WO2019105407A1 - Procédé de preuve de connaissance nulle approprié pour la protection de la confidentialité de chaîne de blocs, et support - Google Patents

Procédé de preuve de connaissance nulle approprié pour la protection de la confidentialité de chaîne de blocs, et support Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019105407A1
WO2019105407A1 PCT/CN2018/118131 CN2018118131W WO2019105407A1 WO 2019105407 A1 WO2019105407 A1 WO 2019105407A1 CN 2018118131 W CN2018118131 W CN 2018118131W WO 2019105407 A1 WO2019105407 A1 WO 2019105407A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
user
proof
phase
random number
zero
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PCT/CN2018/118131
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
邓燚
马顺利
何德彪
张江
陈泌文
谢翔
李升林
孙立林
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云图有限公司
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3825—Use of electronic signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/405—Establishing or using transaction specific rules
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • H04L9/3221—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a privacy protection technology of a blockchain, in particular to a zero-knowledge proof method in blockchain privacy protection.
  • the blockchain system acts as a public account book, which solves the consensus problem established by the trust of all parties. Every participant is able to get a complete data backup, all transaction data is open and transparent, the advantages of this blockchain, but on the other hand, for many blockchain applications, this feature is fatal of. Because many times, not only users themselves want their account privacy and transaction information to be protected, many business accounts and transaction information are important assets and trade secrets of these organizations, and they do not want to be shared publicly with their peers, especially sensitive. Data needs to balance privacy protection and compliance regulation. For business scenarios involving a large number of trade secrets and benefits, data exposure does not meet business rules and regulatory requirements.
  • a smart contract is a piece of code that runs on a blockchain that controls and manages the database.
  • the assets of each account are stored in the database of the smart contract, and the data in the database can be operated by the smart contract under certain conditions.
  • the balance of each account and the operation of the balance are recorded and performed in a smart contract.
  • an inter-node transfer operation is performed by broadcasting a message between all nodes and executing a smart contract.
  • the balance of each node is private information, and each node wants its balance to be invisible to other nodes.
  • the transfer content is also private information, so changes in the balance in the broadcast message do not want other nodes to be visible.
  • it is necessary to support the change operation of the balance in the smart contract and everyone can operate the balance.
  • a consistent public ledger is maintained between the nodes.
  • the ledger records the balance information of each node, and the nodes operate on the common ledger through a certain consensus mechanism.
  • the transaction information of all users in the book, including other information recorded in the blockchain is exposed, and the user's privacy protection problem arises.
  • the system needs to realize the characteristics of the blockchain transaction verifiable and historically checkable while ensuring the privacy of the user, and ensure the validity of the transaction.
  • Bitcoin's solution to privacy protection is to achieve anonymity by blocking the association between the transaction address and the address holder's true identity. So although you can see the address of the sender and recipient of each transfer record, it does not correspond to a specific person in the real world. However, such protection is very weak.
  • the association between the account and the transaction can be traced through the address ID, IP information, and the like.
  • CoinJoin The idea of the principle of the coin is to split the relationship between the input address and the output address. In a transaction, if there are a lot of people involved, including a lot of input and output, it will be more difficult to find the corresponding pair of each person in the input and output, so that the connection between input and output is actually split. . It is better to mix coins and small amounts of coins each time. Although this method is highly anonymous, its risk assessment is not in place and must be trusted by anonymous third parties.
  • the balance on the public ledger is directly encrypted. Only the node itself or the relevant party that gives the right can view the transaction information, and the remaining nodes cannot operate the data, and the account information is difficult to maintain consistency.
  • Chinaledger proposed a scheme based on the Central Counterparty (CCP).
  • the transaction initiator uses the CCP's public key to encrypt the transaction. After signing, it is submitted to the CCP.
  • the CCP realizes decryption, checks the signature, checks the balance, and if it is valid, realizes the transfer of the transfer amount. .
  • the remaining nodes can only endorse the transaction, but cannot endorse the balance.
  • this scheme protects the privacy of the node user, it is too centralized, and the whole system relies on the reputation transaction of the CCP.
  • Ring Signature A ring signature is a simplified group signature, which is named because a signature consists of a certain rule.
  • a signature consists of a certain rule.
  • one member of the ring uses his private key and the public key of other members to sign, but does not need permission from other members, and the verifier only knows that the signature comes from this ring, but I don’t know who is The real signer.
  • Ring signatures solve the problem of full anonymity for signers, which allows a member to sign on behalf of a group of people without revealing the signer's information.
  • the ring signature technology only solves the issue of the anonymity of the trader and cannot protect the privacy of the transaction.
  • Homomorphic Encryption is a method that can perform calculations without prior decryption of encrypted data.
  • homomorphic encryption By using homomorphic encryption to store data on the blockchain, a perfect balance can be achieved without any major changes to the blockchain attributes.
  • the blockchain is still a public blockchain.
  • the data on the blockchain will be encrypted, thus taking care of the privacy of the public blockchain.
  • the homomorphic encryption technique makes the public blockchain have the privacy effect of the private blockchain.
  • the addition homomorphic encryption technique can be used to hide the transaction finance and user balance on the blockchain, and to ensure the remaining users' operations on the balance on the public accounts.
  • homomorphic encryption cannot confirm the consistency of the transaction and lacks the verification link for the validity of the transaction.
  • Zero-knowledge proof is a cryptographic technique, a kind of zero-knowledge proof that proves certain data operations without revealing the data itself, allowing both parties (certifiers and verifiers) to prove A proposal is real and does not need to reveal any information other than it is true.
  • cryptocurrency and blockchain this usually refers to transactional information data.
  • Zcash by introducing zero-knowledge proof technology zk-SNARKs, achieves zero-knowledge-level anonymous cryptocurrency. When using Zcash for trading, neither the transaction address nor the transaction amount is exposed, but Zcash uses The scenario is more limited. ZCash only targets the UTXO model of Bitcoin. It cannot be extended to the balance model such as Ethereum, and it does not support smart contracts very well.
  • Zcash In terms of performance, Zcash needs circuit conversion and computation for consumption when generating proof.
  • the resources and time are very large, so Zcash's light nodes do not use SNARK technology when initiating transactions, but only the whole node uses SNARK technology; when generating system parameters, Zcash must have one or more strong centers to generate system parameters.
  • the trapping gates that control the entire system are also hidden in the system parameters; and the usage scenarios are relatively simple, and the SNARK technology in Zcash has no other applications at present.
  • the object of the present invention is to solve the above problems, and provide a zero-knowledge proof method and medium suitable for blockchain privacy protection, which can support bitcoin UTXO and Ethereum balance model, and can be well combined with smart contracts.
  • a zero-knowledge proof method and medium suitable for blockchain privacy protection which can support bitcoin UTXO and Ethereum balance model, and can be well combined with smart contracts.
  • the technical solution of the present invention is as follows:
  • the present invention discloses a zero-knowledge proof method suitable for blockchain privacy protection, including:
  • the proof generation phase the balance ciphertext of the attestation node and the transfer amount ciphertext respectively using the attestation node and the verification node public key encryption are generated, and the node is generated to generate random parameters and the system parameters obtained in the initialization phase are used as general inputs, and the relevant proof is obtained.
  • the certification node sends ⁇ to the verification node, and the verification node combines the system parameters, parses the ⁇ to verify whether the condition is met, and if so, allows the transaction.
  • the party performing the transaction during the user configuration phase uses the paillier encryption system.
  • the proof generation phase when the user A having the balance t A transfers the amount to the user B as t, the following operations are performed:
  • Step 1 User A gets the ciphertext of t A from the ledger: Where r is a random number and N A is the public key of user A;
  • Step 2 To get Evidence The way to generate parameters includes steps (1) to (3):
  • N A is the public key of user A
  • N B is the public key of user B
  • r t For the generated random number, l is the random number used in the pederson promise
  • ⁇ and ⁇ are two parameters representing the plain space of the scheme.
  • Step 3 Use system parameter PP as a general input and A use private input Generate evidence that proves the above assertion, and the way to generate the proof includes the following steps:
  • H is the hash function in cryptography.
  • the proof generation phase when the user A having the balance t A transfers the amount to the user B as t, the following operations are performed:
  • Step 1 User A gets the ciphertext of t A from the ledger: Where r is a random number and N A is the public key of user A;
  • Step 2 To get Evidence The way to generate parameters includes steps (1) to (3):
  • N A is the public key of user A
  • N B is the public key of user B
  • r t For the generated random number, l is the random number used in the pederson promise
  • ⁇ and ⁇ are two parameters representing the plain space of the scheme.
  • Step 3 Use system parameter PP as a general input and A use private input Generate evidence that proves the above assertion, and the way to generate the proof includes the following steps:
  • the extractor in the process of user A obtaining the ciphertext of t A from the ledger, if user A does not know the value of the random number r, the extractor is used.
  • the algorithm obtains the random number r through the plaintext t A and the private key ⁇ A .
  • the proof generation phase the balance ciphertext of the attestation node and the transfer amount ciphertext respectively using the attestation node and the verification node public key encryption are generated, and the node is generated to generate random parameters and the system parameters obtained in the initialization phase are used as general inputs, and the relevant proof is obtained.
  • the certification node sends ⁇ to the verification node, and the verification node combines the system parameters, parses the ⁇ to verify whether the condition is met, and if so, allows the transaction.
  • the invention also discloses an embodiment of a computer readable storage medium.
  • the present invention also discloses an embodiment of a computer readable storage medium in which a participant in a user configuration phase of a computer program runs a paillier encryption system.
  • the present invention also discloses an embodiment of a computer readable storage medium.
  • the user A having the balance t A performs the following operations when transferring the amount to the user B as t:
  • Step 1 User A gets the ciphertext of t A from the ledger: Where r is a random number and N A is the public key of user A;
  • Step 2 To get Evidence The way to generate parameters includes steps (1) to (3):
  • N A is the public key of user A
  • N B is the public key of user B
  • r t For the generated random number, l is the random number used in the pederson promise
  • ⁇ and ⁇ are two parameters representing the plain space of the scheme.
  • Step 3 Use system parameter PP as a general input and A use private input Generate evidence that proves the above assertion, and the way to generate the proof includes the following steps:
  • H represents a hash function in cryptography
  • the present invention also discloses an embodiment of a computer readable storage medium.
  • the user A having the balance t A performs the following operations when transferring the amount to the user B as t:
  • Step 1 User A gets the ciphertext of t A from the ledger: Where r is a random number and N A is the public key of user A;
  • Step 2 To get Evidence The way to generate parameters includes steps (1) to (3):
  • N A is the public key of user A
  • N B is the public key of user B
  • r t For the generated random number, l is the random number used in the pederson promise
  • ⁇ and ⁇ are two parameters representing the plain space of the scheme.
  • Step 3 Use system parameter PP as a general input and A use private input Generate evidence that proves the above assertion, and the way to generate the proof includes the following steps:
  • the present invention also discloses a computer readable storage medium according to an embodiment, the user A obtained from the cipher text books of t A in the process, if the user A does not know the value of the random number r, the algorithm using the plaintext decimator t A and the private key ⁇ A get the random number r.
  • the present invention also discloses an embodiment of a computer readable storage medium.
  • the present invention also discloses an embodiment of a computer readable storage medium.
  • the method of the present invention includes an initialization phase system parameter (including a parameter generation process and meaning), and a specific process of generating a zero-knowledge proof in the generation phase (including the ciphertext generated in the process, The formulas and parameters involved, as well as the verification phase (including the formulas and conditions for verification, etc.).
  • the zero-knowledge proof scheme suitable for blockchain privacy protection of the present invention protects the transaction amount by combining the homomorphic encryption algorithm.
  • the data in the public ledger of the smart contract is stored using homomorphic encrypted ciphertext, and during the transaction, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is generated to verify the legitimacy and validity of the transaction.
  • the solution of the specific algorithm is to consider two transaction participants in the blockchain, the proof node and the verification node.
  • the system first initializes the parameters, the transaction node generates the public-private key pair and defines the encryption mode; then the node obtains the balance ciphertext and the transfer amount ciphertext respectively using the certification node and the verification node public key encryption; the certification node obtains the relevant parameters through calculation.
  • the advantage of the algorithm of the present invention is that it can simultaneously support the bitcoin UTXO model and the Ethereum balance model, but is more suitable for the balance model, and is suitable for intelligent contract design, can be well combined with smart contracts; system parameters can be configured The system parameters include trapdoor information, and the security of the scheme is strictly proved.
  • system parameters can be generated by multi-party security calculation, and in the alliance chain scenario, the supervisory node can generate system parameters;
  • the application scenarios of the solution are numerous, and can be applied to include, but are not limited to, supply chain finance, clearing and settlement, loan scenarios, etc.
  • the solution of the present invention designs a zero-knowledge proof system for a specific algebraic structure of transactions, and consumes less computing resources and time. Even the light node can generate a proof process.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow chart showing an embodiment of a zero-knowledge proof method for cryptographic chain privacy protection of the present invention.
  • an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the private data in the blockchain, and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is generated in the transaction process to prove the validity of the transaction.
  • the implementation steps of the (non-interactive) zero-knowledge proof method suitable for blockchain privacy protection of this embodiment are as shown in FIG. 1 and include four phases: an initialization phase, a user configuration phase, a certification generation phase, and a verification phase. These four stages are explained separately.
  • N A and N B B's public key may be generated as follows t ciphertext generation mode to:
  • ⁇ and ⁇ are two parameters representing the plain space of the scheme.
  • H represents a hash function in cryptography.
  • Option 2 is:
  • Option 1 (corresponding to scenario 1 of the third phase):
  • the transaction is allowed, and the smart contract on the node automatically modifies the balance of the two nodes of the transaction on the public ledger.
  • the present invention also discloses a computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program executed by a processor, running the method steps as described in the above embodiments.
  • the usable scenarios of the present invention include: when performing asset transfer in the supply chain finance and consistency maintenance of the account information, the balance information of each node is encrypted by using an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm, and is performed between nodes. Broadcast non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to prove the validity of the transaction; protect customer privacy while improving customer identification efficiency and reduce time cost in clearing and settlement scenarios; encrypted withdrawals and borrower transaction records in lending scenarios And track and protect the effectiveness of the payment process.
  • DSPs digital signal processors
  • ASICs application specific integrated circuits
  • FPGAs field programmable gate arrays
  • Programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described herein are implemented or executed.
  • a general purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine.
  • the processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, such as a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration.
  • a software module may reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
  • An exemplary storage medium is coupled to the processor to enable the processor to read and write information to/from the storage medium.
  • the storage medium can be integrated into the processor.
  • the processor and the storage medium can reside in an ASIC.
  • the ASIC can reside in the user terminal.
  • the processor and the storage medium may reside as a discrete component in the user terminal.
  • the functions described may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof. If implemented as a computer program product in software, the functions may be stored on or transmitted as one or more instructions or code on a computer readable medium.
  • Computer readable media includes both computer storage media and communication media including any medium that facilitates transfer of a computer program from one place to another.
  • a storage medium may be any available media that can be accessed by a computer.
  • such computer readable media may comprise RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, disk storage or other magnetic storage device, or can be used to carry or store instructions or data structures. Any other medium that is desirable for program code and that can be accessed by a computer.
  • any connection is also properly referred to as a computer readable medium.
  • the software is transmitted from a web site, server, or other remote source using coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, digital subscriber line (DSL), or wireless technologies such as infrared, radio, and microwave.
  • the coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair cable, DSL, or wireless technologies such as infrared, radio, and microwave are included in the definition of the medium.
  • Disks and discs as used herein include compact discs (CDs), laser discs, optical discs, digital versatile discs (DVDs), floppy discs, and Blu-ray discs, in which disks are often reproduced magnetically. Data, and discs optically reproduce data with a laser. Combinations of the above should also be included within the scope of computer readable media.

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé de preuve de connaissance nulle approprié pour la protection de la confidentialité de chaîne de blocs, et un support, capable de supporter une sortie de transaction inutilisée (UTX) Bitcoin et un modèle de solde Ethereum et de se combiner convenablement avec un contrat intelligent, de telle sorte que la sécurité de la solution est encore améliorée, la scène d'application de la solution est étendue, et la preuve de connaissance nulle conçue pour une structure algébrique spécifique d'une transaction, même un nœud de lumière peut également générer le processus de preuve. La solution technique est la suivante : le procédé comprend : une phase d'initialisation : générant un paramètre de système, comprenant un processus de génération et la signification du paramètre ; une phase de génération de preuve : un processus spécifique de génération d'une preuve de connaissance nulle, comprenant un texte chiffré généré dans le processus, des formules et paramètres impliqués, etc. ; et une phase de vérification : comprenant une formule de vérification et des conditions, etc.
PCT/CN2018/118131 2017-11-30 2018-11-29 Procédé de preuve de connaissance nulle approprié pour la protection de la confidentialité de chaîne de blocs, et support WO2019105407A1 (fr)

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