WO2014038926A1

WO2014038926A1 - A system and method of mutual trusted authentication and identity encryption

Info

Publication number: WO2014038926A1
Application number: PCT/MY2013/000161
Authority: WO
Inventors: Abd Aziz Norazah; Bhagyalaxmi AAKULA; Abdullah KILAUSURIA
Original assignee: Mimos Berhad
Priority date: 2012-09-07
Filing date: 2013-09-06
Publication date: 2014-03-13
Also published as: MY166563A

Abstract

Mutual trusted authentication and identity encryption is provided by utilizing transport layer security extension with properties based attestation mechanism. The system of the present invention comprising a server platform (104) installed with an integrity measurement architecture (IMA) module (104b); a trusted authority module (TA) (104d) associated with a server platform) 104); an integrity properties collection module (IPCM) (104e) in communication with the trusted authority module (TA) (104d); a client platform (102) that is in communication with and registrable to the server platform (104); a transport layer security extension module (TLS extension module) (104a, 102c) associated with the server platform (104) and the client platform (102); and a trusted platform module (TPM) (102b, 104c) associated with the server platform (104) and said client platform (102). The general process of the present invention comprises three main components, wherein the first stage (402) establishes the security and integrity of the server platform. After the establishment of process (402), the next step is to establish identity encryption in the SSL/TLS extension and establish property-based attestation integrated with the Trusted Authority (TA) in the server platform (404). Upon completion of the processes of establishment, communication is performed with secure data transmission using mutual trusted identity encryption between client and server (406) wherein a handshake protocol is established to prioritise exchange of the certificates and keys to ensure the authentication and encryption of data (704).

Description

A SYSTEM AND METHOD OF MUTUAL TRUSTED AUTHENTICATION

AND IDENTITY ENCRYPTION

FIELD OF INVENTION

The present invention relates to a system and method for mutual trusted authentication and identity encryption utilizing transport layer security extension with properties based attestation mechanism. BACKGROUND ART

Client-Server applications have become the backbone of the Internet and are processing increasingly sensitive information. A common method of establishing secure communication between the client and the server is through secure channel technologies, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). TLS and its predecessor, Secure Socket Layer (SSL), are cryptographic protocols which provide secure communications on the Internet for such things as web browsing, instant messaging, email and other data transfer. The TLS and SSL protocols ensure secure transmission of data and authentication of involved endpoints using digital certificates. However, using existing TLS protocol it is difficult to ensure endpoint integrity. As such, the protocol can generally not assure the trustworthiness of involved endpoints. Lack of trustworthiness of client-server systems may lead to a Reply Illusion Attack on SSL and TLS Protocols. Such attacks may expose the private key to the attacker. Hence, it is necessary to enhance the security of TLS communication by enabling platform integrity between client and server to ensure no malware or spyware can be installed.

The present invention utilizes enhance TLS extension with identity-based encryption to protect the end point integrity by integrating property-based attestation to guarantee the trustworthiness and privacy of remote platform. Identity-Based Encryption (I BE) is a cryptographic scheme which claims to be more secure and require less key management compared with Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). IBE is another alternative to public-key encryption that makes publicly available the mapping between identities, public keys and the validity of the latter. Senders using an IBE do not need to look up the public keys and the corresponding certificates of the receivers because the identities (e.g. MAC, emails or IP addresses) together with common public parameters are sufficient for encryption.

Integrity measurement is based on property-based attestation mechanisms which use Trusted Computer Group (TCG) technologies. Attestation is a process of assuring that information is accurate, a critical concept for the trusted platform. This is because the trust in the system is based on taking measurements and checking those measurements. If a system is not able to attest to the accuracy of that information, then the trust in the platform does not exists.

Attestation is closely related to authentication in that the client itself proves its trustworthiness to the remote server. Remote server attestation uses TCG technology, specifically the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) "quote" function. The quote creates a signature of the current platform software state. This state is reported though a log of software events, such as calling a higher software layer, starting a service, or reading a properties configuration file. These events are recorded as "measurements", which are cryptographically protected by extending them into Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). Signing the PCRs effectively signs the event log. Signing the Attestation Identity Key (AIK) used in the quote obtains a certificate signed by a Trusted Third Party. That certificate attests to the Trust properties of the platform. The AIK is generated on and remains locked to the TPM, which is itself physically attached to the platform. Nobody can steal the Private Key which is in the TPM hardware. This ensures secure communication between the trusted endpoints. The present invention includes an embodiment of Interceptor Module (IPCM), SSIJTLS Extension module and Trusted Authority (TA) to establish mutual trusted authentication and identity encryption. The subject matter claimed herein is not limited to embodiments that solve any disadvantages or that operate only in environments such as those described above. Rather, this background is only provided to illustrate one exemplary technology area where some embodiments described herein may be practice.

SUMMARY OF INVENTION

The present invention relates to a system and method for mutual trusted authentication and identity encryption utilizing transport layer security extension with properties based attestation mechanism. One aspect of the present invention provides a system (100) for mutual trusted authentication and identity encryption, the system comprising at least one server platform (104) installed with at least one integrity measurement architecture (IMA) module (104b); at least one trusted authority module (TA) (104d) associated with said server platform) 104); at least one integrity properties collection module (IPCM) (104e) in communication with said trusted authority module (TA) (104d); at least one client platform (102) that is in communication with and registrable to said server platform (104); at least one transport layer security extension module (TLS extension module) (104a, 102c) and associated with said server platform (104) and said client platform (102) respectively; and at least one trusted platform module (TPM) (102b, 104c)associated with said server platform (104) and said client platform (102).

The at least one trusted authority module (TA) (104d) associated with said server platform (104) further establishes identity-based encryption of said server platform (104) and having means for generating system identity information (SIDs) of said server platform; integrating with said integrity properties collection module (IPCM) (104e) to obtain integrity properties list (IPLs) of said server platform and generating integrity property hash value (IPHs) for server platform based on said integrity properties list (IPLs); generating a server private key based on said system identification information (SIDs) and said integrity property hash value (IPHs) and master secret key (MS); and generating and installing said TLS extension modules embedded with said integrity properties list (IPLs).

Another aspect of the present invention provides further means of the at least one trusted platform module (TPM) (102b, 104c) wherein said trusted platform module (TPM) (102b, 104c) is associated with said server platform (104) and said client platform (102) and generates a root key pair to establish security and integrity of said server platform. A further aspect of the present invention provides for the at least one trusted authority module (TA) (104d) wherein said trusted authority module (TA) (104d) further having means for generating a master public key (MB) and a master secret key (MS) based on said root key pair generated by said trusted platform module (102b, 104c) and storing the said master public key (MB) and master secret key (MS) in a server encrypted directory.

A further aspect of the present invention provides for the at least one client platform (102) that is in communication with and registrable to said server platform (104), said client platform further having means for receiving and installing said client private key and said master public key (MB) in a client encrypted directory; storing said integrity property hash value (IPHs) into said property configuration register (PCR); and installing said TLS extension module (102c). Another aspect of the present invention provides a method for mutual trusted authentication and identity encryption utilizing transport layer security extension with properties based attestation mechanism. The method comprising steps of establishing security and integrity of a server platform (402); establishing identity-based encryption of said server platform in a TLS extension module associated with said server platform and integrated with a trusted authority (TA) associated with said server platform (404); and securing data transmission channel using mutual identity encryption between a client platform and said server platform (406). The methodology for establishing identity-based encryption of said server platform in a TLS extension module associated with said server platform and integrated with a trusted authority (TA) associated with said server platform further comprises steps of generating unique system identity information (SIDs) of said server platform (502); integrating said trusted authority (TA) with an integrity properties collection module (IPCM) associated with said server platform to obtain an integrity properties list (IPLs) of said server platform and generating an integrity property hash value (IPHs) for the server platform based in the integrity properties list (IPLs) (504); generating a server private key based on said system identification information (SIDs) and said master secret key (MS) using said trusted authority (TA) (506); generating and installing said TLS extension module embedded with said integrity properties list (IPLs) using said trusted authority (TA) (508); and storing said system identity information (SIDs), master public key (MB), master private key (MS) and server private key are stored in a server encrypted directory (510). The said integrity properties lists (IPLs, IPLc) are encrypted before embedding in said TLS extension modules such as using identity-based encryption.

A further aspect of the invention provides a method for establishing security and integrity of said server platform. The said method further comprises steps of establishing trustworthiness of said server platform by installing Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) (602); generating a root key pair using a trusted platform module (TPM) (604); generating a master public key (MB) and a master secret key (MS) based on said root key pair using said trusted authority (TA) (606); and storing said master public key (MB) and said master secret key (MS) at a server secure storage (608).

A further aspect of the invention provides a method for securing data transmission channel using mutual identity encryption between a client platform and said server platform. The said method further comprises steps of receiving a request signal from said client platform (702); and establishing a handshake process between said client platform and said server platform (704). Another aspect of the invention provides a method for receiving a request signal from said client platform. The said method further comprises steps of creating unique system identity information (SIDc) of said client platform (802); integrating said trusted authority (TA) with said integrity properties collection module (IPCM) to obtain an integrity properties list (IPLc) of said client platform and generating an integrity property hash value (IPHc) for the client platform based on the integrity properties list (IPLc) (804); generating a client private key based on said system identity information (SIDc) and said master secret key (MS) using said trusted authority (TA) (806); generating TLS extension module embedded with said integrity properties list (IPLc) (808); storing said integrity property hash value (IPHc) into a platform configuration register (PCR) (810); sending said client private key, master public key (MB), integrity properties hash value (IPHs) and TLS extension module to said client platform (812); installing said client private key and said master public key (MB) in a client encrypted directory of said client platform (814); storing said integrity property hash value (IPHs) into said property configuration register (PCR) of said client platform (816); and installing said TLS extension module onto said client platform (818).

A further aspect of the present invention provides a method for establishing a handshake process between said client platform and said server platform. The said method further comprises steps of sending a client hello with encrypted integrity properties list (IPLc) from said client platform to said server platform (902); decrypting received integrity properties list (IPLc) with said private key and generate integrity properties hash value (IPHs) and verifies with client integrity properties hash value (IPHc) (904); verifying integrity properties list (IPLc) and, if valid, said server platform sends a server hello with encrypted integrity properties list (IPLs) and TPM certificate to said client platform (906, 910); verifying integrity properties list (IPLs) by said client platform by decrypting received integrity properties hash value (IPHs) with said private key and generate integrity properties hash value (IPH) (912); verifying integrity properties list (IPL) and, if valid said client platform verifies TPM certificate and sends client TPM certificate to said server platform 11 and said server platform verifies received client TPM certificate (914, 916); and initiating data transmission between client and server platform encrypted with TPM public key (918). The present invention consists of features and a combination of parts hereinafter fully described and illustrated in the accompanying drawings, it being understood that various changes in the details may be made without departing from the scope of the invention or sacrificing any of the advantages of the present invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACCOMPANYING DRAWINGS

To further clarify various aspects of some embodiments of the present invention, a more particular description of the invention will be rendered by references to specific embodiments thereof, which are illustrated in the appended drawings. It is appreciated that these drawings depict only typical embodiments of the invention and are therefore not to be considered limiting of its scope. The invention will be described and explained with additional specificity and detail through the accompanying drawings in which:

FIG. 1.0 illustrates the architecture of the system of an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 2.0 illustrates TLS protocol layers.

FIG. 3.0 illustrates a comparison of full TLS handshake with normal certificate extension with a full handshake with identity encryption extension in accordance with embodiments of the invention.

FIG. 4.0 illustrates a general process of the invention.

FIG. 5.0 illustrates the process flow of establishing security and integrity of the server platform 100 of the process of FIG. 4.0.

FIG. 6.0 illustrates the process flow of establishing identity encryption of the process of FIG. 4.0. FIG. 7.0 illustrates the process flow of securing a data transmission channel of FIG. 4.0.

FIG. 8.0 illustrates the process flow for receiving a request signal from said client platform of FIG. 7.0. FIG. 9.0 illustrates the process flow for establishing a handshake process between said client platform and said server platform of FIG. 8.0. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

The present invention provides a system and method for mutual trusted authentication and identity encryption utilizing transport layer security extension with properties based attestation mechanism. Hereinafter, this specification will describe the present invention according to the preferred embodiments. It is to be understood that limiting the description to the preferred embodiments of the invention is merely to facilitate discussion of the present invention and it is envisioned without departing from the scope of the appended claims.

FIG. 1.0 illustrates the architecture of a system (100) according to various embodiments of the invention. This includes an integrity properties collection module (IPCM) (104e), SSL/TLS extension modules (102c and 104a), and trusted authority module (TA) (104d). The system (100) comprises of the following establishment:

1) Establishing the integrity measurement of the server platform (104), initiated with TPM (104c) to generate a root key. TA (104d) then generates a Master Public Key (MB) and Master Secret Key (MS) based on the root key and those keys are stored at secure storage;

2) Establishing identity-based encryption and properties-based attestation to embed in SSL/TLS extensions:

• Based on unique System Identity Info of the server (SIDs), TA generates a server private key, Integrity Property List of the server (IPLs) and Integrity Property Hash Value of the server (IPHs), corresponding with Integrity Property Collection Module (IPCM) (104e) which act as policy.

• Based on unique System Identity Info of the client (SIDs), TA also generates the private key, Integrity Property List of the client (IPLc) and Integrity Property Hash Value of the client (IPHc), corresponding with the Integrity Property Collection Module (IPCM) (104e).

• Then, the server stores the IPHc into PCR.

• Server then instructs client to install embedded TLS extension, IPHs, MB and client private key at client secure storage. Client stores the IPHs into a platform configuration register (PCR). 3) Securing data transmission channel using mutual identity encryption in TLS extension between client and server by using TPM cert for verification process.

The SSL/TLS authentication protocol suite is based on public key cryptography. All secure protocols are based on a client/server model. Client (102) sends a message to a server (104e), and the server (104) responds with the information needed to authenticate itself. The client (102) and server ( 04) perform an additional exchange of session keys, and the authentication dialogue ends. When authentication is completed, secure communication can begin between the server (104) and the client (102) using the secret keys established during the authentication process.

The TLS/SSL security protocol is layered between the application protocol layer and the TCP/IP layer, where it can secure and send application data to the transport layer. Because it works between the application layer and the transport layer, TLS/SSL can support multiple application layer protocols.

TLS/SSL assumes that a connection-oriented transport, typically TCP, is in use. The protocol allows client/server applications to detect the following security risks:

• Message tampering

· Message interception

• Message forgery

The TLS/SSL protocol can be divided into two layers. The first layer consists of the application protocol and the three Handshake sub-protocols: the Handshake Protocol, the Change Cipher Spec Protocol, and the Alert Protocol. The second layer is the Record Protocol. FIG. 2.0 illustrates the various layers and their components.

The present invention involves TLS protocol (also known as SSL3.0). This advanced protocol has additional option called Extensions. By default there are five extensions that exist to make communication more secure, but all are optional. In the client-server architecture, the Client 12 sends Extension data during Client Hello. Server (104) will receive the extension and send back the ServerHello to Client (102). FIG. 3.0 illustrates the comparison between normal certificate extensions with those of embodiments of the invention which use identity encryption extension in a full TLS handshake scenario. According to embodiments of the invention, instead of using certificates, the extension uses encrypted Integrity Properties Lists (IPL) represented as integrity measurements of the host platform. The encryption uses identity-based encryption mechanisms which provide some capabilities that are much simpler and less expensive than PKI. During Client Hello, the client (102) sends the extension with embed encrypted IPL to Server (104). Server (104) receives the extension and verifies the IPL, if valid, then it sends the ServerHello with embed encrypted IPL extension and TPM certificate to client (102). The client (102) then verifies the IPL of server (104) and, if valid, it sends the TPM certificate to server (104). The TPM certificates present as ClientKeyExchange and ServerKeyExchange which are used to encrypt data after establishment of the handshake process. The general process of invention comprises three main components, as illustrated in FIG 4. The first stage (402) establishes the security and integrity of the server platform (104). After the establishment of process (402), the next step is to establish identity encryption in the SSUTLS extension and establish property-based attestation integrated with the Trusted Authority (TA) in the server platform (404). After these two processes of establishment, communication is performed with secure data transmission using mutual trusted identity encryption between client and server (406). Detailed process flows of 402, 404 and 406 are described in FIGs. 5, 6 and 7 respectively.

FIG. 6.0 illustrates the general process (462) which starts installation (602) to secure and establishes trustworthiness of the server platform at least using Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA). During the TPM ownership process, in order to initiate the IMA module, TPM (104c) generates a pair of root keys (604). After the integrity of the server platform (104f) is protected using the IMA (104b), the Trusted Authority (TA) 14 and Integrity Properties Collection Module (IPCM) are installed and configured with specified secure storage which is encrypted with the TPM root key. The TA 14 using the TPM root key creates a master public key (MB) and master secret key (MS) (606) and stores the keys at secure storage (608). Finally, the TA generates System Identity Info (SIDs) for the server which is illustrated in FIG. 8.0. FIG. 5.0 illustrates the general process (500) and continuing process of (404). The TA receives a request signal generation of new platform and automatic creates the SID for the server and client platforms (502). Then, the TA integrates with the IPCM to obtain an Integrity Properties List (IPL) of the server and client platforms and generate Integrity Property Hash values (IPH) based on the IPL's (504). The TA also generates private keys of the server and client platforms based on SID and MS (506). After that, the TA encrypts the IPL's using an identity-based encryption mechanism and builds a new TLS extension library (508). The TLS extension library is embedded with the encrypted IPL's. The process continues with the TA sending a bundle of data consisting of the TLS extension library, private key, IPH's and MB. All the data install into the secure storage but IPH's of verifier are stored into the PCR at the server or client platform (510). The process establishment of (500) ends after the installation process is complete and the host platform of server or client is ready to use. FIG. 7.0 illustrates the general process of (700) when the secure communication between client and server is started. In the secure TLS communication 301 , a request signal from said client platform is received (702) and a handshake protocol is established to prioritise exchange of the certificates and keys to ensure the authentication and encryption of data (704).

FIG. 8.0 illustrates the process flow of (800) for receiving a request signal from said client platform. Upon receipt of a request signal from said client platform, unique system identity information (SI Dc) of said client platform is created (802). Thereafter, TA is integrated with integrity properties collection module (IPCM) to obtain an integrity properties list (IPLc) of client platform and an integrity property hash value (IPHc) is generated for client platform based on integrity properties list (IPLc) (804). Subsequently, a client private key is generated based on system identity information (SIDc) and said master secret key (MS) using the said TA (806). TLS extension module is generated and embedded with said integrity properties list (IPLc) (808) and said integrity property hash value (IPHc) is stored into a platform configuration register (PCR) (810). Client private key, master public key (MB), integrity properties hash value (IPHs) and TLS extension module is sent to said client platform (812) and said client private key and said master public key (MB) is installed in a client encrypted directory of said client platform (814). Thereafter, said integrity property hash value (IPHs) is stored into said property configuration register (PCR) of said client platform (816) and the TLS extension module is installed onto said client platform (818). FIG.9.0 illustrates the establishment of the handshake protocol to prioritise exchange of the certificates and keys to ensure the authentication and encryption of data. The process begins with the Client sending a ClientHello+Extension (contains the encrypted IPL) to the Server (902). Then the Server receives the extension and decrypts it with the Private Key from the TA and generates the IPH based on the IPL and verifies this with the Client IPH (904). If integrity fails, it will show the Error message (908) and exit. If integrity is valid, the Server sends a Server Hello+Extension (contains encrypted IPL), the server TPM Certificate (906, 910) and a "Server Hello Done" message. The Client receives the Extension and decrypts it with the Private Key from the TA and generates the IPH based on the IPL and compares this with the server IPH value (912). If Integrity is not valid, it will display an error message (908) and exit. If integrity is valid, the Client verifies the TPM Certificate and sends the Client TPM Certificate to the Server (914). The Server receives the Client TPM Certificate and verifies the Certificate (916). Then, both the Client and Server start the secure communication using TPM Keys (918). They use the TPM Public key to encrypt the data and the TPM Private Key to decrypt the data which resides in the TPM Hardware 310.

Unless the context requires otherwise or specifically stated to the contrary, integers, steps or elements of the invention recited herein as singular integers, steps or elements clearly encompass both singular and plural forms of the recited integers, steps or elements.

Throughout this specification, unless the context requires otherwise, the word "comprise", or variations such as "comprises" or "comprising", will be understood to imply the inclusion of a stated step or element or integer or group of steps or elements or integers, but not the exclusion of any other step or element or integer or group of steps, elements or integers. Thus, in the context of this specification, the term "comprising" is used in an inclusive sense and thus should be understood as meaning "including principally, but not necessarily solely". It will be appreciated that the foregoing description has been given by way of illustrative example of the invention and that all such modifications and variations thereto as would be apparent to persons of skill in the art are deemed to fall within the broad scope and ambit of the invention as herein set forth.

Claims

1. A system (100) for mutual trusted authentication and identity, the system comprising:

at least one server platform ( 04) installed with at least one integrity measurement architecture (IMA) module (104b) ;

at least one trusted authority module (TA) (104d) associated with said server platform (104);

at least one integrity properties collection module (IPCM) (104e) in communication with said trusted authority module (TA) (104d);

at least one client platform (102) that is in communication with and registrable to said server platform (104);

at least one transport layer security extension module (TLS extension module) (104a, 102c) and associated with said server platform (104) and said client platform (102) respectively; and

at least one trusted platform module (TPM) (102b, 104c)associated with said server platform (104) and said client platform (102)

characterized in that the at least one trusted authority module (TA) (104d) associated with said server platform ( 04) further establishes identity- based encryption of said server platform (104) with the following means: generating system identity information (SIDs) of said server platform;

integrating with said integrity properties collection module (IPCM) (104e) to obtain integrity properties list (IPLs) of said server platform and generating integrity property hash value (IPHs) for server platform based on said integrity properties list (IPLs);

generating a server private key based on said system

identification information (SIDs) and said integrity property hash value (IPHs) and master secret key (MS); and generating and installing said TLS extension modules embedded with said integrity properties list (IPLs)

which the system is encryption utilizing transport layer security extension with properties based attestation mechanism

2. A system (100) according to claim 1 , wherein the at least one trusted platform module (TPM) (102b, 104c) is associated with said server platform (104) and said client platform (102) and further having means for generating a root key pair to establish security and integrity of said server platform and storing said root key pair in a server encrypted directory.

3. A system (100) according to claim 1 , wherein the at least one client platform (102) that is in communication with and registrable to said server platform (104), said client platform further having means for receiving and installing said client private key and said master public key (MB) in a client encrypted directory; storing said integrity property hash value (IPHs) into said property configuration register (PCR); and installing said TLS extension module (102c).

4. A method (400) for mutual trusted authentication and identity encryption the method comprising steps of:

establishing security and integrity of a server platform (402); establishing identity-based encryption of said server platform by utilizing transport layer security extension with properties based attestation mechanism in a TLS extension module associated with said server platform and integrated with a trusted authority (TA) associated with said server platform (404); and

securing data transmission channel using mutual identity encryption between a client platform and said server platform (406)

characterized in that establishing identity-based encryption of said server platform by utilizing transport layer security extension with properties based attestation mechanism in a TLS extension module associated with said server platform and integrated with a trusted authority (TA) associated with said server platform further comprises steps of:

generating unique system identity information (SIDs) of said server platform (502);

integrating said trusted authority (TA) with an integrity

properties collection module (IPCM) associated with said server platform to obtain an integrity properties list (IPLs) of said server platform and generating an integrity property hash value (IPHs) for the server platform based in the integrity properties list (IPLs) (504);

generating a server private key based on said system identification information (SIDs) and said master secret key (MS) using said trusted authority (TA) (506);

generating and installing said TLS extension module embedded with said integrity properties list (IPLs) using said trusted authority (TA) (508); and

storing said system identity information (SIDs), master public key (MB), master private key (MS) and server private key are stored in a server encrypted directory (510).

A method (600) according to claim 4, wherein establishing security and integrity of said server platform further comprises steps of establishing trustworthiness of said server platform by installing Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) (602); generating a root key pair using a trusted platform module (TPM) (604); generating a master public key (MB) and a master secret key (MS) based on said root key pair using said trusted authority (TA) (606); and storing said master public key (MB) and said master secret key (MS) at a server secure storage (608).

A method (700) according to Claim 4, wherein securing data transmission channel using mutual identity encryption between a client platform and said server platform further comprises steps of receiving a request signal from said client platform (702); and establishing a handshake process between said client platform and said server platform (704).

A method (800) according to claim 6, wherein receiving a request signal from said client platform, further comprises steps of:

creating unique system identity information (SIDc) of said client platform

(802); integrating said trusted authority (TA) with said integrity properties collection module (IPCM) to obtain an integrity properties list (IPLc) of said client platform and generating an integrity property hash value (IPHc) for the client platform based on the integrity properties list (IPLc) (804); generating a client private key based on said system identity information (SIDc) and said master secret key (MS) using said trusted authority (TA) (806);

generating TLS extension module embedded with said integrity properties list (IPLc) (808);

storing said integrity property hash value (IPHc) into a platform configuration register (PCR) (810);

sending said client private key, master public key (MB), integrity properties hash value (IPHs) and TLS extension module to said client platform (812);

installing said client private key and said master public key (MB) in a client encrypted directory of said client platform (814);

storing said integrity property hash value (IPHs) into said property configuration register (PCR) of said client platform (816); and

installing said TLS extension module onto said client platform (818).

8. A method (900) according to Claim 6, wherein establishing a handshake process between said client platform and said server platform further comprises steps of: sending a client hello with encrypted integrity properties list (IPLc) from said client platform to said server platform (902);

decrypting received integrity properties list (IPLc) with said private key and generate integrity properties hash value (IPHs) and verifies with client integrity properties hash value (IPHc) (904);

verifying integrity properties list (IPLc) and, if valid, said server platform sends a server hello with encrypted integrity properties list (IPLs) and TPM certificate to said client platform (906, 910);

verifying integrity properties list (IPLs) by said client platform by decrypting received integrity properties hash value (IPHs) with said private key and generate integrity properties hash value (IPH) (912); verifying integrity properties list (IPL) and, if valid said client platform verifies TPM certificate and sends client TPM certificate to said server platform 11 and said server platform verifies received client TPM certificate (914, 916); and

initiating data transmission between client and server platform encrypted with TPM public key (918).

A method according to any of claim 4, wherein said integrity properties lists (IPLs, IPLc) are encrypted before embedding in said TLS extension modules such as using identity-based encryption.