WO2011148744A1 - 通信システム、車載端末、路側装置 - Google Patents
通信システム、車載端末、路側装置 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2011148744A1 WO2011148744A1 PCT/JP2011/059808 JP2011059808W WO2011148744A1 WO 2011148744 A1 WO2011148744 A1 WO 2011148744A1 JP 2011059808 W JP2011059808 W JP 2011059808W WO 2011148744 A1 WO2011148744 A1 WO 2011148744A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- list
- vehicle
- certificate
- roadside device
- vehicle terminal
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
- G08G1/00—Traffic control systems for road vehicles
- G08G1/123—Traffic control systems for road vehicles indicating the position of vehicles, e.g. scheduled vehicles; Managing passenger vehicles circulating according to a fixed timetable, e.g. buses, trains, trams
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
- G08G1/00—Traffic control systems for road vehicles
- G08G1/09—Arrangements for giving variable traffic instructions
- G08G1/0962—Arrangements for giving variable traffic instructions having an indicator mounted inside the vehicle, e.g. giving voice messages
- G08G1/0967—Systems involving transmission of highway information, e.g. weather, speed limits
- G08G1/096766—Systems involving transmission of highway information, e.g. weather, speed limits where the system is characterised by the origin of the information transmission
- G08G1/096783—Systems involving transmission of highway information, e.g. weather, speed limits where the system is characterised by the origin of the information transmission where the origin of the information is a roadside individual element
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
- H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W4/44—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for communication between vehicles and infrastructures, e.g. vehicle-to-cloud [V2C] or vehicle-to-home [V2H]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/84—Vehicles
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a communication technique for guaranteeing the validity of a message using a public key cryptosystem when communicating between roads and vehicles or between vehicles.
- the public key cryptosystem is a scheme in which encryption / decryption is performed using two pairs of a secret key and a public key.
- the secret key must be managed secretly, but the public key may be disclosed. Therefore, in an electronic signature using a public key cryptosystem, a message transmitting side transmits data obtained by encrypting a hash value of a message with a secret key as a signature together with the message.
- the message recipient obtains the sender's public key and decrypts the signature.
- the signature is verified based on whether or not the decrypted value is equal to the hash value generated from the received message.
- a certificate authority gives a signature to a public key. If the certificate authority has a hierarchical structure, the higher-order certificate authority repeatedly signs the public key of the lower-order certificate authority.
- the regional certification authority manages a plurality of roadside devices and issues certificates to the managed roadside devices. Further, the roadside device periodically transmits the certificate of the regional certification authority (regional certificate) to the in-vehicle terminal.
- the in-vehicle terminal receives the message, the time required for verification can be shortened by trusting the regional certificate and verifying the signature of the message while receiving the same regional certificate.
- An object of the present invention is to provide a technique for reducing certificate verification time in a communication system.
- a certification authority that performs authentication, a roadside device arranged on the roadside, an in-vehicle terminal mounted on an automobile, a first server that collects position information of the in-vehicle terminal, a roadside device for which the certificate has expired, and information management of the in-vehicle terminal
- a communication system is configured including the second server that performs the above.
- the in-vehicle terminal transmits its position information to the first server.
- the certificate authority obtains information on the in-vehicle terminal having a high possibility of appearing according to the place and time from the first server, and determines whether the certificate of the in-vehicle terminal obtained from the first server has been revoked.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an example of the overall configuration of a communication system according to the present invention.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of a certificate authority in the communication system illustrated in FIG. 1.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of an in-vehicle terminal in the communication system illustrated in FIG. 1. It is a functional example block diagram of the roadside apparatus in the communication system shown by FIG.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of a certificate authority in the communication system illustrated in FIG. 1. It is a flowchart of creation and distribution of a white list and a black list. It is a data format explanatory drawing of a white list and a black list.
- a communication system (10) includes an authentication station (100) that performs authentication, a roadside device (110) arranged on the roadside, and an in-vehicle terminal (120 ), A first server (130) for collecting location information of the in-vehicle terminal, a roadside device for which the certificate has expired, and a second server (140) for managing information on the in-vehicle terminal.
- the in-vehicle terminal transmits its position information to the first server.
- the certificate authority obtains information on the in-vehicle terminal having a high possibility of appearing according to the place and time from the first server, and determines whether the certificate of the in-vehicle terminal obtained from the first server has been revoked.
- the first list (white list) of in-vehicle terminals whose certificates are valid for each location and time based on the confirmation result
- the second list black list of in-vehicle terminals whose certificates have expired Is transmitted to the roadside device and the in-vehicle terminal device.
- the roadside device and the in-vehicle terminal device verify the certificate using the received first list and second list.
- authentication authority acquires the information of the vehicle-mounted terminal with high possibility of appearance according to a place and time from the said 1st server, and the certificate of the vehicle-mounted terminal acquired from the said 1st server is revoked.
- the second server confirms whether the certificate is valid, and based on the confirmation result, the first list of in-vehicle terminals with valid certificates and the second list of in-vehicle terminals with invalid certificates are obtained for each location and time. Create it and send it to the roadside device and the in-vehicle terminal device. Since the roadside device and the in-vehicle terminal device can perform certificate verification using the received first list and second list, the certificate verification time can be shortened.
- the roadside device and the in-vehicle terminal check the effective location and effective time of the first list and the second list, and if the device is outside the effective location or the effective time When the time has elapsed, the first list and the second list can be deleted. Thereby, it can avoid that the size of the 1st list and the 2nd list undesirably enlarges.
- An in-vehicle terminal transmits and receives information to and from a roadside device or another in-vehicle terminal.
- This in-vehicle terminal has received a message with a storage unit (126) storing a first list of in-vehicle terminals with valid certificates and a second list of in-vehicle terminals with invalid certificates for each location and time
- the certificate verification is omitted and the message is discarded.
- the certificate verification is omitted.
- a signature generation / verification processing unit (124) for verifying the signature According to this configuration, an in-vehicle terminal suitable for the communication system can be obtained.
- the roadside device (110) transmits and receives information to and from the in-vehicle terminal.
- the roadside device includes a storage unit (116) in which a first list of in-vehicle terminals with valid certificates and a second list of in-vehicle terminals with invalid certificates are stored for each location and time, and a message from the in-vehicle terminals.
- a storage unit (116) in which a first list of in-vehicle terminals with valid certificates and a second list of in-vehicle terminals with invalid certificates are stored for each location and time, and a message from the in-vehicle terminals.
- the message sender is in the second list, the verification of the certificate is omitted and the message is discarded.
- the certificate And a signature generation / verification processing unit (114) that performs signature verification by omitting verification.
- the in-vehicle terminal when the in-vehicle terminal obtains the common key necessary for verifying the validity of the first list and the second list from the roadside device, the in-vehicle terminal and its surroundings
- the roadside apparatus can be provided with a communication control processing unit (111) that transmits information necessary for authentication and key sharing.
- a processing unit that confirms the valid times of the first list and the second list and deletes the first list and the second list when the valid time has passed ( 112) can be provided.
- FIG. 1 shows an overall configuration example of a communication system according to the present invention.
- the communication system 10 shown in FIG. 1 includes, but is not limited to, a certificate authority 100, a roadside device 110, an in-vehicle terminal 120, a location information collection / analysis server 130, and a CRL server 140.
- the certificate authority 100 can communicate with the roadside device 110.
- the roadside device 110 includes a plurality of roadside devices 110A, 110B, and 110C provided at predetermined intervals on the road side.
- the certification authority 100 issues a roadside device certificate and an in-vehicle terminal certificate to the roadside device 110 and the in-vehicle terminal 120, respectively.
- a certificate that conforms to ITU (International Telecommunication Union) X.509 can be used.
- the certificate authority 100 issues itself a self-signed certificate authority certificate.
- the certificate authority 100 can communicate with the location information collection / analysis server 130 and the CRL server 140 safely.
- the communication between the certificate authority 100 and the roadside device 110, the certificate authority 100 and the location information collection / analysis server 130, and the certificate authority 100 and the CRL server 140 may be wireless communication or wired communication.
- the location information acquisition / analysis server 130 collects location information of the in-vehicle terminal 120 and analyzes, for example, a traffic jam situation.
- the information collected from the in-vehicle terminal 120 may collect not only the position information but also the speed, destination, route, etc. of the in-vehicle terminal 120.
- the CRL server 140 performs information management of the roadside device 110 and the in-vehicle terminal 120 whose certificate has expired.
- the roadside device 110 can communicate with the certificate authority 100 and performs wireless communication with the in-vehicle terminal 120 existing within the communication range.
- the communication ranges of the individual roadside devices 110A, 110B, and 110C overlap each other, but they do not have to overlap.
- the certificate authority 100 may have a hierarchical structure including a root certificate authority 200, an intermediate certificate authority 210, and a lower certificate authority 220 as shown in FIG. Further, the intermediate certificate authority 210 may have any number of layers. At this time, the root certificate authority 200 issues a certificate for the intermediate certificate authority 210, and the intermediate certificate authority 210 issues a certificate for the lower certificate authority 220. The root certificate authority 200 issues itself a self-signed root certificate authority certificate. Furthermore, as in the case where a plurality of organizations cooperate, a plurality of root certificate authorities may exist and a trust model such as a mesh model or a bridge model may be constructed.
- FIG. 3 shows a configuration example of the in-vehicle terminal 120.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120 includes a communication control processing unit 121, a white list / black list processing unit 122, a key sharing processing unit 123, a message signature generation / verification processing unit 124, a location information acquisition unit 125, and a security information storage unit 126.
- the communication control processing unit 121 performs processing for communicating with the roadside device 110 and other in-vehicle terminals 120.
- the white list / black list processing unit 122 performs processing when the white list and the black list are received from the roadside apparatus 110 and periodically checks the validity of the white list and the black list.
- the key sharing processing unit 123 performs processing for acquiring a common key necessary for MAC (Message Authentication Authentication Code) verification for confirming the integrity of the white list and the black list from the roadside device 110.
- MAC Message Authentication Authentication Code
- the message signature generation / verification unit 124 checks whether the sender of the message exists in the whitelist / blacklist, and verifies the certificate. It is determined whether to omit or not to verify the signature, and perform processing according to the determination result.
- the position information acquisition unit 125 acquires its own position information and requests the communication control processing unit 121 to transmit it.
- the means for acquiring the position information may be acquired by mounting GPS (Global Positioning System) on the in-vehicle terminal 120, or may be acquired from other devices mounted on the vehicle such as car navigation. In addition, when other devices mounted on the car have a communication function, the position information may be transmitted to the position information acquisition / analysis server 130 without going through the in-vehicle terminal 120.
- the security information storage unit 126 is used to store the in-vehicle terminal identification information 300, the in-vehicle terminal certificate 301, the secret key 302, the common key 303, the common key identification information 304, the white list 305, and the black list 306.
- the in-vehicle terminal identification information 300 is an identifier (ID) indicating the in-vehicle terminal 120
- the in-vehicle terminal certificate 301 is a certificate issued to the in-vehicle terminal 120 by the certification authority 100
- a public key is also described.
- the secret key 302 is a secret key that is paired with the public key described in the in-vehicle terminal certificate 301.
- the common key 303 is used to verify the MAC of the white list and the black list received from the road side device, and is acquired from the road side device 110.
- the common key identification information 304 is an identifier of the common key 303.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120 manages a common key 303 and common key identification information 304 as a set, and can hold a plurality of common keys 303 and common key identification information 304.
- the white list 305 is a list of in-vehicle terminals for which the certificate is valid, and is distributed from the certificate authority 100 via the roadside device 110 for each place and every time.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120 can hold a plurality of white lists 305.
- the black list 306 is a list of in-vehicle terminals whose certificates have been revoked.
- the black list 306 is distributed from the certificate authority 100 via the roadside device 110 for each place and time.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120 can hold a plurality of black lists 306.
- FIG. 4 shows a configuration example of the roadside device 110A.
- the other roadside devices 110B and 110C are configured similarly.
- the roadside apparatus 110A includes a communication control processing unit 111, a white list / black list processing unit 112, a key sharing processing unit 113, a message signature generation / verification processing unit 114, and a security information storage unit 116.
- the communication control processing unit 111 performs processing for communicating with the certificate authority 100 and the in-vehicle terminal 120.
- the white list / black list processing unit 112 performs processing when the white list and black list are received from the certificate authority 100, processing for transmitting the white list and black list to the in-vehicle terminal 120, and effectiveness of the white list and black list. Check regularly.
- the key sharing processing unit 113 performs processing for transmitting to the in-vehicle terminal 120 a common key required for MAC (Message Authentication Code) verification for confirming the integrity of the white list and the black list.
- MAC Message Authentication Code
- the message signature generation / verification unit 114 checks whether the sender of the message exists in the whitelist / blacklist, and determines whether to omit the certificate verification. It is determined whether or not to verify the signature, and processing according to the determination result is performed.
- a signature for the message is created, the signature and the roadside device certificate are delivered to the communication control processing unit 111 together with the message, and the transmission of the message is requested.
- the security information storage unit 116 is used to store the roadside device identification information 400, the roadside device certificate 401, the secret key 402, the common key 403, the common key identification information 404, the white list 405, and the black list 406.
- the roadside device identification information 400 is an identifier indicating the roadside device 110A
- the roadside device certificate 401 is a certificate issued by the certification authority 100 to the roadside device 110A.
- the secret key 402 is a secret key that is paired with the public key described in the roadside device certificate 401.
- the common key 403 is for verifying the MAC of the white list and the black list received from the certificate authority 100 and is acquired from the certificate authority 100.
- the common key identification information 404 is an identifier of the common key 403.
- the roadside device 110 manages a common key 403 and common key identification information 404 as a set, and can hold a plurality of common keys 403 and common key identification information 404.
- the white list 405 is a list of in-vehicle terminals whose certificates are valid, and is distributed from the certificate authority 100 for each place and every time.
- the roadside apparatus 110A can hold a plurality of white lists 405.
- the black list 406 is a list of in-vehicle terminals whose certificates have been revoked, and is distributed from the certificate authority 100 every place and every hour.
- the roadside apparatus 110A can hold a plurality of black lists 406.
- FIG. 5 shows a configuration example of the certificate authority 100.
- the certificate authority 100 includes a communication control processing unit 101, a white list / black list processing unit 102, a key generation processing unit 103, a certificate issuance / revocation processing unit 104, and an information storage unit 105.
- the communication control processing unit 101 performs processing for communicating with the roadside device 110, the position information collection / analysis server 103, and the CRL server 104.
- the whitelist / blacklist processing unit 102 periodically collects information on the in-vehicle terminal 120 that is highly likely to appear every hour from the location information collection / analysis server 130, and the certificate of the in-vehicle terminal 120 is revoked.
- the CRL server 140 is inquired as to whether or not a whitelist / blacklist is created. Then, a MAC for the created white list / black list is generated and transmitted to the roadside apparatus 110 via the communication control processing unit 101.
- a blacklist is created and a MAC is generated for the blacklist in real time.
- the key generation processing unit 103 generates a common key used for whitelist / blacklist MAC generation.
- the common key may be generated when the white list and the black list are generated, and may be transmitted to the road side device 110 together with the white list and the black list, or may be generated in advance and transmitted to the road side device 110.
- the certificate issuance / revocation processing unit 104 performs certificate issuance and revocation processing for the roadside device 110 and the in-vehicle terminal 120.
- the information storage unit 105 includes a roadside device management table 500, an in-vehicle terminal management table 510, a common key management table 520, a certificate authority certificate 530, and a private key 540 that is paired with a public key described in the certificate authority certificate 530. , White list 550 and black list 560 are recorded.
- the roadside device management table 500 is a table for managing information on the roadside device 110, and includes roadside device identification information 501, an installation location 502, and a roadside device certificate 503.
- the roadside device identification information 501 is an identifier indicating a roadside device.
- the installation location 502 is information indicating the installation location of the roadside apparatus 110, for example, information on the latitude / longitude of the installation location.
- the roadside device certificate 503 is a certificate issued by the certificate authority 100 to the roadside device 110.
- the in-vehicle terminal management table 510 includes in-vehicle terminal identification information 511 for identifying the in-vehicle terminal and an in-vehicle terminal certificate 512 issued to the in-vehicle terminal 120 by the certificate authority 100.
- the common key management table 520 is a table for managing a common key necessary for generating a whitelist / blacklist MAC, and includes common key identification information 521, a common key 522, and a distribution location 523.
- the common key identification information 521 indicates a common key identifier.
- the common key 522 is generated by the key generation processing unit 103 and used for whitelist / blacklist MAC generation.
- the distribution location 523 represents the location where the white list / black list to which the MAC created using the common key 522 is assigned is distributed. For example, the distribution location 523 may be expressed by latitude / longitude, It may be represented by a list of identification information.
- the certificate authority certificate 530 is a self-signed certificate authority certificate.
- the secret key 540 is a secret key that is paired with the public key described in the certificate authority certificate 530.
- the white list 550 is a white list created by the certificate authority, and a plurality of white lists can be held.
- the black list 560 is a white list created by the certificate authority, and a plurality of black lists can be held.
- FIG. 6 shows a flowchart for creating / distributing a white list / black list.
- the certification authority 100 requests the position information collection / analysis server 130 to transmit the in-vehicle terminal identification information of the in-vehicle terminal 120 that is highly likely to appear every time for each place.
- the location information acquisition / analysis server 130 transmits information corresponding to the request from the certificate authority 100 in step 602.
- the certification authority 100 refers to the in-vehicle terminal management table 510 and acquires the in-vehicle terminal certificate 512 corresponding to the in-vehicle terminal identification information received from the location information acquisition / analysis server 130.
- the CRL server 140 is inquired whether the in-vehicle terminal certificate 512 has been revoked.
- the CRL server 140 confirms whether the in-vehicle terminal certificate 512 sent from the certificate authority 100 has been revoked, and transmits the result to the certificate authority 100.
- the CRL server 140 is inquired about certificate revocation confirmation, but the CRL may be acquired from the CRL server 140 and confirmed by the certificate authority 100.
- the certificate authority 100 that has received the result of the CRL server 140 creates a white list and a black list for each location and time based on the results acquired from the location information acquisition / analysis server 130 and the CRL server 140. .
- the format of the white list and black list will be described later.
- step 606 the distribution location 523 of the common key management table 520 is referred to, a MAC is generated using the corresponding common key 522, and the corresponding roadside device 110 together with the white list and the black list is generated.
- the roadside device 110 performs the white list and black list reception processing in step 607, and then periodically transmits the white list and black list to the in-vehicle terminal 120.
- step 608 the roadside apparatus 120 performs white list and black list reception processing. The white list and black list reception processing of the roadside device 110 and the in-vehicle terminal 120 will be described later.
- Fig. 7 shows the format of the white list and black list.
- the white list and the black list include a type 710, an effective location 720, an effective time 730, the number of in-vehicle terminals 740, an in-vehicle terminal list 750, common key identification information 760, and a MAC 770.
- Type 710 is an identifier indicating a white list or a black list.
- the effective location 720 indicates a range of locations where the white list or the black list is effective.
- the valid time 730 indicates the time during which this white list or black list is valid.
- the number of in-vehicle terminals 740 indicates the number of in-vehicle terminals described in the in-vehicle terminal list 750.
- the in-vehicle terminal list 750 is a list of in-vehicle terminals 120 in which the in-vehicle terminal certificate is valid when the type 710 indicates a white list, and the in-vehicle terminal 120 in which the in-vehicle terminal certificate has been revoked when the type 710 indicates a black list. It is a list.
- the in-vehicle terminal list 750 includes a set of in-vehicle terminal identification information 751 and a serial number 752 of the in-vehicle terminal certificate.
- the common key identification information 760 is an identifier of the common key used for generating the MAC of this white list or black list
- the MAC 770 is an authentication code for information from the type 710 to the common key identification information 760.
- FIG. 8 shows a reception process flowchart of the white list and the black list in the roadside device 110 and the in-vehicle terminal 120.
- step 810 it is confirmed whether the common key identification information 760 described in the white list exists in the common key identification information 404 of the security information storage unit 116. If not, a common key is obtained from the certificate authority 100 in step 820.
- the communication path between the certification authority 100 and the roadside device 110 is safe, and security measures are not implemented in the communication path, but the secure communication between the roadside device 110 and the in-vehicle terminal 120 described later is safe. It is also possible to apply a key sharing mechanism.
- step 810 When it is confirmed in step 810 that the common key identification information 760 exists, or when the common key is acquired in step 820, in step 830, the common key 403 corresponding to the common key identification information 760 is used, and a white list or black A MAC is generated for information from the list type 710 to the common key identification information 760. If the generated MAC does not match the white list or black list MAC 770, the white list or black list is discarded in step 860. If they match, it is confirmed in step 840 whether the same white list or black list is received, and if it is received, it is discarded in step 860. If not received, the received white list or black list is recorded in the white list 405 or black list 406 of the security information storage unit 116 in step 850.
- step 810 to step 860 the processing from step 810 to step 860 is performed in the same manner as the white list or black list in the roadside device 110.
- FIG. 9 shows a mechanism for acquiring a common key in step 820 in the in-vehicle terminal 120.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120 transmits a common key acquisition request together with the in-vehicle terminal identification information 300 to the roadside device 110A.
- the roadside apparatus 110A generates a random number for the in-vehicle terminal 120 and transmits the random number to the in-vehicle terminal 120.
- the in-vehicle terminal identification information received from the in-vehicle terminal 120 and the generated random number are transmitted to the surrounding roadside device 110B via the certificate authority 100, and the surrounding roadside device 110B receives the in-vehicle terminal identification information and the random number received in step 940.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120 moves and becomes out of the communication range of the roadside device 110 before the key sharing is completed. Even in this case, the surrounding roadside device 120 and the in-vehicle terminal 120 can continue to perform the key sharing process. Moreover, in this example, although it transmits to the surrounding roadside apparatus 110B via the certification authority 100, you may transmit directly to the surrounding roadside apparatus 110B.
- step 930 the in-vehicle terminal 120 creates authentication data by encrypting the random number received from the road-side device 110 with its own secret key 302, and transmits it to the road-side device 110 together with the in-vehicle terminal certificate 301.
- step 950 the roadside apparatus 110 verifies the in-vehicle terminal certificate, and then decrypts the authentication data using the public key described in the in-vehicle terminal certificate. If the decrypted value is the same as the random number created in step 920, it is recognized as a valid in-vehicle terminal, and the process proceeds to step 960. Otherwise, it is recognized as an unauthorized in-vehicle terminal and the process is terminated.
- step 960 the common key 403 and the common key identification information 404 are encrypted with the public key described in the in-vehicle terminal certificate sent from the in-vehicle terminal 120, and the encrypted common key data is created.
- the in-vehicle terminal identification information and the random number that have been transmitted to and stored are deleted.
- the encrypted common key data is transmitted to the surrounding roadside device 110, and the surrounding roadside device 110
- the encrypted common key data is broadcast, and the in-vehicle terminal identification information and the random number are deleted in step 990.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120 When the in-vehicle terminal 120 receives the encrypted common key data in step 970, the in-vehicle terminal 120 decrypts the encrypted common key data with its own secret key 302, and stores the common key and the common key identification information in the common key 303 and the common key identification information 304 in the security information storage unit 126. Store and complete the sharing of the common key.
- FIG. 10 shows a flowchart of processing when the roadside device 110 that has received the common key acquisition request from the in-vehicle terminal 120 performs key sharing with the in-vehicle terminal 120 in order to cooperate with the surrounding roadside devices.
- the roadside device 110 that has received the common key acquisition request generates the random number in step 1000 and stores the generated in-vehicle terminal identification information and the generated random number, and then stores the in-vehicle terminal identification information in the in-vehicle terminal 120 and the surrounding roadside terminal 110. Send the generated random number.
- the authentication data is received from the in-vehicle terminal 120, it is determined that the authentication data exists within its own communication range, and the authentication data is verified in step 1040. If verification fails, it is determined as an in-vehicle terminal, and in step 1070, the verification failure is notified to the other roadside device 110.
- the in-vehicle terminal identification information and the random number recorded in step 1080 are deleted, and the key sharing process is terminated. To do.
- step 1050 If the verification is successful, encrypted common key data is created in step 1050, and then the encrypted common key data is transmitted to the in-vehicle terminal 120 and the surrounding roadside device 110 in step 1060. Then, the in-vehicle terminal identification information and the random number recorded in step 1080 are deleted, and the key sharing process is terminated.
- the authentication data is received from the other roadside terminal 110 without receiving the authentication data from the in-vehicle terminal 120, it is determined that the in-vehicle terminal 120 exists outside its communication range and has been authenticated by the surrounding roadside device 110; Proceeding to step 1060, the received encrypted common key data is broadcast, the in-vehicle terminal identification information and the random number recorded in step 1080 are deleted, and the key sharing process is terminated.
- the encrypted common key data is broadcast in consideration of the case where the in-vehicle terminal 120 exists within the communication range of a plurality of roadside terminals and the wireless communication state is not stable. That is, the peripheral roadside device 110 has verified the authentication data and created the encrypted common key data, but the in-vehicle terminal 120 is again out of the communication range of the peripheral roadside device 110 and is within its own communication range. This is the case.
- the authentication data from the in-vehicle terminal 120 and the encrypted common key data is not received from the other roadside device 110, the authentication data from the in-vehicle terminal 120 or the other roadside device 110 is received until a certain time elapses. Wait for reception of encrypted common key data.
- step 1080 If a verification failure notification is received from another roadside device 110, or if nothing is received even after a predetermined time has elapsed, the in-vehicle terminal identification information and the random number are deleted in step 1080, and the key sharing process is terminated.
- step 1010 When the common key acquisition request is not received from the in-vehicle terminal 120 and the in-vehicle terminal identification information and the random number are acquired from the other roadside device 110, the random number is not generated in step 1000, but the processing after step 1010 is This is the same as the roadside device 110 that has received the common key acquisition request.
- FIG. 11 shows processing when a vehicle-mounted terminal whose certificate has been revoked is detected when communication is performed between the vehicle-mounted terminals 120A and 120B.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120A transmits a message to another in-vehicle terminal 120B
- a message and a signature for the message are created in step 1100, and the in-vehicle terminal certificate 301 is transmitted together with the message and the signature.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120B that has received the message verifies the in-vehicle terminal certificate in step 1110 and detects that the certificate has been revoked.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120B creates a revoked certificate detection message. Notify the certificate authority.
- the revocation certificate detection message will be described later.
- the certificate authority 100 receives the revoked certificate detection message, the certificate authority 100 creates a black list in step 1130 and distributes it to the roadside device 110 around the location where the revoked certificate is detected.
- the in-vehicle terminal 120B that first detects the revoked certificate takes time to verify the certificate, but the other in-vehicle terminal 120 and the roadside device 110 receive the blacklist from the certificate authority 100 in real time. By doing so, the certificate verification time can be shortened.
- a revoked certificate detection message is generated and notified to the certificate authority 100 in the same manner as when the in-vehicle terminal 120 detects a revoked certificate.
- the certificate authority 100 can also notify the police.
- FIG. 12 shows a format example of a revocation certificate detection message.
- the revocation certificate detection message includes a type 1200, a detection location 1210, a detection time 1220, the number of detected revocation certificates 1230, a revocation certificate list 1240, common key identification information 1250, and a MAC 1260.
- Type 1200 is an identifier indicating a revocation certificate detection message.
- a detection location 1210 indicates a range of locations where a revoked certificate is detected.
- the detection time 1220 indicates the time when a revoked certificate is detected.
- the number of revoked certificates 1230 indicates the number of revoked certificates described in the revoked certificate list 1240.
- the revoked certificate list 1240 is a list of information relating to revoked certificates, and the revoked certificate list 1240 is a list of revoked certificate serial numbers 1241 and in-vehicle terminal identification information 1242.
- the common key identification information 1250 is an identifier of the common key used for generating the MAC of the revocation certificate detection message, and the MAC 770 is an authentication code for information from the type 1210 to the common key identification information 1250.
- FIG. 13 shows a flowchart of a message verification process in the roadside device 110 and the in-vehicle terminal 120.
- the roadside device 110 or the in-vehicle terminal 120 receives the signed message and the certificate, in step 1300, the roadside device 110 or the in-vehicle terminal 120 checks whether the serial number of the certificate exists in the black list. When it exists, it progresses to step 1310, discards a message, and complete
- step 1310 the process is terminated as success, and if the verification is unsuccessful, the message is discarded in step 1310 and the process is terminated. If the serial number of the certificate does not exist in the white list in step 1320, the process proceeds to step 1330, where the certificate is verified. If the verification is successful, the process proceeds to step 1340. If the verification fails, the message is discarded in step 1310, and the process is terminated. If the certificate verification has failed because the certificate has been revoked in step 1330, a revocation certificate detection message is created and notified to the certificate authority 100.
- the certificate authority 100 when it is detected that the certificate has been revoked, the certificate authority 100 is notified in real time and a blacklist is created. However, it is also applicable to creating a whitelist. In this way, by omitting the certificate verification of the in-vehicle terminals existing in the white list and the black list, the message verification time can be shortened.
- the white list and black list have valid locations and valid times. Therefore, the in-vehicle terminal 120 checks the whitelist and blacklist valid locations 720 and valid times 730 that are regularly held, and if they exist outside the valid locations or have passed the valid times, the whitelist / The black list processing unit 122 deletes the white list and the black list. In the roadside device 110, as with the in-vehicle terminal 120, the whitelist / blacklist processing unit 112 can delete the whitelist and blacklist. However, since the roadside device 110 is fixed to the roadside, the confirmation of the effective location 720 may be omitted. As described above, since the white list and the black list are created every time for each place, the amount of used memory can be reduced by periodically checking the white list and the black list and deleting those that are not valid.
- the present invention can be widely applied to communication technology that guarantees the validity of a message using a public key cryptosystem when communicating between roads and vehicles or between vehicles.
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Abstract
Description
先ず、本願において開示される発明の代表的な実施の形態について概要を説明する。代表的な実施の形態についての概要説明で括弧を付して参照する図面中の参照符号はそれが付された構成要素の概念に含まれるものを例示するに過ぎない。
実施の形態について更に詳述する。
100 認証局
110 路側装置
120 車載端末
130 位置情報収集/分析サーバ
140 CRLサーバ
200 ルート認証局
210 中間認証局
220 下位認証局
Claims (10)
- 認証を行う認証局、路側に配置された路側装置、自動車に搭載された車載端末、上記車載端末の位置情報を収集する第1サーバ、証明書が失効した路側装置及び車載端末の情報管理を行う第2サーバを含み、上記路側装置と上記車載端末との間、または上記車載端末間で情報の送受信を行う通信システムであって、
上記車載端末は、自身の位置情報を上記第1サーバに送信し、
上記認証局は、場所と時間に応じた出現可能性の高い車載端末の情報を上記第1サーバから取得し、上記第1サーバから取得した車載端末の証明書が失効されていないかを第2サーバで確認し、上記確認結果をもとに場所ごと時間ごとに証明書が有効な車載端末の第1リスト及び証明書が失効している車載端末の第2リストを作成して、それを上記路側装置及び上記車載端末装置に送信し、
上記路側装置及び車載端末装置は、受信した第1リスト及び第2リストを用いて、証明書の検証を行うことを特徴とする通信システム。 - 上記路側装置及び上記車載端末は、メッセージを受信した際に、メッセージ送信者が上記第2リストに存在する場合は、証明書の検証を省略してメッセージを破棄し、メッセージ送信者が上記第1リストに存在する際は、証明書の検証を省略して署名の検証を行う請求項1記載の通信システム。
- 上記路側装置は、上記車載端末が上記第1リスト及び上記第2リストの正当性を検証するために必要な共通鍵を上記路側装置から取得する際に、上記車載端末及びその周辺の上記路側装置に認証及び鍵共有に必要な情報を送信する請求項2記載の通信システム。
- 上記路側装置及び上記車載端末は、上記第1リスト及び上記第2リストの有効場所と有効時間を確認し、自身が有効場所外に存在する場合または有効時間を経過している場合に、上記第1リスト及び上記第2リストを削除する請求項3記載の通信システム。
- 車車間又は路車間通信を行っている際に、上記路側装置又は上記車載端末が、失効されている証明書を検知すると、上記情報を認証局にリアルタイムに通知し、認証局が上記第2リストを作成し、検知場所付近の路側装置及び車載端末に上記第2リストを送信する請求項4記載の通信システム。
- 路側装置又は他の車載端末との間で情報の送受信を行う車載端末であって、
場所ごと時間ごとに証明書が有効な車載端末の第1リスト及び証明書が失効している車載端末の第2リストが記憶された記憶部と、
メッセージを受信した際に、メッセージ送信者が上記第2リストに存在する場合は、証明書の検証を省略してメッセージを破棄し、メッセージ送信者が上記第1リストに存在する際は、証明書の検証を省略して署名の検証を行う署名生成/検証処理部と、を含むことを特徴とする車載端末。 - 上記第1リスト及び上記第2リストの有効場所と有効時間を確認し、自身が有効場所外に存在する場合または有効時間を経過している場合に、上記第1リスト及び上記第2リストを削除する処理部を含む請求項6記載の車載端末。
- 車載端末との間で情報の送受信を行う路側装置であって、
場所ごと時間ごとに証明書が有効な車載端末の第1リスト及び証明書が失効している車載端末の第2リストが記憶された記憶部と、
車載端末からメッセージを受信した際に、メッセージ送信者が上記第2リストに存在する場合は、証明書の検証を省略してメッセージを破棄し、メッセージ送信者が上記第1リストに存在する際は、証明書の検証を省略して署名の検証を行う署名生成/検証処理部と、を含むことを特徴とする路側装置。 - 上記車載端末が上記第1リスト及び上記第2リストの正当性を検証するために必要な共通鍵を上記路側装置から取得する際に、上記車載端末及びその周辺の上記路側装置に認証及び鍵共有に必要な情報を送信する通信制御処理部を含む請求項8記載の路側装置。
- 上記第1リスト及び上記第2リストの有効時間を確認し、有効時間を経過している場合に、上記第1リスト及び上記第2リストを削除する処理部を含む請求項9記載の路側装置。
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US13/698,359 US8819418B2 (en) | 2010-05-24 | 2011-04-21 | Communication system, vehicle-mounted terminal, roadside device |
CN201180025801.8A CN102907039B (zh) | 2010-05-24 | 2011-04-21 | 通信***、车载终端、路侧装置 |
JP2012517200A JP5261614B2 (ja) | 2010-05-24 | 2011-04-21 | 通信システム、車載端末、路側装置 |
US14/310,423 US9135820B2 (en) | 2010-05-24 | 2014-06-20 | Communication system, vehicle-mounted terminal, roadside device |
US14/829,131 US9601016B2 (en) | 2010-05-24 | 2015-08-18 | Communication system, vehicle-mounted terminal, roadside device |
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US14/310,423 Continuation US9135820B2 (en) | 2010-05-24 | 2014-06-20 | Communication system, vehicle-mounted terminal, roadside device |
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JPWO2011148744A1 (ja) | 2013-07-25 |
JP5261614B2 (ja) | 2013-08-14 |
CN102907039B (zh) | 2016-03-16 |
EP2579498A1 (en) | 2013-04-10 |
US8819418B2 (en) | 2014-08-26 |
US9135820B2 (en) | 2015-09-15 |
US9601016B2 (en) | 2017-03-21 |
CN102907039A (zh) | 2013-01-30 |
EP2579498A4 (en) | 2017-05-03 |
US20130067220A1 (en) | 2013-03-14 |
US20150358170A1 (en) | 2015-12-10 |
US20140303881A1 (en) | 2014-10-09 |
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