WO2012075761A1 - Procédé et système de chiffrement d'un service de messagerie multimédia - Google Patents
Procédé et système de chiffrement d'un service de messagerie multimédia Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2012075761A1 WO2012075761A1 PCT/CN2011/072762 CN2011072762W WO2012075761A1 WO 2012075761 A1 WO2012075761 A1 WO 2012075761A1 CN 2011072762 W CN2011072762 W CN 2011072762W WO 2012075761 A1 WO2012075761 A1 WO 2012075761A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- mms
- data
- terminal
- encrypted
- mms data
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0464—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/12—Messaging; Mailboxes; Announcements
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of encryption and decryption technology, and in particular, to a method and system for encrypting MMS (Multimedia Message Service). Background technique
- MMS Data service is the focus of the development of the third generation of mobile communication technology.
- MMS is one of the most important data services. Its commercial value is getting higher and higher, the industrial chain is getting bigger and bigger, and it is basically fully popularized to every user in application. Therefore, it is highly concerned by users and operators, so the confidentiality and security of MMS are also receiving more and more attention.
- the MMS data sent by the user is transmitted in plain text and cached in the form of plain text on the server side. It is very easy to be stolen by a third party and cannot achieve the purpose of transmitting confidential information.
- the application number is CN200810170689.7, and the invention is entitled "Patent Application for Protection of Mobile Terminals and Their Data Service Messages", which provides a method for protecting a mobile terminal and its data service message, the main feature of which is to use a public key.
- private key system for encryption Specifically: 1. receiving a data service message that is sent by the sender and encrypted by using a private key certificate, where the information header of the data service message includes the device identity code of the sender; 2. searching according to the device identity code. A public key certificate having the sender, if any, decrypting the data service message with the public key certificate.
- the application number is CN200810089191.8
- the patent application whose invention name is "MMS encryption method and mobile terminal for transmitting and receiving encrypted MMS" is also the method of the public key system, specifically: 1.
- the mobile terminal A uses the public key of B to encrypt the multimedia message to obtain the ciphertext; 2.
- the mobile terminal A sends the ciphertext to the mobile terminal B; 3.
- the mobile terminal B decrypts the ciphertext by using its private key to obtain the multimedia message.
- the object of the present invention is to provide a method and system for encrypting an MMS, which can better solve the problem that the MMS is easily stolen and easily cracked, and the public key private key encryption and decryption technology needs to pre-allocate the public key and the private key and needs
- the implementation process caused by an electronic visa authority has a large inconvenience.
- a method for encrypting an MMS comprising: the transmitting terminal encrypting the MMS data by using the transmitting terminal key CK, and transmitting the encrypted MMS data to the network side MMSC;
- the MMSC After receiving the encrypted MMS data, the MMSC decrypts the encrypted MMS data by using the transmitting terminal CK, and then re-encrypts the decrypted MMS data by using the receiving terminal CK, and then re-encrypts
- the MMS data is sent to the receiving terminal.
- the MMSC acquires the transmitting terminal CK and the receiving terminal CK from the network side data center.
- the network side data center is a home location register/authentication center (HLR/AUC).
- HLR/AUC home location register/authentication center
- the network side MMSC acquires the transmitting terminal CK and the receiving terminal CK from the HLR/AUC simultaneously, or acquires the transmitting terminal CK and the receiving terminal CK, respectively.
- the transmitting terminal CK and the receiving terminal CK are variable.
- the encrypted MMS data is the body of the MMS protocol data unit (MMS PDU)
- MMS PDU MMS protocol data unit
- the (BODY) part is the key data in the BODY of the MMS PDU.
- the method further includes: the sending terminal selecting whether to encrypt the sending MMS.
- the method further includes: after receiving the re-encrypted MMS data, the receiving terminal decrypts the re-encrypted MMS data by using the receiving terminal CK.
- a system for encrypting an MMS comprising: a transmitting terminal, configured to encrypt MMS data by using a sending terminal key CK, and send the encrypted MMS data to a network side MMSC; And after receiving the encrypted MMS data, decrypting the encrypted MMS data by using the sending terminal CK, and then re-encrypting the decrypted MMS data by using the receiving terminal CK, and transmitting the re-encrypted MMS data to the receiving terminal.
- the MMSC is further configured to acquire the transmitting terminal CK and the receiving terminal CK from the network side data center.
- the transmitting terminal is further configured to select whether to encrypt and transmit the MMS data.
- the receiving terminal decrypts the re-encrypted MMS data by using the receiving terminal CK.
- the invention has the beneficial effects that: the network side MMSC participates in the adding and decrypting process and uses the CK to add and decrypt the MMS, so that the MMS is not easily stolen and cracked by the third party during the transmission and storage process. And the implementation process of encryption and decryption is more convenient.
- FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for encrypting an MMS provided by the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a flowchart of constructing MMS data by a transmitting terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart of constructing MMS data by an MMSC according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of constructing MMS data by a receiving terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a system for encrypting an MMS according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description
- FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for encrypting an MMS provided by the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1, the method includes the following steps:
- the sending terminal encrypts the MMS data by using a sending terminal CK (cipher key), and sends the encrypted MMS data to a network side MMSC (MULT MEDIA MESSAGE SERVICE CENTER).
- CK cipher key
- the transmitting terminal uses its own CK as an encryption factor to encrypt the MMS data by using the encryption and decryption module, and adds a corresponding encryption indication field to the HEADER of the MMS PDU (Protocol DATA UNIT), and transmits the encrypted MMS data.
- CK an encryption factor
- MMS PDU Protocol DATA UNIT
- the encrypted MMS data is the main body (BODY) part of the MMS PDU or the key data in the BODY of the MMS PDU.
- the MMSC on the network side decrypts the received encrypted MMS data by using the sending terminal CK, and then re-encrypts the decrypted MMS data by using the receiving terminal CK, and sends the re-encrypted MMS data. To the receiving terminal.
- the MMSC identifies the encrypted indication field in the HEADER of the received MMS PDU to determine whether it is encrypted MMS data, and if so, obtains and transmits from the HLR/AUC (HOME LOCATION REGISTER/AUTHENTICATION CENTER, Home Location Register/Authentication Center)
- the terminal CK and the receiving terminal CK first decrypt the encrypted MMS data using the encryption and decryption module as the decryption factor, and then use the encryption and decryption module as the encryption factor to re-encrypt the MMS, and then re-encrypt the MMS data. Send to the receiving terminal.
- step S200 The sending terminal selects whether to encrypt and send the MMS data, if the sending terminal selects the encrypted sending, step S201 is performed, otherwise step S205 is performed.
- the sending terminal obtains the current valid CK from the local USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module), and the CK is obtained by an algorithm calculated by the RAND and the root key KI of the sending terminal, where RAND is in the signaling connection.
- the random number sent to the transmitting terminal during the authentication process of the network to the transmitting terminal at the time of establishment, and the KI is a security key shared by the USIM and the HLR/AUC of the home network.
- step S202 Using the encryption and decryption module, encrypt the MMS data by using the CK obtained in step S201 as an encryption factor.
- the sending terminal constructs the MMS PDU by using the encrypted MMS data
- the sending terminal sends the encrypted MMS data to the network side MMSC, and the process ends.
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart of constructing MMS data by an MMSC according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 3, the steps of constructing MMS data by the MMSC are as follows:
- the MMSC receives the MMS data sent by the sending terminal.
- step S301 Determine, according to the encrypted indication field of the HEADER of the MMS PDU in the received MMS data, whether the currently received MMS data is encrypted MMS data. If yes, go to step S302, otherwise go to step S306.
- S302 Obtain the transmitting terminal CK and the receiving terminal CK from the HLR/AUC through the MM5 interface extension between the MMSC and the HLR/AUC.
- S304 Re-encrypt the decrypted MMS data by using the encryption and decryption module by using the receiving terminal CK as an encryption factor.
- S305 Send the re-encrypted MMS data to the receiving terminal, and the process ends.
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of constructing MMS data by a receiving terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 4, the steps of constructing MMS data by the receiving terminal are as follows:
- the receiving terminal receives the MMS data sent by the MMSC.
- S402 Obtain a current valid CK from the local USIM, where the CK is obtained by an algorithm by using a RAND and a root key KI of the receiving terminal as an operation factor, where the RAND is sent to the receiving process during the authentication process of the receiving terminal when the signaling connection is established.
- the random number of the terminal, KI is a security key shared by the USIM and the HLR/AUC of the home network.
- S403 Using the encryption and decryption module, the CK obtained by S402 is used as a decryption factor, and the received re-encrypted MMS data is decrypted, and the process ends.
- FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a system for encrypting an MMS according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 5, the system includes: a transmitting terminal 1, an MMSC2, a receiving terminal 3, and an HLR/AUC4.
- the transmitting terminal 1 is configured to encrypt the MMS data by using the encryption/decryption module by using the CK of the transmitting terminal 1 as an encryption factor, and send the encrypted MMS data to the network side MMSC2.
- the transmitting terminal 1 includes an encryption and decryption module for performing encryption/decryption of MMS data.
- the encryption and decryption module obtains the encryption factor CK from the USIM, and determines whether to encrypt and transmit the MMS data according to the agreed rule. If it is encrypted transmission, the corresponding encryption indication field is added in the HEADER of the MMS PDU, and the encrypted MMS data is sent to the MMSC2. If it is a non-encrypted transmission, the MMS data is directly sent to the MMSC2.
- the CK of the transmitting terminal 1 is obtained by an algorithm calculation by the RAND and the root key KI of the transmitting terminal 1 as an operation factor, which is variable with RAND.
- RAND is the random number sent to the transmitting terminal 1 during the authentication process of the network to the transmitting terminal 1 when the signaling connection is established
- KI is a security key shared by the USIM and the HLR/AUC of the home network.
- the MMSC2 also includes an encryption and decryption module. After receiving the MMS data sent by the transmitting terminal 1, first, the encrypted identifier field of the HEADER of the MMS PDU is identified. If the MMS data is encrypted data, the CK of the transmitting terminal 1 is acquired from the HLR/AUC4. And using the CK of the transmitting terminal 1 as a decryption factor to decrypt the encrypted MMS data by using the encryption/decryption module, and then acquiring the CK of the receiving terminal 3 from the HLR/AUC4, and decrypting the encryption/decryption module using the CK of the receiving terminal 3 as an encryption factor.
- the MMS data is re-encrypted, and the re-encrypted MMS data is transmitted to the receiving terminal 3.
- the MMSC 2 can also acquire the CK of the receiving terminal 3 and the CK of the transmitting terminal 1 from the HLR/AUC4.
- the receiving terminal 3 After receiving the re-encrypted MMS data sent by the MMSC2, the receiving terminal 3 decrypts the re-encrypted MMS data by using the CK of the receiving terminal 3 as a decryption factor.
- the CK of the receiving terminal 3 is obtained by an algorithm calculation by the RAND and the root key KI of the receiving terminal 3 as an operation factor, which is variable with RAND.
- RAND is the random number sent to the receiving terminal 3 during the authentication process of the receiving terminal 3 when the signaling connection is established
- KI is a security key shared by the USIM and the HLR/AUC of the home network.
- the present invention implements an encrypted MMS by using a CK variable CK as an encryption and decryption factor by adding corresponding hardware and software to the receiving terminal, the transmitting terminal, and the network side MMSC, and the key is Highly protected, it is not shared between the receiving terminal and the transmitting terminal, making the encrypted MMS highly confidential.
- the hardware encryption and decryption module can be provided by a third party, embedded in the terminal and the network device, and is responsible for encrypting and decrypting the MMS data. In this way, the network, the terminal equipment provider, and the operator cannot steal the encrypted MMS, and the encryption factor is different each time, which makes it more difficult to crack from the wireless transmission environment.
- the present invention utilizes the network side MMSC and CK to participate in adding and decrypting, which makes the implementation process more convenient.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
L'invention concerne un procédé et un système de chiffrement d'un service de messagerie multimédia (MMS). Selon ce procédé, un terminal émetteur chiffre les données MMS en utilisant une clé de chiffrement (CK) qui lui est associée, et transmet les données MMS chiffrées à un centre de service de messagerie multimédia (MMSC) côté réseau; à la réception des données MMS chiffrées transmises par le terminal émetteur, le centre MMSC côté réseau déchiffre les données MMS chiffrées en utilisant la clé CK du terminal émetteur, puis rechiffre les données MMS déchiffrés en utilisant la clé CK associée à un terminal récepteur, et transmet les données MMS rechiffrées au terminal récepteur. Dans le procédé selon la l'invention le centre MMSC côté réseau participe à la procédure de chiffrement et de déchiffrement et effectue le chiffrement et le déchiffrement au moyen des clés de chiffrement (CK), ce qui permet de résoudre le problème lié à la facilité avec laquelle les MMS peuvent être volés et déchiffrés, ainsi que le problème des inconvénients relativement importants d'une technique de chiffrement et de déchiffrement basée sur une clé publique et une clé privée, nécessitant l'allocation préalable de la clé publique et de la clé privée, et la mise en oeuvre d'une section d'authentification électronique.
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CN201010581440.2A CN102036194B (zh) | 2010-12-09 | 2010-12-09 | 一种加密mms的方法及*** |
CN201010581440.2 | 2010-12-09 |
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WO2012075761A1 true WO2012075761A1 (fr) | 2012-06-14 |
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PCT/CN2011/072762 WO2012075761A1 (fr) | 2010-12-09 | 2011-04-14 | Procédé et système de chiffrement d'un service de messagerie multimédia |
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CN104301102B (zh) * | 2013-07-19 | 2019-03-15 | ***通信集团北京有限公司 | Widget通信方法、装置及*** |
CN104680073A (zh) * | 2013-11-29 | 2015-06-03 | 联芯科技有限公司 | 移动通信终端中数据的保密方法及装置 |
CN106162622A (zh) * | 2015-04-09 | 2016-11-23 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 一种实现数据处理的方法及终端 |
CN110311985A (zh) * | 2019-07-09 | 2019-10-08 | 晏保华 | 一种云存储网关间信息同步***、方法及装置 |
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JP2003134105A (ja) * | 2001-10-26 | 2003-05-09 | Hitachi Eng Co Ltd | 暗号文送受信方法及び装置 |
CN1859087A (zh) * | 2005-12-30 | 2006-11-08 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种客户端和服务器密钥协商方法及其*** |
CN101242264A (zh) * | 2008-02-01 | 2008-08-13 | 深圳华为通信技术有限公司 | 数据传输方法、装置和***及移动终端 |
CN101340443A (zh) * | 2008-08-28 | 2009-01-07 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | 一种通信网络中会话密钥协商方法、***和服务器 |
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US8195205B2 (en) * | 2004-05-06 | 2012-06-05 | Telecommunication Systems, Inc. | Gateway application to support use of a single internet address domain for routing messages to multiple multimedia message service centers |
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- 2011-04-14 WO PCT/CN2011/072762 patent/WO2012075761A1/fr active Application Filing
Patent Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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JP2003134105A (ja) * | 2001-10-26 | 2003-05-09 | Hitachi Eng Co Ltd | 暗号文送受信方法及び装置 |
CN1859087A (zh) * | 2005-12-30 | 2006-11-08 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种客户端和服务器密钥协商方法及其*** |
CN101242264A (zh) * | 2008-02-01 | 2008-08-13 | 深圳华为通信技术有限公司 | 数据传输方法、装置和***及移动终端 |
CN101340443A (zh) * | 2008-08-28 | 2009-01-07 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | 一种通信网络中会话密钥协商方法、***和服务器 |
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CN102036194B (zh) | 2014-09-10 |
CN102036194A (zh) | 2011-04-27 |
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