WO2018046008A1 - Procédé de conception de stockage de puce radiofréquence chiffrée par chaînage de blocs - Google Patents

Procédé de conception de stockage de puce radiofréquence chiffrée par chaînage de blocs Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018046008A1
WO2018046008A1 PCT/CN2017/101304 CN2017101304W WO2018046008A1 WO 2018046008 A1 WO2018046008 A1 WO 2018046008A1 CN 2017101304 W CN2017101304 W CN 2017101304W WO 2018046008 A1 WO2018046008 A1 WO 2018046008A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
user
data
radio frequency
blockchain
frequency chip
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PCT/CN2017/101304
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
陆杨
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上海鼎利信息科技有限公司
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Publication of WO2018046008A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018046008A1/fr

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Definitions

  • the invention relates to the field of Internet technology, and relates to a blockchain encryption radio frequency chip storage design method.
  • Blockchain encryption RF chip is increasingly important as a link between the user and the blockchain network.
  • Blockchain encryption RF chip storage methods are constantly threatened by hackers and viruses. Security incidents have occurred many times in recent years.
  • a dense RF chip is used as a tool.
  • the storage and operation of the blockchain encryption RF chip is the foundation and core. It is necessary not only to take into account the technology of the blockchain, but also to consider security, application and scalability. Therefore, there is a need for a storage design method for a blockchain encrypted radio frequency chip that solves the above problems.
  • the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a storage design method for a blockchain encryption radio frequency chip which is widely used, high in security, good in scalability, and highly applicable.
  • the technical solution of the present invention is: a storage design method for a blockchain encryption radio frequency chip, comprising the following steps:
  • the first step is to design the blockchain to encrypt the data structure of the RF chip
  • the data in the blockchain encryption radio frequency chip is designed to be organized and stored in the user memory
  • the third step is to design the encryption and decryption process of the blockchain encryption radio frequency chip
  • the data structure of the blockchain encryption radio frequency chip includes user data, authentication data and account data;
  • the user data includes read control data A, a user name, a user phone, and a user ID;
  • the read control data A is used to store information for controlling user data reading, the user name is used to store the user's name information, the user phone is used to store the user's phone information, and the user ID stores the internal user number;
  • the authentication data includes: read control data B, user password hash value, authentication key, account master public key;
  • the read control data B is used to authenticate the information read by the data, and the information of the authentication data is extracted, and the local time stamp is added to obtain the user anti-counterfeit mark to prevent tampering, and finally the value of the user anti-counterfeiting mark and the user are
  • the value of the password is converted into a hash value of the length required for the actual security authentication by the hash encryption algorithm, and the process of extracting the information of the authentication data reading is:
  • the information read by the authentication data of any length is divided to generate sub-information segments of length 4n bytes, where n is an arbitrary integer value determined according to the system in advance, and then a Hash function transform is used to generate a 4n-length hash. The value is obtained by adding the local timestamp to obtain the user security flag. In the case that the blockchain encryption radio chip is lost, the illegal user is effectively prevented from violently cracking the user password.
  • the authentication key is used to read the control data B and the Secure authentication between user password hash values, account public key decryption is used to decrypt user security tokens for querying the balance of each account;
  • the account data includes: read control data C, master key ciphertext, and master private key ciphertext;
  • the read control data C is used to store the information read by the account data
  • the master key ciphertext is used to associate the user password with the account private key, improve the encryption parameter of the account public key, improve the difficulty of cracking, and make the account more Safety;
  • the data in the blockchain encryption radio frequency chip is organized in the user memory as a tree file structure, and has a multi-level file structure.
  • the tree file structure is divided into three levels: the first level is the total control file, which is more
  • the root of the application file structure is the root directory of the tree file structure, which is used to store the public information file of the blockchain encryption RF chip and serves all applications; the second level is the application file, which is in the total control file.
  • the application file is used to implement various application functions of the blockchain encryption radio frequency chip
  • the third level is an atom file, which is used to store the actual The application data and the corresponding system management information, the data information in the data structure of the blockchain encryption radio frequency chip is stored in the atom file, and the corresponding atom file can be called when the application file needs;
  • the encryption and decryption process of the blockchain encryption radio frequency chip is:
  • Encryption The system randomly generates a 32-byte master key, reads the user's password at the same time, and stores it in the array matrix, where the user uses the password as the row vector and the master key as the column vector.
  • the encryption algorithm encrypts to obtain the master key ciphertext;
  • the blockchain encryption radio frequency chip storage design method of the invention studies the principle of the blockchain, considers the information security degree, designs the data structure of the blockchain encryption radio frequency chip, and considers the process of encryption and decryption, in order to To meet the principle of multi-purpose card, we have designed a multi-level file structure, increased the degree of information protection, and improved the security and ease of use.
  • FIG. 1 is a specific step of a blockchain encryption radio frequency chip storage design method.
  • Embodiment 1 Hash function construction of user password
  • the user-used password required for the verification card is transformed into a hash value of a desired length by a hash function.
  • the specific process is to first fill and divide the user-used password of any length to generate a sub-information segment of length 4n bytes, and then pass Chaotic iteration, function transformation, substitution, and function lookup tables generate a 4n length hash value.
  • the specific algorithm is as follows:
  • the user is represented by a password into a format.
  • m is the initial number of iterations.
  • a user of any length is padded and divided using a password to generate a sub-information segment having a length of 4 n bytes.
  • Embodiment 2 Definition and application of application files under the system total control file
  • the blockchain encrypts the public information files of the RF chip and serves all applications. Create multiple application catalog files according to the usage conditions on the total control file, for example, the blockchain financial environment including key information, personal information, etc., and then define the financial contact application environment, and encrypt the radio frequency chip according to the Chinese financial blockchain.
  • the specification defines the file name for this application as 1PAY.SYS.DDF01.
  • the financial contactless system environment can also be defined and defined as 2PAY.SYS.DDF01.
  • the financial contact application environment and the financial contact application environment are different application files under the system total control file, and the application file realizes various application selections by using the file name to realize various applications of the radio frequency chip.
  • Embodiment 3 Specific Planning of Key Structure
  • Key management is a comprehensive technology involving the generation, inspection, distribution, transmission, use, storage and destruction of keys, and is closely related to the key management system and the quality of personnel.
  • the ISO has developed a key management standard.
  • the specific system has specific practical requirements, so it is difficult to unify in standardization.
  • the hierarchical structure of the key system is often determined according to the functional structure of the encryption system. If the system function is relatively simple, the key hierarchy can be correspondingly reduced. If the function is relatively complicated, it is necessary to increase the number of key structure layers as appropriate.
  • the security of the key management system can be greatly improved by the design of the layered mode. Since the new protocol can be used to change and manage in each layer, the entire key system is a dynamic feature, not just a static storage mechanism. With each layer of keys, there is a corresponding protocol. .
  • a layer 3 key management system is used in the blockchain encryption radio chip system, which is a master key layer, a subkey layer and a session key layer, respectively.
  • the same system master key exists in the intelligent blockchain encryption radio chip and the card reader. According to the actual situation of the system, some smart cards or card readers have one or more master keys to improve the system. Security. Only one master key is used in this system.
  • the subkey is obtained by encrypting the master key using a variable master key parameter
  • the third layer session key is obtained by encrypting the subkey with another variable master key parameter.
  • the data transmitted between the reader and the chip is encrypted using a session key. Normally, the session key can only be used once, so that even if the session key is deciphered by the attacker, only the data is transmitted once. Also, the system master key cannot be derived from the session key.
  • the session key generation method includes: a state-of-the-art manufacturing identification code is used in the blockchain encryption radio frequency chip, and the serial number or the blockchain is used to encrypt the radio frequency chip serial number, wherein the serial number of the radio frequency chip is encrypted according to the blockchain.
  • the system usually records the time of the transaction at the time of the transaction, and there are corresponding counters in some cards to control the number of readings and writes. The counter is automatically incremented when the card is executed with an instruction. This ensures that the value of the counter and the trading time are inconsistent each time a transaction is made. Therefore, the manufacturer's identification code of the card is used by the master key, and the serial number of the card is encrypted to generate a subkey.
  • the same master key is used, since the serial numbers are different, the subkeys generated by each card are also different. To ensure that the session key on each card is used only once, the transaction time and counter values are encrypted using a subkey to generate a session key. Thus, for the same card, the session key used for each transaction is different. For a multi-purpose chip, different applications often use different master keys, so this makes the deciphering system a lot of work, and the meaning of deciphering is not great.
  • the master key can be presented by a plurality of trusted persons independently of each other and then organically synthesized into a key, and then added by a secure random number encryption operation. Therefore, the generation and change of the master key are difficult to predict. Department If the master key is not careful during the loading process, the key will be leaked. Therefore, the master key must be loaded in a secure environment. Since the system master key needs to be manually loaded into the radio frequency chip and the card reader, it is ensured that the loading process must be performed on the dedicated device, and the environment at the time of downloading must be secure, and the information cannot be lost when the radio frequency card is in contact. The in-card operating system ensures that the master key cannot be read again after it has been loaded. It is very troublesome to load the key in the card reader, and a security module is often added to store the key to implement the encryption and decryption algorithm.
  • the encryption and decryption algorithm uses a digital chaotic sequence, which can improve the digital chaotic iterative process without increasing the amount of computation, so that the pseudo-random sequence generated by the whole system is more similar to noise, and the proportion of weak keys is reduced and expanded.
  • the space of the available keys makes the selection of keys more random.
  • the pseudo-chaotic sequence period generated by the iteration of the digital chaotic system is unpredictable, difficult to accurately analyze, and far less than 2 N (N is the implementation accuracy). Although the accuracy of the implementation is improved, the average period of the pseudo-chaotic sequence is still not greatly improved, and there is still a case where the sequence is attracted to a certain fixed value.
  • the m-sequence is used to perturb the chaotic iterative system.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé de conception de stockage d'une puce radiofréquence chiffrée par chaînage de blocs. Le procédé comprend les étapes consistant à : concevoir la structure de données d'une puce radiofréquence chiffrée par chaînage de blocs ; concevoir la forme selon laquelle des données de la puce radiofréquence chiffrée par chaînage de blocs sont organisées et stockées dans une mémoire utilisateur ; et concevoir des processus de chiffrement et de déchiffrement pour la puce radiofréquence chiffrée par chaînage de blocs. L'étude du principe de chiffrement du chaînage de blocs permet au procédé de conception de stockage d'une puce radiofréquence chiffrée par chaînage de blocs d'améliorer la sécurité des informations, satisfaire le principe d'une carte unique pour une pluralité d'usages, améliorer le degré de protection d'informations, et améliorer la sécurité et la commodité d'utilisation.
PCT/CN2017/101304 2016-09-12 2017-09-11 Procédé de conception de stockage de puce radiofréquence chiffrée par chaînage de blocs WO2018046008A1 (fr)

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CN201610818054.8 2016-09-12
CN201610815590.2 2016-09-12
CN201610818054 2016-09-12
CN201610818053.3 2016-09-12
CN201610815590 2016-09-12
CN201610818053 2016-09-12

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