WO2014154129A1 - 一种两次近程连接安全支付的装置、方法和*** - Google Patents
一种两次近程连接安全支付的装置、方法和*** Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2014154129A1 WO2014154129A1 PCT/CN2014/074021 CN2014074021W WO2014154129A1 WO 2014154129 A1 WO2014154129 A1 WO 2014154129A1 CN 2014074021 W CN2014074021 W CN 2014074021W WO 2014154129 A1 WO2014154129 A1 WO 2014154129A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- payment
- data
- final
- payment data
- key
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 53
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 181
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 39
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 15
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims description 9
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 19
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 18
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 16
- 101150117587 pos5 gene Proteins 0.000 description 8
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 7
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000010200 validation analysis Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 3
- ZXQYGBMAQZUVMI-GCMPRSNUSA-N gamma-cyhalothrin Chemical compound CC1(C)[C@@H](\C=C(/Cl)C(F)(F)F)[C@H]1C(=O)O[C@H](C#N)C1=CC=CC(OC=2C=CC=CC=2)=C1 ZXQYGBMAQZUVMI-GCMPRSNUSA-N 0.000 description 3
- 241000700605 Viruses Species 0.000 description 2
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000002708 enhancing effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 description 2
- BQCADISMDOOEFD-UHFFFAOYSA-N Silver Chemical compound [Ag] BQCADISMDOOEFD-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 230000001010 compromised effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000009977 dual effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000000605 extraction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005242 forging Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000003780 insertion Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000037431 insertion Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013508 migration Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000005012 migration Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010295 mobile communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000035755 proliferation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 229910052709 silver Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 239000004332 silver Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000006467 substitution reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000009466 transformation Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
Definitions
- the invention belongs to the field of information security.
- the present invention relates to an apparatus, method and system for secure payment using two short-range communication connections.
- POS5 is issued to the merchant by the acquiring bank 3, and is also associated with the POS5 and the receiving account.
- the issuing bank 1 issues the bank card to the cardholder 6, that is, the bank card account 61 and the cardholder's own PIN62.
- the cardholder enters the bank account account 61 (input payment account F), enters the amount M, enters the PIN62, and the POS5 collects the account S on the POS5 (or the POS is associated with the collection account, which is equivalent to the collection account)
- the bank card account 61 (payment account F) the amount M and the PIN 62 are encrypted, they are transmitted to the acquiring bank 3 through the telephone network 4, and then transmitted to the issuing bank 1 through the bank network 2; if the information is correct, the issuing bank 1 performs The corresponding payment.
- POS5 is a key part of the payment system.
- POS5 If the POS5 is forged or modified, the attacker can obtain the bank card account 61 (or encrypted form) and PIN62 owned by the cardholder 6 and then profit by forging the bank card.
- the banking industry has established strict POS safety technology standards and strict management measures. The technical, manufacturing, and management costs associated with these measures make POS machines inaccessible to ordinary people's homes and small and micro businesses.
- POS payment since the information sent by POS 5 to the acquirer 3 is encrypted information, the acquirer system is considered safe. So the key to payment is that the data obtained by POS5 cannot be stolen and forged. Therefore, it can be said that POS5 is the final payment data generating device, and after the final payment data generated by the device is transmitted to the issuing bank 1, the corresponding payment can be made if it is correct.
- the issuing bank 1, the bank network 2, the acquiring bank 3, the telephone network 4 and the POS 5 are collectively referred to as the bank acquiring system.
- POS2 transmits the encrypted payment data (receipt account S, bank card account 31, amount M and PIN32) to the acquiring platform 1; if the payment data is correct, the corresponding payment is made.
- the acquiring platform includes the issuing bank 1 of Figure 1, the bank network 2, the acquiring bank 3 and the telephone network 4.
- the banking network and the telephone network are only channels for information transmission, and other methods, such as the Internet, can be used.
- POS2 encrypts the payment data
- the acquiring platform 1 decrypts the payment data and verifies the legality of the payment data, executes the legal payment data, and rejects the illegal payment data. It can be more simply described as: POS2 transmits the final payment data (receipt account S, bank card account 31, amount M and PIN32) to the acquiring platform 1, and the acquiring platform 1 executes the legal final payment data payment request, rejecting A payment request for illegal final payment data.
- POS2 transfers the final payment data to the acquiring platform 1 for payment.
- U shield network silver (second generation) payment method is shown in Figure 3.
- Computer 2 provides transaction data such as payment account S and amount M to U shield 4;
- U shield 4 includes cardholder account 31;
- U shield 4 Display the payment account and the amount; after confirming the correct, press the confirmation button on U Shield 4;
- U Shield 4 receives the confirmation button, digitally signed payment account F (bank card account 31), collection account S, amount M, etc.
- the data is sent to the computer 2 and forwarded to the acquiring platform 1; after the acquiring platform 1 verifies that the digital signature is correct, the corresponding payment is made.
- the computer 2 transmits the final payment data (the digital signature of the payment account S, the payment account F and the amount M) to the acquiring platform 1, and the acquiring platform 1 performs the payment request of the legal final payment data, rejecting A payment request for illegal final payment data.
- the final payment data generating device is U shield.
- the EMV card (similar to the first generation U shield, compared with the second generation U shield, no keyboard and display) is used as shown in Figure 4; computer 2 provides the collection account S and the amount M to EMV4; EMV4 signature, sent back To POS2; POS sends the EMV card signed data and input PIN32 to the acquiring platform 1; After the acquiring platform 1 verifies the signature and the PIN32 is correct, the corresponding payment is made. Or simply stated as: POS2 transmits the data (receipt account S, payment account F and digital signature of amount M, PIN32) to the acquiring platform 1 to form the final payment data, and the acquiring platform 1 performs the payment of the legal final payment data. Request, reject the payment request for illegal final payment data.
- the final payment data generating device is the acquiring platform 1.
- the normal process of the EMV4 bank card is to send the PIN32 to the EMV4. If the PIN32 is correct, the signature collection account S, the payment account F, The amount M is sent to the acquiring platform for corresponding payment.
- PIN32 is a pass for EMV4 to sign.
- the transaction amount M of this scheme can be forged by the computer 2, the collection account S can also be forged, and the PIN32 can also be stolen. So it can only be used for "safe" POS2.
- the final payment data generation device here is EMV4, and is a secure payment means (EMV migration) to be popularized when POS2 is secure.
- POS2 transmits the final payment data (the digital signature of the payment account S, the payment account F and the amount M) to the acquiring platform 1, and the acquiring platform 1 performs the payment request of the legal final payment data, rejecting A payment request for illegal final payment data.
- the banking industry also provides mobile phone text messaging.
- the user enters the payment account and the amount on the receiving computer; the receiving computer transmits the payment account, the payment account and the amount to the bank website; the bank website sends the account including the receiving account, the amount and the mobile phone number associated with the user when registering the payment account.
- the confirmation code text message is sent to the user's mobile phone; after the user reads the payment information on the mobile phone, the confirmation code is input on the payment computer; the payment computer sends the confirmation code to the bank website; the website compares the confirmation code from the payment computer with the confirmation code.
- the confirmation code of the SMS is consistent, the payment information is sent to the bank host to complete the payment.
- the website here is the last payment data generation device.
- the problem with this solution is that if the mobile operating system is compromised by a virus or Trojan, the attacker can determine the mobile phone with which the payment account corresponds, so that it can be paid at will. Moreover, the attacker can also collect the payment account and the corresponding confirmation code on the receiving computer, and collect the confirmation code received by the mobile phone at the same time, and the correspondence between the mobile phone and the payment account can be analyzed through comparison.
- the payment scheme is simply described as follows: The website transmits the final payment data (receipt account, payment account, amount) to the acquiring platform 1, and the acquiring platform 1 executes the legal final payment data payment request, rejecting the illegal final payment data. Payment request. Basically similar is "dynamic password" payment, fingerprint payment, and so on.
- the website and the acquiring platform can be a website, and the final payment data generating device is the acquiring platform.
- the meaning of the final payment data generation device is the last "integrated" device that provides the payment data to the acquiring system. Payment can be made by transferring this data to the acquiring platform.
- the final payment data generally includes the collection account, payment account and amount, but sometimes it also includes identity authentication information such as digital signature, PIN or dynamic password.
- the final payment data generating device may also perform corresponding payment only after providing the payment account, payment account and amount information after the identity authentication is completed.
- the bank payment system is essentially an account management system.
- the basic factors are: account, amount (balance), identity authentication.
- account amount (balance)
- identity authentication In the past, the authentication method of the magnetic stripe card was the card number + PIN. Now join the digital certificate technology, can achieve identity authentication, but also digital signature, for the convenience of post-test and legal affairs.
- the asymmetric cryptosystem uses RSA to illustrate: RSA private t month represents the decryption algorithm or signature algorithm (including the use of digest technology, signature digest), RSA ⁇ represents the public algorithm.
- the symmetric encryption algorithm is represented by DES: DES E represents encryption or decryption, and E represents a key.
- the receiving device is generally a mobile phone, and the card reader is integrated with the receiving mobile phone through the earphone port of the mobile phone (or the interface of other external information exchange device).
- the payment amount is first input on the mobile phone; then the payer uses the bank card to swipe the card on the card reader; thus the payment mobile phone obtains the bank card account information of the payer; then, the payer enters the relevant information on the credit card mobile phone.
- PIN The receiving mobile phone encrypts the payee's bank account number, the payer's bank account number, amount and PIN, and then transmits it to the acquiring platform through the mobile wireless network or computer network to complete the payment.
- the essence of the payment is: Transfer the payee's account number, the payer's account number, the amount and the payer's PIN (identity authentication information) to the payer's account bank; After the bank verifies the account number and the corresponding PIN is correct , carry out the corresponding transfer of funds.
- the essence of payment security technology is the adoption of protocols to achieve a combination of security and ease of use.
- Patent documents in this regard can be referred to: Chinese Patent Document ZL200610041361.6 "A device and method for securely using a network server service independent of operating system security", CN99806523.4 “Method and system for secure transaction in a computer system” ", ZL200910234546.2 “A method for confirming data in a CPU card”, ZL200910234552.8 “A security system and method”, ZL200910234553.2 “A device, method and system for enhancing USBKEY security", ZL200410103401.6” - A way to enhance the security of electronic signature tools on computers.”
- the non-contact information exchange technology mainly has 13.56M and 2.4G technologies.
- wireless information exchange technology also includes Bluetooth, ZIGBEE and WIFI.
- wireless technologies suitable for use in the payment field should meet the requirements of short-range communication. That is, first the device must be very close to communicate (less than 10CM) and turn off communication (greater than 10CM) when leaving.
- the exchange of information between the two devices (mobile phones) can also be achieved through the phone's MIC and speakers. In this way, it is guaranteed that when the payment is exchanged, the devices are indeed close to each other.
- patent documents in this regard can also refer to: Chinese patent document ZL201120500867.5 "-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- the short-range connection between device A and device B means that when A and B are close, device A can obtain information with device B, such as NFC, RFID and other radio technologies.
- the short-range one-way connection between device A and device B means that when A and B are close, device A can obtain information from device B, but device B cannot obtain information from device A; for example, using a camera to read the two-dimensional code is A short-range one-way connection, that is, information can be transmitted from a two-dimensional code display device to a device that owns a camera, and vice versa. Also using the MIC and speakers, a connection between device A and device B is used for information exchange, which is also a short-range connection.
- the short-range connection is that only two devices can be physically close to each other in order to exchange information.
- a close to B to indicate that A is close to B to establish a short-range connection; it generally means that A and B are connected to each other to obtain information from B.
- the mobile phone does not utilize its remote communication function, that is, the MID is also the same, and can also be made into a card shape with a display and a keyboard.
- the payment front end has two devices: a payment device (such as a computer or POS) and a confirmation device (mobile phone).
- the payment device and the confirmation device can be used to improve payment security.
- a device for two short-range connection secure payment which includes:
- Display device for selecting to display payment data
- Security device Used to generate payment key data or generate final payment data.
- Short-range communication device for short-range connection input and output data
- the safety device is connected to the display device, and the safety device is connected to the short-range communication device;
- the security device obtains the payment data through the short-range communication device, and selects the delivery to the display device display; the security device generates the payment key data or the final payment data according to the payment data; the security device outputs the payment key data or the final payment data through the short-range communication device again.
- the security module performs associated password calculations to generate final payment data or generate payment key data.
- a system for two short-range connection secure payment which includes:
- Receiving device for transmitting the payment data to the confirmation device in a short-range manner, or receiving the payment key data or the final payment data transmitted from the confirmation device in a short-range manner, or transmitting the payment key data to the final payment data generating device, or from the last payment
- the data generating device receives the last payment data, or transmits the last payment data to the acquiring platform, etc.;
- Confirmation device used to select to display payment data, generate payment key data or final payment data, and transmit it to the receiving device in a short-range manner; the acquiring platform: generate final payment data or receive final payment data according to the received payment key data, And according to the final payment data, the legal final payment data is executed, and the illegal final payment data is rejected;
- the last payment data generating device generates final payment data according to the payment key data, and may connect the payment device, or may connect the confirmation device, may be in the payment device, may be in the confirmation device, or may be in the acquiring platform;
- the receiving device is connected to the acquiring platform; the confirmation device is connected to the receiving device in a short-range manner;
- the confirmation device is close to the payment device, and the payment data is acquired in a short distance; the confirmation device selects to display the payment data; the confirmation device generates the payment key data, and if the final payment data device is connected to the confirmation device, the confirmation device transmits the payment key data to the final payment data.
- the device generates final payment data and transmits it to the confirmation device; the confirmation device approaches the payment device again, and transmits the payment key data or the final payment data to the payment device in a short distance; if the payment key data received by the payment device is the last payment data And directly transmitted to the acquiring platform, otherwise the payment payment key data is transmitted to the final payment data generating device to generate the final payment data, and the final payment data is transmitted to the acquiring platform; the acquiring platform performs payment processing according to the last payment data.
- the CPU card is the last payment data generating means, and the CPU card is directly connected to the payment device, receives the payment key data transmitted from the payment device, generates the final payment data, and transmits the collection device and the acquiring platform.
- a security device in the acquiring platform, which receives the payment key data transmitted by the payment device, generates the final payment data, and transmits it to the acquiring platform.
- the payment device has a security module that receives payment key data transmitted by the payment device, generates final payment data, and transmits it to the acquiring platform.
- a two-way proximity secure payment method includes:
- the confirmation device generates payment key data
- the confirmation device transmits the payment key data to the last payment data device, generates the final payment data, and transmits the final payment data to the confirmation device;
- E. Confirming that the device is again close to the payment device, and transmitting the payment key data or the final payment data to the payment device in a short-range manner;
- the payment key data received by the payment device is the last payment data, it is directly transmitted to the acquiring platform, otherwise the payment payment key data is transmitted to the final payment data generating device to generate the final payment data, and the final payment data is transmitted to the acquiring platform. ;
- the acquiring platform performs payment processing based on the final payment data.
- the final payment data generating device is either a CPU card connected to the payment device, or a security module in the payment device, or an acquiring platform connected to the payment device; and characterized in that the payment device has a payment key
- the data is transmitted to the last payment data generating means, and finally the payment data generating means generates the final payment data based on the payment key data.
- the payment key data in step C is the last payment data
- the confirmation device is the last payment data generating device.
- step C the payment of critical data in step C is generated in the security module of the validation device, and there is also a step in the security module prohibiting payment of critical data to the validation device.
- the last payment data generating device transmits the final payment data to the acquiring platform through the receiving device;
- the confirmation device obtains payment data including the payment account and/or the amount from the payment device through the short-range connection;
- the final payment data generating device is a CPU card connected to the payment device;
- the payment key data is the last payment data
- the confirmation device is the last payment data generating device
- the last payment data generating device is a security module in the payment device
- the final payment data generating device is an acquiring platform connected to the payment device;
- the C payment key data is generated in the security module of the validation device, and there is also a step in the security module prohibiting payment of critical data to the validation device;
- Figure 1 is a schematic diagram showing an existing bank card payment system
- Figure 2 shows a schematic diagram of a simplified bank card payment system
- Figure 3 shows a schematic diagram of an existing U-Shield (second generation) payment system
- Figure 4 shows a schematic diagram of an existing U-Shield generation, CPU card payment, and EMV card payment system
- Figure 5 is a schematic illustration of a system associated with the preferred embodiment 12, 3;
- Figure 6 is a schematic illustration of a system associated with preferred embodiment 4.
- Figure 7 is a schematic illustration of the system associated with the preferred embodiment 56.
- Figure 8 is a schematic illustration of a system associated with preferred embodiment 7;
- Figure 9 is a schematic illustration of a system associated with preferred embodiment 8.
- the payment system consists of the acquiring platform 1, the payment device 2, the bank card 3, the confirmation device 4 and the payer 5.
- the acquiring platform 1 is connected to the receiving device 2; the receiving device 2 is connected to the bank card 3; and the confirming device 4 is connected to the receiving device 2 in close proximity.
- the acquiring platform 1 owning the platform private key RSA receiving device 2 receiving account S receiving data public key RSA m m ⁇ confirming device 4: having platform public key RSA
- Receiving device 2 There is a collection account S, the security module 21 has a collection account S and a receipt data private key RSA m rn;
- Payer 5 has a bank card 3 pays for the required PIN51; bank card 3 has a payment account F
- the payment process is: 1.
- the payment device 2 obtains the amount M, and has a collection account S;
- the acquiring platform 1 calculates RSA (RSA M, S, PIN51), and obtains (M, S, PIN51); according to S to obtain RSA m&, RSA (M, PIN51) is transmitted to the payment device 2 security module 21 ;
- security module 21 calculate RSA m m & ( RSA mmm ⁇ (M, PIN51) to get M and PIN51;
- the bank card 3, the payment device 2 and the acquiring platform 1 perform the payment operation according to the bank payment standard process.
- the security module 21 needs to input the amount M and the PIN, the amount M and PIN 51 obtained by the security module are used, and finally transmitted to The acquiring platform makes the payment.
- the security module 21 is the POS
- the confirmation device 4 is the trusted display and the trusted keyboard of the POS machine, and completes the functions of the display of the POS machine and the PIN pad.
- Steps 1 and 2 are to "confirm that the device is close to the collection device and obtain the payment data in the short distance".
- the payment data is the collection account S (core) and the amount M, and the amount M can also be generated on the confirmation device 4;
- the connection between the confirmation device 4 and the payment device 2 is a short-range connection, such as NFC, RFID, voice communication, and
- the confirmation device 4 scans the payment device 2 to display a two-dimensional code or the like including the receipt data. It may also be such that it is close to the geographic location, such as shaking, so that the confirmation device is connected to the payment device, and such a connection can also be considered as a short-range connection due to the geographical distance.
- Step 3 is "Confirm the device selection to display the payment data"; the payment account here may not be displayed.
- Step 4 is "Confirm the device to generate payment key data.”
- the confirmation device generates payment key data: RSA ⁇ (M, S, PIN51);
- the last payment data generating device of this embodiment is the payment device 2 security module 21, and is not directly connected to the confirmation device 4, so "if last The payment data generating means is connected to the confirmation means, then the confirmation means transmits the payment key data to the last payment data means, generates the final payment data, and transmits to the confirmation means "not executed;
- Step 5 step 6 and step 7 are to "confirm that the device is close to the payment device, transmit the payment key data or the final payment data to the payment device"; the confirmation device is close to the payment device, and the payment key generated by the short-range communication transmission Data to the payment device security module;
- Step 8 that is, "if the payment key data received by the payment device is the last payment data, it is directly transmitted to the acquiring platform, otherwise the payment payment key data is transmitted to the final payment data generating device to generate the final payment data, and the final payment data is transmitted to The acquiring platform "; in this embodiment, the payment key data is not the last payment data.
- the final payment data generating device is a cashier security module, and the cashier security module uses the payment key data to generate final payment data and transmits it to the acquiring platform.
- Step 8 "The acquiring platform performs payment processing according to the final payment data"
- the input PIN 51 in step 4 can also use the PIN 51 in the pre-existence confirmation device 4.
- the bank card, the payment device and the acquiring platform generate the final payment data by using the payment key data: when the bank card is a magnetic card, the last payment data is generated in the payment device security module 21; when the bank card is a CPU card, The last payment data is generated in the CPU card.
- the bank card in the embodiment 1 can also be a U shield. From a technical point of view, the U shield is a CPU card.
- a security module can also be provided to perform related password calculation; and it is possible to transmit only necessary information (amount) to the confirmation device, and to prohibit transmission of other information (receipt account). That is, the information is transmitted only to the desired device, and is prohibited from being transmitted to other devices from the hardware (software), or referred to as: directional transmission.
- the essence of this embodiment is to use the confirmation device as the "password keyboard" of the payment device (POS machine in the PBOC standard).
- the use of asymmetric cryptographic protocols is only for convenience of description. In fact, since the security module of the payment device is issued by the acquiring bank, the public key and the private key of the receiving data can be unnecessary, and other symmetric cryptographic protocols are used; the function of the pair of keys is guaranteed, and is processed by the acquiring platform.
- the obtained M and PIN are transmitted securely to the security module of the payment device.
- the difference between this embodiment and the PIN pad is that the PIN pad and the POS are a whole and are a component of the POS, and the embodiment confirmation device and the payment device are actually two people (or institutions); the PIN pad only inputs the PIN.
- the confirmation device of this embodiment not only inputs the PIN, but also displays the amount, and even displays the payment account (or the payment user name). It is particularly emphasized that in this embodiment, the confirmation device must pass through the acquiring platform to establish a password connection with the receiving device, and the traditional PIN pad is directly authenticated with the POS to establish a password connection.
- a short-range secure payment method which includes:
- the confirmation device generates payment key data; (Step 4)
- the confirmation device is close to the payment device, and the payment key data is transmitted to the collection device in a short distance;
- Step 8 Perform a bank payment standard process to perform a payment operation to form a final payment data
- the acquiring platform performs payment processing according to the final payment data
- the confirmation device 4 can be a mobile phone.
- Embodiment 1 is a password keyboard of a mobile phone as a payment device (POS).
- the connection between the phone and the receiving device is a short-range connection, such as QR code, NFC, voice communication or geographical proximity connection.
- the mobile phone can obtain data from the cash register using the QR code displayed by the scanning cash register, it can also obtain data from the cash register using short-range communication technology (such as NFC), and can also obtain data through the MIC, and can also pass The location is close to the established network connection.
- the receiving device obtains data from the mobile phone, and can use NFC, a two-dimensional code, obtain data through the MIC, and manually input on the keyboard of the cash register.
- the payment key data of Embodiment 1 is inconvenient to use keyboard input, and the recommended short-range connection is NFC short-range communication technology.
- the payer checks the payment data displayed on the mobile phone
- the payment data is correct, enter the bank card PIN code
- the bank card in Embodiment 1 may be a normal magnetic card or a CPU card. If the bank card account information is placed in the security chip built into the mobile phone, or the CPU card is placed in the mobile phone security chip, or the CPU card is directly attached to the mobile phone, the NFC mobile phone and the receiving device are connected in close proximity for information exchange. Then logically, the bank card is still connected to the payment device, but physically the bank card is associated with the confirmation device, that is, the mobile phone contains the bank card.
- FIG. 1 A second embodiment associated with the present invention is shown in FIG.
- the payment system consists of the acquiring platform 1, the payment device 2, the bank card 3, the confirmation device 4 and the payer 5.
- the acquiring platform 1 is connected to the receiving device 2; the receiving device 2 is connected to the bank card 3; and the confirming device 4 is connected to the receiving device 2 in close proximity.
- Acquirer platform 1 own platform private key RS A RSA
- the payment device 2 security module 21 has a collection account S and a receipt data private key RSA and RSA (RSA payer 5 has a bank card 3 payment request PIN51; bank card 3 has a payment account.
- the payment process is:
- the payment device 2 obtains the amount M and transmits it to the security module 21; 2.
- Security module 21 calculates RSA M, S), RSA RSA
- the confirmation device 4 is close to the payment device 2, and the short-range connection transmits RSA (M, PIN51) to the payment device 2, and then the security module 21;
- Security module 21 calculates RSA (RSA (M, PIN51)), and obtains M and PIN51;
- the bank card 3, the payment device 2 and the acquiring platform 1 perform the payment operation according to the bank payment standard process.
- the security module 21 needs to input the amount M and the PIN, the amount M and PIN 51 obtained by the security module are used;
- the acquiring platform 1 makes a payment. Steps 1 and 2 are to "confirm that the device is close to the collection device and obtain the payment data in the short distance".
- the receipt data here is the collection account (core) and the amount M, and the amount can also be generated on the confirmation device;
- the connection between the confirmation device and the payment device is a short-range connection, such as NFC, RFID, voice communication, and confirmation display device scanning.
- the device displays a two-dimensional code including the receipt data.
- the RSA ffi in step 2 (RSA is essentially a digital certificate of the security module signed by the acquirer platform. Since the confirmation device 4 confirms the legitimacy of the security module 21.
- Step 3 is "Confirm the device to display the payment data"; the payment account here may not be displayed.
- Step 4 is "Confirm the device to generate payment key data.”
- the confirmation device generates payment key data: RSA ftft i ffi (M, S, PIN51);
- the last payment data generating device of this embodiment is a cash register security module, and is not connected to the confirmation device, so "if the last payment data generating device Connect the confirmation device, then the confirmation device transmits the payment key data to the last payment data device, generates the final payment data, and transmits it to the confirmation device "not executed;
- Step 5 Step 6 and Step 7 are to "confirm that the device is close to the payment device, transmit the payment key data or the final payment data to the payment device"; the confirmation device is close to the payment device, and the generated payment is transmitted through the short-range communication.
- the final payment data generating device is a cashier security module, and the cashier security module uses the payment key data to generate final payment data and transmits it to the acquiring platform.
- Step 9 "The receiving platform performs payment processing based on the final payment data"
- the input PIN 51 in step 4 can also use the PIN 51 in the pre-existing confirmation device.
- the bank card, the payment device and the acquiring platform generate the final payment data by using the payment key data: when the bank card is a magnetic card, the last payment data is generated in the cash register security module 21; when the bank card is a CPU card, The last payment data is generated in the CPU card.
- the bank card in the embodiment 1 can also be a U shield. From a technical point of view, the U shield is a CPU card.
- a security module can also be provided to perform the relevant password calculation; and it is possible to transmit only the necessary information (amount) to the confirmation device, and to prohibit the transmission of other information (receipt account). That is, the information is transmitted only to the desired device, and is prohibited from being transmitted to other devices from the hardware (software).
- the essence of this embodiment is to use the confirmation device as the "password keyboard" of the payment device (POS machine in the PBOC standard).
- the use of asymmetric cryptographic protocols is only for convenience of description. Thanks to the use of a digitally signed RSA ⁇ i!3 ⁇ 4ffi (RSA & ), and the cashier security module is issued by the acquiring bank, security is guaranteed.
- the technology of the digital signature certificate for the PIN pad is used to confirm the password connection between the device and the security module.
- a short-range secure payment method which includes:
- the confirmation device generates payment key data; (Step 4)
- the confirmation device is again close to the payment device, and the payment key data is transmitted to the payment device security module in a short distance; (steps 5, 6, 7);
- the acquiring platform performs payment processing according to the final payment data
- the confirmation device 4 can be a mobile phone.
- Embodiment 1 is a password keyboard of a mobile phone as a payment device (POS).
- the connection between the phone and the receiving device is a short-range connection, such as QR code, NFC or voice communication.
- QR code displayed by the scanning cash register to obtain data from the cash register
- NFC short-range communication technology
- the receiving device obtains data from the mobile phone, and can use NFC, a two-dimensional code, obtain data through the MIC, and manually input it on the keyboard of the cash register.
- the payment key data of Embodiment 1 is inconvenient to use keyboard input, and the recommended short-range connection is NFC short-range communication technology.
- the payer checks the payment data displayed on the mobile phone
- the payment data is correct, enter the bank card PIN code
- the bank card in Embodiment 2 can be a normal magnetic card or a CPU card. If the bank card account information is placed in the security chip built into the mobile phone, or the CPU card is placed in the mobile phone security chip, or the CPU card is directly attached to the mobile phone, the NFC mobile phone and the receiving device are connected in close proximity for information exchange. Then logically, the bank card is still connected to the payment device, but physically the bank card confirms that the display device is together, that is, the mobile phone contains the bank card.
- Embodiment 1 The difference between this embodiment and Embodiment 1 is that, when paying, the acquiring platform 1 is not required to participate in the password calculation.
- FIG. 1 A third embodiment associated with the present invention is shown in FIG.
- the payment system consists of the acquiring platform 1, the payment device 2, the bank card 3, the confirmation device 4 and the payer 5.
- the acquiring platform 1 is connected to the receiving device 2; the receiving device 2 is connected to the bank card 3; and the confirming device 4 is connected to the receiving device 2 in close proximity.
- the acquiring platform 1 owning the bank card 3 the payment account F the payment data public key RSA m m ⁇ the payment device 2 the collection account S the number of collections SA
- the confirmation device 4 has the payment data public key identifier FB of the bank card 3, the payment data private key RSA mmrnm;
- the payment device 2 security module 21 has a collection account S and a receipt data private key RSA m rn ;
- the payer 5 has a bank card 3 pays the required PIN51; the bank card 3 has a payment account.
- the payment process is:
- the payment device 2 obtains the amount M and transmits it to the security module 21;
- the confirmation device 4 is again close to the cash collection device 2, the short-range connection transmits RSA ft 3 ⁇ 4ffi (M, S, PIN51), the payment data public key identification FB to the payment device 2, and then transmitted to the acquiring platform 1; 6.
- the acquiring platform 1 obtains the payment data public key according to the payment data public key identification FB; calculates RSA (RSA (M, S, PIN51)), obtains M, S and PIN51; calculates RSA M, S, PIN51) Cash collection device 2 security module 21;
- Security module 21 calculates RSA (RSA (M, S, PIN51) to get M, S and PIN51;
- the bank card 3, the payment device 2 and the acquiring platform 1 perform the payment operation according to the bank payment standard process.
- the security module 21 needs to input the amount M and the PIN, the amount M and PIN 51 obtained by the security module are used;
- the acquiring platform makes the payment.
- Steps 1 and 2 are to "confirm that the device is close to the collection device and obtain the payment data in the short distance".
- the receipt data here is the collection account (core) and the amount M, and the amount can also be generated on the confirmation device;
- the connection between the confirmation device and the payment device is a short-range connection, such as NFC, RFID, voice communication, and confirmation display device scanning.
- the device displays a two-dimensional code including the receipt data.
- Step 3 is "Confirm the device to display the payment data"; the payment account here may not be displayed.
- Step 4 is "Confirm the device to generate payment key data.”
- the confirmation device generates payment key data: RSA ft 3 ⁇ 4ffi (M, S, PIN51); the last payment data generating device of the embodiment is the cash register security module, and is not connected to the confirmation device, so "if the last payment data generating device is connected Confirming the device, then the confirmation device transmits the payment key data to the last payment data device, generates the final payment data, and transmits it to the confirmation device "not executed;
- Step 5 Step 6 and Step 7 are to "confirm that the device is close to the payment device, transmit the payment key data or the final payment data to the payment device"; the confirmation device is close to the payment device, and the generated payment is transmitted through the short-range communication.
- the final payment data generating device is a cashier security module, and the cashier security module uses the payment key data to generate final payment data and transmits it to the acquiring platform.
- step 7 the bank card, the payment device and the acquiring platform generate the final payment data by using the payment key data: when the bank card is a magnetic card, the last payment data is generated in the payment device security module 21; when the bank card is a CPU card, The last payment data is generated in the CPU card.
- the essence of this embodiment is to use the confirmation device as the "password keyboard" of the payment device (POS machine in the PBOC standard).
- the POS secret keyboard is connected to the POS by a cryptographic protocol.
- the confirmation device must pass through the acquiring platform to establish a password connection with the receiving device.
- the public key of the payment device is actually authenticated by the acquiring platform.
- FIG. 1 A fourth embodiment associated with the present invention is shown in FIG.
- the payment system consists of the acquiring platform 1, the receiving device 2, the payer 3, the confirming device 4 and the CPU card device 5.
- the acquiring platform 1 is connected to the receiving device 2; the receiving device 2 is connected to the checking device 4; and the CPU card device 5 is connected to the checking device 4.
- the acquiring platform 1 includes: a payment account F of the CPU card device 5 and a payment public key RSA m;
- the CPU card device 5 includes: a CPU card device 5 a payment private key RSA m mn, a payment account F and a PIN 51;
- the payment device 2 includes: a collection account S; the payer 3 has a PIN 51 of the CPU card device 5;
- the payment device 2 obtains the amount M, and has a collection account S;
- the CPU card device 5 compares the received PIN51 with the owned PIN51, after calculating RSA ft3 ⁇ 43 ⁇ 4 (M, S, F), transmitted to the confirmation device 4; 6.
- the confirmation device 4 is again brought close to the collection device 2, and the RSA (MS, F) is transmitted to the collection device 2 in a short distance;
- the receiving device 2 transmits the RSA ft3 ⁇ 4ffi (MSF) acquiring platform 1;
- the acquiring platform 1 performs payment processing according to the final payment data RSA ft3 ⁇ 4ffi (MS, F);
- Steps 1 and 2 are to "confirm that the device is close to the collection device and obtain the payment data in the short distance".
- the receipt data here is the collection account (core) and the amount M, and the amount can also be generated on the confirmation device;
- the connection between the confirmation device and the payment device is a short-range connection, such as NFC RFID, voice and confirmation device scanning the payment device display a QR code containing the receipt data, etc.;
- Step 3 is "Confirm the device to display the payment data"; the payment account here may not be displayed.
- Step 4 is "Confirm that the device uses payment data to generate payment key data.”
- the confirmation device generates payment key data M PIN51, collection account S, payment account F;
- Step 5 transmitting the payment key data to the last payment data generating device CPU card, the last payment data generating device of the embodiment is a CPU card, and the connection confirming device; "If the last payment data device is connected to the confirmation display device, then the confirmation display device is Transmitting payment key data is transmitted to the last payment data device, generating final payment data, and transmitting to the confirmation display device";
- Step 6 is to "confirm that the device is close to the payment device, and the short-range payment of the payment key data or the final payment data to the payment device". Confirming that the device is close to the payment device, and transmitting the generated final payment data to the payment device by short-range communication;
- Step 7 that is, "if the payment key data received by the payment device is the last payment data, it is directly transmitted to the acquiring platform, otherwise the payment payment key data is transmitted to the final payment data generating device to generate the final payment data, and the final payment data is transmitted to The acquiring platform "; in this embodiment, the receiving device receives the final payment data.
- the payee device security device uses the payment key data to generate the final payment data.
- Step 8 "The acquiring platform performs payment processing according to the final payment data"
- the device 4 and the CPU card device 5 can be completely in one physical device such as a mobile phone.
- the CPU card device 5 and the security module 41 can be one module (hardware or software).
- Embodiment 4 is actually a mobile phone as a secure dedicated payment computer.
- This solution is directly second-generation U-Shield security than mobile phones.
- the connection between the mobile phone and the payment device is a short-range connection, so that when the mobile phone is not close to the payment device, it is impossible to transfer the payment key data to the payment device.
- a security module issued by the acquiring bank may be added to the payment device, and the security module capable of securely transmitting the payment account to the confirmation device by the cryptographic protocol may be implemented.
- the CPU card device 5 and the confirmation device security module 41 may actually be a chip, such as a SIM card jointly issued by a bank and a mobile communication company, or a TF card issued separately by the bank.
- the payment system consists of the acquiring platform 1.
- the receiving device 2. The bank card 3.
- the acquiring platform 1 is connected to the receiving device 2;
- the receiving device 2 is connected to the checking device 4 in a short-range manner, the receiving device 2 has a receiving security chip 21;
- the checking device 4 has a confirming security module 41;
- the bank card 3 is The payment device 2 is connected;
- the confirmation device 4 is connected to the cash collection device 2 in a short-range manner.
- the bank card is a CPU card:
- the payer 5 has a PIN51 of the bank card 3;
- Collection Security Module 21 Collection Account S and Collection Data Private Key RSA m m ⁇
- the payment device 2 obtains the amount M, and has a collection account S;
- the confirmation device 4 is again close to the collection device 2, the RSA ft 3 ⁇ 4ffi (M, S, PIN51) is transmitted to the cash collection device 2, and then transmitted to the acquiring platform 1;
- the acquiring platform 1 calculate RSA ⁇ (RSA M, S, PIN51)), then calculate RSA (RSA M, S, PIN51)), transfer to the cash register 2, and then to the bank card 3;
- bank card 3 transfer RSA (M, S, F) to the collection device 2, and then to the acquiring platform 1;
- the acquiring platform 1 calculates RSA RSA M, S, F)), obtains M and S, and then pays according to M, collection account S and payment account F. Steps 1 and 2 are to "confirm that the device is close to the collection device and obtain the payment data in the short distance".
- the receipt data here is the collection account (core) and the amount M.
- the collection account and the amount can also be generated on the confirmation display device, and can be other communication technologies such as NFC, RFID, voice communication or confirmation display device scanning collection device.
- a QR code containing payment data is displayed.
- Step 3 is "Confirm the device to display the payment data"; the payment account here may not be displayed.
- Step 4 is "Confirm the device to generate payment key data.”
- the confirmation device generates payment key data M, PIN51, collection account S, RSA M, S, PIN51);
- the last payment data generating device of the embodiment is a CPU card, and the confirmation device is not connected; "If the last payment data generating device is connected to the confirming device, the confirming device transmits the payment key The data is transmitted to the last payment data device, and the final payment data is generated and transmitted to the confirmation device. This embodiment is not executed;
- Step 5 that is, "confirm that the device is again close to the payment device, and the payment of the key data or the final payment data to the payment device is transmitted in a short distance.” Confirming that the device is close to the payment device, and transmitting the payment key data to the payment device through the short-range communication;
- Steps 6, 7, 8 and 9, that is, "if the payment key data received by the payment device is the last payment data, it is directly transmitted to the acquiring platform, otherwise the payment payment key data is transmitted to the final payment data generating device to generate the final payment data. And transmitting the final payment data to the acquiring platform"; in this embodiment, the bank card 3 is the last payment data generating means.
- Step 10 "The receiving platform performs payment processing according to the last payment data";
- the security module 21 issued by the acquiring platform must be added to the receiving device 2.
- the payment device 4 generates or inputs an amount M
- Confirmation device 4 is close to the collection device 2, receiving the amount M and the collection account;
- Confirmation device 4 is close to the payment device 2, and transmits RSA M, S, PIN51) to the payment device 2, and then transmitted to the acquiring platform 1;
- the acquiring platform 1 calculates RSA ⁇ (RSA M, S, PIN51), then calculates RSA (RSA M, S, PIN51)), and transmits it to the payment device 2 and the security module 21;
- the security module 21 obtains the amounts M, S and PIN51 according to RSA RSA RSA RSA M, S, PIN51));
- the security module 21 transmits the encryption combination (M, S, F, PIN51) according to the bank standard to the acquiring platform 1 for payment processing; here, the RSA «Mg 3 ⁇ 4t3 ⁇ 4 (M, only when the confirmation device is close to the payment device) S, PIN51). If the confirmation device is a mobile phone, the steps to use are:
- RSA ⁇ aMgw ⁇ is essentially a digital signature paid by the payer.
- Such an embodiment 5 is another type of mobile phone U Shield payment associated with a bank card.
- the invention is to output the key data to the user trusted device in a trusted manner, and the user confirms the payment data or uses it after confirmation.
- a system associated with a method of secure payment is shown in FIG.
- the secure payment system includes: the acquiring platform 1.
- the acquiring platform 1 is connected to the receiving device 2;
- the bank card 3 is connected to the receiving device 2;
- the checking device 4 is connected to the receiving device 2 in close proximity.
- the acquiring platform 1 includes: the acquiring platform 1 platform private key RSA bank card 3 payment account F and payment public key RSA receiving account S and receiving public key RSA
- the payment device 2 includes: a security module 21 and a platform public key RSA collection account S;
- Confirmation device 4 includes: payment private key RSA
- the payer has a bank card 52 (with a payment account) and the corresponding PIN51; if the bank card is a magnetic card (only account information), then:
- the payment device 2 generates the amount M, which is calculated. (M, S), transmitted to the acquiring platform 1;
- the acquiring platform 1 calculate RS A RSA M, S)) get M, S, and generate the serial number N, and then calculate the RSA (N) is transmitted to the cash register 2;
- the payment device 2 transmits the RSA (N) to the security module 21; at the same time, the bank card 3 is swiped to obtain the payment account F; the security module 21 calculates RSAfeft (RSA mkmn (N)) to obtain the serial number N; the security module 21 calculates the RSA (F, N); transmitted to Receipt platform 1;
- the acquiring platform 1 calculates RSA RSA (F, N)), obtains F and N, and can obtain the receiving account S according to N;
- the acquiring platform 1 generates a random confirmation code R, and calculates RSA (M, S, R), and transmits it to the payment device 2;
- the confirmation device 4 is again brought close to the payment device 2, and the cash collection device 2 is connected to the confirmation device 4 to obtain K and transmitted to the acquiring platform 1;
- the acquiring platform 1 calculate K-R, get PIN51;
- the acquiring platform 1 generates the final payment data according to PIN51, F, S and M, and performs payment processing.
- steps 1, 2, 3 and 4 transfer M, the collection account S and the payment account F to the acquiring platform 1; obviously, it can also be transmitted directly, and the security is basically not lowered.
- Steps 5 and 6 are to safely transfer the generated confirmation code R and the receipt data to the confirmation device 4. It is "confirmation device acquisition amount and receipt data such as collection account".
- Step 7 that is, "Confirm the device to display the amount data, and/or the payment account.”
- Steps 8 and 9 are to change PIN51. "Confirm the device to generate payment key data.”
- Step 10 "If the final payment data generating means is connected to the confirmation means, the confirmation means transmits the payment key data to the last payment data means, generates the final payment data, and transmits it to the confirmation means", and the last payment data generating means of the embodiment is The acquiring platform, and "confirming that the device is close to the receiving device, transmitting the payment key data or the final payment data to the payment device";
- Step 11 If the payment key data received by the payment device is the last payment data, it is directly transmitted to the acquiring platform, otherwise the payment payment key data is transmitted to the final payment data generating device to generate the final payment data, and the final payment data is transmitted to the receiving data. Single platform.
- Step 12 The acquiring platform performs payment processing according to the last payment data; the acquiring platform 1 obtains the PIN 51, and then forms the final payment data for payment.
- the advantage of Embodiment 6 is that the confirmation code PIN51 is always in an unencrypted state, and K can only be transmitted by the confirmation device physically close to the payment device. It is also possible to use the step of inputting K on the keypad of the cash register, which is also a short-range connection transfer. If the bank card 3 is a CPU card (having computing power), then: the acquiring platform 1 includes: a payment account F of the bank card 3 and a payment public key RSA m;
- the bank card 3 includes: payment data private key RSA mmwM ⁇ payment account F and payment private key RSA u m ;
- the confirmation device 4 includes: a payment data private key RSA
- the payer has a bank card 3 corresponding PIN51;
- the payment device 2 generates the amount M, transmits the M and the collection account S to the bank card 3;
- the bank card 3 generates a random confirmation code R, and calculates RSA M, S, R), and transmits it to the payment device 2;
- the confirmation device 4 is again brought close to the payment device 2, and the cash collection device 2 is connected to the confirmation device 4 to obtain K and transmitted to the bank card 3;
- step 1 is to transfer M, the payment account S and the payment account F to the bank card 3; in steps 2, 3 and 4, the generated confirmation code R and payment data are transmitted to the confirmation device 4.
- Steps 5 and 6 are to change PIN51. Steps 7, 8, and 9, send K to the bank card 3 using the proximity connection method, and get the PIN51, and then form the final payment data for payment.
- the advantage of Embodiment 5 is that the confirmation code R does not always appear in the non-encrypted state, and only the confirmation device is physically close to the payment device to transmit K, and it is obvious that the keyboard K can also be input.
- the connection between the bank card 3 and the payment device is only for information exchange, so the bank card (the magnetic card is the account information F, the CPU card is a computing chip or program) can be put into the confirmation device, that is, the bank card 3 It is logically connected to the payment device 2 and physically in the confirmation device 4. In this way, the usage is:
- Embodiment 5 A more practical dual handset payment embodiment is Embodiment 5.
- the system associated with Embodiment 5 according to the present invention is as shown in FIG.
- the payment system includes: the acquiring platform 1, the network 2, the payment device 3, the payment device 4 and the payer 5.
- the acquiring platform 1 is connected to the receiving device 4 via the network 2; the payment device 3 is connected to the receiving device 4 via NFC.
- a device for two-way short-range connection secure payment associated with Embodiment 5 of the present invention is as shown in the confirmation device of FIG.
- the computing device has a computing (baseband) chip 31 connected to the display 34 and the keyboard 35; the security chip 32 is connected to the computing chip 31 and the NFC chip 32, and the dotted line connection between the computing chip 31 and the NFC chip 33 is the structure of the current mobile phone, but is safe. The angle should not be used. Further, if the PIN required to store the payment in the confirmation device is employed, the keyboard 35 can be omitted.
- a computing (baseband) chip 41 is connected to the display 44 and the keyboard 45 in the receiving device; the security chip 42 is connected to the computing chip 41 and the NFC chip 42, that is, the chip 41 is connected to the acquiring platform 1 via the network 2.
- Network 2 can be GPRS, WIFI, Bluetooth, and telephone networks.
- the security chip 32 can execute the module of the standard payment process of the PBOC (EMV) card; the security chip 42 can execute the process of the security module in the PBOC (EMV) terminal, especially the internetwork POS security module process.
- EMV PBOC
- the acquiring platform 1 has all the information required for the receipt of the bank card, as well as the payment data public key RSA ftftSi H of the payment account F and the receiving data public key RSA m ⁇ of the receiving account S;
- Confirmation device 3 All information with bank card payment and private key of payment data RSA mmrnm ;
- Receiving device 4 The security module 41 has all the information of the bank terminal, the receiving account S and the receiving data private key RSA mm; Payer 5 has PIN51;
- the receiving device 4 calculates the chip 41 to generate the amount M, and transmits it to the security chip 42 (with the receiving account S), and then the NFC chip 43;
- the confirmation device 3 is close to the collection device 4, and the NFC chip 33 is obtained from the NFC chip 43 (M, S);
- the security chip 32 is obtained from the NFC chip 33 (M, S), transferred to the computing chip 31;
- the security chip 32 calculates RSA M, S, PIN51), transferred to the NFC chip 33;
- the payment device 3 is close to the payment device 4, and the NFC chip 33 transmits RSA m mn (M, S, PIN51) to the NFC chip 43, then to the security chip 42, to the computing chip 41, and then transmits the acquiring platform 1 through the network 2. ;
- M, S, PIN51 is transmitted to the computing chip 41 through the network 2, and then transmitted to the security chip 42;
- Security chip 32 card
- security chip 42 terminal security module
- NFC33, NFC43, NFC33 and NFC43 connection baseband chip 41, network 2 and acquirer platform 1, in accordance with the bank payment standard process (PBO EMV)
- PBO EMV bank payment standard process
- the payment operation when the security chip 42 needs to input the amount M and the PIN, uses the amount M and the PIN 51 that the security chip has obtained; the input PIN 51 in the step 4 can also use the PIN 51 pre-stored in the security chip 32.
- the PIN51 calculation step can only be used after the NFC connection between the confirmation device and the collection device is turned off.
- Step 6 preferably also transfers the payment account to the collection platform 1, which facilitates the collection platform to find the payment data public key.
- a confirmation device for a device for two short-range connection secure payment comprises: a display device: for selecting to display payment data; a security device: for generating payment key data, or generating a final payment Data; short-range communication device for short-range connection input and output data; safety device connected to display device, safety device connected to short-range communication device;
- the security device obtains the payment data through the short-range communication device (step 2), and selects the delivery to the display device display (step 3); the security device generates the payment key data or the final payment data according to the payment data (step 4); the security device passes again The short-range communication device outputs payment key data or final payment data (step 5).
- the essence of this embodiment is to use the confirmation device (mobile phone) as the "password keyboard" of the payment device (mobile phone, Internet POS) (the POS machine in the PBOC standard).
- the use of asymmetric cryptographic protocols is only for convenience of description.
- the security module of the payment device is issued by the acquiring bank, the public key and the private key of the receiving data can be omitted, and other secure transmission methods are adopted; the function of the pair of keys is guaranteed, and processed by the acquiring platform.
- the obtained M and PIN are transmitted securely to the security module of the payment device.
- the payment data public key and private key can also use the symmetric cryptosystem. His purpose is to ensure that the M and PIN confirmed by the payer are securely transmitted to the acquiring platform.
- Acquirer Platform 1 All information required for bank card receipt includes the issuer certificate RSA ⁇ i!3 ⁇ 4ffi; the security chip 42 has the data of the standard POS security module, the collection account, the receiving private key RSA ft3 ⁇ 4ffi and the certificate RSA i ⁇ ( RSA fei ⁇ ) ; security chip 32 has a bank card payment account, payment private key RSA and certificate RSA (RSA payer 5 has PIN51;
- the receiving device 4 calculates the chip 41 to generate the amount M, and transmits it to the security chip 42, and then the NFC chip 43;
- the confirmation device 3 is close to the payment device 4, and the NFC chip 33 obtains the M and the collection account S from the NFC chip 43;
- the security chip 32 obtains the M and the collection account S from the NFC chip 33, and transmits it to the baseband chip 31;
- the security chip 32 reads the certificate of the security chip 42: RSA (RSA generates a random number Rl, transmits RSA (R1) to the security chip 42;
- the baseband chip 31 displays the amount M (and the payment account S) on the display 34, the payer inputs the PIN 51 on the keyboard 35 and transmits it to the security chip 32;
- the security chip 32 calculates DES E (M PIN51), transferred to the NFC chip 33;
- the confirmation device 3 is moved close to the collection device 4 NFC chip 33 to transmit DES E (M PIN51) to the NFC chip 43, and then to the security chip 42
- the security chip 42 calculates DES E (M PIN51), and obtains (M PIN51);
- security chip 32 card
- security chip 42 terminal security module
- NFC33 and NFC43 connection baseband chip 41
- baseband chip 41 baseband chip 41
- network 2 and acquirer platform 1 baseband chip 41
- PBO EMV bank payment standard process
- Step 2 3 4 5 and 6 is to perform multiple data exchanges during the first short-range connection.
- the key exchange of the secure chip 32 and the secure chip 42 is implemented here using a conventional digital certificate.
- the payment system includes: the acquiring platform 1, the network 2, the confirmation device 3, the collection device 4, the bank card 6 and the payer 5.
- the acquiring platform 1 is connected to the receiving device 4 via the network 2; the confirming device 3 is connected to the receiving device 4 by a short distance; and the receiving device 4 is connected to the bank card 6 via NFC.
- the computing chip 31 is connected to the display 34 and the keyboard 35 in the confirmation device.
- the receiving device 41 has a computing chip 41 connected to the display 44 and the keyboard 45.
- the security chip 42 is connected to the baseband chip 41 and the NFC chip 42, and the baseband chip 41 is connected to the acquiring platform 1 via the network 2.
- Network 2 can be a GPRS WIFK Bluetooth and telephone network.
- the bank card 6 can execute the module of the standard payment process of the PBOC (EMV) card; the security chip 42 can execute the process of the security module in the PBOC (EMV) terminal, in particular the internetwork POS security module process. Then:
- the acquiring platform 1 has all the information required to include the bank card receipt, and the payment data public key RSA ftftSi H of the payment account F.
- Receiving device 2 security module 21 bank terminal all information and receiving data private key RSA m rn ;
- the payment device 4 is close to the bank card 6 to get the payment account F, the payment device 4 baseband chip 41 generates the amount M, transmits the payment account F, the collection account S and M to the acquiring platform 1;
- the acquiring platform 1 randomly generates a confirmation code R, calculates RSA (M S, R), and transmits it to the payment device 4;
- the receiving device 4 converts the RSA M S R) into a two-dimensional code and displays it;
- the baseband chip 31 scans the display 44 through the camera 33, and obtains RSA M S, R);
- Baseband chip 31 calculates RSA (RSA f (M S R));
- the baseband chip 31 displays M (and R) on the display 34;
- the acquiring platform 1 calculates KR, obtains PIN51, calculates RSA Mw ⁇ (M, S, PIN51), and transmits it to the security device 42 of the payment device 4;
- the security chip 42 calculates RSA mm n (RSA mm & (M, collection account S, PIN51)) (M, collection account S, PIN51); , bank card 6, security chip 42 (terminal security module), NFC43
- RSA mm n RSA mm & (M, collection account S, PIN51)
- M collection account S, PIN51
- bank card 6, security chip 42 terminal security module
- NFC43 The connection with the bank card 6, the baseband chip 41, the network 2, and the acquiring platform 1 are performed in accordance with the bank payment standard process (PBOC, EMV).
- PBOC bank payment standard process
- the essence of this embodiment is to use the payment device (mobile phone) as the "password keyboard" of the payment device (mobile phone, Internet POS) (the POS machine in the PBOC standard).
- the use of asymmetric cryptographic protocols is only for convenience of description.
- the security module of the payment device is issued by the acquiring bank, the public key and the private key of the receiving data can be omitted, and other secure transmission methods are adopted; the function of the pair of keys is guaranteed, and processed by the acquiring platform.
- the obtained M and PIN are transmitted securely to the security module of the payment device.
- the purpose of the payment data public key and private key is to securely transfer M and S to the payment device.
- the conversion PIN51 is K, in order to protect the security of the PIN51.
- the bank card in this embodiment can be inserted into the payment device for direct connection; or it can be attached to the payment device (mobile phone), and the bank card is logically connected to the payment device and physically connected to the payment device.
- the payee account is used to represent the payee's information, facilitating the payer to confirm. Obviously, you can replace it with the name of the payee.
- the core of the idea of the present invention is to use short-range communication technology (NFC, RFID, voice communication or two-dimensional code) to realize the "password keyboard" of the mobile phone as a POS terminal, or use a random confirmation code to bind the transaction data and the confirmation code. Display the transaction data on another device, change the confirmation code, and use the converted confirmation code to generate a real "transaction" command. According to the way of the transaction instruction, it can be the PIN code in the magnetic card transaction. The final result generated by the code is "correct". The system does not care, only cares about not leaking the PIN code input by the user (may be wrong).
- the present invention does not limit the cryptographic protocol; the cryptographic protocol in the embodiment is descriptive and not limiting.
- the present invention is not completely limited to banking applications, and can obviously be applied to online games as well as other applications requiring authentication (account and password) and authentication data (amount). While the invention has been described in the foregoing embodiments, it is understood that Various modifications, improvements, changes and substitutions are possible in the spirit and scope of the invention.
Landscapes
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Cash Registers Or Receiving Machines (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
Abstract
本发明的目的是提出一种安全支付的方法。使用手机作为密码键盘实现安全支付,达到用户在不可信计算机终端支付时,可以利用手机与计算机终端配合,采用两次近程通信,达到可控地在自己手机上输入PIN码,确认支付金额的安全支付。该方法可以用于支付;结合好的密码协议,可简单且安全地解决在可能不安全计算机终端上安全使用网络银行、游戏等服务的方法。
Description
一种两次近程连接安全支付的装置、 方法和***
技术领域
本发明属于信息安全领域。 本发明涉及的是, 一种使用两次近程通信连接进行安全支付的装置、 方法 和***。
背景技术
传统的银行卡支付***如图 1所示, POS5及由收单行 3发放到商家, 同时也关联该 POS5与收款账户。 发卡行 1给持卡人 6发放银行卡, 即发放银行卡账户 61及持卡人自己的 PIN62。 支付时, 持卡人在 POS5 上刷卡输入银行卡账户 61 (输入付款账户 F)、输入金额M、输入 PIN62, POS5把收款账户 S (或由于 POS 与收款账户关联, 相当于收款账户信息)、 银行卡账户 61 (付款账户 F)、 金额 M及 PIN62加密后, 通过电 话网络 4传送到收单行 3, 再通过银行网络 2传送到发卡行 1 ;如果信息正确,发卡行 1则进行相应的支付。 很显然, POS5是该支付体系的关键部分。 如果伪造或改造 POS5, 攻击者就可以获得持卡人 6所拥有的银 行卡账户 61 (或加密形式) 及 PIN62, 然后通过伪造银行卡获利。 为此, 银行业制定了严格的 POS安全技 术标准, 以及严格的管理措施。 这些措施带来的技术、 制造和管理成本使得 POS机不能普及到普通人家里 及小微企业。 在 POS支付中, 由于 POS5发送到收单行 3的信息是加密信息, 而收单行***被认为安全。 所以支付的关键是 POS5所得到的数据不能被窃取和伪造。所以可以称 POS5是最后支付数据生成装置, 把 该装置生成的最后支付数据传送到发卡行 1后, 如果正确就可以进行相应的支付。
在银行业简单地把发卡行 1、 银行网络 2、 收单行 3、 电话网络 4及 POS5统称为银行收单***。 为叙 述方便我们把图 1简化为图 2来表示。 这样, POS2把加密的支付数据(收款账户 S、 银行卡账户 31、 金额 M及 PIN32), 传送到收单平台 1 ; 如果支付数据正确, 则进行相应的支付。 收单平台包括图 1的发卡行 1、 银行网络 2、 收单行 3及电话网络 4。 显然银行网络和电话网络只是信息传递的通道, 完全可以采用其他方 式, 如互联网等。
POS2加密支付数据, 收单平台 1解密支付数据并验证支付数据的合法性, 执行合法支付数据, 拒绝不 合法支付数据。可以更简单地叙述为: POS2把最后支付数据(收款账户 S、银行卡账户 31、金额 M及 PIN32) 传送到收单平台 1,收单平台 1执行合法的最后支付数据的支付请求,拒绝非法的最后支付数据的支付请求。 以下就最简单地表述为: POS2把最后支付数据传送到收单平台 1进行支付。
银行业也提供网银支付方式。 U盾网银 (二代)支付方式如图 3所示, 计算机 2 (POS ) 把收款账户 S、 金额 M等交易数据提供给 U盾 4; U盾 4包括持卡人帐户 31 ; U盾 4显示收款账户及金额; 确认正确后, 按 U盾 4上的确认键; U盾 4收到确认键后, 数字签名付款账户 F (银行卡账户 31 )、 收款账户 S、 金额 M 等支付数据后发送到计算机 2, 转发到收单平台 1 ; 收单平台 1验证数字签名正确后, 进行相应的支付。 或 简单地叙述为: 计算机 2把最后支付数据 (收款账户 S、 付款账户 F及金额 M的数字签名) 传送到收单平 台 1, 收单平台 1执行合法的最后支付数据的支付请求, 拒绝非法的最后支付数据的支付请求。 这里, 最后 支付数据生成装置就是 U盾。
EMV卡 (类似一代 U盾, 与二代 U盾相比, 没有键盘和显示器) 的使用方式如图 4所示; 计算机 2 把收款账户 S及金额 M提供给 EMV4; EMV4签名后, 发回到 POS2; POS把 EMV卡签名后的数据及输入 的 PIN32发送到收单平台 1 ; 收单平台 1验证签名及 PIN32正确后, 进行相应的支付。 或简单地叙述为: POS2把数据 (收款账户 S、 付款账户 F及金额 M的数字签名, PIN32) 传送到收单平台 1组成最后支付数 据, 收单平台 1 执行合法的最后支付数据的支付请求, 拒绝非法的最后支付数据的支付请求。 这里, 最后 支付数据生成装置就是收单平台 1。
EMV4银行卡的正常流程是,把 PIN32送入 EMV4,如果 PIN32正确,则签名收款账户 S、付款账户 F、
金额 M, 送到收单平台进行相应的支付。 这里 PIN32就是一个 EMV4进行签名的通行证。 这个方案的交易 金额 M可以被计算机 2伪造,收款账户 S也可以被伪造、 PIN32也可以被窃取。所以只能用于"安全"的 POS2。 虽然该方案也不安全,但是这里的最后支付数据的生成装置是 EMV4, 并在 POS2安全时是一种将要普及的 安全支付手段 (EMV迁移)。 或更简单地叙述为: POS2把最后支付数据 (收款账户 S、 付款账户 F及金额 M的数字签名)传送到收单平台 1, 收单平台 1执行合法的最后支付数据的支付请求, 拒绝非法的最后支付 数据的支付请求。
银行业也提供手机短信支付方式。 用户在收款计算机上输入付款账户及金额; 收款计算机传送付款账 户、 收款账户及金额到银行网站; 银行网站根据用户注册该付款账户时关联的手机号码, 发送包含收款账 户、 金额及确认码的短信到用户手机; 用户阅读手机上的支付信息确认后, 在收款计算机上输入确认码; 收款计算机将确认码送到银行网站; 网站比较从收款计算机来的确认码与发出短信的确认码, 一致时, 发 送支付信息到银行主机完成支付。 这里网站是最后支付数据生成的装置。 该技术方案的问题在于, 如果手 机操作***被病毒或木马侵入, 那么攻击者就可以确定付款账户与之对应的手机, 这样就可以任意支付了。 而且攻击者在还可以收集收款计算机上的付款账户及相应的确认码, 同时再收集手机收到的确认码, 通过 比对可以分析出手机与付款账户的对应关系。 该支付方案简单地叙述为: 网站把最后支付数据 (收款账户、 付款账户、 金额)传送到收单平台 1, 收单平台 1执行合法的最后支付数据的支付请求, 拒绝非法的最后支 付数据的支付请求。基本类似的还有"动态口令"支付、指纹支付等。 网站与收单平台可以就是一个网站, 最 后支付数据生成装置就是收单平台。
最后支付数据的生成装置的含义就是,提供给收单***支付数据的最后"集成"装置。把该数据传送到收 单平台即能实现支付。 显然最后支付数据一般都包括收款账户、 付款账户及金额, 只不过有时还包括身份 认证信息如数字签名、 PIN或动态口令等。 当然最后支付数据生成装置, 也可以在身份认证完成后, 只提供 收款账户、 付款账户及金额信息就进行相应的支付。
银行支付***, 本质上就是账户管理***。 基本的因素是: 账户、 金额 (余额)、 身份认证。 过去磁条 卡的身份认证方式是*** +PIN。 现在加入数字证书技术, 能够做到身份认证的同时, 还可以数字签名, 为 方便事后检验及法律事务。
在本申请文件中, 需要用到各种密码技术来说明技术方案。 非对称密码***使用 RSA来说明: RSA私 t月表示解密算法或签名算法(包括使用摘要技术, 签名摘要), RSA ^表示公开算法。 用 DES表示对称加密 算法: DESE表示加密或解密, E表示密钥。
随着手机及智能手机的大量普及, 可以利用智能手机进行支付。 网银存在的安全问题, 在手机支付领 域依然存在, 而且更加严重。例如原来在计算机上使用 U盾, 在使用之后还可以拔出。但是手机中的 T盾, 不可能要求用户每次使用时, 进行***和拔出的工作。 手机支付的目标就是希望把手机改造成安全支付的 POS机及卡, 做到 3A支付 (anytime、 anywhere、 anyhow) »
在使用传统的磁条卡进行支付的***中, 人们努力改造手机成为移动 POS机。 美国 square公司、 中国 的拉卡拉及快钱公司都退出了手机刷卡的支付服务, 就是这种努力的结果。 该类***一般说来收款装置是 手机, 其中的刷卡器通过手机的耳机口 (或其他外接信息交换设备的接口) 与收款手机成为一个整体。 当 需要支付时, 首先在手机上输入支付金额; 然后付款人用银行卡在刷卡器上刷卡; 这样收款手机得到了付 款人的银行卡账号信息; 然后, 付款人在刷卡手机上输入相关的 PIN; 收款手机把收款人的银行账号、 付款 人的银行账号、 金额及 PIN加密后, 通过移动无线网或计算机网络传送到收单平台, 完成支付。
该类***在手机上***一个磁条刷卡器, 利用手机的通信功能, 实际上构成了移动 POS终端。 但是其 主要的不安全因素是, 当***刷卡器的手机 (收款装置) 被手机病毒入侵, 或被手机拥有者植入程序或被
改造后, 可以很容易得到刷卡的 PIN及银行账号等关键信息。 由于人们本能地不愿意在自己不能控制的手 机(别人的手机)上输入 PIN, 严重阻碍了该技术的推广。 中国专利文献 ZL200910234546.2 "—种确认 CPU 卡内数据的方法"提出一种确认 CPU卡中数据的方法, 但是该方法并不能适用于"不在刷卡手机上输入 PIN 码"的要求。
不考虑安全因素, 支付的本质就是: 把收款人的账号、 付款人的账号、 金额及付款人的 PIN (身份认证 信息), 传送到付款人的开户银行; 银行验证账号及相应 PIN正确后, 进行相应的资金转移。 支付安全技术 的本质就是采用协议, 来达到安全与易用的结合。
关于这方面的专利文献可以参考:中国专利文献 ZL200610041361.6"—种不依赖操作***安全的安全使 用网络服务器服务的装置和方法"、 CN99806523.4 "计算机***中用于安全交易的方法和***"、 ZL200910234546.2 "一种确认 CPU 卡内数据的方法"、 ZL200910234552.8 "一种安全***及方法"、 ZL200910234553.2 "一种增强 USBKEY安全的装置、 方法及***"、 ZL200410103401.6"—种增强计算机上 使用电子签名工具安全性的方法"。
随着非接触信息交换技术的普及, 特别是 NFC手机的逐步普及。 利用非接触技术结合手机的便携性, 在加强支付安全的同时, 保证使用方便成为新的技术创新领域。 目前非接触信息交换技术主要有 13.56M及 2.4G技术。 其实无线信息交换技术还有蓝牙、 ZIGBEE及 WIFI等。 但是适合用于支付领域的无线技术, 应 该满足近程通讯的要求。 也就是, 首先设备必须非常靠近才能通信 (小于 10CM) ,而且当离开后关断通信 (大于 10CM)。 另外通过手机的 MIC和扬声器, 也可以实现两个设备 (手机)之间的信息交换。 这样, 就 能保证支付进行数据交换时, 设备确实相互靠近。
关于近程通信连接两个设备,这方面的专利文献还可以参考:中国专利文献 ZL201120500867.5"—种现场 支付设备"、 "ZL201210268533.9 一种基于安全芯片和声音载波通信的手机支付器和支付方法"、 ZL201010205532.0 "基于声波的安全数据通信的装置与方法"、 ZL201120494926.2 "一种现场支付设备"、 ZL201110314015.1 "一种移动支付的方法、 ***和终端设备"。 这些文件及以上所提到的所有专利文献都是 本专利实现的背景文件, 为了节省本专利说明书的篇幅, 申请人把上述所有专利文献的说明书都作为本专 利申请的一部分, 表示已经把这些申请文件写入了本说明书。
发明内容
设备 A与设备 B近程连接的含义是, 当 A与 B靠近时, A设备可以与设备 B相互获得信息, 如 NFC、 RFID等射频技术。 设备 A与设备 B近程单向连接的含义是, 当 A与 B靠近时, A设备可以从设备 B获得 信息, 但设备 B不能从设备 A获得信息; 例如, 使用摄像头读取二维码是近程单向连接, 即信息能够从二 维码显示设备传送到拥有摄像头的设备, 反之不能传送信息。 还有使用 MIC及扬声器, 在设备 A与设备 B 之间构成连接, 用于信息交换, 这也是一种近程连接。 总之, 近程连接就是, 只有两个设备相互物理上靠 近后, 才能进行信息交换的连接。 我们使用" A靠近 B", 表示 A靠近 B建立近程连接; 一般表示 A与 B近 程连接从 B获得信息。
为了不在商家的"手机移动 POS"上输入用户银行卡的 PIN,可以采用在银行卡所有人自己的手机上输入 PIN码来提高安全体验。称这个自己的手机为"确认装置"。在本申请文件中,手机没有利用其远程通信功能, 即 MID也是一样, 也可以做成有显示器及键盘的卡形状。
现在银行卡及手机都是必带物品; 手机有显示器及键盘, 充分利用手机是一个易用的方案。 这样支付 前端就有两个装置: 收款装置 (如计算机或 POS )及确认装置 (手机)。 可以利用收款装置及确认装置两个 物品来提高支付安全性。 只要保证在其中一个物品是安全的, 就可以保证支付安全; 比较差的情况就是两 个物品都不安全时,只要两个物品中的"木马"不是同一黑客所为还是可以保证安全;更进一步就是两个物品
中的"木马"就是同一黑客所为, 但是只要黑客很难对应该两个物品, 即很难对应付款账户与相应的手机, 也 还是安全。或者只要黑客不能"实时"对应这两个物品, 并能实时交换信息, 也还是安全。 最后, 如果两个设 备都有硬件安全模块, 这样帐户信息就可以做到只能近程传送, 保证资金只能从付款人到收款人。
一种两次近程连接安全支付的装置, 它包括:
显示装置: 用于选择显示收款数据;
安全装置: 用于生成支付关键数据, 或者生成最后支付数据。
近程通信装置, 用于近程连接输入输出数据;
安全装置与显示装置连接, 安全装置与近程通信装置连接;
安全装置通过近程通信装置获得收款数据, 选择传递到显示装置显示; 安全装置根据收款数据生成支 付关键数据或最后支付数据; 安全装置再次通过近程通信装置输出支付关键数据或最后支付数据。
进一步, 还有安全模块进行相关的密码计算, 生成最后支付数据或生成支付关键数据。
一种两次近程连接安全支付的***, 它包括:
收款装置: 用于向确认装置近程传送收款数据, 或者接收从确认装置近程传送来的支付关键数据或最 后支付数据, 或者传送支付关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置, 或者从最后支付数据生成装置接收最后支 付数据, 或者传送最后支付数据到收单平台等;
确认装置: 用于选择显示收款数据、 生成支付关键数据或最后支付数据, 并近程传送到收款装置; 收单平台: 根据收到的支付关键数据生成最后支付数据或者接收最后支付数据, 并根据最后支付数据, 执行合法的最后支付数据, 拒绝非法的最后支付数据;
最后支付数据生成装置: 根据支付关键数据生成最后支付数据, 他可以连接收款装置, 也可以连接确 认装置, 可以处于收款装置内, 可以处于确认装置内, 还可以处于收单平台内;
收款装置与收单平台连接; 确认装置与收款装置近程连接;
确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据; 确认装置选择显示收款数据; 确认装置生成支付关键数 据, 如果最后支付数据装置连接确认装置, 那么把确认装置传送支付关键数据到最后支付数据装置, 生成 最后支付数据, 并传送到确认装置; 确认装置再次靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据或最后支付数据 到收款装置; 如果收款装置收到的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 则直接传送到收单平台, 否则传送支付 关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置生成最后支付数据, 并传送最后支付数据到收单平台; 收单平台根据最 后支付数据进行支付处理。
进一步, CPU卡是最后支付数据生成装置, CPU卡直接连接收款装置, 接收收款装置传送来的支付关 键数据, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送回收款装置及收单平台。
或者, 收单平台内还有安全装置, 接收收款装置传送来的支付关键数据, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送 到收单平台。
或者, 收款装置还有安全模块, 接收收款装置传送来的支付关键数据, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送到 收单平台。
根据本发明的另一个方面, 一种两次近程连接安全支付方法, 它包括:
A、 确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据;
B、 确认装置选择显示收款数据;
C、 确认装置生成支付关键数据;
D、如果最后支付数据生成装置连接确认装置, 那么确认装置传送支付关键数据传送到最后支付数据装 置, 生成最后支付数据, 并传回到确认装置;
E、 确认装置再次靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据或最后支付数据到收款装置;
F、 如果收款装置收到的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 则直接传送到收单平台, 否则传送支付关键数 据到最后支付数据生成装置生成最后支付数据, 并传送最后支付数据到收单平台;
G、 收单平台根据最后支付数据进行支付处理。
通常地, 最后支付数据生成装置或者是连接收款装置的 CPU卡, 或者是收款装置中的安全模块, 或者 是连接收款装置的收单平台;其特征在于还有收款装置把支付关键数据传送到最后支付数据生成装置,最后 支付数据生成装置根据支付关键数据生成最后支付数据的步骤。
一般地, 步骤 C中的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 确认装置就是最后支付数据生成装置。
一般地, 步骤 C支付关键数据是在确认装置的安全模块中生成, 同时还有安全模块禁止支付关键数据 传送到确认装置的步骤。
通常地, 最后支付数据生成装置通过收款装置传送最后支付数据到收单平台;
一般地, 确认装置通过近程连接从收款装置获得包括收款账户及 (或) 金额等收款数据; 一般地, 最后支付数据生成装置是连接收款装置的 CPU卡;
更方便地, 支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 确认装置就是最后支付数据生成装置;
或者, 最后支付数据生成装置是收款装置中的安全模块;
或者, 最后支付数据生成装置是连接收款装置的收单平台;
更安全地, C支付关键数据是在确认装置的安全模块中生成, 同时还有安全模块禁止支付关键数据传送 到确认装置的步骤;
附图说明
下面参照附图描绘本发明, 其中
图 1表示现有银行卡支付***的示意图;
图 2表示简化的银行卡支付***的示意图;
图 3表示现有 U盾 (二代) 支付***的示意图;
图 4表示现有 U盾 代)、 CPU卡支付及 EMV卡支付***的示意图;
图 5表示优选实施例 1 2, 3相关联的***的示意图;
图 6表示优选实施例 4相关联的***的示意图;
图 7表示优选实施例 5 6相关联的***的示意图;
图 8表示优选实施例 7相关联的***的示意图;
图 9表示优选实施例 8相关联的***的示意图;
具体实施方式
[实施例 1] (手机密码键盘, 平台)
根据本发明关联的第 1种实施方式如图 5所示。 支付***由收单平台 1、 收款装置 2、 银行卡 3、 确认 装置 4及付款人 5组成。 其中收单平台 1与收款装置 2连接; 收款装置 2与银行卡 3连接; 确认装置 4与 收款装置 2近程连接。
收单平台 1: 拥有平台私钥 RSA 收款装置 2收款账户 S的收款数据公钥 RSA m m^ 确认装置 4: 有平台公钥 RSA
收款装置 2: 有收款账户 S , 安全模块 21有收款账户 S及收款数据私钥 RSA m rn ;
付款人 5有银行卡 3支付要求的 PIN51; 银行卡 3拥有付款账户 F
支付流程为:
1、 收款装置 2获得金额 M, 有收款账户 S ;
2、 确认装置 4靠近收款装置 2, 得到 (M、 S ),
3、 确认装置 4选择显示 (M、 S ) ;
4、 确认装置 4上输入 PIN51 , 计算 RSA (M、 S、 PIN51 ) ;
5、 确认装置 4再次靠近收款装置 2, 近程连接传送 RSA ( M、 S、 PIN51 ) 到收款装置 2, 然后 传送到收单平台 1 ;
6、 收单平台 1计算 RSA ( RSA M、 S、 PIN51 ) ), 得到 (M、 S、 PIN51 ) ; 根据 S得到 RSA m& , 计算 RSA ( M、 PIN51 ) 传送到收款装置 2安全模块 21 ;
7、 安全模块 21计算 RSA m m& ( RSA mmm^ ( M、 PIN51 ) 得到 M及 PIN51;
8、 银行卡 3、 收款装置 2及收单平台 1按照银行支付标准流程进行支付操作, 当安全模块 21需要输 入金额 M及 PIN时, 使用安全模块已得到的金额 M及 PIN51 , 最后传送到收单平台进行支付。 这里, 安全模块 21就是 POS, 而确认装置 4就是该 POS机的可信显示器和可信键盘, 完成 POS机的显 示器和密码键盘的功能。
步骤 1和 2, 就是"确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据"。 这里收款数据是收款账户 S (核心) 和金额 M,金额 M也可以在确认装置 4上生成;确认装置 4与收款装置 2的连接是近程连接,如 NFC、RFID、 声音通信及确认装置 4扫描收款装置 2显示包含收款数据的二维码等。 也可以是如摇一摇等根据地理位置 接近, 使得确认装置与收款装置连接, 这样的连接由于地理距离近也可以认为是近程连接。
步骤 3, 是"确认装置选择显示收款数据"; 这里收款账户可以不显示。
步骤 4, 是"确认装置生成支付关键数据"。确认装置生成支付关键数据是: RSA ^^ ( M、 S、 PIN51 ) ; 本实施例的最后支付数据生成装置是收款装置 2安全模块 21, 且与确认装置 4不直接连接, 所以"如果 最后支付数据生成装置连接确认装置, 那么确认装置传送支付关键数据传送到最后支付数据装置, 生成最 后支付数据, 并传送到确认装置"不执行;
步骤 5、 步骤 6和步骤 7,就是"确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据或最后支付数据到收款 装置"; 确认装置靠近收款装置, 通过近程通信传送生成的支付关键数据到收款装置安全模块;
步骤 8, 就是"如果收款装置收到的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 则直接传送到收单平台, 否则传送 支付关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置生成最后支付数据, 并传送最后支付数据到收单平台"; 本实施例, 支付关键数据不是最后支付数据。 最后支付数据生成装置是收款装置安全模块, 收款装置安全模块使用支 付关键数据生成最后支付数据, 并传送到收单平台。
步骤 8, "收单平台根据最后支付数据进行支付处理";
步骤 4中的输入 PIN51也可以使用预存在确认装置 4中 PIN51。 步骤 7中银行卡、 收款装置及收单平 台使用支付关键数据生成最后支付数据:当银行卡是磁卡时,最后支付数据在收款装置安全模块 21中生成; 当银行卡是 CPU卡时, 最后支付数据在 CPU卡中生成。 另外实施例 1中的银行卡也可以是 U盾, 从技术 上看 U盾就是 CPU卡。 在确认装置 4中, 还可以设置安全模块来进行相关的密码计算; 并可以采取只向确 认装置传送必要的信息 (金额), 禁止传送其他信息 (收款账户)。 即, 采用信息只向需要的装置发送, 并 从硬件 (软件)上禁止向其他装置传送, 或称之为: 定向传送。
本实施例的本质就是, 使用确认装置作为收款装置 (PBOC标准中 POS机) 的"密码键盘"。 使用非对 称密码协议只是为了叙述方便。 实际上由于收款装置安全模块是由收单银行发放, 收款数据公钥及私钥均 可以不需要, 而采用其他对称密码协议; 这一对密钥的功能就是保证, 经过收单平台处理得到的 M及 PIN, 安全传送到收款装置的安全模块。
本实施例与密码键盘的区别在于, 密码键盘与 POS是一个整体, 是 POS的一个部件, 而实施例确认装 置与收款装置实际上是两个人 (或机构) 所有; 密码键盘只输入 PIN, 而本实施例的确认装置不仅要输入 PIN, 还要显示金额, 甚至还要显示收款账户 (或收款用户名)。 特别强调的是, 本实施例中, 确认装置必 须通过收单平台才能与收款装置建立密码连接, 而传统密码键盘是直接与 POS进行认证建立密码连接。
本实施例还可以这样描述:
一种近程安全支付方法, 它包括:
A、 确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据; (步骤 1,2 )
B、 确认装置选择显示收款数据; (步骤 3 )
C、 确认装置生成支付关键数据; (步骤 4 )
D、 确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据到收款装置;
E、 传送支付关键数据到收单平台, 再传送到收款装置安全模块; (步骤 5,6,7安全要求);
F、 执行银行支付标准流程进行支付操作, 形成最后支付数据; (步骤 8 )
G、 收单平台根据最后支付数据进行支付处理;
实际上, 确认装置 4可以是手机。 实施例 1就是手机作为收款装置 (POS ) 的密码键盘。 手机与收款 装置的连接是近程连接, 如二维码、 NFC、 声音通信或地理位置近程连接。 如手机可使用扫描收款装置显 示的二维码从收款装置上获得数据, 也可以使用近程通信技术 (如 NFC ) 从收款装置上获得数据, 还可以 通过 MIC获得数据,还可以通过地理位置接近建立的网络连接。收款装置从手机获得数据,可以采用 NFC、 二维码、 通过 MIC获得数据及手工在收款装置的键盘上输入等。 实施例 1的支付关键数据使用键盘输入不 方便, 推荐近程连接是 NFC近程通讯技术。
那么该方案的使用步骤就是:
1、 在收款装置上生成金额 (或收款账户及金额);
2、 把手机靠近收款装置;
3、 付款人査看手机显示的收款数据;
4、 收款数据正确, 输入银行卡 PIN码;
5、 把手机靠近收款装置完成支付;
很显然, 在实施例 1中的银行卡可以是普通的磁卡, 也可以是 CPU卡。 如果把银行卡账户信息放入手 机内置的安全芯片中、 或者把 CPU卡放入手机安全芯片、 或者直接把 CPU卡贴在手机上, 通过 NFC手机 与收款装置近程连接进行信息交换。 那么从逻辑上看, 银行卡还是连接收款装置, 但是物理上银行卡与确 认装置在一起, 即手机内含银行卡。
[实施例 2] (手机密码键盘 2, 没有平台)
根据本发明关联的第 2种实施方式如图 5所示。 支付***由收单平台 1、 收款装置 2、 银行卡 3、 确认 装置 4及付款人 5组成。 其中收单平台 1与收款装置 2连接; 收款装置 2与银行卡 3连接; 确认装置 4与 收款装置 2近程连接。
收单平台 1 : 拥有平台私钥 RS A RSA
确认装置 4: 平台公钥 RSA
收款装置 2安全模块 21有收款账户 S及收款数据私钥 RSA 还有 RSA (RSA 付款人 5有银行卡 3支付要求的 PIN51; 银行卡 3拥有付款账户。
支付流程为:
1、 收款装置 2获得金额 M, 传送到安全模块 21 ;
2、 安全模块 21计算 RSA M、 S)、 RSA RSA
3、 确认装置 4靠近收款装置 2, 获得 RSA (M、 S )、 RSA f (RSA f
4、 确认装置 4计算 RSA RSA RSA 《) ),得到 RSA mmm^ ,计算 RSA RSA
M、 S ) ), 得到金额 M及收款账户 S ;
5、 显示金额 M及 (或) 收款账户 S;
6、 在确认装置 4上输入 PIN51 , 确认装置 4计算 RSA ( M、 PIN51 ) ;
7、 确认装置 4靠近收款装置 2, 近程连接传送 RSA ( M、 PIN51 ) 到收款装置 2, 然后安全模 块 21 ;
8、 安全模块 21计算 RSA ( RSA ( M、 PIN51 ) ), 得到 M及 PIN51;
9、 银行卡 3、 收款装置 2及收单平台 1按照银行支付标准流程进行支付操作, 当安全模块 21需要输 入金额 M及 PIN时, 使用安全模块已得到的金额 M及 PIN51; 最后传送到收单平台 1进行支付。 步骤 1和 2, 就是"确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据"。 这里收款数据是收款账户 (核心)和 金额 M, 金额也可以在确认装置上生成; 确认装置与收款装置的连接是近程连接, 如 NFC、 RFID、 声音通 信及确认显示装置扫描收款装置显示包含收款数据的二维码等。
步骤 2中的 RSA ffi ( RSA 本质就是有收单平台签署的安全模块的数字证书。 由于确认装置 4确认安全模块 21的合法性。
步骤 3, 是"确认装置显示收款数据"; 这里收款账户可以不显示。
步骤 4,是"确认装置生成支付关键数据"。 确认装置生成支付关键数据: RSA ftft i ffi ( M、 S、 PIN51 ) ; 本实施例的最后支付数据生成装置是收款装置安全模块, 且与确认装置不连接, 所以"如果最后支付数 据生成装置连接确认装置, 那么确认装置传送支付关键数据传送到最后支付数据装置, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送到确认装置"不执行;
步骤 5、 步骤 6和步骤 7,就是"确认装置再次靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据或最后支付数据到 收款装置"; 确认装置靠近收款装置, 通过近程通信传送生成的支付关键数据到收款装置及安全模块; 步骤 8, 就是"如果收款装置收到的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 则直接传送到收单平台, 否则传送 支付关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置生成最后支付数据, 并传送最后支付数据到收单平台"; 本实施例, 支付关键数据不是最后支付数据。 最后支付数据生成装置是收款装置安全模块, 收款装置安全模块使用支 付关键数据生成最后支付数据, 并传送到收单平台。
步骤 9, "收单平台根据最后支付数据进行支付处理";
步骤 4中的输入 PIN51也可以使用预存在确认装置中 PIN51。 步骤 7中银行卡、 收款装置及收单平台 使用支付关键数据生成最后支付数据: 当银行卡是磁卡时, 最后支付数据在收款装置安全模块 21中生成; 当银行卡是 CPU卡时, 最后支付数据在 CPU卡中生成。 另外实施例 1中的银行卡也可以是 U盾, 从技术 上看 U盾就是 CPU卡。 在确认装置中, 还可以设置安全模块来进行相关的密码计算; 并可以采取只向确认 装置传送必要的信息 (金额), 禁止传送其他信息 (收款账户)。 即, 采用信息只向需要的装置发送, 并从 硬件 (软件)上禁止向其他装置传送。
本实施例的本质就是, 使用确认装置作为收款装置 (PBOC标准中 POS机) 的"密码键盘"。 使用非对 称密码协议只是为了叙述方便。 由于使用类似数字签名的 RSA ¥i!¾ffi ( RSA & ), 而且收款装置安全模 块是由收单银行发放, 可以保证安全。
本实施例与密码键盘用数字签名证书的技术实现确认装置与安全模块的密码连接。
本实施例还可以这样描述:
一种近程安全支付方法, 它包括:
A、 确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据; (步骤 1,2 )
B、 确认装置显示收款数据; (步骤 3 )
C、 确认装置生成支付关键数据; (步骤 4 )
D、 确认装置再次靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据到收款装置安全模块; (步骤 5,6,7 ) ;
E、 执行银行支付标准流程进行支付操作, 形成最后支付数据;
F、 收单平台根据最后支付数据进行支付处理;
实际上, 确认装置 4可以是手机。 实施例 1就是手机作为收款装置 (POS ) 的密码键盘。 手机与收款 装置的连接是近程连接, 如二维码、 NFC或声音通信。 如手机可使用扫描收款装置显示的二维码从收款装 置上获得数据, 也可以使用近程通信技术 (如 NFC ) 从收款装置上获得数据, 还可以通过 MIC获得数据。 收款装置从手机获得数据,可以采用 NFC、二维码、通过 MIC获得数据及手工在收款装置的键盘上输入等。 实施例 1的支付关键数据使用键盘输入不方便, 推荐的近程连接是 NFC近程通讯技术。
那么该方案的使用步骤就是:
1、 在收款装置上生成金额 (或收款账户及金额);
2、 把手机靠近收款装置;
3、 付款人査看手机显示的收款数据;
4、 收款数据正确, 输入银行卡 PIN码;
5、 把手机靠近收款装置完成支付;
很显然, 在实施例 2中的银行卡可以是普通的磁卡, 也可以是 CPU卡。 如果把银行卡账户信息放入手 机内置的安全芯片中、 或者把 CPU卡放入手机安全芯片、 或者直接把 CPU卡贴在手机上, 通过 NFC手机 与收款装置近程连接进行信息交换。 那么从逻辑上看, 银行卡还是连接收款装置, 但是物理上银行卡确认 显示装置在一起, 即手机内含银行卡。
本实施例与实施例 1的区别在于支付时, 不需要收单平台 1参与密码计算。
[实施例 3] (手机密码键盘 2, 位置)
根据本发明关联的第 3种实施方式如图 5所示。 支付***由收单平台 1、 收款装置 2、 银行卡 3、 确认 装置 4及付款人 5组成。 其中收单平台 1与收款装置 2连接; 收款装置 2与银行卡 3连接; 确认装置 4与 收款装置 2近程连接。
收单平台 1 : 拥有银行卡 3付款账户 F的付款数据公钥 RSA m m^ 收款装置 2收款账户 S的收款数 SA
确认装置 4有银行卡 3的付款数据公钥标识 FB、 付款数据私钥 RSA mmrnm ;
收款装置 2安全模块 21有收款账户 S及收款数据私钥 RSA m rn ;
付款人 5有银行卡 3支付要求的 PIN51; 银行卡 3拥有付款账户。
支付流程为:
1、 收款装置 2获得金额 M, 传送到安全模块 21 ;
2、 确认装置 4靠近收款装置 2, 得到金额 M及收款账户 S ;
3、 显示金额 M及 (或) 收款账户 S;
4、 付款人确认显示信息后,在确认装置 4上输入 PIN51 ,确认装置 4计算 RSA M、 S、 PIN51 ) ;
5、 确认装置 4再次靠近收款装置 2, 近程连接传送 RSA ft ¾ffi ( M、 S、 PIN51 ) , 付款数据公钥标识 FB到收款装置 2, 然后传送到收单平台 1 ;
6、 收单平台 1根据付款数据公钥标识 FB, 得到付款数据公钥; 计算 RSA (RSA (M、 S、 PIN51 ) ), 得到 M、 S及 PIN51 ; 计算 RSA M、 S、 PIN51 )传送到收款装置 2安全模 块 21 ;
7、 安全模块 21计算 RSA (RSA (M、 S、 PIN51 ) 得到 M、 S及 PIN51;
8、 银行卡 3、 收款装置 2及收单平台 1按照银行支付标准流程进行支付操作, 当安全模块 21需要输 入金额 M及 PIN时, 使用安全模块已得到的金额 M及 PIN51; 最后传送到收单平台进行支付。 步骤 1和 2, 就是"确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据"。 这里收款数据是收款账户 (核心)和 金额 M, 金额也可以在确认装置上生成; 确认装置与收款装置的连接是近程连接, 如 NFC、 RFID、 声音通 信及确认显示装置扫描收款装置显示包含收款数据的二维码等。
步骤 3, 是"确认装置显示收款数据"; 这里收款账户可以不显示。
步骤 4,是"确认装置生成支付关键数据"。 确认装置生成支付关键数据: RSA ft ¾ffi (M、 S、 PIN51 ) ; 本实施例的最后支付数据生成装置是收款装置安全模块, 且与确认装置不连接, 所以"如果最后支付数 据生成装置连接确认装置, 那么确认装置传送支付关键数据传送到最后支付数据装置, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送到确认装置"不执行;
步骤 5、 步骤 6和步骤 7,就是"确认装置再次靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据或最后支付数据到 收款装置"; 确认装置靠近收款装置, 通过近程通信传送生成的支付关键数据到收款装置及安全模块; 步骤 8, 就是"如果收款装置收到的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 则直接传送到收单平台, 否则传送 支付关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置生成最后支付数据, 并传送最后支付数据到收单平台"; 本实施例, 支付关键数据不是最后支付数据。 最后支付数据生成装置是收款装置安全模块, 收款装置安全模块使用支 付关键数据生成最后支付数据, 并传送到收单平台。
步骤 7 中银行卡、 收款装置及收单平台使用支付关键数据生成最后支付数据: 当银行卡是磁卡时, 最 后支付数据在收款装置安全模块 21中生成; 当银行卡是 CPU卡时, 最后支付数据在 CPU卡中生成。
本实施例的本质就是, 使用确认装置作为收款装置 (PBOC标准中 POS机) 的"密码键盘"。 POS机密 码键盘与 POS机的通过密码协议连接, 而本实施例中, 确认装置必须通过收单平台才能与收款装置建立密 码连接。
本实施例 3通过收单平台事实上进行了收款装置的公钥的认证。
[实施例 4] (手机 CPU卡)
根据本发明关联的第 4种实施方式, 如图 6所示。 支付***由收单平台 1、 收款装置 2、 付款人 3、 确 认装置 4及 CPU卡装置 5组成。 其中收单平台 1与收款装置 2连接; 收款装置 2与确认装置 4近程连接; CPU卡装置 5与确认装置 4连接。
收单平台 1包括: CPU卡装置 5的付款账户 F及付款公钥 RSA m ;
CPU卡装置 5包括: CPU卡装置 5付款私钥 RSA m mn, 付款账户 F及 PIN51;
收款装置 2包括: 收款账户 S; 付款人 3有 CPU卡装置 5的 PIN51;
1、 收款装置 2获得金额 M, 有收款账户 S;
2、 确认装置 4靠近收款装置 2, 获得 (金额 M, 收款账户 S ) ;
3、 显示金额 M及 (或) 收款账户 S;
4、 确认装置 4上输入 PIN51 , 传送 (M、 S、 PIN51 ) 到 CPU卡装置 5 ;
5、 CPU卡装置 5比较收到的 PIN51与拥有的 PIN51—致后, 计算 RSA ft¾¾ (M、 S、 F), 传送到确 认装置 4;
6、 确认装置 4再次靠近收款装置 2, 近程传送 RSA (M S、 F) 到收款装置 2;
7、 收款装置 2传送 RSA ft¾ffi (M S F) 收单平台 1 ;
8、 收单平台 1根据最后支付数据 RSA ft¾ffi ( M S、 F ) 进行支付处理;
步骤 1和 2, 就是"确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据"。 这里收款数据是收款账户 (核心)和 金额 M, 金额也可以在确认装置上生成; 确认装置与收款装置的连接是近程连接, 如 NFC RFID、 声音及 确认装置扫描收款装置显示包含收款数据的二维码等;
步骤 3, 是"确认装置显示收款数据"; 这里收款账户可以不显示。
步骤 4是"确认装置使用支付数据生成支付关键数据"。 确认装置生成支付关键数据 M PIN51、 收款账 户 S、 付款账户 F;
步骤 5、传送支付关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置 CPU卡,本实施例的最后支付数据生成装置是 CPU 卡, 且连接确认装置; "如果最后支付数据装置连接确认显示装置, 那么把确认显示装置传送支付关键数据 传送到最后支付数据装置, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送到确认显示装置";
步骤 6,就是"确认装置靠近收款装置,近程传送支付关键数据或最后支付数据到收款装置"。确认装置靠 近收款装置, 通过近程通信传送生成的最后支付数据到收款装置;
步骤 7, 就是"如果收款装置收到的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 则直接传送到收单平台, 否则传送 支付关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置生成最后支付数据, 并传送最后支付数据到收单平台"; 本实施例, 收款装置收到的是最后支付数据。 收款装置安全装置使用支付关键数据生成最后支付数据。
步骤 8, "收单平台根据最后支付数据进行支付处理";
这里确认装置 4及 CPU卡装置 5, 完全可以在一个物理装置中, 比如手机。 CPU卡装置 5及安全模块 41可以是一个模块(硬件或软件)。 实施例 4其实就是手机作为一个安全专用支付计算机。这个方案比手机 直接做二代 U盾安全。 手机与收款装置的连接是近程连接, 这样当手机没有靠近收款装置时, 不可能把支 付关键数据传送到收款装置。
为了增强实施例 4的安全, 参照实施例 3, 可以在收款装置中增加一个由收单行发放的安全模块, 通 过密码协议, 能够实现收款账户安全传送到确认装置的安全模块 41
实施例 2的使用步骤就是:
1、 在收款装置上输入金额 (或收款账户及金额);
2、 把手机靠近收款装置;
3、 査看手机显示的支付数据;
4、 支付数据正确, 则输入银行卡 PIN码;
5、 把手机靠近收款装置;
在手机中, 实际上 CPU卡装置 5和确认装置安全模块 41可能是一个芯片, 如银行和移动通信商联合 发放的 SIM卡, 或银行单独发行的 TF卡。
[实施例 5] (手机 CPU卡, 最后支付数据)
根据本发明关联的第 5种实施方式, 如图 7所示。 支付***由收单平台 1、 收款装置 2、 银行卡 3、 确 认装置 4及付款人 5。 其中收单平台 1与收款装置 2连接; 收款装置 2与确认装置 4近程连接, 收款装置 2 中有收款安全芯片 21; 确认装置 4中有确认安全模块 41; 银行卡 3与收款装置 2连接; 确认装置 4与收款 装置 2近程连接。 当银行卡为 CPU卡时:
收单平台 1 : 平台私钥 RSA 付款账户?、 付款公钥 RSA
付款数据公钥 RSA mmmrn ;
银行卡 3: 付款私钥 RSA u , 付款账户 F及 PIN51;
确认安全模块 41: 付款数据私钥 RSA
付款人 5有银行卡 3的 PIN51;
收款安全模块 21: 收款账户 S及收款数据私钥 RSA m m^
1、 收款装置 2获得金额 M, 有收款账户 S;
2、 确认装置 4靠近收款装置 2, 获得 (M、 S);
3、 显示金额 M及 (或) 收款账户 S;
4、 确认装置 4上输入 PIN51, 确认安全模块 41计算 RSA M、 S、 PIN51);
5、 确认装置 4再次靠近收款装置 2, 传送 RSA ft ¾ffi (M、 S、 PIN51)到收款装置 2, 然后传送到收 单平台 1;
6、 收单平台 1计算 RSA ί (RSA M、 S、 PIN51 ) ),然后计算 RSA (RSA M、 S、 PIN51)), 传送到收款装置 2, 然后到银行卡 3;
7、 银行卡 3根据 RSA RSA RSA (RSA M、 S、 PIN51 ) ),得到(M、 S、 PIN51 ), 如果 PIN51与银行卡内的 PIN51—致, 则计算 RSA M、 S、 F);
8、 银行卡 3传送 RSA (M、 S、 F) 到收款装置 2, 然后到收单平台 1;
9、 收单平台 1计算 RSA RSA M、 S、 F)), 得到 M及S, 然后根据 M、 收款账户 S及 付款账户 F进行支付。 步骤 1和 2, 就是"确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据"。 这里收款数据是收款账户 (核心)和 金额 M, 收款账户及金额也可以在确认显示装置上生成, 可以是其他通信技术, 如 NFC、 RFID、 声音通信 或确认显示装置扫描收款装置显示包含支付数据的二维码等。
步骤 3, 是"确认装置显示收款数据"; 这里收款账户可以不显示。
步骤 4是"确认装置生成支付关键数据"。 确认装置生成支付关键数据 M、 PIN51、 收款账户 S, RSA M、 S、 PIN51);
传送支付关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置银行卡 3, 本实施例的最后支付数据生成装置是 CPU卡, 且不连接确认装置; "如果最后支付数据生成装置连接确认装置, 那么确认装置传送支付关键数据传送到最 后支付数据装置, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送到确认装置", 本实施例不执行;
步骤 5, 就是"确认装置再次靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据或最后支付数据到收款装置"。 确认 装置靠近收款装置, 通过近程通信传送支付关键数据到收款装置;
步骤 6、 7、 8和 9, 就是"如果收款装置收到的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 则直接传送到收单平台, 否则传送支付关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置生成最后支付数据, 并传送最后支付数据到收单平台"; 本 实施例, 银行卡 3是最后支付数据生成装置。
步骤 10, "收单平台根据最后支付数据进行支付处理"; 当银行卡是磁卡时, 必须在收款装置 2中加入收单平台发放的安全模块 21。 贝 IJ:
1、 收款装置 4生成或输入金额 M;
2、 确认装置 4靠近收款装置 2, 接收金额 M及收款账户;
3、 显示金额及 (或) 收款账户;
4、 付款人确认显示信息后, 在确认装置 4上输入 PIN51;
5、 确认安全模块 41计算 RSA mm (金额 M、 收款账户 S、 PIN51 );
6、 确认装置 4靠近收款装置 2, 传送 RSA M、 S、 PIN51)到收款装置 2, 然后传送到收单平 台 1;
7、 收单平台 1计算 RSA ί (RSA M、 S、 PIN51 ) ),然后计算 RSA (RSA M、 S、 PIN51)), 传送到收款装置 2及安全模块 21;
8、 安全模块 21根据 RSA RSA RSA RSA M、 S、 PIN51)), 得到金额M、 S及 PIN51;
9、 安全模块 21根据银行标准加密组合 (M、 S、 F、 PIN51), 传送到收单平台 1进行支付处理; 这里, 只有当确认装置靠近收款装置, 才能传送 RSA «Mg¾t¾ (M、 S、 PIN51)。 如果确认装置是手机, 使用步骤就是:
1、 在收款装置上*** (刷) 银行卡;
2、 在收款装置上输入金额;
3、 把手机靠近收款装置;
4、 査看手机显示的支付数据;
5、 支付数据正确, 则输入银行卡 PIN码;
6、 把手机靠近收款装置, 完成支付;
甚至, 由于有生成 RSA ffi (M、 S、 PIN51) 的步骤; 如果在其中加入付款账户 F, 那么收单平台 就能根据M、 S、 F及 PIN51, 直接生成最后支付数据。 RSA^aMgw^本质就是付款人支付的数字签名。 这 样实施例 5是另一种的关联并使用银行卡的手机 U盾支付。
[实施例 6] (PIN码转换)
本发明就是把支付关键数据, 用可信的方法输出到用户可信设备, 由用户确认支付数据或确认后使用。 根据本发明的第 6个实施例, 一种安全支付的方法所关联的***如图 7所示。 安全支付***包括: 收单平 台 1、 收款装置 2、 银行卡 3、 确认装置 4及付款人 5。 其中收单平台 1与收款装置 2连接; 银行卡 3与收 款装置 2连接; 确认装置 4与收款装置 2近程连接。 收单平台 1包括: 收单平台 1平台私钥 RSA 银行卡 3的付款账户 F及付款公钥 RSA 收 款账户 S及收款公钥 RSA
收款装置 2包括: 安全模块 21及平台公钥 RSA 收款账户 S;
确认装置 4包括: 付款私钥 RSA
付款人有银行卡 52 (含有付款账户) 及相应的 PIN51; 如果银行卡为磁卡 (只有账户信息), 那么:
2、 收单平台 1计算 RS A RSA M、 S)) 得到 M、 S, 并生成流水号 N, 然后计算 RSA (N) 传送到收款装置 2;
3、 收款装置 2把 RSA (N) 传送到安全模块 21; 同时刷银行卡 3得到付款账户 F; 安全模块 21 计算 RSAfeft (RSA mkmn (N)), 得到流水号 N; 安全模块 21计算 RSA (F、 N); 传送到
收单平台 1 ;
4、 收单平台 1计算 RSA RSA ( F、 N) ), 得到 F及 N, 可以根据 N得到收款账户 S ;
5、 收单平台 1生成随机确认码 R, 并计算 RSA (M、 S、 R), 传送到收款装置 2;
6、 确认装置 4靠近收款装置 2, 得到 RSA ( M、 S、 R) ;
7、 确认装置计算 RSA ( RSA m &a (M、 S、 R) ) 得到 M、 S及 R, 显示 M及收款账户 S ;
8、 付款人 5确认收款账户 S及金额 M后, 在确认装置 4输入上 PIN51;
9、 确认装置计算 K=PIN51 +R;
10、 确认装置 4再次靠近收款装置 2, 收款装置 2通过与确认装置 4的近程连接, 得到 K并传送到收单 平台 1 ;
11、 收单平台 1计算 K-R, 得到 PIN51;
12、 收单平台 1根据 PIN51、 F、 S及 M, 生成最后支付数据, 进行支付处理。 在该实施例中, 步骤 1、 2、 3及 4就是把 M、 收款账户 S及付款账户 F传送到收单平台 1 ; 显然也可 以直接传送, 安全基本没有降低。 步骤 5和 6就是把生成的确认码 R及收款数据, 安全传送到确认装置 4 中。 就是"确认装置获取金额及收款账户等收款数据"。
步骤 7, 就是"确认装置显示金额数据, 及 (或) 收款账户"。
步骤 8和 9就是变换 PIN51。 "确认装置生成支付关键数据"。
步骤 10、 "如果最后支付数据生成装置连接确认装置, 那么确认装置传送支付关键数据传送到最后支付 数据装置, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送到确认装置", 本实施例的最后支付数据生成装置是收单平台, 并"确 认装置靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据或最后支付数据到收款装置";
步骤 11、 "如果收款装置收到的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 则直接传送到收单平台, 否则传送支付 关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置生成最后支付数据, 并传送最后支付数据到收单平台"。
步骤 12, 收单平台根据最后支付数据进行支付处理; 收单平台 1得到 PIN51 , 然后组成最后支付数据进行支付。 显然, 实施例 6的优点在于, 确认码 PIN51 始终没有出现非加密状态, 并且只用确认装置物理靠近收款装置才能将 K传送出去。 也可以采用在收款装 置的键盘上输入 K的步骤, 这也是近程连接传送。 如果银行卡 3为 CPU卡 (有计算能力), 那么: 收单平台 1包括: 银行卡 3的付款账户 F及付款公钥 RSA m ;
银行卡 3包括: 付款数据私钥 RSA mmwM^ 付款账户 F及付款私钥 RSA u m ;
确认装置 4包括: 付款数据私钥 RSA
付款人有银行卡 3相应的 PIN51 ;
1、 收款装置 2生成金额 M, 传送 M及收款账户 S到银行卡 3 ;
2、 银行卡 3生成随机确认码 R, 并计算 RSA M、 S、 R), 传送到收款装置 2;
3、 确认装置 4靠近收款装置 2, 得到 RSA (M、 S、 R) ;
4、 确认装置计算 RSA RSA M、 S、 R) ) 得到 M、 S及 R, 显示 M及 S ;
5、 付款人 5确认收款账户 S及金额 M后, 在确认装置 4输入 PIN51
6、 确认装置计算 K=PIN51 +R;
7、 确认装置 4再次靠近收款装置 2, 收款装置 2通过与确认装置 4的近程连接, 得到 K并传送到银行 卡 3 ;
8、 银行卡 3计算 K-R, 得到 ΡΙΝ5 Γ ;
9、 如果 ΡΙΝ51=ΡΙΝ5 Γ, 银行卡 3组成最后支付数据 RSA m n (F、 S、 M )传送到收单平台 1进行支 付处理。 在该实施例中, 步骤 1就是把 M、 收款账户 S及付款账户 F传送到银行卡 3 ; 步骤 2、 3及 4就是把生 成的确认码 R及支付数据, 传送到确认装置 4中。 步骤 5和 6就是变换 PIN51。 步骤 7、 8及 9, 就是用近 程连接方式把 K发送到银行卡 3, 并得到 PIN51 , 然后组成最后支付数据进行支付。 显然, 实施例 5的优点 在于, 确认码 R始终没有出现非加密状态, 并且只有确认装置物理靠近收款装置才能将 K传送出去, 显然 也可以键盘输入 K。
很显然, 银行卡 3与收款装置的连接只是为了信息交换, 所以可以把银行卡(磁卡为账户信息 F, CPU 卡为有计算能力的芯片或程序) 放到确认装置中, 即银行卡 3从逻辑上与收款装置 2连接, 物理上在确认 装置 4中。 这样, 使用方式为:
1、 在收款装置上输入金额;
2、 把手机靠近收款装置;
3、 査看手机显示的支付数据;
4、 支付数据正确, 则输入银行卡 PIN码;
5、 把手机靠近收款装置, 完成支付;
更实用的双手机支付实施例为实施例 5。
[实施例 7] (双手机支付)
根据本发明的实施例 5所关联的***如图 8所示。 支付***包括: 收单平台 1、 网络 2、 付款装置 3、 收款装置 4及付款人 5。其中收单平台 1与收款装置 4通过网络 2连接;付款装置 3与收款装置 4通过 NFC 连接。
根据本发明的实施例 5所关联的一种两次近程连接安全支付的装置, 如图 8的确认装置所示。 确认装 置内有计算(基带)芯片 31与显示器 34及键盘 35连接; 安全芯片 32与计算芯片 31及 NFC芯片 32连接, 计算芯片 31与 NFC芯片 33的虚线连接是目前手机的结构, 但是从安全角度应该不用。 另外, 如果采用在 确认装置中存储支付需要的 PIN, 则可以省略键盘 35。
同样, 收款装置内有计算(基带) 芯片 41与显示器 44及键盘 45连接; 安全芯片 42与计算芯片 41及 NFC芯片 42连接, 就是芯片 41通过网络 2与收单平台 1连接。 网络 2可以是 GPRS、 WIFI、 蓝牙及电话 网络。
安全芯片 32可以执行 PBOC ( EMV)卡的标准支付流程的模块; 安全芯片 42可以执行 PBOC (EMV ) 终端中安全模块的流程, 特别是互联网络 POS安全模块流程。
收单平台 1 :拥有包括银行卡收单所需要的所有信息外,还有付款账户 F的付款数据公钥 RSA ftftSiH月、 收款账户 S的收款数据公钥 RSA m ^ ;
确认装置 3 : 有银行卡支付的所有信息及付款数据私钥 RSA mmrnm ;
收款装置 4: 安全模块 41有银行终端所有信息、 收款账户 S及收款数据私钥 RSA m m ;
付款人 5有 PIN51;
1、 收款装置 4计算芯片 41生成金额 M, 并传送到安全芯片 42 (内有收款账户 S), 然后 NFC芯片 43;
2、 确认装置 3靠近收款装置 4, NFC芯片 33从 NFC芯片 43得到 (M、 S);
3、 安全芯片 32从 NFC芯片 33得到 (M、 S), 传送到计算芯片 31;
4、 计算芯片 31在显示器 34上显示 M (及 S)后, 付款人在键盘 35上输入 PIN51, 并传送到安全芯片 32;
5、 安全芯片 32计算 RSA M、 S、 PIN51), 传送到 NFC芯片 33;
6、 付款装置 3靠近收款装置 4, NFC芯片 33传送 RSA m mn (M、 S、 PIN51)到 NFC芯片 43, 然后到 安全芯片 42, 到计算芯片 41, 然后通过网络 2传送收单平台 1;
7、 收单平台 1计算 RSA RSA M、 S、 PIN51)), 得到 (M、 S、 PIN51); 计算 RSA
M、 S、 PIN51) 通过网络 2传送到计算芯片 41, 然后传送到安全芯片 42;
8、 安全芯片 42计算 RSA (RSA mm& (M、 S、 PIN51) 得到 (M、 S、 PIN51);
9、 安全芯片 32 (卡)、 安全芯片 42 (终端安全模块)、 NFC33, NFC43, NFC33与 NFC43的连接、 基带 芯片 41、 网络 2及收单平台 1, 按照银行支付标准流程 (PBO EMV) 进行支付操作, 当安全芯片 42 需要输入金额 M及 PIN时, 使用安全芯片已得到的金额 M及 PIN51; 步骤 4中的输入 PIN51也可以使用预存在安全芯片 32中 PIN51。 为增强安全, 增加确认装置与收款装 置的 NFC连接关断后, 才能使用 PIN51计算的步骤。 步骤 6最好还传送付款账户到收款平台 1, 有利于收 款平台査找付款数据公钥。
作为一种两次近程连接安全支付的装置的确认装置, 在本实施例中, 它包括: 显示装置: 用于选择显 示收款数据; 安全装置: 用于生成支付关键数据, 或者生成最后支付数据; 近程通信装置, 用于近程连接 输入输出数据; 安全装置与显示装置连接, 安全装置与近程通信装置连接;
安全装置通过近程通信装置获得收款数据 (步骤 2), 选择传递到显示装置显示(步骤 3); 安全装置根 据收款数据生成支付关键数据或最后支付数据 (步骤 4); 安全装置再次通过近程通信装置输出支付关键数 据或最后支付数据 (步骤 5)。
本实施例的本质就是, 使用确认装置 (手机) 作为收款装置 (手机, 互联网 POS) 的 (PBOC标准中 POS 机) 的"密码键盘"。 使用非对称密码协议只是为了叙述方便。 实际上由于收款装置安全模块是由收单 银行发放, 收款数据公钥及私钥均可以不需要, 而采用其他安全传送方式; 这一对密钥的功能就是保证, 经过收单平台处理得到的 M及 PIN, 安全传送到收款装置的安全模块。 付款数据公钥及私钥也可以使用对 称密码体制, 他的目的就是保证把经过付款人确认的 M及 PIN安全传送到收单平台。
可以用利用证书, 进行密钥交换:
收单平台 1: 银行卡收单需要的所有信息包括发卡行证书 RSA¥i!¾ffi; 安全芯片 42拥有标准 POS安全 模块的数据、 收款账户、 收款私钥 RSA ft¾ffi及证书 RSA i^(RSAfei^); 安全芯片 32拥有银行卡的付款 账户、 付款私钥 RSA 及证书 RSA (RSA 付款人 5有 PIN51;
1、 收款装置 4计算芯片 41生成金额 M, 并传送到安全芯片 42, 然后 NFC芯片 43;
2、 确认装置 3靠近收款装置 4, NFC芯片 33从 NFC芯片 43得到 M及收款账户 S;
3、 安全芯片 32从 NFC芯片 33得到 M及收款账户 S, 传送到基带芯片 31;
4、 安全芯片 32读取安全芯片 42的证书: RSA (RSA 生成随机数 Rl, 传送 RSA (R1 ) 到安全芯片 42;
5、 安全芯片 42计算 RSA (RSA mk& (RD)得到 R1, 生成随机数 R2, 计算 RSA m & (R1, R2) ,
并传送到安全芯片 32; 使用 E= (Rl R2) 作为对称密码密钥。
6、 安全芯片 32计算 RSA (RSA (Rl, R2)) 得到 R1及 R2, 完成安全芯片 42的认证, 使用 E= (Rl, R2) 作为对称密码密钥。
7、 基带芯片 31在显示器 34上显示金额 M (及收款账户 S) 后, 付款人在键盘 35上输入 PIN51, 并传送 到安全芯片 32;
8、 安全芯片 32计算 DESE (M PIN51), 传送到 NFC芯片 33;
9、 确认装置 3靠近收款装置 4 NFC芯片 33传送 DESE (M PIN51) 到 NFC芯片 43, 然后到安全芯片 42
、 安全芯片 42计算 DESE (M PIN51), 得到 (M PIN51);
、 安全芯片 32 (卡)、 安全芯片 42 (终端安全模块)、 NFC33与 NFC43的连接、 基带芯片 41、 网络 2及 收单平台 1, 按照银行支付标准流程(PBO EMV)进行支付操作, 当安全芯片 42需要输入金额 M及 PIN时, 使用安全芯片 42已得到的金额 M及 PIN51
步骤 2 3 4 5及 6, 是在第一次近程连接时, 进行多次数据交换。
这里使用通常的数字证书实现安全芯片 32和安全芯片 42的密钥交换。
[实施例 8] (手机终端)
关联本发明第 8种实施方式如图 9所示。 支付***包括: 收单平台 1、 网络 2、 确认装置 3、 收款装置 4、 银行卡 6及付款人 5。 其中收单平台 1与收款装置 4通过网络 2连接; 确认装置 3与收款装置 4通过近 程连接; 收款装置 4与银行卡 6通过 NFC连接。
确认装置内有计算芯片 31与显示器 34及键盘 35连接。
收款装置内有计算芯片 41与显示器 44及键盘 45连接; 安全芯片 42与基带芯片 41及 NFC芯片 42连 接, 基带芯片 41通过网络 2与收单平台 1连接。 网络 2可以是 GPRS WIFK 蓝牙及电话网络。 银行卡 6可以执行 PBOC (EMV) 卡的标准支付流程的模块; 安全芯片 42可以执行 PBOC (EMV) 终 端中安全模块的流程, 特别是互联网络 POS安全模块流程。 那么:
收单平台 1:拥有包括银行卡收单所需要的所有信息外,还有付款账户 F的付款数据公钥 RSA ftftSiH 收款账户 S的收款数据公钥 RSA m ^ ;
确认装置有银行卡支付的所有信息及付款数据私钥 RSA mmrnm ;
收款装置 2安全模块 21银行终端所有信息及收款数据私钥 RSA m rn ;
付款人 5有 PIN51;
1、 收款装置 4靠近银行卡 6得到付款账户 F, 收款装置 4基带芯片 41生成金额 M, 传送付款账户 F、 收 款账户 S及 M到收单平台 1;
2、 收单平台 1随机生成确认码 R, 计算 RSA (M S, R), 传送到收款装置 4;
3、 收款装置 4转换 RSA M S R) 为二维码, 并显示;
4、 基带芯片 31通过摄像头 33扫描显示器 44, 得 RSA M S, R);
5、 基带芯片 31计算 RSA (RSA f (M S R));
6、 基带芯片 31在显示器 34上显示 M (及 R);
7、 付款人在键盘 35上输入 PIN51
8、 基带芯片 31计算 K=PIN51 +R, 并显示;
9、 在收款装置 4的键盘 45上输入 K, 传送到收单平台 1;
、 收单平台 1计算 K-R, 得到 PIN51 , 计算 RSA Mw^ ( M、 S、 PIN51 ) , 传送到收款装置 4安全芯片 42;
、 安全芯片 42计算 RSA mm n ( RSA mm & (M、收款账户 S、 PIN51 ) )得到(M、收款账户 S、 PIN51 ); 、 银行卡 6、 安全芯片 42 (终端安全模块)、 NFC43与银行卡 6的连接、 基带芯片 41、 网络 2及收单平 台 1, 按照银行支付标准流程 (PBOC, EMV ) 进行支付操作, 当安全芯片 42需要输入金额 M及 PIN 时, 使用安全芯片已得到的金额 M及 PIN51 ;
本实施例的本质就是, 使用付款装置 (手机) 作为收款装置 (手机, 互联网 POS ) 的 (PBOC 标准中 POS 机) 的"密码键盘"。 使用非对称密码协议只是为了叙述方便。 实际上由于收款装置安全模块是由收单 银行发放, 收款数据公钥及私钥均可以不需要, 而采用其他安全传送方式; 这一对密钥的功能就是保证, 经过收单平台处理得到的 M及 PIN, 安全传送到收款装置的安全模块。 付款数据公钥及私钥的目的就是安 全传送 M、 S到付款装置。 而变换 PIN51为 K, 为了保护 PIN51的安全。
显然, 这个实施例中的银行卡, 可以***收款装置进行直接连接; 也可以贴在付款装置 (手机) 上, 银行卡与收款装置逻辑连接, 而与付款装置物理连接。
在本发明的所有实施例的描述中, 都使用收款账户来表示收款人的信息, 便于付款人进行确认。 显然 都可以换成收款人的名字来代替。 本发明的思想, 其核心就是采用近程通信技术 (NFC、 RFID、 声音通信 或二维码), 实现手机作为 POS终端的"密码键盘", 或者使用随机确认码, 绑定交易数据与确认码, 在另外 设备上显示交易数据, 变换确认码, 利用变换后的确认码, 生成真正的"交易"指令。根据交易指令的方式不 同, 可以是磁卡交易中的 PIN码, 该码生成的最后结果是否是 "正确", 该***并不关心, 只关心不能泄露 用户输入的 PIN码 (可能是错的), 另外可以用图形码 (二维码) 传递加密信息, 也是一个创新。
以上用实施例来说明本发明的方法, 特别是密码认证协议更是如此。 但是本发明, 并不限定密码协议; 实施例中的密码协议是描述性, 而不是限限制性。 本发明并不完全限定用于银行应用, 显然也可以应用于 网络游戏, 还有其他需要身份认证 (账号及密码), 还需要认证数据 (金额) 的应用。 尽管在以上的实施例 中对本发明进行了描述, 但可以理解, 以上实施例的描述是说明性的而非限制性的, 本领域的熟练技术人 员可以理解, 在不脱离由权利要求书定义的本发明的精神和范围的前提下, 可做出各种变形、 改进、 修改 和替换。
Claims
1、 一种两次近程连接安全支付的装置, 它包括:
显示装置: 用于选择显示收款数据;
安全装置: 用于生成支付关键数据, 或者生成最后支付数据;
近程通信装置, 用于近程连接输入输出数据;
安全装置与显示装置连接, 安全装置与近程通信装置连接;
安全装置通过近程通信装置获得收款数据, 选择传递到显示装置显示; 安全装置根据收款数据生成支 付关键数据或最后支付数据; 安全装置再次通过近程通信装置输出支付关键数据或最后支付数据。
2、 根据权利要求 1的装置, 其特征在于还有安全模块进行相关的密码计算, 生成最后支付数据, 生成 支付关键数据。
3、 一种两次近程连接安全支付的***, 它包括:
收款装置: 用于向确认装置近程传送收款数据, 或者接收从确认装置近程传送来的支付关键数据或最 后支付数据, 或者传送支付关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置, 或者从最后支付数据生成装置接收最后支 付数据, 或者传送最后支付数据到收单平台等;
确认装置: 用于选择显示收款数据、 生成支付关键数据或最后支付数据, 并近程传送到收款装置; 收单平台: 根据收到的支付关键数据生成最后支付数据或者接收最后支付数据, 并根据最后支付数据, 执行合法的最后支付数据, 拒绝非法的最后支付数据;
最后支付数据生成装置: 根据支付关键数据生成最后支付数据, 他可以连接收款装置, 也可以连接确 认装置, 可以处于收款装置内, 可以处于确认装置内, 还可以处于收单平台内;
收款装置与收单平台连接; 确认装置与收款装置近程连接;
确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据; 确认装置选择显示收款数据; 确认装置生成支付关键数 据, 如果最后支付数据装置连接确认装置, 那么把确认装置传送支付关键数据到最后支付数据装置, 生成 最后支付数据, 并传送到确认装置; 确认装置再次靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据或最后支付数据 到收款装置; 如果收款装置收到的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 则直接传送到收单平台, 否则传送支付 关键数据到最后支付数据生成装置生成最后支付数据, 并传送最后支付数据到收单平台; 收单平台根据最 后支付数据进行支付处理。
4、 根据权利要求 3的***, 其特征在于 CPU卡是最后支付数据生成装置, CPU卡直接连接收款装置, 接收收款装置传送来的支付关键数据, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送回收款装置及收单平台。
5、 根据权利要求 3的***, 其特征在于收单平台内还有安全装置, 接收收款装置传送来的支付关键数 据, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送到收单平台。
6、根据权利要求 3的***,其特征在于收款装置还有安全模块,接收收款装置传送来的支付关键数据, 生成最后支付数据, 并传送到收单平台。
7、 一种两次近程连接安全支付方法, 它包括:
A、 确认装置靠近收款装置, 近程获取收款数据;
B、 确认装置选择显示收款数据;
C、 确认装置生成支付关键数据;
D、如果最后支付数据生成装置连接确认装置, 那么确认装置传送支付关键数据传送到最后支付数据装 置, 生成最后支付数据, 并传回到确认装置;
E、 确认装置再次靠近收款装置, 近程传送支付关键数据或最后支付数据到收款装置;
F、 如果收款装置收到的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 则直接传送到收单平台, 否则传送支付关键数 据到最后支付数据生成装置生成最后支付数据, 并传送最后支付数据到收单平台;
G、 收单平台根据最后支付数据进行支付处理。
8、根据权利要求 7的方法, 最后支付数据生成装置或者是连接收款装置的 CPU卡, 或者是收款装置中 的安全模块,或者是连接收款装置的收单平台;其特征在于还有收款装置把支付关键数据传送到最后支付数 据生成装置, 最后支付数据生成装置根据支付关键数据生成最后支付数据的步骤。
9、 根据权利要求 7的方法, 其特征在于步骤 C中的支付关键数据是最后支付数据, 确认装置就是最后 支付数据生成装置。
10、 根据权利要求 7的方法, 其特征在于步骤 C支付关键数据是在确认装置的安全模块中生成, 同时 还有安全模块禁止支付关键数据传送到确认装置的步骤。
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN201480019130.8A CN105074746A (zh) | 2013-03-26 | 2014-03-25 | 一种两次近程连接安全支付的装置、方法和*** |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN201310097568.5 | 2013-03-26 | ||
CN201310097568 | 2013-03-26 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2014154129A1 true WO2014154129A1 (zh) | 2014-10-02 |
Family
ID=51622459
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/CN2014/074021 WO2014154129A1 (zh) | 2013-03-26 | 2014-03-25 | 一种两次近程连接安全支付的装置、方法和*** |
Country Status (2)
Country | Link |
---|---|
CN (1) | CN105074746A (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2014154129A1 (zh) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN114330396A (zh) * | 2021-12-31 | 2022-04-12 | 福建新大陆支付技术有限公司 | 基于Android平台的外接密码键盘与身份证信息交互方法 |
Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN101060401A (zh) * | 2006-04-21 | 2007-10-24 | 上海烨鑫网络技术服务有限公司 | 利用手机短信进行自我掌控的第三方安全支付确认方法 |
CN101123454A (zh) * | 2007-09-21 | 2008-02-13 | 北京交通大学 | 基于蓝牙的手机银联卡数据传输方法及*** |
CN102402744A (zh) * | 2011-11-08 | 2012-04-04 | 北京数码视讯软件技术发展有限公司 | 移动设备的数据处理方法、***及移动设备 |
CN102592221A (zh) * | 2012-01-16 | 2012-07-18 | 深圳一卡通新技术有限公司 | 基于手机确认密码的银行卡支付***及方法 |
US20130009756A1 (en) * | 2011-07-07 | 2013-01-10 | Nokia Corporation | Verification using near field communications |
Family Cites Families (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN102073802A (zh) * | 2009-11-23 | 2011-05-25 | 邵通 | 一种安全***及方法 |
AU2011200063B1 (en) * | 2010-10-14 | 2011-06-23 | Nokuta Pty Ltd | Systems and methods of securely carrying out transactions |
CN102568097B (zh) * | 2010-12-08 | 2017-02-22 | 邵通 | 一种增强电子钱包安全的方法和*** |
US9390411B2 (en) * | 2011-07-27 | 2016-07-12 | Murray Jarman | System or method for storing credit on a value card or cellular phone rather than accepting coin change |
CN102521743B (zh) * | 2011-11-16 | 2014-07-09 | 赵启程 | 基于无线通道的手机安全支付方法及*** |
CN102779303A (zh) * | 2012-08-07 | 2012-11-14 | 上海方付通商务服务有限公司 | 一种基于手机的无线支付***及方法 |
-
2014
- 2014-03-25 WO PCT/CN2014/074021 patent/WO2014154129A1/zh active Application Filing
- 2014-03-25 CN CN201480019130.8A patent/CN105074746A/zh active Pending
Patent Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN101060401A (zh) * | 2006-04-21 | 2007-10-24 | 上海烨鑫网络技术服务有限公司 | 利用手机短信进行自我掌控的第三方安全支付确认方法 |
CN101123454A (zh) * | 2007-09-21 | 2008-02-13 | 北京交通大学 | 基于蓝牙的手机银联卡数据传输方法及*** |
US20130009756A1 (en) * | 2011-07-07 | 2013-01-10 | Nokia Corporation | Verification using near field communications |
CN102402744A (zh) * | 2011-11-08 | 2012-04-04 | 北京数码视讯软件技术发展有限公司 | 移动设备的数据处理方法、***及移动设备 |
CN102592221A (zh) * | 2012-01-16 | 2012-07-18 | 深圳一卡通新技术有限公司 | 基于手机确认密码的银行卡支付***及方法 |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN114330396A (zh) * | 2021-12-31 | 2022-04-12 | 福建新大陆支付技术有限公司 | 基于Android平台的外接密码键盘与身份证信息交互方法 |
CN114330396B (zh) * | 2021-12-31 | 2023-10-13 | 福建新大陆支付技术有限公司 | 基于Android平台的外接密码键盘与身份证信息交互方法 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN105074746A (zh) | 2015-11-18 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US9886688B2 (en) | System and method for secure transaction process via mobile device | |
US7357309B2 (en) | EMV transactions in mobile terminals | |
KR101579214B1 (ko) | 보안되지 않은 공중통신 기반시설을 통하여 금융거래를 수행하는 방법 및 그의 장치 | |
US20110103586A1 (en) | System, Method and Device To Authenticate Relationships By Electronic Means | |
US20160117673A1 (en) | System and method for secured transactions using mobile devices | |
EP2733654A1 (en) | Electronic payment method, system and device for securely exchanging payment information | |
EP2701415A1 (en) | Mobile electronic device and use thereof for electronic transactions | |
JP7483688B2 (ja) | 非接触カードの暗号化認証のためのシステムおよび方法 | |
EP2308014A1 (en) | Trusted service manager (tsm) architectures and methods | |
CN103136668A (zh) | 终端支付方法、终端和支付平台 | |
WO2015180578A1 (zh) | 一种可视金融卡的安全支付方法 | |
US20150142667A1 (en) | Payment authorization system | |
CN101916476A (zh) | 一种基于sd加密卡与近距离无线通信技术相结合的移动数据传输方法 | |
US20190347661A1 (en) | Coordinator managed payments | |
EP2779069A1 (en) | Method and system for managing a transaction | |
CN103955820A (zh) | 一种无卡支付方法及装置 | |
CN103268436A (zh) | 移动支付中一种基于触摸屏的图形化密码验证方法与*** | |
CN104715360B (zh) | 无卡支付收款***以及无卡支付收款方法 | |
CN104102934A (zh) | 一种便携式ic卡读写装置、***及方法 | |
KR101250164B1 (ko) | 근접 통신을 이용한 전자화폐의 가치이전 방법 및 이를 위한 휴대단말 | |
WO2014154129A1 (zh) | 一种两次近程连接安全支付的装置、方法和*** | |
CN106157037B (zh) | 移动支付方法及移动支付设备 | |
KR20160093197A (ko) | 비접촉 매체를 이용한 무선 결제 방법 | |
KR20150034863A (ko) | 거래 연동 인증코드 제공 방법 | |
Husni et al. | Mobile Payment Protocol for Tag-to-Tag Near Field Communication (NFC). |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 201480019130.8 Country of ref document: CN |
|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 14772905 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
122 | Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase |
Ref document number: 14772905 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |