WO2014194592A1 - 移动终端、移动支付的安全验证方法及装置 - Google Patents

移动终端、移动支付的安全验证方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2014194592A1
WO2014194592A1 PCT/CN2013/084779 CN2013084779W WO2014194592A1 WO 2014194592 A1 WO2014194592 A1 WO 2014194592A1 CN 2013084779 W CN2013084779 W CN 2013084779W WO 2014194592 A1 WO2014194592 A1 WO 2014194592A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
verification
conduction
switch
conduction path
mobile terminal
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2013/084779
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
古明涛
徐刚
Original Assignee
中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 中兴通讯股份有限公司 filed Critical 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority to US14/896,544 priority Critical patent/US9848326B2/en
Priority to EP13886336.0A priority patent/EP3007363A4/en
Priority to JP2016517126A priority patent/JP2016532170A/ja
Publication of WO2014194592A1 publication Critical patent/WO2014194592A1/zh

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/327Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
    • G06Q20/3278RFID or NFC payments by means of M-devices
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04BTRANSMISSION
    • H04B5/00Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4014Identity check for transactions
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06Authentication
    • H04W12/062Pre-authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of mobile payment, and in particular to a mobile terminal, a mobile payment security verification method and apparatus.
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • the current main application scenario is a credit card payment function.
  • an NFC mobile phone needs to have a security unit (Secure Element). , referred to as SE).
  • SE security unit
  • the mainstream NFC payment scheme is to embed the SE in a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card, but when the mobile phone is lost, the illegal person can use the lost mobile phone to perform the credit card service casually.
  • SIM Subscriber Identity Module
  • a mobile terminal including: a financial card for performing mobile payment, an NFC chip, the mobile terminal further comprising: a switch, coupled to the financial card and the NFC Between the chips, configured to receive a control signal from the processor, and control to turn off or turn on a conduction path between the financial card and the NFC chip according to the control signal; the processor, and the conducting a switch coupling connection configured to verify verification information input by the user before the financial card and the external reader transaction, and generate the control for controlling the conduction switch to conduct the conduction path when the verification is correct And controlling a signal, and generating a control signal for controlling the conduction switch to close the conduction path when the verification fails.
  • the mobile terminal further includes: a display module, coupled to the processor, configured to prompt the user to input correctly when the initial state of the conduction path is off or the verification information fails to be verified Verification information.
  • the processor is further configured to generate the control signal for controlling the closing of the conduction path after the transaction is successful.
  • the financial card comprises one of the following: a subscriber identity module SIM card with a security unit SE built in, a financial integrated circuit IC card.
  • a secure authentication method for mobile payment is provided, which is implemented by a conductive switch connected between an NFC chip and a financial card for performing mobile payment in a mobile terminal, the method comprising: The financial card and the external reader verify the verification information input by the user before the transaction; control the opening or closing of the conduction switch according to the verification result, wherein when the verification result is correct, the conduction switch is controlled to conduct the financial
  • the conduction path between the card and the NFC chip controls the conduction switch to close the conduction path when the verification result fails.
  • the method further includes: prompting the user to input correct verification information in an interface form when the initial state of the conduction path is off or the verification of the verification information fails.
  • the method further includes: controlling, after the transaction is successful, the conduction path to be closed by the conduction switch.
  • a security verification apparatus for mobile payment is provided, which is implemented by a conduction switch connected between a near field communication NFC chip and a financial card for performing mobile payment in a mobile terminal, the apparatus comprising: a verification module, configured to verify the verification information input by the user before the transaction by the financial card and the external reader; and the control module is configured to control the opening or closing of the conduction switch according to the verification result, wherein the verification result is correct And controlling the conduction switch to conduct a conduction path between the financial card and the NFC chip, and when the verification result fails, controlling the conduction switch to close the conduction path.
  • the device further includes: a prompting module, configured to prompt the user to input correct verification information in the form of an interface when the conduction path is closed or the verification information fails to be verified.
  • the control module is further configured to control the conduction path to be closed by the conduction switch after the transaction is successful.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the structure of a mobile terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing another structure of a mobile terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a mobile terminal according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a security verification method for mobile payment according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 5 is a structural block diagram of a security verification apparatus for mobile payment according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Another structural block diagram of a secure authentication device for mobile payment is Another structural block diagram of a secure authentication device for mobile payment; and
  • FIG. 7 is a flow chart of a method for implementing mobile payment in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
  • BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be noted that the embodiments in the present application and the features in the embodiments may be combined with each other without conflict.
  • FIG. 1 is a structural block diagram of a mobile terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG.
  • the mobile terminal includes: a financial card 101 for performing mobile payment, an NFC chip 103, and a turn-on switch 105 coupled between the financial card 101 and the NFC chip 103, and configured to receive from the processor 107.
  • the control signal controls the closing or opening of the conduction path between the financial card 101 and the NFC chip 103 according to the control signal; the processor 107 is coupled to the conduction switch 105 and is arranged to be before the financial card 101 and the external reader transaction. Verifying the verification information input by the user, and generating a control signal for controlling the conduction switch to conduct the conduction path when the verification is correct, and generating a control for closing the conduction path when the verification fails. control signal.
  • the verification information input by the user is verified before the financial card in the mobile terminal and the external reader perform the transaction, and the conduction path between the financial card and the NFC chip is controlled by the conduction switch according to the verification result.
  • Turning on or off therefore, it can solve technical problems such as poor security guarantee effect of the mobile payment scheme, and effectively improve the security of the mobile payment process.
  • the verification fails or the above-mentioned conduction path is in the off state (ie, the initial state is off)
  • the initial state is off
  • the mobile terminal may further include: a display module 109 coupled to the processor 107, configured to prompt the user to input correct verification information in an interface form when the control signal is to control the closing of the conduction path.
  • the processor 107 may further generate a control signal for controlling the closing of the conduction path after the transaction is successful, and close the conduction path.
  • the financial card 101 includes, but is not limited to, one of the following: a SIM card with a built-in SE, and a financial set IC card.
  • the main design idea of the following preferred embodiment is to provide an SWP conduction switch for connecting the SIM card to the NFC chip at the mobile terminal.
  • the SWP conduction switch is controlled by the GPIO port of the mobile phone.
  • the password authentication module 303 needs to be opened. After the correct password is input, the GPIO output signal turns on the SWP switch, so that the NFC chip and the SIM card are turned on, so that the NFC card swiping service can be performed.
  • the preferred embodiment is described by taking a mobile phone as an example. As shown in FIG.
  • the mobile terminal includes: an application processor (Application Processor, AP for short) 301, a password authentication module 303, an NFC chip 305, a SIM card 307 supporting SE, and a single wire protocol (Single Wire Protocol, referred to as SWP).
  • the switch 309 is turned on, and the NFC antenna 311.
  • the AP301 is connected to the NFC chip 305 through the I2C bus, or uses other high-speed buses such as a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) and a High Speed UART (HSU).
  • SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
  • HSU High Speed UART
  • the AP301 communicates with the SIM card 307 through the IS07816 interface, and controls the SWP conduction switch 309 through the GPIO.
  • the SIM card 307 has a built-in SE security unit, communicates with the AP301 via the IS07816 protocol, and communicates with the NFC chip 305 via the SWP.
  • the password authentication module 303 turns on the SWP turn-on switch 309 by controlling the output signal of the GPIO port.
  • the SWP turn-on switch 309 is connected to the SIM card 307 and the NFC chip 305 through the SWP line.
  • the SWP turn-off 309 can turn on or off the connection between the SIM card 307 and the NFC chip 305.
  • the NFC antenna 311 is connected to the NFC chip 305 for radio frequency data transmission.
  • the NFC antenna can be attached to the back of the battery or to the inside of the back cover of the phone, but is not limited to this.
  • 4 is a flow chart of a method for secure verification of mobile payment according to an embodiment of the present invention. The method in this embodiment is implemented by a switch between a NFC chip and a financial card for performing mobile payment in a mobile terminal. As shown in FIG.
  • Step S402 The financial card and the external reader are The verification information entered by the user before the transaction is verified.
  • Step S404 controlling the turning on or off according to the verification result, wherein when the verification result is correct, the control conducting switch turns on the conduction path between the financial card and the NFC chip, and when the verification result fails, the control is turned on.
  • the switch closes the above conduction path.
  • a security verification device for mobile payment is further provided, which is implemented by a conduction switch connected between a near field communication NFC chip and a financial card for performing mobile payment in a mobile terminal, to implement the foregoing implementation.
  • a conduction switch connected between a near field communication NFC chip and a financial card for performing mobile payment in a mobile terminal, to implement the foregoing implementation.
  • the apparatus includes a verification module 50 coupled to the control module 52 for setting verification of the verification information input by the user before the transaction by the financial card and the external reader.
  • the control module 52 is configured to control the opening or closing of the conduction switch according to the verification result, wherein, when the verification result is correct, the conduction switch is controlled to conduct the conduction path between the financial card and the NFC chip, and when the verification result fails The control conduction switch turns off the above conduction path.
  • the foregoing apparatus may further include, but not limited to: a prompting module 54 configured to prompt the user to input the correct test in the form of an interface when the conduction path is closed or the verification information fails to be verified. Certificate information.
  • the function of the prompting module 54 can also be implemented by the control module 52 and a display module (such as a display screen) of the mobile terminal.
  • the above control module 52 is further configured to control the conduction path to be closed by the conduction switch after the transaction is successful.
  • Method 1 Before the NFC card transaction, if the SWP switch 309 is turned off, the user needs to activate the password authentication module 303, and input the correct password. After the password verification is passed, the password authentication module sets the GPIO port output signal, and the SWP is turned on. Switch 309. The SWP connection between the NFC chip 305 and the SIM card 307 is turned on. If an incorrect password is entered, the password authentication module will refuse to open the channel between the NFC chip 305 and the SIM card 307, and the mobile phone cannot perform the NFC card swipe service.
  • the mobile phone can perform the NFC card swiping service close to the Pos machine, and the Pos opportunity to exchange data through the wireless communication protocol between the NFC antenna 311 and the NFC chip 305, and the NFC chip 305 and the SIM card 307 pass the SWP.
  • the protocol exchanges data, in other words, the Pos machine reads the relevant information in the SIM card.
  • the NFC chip 305 reports the successful card-sending event to the mobile phone AP301 through the I2C, and the AP side automatically invokes the password authentication module 303 to control the GPIO port output signal, and closes the SWP-on switch to close the NFC chip 305 and the SIM card 307. aisle.
  • Method 2 Before the card transaction is performed, the user forgets to open the SWP switch 309 through the password authentication module 303. At this time, when the mobile phone is close to the POS machine, the NFC chip 305 detects that there is no path between the SIM card 307, and the NFC chip 305 feeds back to the mobile phone AP301 through the I2C, and the AP side automatically starts the password authentication module, and the pop-up prompt interface prompts the user to pass the password authentication module. Turn on the SWP turn-on switch. After the user opens the SWP switch 309 through the password authentication module, the NFC card service is performed again near the Pos machine.
  • Step S702 Before performing an NFC card swiping transaction, detecting whether the password authentication module has been logged in. If yes, go to step S704, otherwise go to step S710. Step S704, the SWP switch is turned on, and the process goes to step S706.
  • step S706 the card is swiped close to the Pos, and the process goes to step S708.
  • step S708, the card transaction is successful, and the process goes to step S722.
  • step S710 the card is swiped close to the Pos, and the process goes to step S712.
  • step S712 the card transaction fails, and the process goes to step S714.
  • step S714, the mobile phone pops up the password authentication module, and proceeds to step S716.
  • step S718 the card is swiped close to the Pos, and the process goes to step S720.
  • step S720 the card transaction is successful.
  • step S722 the NFC reports a card swipe success event.
  • Step S724 the AP invokes the password authentication module to automatically close the SWP channel, and ends.
  • the following beneficial effects are achieved in the embodiments of the present invention:
  • the user sets a password to control the GPIO port signal to turn on the SWP switch, and the NFC card service can be normally performed after the switch is turned on.
  • the SWP channel is closed, it has no effect on other NFC functions.
  • Point to Point (P2P) and the card reader are used as usual, but the card card service is not supported.
  • a storage medium is provided, the software being stored, including but not limited to: an optical disk, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a rewritable memory, and the like.
  • the technical solution provided by the present invention can verify the verification information input by the user before the financial card in the mobile terminal and the external reader perform the transaction, and control the conduction path between the financial card and the NFC chip according to the verification result. Turning on or off can further improve the security of the mobile payment process.
  • the above modules or steps of the present invention can be implemented by a general-purpose computing device, which can be concentrated on a single computing device or distributed over a network composed of multiple computing devices. Alternatively, they may be implemented by program code executable by the computing device, such that they may be stored in the storage device by the computing device and, in some cases, may be different from the order herein.

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  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract

本发明提供了一种移动终端、移动支付的安全验证方法及装置。其中,该移动终端包括:用于进行移动支付的金融卡、NFC芯片,所述移动终端还包括:导通开关,耦合连接在金融卡与NFC芯片之间,设置为接收来自处理器的控制信号,并根据所述控制信号控制所述金融卡和所述NFC芯片之间导通通路的关闭或开启;所述处理器,与所述导通开关耦合连接,设置为在所述金融卡和外界阅读器交易之前对用户输入的验证信息进行验证,并在验证正确时产生用于控制所述导通开关导通所述导通通路的所述控制信号,以及在验证失败时产生用于控制所述导通开关关闭所述导通通路的所述控制信号。采用本发明提供的技术方案,可以提高移动支付过程的安全性。

Description

移动终端、 移动支付的安全验证方法及装置 技术领域 本发明涉及移动支付领域, 具体而言, 涉及一种移动终端、 移动支付的安全验证 方法及装置。 背景技术 近场通信 (又称为近距离无线通信, Near Field Communication, 简称为 NFC), 目 前的主要应用场景是刷卡支付功能, 为了保证支付交易的安全性, NFC手机需要具备 安全单元(Secure Element, 简称为 SE)。 目前主流的 NFC支付方案, 是将 SE内置于 用户识别模块 (Subscriber Identity Module, 简称为 SIM) 卡中, 但是当手机丢失时, 非法人员便可以使用丢失的手机随便进行刷卡业务。 针对相关技术中的上述问题, 目前尚未提出有效的解决方案。 发明内容 针对相关技术中, 移动支付方案存在的安全保障效果不佳等技术问题, 本发明提 供了一种移动终端、 移动支付的安全验证方法及装置, 以至少解决上述问题。 根据本发明的一个方面, 提供了一种移动终端, 包括: 用于进行移动支付的金融 卡、 NFC芯片, 所述移动终端还包括: 导通开关, 耦合连接在所述金融卡与所述 NFC 芯片之间, 设置为接收来自处理器的控制信号, 并根据所述控制信号控制所述金融卡 和所述 NFC芯片之间导通通路的关闭或开启;所述处理器,与所述导通开关耦合连接, 设置为在所述金融卡和外界阅读器交易之前对用户输入的验证信息进行验证, 并在验 证正确时产生用于控制所述导通开关导通所述导通通路的所述控制信号, 以及在验证 失败时产生用于控制所述导通开关关闭所述导通通路的所述控制信号。 优选地, 上述移动终端还包括: 显示模块, 与所述处理器耦合连接, 设置为在所 述导通通路初始状态为关闭或者对所述验证信息验证失败时, 以界面的形式提示用户 输入正确的验证信息。 优选地, 所述处理器, 还设置为在所述交易成功后, 产生用于控制所述导通通路 关闭的所述控制信号。 优选地, 所述金融卡包括以下之一: 内置有安全单元 SE的用户识别模块 SIM卡、 金融集成电路 IC卡。 根据本发明的另一个方面, 提供了一种移动支付的安全验证方法, 通过移动终端 中连接在 NFC芯片和进行移动支付的金融卡之间的导通开关实现, 所述方法包括: 对 所述金融卡和外界阅读器在交易之前用户输入的验证信息进行验证; 根据验证结果控 制所述导通开关的开启或关闭, 其中, 在验证结果正确时, 控制所述导通开关导通所 述金融卡和所述 NFC芯片之间的导通通路, 在验证结果失败时, 控制所述导通开关关 闭所述导通通路。 优选地, 上述方法还包括: 在所述导通通路初始状态为关闭或者对所述验证信息 验证失败时, 以界面的形式提示用户输入正确的验证信息。 优选地, 上述方法还包括: 在所述交易成功后, 通过所述导通开关控制所述导通 通路关闭。 根据本发明的又一个方面, 提供了一种移动支付的安全验证装置, 通过移动终端 中连接在近场通信 NFC芯片和进行移动支付的金融卡之间的导通开关实现,所述装置 包括: 验证模块, 设置为对所述金融卡和外界阅读器在交易之前用户输入的验证信息 进行验证; 控制模块, 设置为根据验证结果控制所述导通开关的开启或关闭, 其中, 在验证结果正确时,控制所述导通开关导通所述金融卡和所述 NFC芯片之间的导通通 路, 在验证结果失败时, 控制所述导通开关关闭所述导通通路。 优选地, 上述装置还包括: 提示模块, 设置为在所述导通通路关闭或者对所述验 证信息验证失败时, 以界面的形式提示用户输入正确的验证信息。 优选地, 所述控制模块, 还设置为在所述交易成功后, 通过所述导通开关控制所 述导通通路关闭。 通过本发明, 在移动终端中的金融卡和外界阅读器进行交易之前, 对用户输入的 验证信息进行验证,并根据验证结果控制金融卡和 NFC芯片之间的导通通路导通或关 闭的技术手段,解决了相关技术中移动支付方案存在的安全保障效果不佳等技术问题, 进一步提高了移动支付过程的安全性。 附图说明 此处所说明的附图用来提供对本发明的进一步理解, 构成本申请的一部分, 本发 明的示意性实施例及其说明用于解释本发明, 并不构成对本发明的不当限定。 在附图 中- 图 1为根据本发明实施例的移动终端的结构框图; 图 2为根据本发明实施例的移动终端的另一结构框图; 图 3为根据本发明优选实施例的移动终端的结构示意图; 图 4为根据本发明实施例的移动支付的安全验证方法的流程图; 图 5为根据本发明实施例的移动支付的安全验证装置的结构框图; 图 6为根据本发明实施例的移动支付的安全验证装置的另一结构框图; 以及 图 7为根据本发明优选实施例的移动支付的实现方法的流程图。 具体实施方式 下文中将参考附图并结合实施例来详细说明本发明。 需要说明的是, 在不冲突的 情况下, 本申请中的实施例及实施例中的特征可以相互组合。 图 1为根据本发明实施例的移动终端的结构框图。如图 1所示,该移动终端包括: 用于进行移动支付的金融卡 101、 NFC芯片 103、 导通开关 105, 耦合连接在金 融卡 101与 NFC芯片 103之间, 设置为接收来自处理器 107的控制信号, 并根据控 制信号控制金融卡 101和 NFC芯片 103之间导通通路的关闭或开启; 处理器 107, 与导通开关 105耦合连接,设置为在金融卡 101和外界阅读器交易之前对用户输入的 验证信息进行验证, 并在验证正确时产生用于控制导通开关导通上述导通通路的控制 信号, 以及在验证失败时产生用于控制上述导通开关关闭上述导通通路的控制信号。 通过上述各个结构, 由于在移动终端中的金融卡和外界阅读器进行交易之前, 对 用户输入的验证信息进行验证,并根据验证结果通过导通开关控制金融卡和 NFC芯片 之间的导通通路导通或关闭, 因此, 可以解决移动支付方案存在的安全保障效果不佳 等技术问题, 有效提高移动支付过程的安全性。 在本实施例中, 为了在验证失败或上述导通通路在交易之前为关闭状态 (即初始 状态为关闭) 的情况下可以进行正常的移动支付, 在本实施例中, 如图 2所示, 上述 移动终端还可以包括: 显示模块 109, 与处理器 107耦合连接, 设置为在控制信号为 控制上述导通通路关闭时, 以界面的形式提示用户输入正确的验证信息。 在本实施例中, 为了节省运行资源, 上述处理器 107, 还可以在交易成功后, 产 生用于控制上述导通通路关闭的控制信号, 以及时关闭上述导通通路。 在本实施例中, 上述金融卡 101包括但不限于以下之一: 内置有 SE的 SIM卡、 金融集 IC卡。 为了更好地理解上述实施例, 以下结合移动终端的一个优选实施例详细说明。 以 下优选实施例的主要设计思想在于, 在移动终端设置 SWP导通开关, 用于将 SIM卡 连接到 NFC芯片。其中 SWP导通开关通过手机 GPIO口进行控制。 当用户进行刷卡 业务时, 需要打开密码认证模块 303, 输入正确密码后, GPIO输出信号打开 SWP导 通开关, 使 NFC芯片与 SIM卡之间导通, 便可以进行 NFC刷卡业务。 本优选实施例以手机为例进行说明。 如图 3所示, 该移动终端包括: 应用处理器 (Application Processor, 简称为 AP) 301, 密码认证模块 303, NFC芯片 305, 支持 SE的 SIM卡 307, 单线协议 (Single Wire Protocol, 简称为 SWP) 导通开关 309, 以及 NFC天线 311。
AP301通过 I2C总线与 NFC芯片 305相连, 或者使用其他高速总线比如串行外 设接口 (Serial Peripheral Interface, 简称为 SPI ), 高速串口 (High Speed UART, 简称为 HSU ) 等。
AP301通过 IS07816接口与 SIM卡 307进行通讯, 通过 GPIO对 SWP导通开 关 309进行控制。
SIM卡 307内置 SE安全单元, 与 AP301通过 IS07816协议进行通讯, 与 NFC 芯片 305通过 SWP进行通讯。 密码认证模块 303通过控制 GPIO口输出信号导通 SWP导通开关 309。
SWP导通开关 309通过 SWP线与 SIM卡 307和 NFC芯片 305相连。 SWP导 通关 309能导通或断开 SIM卡 307与 NFC芯片 305之间的连接。 NFC天线 311与 NFC芯片 305相连, 进行射频数据传输。 NFC天线可以贴在电 池背面或者手机后盖内侧, 但不限于此。 图 4为根据本发明实施例的移动支付的安全验证方法的流程图。 本实施例中的方 法通过移动终端中连接在 NFC芯片和进行移动支付的金融卡之间的导通开关实现,如 图 4所示, 该方法包括: 步骤 S402, 对金融卡和外界阅读器在交易之前用户输入的验证信息进行验证。 步骤 S404,根据验证结果控制导通开关的开启或关闭,其中,在验证结果正确时, 控制导通开关导通金融卡和 NFC芯片之间的导通通路, 在验证结果失败时, 控制导通 开关关闭上述导通通路。 通过上述各个步骤, 同样可以解决移动支付方案存在的安全保障效果不佳等技术 问题, 有效提高移动支付过程的安全性。 在本实施例中, 在导通通路初始状态为关闭或者对验证信息验证失败时, 可以以 界面的形式提示用户输入正确的验证信息。 为了节省资源, 在交易成功后, 通过导通开关控制上述导通通路关闭。 在本实施例中还提供了一种移动支付的安全验证装置, 该装置通过移动终端中连 接在近场通信 NFC芯片和进行移动支付的金融卡之间的导通开关实现,用于实现上述 实施例及优选实施方式, 已经进行过说明的不再赘述, 下面对该装置中涉及到的模块 进行说明。如以下所使用的, 术语"模块"可以实现预定功能的软件和 /或硬件的组合。 尽管以下实施例所描述的装置较佳地以软件来实现, 但是硬件, 或者软件和硬件的组 合的实现也是可能并被构想的。 图 5为根据本发明实施例的移动支付的安全验证装置 的结构框图。 如图 5所示, 该装置包括- 验证模块 50, 连接至控制模块 52, 设置为对金融卡和外界阅读器在交易之前用 户输入的验证信息进行验证。 控制模块 52, 设置为根据验证结果控制导通开关的开启或关闭, 其中, 在验证结 果正确时, 控制上述导通开关导通金融卡和 NFC芯片之间的导通通路, 在验证结果失 败时, 控制导通开关关闭上述导通通路。 在本实施例中, 如图 6所示, 上述装置还可以包括但不限于: 提示模块 54, 设置 为在导通通路关闭或者对验证信息验证失败时, 以界面的形式提示用户输入正确的验 证信息。 该提示模块 54的功能也可以通过控制模块 52和移动终端的显示模块(例如 显示屏) 实现。 优选地, 为了节省资源, 上述控制模块 52, 还设置为在交易成功后, 通过导通开 关控制导通通路关闭。 以下结合一个优选实施例,说明利用上述实施例的设计思想实现移动支付的方案, 本实施例中的移动支付的实现方法可以基于图 3所示移动终端实现, 但不限于此。 方式一: 在进行 NFC刷卡交易前, 如果 SWP导通开关 309关闭, 用户需要启动 密码认证模块 303, 输入正确密码, 密码验证通过后, 密码认证模块会设置 GPIO口 输出信号, 导通 SWP导通开关 309。 NFC芯片 305与 SIM卡 307之间 SWP连接被 导通。 如果输入错误密码, 密码认证模块会拒绝打开 NFC芯片 305与 SIM卡 307之 间的通道, 此时手机无法进行 NFC刷卡业务。 当输入正确密码打开 SWP通道后, 手 机可以靠近 Pos机进行 NFC刷卡业务, Pos机会通过 NFC天线 311与 NFC芯片 305 之间通过无线通讯协议交互数据, NFC芯片 305会与 SIM卡 307之间通过 SWP协 议交互数据, 换句话就是 Pos机读取 SIM卡内相关信息。交易成功后, NFC芯片 305 通过 I2C上报刷卡成功事件给手机 AP301, AP侧会自动调用密码认证模块 303, 控 制 GPIO口输出信号, 关闭 SWP导通开关来关闭 NFC芯片 305与 SIM卡 307之间 的通道。 方式二: 在进行刷卡交易前, 用户忘记了通过密码认证模块 303打开 SWP导通 开关 309。此时, 手机靠近 POS机时, NFC芯片 305会检测 SIM卡 307之间不是通 路, NFC芯片 305通过 I2C反馈给手机 AP301, AP侧自动启动密码认证模块, 弹出 提示界面提示用户需要通过密码认证模块打开 SWP导通开关。 用户通过密码认证模 块打开 SWP导通开关 309后, 再次靠近 Pos机进行 NFC刷卡业务, 刷卡交易成功 后, NFC上报刷卡成功事件给手机 AP301, AP侧自动调用密码认证模块关闭 SWP 通道。 为了更好地理解上述实现过程, 以下结合图 7所示流程详细说明。 图 7为根据本 发明优选实施例的移动支付的实现方法的流程图。 如图 7所示, 该方法包括: 步骤 S702, 在进行 NFC刷卡交易前, 检测是否已登录密码认证模块, 如果是转 步骤 S704, 否则转步骤 S710。 步骤 S704, 打开 SWP导通开关, 转步骤 S706。 步骤 S706, 靠近 Pos机刷卡, 转步骤 S708。 步骤 S708, 刷卡交易成功, 转步骤 S722。 步骤 S710, 靠近 Pos机刷卡, 转步骤 S712。 步骤 S712, 刷卡交易失败, 转步骤 S714。 步骤 S714, 手机弹出密码认证模块, 转步骤 S716。 步骤 S716, 打开 SWP导通开关。 步骤 S718, 靠近 Pos机刷卡, 转步骤 S720。 步骤 S720, 刷卡交易成功。 步骤 S722, NFC上报刷卡成功事件。 步骤 S724, AP调用密码认证模块自动关闭 SWP通道, 结束。 综上所述, 本发明实施例实现了以下有益效果: 相关技术中, 没有针对带 NFC刷 卡手机丢失问题进行有效的保护措施, 采用上述实施例提供的方案, 可以有效地防止 非法人员进行非法刷卡业务; 上述实施例中, 用户设置密码来控制 GPIO口信号导通 SWP开关, 开关接通后可以正常 NFC刷卡业务。 当关闭 SWP通道的同时, 对 NFC 其他功能无影响, 点到点 ( Point to Point, 简称为 P2P) 和读卡器照常使用, 唯独刷 卡业务不支持; 通过设置密码来控制 GPIO口信号, 进而导通 SWP开关。 如果 SIM 卡未保存银行卡密码信息, 刷卡时需要输入 SWP导通开关的密码和银行卡密码, 可 以达到双层保护的作用, 有效防止非法窃取。 在另外一个实施例中, 还提供了一种软件, 该软件用于执行上述实施例及优选实 施方式中描述的技术方案。 在另外一个实施例中, 还提供了一种存储介质, 该存储介质中存储有上述软件, 该存储介质包括但不限于: 光盘、 软盘、 硬盘、 可擦写存储器等。 工业实用性 本发明提供的技术方案, 可以在移动终端中的金融卡和外界阅读器进行交易之前 对用户输入的验证信息进行验证,并根据验证结果控制金融卡和 NFC芯片之间的导通 通路导通或关闭, 能够进一步提高移动支付过程的安全性。 显然, 本领域的技术人员应该明白, 上述的本发明的各模块或各步骤可以用通用 的计算装置来实现, 它们可以集中在单个的计算装置上, 或者分布在多个计算装置所 组成的网络上, 可选地, 它们可以用计算装置可执行的程序代码来实现, 从而, 可以 将它们存储在存储装置中由计算装置来执行, 并且在某些情况下, 可以以不同于此处 的顺序执行所示出或描述的步骤, 或者将它们分别制作成各个集成电路模块, 或者将 它们中的多个模块或步骤制作成单个集成电路模块来实现。 这样, 本发明不限制于任 何特定的硬件和软件结合。 以上仅为本发明的优选实施例而已, 并不用于限制本发明, 对于本领域的技术人 员来说, 本发明可以有各种更改和变化。 凡在本发明的精神和原则之内, 所作的任何 修改、 等同替换、 改进等, 均应包含在本发明的保护范围之内。

Claims

权 利 要 求 书
1. 一种移动终端, 包括: 用于进行移动支付的金融卡、 近场通信 NFC芯片, 所述 移动终端还包括:
导通开关,耦合连接在所述金融卡与所述 NFC芯片之间, 设置为接收来自 处理器的控制信号,并根据所述控制信号控制所述金融卡和所述 NFC芯片之间 导通通路的关闭或开启;
所述处理器, 与所述导通开关耦合连接, 设置为在所述金融卡和外界阅读 器交易之前对用户输入的验证信息进行验证, 并在验证正确时产生用于控制所 述导通开关导通所述导通通路的所述控制信号, 以及在验证失败时产生用于控 制所述导通开关关闭所述导通通路的所述控制信号。
2. 根据权利要求 1所述的移动终端, 其中, 所述移动终端还包括:
显示模块, 与所述处理器耦合连接, 设置为在所述导通通路初始状态为关 闭或者对所述验证信息验证失败时, 以界面的形式提示用户输入正确的验证信 息。
3. 根据权利要求 1所述的移动终端, 其中, 所述处理器, 还设置为在所述交易成 功后, 产生用于控制所述导通通路关闭的所述控制信号。
4. 根据权利要求 1至 3任一项所述的移动终端,其中,所述金融卡包括以下之一: 内置有安全单元 SE的用户识别模块 SIM卡、 金融集成电路 IC卡。
5. 一种移动支付的安全验证方法,通过移动终端中连接在近场通信 NFC芯片和进 行移动支付的金融卡之间的导通开关实现, 所述方法包括:
对所述金融卡和外界阅读器在交易之前用户输入的验证信息进行验证; 根据验证结果控制所述导通开关的开启或关闭,其中,在验证结果正确时, 控制所述导通开关导通所述金融卡和所述 NFC芯片之间的导通通路,在验证结 果失败时, 控制所述导通开关关闭所述导通通路。
6. 根据权利要求 5所述的方法, 其中, 还包括:
在所述导通通路初始状态为关闭或者对所述验证信息验证失败时, 以界面 的形式提示用户输入正确的验证信息。 根据权利要求 5或 6所述的方法, 其中, 还包括:
在所述交易成功后, 通过所述导通开关控制所述导通通路关闭。 一种移动支付的安全验证装置,通过移动终端中连接在近场通信 NFC芯片和进 行移动支付的金融卡之间的导通开关实现, 所述装置包括:
验证模块, 设置为对所述金融卡和外界阅读器在交易之前用户输入的验证 信息进行验证;
控制模块, 设置为根据验证结果控制所述导通开关的开启或关闭, 其中, 在验证结果正确时,控制所述导通开关导通所述金融卡和所述 NFC芯片之间的 导通通路, 在验证结果失败时, 控制所述导通开关关闭所述导通通路。 根据权利要求 8所述的装置, 其中, 所述装置还包括:
提示模块, 设置为在所述导通通路关闭或者对所述验证信息验证失败时, 以界面的形式提示用户输入正确的验证信息。 根据权利要求 8或 9所述的装置, 其中, 所述控制模块, 还设置为在所述交易 成功后, 通过所述导通开关控制所述导通通路关闭。
PCT/CN2013/084779 2013-06-07 2013-09-30 移动终端、移动支付的安全验证方法及装置 WO2014194592A1 (zh)

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