块头后生成正式区块头，和区块体、时间戳、签名S′一起向全域发布并执行签名验证单元，若小于预设值或超过截止时间，则本轮值班管家不生成区块；
签名验证单元，用于委员节点接收到正式区块后验证区块内的签名P′和S′并将有效区块包含的事务从事务池中删除。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述监听节点签名生成单元中还包括
实务正确判断单元，用那个与底层域内任意普通节点还接收域内事务并验证事务内容和签名是否正确，若正确，则向域内其他节点转发该事务，若不正确，则直接丢弃。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述签名验证单元还包括
第三判断单元，用于判断接收区块的委员节点是否处于顶层域，若不处于顶层域，则提取区块为一条事务，根据后附的管家签名S′生成新的上级群签名S″，作为上一层域的普通节点提交该事务，其他上级节点继续 验证签名P′和S″，若接收委员节点处于顶层域，则执行第四判断单元；
第四判断单元，用于判断收到正式区块的委员节点数量是否大于设定值，若大于设定值，则此区块进入合法状态拥有最终确认性，若小于设定值，则此区块无效。
本发明的进一步技术方案是：所述预设值大于等于50％；所述设定值大于等于50％。
本发明的有益效果是：采用群/环签名技术实现成员身份的隐私保护。管家节点与普通节点建立群，生成多个事务的上级群签名；同时与委员节点建立环，生成多个投票消息的上级环签名。普通节点在接收到签名消息后，只能确定消息的内容而不能知道消息的处理流程，从而兼顾权限控制和区块链的公开透明特性。
下级域中的委员节点同时也是上级域中的普通节点，负责为下级域中的事务向上层域提起请求。在跨域节点中加入层次化签名设计可以实现身份追踪，从而更好地管理成员和区块事务。
群主可以对于一个群内的成员进行管理，识别消息的具体来源，从而保证群内的成员不能恶意发送消息而接受不到相应的惩罚。在多模标识网络中，管家与普通节点间的群建立与维护过程对于网络的正常运转具有重要意义，防止了不正当节点对网络的扰动。
附图说明
图1是本发明实施例提供的层次化签名树结构身份模型示意图。
图2是本发明实施例提供的新型联盟链架构下的层次化签名机制示意图。
具体实施方式
如图1-2所示，本发明提供的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法，其详述如下：
步骤S1，利用区块链技术对网络标识进行注册，形成多模标识网络并进行域划分构建层级化区块链***，并通过PoV投票共识算法对每个网络域进行管理。
步骤S2，在多模标识网络中根据各节点的身份不同通过层次化群/环签名机制将各节点签名共同组成树型签名结构；根据各个节点签名的所属和作用将其分化为投票环签名和普通群签名两类签名树。
步骤S3，网络仅验证树形签名结构的上级节点签名从而实现以该签名为根的下级节点签名树验证。每个上级节点管理一组下级节点作为叶子节点，每个上级节点签名由下级节点签名结合生成且包含了下级节点签名的全部信息，对上级签名的验证也包含了对以该签名为根的树的验证。
与普通的群/环签名要求相似，在只拿到签名和验证公钥的情况下，任何第三方都不能追踪签名所属者的身份。此外，层次化的群签名方案的安全性要求群管理员只能追踪其叶子节点的签名者身份，并不能打开其他群组下的成员所产生的签名。通过在不同层级、不同身份的节点之间建立群组关系，上级节点的群管理员可以快速定位到问题群，并识别相应的恶意用户。
一种用于多模标识网络的隐私保护与身份管理方法，根据多模标识联盟链网络的结构化特性，设计了一套层次化签名方案。通过利用群/环签名的匿名性和可监管优势，本发明实现了不同层次间节点身份的充分隐匿与 同一层次内身份的有效管理，更好地满足了多模标识网络对安全和管理的需求。
在本发明中，域内节点按身份由低到高分为普通节点、管家节点和委员节点，同一节点可以兼任多个身份，如图1所示。其中，普通节点只享有知情权和提案权，无法参与共识过程。管家节点拥有生产区块的权利。委员节点拥有验证区块和推荐、验证、评价管家节点并参与上一级共识的权利。下层域的委员节点同时也在上一层域担任身份。
由于多模网络的节点分工不同，本发明考虑使用层次化的群/环签名机制。网络中的节点签名共同形成树型结构，每个上级节点管理一组下级节点作为其叶子节点。上级签名由下级签名结合生成，包含了下级的全部信息，对上级签名的验证也包含了对以该签名为根的树的验证。与普通的群/环签名要求相似，在只拿到签名和验证公钥的情况下，任何第三方都不能追踪产生签名的签名者的身份。此外，层次化的群签名方案的安全性要求群管理员只能追踪其叶子节点的签名者身份，并不能打开其他群组下的成员所产生的签名。通过在不同层级、不同身份的节点之间建立群组关系，上级节点的群管理员可以快速定位到问题群，并识别相应的恶意用户。
针对于层次化签名方案的特点，本发明使用如下区块结构：
Figure PCTCN2018119724-appb-000001
Figure PCTCN2018119724-appb-000002
Figure PCTCN2018119724-appb-000003
具体签名流程如图2所示。
1)底层域内任意普通节点产生事务并附上签名S，同时也接收域内事务，验证事务内容和签名的正确性，若正确则向域内其他节点转发该事务。管家节点监听域内事务，并将有效的事务放入事务池中。
2)值班管家节点定期从事务池中取出一些事务，封装成预区块，与这些事务所属的普通节点组成群，生成新的上级群签名S′，和预区块一起发送给域内所有委员节点和管家节点。管家节点在收到新的上级群签名S′和预区块后，将其进行备份。
3)委员节点收到预区块后，验证预区块内的事务和管家签名S′，若 同意本区块生成则将自己的可关联环签名P和时间戳作为投票消息发回给值班管家节点。
4)在区块截止生成时间之前，若值班管家已经收集到大于预设值数量的同域委员节点的签名和时间戳，则与这些签名所属的委员节点组成环，生成新的上级环签名P′，值班管家将新的签名P′加在预区块头后生成正式区块头，和区块体、签名S′一起向全域发布。若小于预设值或超过截止时间，则本轮共识不生成区块。在该过程中，根据应用环境不同，值班管家收到的委员节点的签名和时间戳的数量值也不同，可能是大于50％的委员节点，也可能是60％委员节点或70％委员节点或80％委员节点或85％委员节点或90％委员节点等。
5)当委员节点接收到正式区块后，验证区块内的签名P′和S′，将有效区块包含的事务从事务池中删除。若此时委员节点不处于顶层域，提取区块为一条事务，根据后附的管家签名S′生成新的上级群签名S″，作为上一层域的普通节点提交该事务。其他上级节点继续验证签名P′和S″。若此时委员节点处于顶层域，当有大于设定值数量的委员节点确认收到后，此区块进入合法状态，拥有最终确认性。在收到委员节点确认中，确认数量可能是半数委员节点或60％委员节点或70％委员节点或80％委员节点或85％委员节点或90％委员节点等。根据应用场景的不同和应用环境可以在任意选择上述的数值作为确认点。
本发明的另一目的在于提供一种于多模标识网络的隐私保护与身份管 理***，所述用于多模标识网络的隐私保护与身份管理***包括
多模标识网络生成模块，用于利用区块链技术对网络标识进行注册，形成多模标识网络并进行域划分构建层级化区块链***；
层次化签名模块，用于在多模标识网络中根据各节点的身份不同通过层次化群/环签名机制将各节点签名共同组成树型签名结构；
验证模块，用于网络仅验证树形签名结构的上级节点签名从而实现以该签名为根的下级节点签名树验证。
所述验证模块中每个上级节点管理一组下级节点作为叶子节点，每个上级节点签名由下级节点签名结合生成且包含了下级节点签名的全部信息。
所述层次化签名模块中根据各个节点签名的所属和作用将其分化为投票环签名和普通群签名两类签名树。
所述层次化签名模块中层次化群/环签名机制包括
监听节点签名生成单元，用于底层域内任意普通节点生成事务并附上签名S，管家节点监听域内事务并将有效事务放入事务池中；
预区块生成单元，用于值班管家节点定期取事务封装成预区块，与事务所属普通节点组成群生成新的上级群签名S′并与预区块一并发送给域内所有委员节点和管家节点；
第一判断单元，用于委员节点收到预区块后验证其事务和管家签名S′并判断是否同意生成对应的正式区块，若同意生成正式区块，则将自己的可关联环签名P和时间戳作为投票消息发回给值班管家节点并执行第二判断单元，若不同意，则直接丢弃；
第二判断单元，用于在区块截止生成时间之前，值班管家判断收集到同域委员节点的签名和时间戳数量是否大于预设值，若大于预设值，则值班管家节点与这些签名所属委员节点组成环并生成新的上级环签名P′，将其加在预区块头后生成正式区块头，和区块体、时间戳、签名S′一起向全域发布并执行签名验证单元，若小于预设值或超过截止时间，则本轮值班管家不生成区块；
签名验证单元，用于委员节点接收到正式区块后验证区块内的签名P′和S′并将有效区块包含的事务从事务池中删除。
所述监听节点签名生成单元中还包括
实务正确判断单元，用那个与底层域内任意普通节点还接收域内事务并验证事务内容和签名是否正确，若正确，则向域内其他节点转发该事务，若不正确，则直接丢弃。
所述签名验证单元还包括
第三判断单元，用于判断接收区块的委员节点是否处于顶层域，若不处于顶层域，则提取区块为一条事务，根据后附的管家签名S′生成新的上级群签名S″，作为上一层域的普通节点提交该事务，其他上级节点继续验证签名P′和S″，若接收委员节点处于顶层域，则执行第四判断单元；
第四判断单元，用于判断收到正式区块的委员节点数量是否大于设定值，若大于设定值，则此区块进入合法状态拥有最终确认性，若小于设定值，则此区块无效。
所述预设值大于等于50％；所述设定值大于等于50％。
采用群/环签名技术实现成员身份的隐私保护。管家节点与普通节点建立群，生成多个事务的上级群签名；同时与委员节点建立环，生成多个投票消息的上级环签名。普通节点在接收到签名消息后，只能确定消息的内容而不能知道消息的处理流程，从而兼顾权限控制和区块链的公开透明特性。
下级域中的委员节点同时也是上级域中的普通节点，负责为下级域中的事务向上层域提起请求。在跨域节点中加入层次化签名设计可以实现身份追踪，从而更好地管理成员和区块事务。
群主可以对于一个群内的成员进行管理，识别消息的具体来源，从而保证群内的成员不能恶意发送消息而接受不到相应的惩罚。在多模标识网络中，管家与普通节点间的群建立与维护过程对于网络的正常运转具有重要意义，防止了不正当节点对网络的扰动。
以上所述仅为本发明的较佳实施例而已，并不用以限制本发明，凡在本发明的精神和原则之内所作的任何修改、等同替换和改进等，均应包含在本发明的保护范围之内。

Claims (14)

  1. 一种用于多模标识网络的隐私保护与身份管理方法，其特征在于，所述用于多模标识网络的隐私保护与身份管理方法包括以下步骤：
    S1、利用区块链技术对网络标识进行注册，形成多模标识网络并进行域划分构建层级化区块链***；
    S2、在多模标识网络中根据各节点的身份不同通过层次化群/环签名机制将各节点签名共同组成树型签名结构；
    S3、网络仅验证树形签名结构的上级节点签名从而实现以该签名为根的下级节点签名树验证。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法，其特征在于，所述步骤S3中每个上级节点管理一组下级节点作为叶子节点，每个上级节点签名由下级节点签名结合生成且包含了下级节点签名的全部信息。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法，其特征在于，所述步骤S2中根据各个节点签名的所属和作用将其分化为投票环签名和普通群签名两类签名树。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法，其特征在于，所述步骤S2中层次化群/环签名机制包括以下步骤：
    S21、底层域内任意普通节点生成事务并附上签名S，管家节点监听域内事务并将有效事务放入事务池中；
    S22、值班管家节点定期取事务封装成预区块，与事务所属普通节点组成群生成新的上级群签名S′并与预区块一并发送给域内所有委员节点和管家节点；
    S23、委员节点收到预区块后验证其事务和管家签名S′并判断是否同意生成对应的正式区块，若同意生成正式区块，则将自己的可关联环签名P和时间戳作为投票消息发回给值班管家节点并执行下一步，若不同意，则直接丢弃；
    S24、在区块截止生成时间之前，值班管家判断收集到同域委员节点的签名和时间戳数量是否大于预设值，若大于预设值，则值班管家节点与这些签名所属委员节点组成环并生成新的上级环签名P′，将其加在预区块头后生成正式区块头，和区块体、时间戳、签名S′一起向全域发布并执行下一步，若小于预设值或超过截止时间，则本轮值班管家不生成区块；
    S25、委员节点接收到正式区块后验证区块内的签名P′和S′并将有效区块包含的事务从事务池中删除。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法，其特征在于，所述步骤S21中还包括以下步骤：
    S211、底层域内任意普通节点还接收域内事务并验证事务内容和签名是否正确，若正确，则向域内其他节点转发该事务，若不正确，则直接丢弃。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法，其特征在于，所述步骤S25还包括以下步骤：
    S251、判断接收区块的委员节点是否处于顶层域，若不处于顶层域，则提取区块为一条事务，根据后附的管家签名S′生成新的上级群签名S″， 作为上一层域的普通节点提交该事务，其他上级节点继续验证签名P′和S″，若接收委员节点处于顶层域，则执行下一步；
    S252、判断收到正式区块的委员节点数量是否大于设定值，若大于设定值，则此区块进入合法状态拥有最终确认性，若小于设定值，则此区块无效。
  7. 根据权利要求4-7任一项所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的方法，其特征在于，所述预设值大于等于50％；所述设定值大于等于50％。
  8. 一种用于多模标识网络的隐私保护与身份管理***，其特征在于，所述用于多模标识网络的隐私保护与身份管理***包括
    多模标识网络生成模块，用于利用区块链技术对网络标识进行注册，形成多模标识网络并进行域划分构建层级化区块链***；
    层次化签名模块，用于在多模标识网络中根据各节点的身份不同通过层次化群/环签名机制将各节点签名共同组成树型签名结构；
    验证模块，用于网络仅验证树形签名结构的上级节点签名从而实现以该签名为根的下级节点签名树验证。
  9. 根据权利要求8所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的***，其特征在于，所述验证模块中每个上级节点管理一组下级节点作为叶子节点，每个上级节点签名由下级节点签名结合生成且包含了下级节点签名的全部信息。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的***，其特征在于，所述层次化签名模块中根据各个节点签名的所属和作 用将其分化为投票环签名和普通群签名两类签名树。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的***，其特征在于，所述层次化签名模块中层次化群/环签名机制包括
    监听节点签名生成单元，用于底层域内任意普通节点生成事务并附上签名S，管家节点监听域内事务并将有效事务放入事务池中；
    预区块生成单元，用于值班管家节点定期取事务封装成预区块，与事务所属普通节点组成群生成新的上级群签名S′并与预区块一并发送给域内所有委员节点和管家节点；
    第一判断单元，用于委员节点收到预区块后验证其事务和管家签名S′并判断是否同意生成对应的正式区块，若同意生成正式区块，则将自己的可关联环签名P和时间戳作为投票消息发回给值班管家节点并执行第二判断单元，若不同意，则直接丢弃；
    第二判断单元，用于在区块截止生成时间之前，值班管家判断收集到同域委员节点的签名和时间戳数量是否大于预设值，若大于预设值，则值班管家节点与这些签名所属委员节点组成环并生成新的上级环签名P′，将其加在预区块头后生成正式区块头，和区块体、时间戳、签名S′一起向全域发布并执行签名验证单元，若小于预设值或超过截止时间，则本轮值班管家不生成区块；
    签名验证单元，用于委员节点接收到正式区块后验证区块内的签名P′和S′并将有效区块包含的事务从事务池中删除。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的***，其特征在于，所述监听节点签名生成单元中还包括
    实务正确判断单元，用那个与底层域内任意普通节点还接收域内事务并验证事务内容和签名是否正确，若正确，则向域内其他节点转发该事务，若不正确，则直接丢弃。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的***，其特征在于，所述签名验证单元还包括
    第三判断单元，用于判断接收区块的委员节点是否处于顶层域，若不处于顶层域，则提取区块为一条事务，根据后附的管家签名S′生成新的上级群签名S″，作为上一层域的普通节点提交该事务，其他上级节点继续验证签名P′和S″，若接收委员节点处于顶层域，则执行第四判断单元；
    第四判断单元，用于判断收到正式区块的委员节点数量是否大于设定值，若大于设定值，则此区块进入合法状态拥有最终确认性，若小于设定值，则此区块无效。
  14. 根据权利要求11-13任一项所述的用于多模标识网络隐私保护与身份管理的***，其特征在于，所述预设值大于等于50％；所述设定值大于等于50％。
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