WO2018090499A1 - 交易方法、支付设备、校验设备和服务器 - Google Patents
交易方法、支付设备、校验设备和服务器 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2018090499A1 WO2018090499A1 PCT/CN2017/074736 CN2017074736W WO2018090499A1 WO 2018090499 A1 WO2018090499 A1 WO 2018090499A1 CN 2017074736 W CN2017074736 W CN 2017074736W WO 2018090499 A1 WO2018090499 A1 WO 2018090499A1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
- G06Q20/3226—Use of secure elements separate from M-devices
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
- G06Q20/20—Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
- G06Q20/204—Point-of-sale [POS] network systems comprising interface for record bearing medium or carrier for electronic funds transfer or payment credit
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/321—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices using wearable devices
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/327—Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3825—Use of electronic signatures
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/326—Payment applications installed on the mobile devices
Definitions
- the present application relates to the field of electronic devices, and more particularly to a method, a payment device, a verification device, and a server for contactless and confidential payment transactions.
- the non-contact payment standards issued by the people's bank of china include contactless standard lending/crediting PBOC and contactless fast standard lending/credit (qPBOC), where qPBOC has The advantage of short interaction time (less than 500ms), user experience is good, therefore, most of the current contactless transactions are qPBOC processes.
- the cardholder verification method CVM only supports online personal identification number (PIN) and signature two cardholder verification methods. Most online PINs are used for offline online transactions where there is a receiving device and the transaction needs to be sent by the receiving device to the issuing bank host.
- Offline transaction means that the information interaction between the payment device (for example, mobile phone) and the payment device (for example, point of sale, PoS) does not require networking, and the information is exchanged between the two devices. of.
- the payment terminal device does not need to have networking capability, and the transaction is handled by the payment terminal device.
- the payment device directly interacts with the issuing bank host, and the payment device needs to have networking capability, and does not require the presence of the receiving device.
- the online transaction is for the type of transaction, that is, the transaction needs to be sent by the receiving device to the issuing bank host for authorization, and the receiving device and the issuing bank host have a communication connection.
- Flash payment is a brand defined on the basis of PBOC2.0/3.0 standard.
- SE security element
- HCE host card emulation
- Pay is based on HCE to implement card simulation in mobile devices, compatible with PBOC technology logic.
- UnionPay has launched the Flash Pay Online Small-Scale Fast Service (small amount of three-free business), and merchants can apply to join the business as a whitelist merchant.
- IC integrated circuit
- an online transaction initiated by a flash payment method that is lower than a standard limit at the whitelist merchant supports a small amount of fast service by default.
- There is no need to jump the secret interface and signature verification that is, the cardholder verification in the PBOC process is not required, and the cardholder pays the card for payment.
- the acquiring institution adds a password-free identification mark transaction to the transaction, which is a small-scale fast business, and realizes the confidentiality authorization for the transaction by the issuing bank.
- the existing Alipay wearable smart device-free technology is aimed at an online transaction mode without a PoS machine, and for the offline transaction mode in which a PoS machine exists, there is no technology for the wear-free smart device.
- the cloud flash payment transaction is forced online, that is, the transaction needs to be sent by the PoS machine to the issuing bank host for verification, and the interaction between the payment device and the PoS machine does not need to be networked, and the transaction is processed by the PoS machine.
- the HCE application can conduct a small-value confidential transaction without identity verification.
- the HCE swipe card (including credit card) transaction always needs to input the password.
- the application provides a transaction method, a payment device, an inspection device, and a server. It can enhance the security of HCE cloud flash payment transactions and improve user experience.
- a transaction method includes: the payment device sends a secret request information to the verification device, where the confidential request information is used by the payment device to request a secret identifier from the verification device, the confidentiality Identifying a card for indicating a transaction having a secret-free identity associated with the verification device and corresponding to the card, wherein the payment device, the verification device, and the card are associated with each other; the payment device receiving the And verifying the secret-free response information sent by the device in response to the secret-free request information, the secret-free response information includes the secret-free identifier; and the payment device modifies the cardholder verification method CVM list of the card according to the secret-free response information In order to enable the point-of-sale device PoS machine to know that the transaction is a secret-free transaction; the payment device generates an authorization request ciphertext ARQC according to the confidential-free response information, and sends the ARQC to the PoS machine, where the ARQC includes the secret-free identifier
- the ARQC includes the secret-free identifier
- the transaction method provided by the first aspect implements two-factor verification by mutual authentication between the payment device and the additional verification device, and even if the payment device is lost or the information of the card is stolen, the verification is required due to the small-sized confidential transaction. Check the equipment, so it will not be stolen, which can improve the security of the transaction.
- the validity of the authentication-free authentication device is used to verify the confidentiality of the server by verifying the confidentiality-free identifier, and the verification device is received by the payment device.
- the CVM list of the card is modified to realize the confidentiality of the PoS machine, and the cardholder verification process is no longer performed at the PoS machine, thereby avoiding the risk of the password being peeped during the transmission, the security is higher, and the user experience is better.
- the payment device modifies the CVM list of the card, including: setting a usage condition of the online personal identification code PIN to a CVM list of the card
- the transaction amount is greater than the exemption limit, and the exemption limit corresponds to the exemption ID.
- the payment device in conjunction with the first aspect or the first possible implementation of the first aspect, includes: in a CVM list of the card In the CVM type, add the device cardholder verification method CDCVM, and record the result of the CDCVM as verified.
- the method further includes: the payment device sending the confidential authentication request information to the server, where the confidential authentication request information is used to request the security device for the confidential identifier, so that the server is configured according to the server
- the secret-free authentication request generates the secret-free identifier, determines an encryption-free quota corresponding to the confidential-free identifier, and sends the secret-free identifier to the verification device.
- any one of the first to third possible implementation manners of the first aspect in a fourth possible implementation manner of the first aspect, encrypts or signs the first encryption key in the first key pair, wherein the first encryption key is sent by the server to the verification device.
- any one of the first to fourth possible implementations of the first aspect is possible
- the fifth possible implementation manner of the first aspect the sending, by the payment device, the secret-free request information to the verification device, that: the payment device sends the second of the second key pair to the verification device Encryption request information encrypted by the encryption key, wherein the second key pair is negotiated and generated by the payment device and the verification device, the second key pair including the second encryption key and the second decryption key .
- the payment device is a mobile phone
- the verification device is a wearable device; or the payment device is a wearable device, and the verification device is a mobile phone.
- a transaction method includes: the verification device receives the confidential request information sent by the payment device, where the confidential request information is used by the payment device to request a secret identifier from the verification device, where the The secret identifier is used to indicate that the card of the transaction has a secret-free identity associated with the verification device and corresponds to the card, wherein the payment device, the verification device, and the card are associated with each other; the verification device Parsing the confidentiality request information, and sending the confidentiality response information in response to the confidentiality request information to the payment device, the confidentiality response information including the confidentiality identification information, wherein the confidentiality response information is used by the payment device to modify the Cardholder verification method for card CVM list.
- the transaction method provided by the second aspect is stored separately from the information of the card in the payment device by storing the secret-free identifier at the verification device, and the authorization device is required to apply for authorization after each transaction selection, and the verification is performed.
- the device and the payment device perform mutual authentication to implement two-factor authentication, so that even if the payment device is lost or the information of the card is stolen, since the small-sized confidential transaction needs to verify the verification device, it will not be stolen. , higher security and better user experience.
- the method further includes: the verification device receiving the server of the transaction Sending the secret-free identifier, wherein the secret-free identifier is generated by the server according to the secret-free authentication request information sent by the payment device.
- the method further includes: the verification device receiving the first encryption key in the first key pair sent by the server, the first key pair including the first encryption key and the first decryption key: the verification device utilizes The first encryption key encrypts or signs the secret identifier.
- the verification device parses the The secret request information includes: the verification device decrypts the confidentiality request information by using a second decryption key of the second key pair, wherein the second key pair is negotiated and generated by the verification device and the payment device, The second key pair includes a second encryption key and the second decryption key.
- the verification device is wearable
- the device is a mobile phone; or the verification device is a mobile phone, and the payment device is a wearable device.
- a transaction method comprising: receiving, by a server, an authorization request message sent by a point-of-sale device PoS, the authorization request message including an authorization request ciphertext ARQC, the ARQC including the verification device and a secret-free identifier corresponding to the card that needs to be traded, the secret-free identifier is used to enable the server to know that the card has a secret-free capability, and the ARQC is sent by the payment device to the PoS machine, wherein the payment device, the verification device The device and the card are already associated with each other; the server verifies whether the transaction is valid based on the ARQC.
- the server validates the secret-density identifier stored in the verification device and the information of the card in the payment device to implement two-factor verification, so that even if the payment device is lost or the card information
- the small-scale confidential transaction since the small-scale confidential transaction also needs to verify the verification device, it will not be authorized for the transaction, the security is higher, and the user experience is better.
- For PoS machines and/or HCE payment applications that do not support small-value-free encryption use the validity of the authentication-verifying device to exempt the confidentiality authority, and authorize the secret-free transaction by verifying the secret-free identification, which is more secure and user-friendly. better.
- the method before the server receives the authorization request message sent by the PoS, the method further includes: the server receiving the secret authentication request sent by the payment device The information, the secret authentication request information is used to request the security-free identifier for the verification device; the server generates the confidential-free identifier according to the confidential-free authentication request information, and determines the confidentiality-free quota corresponding to the confidential-free identifier; The server sends the exemption identifier to the verification device.
- the server in conjunction with the first possible implementation of the third aspect, in a second possible implementation manner of the third aspect, the server, according to the ARQC, verifying whether the transaction is valid, including: the server decrypting the ARQC, determining the exemption The secret identifier is valid, and when the transaction amount is less than or equal to the exemption limit, the transaction is determined to be confidential; the server decrypts the ARQC, determines that the exemption identifier is invalid, rejects the transaction, or when the server determines that the transaction amount is greater than the exemption When the secret limit is determined, the transaction is determined to be confidential.
- the method before the server receives the authorization request packet sent by the PoS, the method further includes: generating, by the server a key pair, the first key pair including a first encryption key and a first decryption key; the server transmitting the first encryption key to the verification device, the first encryption key being used for the verification The device encrypts or signs the secret identifier, wherein the server determines whether the secret identifier is valid using the first decryption key in the first key pair.
- the payment device is a mobile phone
- the verification device is a wearable device; or the payment device is a wearable device, and the verification device is a mobile phone.
- a payment device for performing the method of any of the above first aspect or any of the possible implementations of the first aspect.
- the payment device comprises means for performing the method of any of the above-described first aspect or any of the possible implementations of the first aspect.
- a verification apparatus for performing the method of any of the above-described second aspect or any of the possible implementations of the second aspect.
- the verification device comprises means for performing the method of any of the above-described second aspect or any of the possible implementations of the second aspect.
- a server for performing the method of any of the above-described third aspect or any of the possible implementations of the third aspect.
- the server comprises means for performing the method of any of the above mentioned third or third aspects of the third aspect.
- a seventh aspect provides a payment device including a processor, a memory, a receiver, and a transmitter, the processor, the memory, the receiver, and the transmitter being connected by a bus, the memory for storing an instruction, the receiving The transmitter, the transmitter, and the processor are configured to invoke instructions stored in the memory to perform the method of any of the first aspect or any of the possible implementations of the first aspect.
- a verification apparatus including a processor, a memory, a receiver, and a transmitter, the processor, the memory, the receiver, and the transmitter are connected by a bus, and the memory is configured to store an instruction, where The receiver, the transmitter and the processor are operative to invoke instructions stored in the memory to perform the method of any of the above-described second aspect or any of the possible implementations of the second aspect.
- a server including a processor, a memory, a receiver, and a transmitter, the processor, The memory, the receiver and the transmitter are connected by a bus for storing instructions, the receiver, the transmitter and the processor for invoking instructions stored in the memory, performing the third or third aspect above The method in any possible implementation.
- a tenth aspect a computer readable medium for storing a computer program, the computer program comprising instructions for performing the method of the first aspect or any of the possible implementations of the first aspect.
- a computer readable medium for storing a computer program comprising instructions for performing the method of any of the second aspect or any of the possible implementations of the second aspect.
- a computer readable medium for storing a computer program comprising instructions for performing the method of any of the third aspect or any of the possible implementations of the third aspect.
- 1 is a schematic diagram of two existing mobile payment modes based on SE and HCE based;
- FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a conventional contactless payment qPBOC
- FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of an online authorization request message in an existing qPBOC
- FIG. 4 is a schematic flow chart of a conventional mobile device card small-value confidential transaction
- FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a transaction method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of a transaction method according to another embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of a structure of an authorization request message according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 8 is a schematic block diagram of a payment device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram of a payment device according to another embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 10 is a schematic block diagram of a verification device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 11 is a schematic block diagram of a verification device according to another embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 12 is a schematic block diagram of a smartphone according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 13 is a schematic block diagram of a server in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 14 is a schematic block diagram of a server according to another embodiment of the present invention.
- Authorization request cryptogram The application ciphertext generated after the IC card transaction is judged to be online after the transaction is authorized by the issuing bank, and the key issued by the issuing bank in the card encrypts the authorized amount and the application transaction counter. .
- the ciphertext is returned to the PoS machine in response to the processing option command, and the PoS machine then generates an online authorization request message using the ciphertext and other necessary information, and sends it to the issuing bank for transaction authorization.
- Application transaction counter A counter used in a card to indicate the number of transactions (whether successful or not).
- CVM A method for verifying the identity of a cardholder.
- CD-CVM is a unique cardholder authentication method based on mobile device initiated flash payment transactions, which currently (including but not limited to) digital passwords and fingerprints for wallet applications. If the phone and PoS support CDCVM in the CVM list at the same time, the CDCVM result will be the cardholder verification result (CDCVM has the highest priority in the CVM list), no need to provide online PIN or signature. Compared to digital passwords, fingerprints are actually It is more convenient to use and has a better user experience (both methods belong to CDCVM).
- Get processing options The instructions sent by the PoS machine to the card during the PBOC/qPBOC application initialization phase. At the same time, the command will include the transaction information, the terminal transaction attributes, and the parameters that the card previously requested from the terminal.
- HCE The physical SE of traditional incoming communication in HCE mode is replaced by the cloud (SE or the Cloud) managed by remotely.
- Mobile devices can implement secure incoming communication applications, such as payment, marketing and access control, even without the SE module. Wait.
- SE Information used to store virtual cards, isolated from the operating system, with strong security and tamper resistance.
- PIN A number used to identify an individual, known as a password.
- NFC Near field communication
- NFC is a short-range wireless connection technology. Based on radio frequency identification technology, magnetic field sensing is used to realize communication between electronic devices at close range. Users only need to touch or close the device. To achieve intuitive, secure and contactless exchange of information, content and transactions, such as near-field payment, NFC works at a frequency of 13.56MHz, the effective range of communication is 0-20cm.
- PoS machine It is a multi-function terminal. It can be installed in the credit card merchants and the receiving network to connect with the computer to realize the automatic transfer of electronic funds. It has the functions of supporting consumption, pre-authorization, balance inquiry and transfer. It is safe, fast and reliable to use.
- Trusted execution environment The trusted execution environment coexists with the common execution environment (or rich execution environment, REE, REE refers to the operating environment that does not have specific security functions).
- REE rich execution environment
- REE refers to the operating environment that does not have specific security functions.
- the operating environment in the intelligent terminal through the support of hardware, has the security capability and can meet certain security requirements, and realizes the operation mechanism isolated from the common execution environment.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of two existing mobile payment modes based on SE and HCE.
- the HCE-based mobile payment technology does not have an SE, and the technology can be implemented by an NFC controller without requiring a secure carrier.
- the smart card instruction data is notified to the application processor and notified by the operating system to the developed mobile application.
- the host card emulation method allows any program to emulate an IC card to communicate directly with the NFC reader, so the HCE solution is compared to the traditional SE-based card emulation solution.
- Mainly in the account data related to the transaction can only save REE or TEE, because of the lack of a secure storage environment, HCE-based flash payment needs to combine additional risk management mechanisms.
- HCE-based mobile payment model does not have a secure carrier, all transactions based on HCE use a restricted key and force each transaction to be online. In addition to the small fast business, each transaction is also forced to ensure confidentiality. Safety.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of the existing contactless payment qPBOC.
- the initial transaction processing flow is entered, in which the PoS machine obtains the cashier input.
- a series of checks are performed first, for example, checking whether the monetary unit meets the requirements, whether the authorized amount exceeds the CVM limit of the PoS machine, etc.
- the user is required to present the card.
- the PoS opportunity sends a GPO command to the card, with the authorization amount, ATC and other transaction information, and PoS machine transaction attributes and other parameters of the PoS machine, for card execution risk management, judgment of transaction type (offline/online/rejection) and generation of related ciphertext, etc. operating.
- the PoS machine After the card sends the generated ARQC back to the PoS machine in the GPO response, the PoS machine obtains the response information of the card through the Read Record command. When the card returns the response of the last Read Record command, Adding an identifier to the instruction to inform the PoS machine that this is the last piece of information. After receiving the response of the instruction, the PoS machine will know that the information has been read, that is, the GPO process has been completed and the information with the card has been exchanged. The opportunity to perform the next information processing operation and prompt the user to remove the card, that is, the user can leave the card from the sensing area of the PoS machine.
- the card will generate an ARQC ciphertext with the authorization amount, ATC and other parameters, and feed the ciphertext to the PoS machine in the GPO response.
- the PoS machine determines whether to perform cardholder authentication according to the relevant information. If cardholder authentication is required, the card CVM list obtained in the previous period and the CVM list supported by the terminal are selected to support one party. The highest priority CVM.
- the online PIN will be the preferred CVM.
- the PoS machine prompts the cardholder to input the online PIN on the PoS machine, and adds the online PIN together with the ARQC ciphertext and other information to the online authorization request message. Submit it to the issuing bank host for verification. After the card issuing host verifies and returns the transaction authorization result, the PoS machine informs the cardholder of the transaction result.
- 3 is a schematic structural diagram of an online authorization request message in the existing qPBOC. As shown in FIG. 3, the authorization request message includes an ARQC, an online PIN, and other transaction-related information, wherein the online PIN is input on the PoS machine. .
- the mobile device card payment refers to a mobile payment based on SE, that is, binding a card that needs to be traded to a mobile device, and such a card is also called A mobile device card, such as payment for a card bound to the mobile device (eg, a mobile phone), can be completed by the mobile device.
- the existing offline mobile device secret-free transaction is for a merchant in the whitelist, and for a transaction in which the transaction amount in the whitelist merchant is less than or equal to the small business standard limit, the mobile device card passes the transaction.
- the relevant parameters of the card inform the PoS machine, the PoS machine reads the relevant information of the card, and knows that the mobile device card supports a small amount of confidentiality; and the PoS machine knows that the mobile device card supports the small amount of the secret-free function, according to the transaction amount
- the relationship between the size and the size of the confidentiality limit is not required for transactions with a transaction amount less than or equal to the confidentiality limit. That is, the PoS machine does not perform cardholder authentication, and adds a secret-free identifier to the authorization request message.
- the request message is sent to the issuing bank host, and the authorization request message includes the ARQC sent by the mobile device card.
- the issuing bank host identifies the small fast service according to the exempted identification, and confirms the The transaction is a secret for small transactions.
- CDCVM is selected as the implementation of CVM, that is, the process of verifying the online password of the card is eliminated, and then the PoS machine records the CDCVM for this transaction and requests the issuing bank host. Secret exemption for this transaction.
- the issuer host identifies small transactions through a small amount of fast transaction limits, authorizing transactions based on the mobile device card's small fast transaction limit and CDCVM.
- the existing offline confidential transaction there is no cardholder verification method based on the second device such as wearable, and for the small-density HCE cloud flash payment based on the mobile device card, some issuers are for security reasons.
- the CDCVM in the HCE software environment is not considered to be a trusted CDCVM, so the CDCVM is not added to the CVM list of the cloud flash card.
- the HCE application can perform small-value confidential transactions without identity verification. At this time, the information of the HCE card can be easily stolen by the Trojan or the mobile phone is lost.
- the HCE card (including the credit card) always needs to input the password when trading. Therefore, entering a password at the PoS machine risks the password being peeped and stolen.
- FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of the transaction method 100 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the transaction method of the embodiment of the present invention will be described below with reference to FIG. It should be understood that the embodiment of the present invention is only described by taking the transaction method shown in FIG. 5 as an example, but the embodiment of the present invention is not limited thereto.
- the subject involved in the transaction method of the embodiment of the present invention includes: a payment device, a verification device, a PoS machine, and a server.
- the payment device may be a mobile phone.
- the verification device may be a wearable device, or the payment device may be a wearable device.
- the verification device may be a mobile phone, and the server may be a card issuing bank. Host.
- the mobile phone can be used as a payment device, and the watch worn by the user can be a verification device, or the mobile phone can be used as a verification device, and the watch worn by the user can be a payment device.
- the wearable device may include, but is not limited to, a watch supported by a wrist, such as a smart watch, a smart bracelet, etc.; a foot-supported footwear, such as a smart sports shoe; and a head-supported eyeglass, such as Smart glasses, smart helmets, etc.
- the payment device is not limited to a mobile phone, as long as the device can perform the payment function, and the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the method 100 includes the following steps:
- the payment device sends the confidential request information to the verification device, where the confidential request information is used to request the authentication device to obtain a secret-free identifier, where the confidential identifier is used to indicate that the card of the transaction has a confidentiality-free identifier.
- the verification device Associated with the verification device and corresponding to the card, wherein the payment device, the verification device, and the card are associated with each other.
- the payment device sends the confidential request information to the verification device, and is used to apply to the verification device for the secret-free identification, where the confidential identifier is used to indicate that the transaction card is free.
- the secret capability that is, the card issuing host can know that the card of the transaction has a secret-free capability, and the secret-free identifier corresponds to the card, is stored in the verification device, and is associated with the verification device, and is not directly related to the payment.
- the device is associated, so that the relationship between the secret-free identifier and the payment device is avoided, and the identity verification of the holder when the verification device transactions the transaction device can be achieved.
- the verification device receives the confidentiality request information sent by the payment device.
- the issuing bank host confirms that the card has the capability of being free of confidentiality according to the secret-free identification.
- the exemption request information may include information of a card that needs to be traded, for example, may be an identification of the card, to inform the verification device which card is currently required to be traded, and follow-up for the card. operating.
- the confidential request information may further include a random number of the payment device, the random number may be an ATC for further ensuring the validity and security of the transaction, and the confidential request information may further include other related to the transaction.
- the information or the data in the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the payment device selects a card that needs to be traded, and when the verification device is detected, generates the confidentiality request information, and sends the confidentiality request information to the associated verification device.
- card-free capability of the card may be a non-disclosure capability within a certain limit, and the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the verification device parses the exemption request information.
- the verification device sends, to the payment device, the secret-free response information in response to the secret-free request information, where the confidential-free response information includes the secret-free identification information, where the confidential-free response information is used by the payment device to modify the hold of the card.
- Card person verification method CVM list
- the verification device parses the exemption request information to determine the exemption
- the validity of the confidential request information may be verified by using some identification information negotiated at the time of binding, whether the confidential request information is sent by the payment device bound to the verification device, and whether the card to be traded is authentic or not. And so on, after determining that the information is valid, the verification device sends the confidential answering information in response to the confidential request information to the payment device.
- the payment device receives the confidentiality response information, because for a cardholder, the verification device And the payment device is carried by the card holder, so this process can be considered as a verification of the identity of the cardholder.
- the exemption response information includes the exemption identifier.
- the two-factor verification is implemented by the cardholder's additional verification device to verify the payment device.
- the payment device can confirm the legality of the cardholder identity, thereby modifying the cardholder verification method list of the card.
- the secret-free response information may further include the secret-free quota corresponding to the secret-free identifier, where the secret-free quota is used to define the amount of the secret-privileged authority, so that the card can be traded under the corresponding confidentiality limit.
- the secret-free password may be sent by the issuing bank host to the verification device.
- the secret-free response information should also include the random number. Further, the effectiveness and security of the transaction are further ensured, and the embodiments of the present invention are not limited herein.
- the information of the confidentiality response may also include other information or data related to the current transaction, which is not limited herein.
- the payment device modifies the cardholder verification method list of the card according to the confidentiality response information, so as to enable the PoS machine to know that the transaction is a secret-free transaction;
- the payment device generates an authorization request ciphertext according to the secret-free response information, and the authorization request ciphertext includes the secret-free identifier.
- the cardholder verification method CVM list of the card is modified, and the modified CVM list of the card is returned to the PoS machine in a command (SELECT)
- the purpose of modifying the CVM list of the card is to let the PoS machine know that the transaction is secret-free, and the password verification is not performed at the PoS machine, that is, the user is not required to provide a password, and the password is used at the issuing bank host.
- the verification of the identity of the cardholder is performed. Since the process of requesting the confidentiality identifier from the payment device to the verification device can be regarded as the verification of the identity of the cardholder, the actual use does not need to be performed at the PoS machine. This part of the secret, without the need for confidentiality means that this transaction does not require additional cardholder authentication, that is, there is no need to carry out the CVM link in the PBOC process.
- the payment device modifies the CVM list of the card, which may be consistent in S609 in the schematic flowchart of the transaction method 200 of another embodiment of the present invention as shown in FIG. 6.
- the modifying, by the payment device, the CVM list of the card may include: setting a usage condition of the online personal identification number PIN to a transaction amount greater than the confidentiality limit in the CVM list of the card, the confidentiality The quota corresponds to the exemption ID.
- the PoS machine since the purpose of modifying the CVM list of the card is to let the PoS machine know that the transaction is secret-free, the password verification is not performed at the PoS machine. Finally, the PoS machine performs the CVM that is supported by the card and the CVM list of the PoS machine.
- Table 1 is the card's data table, which includes some parameters of the card's CVM list. It can be found that in the normal CVM type, the online PIN verification will be used first. Therefore, the payment device will be online in the card CVM list.
- the usage condition of the PIN verification is set to the transaction amount is greater than the exemption quota, so that when the CVM is executed, since only the CVM list of the card is modified, only the CVM shared by the card and the PoS machine is selected, so When the transaction amount is less than or equal to the exemption limit, because the transaction does not meet the conditions for using the online PIN, the signature or other CVM that does not need to be encrypted is selected. It is now free.
- the secret-free quota may be carried in the confidential-free response information, and the payment device is obtained by parsing the confidential-free response information, or may be obtained by the payment device by other means, for example, the issuer host may be
- the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein, and is sent to the payment device and then saved by the payment device.
- the payment device modifying the CVM list of the card may further include: adding a device cardholder verification method CDCVM to the CVM type in the CVM list of the card, and recording the CDCVM result as Verification passed.
- the payment device since the payment device has successfully received the confidentiality response information, which is equivalent to the identity verification of the payment device, and confirms the legality of the identity of the user holding the payment device, The payment device has been verified by CDCVM and the cardholder authentication is passed. It can be seen from the above that the final PoS machine performs the CVM supported by the card and the CVM list of the PoS machine. Therefore, the condition of use of the modification is that the PoS machine also needs to support the CDCVM, and it is necessary to determine that the transaction amount is less than or It can be used when it is equal to the exemption limit. As shown in Table 1, CDCVM is also present in the CVM type in the CVM list of the PoS machine.
- this modification mode can be utilized, when the PoS machine determines that the transaction amount is less than Or equal to the exemption limit, it is judged that the CDCVM is valid (the conditions for using the quota condition are met), and then the CDCVM is used as the cardholder verification mode of the transaction, and the password verification is not performed at the PoS machine.
- the transaction amount is greater than the exemption limit, the authentication method of the online PIN input is used for the authentication.
- the payment device modifying the CVM list of the card may further include: setting, in the CVM list of the card, the usage condition of the online personal identification code PIN as the transaction amount, as shown in Table 1. Greater than the exemption limit, and the device cardholder verification method CDCVM is added to the CVM type in the CVM list of the card, and the result of recording the CDCVM is verified.
- the measure for executing the CVM for modifying the card is to enter the immissory state after the card is interacted with the PoS machine. Then interact with the PoS machine. Therefore, at this time, the CVM attribute of the PoS machine is not known, that is, it is not known whether the PoS machine supports CDCVM.
- the modification manner can be used, so that the PoS machine knows that the transaction is exempt.
- the CVM method for modifying the card by the payment device may further include setting the application interchange profile (AIP) to not support CVM, as shown in Table 1, that is, the CVM is not required to be performed, wherein
- the card's AIP indicates the list of capabilities that the card supports for certain functions in this application, including static data authentication (SDA), dynamic data authentication (DDA), cardholder verification, card issuer authentication, and composite Combined dynamic data authentication/application cryptogram (DDA/AC).
- SDA static data authentication
- DDA dynamic data authentication
- DDA/AC composite Combined dynamic data authentication/application cryptogram
- the premise of the use of the modification is to determine that the transaction amount (authorization amount) is less than or equal to the exemption limit, and after using the modification method, an indication information needs to be added to the ARQC generated by the payment device, and the indication information is used.
- the issuing bank host After receiving the indication information, the issuing bank host knows that the transaction has been verified by the verification device and combines the confidentiality permission of the card. The transaction is exempt from confidentiality.
- the CVM method for modifying the card may further include other modification manners, as long as the modification manner enables the PoS machine to know that the transaction is exempt, and does not need to be transported on the PoS machine.
- the operation may be performed, and the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the payment device In S109, the payment device generates an authorization request ciphertext ARQC according to the confidentiality response information, the ARQC includes the secret-free identifier, and the payment device sends the ARQC to the PoS machine in a GPO response.
- the PoS opportunity tells the payment device that the transaction amount, other transaction information related to the transaction, and the terminal transaction attribute of the PoS machine are included in the GPO instruction, and the payment device performs risk management check and determines
- the transaction type offline completion/online authorization/rejection transaction
- the terminal transaction attribute of the PoS machine includes a CVM list of the PoS machine, and the payment device returns a modified CVM list of the card to the PoS machine in a response of the last instruction (SELECT) of the GPO, the payment After the device sends the ARQC to the PoS machine to complete the corresponding GPO command, the device can leave the sensing area of the PoS machine.
- the payment device may also add the confidentiality limit, the identifier of the payment device, and other information or data related to the transaction to the ARQC, and when the secret-free response information includes the random number, the payment The device may also add the random number to the ARQC to further ensure the security of the transaction.
- the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the payment device sends the ARQC to the PoS machine, where the ARQC is used by the PoS machine to generate an authorization request message, and sends the authorization request message to the card line host of the transaction, where the authorization request message includes the ARQC. .
- the payment device sends the ARQC to the PoS machine in the GPO response, and the authorization request ciphertext is used by the PoS machine to generate an authorization request message, and sends the authorization request message to the card issuer host.
- the PoS machine adds the ARQC and related transaction information to the authorization request message.
- the PoS machine adds the ARQC to the authorization request message, and sends the authorization request message to the card issuer host, and the authorization request message may further include other information of the transaction, for example, a transaction.
- the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the PoS machine sends the authorization request message to the issuing bank host.
- the issuing bank host receives an authorization request message sent by the PoS machine, where the authorization request message includes the ARQC, and the ARQC includes the school. Excluding a secret-free identifier corresponding to the card that is associated with the device, and the secret-free identifier is used to enable the card-issuing host to know that the card has the confidentiality-free capability within the confidentiality limit, wherein the payment device, the verification device The device and the card are already associated with each other.
- the card issuer host receives an authorization request message sent by the PoS machine, where the authorization request message includes the ARQC, and the ARQC includes Verifying a secret-free identifier associated with the card that is associated with the transaction, and the secret-free identifier is used to enable the card-issuing host to know that the card has a secret-free capability, and the secret-free identifier is a license corresponding to the card that needs to be traded.
- a secret identifier, and the secret-free identifier is associated with the verification device, and is not directly associated with the payment device. In this way, the card holder can be authenticated by holding the verification device, and Further, the verification device and the payment device can also perform mutual authentication and provide cardholder identity verification.
- the issuing bank host verifies whether the transaction is valid according to the ARQC.
- the issuing bank host decrypts the ARQC in the authorization request message, and when the ARQC is included in the ARQC, extracts the confidential identifier, and when determining that the confidential identifier is valid and determined
- the transaction amount is less than or equal to the privilege limit, it is determined that the privilege transaction authority is valid, and the transaction is authorized; when the card issuing bank decrypts the ARQC and determines that the privilege identifier is invalid, the transaction is rejected.
- Issuer host freeze Or cancel the binding relationship between the card and the verification device, cancel the password-free function of the verification device, and notify the card/the payment device to perform corresponding processing (no longer apply for the secret-free request or re-apply the application for the secret-free identification/ Update); or when the issuer host determines that the transaction amount is greater than the privilege limit, it is necessary to verify the online password carried in the authorization request message to determine whether to authorize the transaction.
- the exemption limit may be determined and saved when the issuer host generates the exemption identity.
- the size of the serial numbers of the above processes does not mean the order of execution, and the order of execution of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not be implemented in accordance with the present invention.
- the implementation of the example creates any restrictions.
- the transaction method of the embodiment of the present invention increases the security of the HCE transaction by introducing a verification device, and performs mutual authentication by the payment device and the additional verification device, so that the payment device is lost. Or in the case of information theft of the card, since the small-sized confidential transaction also needs to verify the verification device, it will not be stolen. Moreover, for a PoS machine and/or an HCE payment application that does not support a small amount of confidentiality, the verification verification device is used to verify the validity of the confidentiality authority, and the card is modified by verifying that the confidentiality identification and the payment device receive the verification device response.
- the CVM list is used to realize the confidentiality of the PoS machine and the issuing bank host, thereby realizing a small amount of confidential payment, no need to perform the confidentiality operation, avoiding the risk of the password being peeped when the confidentiality is transmitted, and the security is higher. User experience is better.
- FIG. 6 is a schematic flow chart of a transaction method 200 according to another embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 6, steps S206 to S213 of the transaction method 200 are similar to steps S106 to S113 of the transaction method 100, and are not described herein again.
- the method 200 may further include:
- the payment device and the verification device mutually authenticate and bind, and negotiate to generate a second key pair, where the second key pair includes a second encryption key and a second decryption key.
- the payment device first exchanges information of both parties with the verification device and performs binding, and generates the second key pair for subsequent authentication of the payment device and the identity of the verification device. And encrypting the information between the two, so that the security of the transaction can be enhanced.
- the second key pair may be symmetric, ie the second encryption key and the second decryption key included in the second key pair are the same.
- the second key pair may also be asymmetric, that is, the second encryption key and the second decryption key are different.
- the second key pair may include the second encryption key and the second decryption key.
- the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the second key pair is merely for the purpose of illustrating a key pair that is used in the encryption, and should not impose any limitation on the embodiments of the present invention.
- the payment device and the verification device can also use other methods to verify the identity between the two.
- the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the payment device sends the secret-free function request information to the card-issuing host, where the secret-free authentication request information is used to request the secret-protected identifier for the verification device, so that the card-issuing host obtains the information according to the confidential authentication request information.
- the exemption identifier is generated, the exemption quota corresponding to the exemption identifier is determined, and the exemption identifier is sent to the verification device.
- the information of the verification device is stored in the payment device, and the user can pass the payment device because the payment device has been bound to the card.
- the related payment application or related options on the payment application, for example, may be a binding third party device (verification device) and the like to send the confidential authentication request information to the issuer host.
- the issuer host receives the exemption function request information.
- the exemption function request information is used to apply to the issuing bank host to enable the verification device to perform the confidential authentication function, that is, the verification device requests the exemption identification, so that the issuing bank host opens the payment device and the
- the two-factor confidentiality verification function of the verification device separates the payment device of the payment end from the verification device of the authentication end, and verifies the payment device by using an additional verification device, thereby increasing the security of the transaction.
- the confidentiality request information may include information of the card, for example, may be an identifier of the card, used by the issuing bank host to verify the card information, and bind the card to the verification device. In this way, the issuing bank host can generate a secret-free identifier associated with the verification device, determine the confidentiality limit corresponding to the confidential identifier, and other transaction-related information.
- the payment device may also send multiple card information to the issuing bank host, where the issuing bank host binds each card to the verification device, and correspondingly, the issuing bank host may also receive The information of the plurality of cards, and generating a secret-free identifier corresponding to each card and an imperfect quota corresponding to the secret-free identifier, and transmitting the secret-free identifier to the verification device, so that, during the transaction, The verification device can select the secret-free identifier corresponding to the card according to the secret-free request information, thereby performing subsequent operations.
- the embodiments of the present invention are not limited herein.
- the payment device may also send the information of the verification device or other information related to the transaction to the issuing bank host, for example, the identifier of the verification device and the identifier of the payment device, etc., the present invention
- the embodiment is not limited herein.
- the issuing bank host receives the confidential authentication request information sent by the payment device.
- the issuing bank host generates the confidentiality identifier according to the confidential authentication request information, and determines an exemption quota corresponding to the exemption identifier.
- the issuer host sends the secret-free identifier to the verification device.
- the issuing bank host may activate the verification device confidential authentication function, and according to the content included in the confidential authentication request information, for example, The identification of the card, after determining that the card is valid, binding the card to the verification device. Since the card and the payment device have been previously bound, the payment device, the card, and the verification device are mutually Bind.
- the issuing bank host may generate a secret-free identifier associated with the verification device and corresponding to the card, determine an encryption-free quota corresponding to the confidential-free identifier, save the secret-exempt identifier and the secret-free quota, and The secret-free identification is sent to the verification device, and the confidential information is stored in the verification device, and is stored separately from the information of the card in the payment device.
- the verification device applies for the secret-free identifier corresponding to the card of the transaction, and only after the payment device obtains the secret-free identifier, the subsequent processing can be performed. This process can be regarded as verifying whether the identity of the cardholder is legal, that is, the process of applying for the exemption identification to the verification device after each transaction selection can be regarded as checking after each transaction selection.
- the device applies for authorization, which enhances the security of the transaction.
- the secret authentication request information may further include an identifier of the verification device, where the subsequent issuer host verifies the identity of the verification device according to the identifier of the verification device, and searches for the confidential identifier.
- the verification device exemption verification request information may also include other information related to the transaction, which is not limited herein.
- the issuer host may further determine other information or data related to the transaction, and send the information or data to the verification device, for example, the number of transactions, etc., which is not used herein. limit.
- the issuing bank host may send the privilege limit to the verification device, and the subsequent verification device generates the esoteric response information, which is implemented by the present invention.
- the example is not limited here.
- the issuer host may further generate a first key pair, the first key.
- the pair includes a first encryption key and a first decryption key; correspondingly, in S204, the issuer host sends the first encryption key to the verification device, the first encryption key being used for the verification device Encrypt or sign the exemption ID.
- the issuer host may generate a first key pair for subsequent encryption or signature of the secret-exempt identifier, and the first key pair may be
- the issuing bank host generates, according to the verification device confidential authentication request information sent by the payment device, when the first key pair can be asymmetric, that is, the first key pair includes the first encryption key and the first A decryption key, the issuer host sends the first encryption key to the verification device.
- first key pair may also be symmetric, that is, the first encryption key and the first decryption key are identical, and the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the first key pair is only for explaining a key pair that needs to be used for encrypting the secret-exempt identifier, that is, a method used to determine that the secret-exempt identifier is valid, and the present invention is not The embodiment imposes any limitations.
- the card issuer host and the check device may determine that the secret-free identifier is valid by using other methods, which is not limited herein.
- steps S201 through S204 described above may be performed during the pre-preparation process, i.e., prior to the start of the transaction, such that in each subsequent transaction, the steps of performing these pre-preparations are not required.
- the payment device generates secret-free request information, where the confidential-free request information is used to request the secret-free identifier from the verification device, where the payment device, the verification device, and the card are associated with each other.
- the user when the user needs a transaction, the user selects a card that needs to be traded at the payment device, and the card may be one or more of the cards that have been associated with the verification device and have registered at the issuer host. Since the payment device has been associated with the verification device, after the payment device detects the verification device, in order to further confirm the accuracy of the transaction, for example, there may be some users who do not want to conduct the transaction. Just want to check the card bound to the payment device, the payment device will mistakenly think that the user needs to trade to generate the confidential request information. Therefore, the payment device will automatically or manually after the user confirms that the transaction is required. This exemption request information is generated, thereby avoiding this situation.
- the exemption request information may include a random number of the payment device and an identifier of the card, where the identifier of the card is used by the verification device to find the exemption associated with the card. Relevant information and parameters such as secret identification.
- the payment device may encrypt the exemption request information by using a second encryption key in the second key pair, correspondingly
- the payment device may send the confidentiality request information encrypted by using the second encryption key in the second key pair, and the second key pair is negotiated by the payment device and the verification device.
- the second key pair includes the second encryption key and the second decryption key.
- the payment device may encrypt the confidential request information by using the second encryption key in the second key pair, and The encrypted confidential request information is sent to the verification device.
- the verification device receives the encrypted confidential request information, and uses the second decryption key to verify the validity of the confidential request information.
- the verification device can also encrypt the confidentiality response information by using the second encryption key, and the payment device can also decrypt the confidentiality response information by using the second decryption key, thereby further enhancing the security of the transaction and avoiding When the payment device is lost, it is stolen by someone else due to a small amount of confidential transaction.
- the confidentiality request information is encrypted by using the second encryption key only
- a method for enhancing security and completing mutual authentication that is, a method for further mutual authentication between the payment device and the verification device, the method may also be another mutual authentication method, the second key pair It is also possible to have any other key pair that can complete the authentication without any restrictions on the embodiments of the present invention.
- the payment device may encrypt the confidential request information by using the second encryption key.
- the second decryption key may also be used to decrypt the secret-free response information of the verification device in response to the confidential request information.
- the payment device may use the second encryption key to sign the confidential request information and verify that the verification device responds to the confidential request information with the second decryption key.
- the signature of the secret-free response message is further processed by a key means to complete authentication between the payment device and the verification device.
- the verification device may also use other authentication methods to verify whether the identity of the holder of the payment device is legal.
- the user may set a time when the verification device and the payment device are bound.
- the first password when the subsequent payment device requests the authentication device from the authentication device, the verification device may further require the user to input the first password, and verify the identity of the payment device holder by using the first password.
- the verification device is a wearable device, for example, when it is a smart wristband, the verification device may perform the first password, wearing state detection, pulse detection, and the like, and the biometric identification technology protects the confidentiality identifier, that is, The authentication mode of the user is required to be verified by the user.
- the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the verification device decrypts the confidentiality request information by using the second decryption key, and encrypts or signs the secret identifier by using the first encryption key.
- the verification device uses the second decryption key to verify the validity of the confidential request information, thereby increasing the verification device.
- the secret encryption identifier may be encrypted or signed with the first encryption key in the first key pair, when the first When the key pair is symmetric, that is, the first encryption key and the first decryption key are identical, the secret encryption identifier may be encrypted by using the first encryption key in the first key pair, when the first When the key pair is asymmetric, that is, the first encryption key is different from the first decryption key, the first encryption key may be signed by the first encryption key, and the first key pair may be
- the issuing bank host generates, according to the confidentiality request information of the verification device sent by the payment device, the verification device receives the first secret key pair sent by the issuing bank host, and correspondingly, the issuing bank
- the information in addition to the secret-encryption identifier, the information may be encrypted or signed by using the first encryption key, and other information, for example, the confidentiality limit, the random The number, the information of the card, and the like can be encrypted or signed by using the first encryption key, which is not limited herein.
- first key pair and the first encryption key are only used to describe the encryption of the confidential identifier.
- the encryption key may be encrypted by using other encryption methods.
- the first key pair and the first encryption key should not impose any limitation on the embodiments of the present invention.
- the secret-free response information when the confidentiality request information may include a random number of the payment device, the secret-free response information shall also include a random number of the payment device, and the random number may be ATC.
- the secret-free response information may further include an identifier of the verification device and the secret-free The quota, the identifier of the verification device is used by the issuer host to determine the identity of the verification device and to find the secret identifier. It should be understood that the information of the confidentiality response may also include other information or data related to the current transaction, which is not limited herein.
- the payment device may confirm the exemption by verifying the identifier of the verification device.
- the secret response information is valid, and the CVM list of the card is modified according to the identity of the verification device and the secret-free quota.
- the ARQC when the confidentiality response information includes a random number of the payment device, the ARQC should also include a random number of the payment device, and the ARQC may further include the confidentiality limit.
- the information of the verification device and the like are not limited herein.
- the authorization request ciphertext may include the unpredictable number of the transaction, the issuer defined data (IDD), and the card according to the terminal transaction attribute provided by the PoS machine for card risk management.
- the obtained verification result the confidentiality limit, the identification of the verification device, and the like.
- the payment device performs CDCVM verification in advance, and then the authorization request ciphertext returned to the PoS machine during the interaction with the PoS machine may further include the verification result of the CDCVM, for example, for example. , can be CDCVM has been executed, and the verification passed.
- the authorization request ciphertext may also include other information or data related to the transaction, for example, may include risk management parameters set by the card, the number of transactions, and the like.
- the authorization request ciphertext may further include other information or data related to the current transaction, which is not limited herein.
- the authorization request ciphertext should also include a random number of the payment device.
- FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of a structure of an authorization request message in an embodiment of the present invention.
- the authorization request message includes the authorization request ciphertext and other transaction information, and the authorization request ciphertext
- the secret-exempt identifier is signed by using the first encryption key.
- the authorization request message may also include other information or data related to the current transaction, which is not limited herein.
- the issuer host may determine the exemption by using the first decryption key in the first key pair. Whether the secret identifier is valid to verify the transaction.
- the issuing bank host decrypts the authorization request ciphertext, and when the corresponding field in the ciphertext is checked, the data related to the transaction, for example, may be IDD, proves that the authorization request ciphertext includes the secret cryptographic identifier, and then And obtaining, according to the identifier of the verification device and the association relationship between the secret-free identifier and the verification device, the secret-privilege information such as the secret-free quota corresponding to the first decryption key and the secret-free identifier, and using the first Decrypting the key to verify whether the exemption identifier is valid, for example, checking whether the exemption identifier has been tampered with, checking whether the exemption quota has changed, etc., when determining that the exemption identifier is valid, and when the transaction amount is less than or equal to the When the secret limit is exceeded, it is determined that the transaction is valid and no cryptography is required.
- the secret-privilege information such as the secret-free quota corresponding to the first decrypt
- the issuing bank host detects that the corresponding field in the ciphertext does not include the data related to the transaction, it proves that the confidentiality identifier is not included in the authorization request ciphertext, and then the cryptographic operation is required. Or the quarantine identifier is detected, and the privilege limit corresponding to the first decryption key and the privileged identifier is found according to the identifier of the calibrating device and the association relationship between the cryptographic identifier and the cryptographic identifier.
- the confidentiality limit may be not only in the pre-preparation process, for example, after the issuing bank host receives the verification device confidential authentication request information, the issuing bank host generates the self-generated And the saved may be carried in the authorization request ciphertext by the PoS machine to be sent to the issuing bank host, or may be obtained by other methods, and the embodiment of the present invention is not limited herein.
- the identifier of the verification device may be saved not only by the verification device but also by the issuer host when the card is bound to the card issuer host, or may be carried in the message by the PoS machine.
- the issuing bank is hosted.
- the embodiments of the present invention are not limited herein.
- the size of the sequence numbers of the above processes does not mean the order of execution, and the order of execution of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not be in accordance with the present invention.
- the implementation of the embodiments imposes any limitations.
- the transaction method of the embodiment of the present invention increases the security of the HCE transaction by introducing a verification device for verification, and stores the secret-free identifier and the secret-free quota by using the verification device registered at the issuing bank host, and
- the second factor of the payment device identity verification is mutually verified by the payment device and the additional verification device to implement two-factor verification, and the encryption of the first key pair and the second key pair is added, and the verification is performed. Verify the validity of the device's exemption authority, so that even if the payment device is stolen or the card information is leaked, since the confidential transaction needs to verify the verification of the device, it will not be stolen.
- the PoS machine and the issuing bank host are implemented by verifying the secret-free identification and the payment device receiving the verification device response, modifying the CVM list of the card.
- the secret-free so as to achieve a small amount of confidential payment, without the need for confidentiality operations, to avoid the risk of passwords being peeped when losing confidentiality, higher security, better user experience.
- the transaction method of the embodiment of the present invention does not need to modify the PoS machine, and the technical difficulty and cost are low, and the implementation is convenient.
- FIG. 8 is a schematic block diagram of a payment device in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention. It should be understood that the payment device embodiment and the method embodiment correspond to each other, and a similar description can refer to the method embodiment, and the payment device 300 shown in FIG. 8 corresponds to the payment device in FIG. 5 and FIG.
- the payment device 300 includes:
- the sending unit 310 is configured to send the confidential request information to the verification device, where the confidentiality request information is used by the payment device to request the security device to obtain a secret-free identifier, where the secret-free identifier is used to indicate that the card of the transaction has a secret-free capability.
- the secret identifier is associated with the verification device and corresponds to the card, wherein the payment device, the verification device, and the card are associated with each other;
- the receiving unit 320 is configured to receive the secret-free response information sent by the verification device in response to the secret-free request information, where the confidential-free response information includes the secret-free identifier;
- the processing unit 330 is configured to modify the cardholder verification method CVM list of the card according to the confidentiality response information, so that the point-of-sale device PoS machine knows that the transaction is a secret-free transaction;
- the processing unit 330 is further configured to generate an authorization request ciphertext ARQC according to the secret-free response information, where the sending unit 310 is further configured to send the ARQC to the PoS machine, where the ARQC includes the secret-free identifier, and the ARQC is used for the PoS
- the machine generates an authorization request message, and sends the authorization request message to the server of the transaction, and the authorization request message includes the ARQC.
- the payment device of the embodiment of the present invention implements two-factor verification by performing mutual authentication with an additional verification device.
- the verification verification device is used to verify the validity of the confidentiality authority, and the card is modified by verifying that the confidentiality identification and the payment device receive the verification device response.
- the CVM list is used to realize the confidentiality of the PoS machine and the server, thereby realizing a small amount of confidential payment, no need to perform the confidential operation, avoiding the risk of the password being peeped during the transmission, and the security is higher, the user experience better.
- the payment device 300 may further include a storage unit 340, where the storage unit 340 may be used to store the code executed by the sending unit 310, the receiving unit 320, and the processing unit 330.
- the processing unit 330 is specifically configured to: set, in the CVM list of the card, a usage condition of the online personal identification code PIN to be greater than an exemption quota.
- the processing unit 330 is specifically configured to: add a device cardholder verification method CDCVM in the CVM type in the card CVM list, and record the result of the CDCVM as verified.
- the sending unit 310 is further configured to: before the sending unit 310 sends the confidential request information to the verification device, send the confidential authentication request information to the server, the secret authentication request The information is used to request the cryptographic identifier for the verification device, so that the server generates the quarantine identifier according to the privilege authentication request information, determines an privilege limit corresponding to the privileged identifier, and sends the privilege limit to the calibration device. Send the exemption ID.
- the secret identifier received by the receiving unit 320 is encrypted or signed by the verification device by using a first encryption key in the first key pair, where the first encryption is performed.
- the key is sent by the server to the verification device.
- the sending unit 310 is specifically configured to send, to the verification device, the secret-exempt request information encrypted by the second encryption key in the second key pair, where the second key Generated by the payment device and the verification device, the second key pair includes the second encryption key and the second decryption key.
- the payment device 300 may correspond to the payment device in the embodiment of the present invention, and the above and other operations and/or functions of the respective units in the payment device 300 respectively implement the operations in FIGS. 5 and 6
- the corresponding processes of the various methods are not described here for brevity.
- the transmitting unit 310 may be implemented by a transmitter
- the receiving unit 320 may be implemented by a receiver
- the processing unit 330 may be implemented by a processor, which may be implemented by a memory.
- the payment device 400 can include a transmitter 410, a receiver 420, a processor 430, and a memory 440.
- Transmitter 410, receiver 420, processor 430 and memory 440 of Figure 9 communicate with one another via internal connection paths to communicate control and/or data signals.
- the memory 440 is configured to store program code
- the transmitter 410, the receiver 420, and the processor 430 are configured to invoke the program code to implement the methods in the above embodiments of the present invention.
- the payment device 400 illustrated in FIG. 9 may correspond to a payment device in an embodiment of the present invention, and that the above and other operations and/or functions of the various components in the payment device 400 respectively implement the operations of FIGS. 5 and 6
- the corresponding processes of the various methods are not described here for brevity.
- the processor 430 may be a central processing unit (CPU), a network processor (NP), or a combination of a CPU and an NP.
- the processor may further include a hardware chip.
- the hardware chip may be an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a programmable logic device (PLD), or a combination thereof.
- FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram of a verification device 500 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention. It should be understood that the verification device embodiment Corresponding to the method embodiment, a similar description can refer to the method embodiment, and the verification device 500 shown in FIG. 10 corresponds to the verification device in FIG. 5 and FIG.
- the verification device 500 includes:
- the receiving unit 510 is configured to receive the confidentiality request information sent by the payment device, where the confidentiality request information is used by the payment device to request the authentication device from a secret identifier, where the confidentiality identifier is used to indicate that the card of the transaction has a secret-free capability.
- the secret identifier is associated with the verification device and corresponds to the card, wherein the payment device, the verification device, and the card are associated with each other;
- the processing unit 520 is configured to parse the exemption request information
- the sending unit 530 is configured to send, to the payment device, the secret-free response information in response to the confidential request information, where the confidential-free response information includes the secret-free identification information, where the confidential-free response information is used by the payment device to modify the hold of the card Card person verification method CVM list.
- the verification device of the embodiment of the present invention stores the information of the card in the payment device separately by storing the secret-free identifier, and applies authorization to the verification device after each transaction selection, by performing mutual interaction with the payment device. Verification to achieve two-factor authentication, so that even if the payment device is lost or the information of the card is stolen, since the small-scale confidential transaction needs to verify the verification device, it will not be stolen and the security is higher. User experience is better.
- the verification device 500 may further include a storage unit 540, where the storage unit 540 may be used to store the code executed by the receiving unit 510, the processing unit 520, and the sending unit 530.
- the receiving unit 510 is further configured to: before the sending unit 530 sends the confidentiality response information to the payment device, receive the secret identifier sent by the server of the transaction, where the The secret identifier is generated by the server according to the secret authentication request information sent by the payment device.
- the receiving unit 510 is further configured to: before the sending unit 530 sends the confidentiality response information to the payment device, receive the first encryption key in the first key pair sent by the server.
- the first key pair includes the first encryption key and the first decryption key;
- the processing unit 520 is further configured to: encrypt or sign the secret identifier by using the first encryption key.
- the processing unit 520 is specifically configured to: decrypt the secret request information by using a second decryption key in the second key pair, where the second key pair is used by the verification device Generated in consultation with the payment device, the second key pair includes the second encryption key and the second decryption key.
- verification device 500 may correspond to the verification device in the embodiment of the present invention, and the above and other operations and/or functions of the respective units in the verification device 500 respectively implement FIG. 5 and FIG. The corresponding processes of each method in 6 are not repeated here for brevity.
- the receiving unit 510 may be implemented by a receiver
- the processing unit 520 may be implemented by a processor
- the transmitting unit 530 may be implemented by a transmitter
- the storage unit 540 may be implemented by a memory.
- the verification device 600 can include a receiver 610, a processor 620, a transmitter 630, and a memory 640.
- Receiver 610, processor 620, transmitter 630 and memory 640 in Figure 11 communicate with one another via internal connection paths to communicate control and/or data signals.
- the memory 640 is configured to store program code
- the receiver 610, the processor 620, and the transmitter 630 are configured to invoke the program code to implement the methods in the foregoing embodiments of the present invention.
- verification device 600 illustrated in FIG. 11 may correspond to the verification device in the embodiment of the present invention, and the above and other operations and/or functions of the various components in the verification device 600 respectively implement FIG. 5 and FIG. The corresponding processes of each method in 6 are not repeated here for brevity.
- the processor 620 may be a central processing unit (CPU).
- Central processing unit CPU
- NP Network processor
- the processor may further include a hardware chip.
- the hardware chip may be an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a programmable logic device (PLD), or a combination thereof.
- the structure of the payment device or the verification device of the embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail below by taking the payment device or the verification device as a smart phone as an example. It should be understood that the smart phone is only used for convenience of description, and should not be used. The scope of protection of the embodiments of the present invention is limited.
- FIG. 12 is a schematic block diagram showing a part of the structure of a smartphone 700 related to a payment device or a verification device of an embodiment of the present invention.
- the smart phone 700 includes: a radio frequency (RF) circuit 710, a memory 720, an input unit 730, a display unit 740, an audio circuit 750, a processor 760, a power source 770, a sensor 780, and the like.
- RF radio frequency
- FIG. 7 does not constitute a limitation to the smartphone, and may include more or less components than those illustrated, or combine some components, or different component arrangements. .
- the smart phone may further include a camera, a wireless fidelity (WiFi) module, and the like, and details are not described herein.
- WiFi wireless fidelity
- the RF circuit 710 can be used for transmitting and receiving information or receiving and transmitting signals during a call, and is processed by the processor 720; for example, generally, the RF circuit 710 includes but is not limited to an antenna, at least one amplifier, and a transceiver. , coupler, low noise amplifier (LNA), duplexer, etc.
- the RF circuit may include, but is not limited to, NFC based on radio frequency identification (RFID) technology for contactless short range communication.
- RFID radio frequency identification
- RF circuitry 710 can also communicate with the network and other devices via wireless communication.
- the wireless communication can use any communication standard or protocol, including but not limited to global system of mobile communication (GSM), general packet radio service (GPRS), code division multiple access (code) Division multiple access (CDMA), wideband code division multiple access (WCDMA), long term evolution (LTE), e-mail, short messaging service (SMS), and the like.
- GSM global system of mobile communication
- GPRS general packet radio service
- code code division multiple access
- WCDMA wideband code division multiple access
- LTE long term evolution
- SMS short messaging service
- the memory 720 can be used to store software programs and modules, and the processor 760 executes various functional applications and data processing of the smartphone 700 by running software programs and modules stored in the memory 720.
- the memory 720 can mainly include a storage program area and a storage data area, wherein the storage program area can store an operating system, an application required for at least one function (such as a sound playing function, an image playing function, etc.), and the like; the storage data area can be stored. Data created according to the use of the smartphone 700 (such as audio data, phone book, etc.) and the like.
- memory 720 can include high speed random access memory, and can also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one magnetic disk storage device, flash memory device, or other volatile solid state storage device.
- the input unit 730 can be configured to receive input numeric or character information and to generate key signal inputs related to user settings and function control of the smartphone 700.
- the input unit 730 can include a touch panel as well as other input devices.
- a touch panel also referred to as a touch screen, can collect touch operations on or near the user (such as the user using a finger, a stylus, or the like, any suitable object or accessory on or near the touch panel).
- the corresponding connecting device is driven according to a preset program.
- the touch panel may include two parts: a touch detection device and a touch controller.
- the touch detection device detects the touch orientation of the user, and detects a signal brought by the touch operation, and transmits the signal to the touch controller; the touch controller receives the touch information from the touch detection device, converts the touch information into contact coordinates, and sends the touch information.
- touch panels can be implemented in various types such as resistive, capacitive, infrared, and surface acoustic waves.
- the input unit may also include other input devices. Specifically, other input devices may include, but are not limited to, one or more of a physical keyboard, function keys (such as volume control buttons, switch buttons, etc.), trackballs, mice, joysticks, and the like.
- the display unit 740 can be used to display information input by the user or information provided to the user as well as various menus of the device.
- the display unit 740 can include a display panel.
- the display panel can be configured in the form of a liquid crystal display (LCD), an organic light-emitting diode (OLED), or the like.
- the touch panel may cover the display panel, and when the touch panel detects a touch operation on or near the touch panel, the touch panel transmits to the processor to determine the type of the touch event, and then the processor 760 displays the panel according to the type of the touch event. Provide corresponding visual output on it.
- the touch panel and the display panel are two independent components to implement the input and output functions of the smart phone 700, in some embodiments, the touch panel and the display panel may be integrated to realize the smart function. The input and output functions of the mobile phone 700.
- An audio circuit 750, a speaker, and a microphone can provide an audio interface between the user and the smartphone 700.
- the audio circuit 750 can transmit the converted electrical signal of the received audio data to the speaker, and convert it into a sound signal output by the speaker; on the other hand, the microphone converts the collected sound signal into an electrical signal, which is received by the audio circuit 750 and then converted.
- the audio data is output to memory 720 for further processing.
- the processor 760 is a control center for the smartphone 700 that connects various portions of the entire smartphone 700 using various interfaces and lines, by running or executing software programs and/or modules stored in the memory, and recalling stored in the memory 720.
- the processor 760 may include one or more processing units; preferably, the processor 760 may integrate an application processor and a modem processor, where the application processor mainly processes an operating system, a user interface, an application, and the like.
- the modem processor primarily handles wireless communications. It will be appreciated that the above described modem processor may also not be integrated into the processor 760.
- a power source 770 such as a battery, is used to power the various components.
- the power source can pass through the power rail system and the processor logic vector to manage functions such as charging, discharging, and power consumption through the power management system.
- the handset 700 can also include at least one type of sensor 780, such as a light sensor, motion sensor, and other sensors.
- the light sensor may include an ambient light sensor and a proximity sensor, wherein the ambient light sensor may adjust the brightness of the display unit 740 according to the brightness of the ambient light.
- the accelerometer sensor can detect the magnitude of acceleration in all directions (usually three axes). When it is stationary, it can detect the magnitude and direction of gravity. It can be used to identify the gesture of the mobile phone (such as horizontal and vertical screen switching, related Game, magnetometer attitude calibration), vibration recognition related functions (such as pedometer, tapping), etc.
- the mobile phone 700 can also be configured with gyroscopes, barometers, hygrometers, thermometers, infrared sensors and other sensors, here Let me repeat.
- the structure of the smart phone 700 shown in FIG. 12 does not constitute a limitation on the smart phone, nor should it constitute any limitation on the structure of the payment device or the verification device implemented by the present invention, for example, with the embodiment of the present invention.
- the related testing device may not include the components such as the audio circuit 750, the sensor 780, and the like as shown in FIG. 12, which is not limited herein.
- FIG. 13 is a schematic block diagram of a server 800 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention. It should be understood that the server embodiment and the method embodiment correspond to each other, and a similar description can refer to the method embodiment.
- the server 800 shown in FIG. 13 corresponds to the issuer host in FIG. 5 and FIG. Server 800 includes:
- the receiving unit 810 is configured to receive an authorization request message sent by the point-of-sale device PoS, where the authorization request message includes an authorization request ciphertext ARQC, where the ARQC includes an exemption key associated with the verification device and corresponding to the card that needs to be traded.
- An identifier the secret identifier is used to enable the server to know that the card has a secret-free capability, and the ARQC is The payment device sends to the PoS machine, wherein the payment device, the verification device, and the card are associated with each other;
- the processing unit 820 is configured to verify, according to the ARQC, whether the transaction is valid.
- the server 800 may further include a storage unit 840, where the storage unit 840 may be used to store the code executed by the receiving unit 810 and the processing unit 820.
- the receiving unit 810 is further configured to: before receiving the authorization request message sent by the PoS, receive the confidential authentication request information sent by the payment device, where the confidential authentication request information is used.
- the processing unit 820 is further configured to: generate the secret-free identifier according to the secret-free authentication request information, and determine the secret-free quota corresponding to the secret-free identifier; the server 800 can also The sending unit 830 is configured to send the exemption identifier to the verification device.
- the processing unit 820 is specifically configured to: decrypt the ARQC, determine that the exemption identifier is valid, and determine that the transaction is exempt from confidentiality when the transaction amount is less than or equal to the exemption quota; decrypt the ARQC, When it is determined that the exemption identifier is invalid, the transaction is rejected, or when it is determined that the transaction amount is greater than the exemption limit, the transaction is determined to be confidential.
- the processing unit 820 is further configured to: before the receiving unit 810 receives the authorization request message sent by the PoS, generate a first key pair, where the first key pair includes the first An encryption key and a first decryption key; the sending unit 830 is further configured to send the first encryption key to the verification device, where the first encryption key is used by the verification device to encrypt or sign the secret identifier; The processing unit 820 is specifically configured to: determine whether the exemption identifier is valid by using the first decryption key in the first key pair.
- the server of the embodiment of the present invention implements two-factor verification by verifying the secret-free identifier stored in the verification device and the information of the card in the payment device, so that even if the payment device is lost or the card information is stolen Since the small-scale confidential transaction also needs to verify the verification device, the transaction will not be authorized, the security is higher, and the user experience is better.
- server device 800 may correspond to the issuer host in the embodiment of the present invention, and the above and other operations and/or functions of the respective units in the server 800 respectively implement the operations in FIGS. 5 and 6.
- the corresponding processes of the various methods are not described here for brevity.
- the receiving unit 810 may be implemented by a receiver
- the processing unit 820 may be implemented by a processor
- the transmitting unit 830 may be implemented by a transmitter, which may be implemented by a memory.
- the server 900 may include a receiver 910, a processor 920, a transmitter 930, and a memory 940, and the receiver 910, the processor 920, the transmitter 930, and the memory 940 in FIG.
- the connection paths communicate with one another to communicate control and/or data signals.
- the memory 940 is for storing program code
- the receiver 910, the processor 920, and the transmitter 930 are used to call the program code to implement the methods in the above embodiments of the present invention.
- server 900 illustrated in FIG. 14 may correspond to the issuer host in the embodiment of the present invention, and that the above and other operations and/or functions of the various components in the server 900 implement the respective aspects of FIGS. 5 and 6, respectively. The corresponding process of the method is not repeated here for the sake of brevity.
- the processor 920 may be a central processing unit (CPU), a network processor (NP), or a combination of a CPU and an NP.
- the processor may further include a hardware chip.
- the hardware chip may be an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a programmable logic device (PLD), or a combination thereof.
- the embodiment of the invention further provides a computer readable medium for storing computer program code, the computer
- the program includes instructions for executing the transaction method of the embodiment of the present invention in Figs. 5 and 6 described above.
- the readable medium may be a read-only memory (ROM) or a random access memory (RAM), which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
- the disclosed systems, devices, and methods may be implemented in other manners.
- the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
- the division of the unit is only a logical function division.
- there may be another division manner for example, multiple units or components may be combined or Can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed.
- the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, device or unit, and may be in an electrical, mechanical or other form.
- the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.
- each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
- the functions may be stored in a computer readable storage medium if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a standalone product.
- the technical solution of the present application which is essential or contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, may be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium, including
- the instructions are used to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present application.
- the foregoing storage medium includes various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a ROM, a RAM, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.
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Abstract
本申请提供了一种交易方法、支付设备、校验设备和服务器。该方法包括:支付设备向校验设备发送免密请求信息,该免密请求信息用于该支付设备向该校验设备请求免密标识,该免密标识用于指示交易的卡片具有免密能力,该免密标识与该校验设备关联并且与该卡片对应;该支付设备接收该校验设备发送的响应于该免密请求信息的免密应答信息,该免密应答信息包括该免密标识;该支付设备根据该免密应答信息,修改该卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表,生成授权请求密文ARQC,并将该ARQC发送给该PoS机。本申请提供的交易方法,通过支付设备和校验设备实现双因子验证,能在不改动PoS机的情况下使其跳过在PoS处的输密过程,增强交易的安全性,提高用户的体验。
Description
本申请涉及电子设备领域,并且更具体的,涉及一种非接触免密支付交易的方法、支付设备、校验设备和服务器。
中国人民银行(the people's bank of china,PBOC)发布的非接触式支付标准包括非接触式标准借/贷记PBOC和非接触式快速标准借/贷记(quick PBOC,qPBOC),其中,qPBOC具有交互时间短(小于500ms)的优点,用户体验好,因此,目前大部分非接触式交易为qPBOC流程。对于qPBOC,持卡人验证方法(cardholder verification method,CVM)仅支持联机个人识别码(personal identification number,PIN)与签名两种持卡人验证方法。对于存在收款端设备,并且交易需要由收款端设备发送到发卡行主机处进行授权的线下联机交易,多数使用联机PIN。线下交易是指支付端设备(例如,手机)和收款端设备(例如,销售点设备,point of sale,PoS)之间的信息交互不需要联网,信息是在两个设备之间进行交互的。这种情况下支付端设备不需要具备联网能力,交易由收款端设备处理。而对于线上交易,支付端设备是直接与发卡行主机进行交互的,支付端设备需要具备联网能力,不需要收款端设备的存在。联机交易是针对交易的类型,即交易需要由收款端设备发送到发卡行主机处进行授权,收款端设备与发卡行主机之间是具备通信连接的。
闪付是以PBOC2.0/3.0标准为基础定义的一个品牌,目前有基于安全模块(secure element,SE)和基于主机卡模拟(host card emulation,HCE)的两种移动支付模式,银联云闪付是基于HCE在移动设备中实现卡片的模拟,兼容PBOC技术逻辑。
目前,针对于一些小额业务占比比较大、结账速度要求高的行业和商户,银联推出了闪付联机小额快速业务(小额三免业务),商户可以申请加入该业务成为白名单商户。对于持卡人使用的集成电路(integrated circuit,IC)卡或者承载IC卡信息的移动设备,在该白名单商户处以闪付方式发起的低于标准限额的联机交易,默认支持小额快速业务,无需跳输密界面与签名验证,即无需进行PBOC流程中的持卡人验证,实现持卡人挥卡即付的目的。对于白名单商户处发起的符合条件的(闪付、低于限额)交易,收单机构对交易添加免验密码标识标记交易属于小额快速业务,实现发卡行处对交易免密授权。
由于移动设备的引入,目前有了基于设备的持卡人验证方法(consumer device CVM,CD-CVM)或设备持卡人验证,在设备端通过指纹或者数字密码的方式完成对持卡人身份的校验。支付宝推出了一种线上交易的可穿戴设备免密的功能,利用可穿戴设备随身佩戴的特性,作为持卡人身份的代表,增加了一重验证因素。
现有的支付宝可穿戴智能设备免密的技术,针对的是无PoS机的线上交易模式,而对于存在PoS机的线下交易模式,并不存在可穿戴智能设备的免密的技术。目前,由于云闪付交易是强制联机的,即交易需要由PoS机发送到发卡行主机进行验证,对于支付设备和PoS机之间的交互不需要联网,并且交易由PoS机进行处理的线下HCE云闪付的免密交易只有一种途径:在卡片支持小额快速业务时,在支持小额快速业务的白名单商
户处进行免密交易时,HCE应用可以在不经过身份校验的情况下进行小额免密交易。而当PoS机和/或HCE支付应用不支持小额免密,即线下的HCE云闪付非免密交易时,HCE刷卡(包括***)交易时始终需要输入密码。
发明内容
本申请提供了一种交易方法、支付设备、检验设备和服务器。可以增强HCE云闪付交易时的安全性,提高用户体验。
第一方面,提供了一种交易方法,该方法包括:支付设备向校验设备发送免密请求信息,该免密请求信息用于该支付设备向该校验设备请求免密标识,该免密标识用于指示交易的卡片具有免密能力,该免密标识与该校验设备关联并且与该卡片对应,其中,该支付设备、该校验设备以及该卡片已相互关联;该支付设备接收该校验设备发送的响应于该免密请求信息的免密应答信息,该免密应答信息包括该免密标识;该支付设备根据该免密应答信息,修改该卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表,以便于使销售点设备PoS机获知该交易为免密交易;该支付设备根据该免密应答信息生成授权请求密文ARQC,并将该ARQC发送给该PoS机,该ARQC包括该免密标识,该ARQC用于该PoS机生成授权请求报文,并向该交易的服务器发送该授权请求报文,该授权请求报文包括该ARQC。
第一方面提供的交易方法,通过支付设备与额外的校验设备进行互相验证来实现双因子验证,即使在支付设备丢失或者卡片的信息窃取的情况下,由于小额免密交易还需验证校验设备,因此也不会被进行盗刷,可以提高交易的安全性。对于不支持小额免密的PoS机和/或HCE支付应用时,利用验证校验设备免密权限的有效性,通过验证免密标识实现服务器处的免密,通过支付设备收到校验设备响应后,修改卡片的CVM列表,来实现PoS机处的免密,不再PoS机处进行持卡人验证过程,可以避免输密时密码被窥视的风险,安全性更高,用户体验更好。
结合第一方面,在第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式中,该支付设备修改该卡片的CVM列表,包括:在该卡片的CVM列表中,将联机个人识别码PIN的使用条件设置为交易金额大于免密限额,该免密限额与该免密标识对应。
结合第一方面或第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式,在第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式中,该支付设备该修改该卡片CVM列表,包括:在该卡片的CVM列表中的CVM类型中添加设备持卡人验证方法CDCVM,记录该CDCVM的结果为已验证通过。
结合第一方面,第一方面第一种至第二种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式,在第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式中,在该支付设备向校验设备发送免密请求信息之前,该方法还包括:该支付设备向该服务器发送免密验证请求信息,该免密验证请求信息用于为该校验设备请求该免密标识,以便于该服务器根据该免密验证请求生成该免密标识,确定与该免密标识对应的免密限额,并向该校验设备发送该免密标识。
结合第一方面,第一方面第一种至第三种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式,在第一方面的第四种可能的实现方式中,该免密标识由该校验设备利用第一密钥对中的第一加密密钥进行加密或者签名,其中,该第一加密密钥由该服务器发送给该校验设备。
结合第一方面,第一方面第一种至第四种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方
式,在第一方面的第五种可能的实现方式中,该支付设备向校验设备发送免密请求信息,包括:该支付设备向该校验设备发送经第二密钥对中的第二加密密钥加密的该免密请求信息,其中,该第二密钥对由该支付设备和该校验设备协商生成,该第二密钥对包括该第二加密密钥和第二解密密钥。
结合第一方面,第一方面第一种至第五种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式,在第一方面的第六种可能的实现方式中,该支付设备为手机,该校验设备为可穿戴设备;或该支付设备为可穿戴设备,该校验设备为手机。
第二方面,提供了一种交易方法,该方法包括:校验设备接收支付设备发送的免密请求信息,该免密请求信息用于该支付设备向该校验设备请求免密标识,该免密标识用于指示交易的卡片具有免密能力,该免密标识与该校验设备关联并且与该卡片对应,其中,该支付设备、该校验设备以及该卡片已相互关联;该校验设备解析该免密请求信息,并向该支付设备发送响应于该免密请求信息的免密应答信息,该免密应答信息包括与该免密标识,该免密应答信息用于该支付设备修改该卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表。
第二方面提供的交易方法,通过在校验设备处存储该免密标识,与该支付设备内卡片的信息分开存储,每次交易选卡后都要向该校验设备申请授权,通过校验设备与支付设备进行互相验证来实现双因子验证,这样,即使在支付设备丢失或者卡片的信息窃取的情况下,由于小额免密交易还需验证校验设备,因此也不会被进行盗刷,安全性更高,用户体验更好。
结合第二方面,在第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式中,在该校验设备向该支付设备发送该免密应答信息前,该方法还包括:该校验设备接收该交易的服务器发送该免密标识,其中,该免密标识是该服务器根据该支付设备发送的免密验证请求信息生成的。
结合第二方面或第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式,在第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式中,在该校验设备向该支付设备发送该免密应答信息前,该方法还包括:该校验设备接收该服务器发送的第一密钥对中的第一加密密钥,该第一密钥对包括该第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥:该校验设备利用该第一加密密钥加密或者签名该免密标识。
结合第二方面,第二方面第一种至第二种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式,在第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式中,该校验设备解析该免密请求信息,包括:该校验设备利用第二密钥对中的第二解密密钥解密该免密请求信息,其中,该第二密钥对由该校验设备和该支付设备协商生成,该第二密钥对包括第二加密密钥和该第二解密密钥。
结合第二方面,第二方面第一种至第三种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式,在第二面的第四种可能的实现方式中,该校验设备为可穿戴设备,该支付设备为手机;或该校验设备为手机,该支付设备为可穿戴设备。
第三方面,提供了一种交易方法,该方法包括:服务器接收销售点设备PoS机发送的授权请求报文,该授权请求报文包括授权请求密文ARQC,该ARQC包括与校验设备关联并且与需要进行交易的卡片对应的免密标识,该免密标识用于使该使服务器获知该卡片具有免密能力,该ARQC由支付设备发送给该PoS机,其中,该支付设备、该校验设备以及该卡片已相互关联;该服务器根据该ARQC,验证该交易是否有效。
第三方面提供的交易方法,通过服务器验证存储在该校验设备中的该免密标识和该支付设备内卡片的信息来实现双因子验证,这样,即使在支付设备丢失或者卡片的信息
窃取的情况下,由于小额免密交易还需验证校验设备,因此也不会被对交易进行授权,安全性更高,用户体验更好。对于不支持小额免密的PoS机和/或HCE支付应用时,利用验证校验设备免密权限的有效性,通过验证免密标识来对免密交易进行授权,安全性更高,用户体验更好。
结合第三方面,在第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式中,在该服务器接收PoS机发送的授权请求报文前,该方法还包括:该服务器接收该支付设备发送的免密验证请求信息,该免密验证请求信息用于为该校验设备请求该免密标识;该服务器根据该免密验证请求信息,生成该免密标识,确定与该免密标识对应的该免密限额;该服务器向该校验设备发送该免密标识。
结合第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式,在第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式中,该服务器根据该ARQC,验证该交易是否有效,包括:该服务器解密该ARQC,确定该免密标识有效,并且交易金额小于或者等于该免密限额时,确定该交易免密;该服务器解密该ARQC,确定该免密标识无效时,拒绝该交易,或者当该服务器确定交易金额大于该免密限额时,确定该交易输密。
结合第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式,在第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式中,在该服务器接收PoS机发送的授权请求报文前,该方法还包括:该服务器生成第一密钥对,该第一密钥对包括第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥;该服务器向该校验设备发送该第一加密密钥,该第一加密密钥用于该校验设备加密或者签名该免密标识,其中,该服务器利用该第一密钥对中的第一解密密钥确定该免密标识是否有效。
结合第三方面,第三方面第一种至第三种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式,在第三方面的第四种可能的实现方式中,该支付设备为手机,该校验设备为可穿戴设备;或该支付设备为可穿戴设备,该校验设备为手机。
第四方面,提供了一种支付设备,用于执行上述第一方面或第一方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法。具体地,该支付设备包括用于执行上述第一方面或第一方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法的单元。
第五方面,提供了一种校验设备,用于执行上述第二方面或第二方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法。具体地,该校验设备包括用于执行上述第二方面或第二方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法的单元。
第六方面,提供了一种服务器,用于执行上述第三方面或第三方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法。具体地,该服务器包括用于执行上述第三方面或第三方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法的单元。
第七方面,提供了一种支付设备,包括处理器、存储器、接收器和发送器,该处理器、该存储器、该接收器和该发送器通过总线连接,该存储器用于存储指令,该接收器、该发送器和该处理器用于调用该存储器中存储的指令,执行上述第一方面或第一方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法。
第八方面,提供了一种校验设备,包括处理器、存储器、接收器和发送器,该处理器、该存储器、该接收器和该发送器通过总线连接,该存储器用于存储指令,该接收器、该发送器和该处理器用于调用该存储器中存储的指令,执行上述第二方面或第二方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法。
第九方面,提供了一种服务器,包括处理器、存储器、接收器和发送器,该处理器、
该存储器、该接收器和该发送器通过总线连接,该存储器用于存储指令,该接收器、该发送器和该处理器用于调用该存储器中存储的指令,执行上述第三方面或第三方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法。
第十方面,提供了一种计算机可读介质,用于存储计算机程序,该计算机程序包括用于执行第一方面或第一方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法的指令。
第十一方面,提供了一种计算机可读介质,用于存储计算机程序,该计算机程序包括用于执行第二方面或第二方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法的指令。
第十二方面,提供了一种计算机可读介质,用于存储计算机程序,该计算机程序包括用于执行第三方面或第三方面的任意可能的实现方式中的方法的指令。
图1是现有的基于SE和基于HCE的两种移动支付模式的示意图;
图2是现有的非接触支付qPBOC的示意性流程图;
图3是现有的qPBOC中联机授权请求报文的结构示意图;
图4是现有的移动设备卡小额免密交易的示意性流程图;
图5是本发明一个实施例的交易方法的示意性流程图;
图6是本发明另一个实施例的交易方法的示意性流程图;
图7是本发明一个实施例的授权请求报文结构的示意图;
图8是本发明一个实施例的支付设备的示意性框图;
图9是本发明另一实施例的支付设备的示意性框图;
图10是本发明一个实施例的校验设备的示意性框图;
图11是本发明另一实施例的校验设备的示意性框图;
图12是本发明一个实施例的智能手机的示意性框图;
图13是本发明一个实施例的服务器的示意性框图;
图14是本发明另一实施例的服务器的示意性框图;
下面将结合附图,对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行详细描述。
本发明实施例中涉及以下关键术语。
授权请求密文(authorization request cryptogram,ARQC):IC卡交易时判断交易需联机授权后生成的应用密文,由发卡行预置在卡内的密钥对授权金额、应用交易计数器等信息加密生成。对于qPBOC,该密文在获取处理选项指令的响应中返回给PoS机,PoS机随后用密文以及其他必须信息生成联机授权请求报文,发送给发卡行进行交易授权。
应用交易计数器(application transaction counter,ATC):卡片内用于指示交易次数(无论成功与否)的一个计数器。
CVM:用于验证持卡人身份的方法。
CD-CVM:CDCVM是基于移动设备发起的闪付交易时的一种特有的持卡人验证方式,目前通常(包括但不限于)为钱包应用的数字密码和指纹。若手机和PoS在CVM列表中同时支持CDCVM,则CDCVM的结果将作为持卡人验证结果(CDCVM在CVM列表中有最高优先级),无需再提供联机PIN或签名等。相对于数字密码,指纹在实际
使用时更方便,用户体验更好(两种方式都属于CDCVM)。
获取处理选项(get processing options,GPO):在PBOC/qPBOC应用初始化阶段PoS机向卡片发送的指令,同时会在该指令中附带交易信息、终端交易属性、卡片此前要求终端提供的参数等信息。
HCE:HCE模式下传统进场通信的实体SE被远程托管的云端(Cloud或SE on the Cloud)所取代,移动设备即使没有SE模块也可实现安全的进场通信应用,如支付、营销和门禁等。
SE:用来存储虚拟卡片的信息,并与操作***隔离,具有极强的安全性和防篡改能力。
PIN:用于识别个人身份的数字,即通常所说的密码。
近场通信(near field communication,NFC):NFC是一种短距离无线连接技术,基于射频识别技术,利用磁场感应实现电子设备在近距离间的通信,用户只需要通过触摸或者设备靠近,就可以实现直观、安全和非接触式的交换信息、内容和进行交易,如近场支付,NFC的工作在13.56MHz的频率上,通信的有效范围为0-20cm。
PoS机:是一种多功能终端,把它安装在***的特约商户和受理网点中与计算机联成网络,就能实现电子资金自动转帐,它具有支持消费、预授权、余额查询和转帐等功能,使用起来安全、快捷、可靠。
可信执行环境(trusted execution environment,TEE):可信执行环境是与普通执行环境(或者称之为富执行环境,rich execution environment,REE,REE泛指不具备特定安全功能的运行环境)共同存于智能终端中的运行环境,通过硬件的支撑,具有安全能力并且能够满足一定的安全需求,实现与普通执行环境相隔离的运行机制。
目前通用的两种移动支付模式主要是基于SE和基于HCE的两种移动支付模式,而银联云闪付是基于HCE在移动设备中实现卡片的模拟,并且兼容PBOC技术逻辑。图1是现有的基于SE和基于HCE的两种移动支付模式的示意图,由图1可知,基于HCE的移动支付技术没有SE,该技术可以在不需要安全载体的情况下,由NFC控制器将智能卡指令数据通知到应用处理器,并由操作***通知到制定的手机应用。相比于基于SE的卡模拟,通过主机卡模拟的方法,这样使得任何程序都可以模拟一个IC卡来与NFC读卡器直接通信,因此HCE方案相比于传统的基于SE的卡模拟方案,主要在于与交易相关的账户数据等只能保存REE或TEE中,因为缺乏安全的储存环境,基于HCE的闪付需要结合额外的风险管理机制。由于基于HCE的移动支付模式没有安全载体,因此,基于HCE的所有交易都要使用限制密钥并强制要求每笔交易联机进行,除了小额快速业务外,每笔交易还都会强制输密以确保安全。
图2是现有的非接触支付qPBOC的示意性流程图,如图2所示,在交易预处理和应用选择完成后,进入初始交易处理流程,在此过程中,PoS机在获得收银员输入的授权金额后,先进行一系列的检查,例如,检查货币单位是否符合规定、授权金额是否超过了PoS机的CVM限额等,经检查符合要求后,会要求用户出示卡片。PoS机会发送GPO指令到卡片,附带授权金额、ATC等交易信息以及PoS机交易属性等PoS机的参数,供卡片执行风险管理、判断交易类型(脱机/联机/拒绝)并生成相关密文等操作。
卡片将生成的ARQC在GPO响应中反馈给PoS机后,PoS机通过读数据(Read Record)指令获得卡片的响应信息,当卡片返回最后一条Read Record指令的响应时,会
在该指令中添加标识告知PoS机这是最后一条信息,PoS机接收到这条指令的响应后就会获知信息已读取完毕,即已经完成了GPO过程以及与卡片的信息交互,此时PoS机会执行下一步信息处理操作,并提示用户可以将卡片移开了,即用户可以将卡片离开PoS机的感应区。若该交易为联机交易,卡片则会用授权金额、ATC等参数生成ARQC密文,并在GPO的响应中将密文反馈给PoS机。PoS机在接收卡片GPO响应后,根据相关信息判断是否进行持卡人认证,若需要进行持卡人认证,则将结合前期获得的卡片CVM列表与终端自身支持的CVM列表,选择一个双方共同支持的最高优先级的CVM。
对于qPBOC,联机PIN将作为首选CVM。在此情况下,PoS机在卡片GPO响应并离开感应区后,提示持卡人在PoS机上输入联机PIN,并将该联机PIN与ARQC密文以及其他信息一起添加到联机授权请求报文中,交给发卡行主机进行验证。待发卡行主机验证并反馈交易授权结果后,PoS机将交易结果告知持卡人。图3是现有的qPBOC中联机授权请求报文的结构示意图,由图3可知,该授权请求报文包括ARQC、联机的PIN以及其他与交易相关的信息,其中,联机的PIN在PoS机上输入。
图4是现有的移动设备卡小额免密交易的示意性流程图,移动设备卡支付是指基于SE的移动支付,即把需要交易的卡片与移动设备进行绑定,这样的卡片也叫移动设备卡,与该移动设备(例如手机)绑定的卡片的支付等功能可以由该移动设备来完成。如图4所示,现有的线下移动设备免密交易针对的是白名单中的商户,对于白名单商户中的交易金额小于或者等于小额业务标准限额的交易,移动设备卡通过将交易的卡片的相关参数告知PoS机,PoS机读取卡片的相关信息,获知该移动设备卡支持小额免密;而PoS机获知了移动设备卡支持小额免密功能后,根据本次交易金额与免密限额的大小关系,对交易金额小于或者等于免密限额以下的交易不要求输密,即PoS机不进行持卡人身份验证,并在授权请求报文中添加免密标识,将授权请求报文发送给发卡行主机,该授权请求报文包括该移动设备卡片发送的ARQC,当交易被上送到发卡行主机,发卡行主机根据该免密标识识别小额快速业务,并确认该交易为小额交易免密。
对于非白名单中但PoS机支持CDCVM的商户,通过选择CDCVM来作为CVM的实现方式,即免去验证卡片联机密码的过程,随后PoS机记录本次交易执行的为CDCVM,并请求发卡行主机对本次交易免密授权。发卡行主机通过小额快速交易限额识别出小额交易,根据移动设备卡小额快速交易限额和CDCVM对交易进行授权。
现有的线下免密交易,没有基于可穿戴等第二设备进行的持卡人验证方式,而且对于基于移动设备卡的小额免密的HCE云闪付,有些发卡行出于安全考虑,不认为HCE软件环境下的CDCVM为可信CDCVM,因此不将CDCVM加入云闪付卡片的CVM列表。
当PoS机支持小额免密时,HCE应用可以在不经过身份校验的情况下进行小额免密交易。这时,HCE卡片的信息容易被木马窃取或者手机丢失后,可进行盗刷;当PoS机和/或HCE支付应用不支持小额免密时,HCE刷卡(包括***)交易时始终需要输入密码,因此在PoS机处输密码会有密码被窥视、窃取的风险。
基于现有的HCE云闪付免密交易存在的安全问题,本发明实施例提供了一种交易方法,图5是本发明一个实施例的交易方法100的示意性流程图。下面将结合图5介绍本发明实施例的交易方法。应理解,本发明实施例仅以图5所示的交易方法为例进行说明,但本发明实施例并不限制于此。
本发明实施例的交易方法涉及的主体包括:支付设备、校验设备,PoS机和服务器。
其中,该支付设备可以是手机,对应地,该校验设备可以是可穿戴设备,或者,该支付设备可以是可穿戴设备,对应地,该校验设备可以是手机,该服务器可以为发卡行主机。例如,对于一个持卡人来说,自己使用手机可以为支付设备,随身佩戴的手表可以为校验设备,或者,自己使用手机可以为校验设备,随身佩戴的手表可以为支付设备。该可穿戴设备可以包括但不限于以手腕为支撑的手表类,例如智能手表、智能手环等;以脚为支撑的鞋类,例如智能运动鞋等;以头部为支撑的眼镜类,例如智能眼镜、智能头盔等。该支付设备也不限于手机,只要可以完成支付功能的设备即可,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
如图5所示,该方法100包括以下步骤:
S106,支付设备向校验设备发送免密请求信息,该免密请求信息用于向该校验设备请求免密标识,该免密标识用于指示交易的卡片具有免密能力,该免密标识与该校验设备关联并且与该卡片对应,其中,该支付设备、该校验设备以及该卡片已相互关联。
具体而言,在需要进行交易的时候,该支付设备向该校验设备发送免密请求信息,用于向该校验设备申请该免密标识,该免密标识用于指示交易的卡片具有免密能力,即可以使发卡行主机获知该交易的卡片具有免密能力,该免密标识与该卡片对应,存储在该校验设备中,并且与该校验设备关联,并不是直接与该支付设备关联,这样,避免了该免密标识与该支付设备之间相关,可以达到该校验设备对该支付设备交易时的持有人身份验证。相应地,该校验设备接收该支付设备发送的该免密请求信息。该发卡行主机根据该免密标识便确认该卡片具有免密的能力。
应理解,该免密请求信息可以包括需要进行交易的卡片的信息,例如可以是该卡片的标识,以告知该校验设备当前需要进行交易的是哪张卡片,并针对这张卡片进行后续的操作。该免密请求信息还可以包括该支付设备的随机数时,该随机数可以是ATC,用于进一步确保该交易的有效性和安全性,该免密请求信息还可以包括其他与本次交易有关的信息或者数据,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
还应理解,在交易开始之前,该支付设备、该校验设备以及该卡片三者之间已相互关联。该支付设备选择需要交易的卡片,检测到该校验设备时,生成该免密请求信息,向关联的校验设备发送该免密请求信息。
还应理解,该卡片的免密能力可以是在一定的限额内的免密能力,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
S107,该校验设备解析该免密请求信息。
S108,该校验设备向该支付设备发送响应于该免密请求信息的免密应答信息,该免密应答信息包括该免密标识,该免密应答信息用于该支付设备修改该卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表。
具体而言,该校验设备接收到该免密请求信息后,由于之前该校验设备已经和该支付设备进行了绑定,因此,该校验设备会解析该免密请求信息,确定该免密请求信息的有效性,例如,可以通过绑定时协商的某些标识信息来验证该免密请求信息是不是与该校验设备绑定的该支付设备发送的,需要交易的卡片是否真实有效等等,确定这些信息有效后,该校验设备会向该支付设备发送响应于该免密请求信息的该免密应答信息。
相应的,该支付设备接收该免密应答信息,由于对于一个持卡人来说,该校验设备
和该支付设备都是该持卡人随身携带的,因此这个过程可以认为是对持卡人身份的一次验证。该免密应答信息包括与该免密标识。这样,凭借在该校验设备处存储该免密标识,在交易时作为支付设备身份校验的第二因子,通过持卡人额外的校验设备对支付设备的进行验证来实现双因子验证,在这个过程完成之后,该支付设备就可以确认该持卡人身份的合法性,从而修改卡片的持卡人验证方法列表。
可选的,该免密应答信息还可以包括与该免密标识对应的该免密限额,该免密限额用于定义该免密权限的额度,使该卡片能够在对应免密限额下的交易免密,该免密限额可以是该发卡行主机发送给该校验设备的,当该免密请求信息包括该支付设备的随机数时,该免密应答信息也应当包括该随机数,用于进一步确保该交易的有效性和安全性,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
应理解,该免密应答信息还可以包括其他与本次交易有关的信息或者数据,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
S109,该支付设备根据该免密应答信息,修改该卡片的持卡人验证方法列表,以便于使PoS机获知该交易为免密交易;
该支付设备根据该免密应答信息,生成授权请求密文,该授权请求密文包括该免密标识。
具体而言,在S109中,该支付设备成功接收到该免密应答信息后,确认该免密应答信息有效时,即确认了该持卡人身份的合法性,通过这种方法,便可以通过持有该校验设备证明该持卡人的身份,更进一步的,该校验设备和该支付设备之间还可以进行互相之间的验证。该支付设备获知该校验设备具有有效的免密权限后,修改该卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表,并在一条指令(SELECT)中将修改后的该卡片的CVM列表返回给该PoS机,修改该卡片的CVM列表的目的是为了让该PoS机获知本次交易是免密的,不在该PoS机处进行密码校验,即不需要用户提供密码,该密码用于在发卡行主机处进行该持卡人身份的验证,由于之前支付设备向校验设备请求免密标识的这个过程已经可以看作是对持卡人身份的验证,因此,在实际使用中不用在PoS机处进行输密这一环节,而不用进行输密意味着本次交易不用再进行额外的持卡人身份验证,即不用再进行PBOC流程里的CVM环节。
在S109中,该支付设备修改该卡片的CVM列表,可以如图6中所示的本发明另一个实施例的交易方法200的示意性流程图中S209一致。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该支付设备修改该卡片的CVM列表可以包括:该卡片的CVM列表中,将联机个人识别码PIN的使用条件设置为交易金额大于该免密限额,该免密限额与该免密标识对应。
具体而言,由于修改该卡片的CVM列表的目的是为了让该PoS机获知本次交易是免密的,不在该PoS机处进行密码校验。而最终该PoS机执行的是该卡片和该PoS机的CVM列表中共同支持的CVM。表1为卡片的数据表,其中包括卡片的CVM列表的部分参数,可以发现,在正常的CVM类型中,首先会采用联机的PIN验证,因此,该支付设备在该卡片CVM列表中,将联机PIN验证的使用条件设置为交易金额大于免密限额,这样,最终在执行CVM时,由于对仅对该卡片的CVM列表进行修改,因此,只会选择该卡片和该PoS机共有的CVM,因此,当交易金额小于或者等于该免密限额时,因为交易不满足使用联机PIN的条件,所以会选择签名或者其他不需要输密的CVM来实
现免密。
表1卡片数据表
应理解,该免密限额可以是携带在该免密应答信息中,该支付设备通过解析该免密应答信息获取的,也可以是该支付设备通过其他方式获取的,例如,可以该发卡行主机发送给该支付设备的,然后该支付设备自己保存的,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该支付设备修改该卡片的CVM列表,还可以包括:在该卡片的CVM列表中的CVM类型中添加设备持卡人验证方法CDCVM,记录该CDCVM的结果为已验证通过。
具体而言,由于该支付设备已经成功接收到该免密应答信息,相当于已经对该支付设备进行了身份验证,确认了持有该支付设备的使用者的身份的合法性,即可以认为该支付设备已经进行了CDCVM验证,且持卡人身份验证是通过的。由上文可知,最终PoS机执行的是该卡片和该PoS机的CVM列表中共同支持的CVM,因此,这种修改方式的使用条件是PoS机也需要支持CDCVM,并且需要确定交易金额小于或者等于该免密限额时才可以使用。如表1所示,即在PoS机的CVM列表中的CVM类型中也存在CDCVM,因此,在该PoS机也支持CDCVM情况下,可以利用这种修改方式,当该PoS机判断该交易金额小于或者等于该免密限额时,判断这个CDCVM是有效的(满足限额条件的使用条件)后,才会使用CDCVM作为本次交易的持卡人验证方式,不在该PoS机处进行密码校验。而当该交易金额大于该免密限额时,就会采用联机PIN输入的验密方式进行验密。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该支付设备修改该卡片的CVM列表,还可以包括:在该卡片的CVM列表中,如表1所示,将联机个人识别码PIN的使用条件设置为交易金额大于该免密限额,并且,在该卡片的CVM列表中的CVM类型中添加设备持卡人验证方法CDCVM,记录该CDCVM的结果为已验证通过。
具体而言,由于qPBOC规定的卡片和PoS机交互的时间非常短,一般在0.3-0.5s以内,因此执行修改卡片的CVM的措施是在卡片与PoS机交互之前,修改完后进入免密状态再与PoS机交互。因此,这时并不知道PoS机的CVM属性,即并不知道PoS机是否支持CDCVM,通过同时使用这两种修改方式,就不用考虑PoS机是否支持CDCVM,因此,采用这样的修改方式可以覆盖整个应用场景,当确定交易金额小于或者等于该免密限额时,便可以使用这种修改方式,使得PoS机处获知此次交易免密。
还应理解,该支付设备修改该卡片的CVM方法还可以包括设置该卡片应用交互特征(application interchange profile,AIP)为不支持CVM,如表1所示,即不需要执行CVM这个环节,其中,该卡片的AIP指示在此应用中卡片支持特定功能的能力列表,包括静态数据认证(static data authentication,SDA)、动态数据认证(dynamic data authentication,DDA),持卡人验证、发卡行认证以及复合动态数据认证(combined dynamic data authentication/application cryptogram,DDA/AC)。这种修改方式的使用前提是确定交易金额(授权金额)小于或者等于该免密限额,并且当使用这种修改方式后,需要在该支付设备生成的ARQC中添加一条指示信息,该指示信息用于告知该发卡行主机本次交易已经进行了CVM验证并请求该发卡行主机根据该CVM对该交易进行授权,这样,该PoS机检测到该卡片的AIP不支持CVM后就不会要求执行CVM了。因此,本次交易实际上并没有执行PBOC流程中的CVM环节,该发卡行主机在接收到该指示信息后,便会知道该交易已经过校验设备的验证并且结合该卡片的免密权限对该交易进行免密授权。
还应理解,在本发明的实施例中,修改该卡片的CVM方法还可以包括其他修改方式,只要该修改方式能使得PoS机获知本次交易是免密的,不需要在PoS机上进行输密操作即可,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
在S109中,该支付设备根据该免密应答信息生成授权请求密文ARQC,该ARQC包括该免密标识,该支付设备在GPO响应中将该ARQC发送给该PoS机。而在此之前,该PoS机会将交易金额、与该交易相关的其他交易信息以及该PoS机的终端交易属性在GPO指令中附带告诉该支付设备,用于该支付设备执行风险管理检查,并判断交易类型(脱机完成/联机授权/拒绝交易),生成该ARQC。该PoS机的终端交易属性包括该PoS机的CVM列表,而该支付设备会在该GPO的上一条指令(SELECT)的响应中将修改后的该卡片的CVM列表返回给该PoS机,该支付设备在将该ARQC发送给该PoS机完成GPO指令的相应后,便可以离开该PoS机的感应区。
应理解,该支付设备还可以将该免密限额、该支付设备的标识以及其他与本次交易有关的信息或者数据添加到该ARQC中,当该免密应答信息包括该随机数时,该支付设备也可以将该随机数添加到ARQC中,进一步确保该交易的安全性,本发明实施例在此不做限制。
S110,该支付设备将该ARQC发送给该PoS机,该ARQC用于该PoS机生成授权请求报文,并向该交易的卡行主机发送该授权请求报文,该授权请求报文包括该ARQC。
具体而言,该支付设备在GPO响应中将该ARQC发送给该PoS机,该授权请求密文用于该PoS机生成授权请求报文,并向该发卡行主机发送该授权请求报文。
S111,该PoS机将该ARQC和相关的交易信息添加到授权请求报文中。
具体而言,该PoS机将该ARQC添加到该授权请求报文中,并向该发卡行主机发送该授权请求报文,该授权请求报文还可以包括本次交易的其他信息,例如,交易金额等,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
S112,该PoS机向该发卡行主机发送该授权请求报文,相应的,该发卡行主机接收该PoS机发送的授权请求报文,该授权请求报文包括该ARQC,该ARQC包括与该校验设备关联并且与需要进行交易的卡片对应的免密标识,该免密标识用于使该发卡行主机获知该卡片具有该免密限额内的免密能力,其中,该支付设备、该校验设备以及该卡片已相互关联。
具体而言,在S112中,当该PoS机和该支付设备交互完成以后,该发卡行主机会接收到该PoS机发送的授权请求报文,该授权请求报文包括该ARQC,该ARQC包括与校验设备关联并且与需要进行交易的卡片对应的免密标识,该免密标识用于使该发卡行主机获知该卡片具有免密能力,该免密标识是与需要进行交易的卡片对应的免密标识,并且该免密标识与该校验设备相关联,而并不是直接与该支付设备相关联,通过这种方法,便可以通过持有该校验设备证明该持卡人的身份,更进一步的,该校验设备和该支付设备之间还可以进行互相之间的验证,并提供持卡人身份验证的功能。
S113,该发卡行主机根据该ARQC,验证该交易是否有效。
具体而言,在S113中,该发卡行主机解密该授权请求报文中的该ARQC,检测到该ARQC中包括该免密标识时,提取该免密标识,当确定该免密标识有效并且确定交易金额小于或者等于该免密限额时,确定该免密交易权限有效,并对该交易授权;当该发卡行主机解密该ARQC,确定该免密标识无效时,拒绝该交易,此时,该发卡行主机冻结
或取消该卡片与该校验设备的绑定关系,取消该校验设备免密功能,并通知该卡片/该支付设备进行相应处理(不再申请免密请求或重新进行免密标识的申请/更新);或者当该发卡行主机确定交易金额大于该免密限额时,需要验证该授权请求报文中携带的联机密码来确定是否对该交易进行授权。该免密限额可以是在该发卡行主机生成该免密标识时确定并且保存的。
应理解,在本发明各个实施例中,上述各过程的序号的大小并不意味着执行顺序的先后,各过程的执行顺序应该以其功能和内在的逻辑而定,而不应对本发明的实施例的实施过程造成任何限制。
因此,本发明实施例的交易方法,通过引入校验设备进行验证来增加HCE交易的安全性,通过支付设备与额外的校验设备进行互相验证来实现双因子验证,这样,即使在支付设备丢失或者卡片的信息窃取的情况下,由于小额免密交易还需验证校验设备,因此也不会被进行盗刷。并且,对于不支持小额免密的PoS机和/或HCE支付应用时,利用验证校验设备免密权限的有效性,通过验证免密标识和支付设备收到校验设备响应后,修改卡片的CVM列表,来实现PoS机与发卡行主机处的免密,从而实现了小额免密支付,不需要再进行输密操作,避免了输密时密码被窥视的风险,安全性更高,用户体验更好。
图6是本发明另一个实施例的交易方法200的示意性流程图。如图6所示,该交易方法200的步骤S206至S213与交易方法100的步骤S106至S113类似,此处不再赘述。
在S206之前,该方法200还可以包括:
S201,该支付设备与该校验设备相互验证与绑定,并协商生成第二密钥对,该第二密钥对包括第二加密密钥和第二解密密钥。
具体而言,在交易开始之前,该支付设备首先与该校验设备交换双方的信息并进行绑定,生成该第二密钥对,用于后续的该支付设备和该校验设备身份的认证以及加密两者之间交互的信息,这样,可以增强交易的安全性。
应理解,该第二密钥对可以是对称的,即该第二密钥对包括的第二加密密钥和第二解密密钥是相同的。该第二密钥对也可以是不对称的,即第二加密密钥和第二解密密钥是不相同,此时,该第二密钥对可以包括第二加密密钥和第二解密密钥,本发明实施例在此不做限制。
还应理解,该第二密钥对仅是为了说明需要进行加密时使用的一个密钥对,而不应对本发明的实施例造成任何限制。该支付设备和该校验设备还可以利用其他方法验证两者之间身份,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
S202,该支付设备向该发卡行主机发送免密功能请求信息,该免密验证请求信息用于为该校验设备请求该免密标识,以便于该发卡行主机根据该免密验证请求信息,生成该免密标识,确定与该免密标识对应的免密限额,并向该校验设备发送该免密标识。
具体而言,当该支付设备和该校验设备完成相互认认证以后,该支付设备中会存储该校验设备的信息,由于该支付设备已经与该卡片绑定,用户可以通过该支付设备上的相关支付应用程序,或者支付应用程序上的相关选项,例如,可以是绑定第三方设备(校验设备)等选项向发卡行主机发送该免密验证请求信息。相应的,该发卡行主机接收该免密功能请求信息。该免密功能请求信息用于向该发卡行主机申请开通该校验设备免密验证功能,即为该校验设备请求该免密标识,这样,发卡行主机便开通该支付设备和该
校验设备双因子免密验证功能,将支付端的支付设备和鉴权端的校验设备进行分离,通过额外的校验设备对支付设备进行验证,可以增加交易的安全性。
应理解,该免密功能请求信息可以包括该卡片的信息,例如,可以是该卡片的标识,用于该发卡行主机验证该卡片的信息,并将该卡片与该校验设备进行绑定,这样,该发卡行主机就可以生成与该校验设备关联的免密标识,确定与该免密标识对应的免密限额以及其他与交易相关的信息。
可选的,该支付设备也可以向该发卡行主机发送多张卡片信息,用于该发卡行主机将每张卡片与该校验设备都进行绑定,相应的,该发卡行主机也可以接收该多张卡片的信息,并生成与该每张卡片对应的免密标识以及与该免密标识对应的免密限额,并将这些免密标识发送给该校验设备,这样,在交易时,该校验设备就可以根据该免密请求信息从中选取与该卡片对应的免密标识,从而进行后续的操作。本发明实施例在此不作限制。
应理解,该支付设备还可以向该发卡行主机发送该校验设备的信息或者其他与该交易相关的信息,例如,可以是该校验设备的标识和该支付设备的标识等信息,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
S203,该发卡行主机接收该支付设备发送的该免密验证请求信息;
该发卡行主机根据该免密验证请求信息,生成该免密标识,确定与该免密标识对应的免密限额。
S204,该发卡行主机将该免密标识发送给该校验设备。
具体而言,该发卡行主机接收到该支付设备发送的该免密验证请求信息后,便可以开通该校验设备免密验证功能,根据该免密验证请求信息包括的内容,例如,可以是该卡片的标识,确定该卡片有效后,将该卡片与该校验设备进行绑定,由于该卡片和该支付设备之前已经绑定,因此,该支付设备、该卡片以及该校验设备均相互绑定。该发卡行主机便可以生成与该校验设备关联的并且与该卡片对应的免密标识,确定与该免密标识对应的免密限额,保存该免密标识与该免密限额后,并将该免密标识发送给该校验设备,通过在该校验设备存储该免密标识,与该支付设备内卡片的信息分开存储,对于用户后续的每次交易,当用户在支付设备上选择了需要支付的卡片后,由于该支付设备与该校验设备已经进行关联,而与该支付设备关联并且与需要交易的卡片对应的免密标识是存储在校验设备中的,用户还需要向该校验设备申请与该交易的卡片对应的免密标识,只有该支付设备获取了该免密标识,才可以进行后续的处理。这个过程可以看作是用于验证该持卡人的身份是否合法,即每次交易选卡后向校验设备申请免密标识的过程可以看作是每次交易选卡后都要向校验设备申请授权,这样会增强了交易的安全性。
可选的,该免密验证请求信息还可以包括该校验设备的标识,用于后续的该发卡行主机根据该校验设备的标识验证该校验设备的身份,寻找该免密标识,该校验设备免密验证请求信息还可以包括其他与该交易相关的信息,本发明实施例在此不做限制。
可选的,该发卡行主机还可以确定与该交易相关的其他信息或者数据,并将这些信息或者数据发送给该校验设备,例如,可以是交易笔数等,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
可选的,如图6所示,在S204中,该发卡行主机也可以将该免密限额发送给该校验设备,用于后续的该校验设备生成该免密应答信息,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
可选的,如图6所示,在S203,该发卡行主机还可以生成第一密钥对,该第一密钥
对包括第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥;相应的,在S204中,该发卡行主机向该校验设备发送该第一加密密钥,该第一加密密钥用于该校验设备加密或者签名该免密标识。
具体而言,为了进一步增强双因子校验交易的安全性,该发卡行主机可以生成第一密钥对,用于后续的对该免密标识进行加密或者签名,该第一密钥对可以是该发卡行主机根据该支付设备发送的该校验设备免密验证请求信息后生成,该第一密钥对可以是不对称的时,即该第一密钥对包括第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥,该发卡行主机将该第一加密密钥发送给该校验设备。
应理解,该第一密钥对也可以是对称的,即第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥完全相同,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
还应理解,该第一密钥对仅是为了说明需要对该免密标识进行加密时使用的一个密钥对,即是为了确定该免密标识有效而使用的一个方法,而不应对本发明的实施例造成任何限制。该发卡行主机和该校验设备还可以利用其他方法确定该免密标识有效,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
还应理解,上述的S201至S204步骤可以是在前置准备过程中,即在交易开始前进行,这样,在以后的每次交易中,就不需要在执行这些前置准备的步骤。
S205,该支付设备生成免密请求信息,该免密请求信息用于向该校验设备请求该免密标识,其中,该支付设备、该校验设备以及该卡片已相互关联。
具体而言,在用户需要交易时,用户在该支付设备选择需要交易的卡片,该卡片可以是与该校验设备已经关联并且已经在该发卡行主机处注册过的卡片的中的一个或者多个,由于该支付设备与该校验设备已经进行关联,因此,在该支付设备检测到该校验设备后,为了进一步确认该交易的准确性,例如,可能存在某些用户其实不想进行交易,只是想检查该支付设备绑定的卡片,该支付设备会误以为该户用需要交易从而生成免密请求信息这种情况,因此,该支付设备会经用户确认需要交易后,才会自动或者手动生成该免密请求信息,从而避免了这种情况。
可选地,如图6所示,在S205中,该免密请求信息可以包括该支付设备的随机数和该卡片的标识,该卡片的标识用于该校验设备找到与该卡片关联的免密标识等相关信息和参数。
可选地,如图6所示,在S205中,为了增加整个支付过程的安全性,该支付设备可以利用该第二密钥对中的第二加密密钥加密该免密请求信息,相应的,在S206中,该支付设备可以发送利用该第二密钥对中的第二加密密钥加密后的该免密请求信息,该第二密钥对由该支付设备和该校验设备协商生成,该第二密钥对包括该第二加密密钥和第二解密密钥。
具体而言,为了进一步对该支付设备和该校验设备进行验证,增强支付的安全性,该支付设备可以利用第二密钥对中的第二加密密钥加密该免密请求信息,并将加密后的该免密请求信息发送给该校验设备,相应的,该校验设备接收加密后的该免密请求信息,利用该第二解密密钥去验证该免密请求信息的有效性,相应的,该检验设备也可以用该第二加密密钥加密该免密应答信息,该支付设备也可以用该第二解密密钥解密该免密应答信息,可以进一步增强交易的安全性,避免了当该支付设备丢失后,由于小额免密交易而被别人进行盗刷。
应理解,在本发明的实施例中,利用该第二加密密钥对该免密请求信息进行加密仅
是为了增强安全性、完成相互认证的一个方法,即是为了该支付设备与该校验设备之间进一步相互验证的一个方法,该方法还可以是其他相互验证的方法,该第二密钥对也可是时任何可以完成身份验证的其他密钥对,而不应对本发明实施例产生任何限制。
还应理解,当该第二密钥对是对称的,即第二加密密钥和第二解密密钥是相同,此时,该支付设备可以利用该第二加密密钥加密该免密请求信息,还可以利用该第二解密密钥解密该校验设备对该免密请求信息响应的免密应答信息。当该第二密钥对是不对称的,该支付设备可以利用该第二加密密钥签名该免密请求信息并对用第二解密密钥验证该校验设备对该免密请求信息响应的免密应答信息的签名。进一步通过密钥手段对请求/响应信息进行处理来完成该支付设备和该校验设备之间的认证。本发明实施例在此不做限制。
还应理解,该校验设备还可以利用另外一些身份验证方式来验证该支付设备的持有人的身份是否合法,例如,可以是用户在该校验设备和该支付设备绑定的时候设置一个首次密码,在后续的该支付设备向该校验设备请求免密标识时,该校验设备还可以要求用户输入该首次密码,通过该首次密码对该支付设备持有人身份的进行验证。对于校验设备为可穿戴设备,例如,为智能手环时,还可以是该校验设备进行首次密码+佩戴状态检测、脉搏检测等生物识别技术对该免密标识进行保护等方式,即不需要用户主动操作的验证方式对该支付设备的持有人的身份进行验证,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
可选的,如图6所示,在S207中,该校验设备利用该第二解密密钥解密该免密请求信息,利用第一加密密钥加密或者签名该免密标识。
具体而言,当该免密请求信息是利用该第二加密密钥加密时,该校验设备利用该第二解密密钥去验证该免密请求信息的有效性,从而增加了该校验设备和该支付设备之间的身份验证的安全性。并且。为了进一步增强交易的安全性,在该校验设备发送该免密应答信息之前,可以将该免密标识用该第一密钥对中的第一加密密钥进行加密或者签名,当该第一密钥对是对称的时,即第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥完全相同,可以利用该第一密钥对中的第一加密密钥对该免密标识进行加密,当该第一密钥对是非对称的时,即第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥不同,可以利用该第一密钥对中第一加密密钥签名该免密标识,该第一密钥对可以是该发卡行主机根据该支付设备发送的开通该校验设备的免密功能请求信息生成,该校验设备接收该发卡行主机发送的该第一密密钥对,相应的,该发卡行主机可以根据该第一解密密钥来确定该免密标识是否真实有效。这样,该校验设备利用该第一密钥对该免密标识处理,从而完成该校验设备和发卡行主机之间的认证,进一步提高了交易的安全性。
应理解,在本发明的实施例中,在该免密应答信息中,除了该免密标识可以利用该第一加密密钥加密或者签名外,其他的信息,例如,该免密限额、该随机数、该卡片的信息等都可以利用该第一加密密钥进行加密或者签名,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
还应理解,该第一密钥对以及该第一加密密钥仅仅为了说明需要对该免密标识进行加密,在本发明的实施例中,还可以利用其他加密方式对该免密标识进行加密,该第一密钥对以及该第一加密密钥不应对本发明的实施例造成任何限制。
可选的,如图6所示,S208中,当该免密请求信息可以包括该支付设备的随机数时,该免密应答信息也应当包括该支付设备的随机数,该随机数可以是ATC,用于进一步确保该交易的有效性和安全性,该免密应答信息还可以包括该校验设备的标识以及该免密
限额,该校验设备的标识用于该发卡行主机确定该校验设备的身份以及寻找该免密标识。应理解,该免密应答信息还可以包括其他与本次交易有关的信息或者数据,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
可选的,如图6所示,在S208中,当该免密应答信息还包括该校验设备的标识时,在S209中,该支付设备可以通过验证该校验设备的标识,确认该免密应答信息有效,并根据该校验设备的标识和该免密限额,修改该卡片的CVM列表。
可选的,如图6所示,在S209中,当该免密应答信息包括该支付设备的随机数时,该ARQC也应当包括该支付设备的随机数,该ARQC还可以包括该免密限额、该校验设备的标识等信息,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
可选的,在S209中,该授权请求密文该可以包括该交易不可预知数、发卡行自定义数据(issuer defined data,IDD)、卡片根据PoS机提供的终端交易属性等参数进行卡片风险管理后得到的验证结果、该免密限额、该校验设备的标识等信息中的一个或者几个。本发明实施例在此不作限制。例如,在该PoS机也支持CDCVM的情况下,该支付设备预先进行CDCVM验证,之后在和PoS机交互的过程中返回给该PoS机的授权请求密文中还可以包括该CDCVM的验证结果,例如,可以是CDCVM已执行,且验证通过。该授权请求密文还可以包括其他和本次交易相关的信息或者数据,例如,可以包括卡片设置的风险管理参数,交易笔数等。
可选的,该授权请求密文还可以包括与本次交易有关的其他信息或者数据,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
可选的,当该免密应答信息包括该支付设备的随机数时,该授权请求密文也应当包括该支付设备的随机数。
可选的,图7是本发明一个实施例中的授权请求报文结构的示意图,由图7可知,该授权请求报文包括该授权请求密文和其他的交易信息,而该授权请求密文包括利用该第一加密密钥进行签名后的该免密标识。该授权请求报文还可包括与本次交易有关的其他信息或者数据,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
可选的,当该免密标识是利用该第一加密密钥进行加密或者签名的时,在S213中,该发卡行主机可以利用该第一密钥对中的第一解密密钥确定该免密标识是否有效,来验证该交易。
具体而言,该发卡行主机解密该授权请求密文,当检查到密文中对应的字段包含与该交易有关的数据,例如可以是IDD,则证明该授权请求密文中包括该免密标识,然后根据该校验设备的标识和该免密标识与该校验设备的关联关系,寻找到该第一解密密钥和该免密标识对应的该免密限额等免密权限信息,利用该第一解密密钥去验证该免密标识是否有效,例如,检验该免密标识是否被篡改过,检验该免密限额是否发生变化等,当确定该免密标识有效,并且当交易金额小于或者等于该免密限额时,确定该交易有效,且不用进行验密。
当该发卡行主机检测到密文中对应的字段不包括与该交易有关的数据,则证明该授权请求密文中不包括该免密标识,这时,就需要进行验密操作。或者已检测到该免密标识,根据该校验设备的标识和该免密标识与该校验设备的关联关系,并寻找到该第一解密密钥和该免密标识对应的该免密限额等免密权限信息,但利用该第一解密密钥去验证该免密标识并确定该免密标识无效时,例如,该免密标识与该卡片不对应,或者被篡改
过,则该发卡行主机会拒绝该交易。或者当检测到该免密标识,且该免密标识有效,但交易金额大于该免密限额时,确定该交易需要进行验密。
应理解,在本发明的实施例中,该免密限额不仅可以是在前置准备过程中,例如,在该发卡行主机接收到该校验设备免密验证请求信息后,发卡行主机自己生成并且保存的,还可以是携带在授权请求密文中由该PoS机发送给该发卡行主机的,或者也可以是通过其他方法获得的,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
还应理解,该校验设备的标识不仅可以是在该校验设备以及该卡片在发卡行主机处相互绑定时发卡行主机保存的,还可以是携带在报文中由该PoS机发送给该发卡行主机的。本发明实施例在此不作限制。
还应理解,在本发明各个实施例中,上述各过程的序号的大小并不意味着执行顺序的先后,各过程的执行顺序应该以其功能和内在的逻辑而定,而不应对本发明的实施例的实施过程造成任何限制。
因此,本发明实施例的交易方法,通过引入校验设备进行验证来增加HCE交易的安全性,凭借在发卡行主机处注册的校验设备来存储免密标识与免密限额,在交易时作为支付设备身份校验的第二因子,通过支付设备和额外的校验设备进行互相验证来实现双因子验证,并且增加了利用第一密钥对和第二密钥对进行加密这一环节,验证校验设备免密权限的有效性,这样,即使在支付设备被盗或者卡片信息泄露的情况下,由于免密交易还需要校验设备的验证,也不会被进行盗刷。对于不支持小额免密的PoS机和/或HCE支付应用时,通过验证免密标识和该支付设备收到校验设备响应后,修改卡片的CVM列表,来实现PoS机与发卡行主机处的免密,从而实现小额免密支付,不用进行输密操作,避免了输密时密码被窥视的风险,安全性更高,用户体验更好。并且,本发明实施例的交易方法不用改动PoS机,实现的技术难度和成本低,便于实现。
上文中结合图1至图7,详细描述了根据本发明实施例的交易的方法,下面将结合图8至图14,详细描述根据本发明实施例的支付设备、校验设备和服务器。
图8是本发明一个实施例的支付设备的示意性框图。应理解,支付设备实施例与方法实施例相互对应,类似的描述可以参照方法实施例,图8所示的支付设备300对应于图5和图6中的支付设备。该支付设备300包括:
发送单元310,用于向校验设备发送免密请求信息,该免密请求信息用于该支付设备向该校验设备请求免密标识,该免密标识用于指示交易的卡片具有免密能力,该免密标识与该校验设备关联并且与该卡片对应,其中,该支付设备、该校验设备以及该卡片已相互关联;
接收单元320,用于接收该校验设备发送的响应于该免密请求信息的免密应答信息,该免密应答信息包括该免密标识;
处理单元330,用于根据该免密应答信息,修改该卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表,以便于使销售点设备PoS机获知该交易为免密交易;
该处理单元330还用于根据该免密应答信息生成授权请求密文ARQC,该发送单元310还用于将该ARQC发送给该PoS机,该ARQC包括该免密标识,该ARQC用于该PoS机生成授权请求报文,并向该交易的服务器发送该授权请求报文,该授权请求报文包括该ARQC。
本发明实施例的支付设备,通过与额外的校验设备进行互相验证来实现双因子验证,
这样,即使在支付设备丢失或者卡片的信息窃取的情况下,由于小额免密交易还需验证校验设备,因此也不会被进行盗刷。并且,对于不支持小额免密的PoS机和/或HCE支付应用时,利用验证校验设备免密权限的有效性,通过验证免密标识和支付设备收到校验设备响应后,修改卡片的CVM列表,来实现PoS机与服务器处的免密,从而实现了小额免密支付,不需要再进行输密操作,避免了输密时密码被窥视的风险,安全性更高,用户体验更好。
可选的,该支付设备300还可以包括存储单元340,存储单元340可以用于存储发送单元310、接收单元320和处理单元330执行的代码等。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该处理单元330具体用于:在该卡片的CVM列表中,将联机个人识别码PIN的使用条件设置为交易金额大于免密限额。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该处理单元330具体用于:在该卡片CVM列表中的CVM类型中添加设备持卡人验证方法CDCVM,记录该CDCVM的结果为已验证通过。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该发送单元310还用于:在该发送单元310向该校验设备发送该免密请求信息之前,向该服务器发送免密验证请求信息,该免密验证请求信息用于为该校验设备请求该免密标识,以便于该服务器根据该免密验证请求信息,生成该免密标识,确定与该免密标识对应的免密限额,并向该校验设备发送该免密标识。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该接收单元320接收的该免密标识是由该校验设备利用第一密钥对中的第一加密密钥进行加密或者签名的,其中,该第一加密密钥由该服务器发送给该校验设备。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该发送单元310具体用于向该校验设备发送经第二密钥对中的第二加密密钥加密的该免密请求信息,其中,该第二密钥对由该支付设备和该校验设备协商生成,该第二密钥对包括该第二加密密钥和第二解密密钥。
应理解,根据本发明实施例支付设备300可对应于本发明实施例中的支付设备,并且该支付设备300中的各个单元的上述和其他操作和/或功能分别实现图5和图6中的各个方法的相应流程,为了简洁,在此不再赘述。
应注意,在本发明的实施例中,该发送单元310可以由发送器实现,该接收单元320可以由接收器实现,该处理单元330可以由处理器来实现,该存储单元340可以由存储器来实现,如图9所示,支付设备400可以包括发送器410、接收器420、处理器430和存储器440。图9中的发送器410、接收器420、处理器430和存储器440之间通过内部连接通路互相通信,传递控制和/或数据信号。该存储器440用于存储程序代码,该发送器410、该接收器420、该处理器430用于调用该程序代码以实现本发明上述各实施例中的方法。
应理解,图9所示的支付设备400可对应于本发明实施例中的支付设备,并且该支付设备400中的各个部件的上述和其他操作和/或功能分别实现图5和图6中的各个方法的相应流程,为了简洁,在此不再赘述。
在本发明实施例中,处理器430可以是中央处理器(central processing unit,CPU),网络处理器(network processor,NP)或者CPU和NP的组合。处理器还可以进一步包括硬件芯片。上述硬件芯片可以是专用集成电路(application-specific integrated circuit,ASIC),可编程逻辑器件(programmable logic device,PLD)或其组合。
图10是本发明一个实施例的校验设备500的示意性框图。应理解,校验设备实施例
与方法实施例相互对应,类似的描述可以参照方法实施例,图10所示的校验设备500对应于图5和图6中的校验设备。该校验设备500包括:
接收单元510,用于接收支付设备发送的免密请求信息,该免密请求信息用于该支付设备向该校验设备请求免密标识,该免密标识用于指示交易的卡片具有免密能力,该免密标识与该校验设备关联并且与该卡片对应,其中,该支付设备、该校验设备以及该卡片已相互关联;
处理单元520,用于解析该免密请求信息;
发送单元530,用于向该支付设备发送响应于该免密请求信息的免密应答信息,该免密应答信息包括该免密标识,该免密应答信息用于该支付设备修改该卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表。
本发明实施例的校验设备,通过存储该免密标识,与该支付设备内卡片的信息分开存储,每次交易选卡后都要向该校验设备申请授权,通过与该支付设备进行互相验证来实现双因子验证,这样,即使在支付设备丢失或者卡片的信息窃取的情况下,由于小额免密交易还需验证校验设备,因此也不会被进行盗刷,安全性更高,用户体验更好。
可选的,该校验设备500还可以包括存储单元540,存储单元540可以用于存储接收单元510、处理单元520和发送单元530执行的代码等。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该接收单元510还用于:在该发送单元530向该支付设备发送该免密应答信息前,接收该交易的服务器发送的该免密标识,其中,该免密标识是该服务器根据该支付设备发送的免密验证请求信息生成的。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该接收单元510还用于:在该发送单元530向该支付设备发送该免密应答信息前,接收该服务器发送的第一密钥对中的第一加密密钥,该第一密钥对包括该第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥;该处理单元520还用于:利用该第一加密密钥加密或者签名该免密标识。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该处理单元520具体用于:利用第二密钥对中的第二解密密钥解密该免密请求信息,其中,该第二密钥对由该校验设备和该支付设备协商生成,该第二密钥对包括该第二加密密钥和该第二解密密钥。
应理解,根据本发明实施例校验设备500可对应于本发明实施例中的校验设备,并且该校验设备500中的各个单元的上述和其他操作和/或功能分别实现图5和图6中的各个方法的相应流程,为了简洁,在此不再赘述。
应注意,在本发明的实施例中,该接收单元510可以由接收器实现,该处理单元520可以由处理器来实现,该发送单元530可以由发送器实现,该存储单元540可以由存储器来实现,如图11所示,校验设备600可以包括接收器610、处理器620、发送器630和存储器640。图11中的接收器610、处理器620、发送器630和存储器640之间通过内部连接通路互相通信,传递控制和/或数据信号。该存储器640用于存储程序代码,该接收器610、处理器620、发送器630用于调用该程序代码以实现本发明上述各实施例中的方法。
应理解,图11所示的校验设备600可对应于本发明实施例中的校验设备,并且该校验设备600中的各个部件的上述和其他操作和/或功能分别实现图5和图6中的各个方法的相应流程,为了简洁,在此不再赘述。
在本发明实施例中,处理器620可以是中央处理器(central processing unit,CPU),
网络处理器(network processor,NP)或者CPU和NP的组合。处理器还可以进一步包括硬件芯片。上述硬件芯片可以是专用集成电路(application-specific integrated circuit,ASIC),可编程逻辑器件(programmable logic device,PLD)或其组合。
下面将以该支付设备或者该检验设备为智能手机为例,对本发明实施例的支付设备或校验设备的结构进行详细描述,应理解,以智能手机为例仅是为了描述方便,而不应该对本发明实施例的保护范围构成限定。
图12示出了与本发明实施例的支付设备或者校验设备相关的智能手机700的部分结构的示意性框图。参考图12,智能手机700包括:射频(radio frequency,RF)电路710,存储器720、输入单元730、显示单元740、音频电路750、处理器760、电源770、传感器780等部件。本领域技术人员可以理解,图7中示出的智能手机的结构并不构成对智能手机的限定,可以包括比图示更多或更少的部件,或者组合某些部件,或者不同的部件布置。
例如,智能手机可以还包括摄像头、无线保真(wireless fidelity,WiFi)模块等,在此不再赘述。
在本发明实施例中,RF电路710可用于收发信息或通话过程中信号的接收和发送,给处理器720处理;例如,通常,RF电路710包括但不限于天线、至少一个放大器、收发信机、耦合器、低噪声放大器(low noise amplifier,LNA)、双工器等。该RF电路可以包括但不限于基于无线射频识别(radio frequency identification,RFID)技术的NFC,用于无接触近距离通信。此外,RF电路710还可以通过无线通信与网络和其他设备通信。该无线通信可以使用任意一种通信标准或协议,包括但不限于全球移动通讯***(global system of mobile communication,GSM)、通用分组无线服务(general packet radio service,GPRS)、码分多址(code division multiple access,CDMA)、宽带码分多址(wideband code division multiple access,WCDMA)、长期演进(long term evolution,LTE)、电子邮件、短消息服务(short messaging service,SMS)等。
存储器720可用于存储软件程序以及模块,处理器760通过运行存储在存储器720的软件程序以及模块,从而执行智能手机700的各种功能应用以及数据处理。存储器720可主要包括存储程序区和存储数据区,其中,存储程序区可存储操作***、至少一个功能所需的应用程序(比如声音播放功能、图象播放功能等)等;存储数据区可存储根据智能手机700的使用所创建的数据(比如音频数据、电话本等)等。此外,存储器720可以包括高速随机存取存储器,还可以包括非易失性存储器,例如至少一个磁盘存储器件、闪存器件、或其他易失性固态存储器件。
输入单元730可用于接收输入的数字或字符信息,以及产生与智能手机700的用户设置以及功能控制有关的键信号输入。具体地,输入单元730可包括触控面板以及其他输入设备。触控面板,也称为触摸屏,可收集用户在其上或附近的触摸操作(比如用户使用手指、触笔等任何适合的物体或附件在触控面板上或在触控面板附近的操作),并根据预先设定的程式驱动相应的连接装置。可选的,触控面板可包括触摸检测装置和触摸控制器两个部分。其中,触摸检测装置检测用户的触摸方位,并检测触摸操作带来的信号,将信号传送给触摸控制器;触摸控制器从触摸检测装置上接收触摸信息,并将它转换成触点坐标,再送给处理器,并能接收处理器发来的命令并加以执行。此外,可以采用电阻式、电容式、红外线以及表面声波等多种类型实现触控面板。除了触控面板,
输入单元还可以包括其他输入设备。具体地,其他输入设备可以包括但不限于物理键盘、功能键(比如音量控制按键、开关按键等)、轨迹球、鼠标、操作杆等中的一种或多种。
显示单元740可用于显示由用户输入的信息或提供给用户的信息以及设备的各种菜单。显示单元740可包括显示面板,可选的,可以采用液晶显示器(liquid crystal display,LCD)、有机发光二极管(organic light-emitting diode,OLED)等形式来配置显示面板。进一步的,触控面板可覆盖显示面板,当触控面板检测到在其上或附近的触摸操作后,传送给处理器以确定触摸事件的类型,随后处理器760根据触摸事件的类型在显示面板上提供相应的视觉输出。虽然在图12中,触控面板与显示面板是作为两个独立的部件来实现智能手机700的输入和输出功能,但是在某些实施例中,可以将触控面板与显示面板集成而实现智能手机700的输入和输出功能。
音频电路750、扬声器,麦克风可提供用户与智能手机700之间的音频接口。音频电路750可将接收到的音频数据转换后的电信号,传输到扬声器,由扬声器转换为声音信号输出;另一方面,麦克风将收集的声音信号转换为电信号,由音频电路750接收后转换为音频数据,将音频数据输出至存储器720以便进一步处理。
处理器760是智能手机700的控制中心,利用各种接口和线路连接整个智能手机700的各个部分,通过运行或执行存储在存储器内的软件程序和/或模块,以及调用存储在存储器720内的数据,执行智能手机700的各种功能和处理数据,从而对智能手机700进行整体监控。可选的,处理器760可包括一个或多个处理单元;优选的,处理器760可集成应用处理器和调制解调处理器,其中,应用处理器主要处理操作***、用户界面和应用程序等,调制解调处理器主要处理无线通信。可以理解的是,上述调制解调处理器也可以不集成到处理器760中。
电源770(比如电池)用于给各个部件供电,优选地,电源可以通过电源管***与处理器逻辑向量,从而通过电源管理***实现管理充电、放电以及功耗等功能。
手机700还可包括至少一种传感器780,比如光传感器、运动传感器以及其他传感器。具体地,光传感器可包括环境光传感器及接近传感器,其中,环境光传感器可根据环境光线的明暗来调节显示单元740的亮度。作为运动传感器的一种,加速计传感器可检测各个方向上(一般为三轴)加速度的大小,静止时可检测出重力的大小及方向,可用于识别手机姿态的应用(比如横竖屏切换、相关游戏、磁力计姿态校准)、振动识别相关功能(比如计步器、敲击)等;至于手机700还可配置的陀螺仪、气压计、湿度计、温度计、红外线传感器等其他传感器,在此不再赘述。
应理解,图12中示出的智能手机700的结构并不构成对智能手机的限定,也不应对本发明实施的支付设备或者校验设备的结构构成任何限定,例如,与本发明实施例的相关的检验设备可以不包括如图12所示音频电路750、传感器780等部件,本发明实施例在此不作限制。
图13是本发明一个实施例的服务器800的示意性框图。应理解,服务器实施例与方法实施例相互对应,类似的描述可以参照方法实施例,图13所示的服务器800对应于图5和图6中的发卡行主机。服务器800包括:
接收单元810,用于接收销售点设备PoS机发送的授权请求报文,该授权请求报文包括授权请求密文ARQC,该ARQC包括与校验设备关联并且与需要进行交易的卡片对应的免密标识,该免密标识用于使该使该服务器获知该卡片具有免密能力,该ARQC由
支付设备发送给该PoS机,其中,该支付设备、该校验设备以及该卡片已相互关联;
处理单元820,用于根据该ARQC,验证该交易是否有效。
可选的,该服务器800还可以包括存储单元840,存储单元840可以用于存储接收单元810和处理单元820执行的代码等。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该接收单元810还用于:在接收该PoS机发送的授权请求报文前,接收该支付设备发送的免密验证请求信息,该免密验证请求信息用于为该校验设备请求该免密标识,该处理单元820还用于根据该免密验证请求信息,生该免密标识,确定与该免密标识对应的该免密限额;该服务器800还可以包括发送单元830,该发送单元830用于所向该校验设备发送该免密标识。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该处理单元820具体用于:解密该ARQC,确定该免密标识有效,并且交易金额小于或者等于该免密限额时,确定该交易免密;解密该ARQC,确定该免密标识无效时,拒绝该交易,或者当确定交易金额大于该免密限额时,确定该交易输密。
可选的,作为一个实施例,该处理单元820还用于在该接收单元810接收该PoS机发送的该授权请求报文前,生成第一密钥对,该第一密钥对包括第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥;该发送单元830还用于向该校验设备发送该第一加密密钥,该第一加密密钥用于该校验设备加密或者签名该免密标识;其中,该处理单元820具体用于:利用该第一密钥对中的第一解密密钥确定该免密标识是否有效。
本发明实施例的服务器,通过验证存储在该校验设备中的该免密标识和该支付设备内卡片的信息来实现双因子验证,这样,即使在支付设备丢失或者卡片的信息窃取的情况下,由于小额免密交易还需验证校验设备,因此也不会对交易进行授权,安全性更高,用户体验更好。
应理解,根据本发明实施例服务器备800可对应于本发明实施例中的发卡行主机,并且该服务器800中的各个单元的上述和其他操作和/或功能分别实现图5和图6中的各个方法的相应流程,为了简洁,在此不再赘述。
应注意,在本发明的实施例中,该接收单元810可以由接收器实现,该处理单元820可以由处理器来实现,该发送单元830可以由发送器实现,该存储单元840可以由存储器来实现,如图14所示,该服务器900可以包括接收器910、处理器920、发送器930和存储器940,图14中的接收器910、处理器920、发送器930和存储器940之间通过内部连接通路互相通信,传递控制和/或数据信号。该存储器940用于存储程序代码,该接收器910、处理器920和发送器930用于调用该程序代码以实现本发明上述各实施例中的方法。
应理解,图14所示的服务器900可对应于本发明实施例中的发卡行主机,并且该服务器900中的各个部件的上述和其他操作和/或功能分别实现图5和图6中的各个方法的相应流程,为了简洁,在此不再赘述。
在本发明实施例中,处理器920可以是中央处理器(central processing unit,CPU),网络处理器(network processor,NP)或者CPU和NP的组合。处理器还可以进一步包括硬件芯片。上述硬件芯片可以是专用集成电路(application-specific integrated circuit,ASIC),可编程逻辑器件(programmable logic device,PLD)或其组合。
本发明实施例还提供了一种计算机可读介质,用于存储计算机程序代码,该计算机
程序包括用于执行上述图5和图6中本发明实施例的交易方法的指令。该可读介质可以是只读存储器(read-only memory,ROM)或随机存取存储器(random access memory,RAM),本发明实施例对此不做限制。
应理解,本文中术语“和/或”以及“A或B中的至少一种”,仅仅是一种描述关联对象的关联关系,表示可以存在三种关系,例如,A和/或B,可以表示:单独存在A,同时存在A和B,单独存在B这三种情况。另外,本文中字符“/”,一般表示前后关联对象是一种“或”的关系。
本领域普通技术人员可以意识到,结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤,能够以电子硬件、或者计算机软件和电子硬件的结合来实现。这些功能究竟以硬件还是软件方式来执行,取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能,但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到,为描述的方便和简洁,上述描述的***、装置和单元的具体工作过程,可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程,在此不再赘述。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中,应该理解到,所揭露的***、装置和方法,可以通过其它的方式实现。例如,以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的,例如,所述单元的划分,仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分,实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式,例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个***,或一些特征可以忽略,或不执行。另一点,所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口,装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接,可以是电性,机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的,作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元,即可以位于一个地方,或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外,在本申请各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中,也可以是各个单元单独物理存在,也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。
所述功能如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时,可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解,本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来,该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中,包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机,服务器,或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括:U盘、移动硬盘、ROM、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述,仅为本申请的具体实施方式,但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此,任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内,可轻易想到变化或替换,都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此,本申请的保护范围应所述以权利要求的保护范围为准。
Claims (37)
- 一种交易方法,其特征在于,包括:支付设备向校验设备发送免密请求信息,所述免密请求信息用于所述支付设备向所述校验设备请求免密标识,所述免密标识用于指示用于交易的卡片具有免密能力,所述免密标识与所述校验设备关联并且与所述卡片对应,其中,所述支付设备、所述校验设备以及所述卡片已相互关联;所述支付设备接收所述校验设备发送的响应于所述免密请求信息的免密应答信息,所述免密应答信息包括所述免密标识;所述支付设备根据所述免密应答信息,修改所述卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表,以便于使销售点设备PoS机获知所述交易为免密交易;所述支付设备根据所述免密应答信息生成授权请求密文ARQC,并将所述ARQC发送给所述PoS机,所述ARQC包括所述免密标识,所述ARQC用于所述PoS机生成授权请求报文,并向所述交易的服务器发送所述授权请求报文,所述授权请求报文包括所述ARQC。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述修改所述卡片的CVM列表,包括:在所述CVM列表中,将联机个人识别码PIN的使用条件设置为交易金额大于免密限额,所述免密限额与所述免密标识对应。
- 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述修改所述卡片CVM列表,还包括:在所述CVM列表中的CVM类型中添加设备持卡人验证方法CDCVM,记录所述CDCVM的结果为已验证通过。
- 根据权利要求1至3中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,在所述支付设备向校验设备发送免密请求信息之前,所述方法还包括:所述支付设备向所述服务器发送免密验证请求信息,所述免密验证请求信息用于为所述校验设备请求所述免密标识,以便于所述服务器根据所述免密验证请求信息,生成所述免密标识,确定与所述免密标识对应的免密限额,并向所述校验设备发送所述免密标识。
- 根据权利要求1至4中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述免密标识由所述校验设备利用第一密钥对中的第一加密密钥进行加密或者签名,其中,所述第一加密密钥由所述服务器发送给所述校验设备。
- 根据权利要求1至5中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述支付设备向校验设备发送免密请求信息,包括:所述支付设备向所述校验设备发送经第二密钥对中的第二加密密钥加密的所述免密请求信息,其中,所述第二密钥对由所述支付设备和所述校验设备协商生成,所述第二密钥对包括所述第二加密密钥和第二解密密钥。
- 根据权利要求1至6中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述支付设备为手机,所述校验设备为可穿戴设备;或所述支付设备为可穿戴设备,所述校验设备为手机。
- 一种交易方法,其特征在于,包括:校验设备接收支付设备发送的免密请求信息,所述免密请求信息用于所述支付设备 向所述校验设备请求免密标识,所述免密标识用于指示用于交易的卡片具有免密能力,所述免密标识与所述校验设备关联并且与所述卡片对应,其中,所述支付设备、所述校验设备以及所述卡片已相互关联;所述校验设备解析所述免密请求信息,并向所述支付设备发送响应于所述免密请求信息的免密应答信息,所述免密应答信息包括所述免密标识,所述免密应答信息用于所述支付设备修改所述卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表。
- 根据权利要求8所述的方法,其特征在于,在所述校验设备向所述支付设备发送所述免密应答信息前,所述方法还包括:所述校验设备接收所述交易的服务器发送的所述免密标识,所述免密标识是所述服务器根据所述支付设备发送的免密验证请求信息生成的。
- 根据权利要求8或9所述的方法,其特征在于,在所述校验设备向所述支付设备发送所述免密应答信息前,所述方法还包括:所述校验设备接收所述服务器发送的第一密钥对中的第一加密密钥,所述第一密钥对包括所述第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥;所述校验设备利用所述第一加密密钥加密或者签名所述免密标识。
- 根据权利要求8至10中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述校验设备解析所述免密请求信息,包括:所述校验设备利用第二密钥对中第二解密密钥解密所述免密请求信息,其中,所述第二密钥对由所述校验设备和所述支付设备协商生成,所述第二密钥对包括第二加密密钥和所述第二解密密钥。
- 根据权利要求8至11中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述校验设备为可穿戴设备,所述支付设备为手机;或所述校验设备为手机,所述支付设备为可穿戴设备。
- 一种交易方法,其特征在于,包括:服务器接收销售点设备PoS机发送的授权请求报文,所述授权请求报文包括授权请求密文ARQC,所述ARQC包括与校验设备关联并且与需要进行交易的卡片对应的免密标识,所述免密标识用于使所述服务器获知所述卡片具有免密能力,所述ARQC由支付设备发送给所述PoS机,其中,所述支付设备、所述校验设备以及所述卡片已相互关联;所述服务器根据所述ARQC,验证所述交易是否有效。
- 根据权利要求13所述的方法,其特征在于,在所述服务器接收PoS机发送的授权请求报文前,所述方法还包括:所述服务器接收所述支付设备发送的免密验证请求信息,所述免密验证请求信息用于为所述校验设备请求所述免密标识;所述服务器根据所述免密验证请求信息,生成所述免密标识,确定与所述免密标识对应的免密限额;所述服务器向所述校验设备发送所述免密标识。
- 根据权利要求14所述的方法,其特征在于,所述服务器根据所述ARQC,验证所述交易是否有效,包括:所述服务器解密所述ARQC,确定所述免密标识有效,并且交易金额小于或者等于所述免密限额时,确定所述交易免密;所述服务器解密所述ARQC,确定所述免密标识无效时,拒绝所述交易,或者当所 述服务器确定交易金额大于所述免密限额时,确定所述交易输密。
- 根据权利要求15所述的方法,其特征在于,在所述服务器接收PoS机发送的授权请求报文前,所述方法还包括:所述服务器生成第一密钥对,所述第一密钥对包括第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥;所述服务器向所述校验设备发送所述第一加密密钥,所述第一加密密钥用于所述校验设备加密或者签名所述免密标识;其中,所述服务器利用所述第一密钥对中的第一解密密钥确定所述免密标识是否有效。
- 根据权利要求13至16中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述支付设备为手机,所述校验设备为可穿戴设备;或所述支付设备为可穿戴设备,所述校验设备为手机。
- 一种支付设备,其特征在于,所述支付设备包括:发送单元,用于向校验设备发送免密请求信息,所述免密请求信息用于所述支付设备向所述校验设备请求免密标识,所述免密标识用于指示用于交易的卡片具有免密能力,所述免密标识与所述校验设备关联并且与所述卡片对应,其中,所述支付设备、所述校验设备以及所述卡片已相互关联;接收单元,用于接收所述校验设备发送的响应于所述免密请求信息的免密应答信息,所述免密应答信息包括所述免密标识;处理单元,用于根据所述免密应答信息,修改所述卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表,以便于使销售点设备PoS机获知所述交易为免密交易;所述处理单元还用于根据所述免密应答信息生成授权请求密文ARQC,所述发送单元还用于将所述ARQC发送给所述PoS机,所述ARQC包括所述免密标识,所述ARQC用于所述PoS机生成授权请求报文,并向所述交易的服务器发送所述授权请求报文,所述授权请求报文包括所述ARQC。
- 根据权利要求18所述的支付设备,其特征在于,所述处理单元具体用于:在所述卡片的CVM列表中,将联机个人识别码PIN的使用条件设置为交易金额大于免密限额,所述免密限额与所述免密标识对应。
- 根据权利要求18或19所述的支付设备,其特征在于,所述处理单元具体用于:在所述卡片的CVM列表中的CVM类型中添加设备持卡人验证方法CDCVM,记录所述CDCVM的结果为已验证通过。
- 根据权利要求18至20中任一项所述的支付设备,其特征在于,所述发送单元还用于:在向所述校验设备发送所述免密请求信息之前,向所述服务器发送免密验证请求信息,所述免密验证请求信息用于为所述校验设备请求所述免密标识,以便于所述服务器根据所述免密验证请求信息,生成所述免密标识,确定与所述免密标识对应的免密限额,并向所述校验设备发送所述免密标识。
- 根据权利要求18至21中任一项所述的支付设备,其特征在于,所述接收单元接收的所述免密标识是由所述校验设备利用第一密钥对中的第一加密密钥进行加密或者签名的,其中,所述第一加密密钥由所述服务器发送给所述校验设备。
- 根据权利要求18至22中任一项所述的支付设备,其特征在于,所述发送单元具体用于:向所述校验设备发送经第二密钥对中的第二加密密钥加密的所述免密请求信息,其中,所述第二密钥对由所述支付设备和所述校验设备协商生成,所述第二密钥对包括所述第二加密密钥和第二解密密钥。
- 根据权利要求18至23中任一项所述的支付设备,其特征在于,所述支付设备为手机,所述校验设备为可穿戴设备;或所述支付设备为可穿戴设备,所述校验设备为手机。
- 一种校验设备,其特征在于,所述校验设备包括:接收单元,用于接收支付设备发送的免密请求信息,所述免密请求信息用于所述支付设备向所述校验设备请求免密标识,所述免密标识用于指示交易的卡片具有免密能力,所述免密标识与所述校验设备关联并且与所述卡片对应,其中,所述支付设备、所述校验设备以及所述卡片已相互关联;处理单元,用于解析所述免密请求信息;发送单元,用于向所述支付设备发送响应于所述免密请求信息的免密应答信息,所述免密应答信息包括所述免密标识,所述免密应答信息用于所述支付设备修改所述卡片的持卡人验证方法CVM列表。
- 根据权利要求25所述的校验设备,其特征在于,所述接收单元还用于:在所述发送单元向所述支付设备发送所述免密应答信息前,接收所述交易的服务器发送的所述免密标识,其中,所述免密标识是所述服务器根据所述支付设备发送的所述校验设备免密验证请求信息成的。
- 根据权利要求25或26所述校验设备,其特征在于,所述接收单元还用于:在所述发送单元向所述支付设备发送所述免密应答信息前,接收所述服务器发送的第一密钥对中的第一加密密钥,所述第一密钥对包括所述第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥;所述处理单元还用于:利用所述第一加密密钥加密或者签名所述免密标识。
- 根据权利要求25至27中任一项所述的校验设备,其特征在于,所述处理单元具体用于:利用第二密钥对中第二解密密钥解密所述免密请求信息,其中,所述第二密钥对由所述校验设备和所述支付设备协商生成,所述第二密钥对包括第二加密密钥和所述第二解密密钥。
- 根据权利要求25至28中任一项所述的校验设备,其特征在于,所述校验设备为可穿戴设备,所述支付设备为手机;或所述校验设备为手机,所述支付设备为可穿戴设备。
- 一种服务器,其特征在于,所述服务器包括:接收单元,用于接收销售点设备PoS机发送的授权请求报文,所述授权请求报文包括授权请求密文ARQC,所述ARQC包括与校验设备关联并且与需要进行交易的卡片对应的免密标识,所述免密标识用于使所述使服务器获知所述卡片具有免密能力,所述ARQC由支付设备发送给所述PoS机,其中,所述支付设备、所述校验设备以及所述卡片已相互关联;处理单元,用于根据所述ARQC,验证所述交易是否有效。
- 根据权利要求30所述的服务器,其特征在于,所述接收单元还用于:在接收所述PoS机发送的所述授权请求报文前,接收所述支付设备发送的免密验证请求信息,所 述免密验证请求信息用于为所述校验设备请求所述免密标识;所述处理单元还用于:根据所述免密验证请求信息,生成所述免密标识,确定与所述免密标识对应的免密限额;其中,所述服务器还包括发送单元,所述发送单元用于所向所述校验设备发送所述免密标识。
- 根据权利要求31所述的服务器,其特征在于,所述处理单元具体用于:解密所述ARQC,确定所述免密标识有效,并且交易金额小于或者等于所述免密限额时,确定所述交易免密;解密所述ARQC,确定所述免密标识无效时,拒绝所述交易,或者当确定交易金额大于所述免密限额时,确定所述交易输密。
- 根据权利要求32所述的服务器,其特征在于,所述处理单元还用于:在所述接收单元接收所述PoS机发送的所述授权请求报文前,生成第一密钥对,所述第一密钥对包括第一加密密钥和第一解密密钥;所述发送单元还用于:向所述校验设备发送所述第一加密密钥,所述第一加密密钥用于所述校验设备加密或者签名所述免密标识;其中,所述处理单元具体用于:利用所述第一密钥对中的第一解密密钥确定所述免密标识是否有效。
- 根据权利要求30至33中任一项所述的服务器,其特征在于,所述支付设备为手机,所述校验设备为可穿戴设备;或所述支付设备为可穿戴设备,所述校验设备为手机。
- 一种支付设备,其特征在于,所述支付设备包括:处理器、存储器、接收器和发送器,所述处理器、所述存储器、所述接收器和所述发送器之间通过总线连接,所述存储器用于存储指令,所述接收器、所述发送器和所述处理器用于调用所述存储器中存储的指令,执行权利要求1至7中任一项所述的交易方法。
- 一种校验设备,其特征在于,所述校验设备包括:处理器、存储器、接收器和发送器,所述处理器、所述存储器、所述接收器和所述发送器之间通过总线连接,所述存储器用于存储指令,所述接收器、所述发送器和所述处理器用于调用所述存储器中存储的指令,执行权利要求8至12中任一项所述的交易方法。
- 一种服务器,其特征在于,所述服务器包括:处理器、存储器、接收器和发送器,所述处理器、所述存储器、所述接收器和所述发送器之间通过总线连接,所述存储器用于存储指令,所述接收器、所述发送器和所述处理器用于调用所述存储器中存储的指令,执行权利要求13至17中任一项所述的交易方法。
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CN108604341B (zh) | 2022-04-12 |
CN108604341A (zh) | 2018-09-28 |
US20190362334A1 (en) | 2019-11-28 |
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