WO2019071458A1 - Procédé et système de suivi de clé publique d'utilisateur dans des conditions de cryptomonnaie - Google Patents

Procédé et système de suivi de clé publique d'utilisateur dans des conditions de cryptomonnaie Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019071458A1
WO2019071458A1 PCT/CN2017/105649 CN2017105649W WO2019071458A1 WO 2019071458 A1 WO2019071458 A1 WO 2019071458A1 CN 2017105649 W CN2017105649 W CN 2017105649W WO 2019071458 A1 WO2019071458 A1 WO 2019071458A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
public key
transaction
tracking
party
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PCT/CN2017/105649
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
张鹏
喻建平
任浩
申屠青春
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深圳大学
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Priority to PCT/CN2017/105649 priority Critical patent/WO2019071458A1/fr
Publication of WO2019071458A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019071458A1/fr

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to domain information security technologies, and more particularly to a method and system for conditionally tracking a user's public key in a cryptocurrency.
  • Digital cryptocurrency is an application form of blockchain. It is a digital currency trading platform developed on the basis of decoupling, open source, trust, collective maintenance, and reliable data. Bitcoin is one of the most successful digital cryptocurrencies, but since all transactions are public and any transaction can be traced to its originators and recipients, Bitcoin is not traceable and due to big data analysis, The application of data mining and other technologies, the user's relevance to the transaction is easy to expose, Bitcoin does not have non-connectability.
  • the CryptoNote protocol uses a one-time public key technology to achieve non-connectability between users and transactions, and uses one-time ring signature technology to achieve untrackability of transactions.
  • the cryptocurrency based on CryptoNote protocol is easy to become a hotbed of criminal activities such as money laundering and extortion.
  • the main object of the present invention is to provide a method and system for conditionally tracking a user's public key in a cryptocurrency, aiming at solving the problem of money laundering, extortion, etc. due to lack of effective supervision when using a one-time public key transaction in the prior art.
  • a first aspect of the present invention provides a method for conditionally tracking a user's public key in a cryptocurrency, the method comprising:
  • the sender client obtains the receiver public key and the tracking party public key respectively, and calculates the target key and the transaction key according to the sender private key selected by the sender, the receiver public key, and the tracking party public key, and attaches Disclosed in the transaction, the recipient public key includes a first public key and a second public key, and the first public key is obtained based on a point on a predefined elliptic curve and a recipient private key selected by the receiver;
  • the tracking party client obtains the target key and the transaction key, and recovers the location of the recipient public key according to the target key, the transaction key, and the tracking party private key selected by the tracking party.
  • the first public key is described, so that the tracking party client uses the first public key obtained by the recovery to achieve tracking of the transaction destination.
  • a second aspect of the present invention provides a system for conditionally tracking a user's public key in a cryptocurrency, the system comprising:
  • the sender client is configured to obtain the receiver public key and the tracking party public key respectively, and calculate the target key and the transaction secret according to the sender private key selected by the sender, the receiver public key, and the tracking party public key.
  • the key is additionally disclosed in the transaction, the recipient public key includes a first public key and a second public key, the first public key being a point based on a predefined elliptic curve and a recipient private key selected by the receiver owned;
  • a tracking party client configured to acquire the target key and the transaction key, and recover the recipient public key according to the target key, the transaction key, and a tracking party private key selected by a tracking party The first public key in the tracking, so that the tracking party client uses the restored first public key to achieve tracking of the transaction destination.
  • the invention provides a method for conditionally tracking a user public key in a cryptocurrency, the method comprising: a sender client obtaining a receiver public key and a tracking party public key, and generating a target key and a transaction key in combination with the sender private key And publicly, the recipient public key includes a first public key and a second public key, and the first public key is obtained based on a point on a predefined elliptic curve and a recipient private key selected by the receiver, and the tracking client obtains The target key and the transaction key are combined with the tracking party private key to recover the first public key of the recipient. Generate The target key and the transaction key are one-time, so the sender and the receiver are based on a one-time public key transaction.
  • each transaction has non-connectability; and because the target key and The transaction key generation uses the tracking party public key and the receiver public key indirectly or directly, so the tracking party client can recover the first public key of the receiver by acquiring the target key and the transaction key, thereby tracking the reception.
  • Fang solves the technical problem of using a one-time public key transaction in traditional transactions because of the lack of effective supervision and easy to become a hotbed of criminal activities such as money laundering and extortion.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a transaction system in a first embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a method for conditionally tracking a user public key in a cryptocurrency according to a second embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a method for a conditionally trackable user public key in a cryptocurrency according to a third embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a system for a conditionally trackable user public key in a cryptocurrency according to a fourth embodiment of the present invention.
  • the present invention proposes a method and system for conditionally tracking a user's public key in a cryptocurrency, and the generated target key and transaction key are one-time, so the sender and the receiver are based on one-time
  • the sender and the receiver are based on one-time
  • the tracking party can recover the first public key of the receiver by acquiring the target key and the transaction key, thereby tracking the receiver, and solving the problem of using the one-time public key transaction in the traditional transaction due to lack of effective supervision, and easily becoming money laundering Technical issues of hotbeds such as extortion and criminal activities.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a transaction system in a first embodiment of the present invention.
  • the transaction system includes a sender, a receiver, and a tracker.
  • the table shows:
  • the transaction key (R A , R T ) and the recipient public key (A, A T ) are composed of two parts.
  • the receiver public key (A, A T ) is divided into a receiver first public key A and a receiver second public key A T .
  • the meaning of all the parameters in the formula is as shown in the parameters in the table.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a method for a conditionally trackable user public key in a cryptographic currency according to a second embodiment of the present invention, the method includes:
  • Step 201 The sender client obtains the receiver public key and the tracking party public key respectively, and calculates the target key and the transaction secret according to the sender private key selected by the sender, the receiver public key, and the tracking party public key.
  • the key is additionally disclosed in the transaction, the recipient public key includes a first public key and a second public key, the first public key being a point based on a predefined elliptic curve and a recipient private key selected by the receiver owned;
  • the tracking party client calculates and displays the tracking party public key T according to the tracking party private key t selected by the tracking party, and the receiving client obtains the tracking party public key T and calculates and receives the receiving party private key a.
  • the public key (A, A T ) is disclosed, and the sender client obtains the tracking party public key T and the receiver public key (A, A T ), and combines the sender private key r to calculate the target key P and the transaction secret.
  • the key (R A , R T ) is appended to the transaction.
  • the receiver public key (A, A T ) disclosed by the receiver client includes two parts, which are respectively referred to as the receiver first public key A and the receiver second public key A T .
  • the first public key A of the receiver is obtained based on the point G on the predefined elliptic curve and the recipient private key a selected by the receiver, and the second public key A T of the receiver is based on the tracking public key T and the receiving private Key a.
  • Session key (R A, R T) comprises two parts sender client output, referred to as a first session key and the second session key R A R T.
  • the first transaction key R A is obtained based on the sender private key r and the recipient first public key A
  • the second transaction key R T is obtained based on the sender private key r and the tracking party public key T.
  • Step 202 The tracking client obtains the target key and the transaction key, and recovers the recipient public key according to the target key, the transaction key, and the tracking party private key selected by the tracking party.
  • the first public key in the tracking so that the tracking party client uses the restored first public key to achieve tracking of the transaction destination.
  • the target key P and the transaction key (R A , R T ) are disclosed by the sender client in the transaction.
  • the tracking party private key t is randomly selected by the party that is in the transaction to track the whereabouts of the transaction.
  • the tracking party client obtains the target key P and the transaction key (R A , R T ) attached by the sender client in the transaction, and the tracking party private key t is calculated to obtain the recipient's first public key A, through which the receiving The first public key A is tracked to the recipient to track the whereabouts of the transaction.
  • the sender client obtains the receiver public key and the tracking party public key, generates a target key and a transaction key in combination with the sender private key, and exposes the tracking client to obtain the target key and the transaction secret.
  • the key is combined with the tracking party private key to recover the first public key of the recipient.
  • the generated target key and transaction key are one-time, so the sender and the receiver are based on one-time public key transactions.
  • each transaction has non-connectability; and because the target key
  • the tracking party public key and the receiver public key are used indirectly or directly with the generation of the transaction key, so the tracking party client can recover the first public key of the receiver by acquiring the target key and the transaction key, thereby tracking
  • the receiver has solved the technical problem of using a one-time public key transaction in traditional transactions because of the lack of effective supervision and easy to become a hotbed of criminal activities such as money laundering and extortion.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a method for a conditionally trackable user public key in a cryptographic currency according to a third embodiment of the present invention, the method includes:
  • Step 301 The tracking party client obtains the tracking party public key by using the tracking party private key and discloses it;
  • the tracking party public key T is based on a point G and a tracking party selected in advance on the elliptic curve.
  • the tracking party private key t is calculated.
  • the tracking party public key is obtained according to the following formula:
  • Step 302 The receiving client obtains the tracking party public key, and obtains the receiving public key by using the receiving private key and the tracking party public key and discloses the public key;
  • the receiver public key (A, A T ) includes two parts, namely, the receiver first public key A and the receiver second public key A T .
  • the first public key A of the receiver is obtained based on the point G defined in advance on the elliptic curve and the recipient private key a selected by the receiver.
  • the second public key A T of the receiver is based on the tracking party public key T and the receiver.
  • the private key a is obtained.
  • the receiver public key (A, A T ) is obtained by the following formula:
  • Step 303 The sender client obtains the receiver public key and the tracking party public key respectively, and obtains the target key and the transaction key according to the preset formula.
  • the transaction key (R A , R T ) is composed of two parts, namely a first transaction key R A and a second transaction key R T , and the first transaction key R A is based on sending
  • the second transaction key R T is obtained based on the sender private key r and the tracking party public key T, obtained by the party private key r and the recipient's first public key A.
  • the target key P and the transaction key (R A , R T ) are obtained as follows:
  • H represents a predefined hash function
  • G represents a point on a predefined elliptic curve
  • a T represents the recipient's second public key
  • Step 304 The sender client attaches the target key and the transaction key to the transaction and discloses it;
  • Step 305 The receiver client obtains the target key and the transaction key, calculates a one-time public key by using a preset formula, and determines whether the one-time public key is equal to the target key.
  • the one-time public key P′ generated by the receiver client is used to determine whether the target key P disclosed by the sender client is equal, thereby determining whether the transaction is established.
  • the one-time public key P' can be obtained according to the following formula:
  • a represents the recipient private key
  • G represents a point on the predefined elliptic curve
  • l represents the prime order of the predefined point G
  • H represents a predefined hash function
  • R T represents the second transaction key in the transaction key
  • A represents the recipient's first public key in the recipient public key.
  • a T aT, indicating the recipient's second public key in the recipient's public key.
  • Step 306 If the one-time public key is equal to the target key, the receiving client calculates the one-time private key by using a preset formula, so that the receiver signs the transaction by using the one-time private key;
  • the one-time private key p is obtained by the following formula:
  • a represents the recipient private key
  • G represents a point on the predefined elliptic curve
  • l represents the prime order of the predefined point G
  • R T represents the second transaction key
  • Step 307 The tracking party client obtains the target key and the transaction key, and uses the preset formula to recover the first public key in the recipient public key in combination with the tracking party private key.
  • the tracking client obtains the target key P and the transaction key (R A , R T ), and recovers the first public key A of the receiver in combination with the tracking private key t.
  • Key A is part of the recipient's public key (A, A T ), and the recipient's first public key A is used to enable the tracker to track the whereabouts of the transaction, ie, to the recipient.
  • the tracking party client restores the recipient's first public key A according to the following formula:
  • G represents a point on a predefined elliptic curve
  • R A represents the first transaction key
  • H represents a predefined hash function
  • Key r denotes the sender's private key
  • t denotes the tracking party's private key
  • G represents a point on a predefined elliptic curve
  • H represents a predefined hash function.
  • the target key and the transaction key generated by the sender client are one-time, so the sender and the receiver are based on the one-time public key transaction, and because the one-time public key is random, Each transaction is not connectable; the recipient signing the agreement uses the one-time private key generated by the receiving client to ensure the anonymity of the transaction; because the target key and the transaction key are generated indirectly or directly using the tracking party.
  • the public key and the recipient public key so the tracking client can recover the first public key of the receiver by acquiring the target key and the transaction key, thereby tracking the recipient, and solving the one-time public key in the traditional transaction. Due to the lack of effective supervision during trading, it is easy to become a hotbed of criminal activities such as money laundering and extortion.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a system for conditionally trackable user public key in a cryptocurrency according to a fourth embodiment of the present invention.
  • the system includes a sender client 401, a receiver client 402, and a tracker client 403, the system including:
  • the tracking party client 403 is configured to obtain the tracking party public key by using the tracking party private key and disclose the public key;
  • the receiving client 402 is configured to obtain the tracking party public key, and obtain the receiving public key by using the receiving private key and the tracking party public key and disclose the public key;
  • the sender client 401 is configured to respectively obtain the receiver public key and the tracking party public key, and calculate the target key according to the sender private key selected by the sender, the receiver public key, and the tracking party public key, and attach the information to the transaction. ;
  • the receiving client 402 is further configured to acquire a target key and a transaction key, generate a one-time public key, and determine whether the generated one-time public key and the target key are equal. If the judgment is equal, generate a one-time private key. In order for the recipient to sign the agreement using the generated one-time private key;
  • the tracking party client 403 is further configured to acquire the target key and the transaction key, and recover the first public key in the recipient public key according to the target key, the transaction key, and the tracking party private key, so as to track the client 403.
  • the tracking of the transaction destination is achieved by using the first public key obtained by the recovery.
  • the system is an interactive system, and the arrow indicates that a message disclosed by the client (including each public key, target key, and transaction key) can be acquired by another client.
  • the target key and transaction key generated by the sender client are one-time, so the sender and receiver are the base.
  • each transaction has non-connectability due to the randomness of the one-time public key; and the tracking party public key and the receiver public key are used indirectly or directly due to the generation of the target key and the transaction key. Therefore, the tracking client can recover the first public key of the receiver by acquiring the target key and the transaction key, thereby tracking the receiver, and solving the lack of effective supervision when using the one-time public key transaction in the traditional transaction. It is easy to become a hotbed of criminal activities such as money laundering and extortion.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé et un système suiveuse d'une clé publique d'utilisateur dans des conditions de cryptomonnaie. Le procédé comprend les étapes suivantes : un terminal client de partie expéditrice acquiert une clé publique de partie réceptrice et une clé publique de partie suiveuse, incorpore une clé privée de partie expéditrice pour générer une clé cible et une clé de transaction et les publie, la clé publique de partie réceptrice comprenant une première clé publique et une seconde clé publique, la première clé publique étant obtenue sur la base d'un point sur une courbe elliptique prédéfinie et de l'ordre premier dudit point ; le terminal client de partie suiveuse acquiert la clé cible et la clé de transaction et incorpore une clé privée de partie suiveuse pour récupérer la première clé publique de la partie réceptrice. La clé cible générée et la clé de transaction appartiennent à une clé publique unique et sont aléatoires. Les transactions ne sont donc pas connectables, et le client de partie suiveuse peut récupérer la première clé publique de la partie réceptrice et suivre la partie réceptrice. L'invention résout ainsi le problème technique lié au fait que des transactions classiques deviennent le repaire d'activités criminelles telles que le blanchiment d'argent et l'extorsion lors de l'utilisation d'une clé publique à usage unique en raison du manque de supervision efficace.
PCT/CN2017/105649 2017-10-11 2017-10-11 Procédé et système de suivi de clé publique d'utilisateur dans des conditions de cryptomonnaie WO2019071458A1 (fr)

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US11251937B2 (en) 2018-01-21 2022-02-15 CipherTrace, Inc. Distributed security mechanism for blockchains and distributed ledgers
US11438175B2 (en) 2020-12-29 2022-09-06 CipherTrace, Inc. Systems and methods for correlating cryptographic addresses between blockchain networks
US11546373B2 (en) 2018-11-20 2023-01-03 CipherTrace, Inc. Cryptocurrency based malware and ransomware detection systems and methods
US11836718B2 (en) 2018-05-31 2023-12-05 CipherTrace, Inc. Systems and methods for crypto currency automated transaction flow detection
US12026789B2 (en) 2022-02-07 2024-07-02 CipherTrace, Inc. Systems and methods of forensic analysis of cryptocurrency transactions

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Cited By (6)

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US11251937B2 (en) 2018-01-21 2022-02-15 CipherTrace, Inc. Distributed security mechanism for blockchains and distributed ledgers
US11836718B2 (en) 2018-05-31 2023-12-05 CipherTrace, Inc. Systems and methods for crypto currency automated transaction flow detection
US11546373B2 (en) 2018-11-20 2023-01-03 CipherTrace, Inc. Cryptocurrency based malware and ransomware detection systems and methods
US11888892B2 (en) 2018-11-20 2024-01-30 CipherTrace, Inc. Cryptocurrency based malware and ransomware detection systems and methods
US11438175B2 (en) 2020-12-29 2022-09-06 CipherTrace, Inc. Systems and methods for correlating cryptographic addresses between blockchain networks
US12026789B2 (en) 2022-02-07 2024-07-02 CipherTrace, Inc. Systems and methods of forensic analysis of cryptocurrency transactions

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