WO2014060482A1 - Systeme et procede de securisation des echanges de donnees, objet portable utilisateur et dispositif distant de telechargement de donnees - Google Patents
Systeme et procede de securisation des echanges de donnees, objet portable utilisateur et dispositif distant de telechargement de donnees Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2014060482A1 WO2014060482A1 PCT/EP2013/071644 EP2013071644W WO2014060482A1 WO 2014060482 A1 WO2014060482 A1 WO 2014060482A1 EP 2013071644 W EP2013071644 W EP 2013071644W WO 2014060482 A1 WO2014060482 A1 WO 2014060482A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- host
- keys
- client
- enc
- processing means
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of securing the exchange of data between a host and a client, for example between a server and a portable and connectable electronic object. More specifically, the invention relates to a system comprising a portable electronic object that can be connected to a remote server, said system being adapted to create a secure channel for exchanging data between a host and a client, while proposing defense strategies and protection against intrusions and attacks.
- the technical problem to be solved is therefore to secure data exchanges between at least two connected devices, whatever the type of device.
- the present invention proposes to solve at least in part the disadvantages set out above, by proposing a data exchange system comprising devices connected to a network, a part of the secret information contained in the memory of the devices being never transmitted. The data is therefore exchanged between the devices connected safely and with integrity.
- the invention relates to a data exchange security system characterized in that it comprises at least two devices acting as a host or client, at least the client is portable, communicating with a network.
- ad means communication or communication means, each device comprising at least one programmable nonvolatile permanent memory zone and data processing means, a data encryption / decryption algorithm coupled to a first set of secret keys stored in a secret zone of the device not accessible from the outside, the devices being intended to exchange secret data in a secure manner by the means for processing at least one device via the encryption / decryption algorithm and the first set of secret keys, or thereunder at least one secure communication channel between both devices, the host device comprising at least a second set of secret keys stored in a memory area to be sent to the client device, the keys of the second set being encrypted by the processing means of the host device using the an encryption / decryption algorithm and at least one key of the first set, the encrypted keys of the second set being sent by the processing means of the host device in a memory zone of the
- the data exchange security system is characterized in that the host device comprises a deactivation command of the client device stored in a memory zone.
- the system for securing data exchanges is characterized in that the reactivation of the client device by a user is su ivi the opening of a new secure channel according to the specifications GlobalPIatform.
- the system for securing data exchanges is characterized in that the host and client devices each comprise in a memory zone a diversification algorithm, the algorithm making it possible to derive the secret keys from each set of keys stored in the secret memory area of the client device, so that only a key diversifier is transmitted between the two devices after a double opening of secure channel to calculate a diversified set of keys that will be the first set of keys.
- the data exchange security system is characterized in that the encryption / decryption algorithm is a triple DES symmetric algorithm and the first set of keys is a set of three triple DES keys, the opening of which is a secure channel by the system being realized via the encryption / decryption algorithm and the first set of secret keys according to a specified Global Platform security protocol.
- the system for securing data exchanges is characterized in that the second set of secret keys is a set of three triple DES secret keys.
- An additional objective of the invention is to propose a method for securing data exchanges.
- the method implemented by the system for securing data exchanges is characterized in that it comprises: a. a step of closing the secure channel for exchanging data between a host device and a key device of the system, b. a step of selecting, by the processing means of the host device of the system, a number of secret keys recorded in a memory zone of said device, this device only storing in a memory zone a second set of secret keys
- an instruction for writing the encrypted key in a memory zone of the client device e. a step of decryption of the encrypted key, performed by the means of processing the client ispositif via the encryption / decryption algorithm used at least in the corresponding secret key of the first set of keys, followed by the registration the decrypted key in a memory area of the client device, f. a step of repeating steps c to e for all the keys of the second set of secret keys, g. a step of opening by the system of a new session and a new secure channel, realized via the encryption / decryption algorithm and the second set of secret keys according to a security protocol of the Global Platform type.
- the method for securing data exchanges characterized in that the opening of a secure channel realized via the triple DES algorithm and a set of three secret keys according to a specified security protocol of the Global type. Platfornn, said triple DES algorithm and the first set of secret keys being stored in a memory area of each device, comprises the following steps: a. a step of logging by the processing means of a host device of the security system, following the generation of a session counter by a client device of the system sent to the host device, the session counter being incremented each time a new session is opened, b.
- a step of derivation of the secret keys stored in the memory of the client device realized by the processing means of said device via the triple DES algorithm using the session counter and a host random number generated and sent to the client device by the processing means of the host device, a step of generating five derived keys S-ENC, R-ENC, C -MAC, R-MAC and S-DEK used with the triple DES algorithm respectively allow to encrypt the commands sent to a device, to encrypt the responses of the device, to generate a signature for each command, to generate a signature for each response, and to encrypt confidential data, a generation step by the means of processing the client device of a client cryptogram, via the triple DES algorithm using the derived key S-ENC, the random number host and a number random client generated by the processing means of the client device, a step of sending by the processing means of the client device to the host device, the session counter , the random number client and cryptogram cl ient calculated in the previous step, followed by the computation and generation of the five
- a step of generating by the means for processing the host device of a host cryptogram, via the triple DES algorithm using the derived key S-ENC, the random host number and the client random number i. a step of sending by the processing means of the host device to the client device, the host cryptogram calculated in the previous step, j. a step of generating, by the client device processing means, the host cryptogram via the triple DES algorithm using the S-ENC derived key, the random host number and the client random number, k.
- the method of securing data exchanges is characterized in that it comprises, upstream of the third step of derivation of the secret keys, a step of diversification of the set of secret keys realized by a diversification algorithm of so that only the diversified keys are transmitted to the host device by the processing means of the client device.
- the method of securing the data exchange comprises steps leading to the deactivation of the client device and its reactivation by the user, followed by the opening of a new secure channel between the the host device and the client device, these steps being as follows: a) A step of disabling control by the host device processing means via the triple DES algorithm using the derived C-MAC key to integrating a digital signature with the encrypted command, b) a step of sending by the processing means of the host device the encrypted deactivation command to the client device, c) a decryption step, by the processing means of the key device the deactivation command encrypted via the triple DES algorithm using the derived key C-MAC, d) a step of sending to the host device by the means for processing the key device, a response to the deactivation command, this response being sent on the one hand in clear and on the other hand encrypted via the triple DES algorithm using the derived key R-MAC, integrating a digital signature to the response, e) a
- a further object of the invention is to propose a portable user object comprising a non-volatile secure memory zone and data processing means, the portable object being characterized in that it further comprises: means of connection or of communication to an external device, an encryption / decryption algorithm and at least one set of secret keys stored in the memory area, - an operating system implemented by the processing means, the operating system comprising the algorithms and commands necessary to open a specified secure channel GlobalPIatform between the portable object and an external device connected to said object, means for interpreting a deactivation command sent by an external device, the portable object sending in back to the end of a self-contained response with a digital signature ensuring the integrity of the response, means of integrity interpretation of a write command, in a memory zone, of a new set of secret keys, the portable user object being a client device of the data exchange security system according to the invention.
- the portable user object is characterized in that the connection means are USB type.
- the user portable object is characterized in that the means of con n exio n use a radio type protocol.
- the portable user object is characterized in that it comprises a secret key diversification algorithm, the algorithm making it possible to derive the secret keys stored in a non-volatile memory zone of the portable object, so that only the keys derived by the diversification algorithm are transmitted to a remote device.
- the portable user object is characterized in that the object is a smart card.
- An additional objective is to propose a remote device for downloading data in a portable user object according to the invention, the device comprising a non-volatile secure memory area and data processing means, the remote device being characterized in that it further comprising: providing or connecting a communication device to an external device, an encryption / decryption algorithm and at least one set of secret keys stored in the memory area; operation is implemented by the processing means, the operating system comprising the algorithms and commands necessary for the session opening and a secure channel according to the Global Platform specifications between the remote device and a connected portable object remote device audit, - means for selecting a new set of secret keys stored in a non-volatile memory area of the dispo remote system, encrypted by the encryption / decryption algorithm and sent by the data processing means to a portable object connected to the remote device.
- the remote device is characterized in that the device comprises contact connection means.
- the remote device is characterized in that the device comprises connection means using a radio type protocol.
- the remote device is characterized in that it comprises a deactivation command intended to be sent to a portable object connected to said remote device, the processing means of the portable object returning a response comprising a digital signature guaranteeing the integrity of the response, this command being configured to make the user portable object unusable until it is deactivated and then reactivated by a user, the remote device comprising the commands necessary to open a new session and to a new secure data exchange channel.
- the remote device is characterized in that said device is a remote server, said server being connected to the portable user object via a local or extended network.
- the remote device is characterized in that said device is a smart card, said card being connected to the portable user object via a local or extended network.
- Figure 1 illustrates the invention in one embodiment.
- Fig ure 2 illustrates the portable user object in one embodiment.
- Figure 3 illustrates the steps to open a secure channel with Global Platform specifications.
- Figure 4 illustrates the steps describing the operation of a deactivation command of the client device.
- FIG. 5 illustrates the steps of the method of securing data exchanges according to one embodiment.
- the data exchange security system comprises at least two devices, for example and non-imitatively a host device (H) and a client device (C1), connected and communicating with a local network. or extended.
- H host device
- C1 client device
- the key device is portable and connectable to a computing device (2), for example a personal computer, connected to the local or wide area network.
- portable device is meant a device that can be put for example in a pocket of clothing.
- the portable client device (Cl) is for example included in a smart card (1) comprising a body made of conventional synthetic material, for example ABS (Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene) or PVC (Polyvinyl Chloride).
- the body of the card can be made of biodegradable material.
- the card includes a pre-cut detachable portion for forming the client device (C1), said device being a portable user object (C1).
- the detachable portion of the card is delimited by a linear recess (D), and is attached to the rest of the card body by means of frangible connection means thus interrupting the linear recess.
- D linear recess
- the portable user object (Cl) comprises means embodying a fold line (P).
- the fold line is materialized by a localized thinning of the body of the map. This thinning may, for example and without limitation, be carried out by punching, milling, laser cutting or any other machining means.
- fold line separates two zones respectively called dormant (3) and flap (4).
- the portion under the connector now has a thickness compatible with the dimensions of a female USB connector.
- the portable user object can be connected to a computer host (2) via a USB port, for example and without limitation a terminal of a user.
- the card (1) is made in dimensions respecting the format of the ISO 781 6 standard, in particular the ISO 7816-1 standard relating to the physical characteristics of smart cards.
- the user portable object (Cl) notably comprises an electronic device secured to the body of the object, for example using a conventional adhesive during a step of integrating the electronic device.
- the electronic device comprises connection means (30) of the serial transmission computer bus type.
- the electronic device is an electronic chip electrically connected according to the Universal Serial Bus (USB) standard to a vignette with electrically disjointed contact pads, manufactured according to a method known to those skilled in the art. the electronic chip is placed under the thumbnails with contact pads, then the electrical contacts of the chip are then connected to the contact pads of said sticker.
- USB Universal Serial Bus
- the portable user object comprises non-contact communication means, for example and without limitation a radio type antenna, RF ID or any contactless communication protocol known to the person in charge. job.
- the electronic chip may comprise, for example and without limitation, at least one microcontroller, such as for example and without limitation a microprocessor comprising a volatile memory, a USB controller or an RFID type radio antenna, one or more memory spaces, for example programmable permanent nonvolatile programmable memories integrated or not in the microcontroller.
- the clock signals, USB type devices are not transmitted by the USB connector, the chip will therefore include its clock circuit integrated or not in a microcontroller.
- This clock circuit may, for example and without limitation, include a resonator or a quartz.
- the contact pads are formed by an eight-button sticker. Unlike thumbnails in ISO 7816 format, which are also used on chip cards, contact plots corresponding to ISO contacts C1 to C4 have been lengthened to match the dimensions of the contact areas of the sticker. with those of a USB con - nector while complying with the 781 6-2 standard for the dimensions and location of contacts. For this, the length of the contact pads corresponding to the ISO contacts C5 to C8 has been improved. Since a USB connector has only four tracks, the contact areas corresponding to the ISO contacts C5 to C8 will not be used. According to a first embodiment, these contact pads will each be isolated from each other but will not be wired to the microcircuit. According to another embodiment, the contact pads corresponding to the ISO contacts C5 to C8 may be isolated from the ISO contacts C2 to C4 but will not be isolated from each other and will be connected to the ISO contact C1 so as to form only one range of contacts.
- the user portable object (Cl) forms a computer element connectable either according to the USB standard or for example according to the RFID standard, a microcontroller of the electronic chip being programmed by means of programming such that said portable object behaves as a man / machine interface once connected, for example to a terminal (2).
- the host device (H) of the data exchange security system is a server computer comprising at least one programmable nonvolatile permanent secure memory zone, data processing means, for example a microprocessor, a system operating system being installed in a memory zone of the server (H) so as to manage at least the data exchanges between the host (H) and client (Cl) devices.
- the server (H) also comprises connection means, for example to a wide area or local area network.
- the connection means are of the contact type, for example and nonimitatively the connections to the wide area network or local are made via wired connection means.
- the server comprises radio wireless communication means, such as wifi, RFID or any contactless communication protocol known to those skilled in the art.
- the host device (H) is a portable card (1) having properties similar to the portable user object having the role of client device.
- the security system implements, in a mode of implementation, a data exchange protocol having the GlobalPIatform specifications, well known to those skilled in the art.
- the security system is able to implement a data security protocol according to the specifications "GlobalPIatform - Card Specification - version 2.2", published in March 2006.
- the purpose of such protocols is the creation by the data exchange security system, a security channel for exchanging data between the host (H) and client (Cl) devices communicating via a local or wide area network.
- the host (H) and client (Cl) devices comprise, in a realizational mode, at least one algorithm for encrypting / decrypting the data and at least one set of encryption keys recorded in a secret area of the device, this area being inaccessible from the outside.
- the keys of each game are symmetrical.
- the encryption / decryption algorithm used is a so-called triple DES algorithm (3-DES, DES coming from the English "Data Encryption stantard").
- Each set of secret keys includes for example three secret keys 3-DES, denoted ENC, MAC and DEK.
- the ENC key is a secret encryption key for data, ensuring the confidentiality of the data exchanged.
- the secret key MAC is a key to integrity.
- the 3-DES algorithm using the secret key MAC on a data generates a digital signature accompanying each data encrypted by the algorithm and the key MAC. This digital signature ensures that data transferred from one device to another is not corrupted.
- the DEK key is a secret key for encrypting confidential data, and provides additional protection for sensitive data, for example and without limitation, containing information concerning user data.
- the host (H) and client (Cl) devices comprise an operating system, implemented by the processing means, comprising the algorithms and the commands necessary to open a secure channel.
- the processing means comprising the algorithms and the commands necessary to open a secure channel.
- having the Global Platform specifications allowing the secure exchange of data between the client, for example a portable user object (Cl), and the host (H), for example a server.
- the method for opening a secure channel having the Global Platform specifications between the client device (C1) and the host device (H) of the data exchange security system. will now be described.
- the opening of this channel is performed via a 3-DES algorithm stored in a non-volatile secure memory area of the host device and the client device, and a set of three secret keys ENC, MAC and DEK registered in a secret area of each device (H, Cl), not accessible from the outside.
- the processing means of the host device (H) control the opening of a new session.
- Information indicating the opening of the session is sent to the client device (C1) by the processing means of the host device (H).
- the processing means of the client device Upon receipt of this information, the processing means of the client device generates (60) a session counter (SC) incremented each time a new session is opened. This session counter is stored in a memory area of the client device (Cl).
- SC session counter
- the processing means of the client device (C1) perform a derivation operation (501) of the three secret keys ENC, MAC and DEK, via the 3-DES algorithm using the session counter (SC) and a host random number (HC) generated by the processing means of the host device (H), said random number (HC) being sent (61) to the client device (C1) and stored in the memory of the client device.
- five secret derived keys are generated (90) by the processing means of the client device (C1), and stored in a memory area of the device (C1).
- the first key named S-ENC, makes it possible to encrypt the commands sent to one device (H, Cl) by the other device (H, Cl).
- the second key is used to encrypt the responses sent to one device by the other device.
- the two keys named C-MAC and R-MAC respectively allow to generate a signature for each command and for each answer sent, thus ensuring the integrity of the transferred data.
- the fifth key named S-DEK, allows you to check the confidential data, whether they are commands or responses.
- the processing means of the client device (C1) generate (504) a client cryptogram (Ccrypto c ), via the algorithm 3- DES using the derived key S-ENC as well as the random host number ( HC) and a client random number (CC) generated by the processing means of the client device (C1).
- this client cryptogram (Ccrypto c ), the session counter (SC) and the client random number (CC) are sent to the host device (H) by the processing means of the client device (Cl).
- the client cryptogram (Ccrypto c ), the session counter (SC) and the client random number (CC) are stored in a memory area of the host device (H).
- the processing means of the host device (H) calculate (500, 80) the five derived keys S-ENC, R-ENC, C-MAC, R-MAK and S-DEK via the triple DES algorithm using the counter session (SC) and the host random number (HC).
- the host device processing means (H) computes (503) the client cryptogram (Ccrypto H ) via the triple DES algorithm using the derived key S-ENC, the random number host (HC) and the client random number (CC).
- the processing means of the host device (H) compare the client cryptograms (Ccrypto c , Ccrypto H ) respectively calculated by the client device (Cl) and the host device (H). If the two client cryptograms (Ccrypto c , Ccrypto H ) are identical, then the client device (Cl) is authenticated by the processing means of the host device (H).
- the processing means of the host device (H) calculates (502) a host cryptogram (Hcrypto H ), via the 3-DES algorithm using the derived key S-ENC, the host random number (HC ) and the client random number (CC). This host cryptogram (Hcrypto H ) is stored in a memory area of the host device (H).
- this host cryptogram (Hcrypto H ) is sent (62) to the client device (C1) by the processing means of the host device (H).
- the host cryptogram (Hcrypto H ) is stored in a memory area of the client device (Cl).
- the processing means of the client device (C1) compute (505) the host cryptogram (Hcrypto c ) via the 3-DES algorithm using the derived key S-ENC, the random host number ( HC) and the client random number (CC).
- the processing means of the client device (C1) compare the host cryptograms (Hcrypto H , Hcrypto c ) respectively calculated by the client device (Cl) and the host device (H). If the two host cryptograms (Hcrypto H , Hcrypto c ) are identical, then the host device (H) is authenticated by the client device processing means (Cl).
- a step of diversification of the derived keys obtained in the third step of the method of opening a secure channel having the GlobalPIatform specifications is performed via a diversification algorithm stored in a memory zone of the host devices (H ) and customer (Cl).
- this diversification algorithm is also a 3-DES algorithm.
- one of the devices of the data exchange security system for example and without limitation the host device (H), comprises a set of additional secret keys. (ENCd, MACd, DEKd) recorded in a programmable nonvolatile permanent memory area of the device (H).
- this second set of secret keys comprises three secret keys 3-DES: a key ENC d , a key MACci and a key DEK C i.
- the data exchange security system uses this second set of keys (ENCd, MACci, DEK C i) in place of the first set of keys used (S-ENC, R-ENC, C-MAC , R-MAC, S-DEK), derived from the set of keys (ENC, MAC, DEK), which served to open a first secure channel, if the means for processing one of the devices (H, Cl) of the system , host or client, suspects an attack or a violation of the confidentiality and / or integrity rules imposed by said secure channel.
- the method describes the replacement of a first set of 3-DES keys (ENC, MAC, DEK) by a second set of keys 3-DES (ENCd, MACd, DEKd), followed by the opening of a new secure channel will now be described.
- the processing means of said device (H, Cl) control the closure of the current secure channel.
- the processing means of the host device (H) encrypt (510) the first key (ENC c * l ) secret of the second set of keys (ENCd, MACd, DEKd), via the encryption algorithm / decryption 3-DES using at least one secret key of the first set of keys (ENC, MAC, DEK).
- diversified keys S-ENC, R-ENC, C-MAC, R-MAC, S- DEK
- recorded (92) in a memory area of the host device (H) are used to encrypt the first secret key (ENC c * l ) of the second set of keys
- the processing means of the host device (H) send (64) to the second device (C1), for example and without limitation the client device (Cl), the encrypted key (ENC c * l ) in the previous step and an instruction to write the encrypted key (ENC c * l ) in the memory of the client device (Cl).
- the write instruction of the encrypted key (ENC c * 1 ) in the memory of the client device (C1) is part of the operating system of the client device (C1).
- the diversified keys S-ENC, R-ENC, C-MAC, R-MAC, S-DEK
- registered (22) in a memory zone of the client device (C1) are used to decipher the first key (ENC c * l ) secret of the second set of keys (ENCci, MACci, DEK C i).
- the decrypted key (ENCci) is then recorded (83) in a memory area of the client device (Cl). Steps three to five are repeated for all keys (MACci,
- the data exchange security system controls the opening of a new secure channel according to the method explained above in the description, the opening being performed via the 3-DES encryption / decryption algorithm. using the keys of the second set of secret keys (ENCci, MACci, DEK C i).
- the client device for example a portable user object (C1), comprises means for interpreting a write command, in a memory zone of said device (C1), of a new set of secret keys (ENCd, MACd, DEK C i).
- the host device (H) itself comprises means for selecting a new set of secret keys (ENCd, MACd, DEK C i) stored in a non-volatile memory area of the host device (H).
- the host device for example a portable user object (C1), comprises means for interpreting a write command, in a memory zone of said device (C1), of a new set of secret keys (ENCd, MACd, DEK C i).
- the host device (H) itself comprises means for selecting a new set of secret keys (ENCd, MACd, DEK C i) stored in a non-volatile memory area of the host device (H).
- the host device for example a portable user object (C1), comprises means for interpreting a write command, in
- H includes a client device (Cl) disabling command (HALT), the command being stored in a memory space of the host device (H).
- This command is integrated so that the processing means of the host device (H) are certain that only the user controls the client device (Cl), and not a malicious program for example Trojan horse type.
- the method of securing the data exchange comprises a series of optional steps leading to the deactivation of the client device (Cl) and then its reactivation by the user, followed by the opening of a secure channel .
- the host device processing means (50) encrypts (506) the deactivation command stored in a memory area of the host device (H) via the 3-DES algorithm using the derived key C -MAC.
- This step therefore makes it possible to integrate a digital signature with the encrypted command (HALT * ).
- the set of keys (S-ENC, R-ENC, C-MAC, R-MAC, S-DEK) has been derived by a diversifier (DIV).
- the keys thus obtained are recorded on the one hand (91) in a memory zone of the host device (H) and on the other hand ( 81) in a memory area of the client device (C1).
- the host device processing means (H) sends (63) the encrypted deactivation command (HALT * ) to the client device (C1).
- the client device processing means (C1) decrypts (507) the deactivation command (HALT) via the 3-DES algorithm and the C-MAC secret key. This step certifies the authenticity of the deactivation command received.
- the client device processing means (C1) sends (73) to the host device (H) a response to the deactivation command.
- This response is sent on the one hand in the clear (73) and on the other hand (74) unencrypted and signed (508) via the 3-DES algorithm using the R-MAC key, thus integrating a digital signature to the response. signed.
- the client device (C1) for example a portable user object, comprises means for interpreting a deactivation command sent by the host device (H), for example a external device.
- the encrypted response received by the host device (H) is decrypted (509) by the processing means of said device (H), via the 3-DES algorithm and the R-MAC key.
- This step makes it possible to certify the authenticity of the response received.
- the authentication of the response is immediately followed by the deactivation of the key device (C1), then the sending (21), by the processing means of the host device (H), of an invitation to disconnect the device customer (Cl).
- the processing means of the host device (H) send via the network an invitation (22) to connect the client device (C1) to the network.
- the data exchange security system commands the opening of a new session and confirms the opening of a new secure channel (OSCS) according to the method described above in the description.
- the host (H) and client (Cl) devices comprise the necessary commands stored in a memory zone of the said devices (H, Cl), the opening of a new session and a new secure data exchange channel. .
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2015537243A JP2015532565A (ja) | 2012-10-19 | 2013-10-16 | データ交換、ポータブルユーザオブジェクト、およびデータをダウンロードするためのリモートデバイスを安全にするためのシステムおよび方法 |
BR112015008915A BR112015008915A2 (pt) | 2012-10-19 | 2013-10-16 | sistema e método de segurança da troca de dados, objeto portátil de utilizador e dispositivo remoto para o teledescarregamento de dados. |
CA2888662A CA2888662A1 (fr) | 2012-10-19 | 2013-10-16 | Systeme et procede de securisation des echanges de donnees, objet portable utilisateur et dispositif distant de telechargement de donnees |
CN201380066739.6A CN104903907A (zh) | 2012-10-19 | 2013-10-16 | 用于确保数据交换安全的***及方法、便携式用户对象以及用于下载数据的远程设备 |
US14/436,812 US20150334095A1 (en) | 2012-10-19 | 2013-10-16 | System and method for securing data exchanges, portable user object and remote device for downloading data |
EP13789497.8A EP2909785A1 (fr) | 2012-10-19 | 2013-10-16 | Systeme et procede de securisation des echanges de donnees, objet portable utilisateur et dispositif distant de telechargement de donnees |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR1259986A FR2997209B1 (fr) | 2012-10-19 | 2012-10-19 | Systeme et procede de securisation des echanges de donnees, objet portable utilisateur et dispositif distant de telechargement de donnees |
FR1259986 | 2012-10-19 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2014060482A1 true WO2014060482A1 (fr) | 2014-04-24 |
Family
ID=47557252
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2013/071644 WO2014060482A1 (fr) | 2012-10-19 | 2013-10-16 | Systeme et procede de securisation des echanges de donnees, objet portable utilisateur et dispositif distant de telechargement de donnees |
Country Status (8)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20150334095A1 (fr) |
EP (1) | EP2909785A1 (fr) |
JP (1) | JP2015532565A (fr) |
CN (1) | CN104903907A (fr) |
BR (1) | BR112015008915A2 (fr) |
CA (1) | CA2888662A1 (fr) |
FR (1) | FR2997209B1 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2014060482A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR3022053B1 (fr) * | 2014-06-06 | 2018-02-02 | Oberthur Technologies | Procede d'authentification d'une premiere entite electronique par une seconde entite electronique et entite electronique mettant en œuvre un tel procede |
FR3046000B1 (fr) * | 2015-12-21 | 2018-02-16 | Oberthur Technologies | Procede de reception de donnees au sein d'une entite electronique et entite electronique associee |
US11159498B1 (en) | 2018-03-21 | 2021-10-26 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Information security proxy service |
US10979403B1 (en) * | 2018-06-08 | 2021-04-13 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Cryptographic configuration enforcement |
US11777709B2 (en) * | 2019-09-19 | 2023-10-03 | Visa International Service Association | System and method for using dynamic tag content |
CN112565367B (zh) * | 2020-11-27 | 2021-08-27 | 北京三维天地科技股份有限公司 | 一种基于对称算法的数据交换平台和数据交换方法 |
Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20050005093A1 (en) * | 2003-07-01 | 2005-01-06 | Andrew Bartels | Methods, systems and devices for securing supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) communications |
WO2010045823A1 (fr) * | 2008-10-22 | 2010-04-29 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Procédé et système de mise à jour de clé cryptographique |
Family Cites Families (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6898288B2 (en) * | 2001-10-22 | 2005-05-24 | Telesecura Corporation | Method and system for secure key exchange |
US7636441B2 (en) * | 2004-01-12 | 2009-12-22 | Intel Corporation | Method for secure key exchange |
US8346214B2 (en) * | 2005-04-29 | 2013-01-01 | Jasper Wireless, Inc. | Self provisioning of wireless terminals in wireless networks |
US7668313B2 (en) * | 2005-10-31 | 2010-02-23 | Texas Instruments Incorporated | Recipient-encrypted session key cryptography |
US7769919B2 (en) * | 2008-05-15 | 2010-08-03 | International Business Machines Corporation | Protecting computer memory from simultaneous direct memory access operations using active and inactive translation tables |
CN101820613B (zh) * | 2009-02-27 | 2014-03-19 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 一种应用下载的***和方法 |
US8509448B2 (en) * | 2009-07-29 | 2013-08-13 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Methods and device for secure transfer of symmetric encryption keys |
US20130139198A1 (en) * | 2011-11-29 | 2013-05-30 | General Instrument Corporation | Digital transport adapter regionalization |
-
2012
- 2012-10-19 FR FR1259986A patent/FR2997209B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2013
- 2013-10-16 WO PCT/EP2013/071644 patent/WO2014060482A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2013-10-16 JP JP2015537243A patent/JP2015532565A/ja active Pending
- 2013-10-16 CA CA2888662A patent/CA2888662A1/fr not_active Abandoned
- 2013-10-16 CN CN201380066739.6A patent/CN104903907A/zh active Pending
- 2013-10-16 EP EP13789497.8A patent/EP2909785A1/fr not_active Withdrawn
- 2013-10-16 BR BR112015008915A patent/BR112015008915A2/pt not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2013-10-16 US US14/436,812 patent/US20150334095A1/en not_active Abandoned
Patent Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20050005093A1 (en) * | 2003-07-01 | 2005-01-06 | Andrew Bartels | Methods, systems and devices for securing supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) communications |
WO2010045823A1 (fr) * | 2008-10-22 | 2010-04-29 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Procédé et système de mise à jour de clé cryptographique |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
"Globalplatform Card Specification Version 2.2", GLOBALPLATFORM,, 1 March 2006 (2006-03-01), pages 1 - 375, XP007908232 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
FR2997209B1 (fr) | 2016-01-01 |
EP2909785A1 (fr) | 2015-08-26 |
BR112015008915A2 (pt) | 2017-07-04 |
CN104903907A (zh) | 2015-09-09 |
CA2888662A1 (fr) | 2014-04-24 |
JP2015532565A (ja) | 2015-11-09 |
US20150334095A1 (en) | 2015-11-19 |
FR2997209A1 (fr) | 2014-04-25 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
EP2053827B1 (fr) | Procédé de personnalisation sécurisé d'un chipset NFC | |
WO2014060482A1 (fr) | Systeme et procede de securisation des echanges de donnees, objet portable utilisateur et dispositif distant de telechargement de donnees | |
EP2545721B1 (fr) | Protection contre un deroutement d'un canal de communication d'un circuit nfc | |
WO2016079403A1 (fr) | Procédé de sécurisation d'un jeton de paiement. | |
EP2545722B1 (fr) | Detection d'un deroutement d'un canal de communication d'un dispositif de telecommunication couple a un circuit nfc | |
EP1872507A2 (fr) | Procédé et dispositif d'acces a une carte sim logée dans un terminal mobile | |
EP1549011A1 (fr) | Procédé et système de communication entre un terminal et au moins un équipment communicant | |
FR2989799A1 (fr) | Procede de transfert d'un dispositif a un autre de droits d'acces a un service | |
EP1293062B1 (fr) | Procede d'authentification / identification biometrique securise , module de saisie et module de verification de donnees biometriques | |
WO2016207715A1 (fr) | Gestion securisee de jetons électroniques dans un telephone mobile. | |
EP3136283B1 (fr) | Dispositif et procédé sécurisation de commandes échangées entre un terminal et circuit intégré | |
EP3054393B1 (fr) | Procédé d'authentification d'un objet par un dispositif capables de communiquer mutuellement sans contact, système et objet correspondants | |
EP2426652A1 (fr) | Procédé simplifié de personnalisation de carte à puce et dispositif associé | |
EP3095223B1 (fr) | Méthode de transmission de données chiffrées, méthode de réception, dispositifs et programmes d'ordinateur correspondants | |
FR3002056A1 (fr) | Authentification de signature manuscrite numerisee. | |
WO2004084525A2 (fr) | Procede de protection d’un terminal de telecommunication de type telephone mobile | |
FR2730076A1 (fr) | Procede d'authentification par un serveur du porteur d'un objet portatif a microprocesseur, serveur et objet portatif correspondants | |
FR3032292A1 (fr) | Element securise et procede mis en œuvre dans un tel element securise | |
EP2084679A1 (fr) | Entite electronique portable et procede de blocage, a distance, d'une fonctionnalite d'une telle entite electronique portable | |
EP3021515B1 (fr) | Amélioration de l'intégrité authentique de données à l'aide du dernier bloc chiffrant ces données en mode cbc | |
FR3003059A1 (fr) | Systeme et procede de gestion d’au moins une application en ligne, objet portable utilisateur communiquant par un protocole radioelectrique et dispositif distant du systeme | |
WO2014135526A1 (fr) | Système et procédé de gestion d'au moins une application en ligne, objet portable utilisateur usb et dispositif distant du système | |
EP1962239A1 (fr) | Procédé de vérificatiion d'un code identifiant un porteur, carte à puce et terminal respectivement prévus pour la mise en ceuvre dudit procédé | |
EP2836952A1 (fr) | Procede de generation et de verification d'identite portant l'unicite d'un couple porteur-objet |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 13789497 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2888662 Country of ref document: CA |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 14436812 Country of ref document: US |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2015537243 Country of ref document: JP Kind code of ref document: A |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
REEP | Request for entry into the european phase |
Ref document number: 2013789497 Country of ref document: EP |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2013789497 Country of ref document: EP |
|
REG | Reference to national code |
Ref country code: BR Ref legal event code: B01A Ref document number: 112015008915 Country of ref document: BR |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 112015008915 Country of ref document: BR Kind code of ref document: A2 Effective date: 20150420 |