WO2011137782A1 - 无线局域网中密钥的发送方法、装置及*** - Google Patents
无线局域网中密钥的发送方法、装置及*** Download PDFInfo
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- WO2011137782A1 WO2011137782A1 PCT/CN2011/074199 CN2011074199W WO2011137782A1 WO 2011137782 A1 WO2011137782 A1 WO 2011137782A1 CN 2011074199 W CN2011074199 W CN 2011074199W WO 2011137782 A1 WO2011137782 A1 WO 2011137782A1
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- Prior art keywords
- message
- wlan
- wlan station
- address
- key
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
- H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
- H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a method, device, and system for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network. Background technique
- WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
- the network structure based on the WLAN technology usually includes a network device such as a WLAN station, an access point (AP), and an AC (Access Control).
- the role of the AP is to connect the WLAN site to the existing wired network.
- the AC can manage the AP through the control channel of the CAP P (Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Point).
- the ACs used in the WLAN can be divided into two types: one is the BRAS (Broadband Remote Access Server), which is separated from the AC, and the BRAS device implements the access of the WLAN station.
- BRAS Broadband Remote Access Server
- Authentication function AC implements AP management functions.
- the BRAS device integrates AC.
- the AC is integrated into the BRAS device as a function module.
- the BRAS device implements the access authentication function and AP management function of the WLAN site at the same time.
- the AP establishes a CAPWAP link with the BRAS device (including the CAPWAP data channel and the CAPWAP control channel).
- the WLAN station sends the association request information to the AP, and the AP receives the association of the WLAN site.
- a request is sent to the BRAS device to determine if the WLAN site is allowed to associate with the AP.
- the BRAS device determines that if the WLAN station is allowed to associate with the AP, the result is sent to the AP, and the AP sends an association response frame to the WLAN station to allow the WLAN station to associate with the AP.
- the WLAN station associated AP has succeeded, this only means that the WLAN station obtains the license for the wireless link between it and the AP.
- the WLAN site also needs to initiate an authentication request to the BRAS device, and the BRAS device forwards the authentication request of the WLAN site to the AAA (Authentication Authorization Account, Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) server.
- the BRAS device After obtaining the AAA server authorization, the BRAS device sends an authentication response to the WLAN site to notify the WL AN site that the authentication is successful and allows access to the Internet.
- AAA Authentication Authorization Account, Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
- the WLAN site can use three types of access authentication methods: EAP-SIM (Extensible Authentication Protocol Method For Mobile Communications Subscriber Identity Modules), EAP-AKA (European Mobile Communication System User Consistency Module Scalable Authentication Protocol) The Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement, the third generation mobile communication network (3G) authentication and key agreement mechanism scalable authentication protocol) is one of the authentication methods.
- EAP-SIM/EAP-AKA authentication scenario the wireless link transmission data between the LAN site and the AP is encrypted using the WPA2 (Wi-Fi Protected Access) standard. After the WLAN site is authenticated, the AAA server will be down. Send the master key PMK of the WLAN site to the BRAS device.
- the BRAS device After the BRAS device obtains the master key PMK of the WLAN site, if the BRAS device integrates the AC, that is, when the AC is integrated as a function module in the BRAS device, the BRAS device can notify the AC module of the BRAS device by using an internal communication mechanism.
- the temporary key PTK is negotiated with the WLAN station by initiating a "four-way handshake" with the master key PMK, and the wireless link between the subsequent WLAN station and the AP uses the temporary key PTK to encrypt the data.
- the BRAS device In the application scenario where the BRAS device is separated from the AC, after the BRAS device obtains the master key PMK of the WLAN site from the AAA server, since the BRAS device and the AC are not the same device, the BRAS device cannot use the internal communication mechanism to notify the AC.
- the master key PMK of the WLAN site makes it impossible for the AC to know when to make a "four-way handshake" with the WLAN site to negotiate the temporary key PTK.
- An embodiment of the present invention provides a method and an apparatus for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network.
- the BRAS device can send a master key of the designated WLAN station to the AC, and trigger the AC and the AC.
- the WLAN site negotiates a temporary key.
- a method for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network includes:
- the first CAPWAP message carries an Internet Protocol IP address of the access point AP, an IP address of the AC, and a wireless local area network Media access control MAC address of the WLAN site;
- the IP address of the AC associated with the WLAN station is searched in the site information table
- the secondary handshake negotiates a temporary key, and the third CAPWAP message carries a master key of the WLAN station, a four-way handshake trigger bit, and a MAC address of the WLAN station.
- a device for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network includes:
- the first receiving unit 11 is configured to receive the control and configuration CAPWAP message of the first wireless access point sent by the access controller AC, where the first CAPWAP message carries the Internet protocol IP address of the access point AP, The IP address of the AC, the media access control MAC address of the WLAN site of the wireless local area network;
- the processing unit 12 is configured to obtain an IP address of the AP, an IP address of the AC, and a MAC address of the WL AN site from the first CAP P message, and save the information to the site information table.
- the first sending unit 13 is configured to send a second CAPWAP message to the AC, to trigger the AC to send association success information to the WLAN station, where the second CAP P message carries a MAC address of the WLAN station;
- the second receiving unit 14 is configured to receive an authentication request packet of the WL AN station forwarded by the AC, and initiate authentication to an authentication, authorization, and accounting AAA server;
- the searching unit 15 is further configured to: when receiving the primary key of the WLAN station delivered by the AAA server, look up an IP address of an AC associated with the WLAN station in the site information table;
- the second sending unit 16 is configured to send a third CAPWAP message to the AC, to instruct the AC to perform a four-way handshake negotiation temporary key with the WLAN station, where the third CAP P message carries the WLAN station The master key, the four-way handshake trigger bit, and the MAC address of the WLAN station.
- the method and device for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network can use the received first CAP P message from the AC to obtain an IP address of the access point AP, an IP address of the AC, and a WLAN station.
- the MAC address is saved to the site information table. After the WLAN site is successfully associated with the AP and authenticated by the AAA server, the method provided by the embodiment of the present invention receives the AAA server.
- the master key of the WLAN station that is delivered, the IP address of the AC associated with the WLAN station is found from the site information table, and the master key carrying the WLAN station is sent to the AC,
- the BRAS device in the embodiment of the present invention may send the master key of the WLAN station to the AC, and trigger the AC to negotiate with the WLAN site for temporary confidentiality.
- the key can ensure that the site in the WLAN network can still use the WAP2 standard to implement wireless link data encryption with the AP after the authentication is passed, which fully guarantees the security and reliability of the WLAN network. .
- FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 1 is a flowchart of another method for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for negotiating a temporary key by using a master key according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 6 is a structural diagram of another apparatus for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of another method for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a
- FIG. 7 is a structural diagram of another apparatus for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network according to an embodiment of the present invention. Another structural diagram of a transmitting device for a key in a wireless local area network;
- FIG. 8 is a structural diagram of a device for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network according to an embodiment of the present invention;
- FIG. 9 is a structural diagram of a device for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network according to an embodiment of the present invention;
- FIG. 10 is a structural diagram of still another apparatus for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description
- FIG. 1 provides a method for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network.
- the BRAS device and the AC are separated from each other, the BRAS device implements the WLAN site access authentication function, and the AC implements the AP management.
- the method is described in detail below from the BRAS device side, and specifically includes:
- the BRAS device receives a first C AP P message sent by the access controller AC, where the first CAPWAP message carries an IP address of the access point AP, an IP address of the AC, and a MAC address of the WLAN station.
- the BRAS device extracts an IP address of the access point AP, an IP address of the AC, and a MAC address of the WLAN station from the first CAPWAP message, and saves the extracted information as WLAN site information to the site information table. in.
- the WLAN station when the WLAN station requests the associated AP, the WLAN station sends the association request information to the AC, and after receiving the association request information, the AC extracts the IP address and the location of the AP from the association request information.
- the IP address of the AC, the MAC address of the WLAN station, and the extracted information is sent to the BRAS device through the first CAP P message.
- the BRAS device will set the IP address of the access point AP, Information such as the IP address of the AC, the MAC address of the WLAN site, and the like are stored in the site information table.
- the site information table is mainly used to find an AP and an AC associated with a certain site. For example, when the BRAS device needs to notify the AC of a processing message of a certain site, the site information table can be searched for the IP address of the AC of the site.
- the first CAP P message may be a new message obtained by extending the CAP P protocol message, where the first CAPWAP message carries an IP address of the AP, an IP address of the AC, and a MAC address of the WLAN station.
- the 802.11 frame is used for data transmission between the WLAN station and the AP, and the AP converts the 802.11 frame of the WLAN station into an AC recognizable frame format, and then sends the converted data through the CAPWAP data channel. Frame to AC.
- an 802.11 frame of a WLAN site is converted to an 802.3 frame and sent to the AC.
- the BRAS device sends a second CAPWAP message carrying the MAC address of the WLAN station to the AC, to trigger the AC to send association success information to the WLAN station.
- the BRAS device After the BRAS device receives the first CAPWAP message sent by the AC, and extracts and saves the IP address of the AP carried in the first CAPWAP message, the IP address of the AC, and the MAC address of the WLAN station, the BRAS device sends the The AC sends a second CAPWAP message carrying the MAC address of the WLAN station. After receiving the second CAPWAP message, the AC sends the association success information to the WLAN station, and informs the WLAN station to allow the WLAN station to The AP is associated. The WLAN station is successfully associated with the AP.
- the second CAPWAP message may be a new message obtained by extending the CAPWAP protocol message, where the message carries the MAC address of the WLAN station.
- the AC does not receive the second CAPWAP message within a preset time, for example, the AC does not receive the second CAPWAP message within 10 minutes after sending the first CAPWAP message
- the AC The first CAPWAP message in 101 is resent to the BRAS device, and if the AC resends the first CAPWAP message for a specified number of times, it is still not received.
- the second CAPWAP message sent by the BRAS device for example, after the AC resends the first CAPWAP message three times, and still does not receive the second CAP P message sent by the BRAS device, the AC returns the association failure information. Give the WLAN site.
- the BRAS device receives the authentication request packet of the WL AN station forwarded from the AC, and initiates authentication to the authentication, authorization, and accounting AAA server.
- the WLAN station After the WLAN station successfully associates with the AP, the WLAN station initiates an authentication request.
- the BRAS device receives the authentication request from the WLAN site forwarded by the AC, and initiates authentication to the AAA server.
- the BRAS device receives the master key of the WLAN station delivered by the AAA server.
- the RADIUS Remote Authentication
- the WLAN station initiates EAP-S IM/EAP-AKA authentication to the BRAS device, and after the standard protocol interaction process of the EAP-S IM/EAP-AKA, the AAA server allows the WLAN site authentication. Pass and send the master key PMK to the BRAS device through the RADIUS protocol.
- the BRAS device searches for the IP address of the AC associated with the WLAN station from the site information table, and sends a third CAPWAP message to the AC to instruct the AC to perform four handshakes with the WLAN station.
- a third CAPWAP message to the AC to instruct the AC to perform four handshakes with the WLAN station.
- the third CAPWAP message carries the master key of the WLAN station, the four-way handshake trigger bit, and the MAC address of the WLAN station.
- the BRAS device searches the site information table for the IP address of the AC associated with the WLAN station, and notifies the master key PMK and the four-way handshake trigger bit of the WLAN station by using a third CAPWAP message.
- the AC associated with the WLAN site can be The new message obtained by the CAP P protocol packet is extended, and the message carries the master key of the WLAN station, the four-way handshake trigger bit, and the MAC address of the WLAN station.
- the BRAS device can use the received first CAP P message from the AC, and can set the IP address of the access point AP, The IP address of the AC and the MAC address of the WLAN station are saved in the site information table. After the WLAN station is successfully associated with the AP and authenticated by the AAA server, the BRAS device receives the master key of the WLAN site delivered by the AAA server, and finds the WLAN from the site information table.
- An IP address of the AC associated with the site and sending, to the AC, a third CAP P message carrying the master key of the WLAN station, the four-way handshake trigger bit, and the MAC address of the WLAN station, indicating the AC Performing a four-way handshake with the WLAN site to negotiate a temporary key.
- the BRAS device may send the master key of the WLAN station to the AC, and trigger the AC to negotiate with the WLAN site for temporary confidentiality. key. Therefore, it can be ensured that the sites in the WLAN network can still use the WAP2 standard to implement wireless link data encryption with the AP after the authentication is passed, thereby fully ensuring the security and reliability of the WLAN network.
- the first CAP P message/the second CAPWAP message/the third CAP P message may further carry the virtual local area network identifier VLAN ID of the WLAN station.
- the VL AN ID of the WLAN station carried in the first CAPWAP message is also saved in the station information table.
- AC Hel per can be configured on the AC
- the AC Helper can be a BRAS device.
- the BRAS device runs the CAP P protocol.
- the AC actively requests the BRAS device to establish a CAPWAP chain according to the IP address of the locally configured BRAS device. Road.
- the method further includes:
- the CAPWAP protocol run by the BRAS device does not have the function of controlling and managing the AP. Therefore, it is only necessary to establish a data with DTLS (DTLS). 4 ⁇ Transport Layer Security Protocol) cryptographic function and CAP P control channel of KEEPALIVE mechanism ( keep-alive mechanism), no need to establish CAP P data channel.
- the method further includes:
- the BRAS device receives the fourth CAP P message sent by the AC, to confirm that the AC has received the third CAPWAP message, where the fourth CAPWAP message carries the MAC address of the WLAN station.
- the fourth CAPWAP message may be a new message obtained by extending the CAPWAP protocol message, where the message carries the MAC address of the WLAN station. If the BRAS device does not receive the fourth CAPWAP message within the specified time, for example, the BRAS device does not receive the fourth CAPWAP message within 10 minutes after sending the third CAP P message, The BRAS device will resend the third CAP P message to the AC. If the third CAPWAP message is resent to the AC, for example, the BRAS device resends the third CAPWAP message to the AC three times, and still does not receive the fourth CAPWAP message.
- the BRAS device deletes the information of the WLAN station from the site information table, and detects whether the CAPWAP control channel between the BRAS device and the AC is in a connected state.
- the CAPWAP control channel may be detected according to the KEEPAL I VE message.
- the connected state is still in the disconnected state.
- the seventh C AP P message is sent to the AC to notify the AC that the WL AN site information has been deleted.
- the seventh CAP P message may be an extension.
- a new message obtained by the CAPWAP protocol packet carries the WLAN site MAC address.
- the AC After receiving the seventh CAPWAP message, the AC obtains an IP address of the AP associated with the WLAN station from the locally stored site information table according to the MAC address of the WLAN station, and notifies the AP to disassociate the WLAN site, and The WLAN site is removed from the locally stored site information table.
- the AC can also detect the current state of the CAPWAP control channel.
- the BRAS device confirms that the CAPWAP control channel is in the disconnected state, the BRAS device cannot send the seventh CAPWAP message to the AC.
- the AC obtains the IP addresses of all the WLAN stations corresponding to the BRAS device and the APs associated with the WLAN station from the locally stored site information table, and notifies all the WLANs.
- the respective APs of the site are respectively disassociated from their associated WLAN sites, and all the WLAN sites are deleted from the locally stored site information table.
- the AC may obtain a master key of the WLAN station from a third CAPWAP message, and perform a four-way handshake negotiation with the WLAN station to obtain a temporary secret of the WLAN station. Key PTK. Then, the AC notifies the AP of the temporary key PTK, and the WLAN station and the AP both use the temporary key PTK to encrypt and decrypt the wireless data. Specifically, after the AC receives the third CAPWAP message, the AC obtains the master key of the WLAN station and triggers a "four-way handshake" to negotiate a temporary key PTK with the WLAN station, as shown in FIG.
- the AC sends the first EAPoL-KEY packet (the KEY of the Extensible Authentication Protocol over Local Area Network) to the WLAN station, and the first EAPoL-KEY packet carries the EA packet.
- the MAC address of the AC and the first AC-NONCE Access Control NONCE, NONCE random value of the AC device).
- the WLAN station After receiving the first EAPoL-KEY packet, the WLAN station uses the MAC address of the AC and the first AC-N0NCE, the MAC address of the WLAN station, and the STA-receiving CE (STATION NONCE, NONCE of the station) The random value), and the locally stored master key PMK, calculate the first temporary key PTK.
- the calculated first temporary key ⁇ may be 64 bytes.
- a specific 16 bytes in the first temporary key ⁇ may be used as the first message complete code, and another specific 16 bytes are used as the Wireless data encryption key for WLAN sites and ports.
- the WLAN station returns a second EAPoL-KEY packet to the AC, where the packet carries the MAC address of the WLAN station, the STA-N0NCE, and the first message complete code.
- the AC receives the second EAPoL-KEY packet, uses the MAC address of the WLAN station in the packet, and STA-N0NCE, and uses the MAC address of the AC and the first AC_N0CE, and the third CAPWAP.
- the master key PMK of the WLAN site acquired in the message calculates the second temporary key PTK.
- the second temporary key ⁇ can also be 64 bytes.
- the foregoing AC device may also take a specific 16 bytes from the second temporary key PTK as a second message complete code, and compare the second message complete code with the first message complete code, if the two are consistent, The AC verifies that the WLAN site does know the master key PMK.
- the AC regenerates the second AC-N0CE, and uses the MAC address of the AC and the newly generated second AC-N0CE, the MAC address of the WLAN station, and the STA-N0NCE, and the main WLAN station.
- the key PMK calculates the third temporary key PTK.
- the third temporary key can also be 64 bytes, optionally, a specific 16 bytes can also be retrieved from the third temporary key PTK as a third message complete code, and another specific 16 bytes are ready to install and use the data encryption key.
- the AC device returns a third EAPoL-KEY packet to the WLAN station, where the packet carries the MAC address of the AC and the newly generated second AC_N0NCE, the newly generated third message complete code, and the data to be installed and used for encryption. key.
- the WL AN station receives the third EAPoL-KEY packet, and also verifies the message complete code of the packet, and after verifying that the AC has known the master key PMK, the WLAN station returns the fourth EAPoL-KEY packet. , notify the AC that the master key has been verified, the data encryption key is ready to be installed and used, and the handshake process ends.
- the AC uses the CAPWAP protocol packet to deliver the temporary key PTK to the AP, and the CAPWAP protocol packet is encrypted and transmitted using DTLS.
- the BRAS device stores the WLAN site information in the website after the site information table, and may also set a life cycle for each site information stored in the site information table, if the life cycle of the WLAN site information expires,
- the BRAS device extracts the IP address of the AC associated with the WLAN station from the site information table, and sends a fifth CAP P message to the AC through the CAP P control channel to notify the AC that the life cycle of the WL AN site has arrived.
- the fifth C AP P message may be a new message obtained by extending the C AP P protocol message, and carries the MAC address of the WL AN station.
- the AC After receiving the fifth CAP P message, the AC checks to notify the BRAS device that the WLAN station is online if the WLAN station is still online. Otherwise, the AC does not send any message, and the BRAS device will use the WLAN site information. Delete from the site information table.
- the AC sends a sixth CAPWAP message to the BRAS device to notify the BRAS device that the WLAN station and the AP have been disassociated.
- the sixth CAPWAP message may be an extended CAPWAP protocol.
- the new message obtained by the message carries the MAC address of the WLAN station.
- the BRAS device in the embodiment of the present invention deletes the WLAN site information from the site information table according to the sixth CAPWAP message, and causes the WLAN site to go offline and cannot access the Internet.
- the BRAS device in the embodiment of the present invention actively deletes the WLAN station information from the site information table, and sends a seventh CAPWAP message to the AC associated with the WLAN station, to Notifying the AC that the WL AN station information has been deleted.
- the seventh CAPWAP message may be a new message obtained by extending the CAPWAP protocol message, carrying the WLAN station MAC address.
- the AC obtains an IP address of the AP associated with the WLAN station from the locally stored site information table, and notifies the AP to disassociate the WLAN site, and the WLAN is removed. The site is removed from the locally stored site information table.
- the AC fails to negotiate the temporary key PTK with the WLAN site "four-way handshake"
- the AC will actively send a sixth CAPWAP message to the BRAS device to notify the BRAS device that the AC and the WLAN site temporary key negotiation fails.
- the BRAS device deletes the WLAN site information from the site information table according to the sixth CAPWAP message, and causes the site to go offline and cannot access the Internet.
- the virtual network identifier VL AN ID of the WL AN site may also be carried in the seventh C APWAP message.
- An embodiment of the present invention provides a device for transmitting a key in a wireless local area network, as shown in FIG. 5, including:
- the first receiving unit 11 is configured to receive the control and configuration CAPWAP message of the first wireless access point sent by the access controller AC, where the first CAPWAP message carries the Internet Protocol IP address of the access point AP, IP address of the AC, media access control MAC address of the WLAN site of the wireless local area network;
- the processing unit 12 is configured to obtain an IP address of the AP, an IP address of the AC, and a MAC address of the WL AN site from the first CAP P message, and save the information to the site information table.
- the first sending unit 13 is configured to send a second CAP P message to the AC, to trigger the AC to send association success information to the WLAN station, where the second CAP P message carries a MAC address of the WLAN station;
- the second receiving unit 14 is configured to receive an authentication request packet of the WL AN station forwarded by the AC, and initiate authentication to an authentication, authorization, and accounting AAA server;
- the searching unit 15 is configured to: when receiving the master key of the WLAN station delivered by the AAA server, look up an IP address of an AC associated with the WLAN station in the site information table;
- the second sending unit 16 is configured to send a third CAPWAP message to the AC, to instruct the AC to perform a four-way handshake negotiation temporary key with the WLAN station, where the third CAP P message carries the WLAN station The master key, the four-way handshake trigger bit, and the MAC address of the WLAN station.
- the apparatus may further include: a link establishing unit 17 configured to receive a CAP P link request sent by the AC, and establish a CAP P control channel with the AC.
- a link establishing unit 17 configured to receive a CAP P link request sent by the AC, and establish a CAP P control channel with the AC.
- the device may further include:
- the third receiving unit 18 is configured to receive a fourth C AP P message that is sent by the AC and that carries the MAC address of the WLAN station, to confirm that the AC has received the third C AP P message.
- a life cycle may be set for each site information that is saved in the site information table.
- the device further includes:
- the third sending unit 19 is configured to: when the life cycle of the WLAN station information expires, send a fifth CAP P message carrying the MAC address of the WLAN station to the AC associated with the pointing site, to notify The life cycle of the WL AN site of the AC has arrived.
- the apparatus may further include: a fourth receiving unit 20 and a deleting unit 21.
- the fourth receiving unit 20 is configured to receive the carrying of the AC after the WLAN station and the AP are disassociated, or when the AC and the WLAN station "four-way handshake" negotiate the temporary key PTK.
- the deleting unit 21 is also triggered to delete the WLAN station information from the site information table.
- the device further includes: a fourth sending unit twenty two.
- the fourth sending unit 22 is configured to send a seventh CAPWAP message to the AC associated with the WLAN station, to notify the AC that the WL AN site information has been deleted, and the seventh C APWAP message carries the WLAN site MAC address.
- the sending device of the key in the wireless local area network may be a BRAS device, and the WLAN station may be a mobile terminal.
- first CAP P message / second CAP P message / third CAP P message / fourth CAP P message / fifth CAP P message / sixth CAP P message / seventh CAP P message The VLAN ID of the WLAN station carried in the first CAPWAP message is also saved in the first CAPWAP message.
- the BRAS device may send the master key of the WLAN station to the AC, and trigger the AC to negotiate with the WLAN site for temporary confidentiality. key. Therefore, it can be ensured that the sites in the WLAN network can still use the WAP2 standard to implement wireless link data encryption with the AP after the authentication is passed, thereby fully ensuring the security and reliability of the WLAN network.
- the foregoing program can be stored in a computer readable storage medium, and the program is executed when executed.
- the foregoing storage medium includes: ROM, RAM, magnetic disk or optical disk, and the like, which can store various program codes.
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Description
无线局域网中密钥的发送方法、 装置及*** 本申请要求于 2010年 9月 19日提交中国专利局、 申请号为 201010286269.2 发明名称为 "无线局域网中密钥的发送方法及装置" 的中国专利申请的优先 权, 其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本发明涉及通信技术领域, 尤其涉及一种无线局域网中密钥的发送方法、 装置及***。 背景技术
WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network, 无线局域网)是以无线信道作为传 输媒介的计算机局域网, 是有线联网方式的重要补充和延伸。 基于 WLAN技术的 网络结构中通常包括 WLAN站点、 AP( Access Point,接入点)、AC( Access Control, 接入控制器)等网络设备。 其中, AP的作用是将 WLAN站点与现有的有线网络连 接起来, 而 AC通过 CAP P ( Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Point, 无线接入点的控制和配置)控制通道可以实现对 AP的管理。
目前, 根据实现功能的不同, WLAN中釆用的 AC可以分为两种类型: 一种是 BRAS (Broadband Remote Access Server, 宽带远程接入服务器) 与 AC分离, 由 BRAS设备实现 WLAN站点的接入认证功能, AC实现 AP管理功能。 另一种是 BRAS设备集成 AC, 此时 AC作为一个功能模块集成到 BRAS设备中, BRAS设备同 时实现 WLAN站点的接入认证功能和 AP管理功能。
下面以 BRAS集成 AC为例, 对 WLAN站点的接入认证的实现过程进行介绍。 首先, AP与 BRAS设备建立 CAPWAP链路 (包括 CAPWAP数据通道和 CAPWAP 控制通道)。 WLAN站点向 AP发送关联请求信息, AP接收到 WLAN站点的关联请
求信息后,向 BRAS设备发送请求,以确定是否允许此 WLAN站点关联该 AP。 BRAS 设备经过判断如果允许该 WLAN站点与该 AP进行关联, 则将结果下发给 AP, AP 向 WLAN站点发送关联响应帧, 允许 WLAN站点关联 AP。 此时, 虽然 WLAN站点关 联 AP已经成功, 但这只意味着 WLAN站点取得其与 AP之间的无线链路的使用许 可。 之后, WLAN 站点还需要向 BRAS 设备发起认证请求, BRAS 设备向 AAA ( Authentication Authorization Account, 认证、 授权、 计费)月良务器转发 该 WLAN站点的认证请求。 获得 AAA服务器授权后, BRAS设备向 WLAN站点发送 认证响应 , 以通知该 WL AN站点认证成功 , 允许其访问互联网络。
现有技术中, WLAN站点可以釆用三种接入认证方式, EAP-SIM (Extensible Authentication Protocol Method For Mobile Communications Subscriber Identity Modules, 全球移动通信***用户一致模块的可扩展鉴定协议) /EAP-AKA (Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement, 第三代移动通讯网络(3G)的认证和密钥 协商机制的可扩展鉴定协议)是其中一种认证方式。 在 EAP-SIM/EAP-AKA认证 场景中, LAN站点和 AP之间的无线链路传输数据会釆用 WPA2( Wi-Fi Protected Access )标准进行加密, 在 WLAN站点认证通过后, AAA服务器都会下发该 WLAN 站点的主密钥 PMK给 BRAS设备。
BRAS设备获得 WLAN站点的主密钥 PMK之后, 如果 BRAS设备集成了 AC, 也 即当 AC作为一个功能模块集成在 BRAS设备中时, 该 BRAS设备可以釆用内部通 信机制通知 BRAS设备的 AC模块, 直接釆用主密钥 PMK与该 WLAN站点发起 "四 次握手"协商临时密钥 PTK,后续 WLAN站点与 AP之间的无线链路釆用临时密钥 PTK加密数据。
然而, 在 BRAS设备与 AC分离的应用场景中, BRAS设备从 AAA服务器获得 WLAN站点的主密钥 PMK后, 由于 BRAS设备与 AC不是同一台设备, 因而 BRAS设 备无法釆用内部通信机制通知 AC该 WLAN站点的主密钥 PMK, 使得 AC也无法知 道何时与该 WLAN站点进行 "四次握手" 协商临时密钥 PTK。 发明内容
本发明的实施例提供一种无线局域网中密钥的发送方法及装置, 在 BRAS设 备与 AC分离的应用场景中, BRAS设备可以向 AC下发指定 WLAN站点的主密钥, 并触发该 AC与 WLAN站点进行协商临时密钥。 为达到上述目的, 本发明的实施例釆用如下技术方案:
一方面, 一种无线局域网中密钥的发送方法, 包括:
接收接入控制器 AC发送的第一无线接入点的控制和配置 CAPWAP消息, 所 述第一 CAPWAP消息中携带接入点 AP的英特网协议 IP地址、所述 AC的 IP地址、 无线局域网 WLAN站点的媒体接入控制 MAC地址;
从所述第一 CAP P消息中获取所述 AP的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 所 述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址, 并保存到站点信息表中;
向所述 AC发送第二 CAPWAP消息, 以触发所述 AC向所述 WLAN站点发送关 联成功信息, 所述第二 CAPWAP消息携带所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址;
接收从所述 AC转发来的所述 WLAN站点的认证请求报文, 向认证、 授权、 计费 AAA服务器发起认证;
当接收到所述 AAA服务器下发的所述 WLAN站点的主密钥时, 在所述站点信 息表中查找与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC的 IP地址;
向所述 AC发送第三 CAPWAP消息, 以指示所述 AC与所述 WLAN站点进行四
次握手协商临时密钥, 所述第三 CAPWAP消息携带所述 WLAN站点的主密钥、 四 次握手触发比特位、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。
另一方面, 一种无线局域网中密钥的发送装置, 包括:
第一接收单元 11 ,用于接收接入控制器 AC发送的第一无线接入点的控制和 配置 CAPWAP消息, 所述第一 CAPWAP消息中携带接入点 AP的英特网协议 IP地 址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 无线局域网 WLAN站点的媒体接入控制 MAC地址;
处理单元 12 , 用于从所述第一 CAP P消息中获取所述 AP的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 I P地址、 所述 WL AN站点的 MAC地址, 并保存到站点信息表中;
第一发送单元 1 3 , 用于向所述 AC发送第二 CAPWAP消息, 以触发所述 AC向 所述 WLAN站点发送关联成功信息, 所述第二 CAP P消息携带所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址;
第二接收单元 14 , 用于接收从所述 AC转发来的所述 WL AN站点的认证请求 报文, 向认证、 授权、 计费 AAA服务器发起认证;
查找单元 15 ,还用于当接收到所述 AAA服务器下发的所述 WLAN站点的主密 钥时, 在所述站点信息表中查找与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC的 IP地址;
第二发送单元 16 , 用于向所述 AC发送第三 CAPWAP消息, 以指示所述 AC与 所述 WLAN站点进行四次握手协商临时密钥,所述第三 CAP P消息携带所述 WLAN 站点的主密钥、 四次握手触发比特位、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。
本发明实施例提供的无线局域网中密钥的发送方法及装置, 利用接收到的 来自 AC的第一 CAP P消息, 可以将接入点 AP的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 WLAN站点的 MAC地址保存到站点信息表中。 当所述 WLAN站点与所述 AP关联成 功并通过 AAA服务器的认证之后, 本发明实施例提供的方法会接收 AAA服务器
下发的所述 WLAN站点的主密钥, 从所述站点信息表中查找出与所述 WLAN站点 关联的 AC的 IP地址, 并向所述 AC发送携带有所述 WLAN站点的主密钥、 四次 握手触发比特位、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址的第三 C AP P消息, 指示所述 AC 与所述 WLAN站点进行四次握手协商临时密钥。
在 BRAS设备与 AC分离的应用场景中, 与现有技术相比, 本发明实施例中 BRAS设备可以向 AC发送所述 WLAN站点的主密钥, 触发该 AC与所述 WLAN站点 进行协商临时密钥, 从而可以保证 WLAN网络中的站点在认证通过后, 仍然可以 釆用 WAP2标准实现与 AP之间的无线链路数据加密, 充分保证 WLAN网络的安全 性和可靠性。。 附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例或现有技术中的技术方案, 下面将对实施 例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍, 显而易见地, 下面描述 中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例, 对于本领域普通技术人员来讲, 在不付 出创造性劳动的前提下, 还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图 1为本发明实施例中提供的一种无线局域网中密钥的发送方法的流程图; 图 1为本发明实施例中提供的另一种无线局域网中密钥的发送方法流程图; 图 3为本发明实施例中提供的又一种无线局域网中密钥的发送方法流程图; 图 4为本发明实施例中提供的利用主密钥进行协商临时密钥的流程图; 图 5为本发明实施例中提供的一种无线局域网中密钥的发送装置的结构图; 图 6为本发明实施例中提供的另一种无线局域网中密钥的发送装置结构图; 图 7 为本发明实施例中提供的又一种无线局域网中密钥的发送装置的结构 图;
图 8为本发明实施例中提供的再一种无线局域网中密钥的发送装置结构图; 图 9 为本发明实施例中提供的还又一种无线局域网中密钥的发送装置结构 图;
图 10为本发明实施例中提供的再又一种无线局域网中密钥的发送装置结构 图。 具体实施方式
下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图, 对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清 楚、 完整地描述, 显然, 所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例, 而不是 全部的实施例。 基于本发明中的实施例, 本领域普通技术人员在没有作出创造 性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例, 都属于本发明保护的范围。
如图 1 所示的实施例提供一种无线局域网中密钥的发送方法, 在本发明的 实施例中, BRAS设备与 AC彼此分离,由 BRAS设备实现 WLAN站点接入认证功能, AC实现 AP管理功能。 下面从 BRAS设备一侧详细描述该方法, 具体包括:
100、 BRAS设备接收接入控制器 AC发送的第一 C AP P消息,所述第一 CAPWAP 消息中携带有接入点 AP的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 WLAN站点的 MAC地址;
101、 BRAS设备从上述第一 CAPWAP消息中提取接入点 AP的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 WLAN站点的 MAC地址, 并将所述提取出的信息作为 WLAN站点信 息保存到站点信息表中。
具体地, 当 WLAN站点请求关联 AP时, 所述 WLAN站点向所述 AC发送关联 请求信息, 所述 AC接收到该关联请求信息后,从该关联请求信息中提取所述 AP 的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 WLAN站点的 MAC地址, 并将提取出来的信息通 过第一 CAP P消息发送给 BRAS设备。 所述 BRAS设备将接入点 AP的 IP地址、
所述 AC的 IP地址、 WLAN站点的 MAC地址等信息保存在站点信息表中。 该站点 信息表主要用于查找某个站点关联的 AP和 AC,例如当 BRAS设备需要向 AC通知 某站点的处理消息时, 可以到所述站点信息表中查找该站点的 AC的 IP地址。
例如, 该第一 CAP P消息可以是扩展 CAP P协议报文得到的新消息, 该 第一 CAPWAP消息携带有 AP的 IP地址、 AC的 IP地址、 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。
另夕卜, 所述 WLAN站点与 AP之间釆用 802. 11帧进行数据传输, AP将 WLAN 站点的 802. 11帧转化为 AC可识别的帧格式后, 通过 CAPWAP数据通道发送转化 后的数据帧给 AC。例如,将 WLAN站点的 802. 11帧转化为 802. 3帧后发送给 AC。
102、 BRAS 设备向所述 AC发送携带有所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址的第二 CAPWAP消息, 以触发所述 AC发送关联成功信息给所述 WLAN站点。
具体地, 上述 BRAS设备接收到 AC发送的第一 CAPWAP消息, 将所述第一 CAPWAP消息携带的 AP的 IP地址、 AC的 IP地址、 WLAN站点的 MAC地址进行提 取并保存后, 上述 BRAS设备向所述 AC发送携带有所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址的 第二 CAPWAP消息, 接收到第二 CAPWAP消息后, 所述 AC发送关联成功信息给所 述 WLAN站点, 告知所述 WLAN站点允许其与所述 AP进行关联。 所述 WLAN站点 与所述 AP关联成功。
例如, 该第二 CAPWAP消息可以为扩展 CAPWAP协议报文得到的新消息, 该 消息携带有 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。
另外, 如果所述 AC在预设时间内, 没有接收到上述第二 CAPWAP消息, 例 如所述 AC 在发送上述第一 CAPWAP 消息后的 10 分钟内没有接收到上述第二 CAPWAP消息,那么所述 AC会向所述 BRAS设备重新发送 101中的第一 CAPWAP消 息, 如果 AC重新发送了指定次数的所述第一 CAPWAP消息后, 仍然没有接收到
BRAS 设备下发的上述第二 CAPWAP 消息, 例如: AC 重新发送了三次所述第一 CAPWAP消息后, 仍然没有接收到 BRAS设备下发的上述第二 CAP P消息, 则所 述 AC返回关联失败信息给所述 WLAN站点。
103、 BRAS设备接收从 AC转发来的所述 WL AN站点的认证请求报文, 并向认 证、 授权、 计费 AAA服务器发起认证。
具体地, 当经过 102所述 WLAN站点与所述 AP关联成功之后, 所述 WLAN站 点会发起认证请求。 此时, BRAS设备会接收到从 AC转发来的所述 WLAN站点的 认证请求 ^艮文, 并向 AAA服务器发起认证。
104、 BRAS设备接收 AAA服务器下发的所述 WLAN站点的主密钥。
当 AAA 服务器确认 WLAN 站点认证成功后, 通过 RADIUS ( Remote Authent i ca t ion Dia l-In User Serv i ce ,远程认证拔入用户月良务)十办议通 口 BRAS 设备, 并将所述 WLAN站点的主密钥 PMK下发给 BRAS设备。 一种可能的场景为: 所述 WLAN站点会向 BRAS设备发起 EAP-S IM/EAP-AKA认证,经过 EAP-S IM/EAP-AKA 的标准协议交互过程后, AAA服务器允许所述 WLAN站点认证通过,并通过 RADIUS 协议下发主密钥 PMK给 BRAS设备。
105、 BRAS设备从所述站点信息表中查找出与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC的 IP地址, 并向所述 AC发送第三 CAPWAP消息, 以指示所述 AC与所述 WLAN站点 进行四次握手协商临时密钥; 其中, 该第三 CAPWAP消息携带有所述 WLAN站点 的主密钥、 四次握手触发比特位、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。
具体地, BRAS设备从所述站点信息表中查找出与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC 的 IP地址, 通过第三 CAPWAP消息将所述 WLAN站点的主密钥 PMK和四次握手触 发比特位通知给与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC。 例如, 该第三 CAPWAP消息可以为
扩展 CAP P协议报文得到的新消息, 该消息携带有所述 WLAN站点的主密钥、 四次握手触发比特位、 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。
从本发明实施例提供的无线局域网中密钥的发送方法实现过程可以看出, 所述 BRAS设备利用接收到的来自 AC的第一 CAP P消息, 可以将接入点 AP的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 WLAN站点的 MAC地址保存到站点信息表中。 当所 述 WLAN站点与所述 AP关联成功并通过 AAA服务器的认证之后, BRAS设备会接 收 AAA服务器下发的所述 WLAN站点的主密钥, 从所述站点信息表中查找出与所 述 WLAN站点关联的 AC的 IP地址, 并向所述 AC发送携带有所述 WLAN站点的主 密钥、 四次握手触发比特位、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址的第三 CAP P消息, 指示所述 AC与所述 WLAN站点进行四次握手协商临时密钥。
与现有技术相比,在 BRAS设备与 AC分离的场景中, 本发明实施例中, BRAS 设备可以向 AC发送所述 WLAN站点的主密钥, 触发该 AC与所述 WLAN站点进行 协商临时密钥。 从而可以保证 WLAN网络中的站点在认证通过后, 仍然可以釆用 WAP2标准实现与 AP之间的无线链路数据加密, 充分保证 WLAN网络的安全性和 可靠性。
需要说明的是, 具体应用过程中, 优选的, 在上述第一 CAP P 消息 /第二 CAPWAP消息 /第三 CAP P消息中还可以携带所述 WLAN站点的虚拟局域网标识 VLAN ID, 此时, 在上述 101 中也会在站点信息表中保存所述第一 CAPWAP消息 中携带的所述 WLAN站点的 VL AN I D。
可选的, 在 WLAN网络建立初始时, 可以在 AC上配置 AC Hel per ( AC的帮 助设备 ), 该 AC Helper具体可以为 BRAS设备。 该 BRAS设备运行 CAP P协议。 AC根据本地配置的 BRAS设备的 IP地址, 主动向 BRAS设备请求建立 CAPWAP链
路。 此时, (如图 2所示)在 BRAS设备接收来自接入控制器 AC的第一 CAPWAP 消息之前, 该方法还包括:
106、 接收所述 AC发送的 CAP P链路请求, 并与所述 AC之间建立 CAPWAP 控制通道。
由于 BRAS设备作为 AC He l per只面向 AC , 不面向 AP , 所以 BRAS设备所运 行的 CAPWAP 协议不具有控制和管理 AP 的功能, 因而只需要建立具有 DTLS ( Da tagram Transpor t Layer Secur i ty, 数据 4艮传输层安全协议)加密功能和 KEEPALIVE机制 (保活机制 ) 的 CAP P控制通道, 无需建立 CAP P数据通道。
可选的, 如图 3所示, 当 BRAS设备向所述 AC发送第三 CAPWAP消息后, 该 方法还包括:
107、 所述 BRAS设备接收所述 AC发送的第四 CAP P消息, 以确认所述 AC 已经收到所述第三 CAPWAP消息, 其中, 第四 CAPWAP消息携带有所述 WLAN站点 的 MAC地址。
例如, 该第四 CAPWAP消息可以是扩展 CAPWAP协议报文得到的新消息, 该 消息携带有 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。 如果本步骤中所述 BRAS设备在指定时间内 没有接收到上述第四 CAPWAP消息, 例如, 所述 BRAS设备在发送第三 CAP P消 息后的 10分钟内没有接收到上述第四 CAPWAP消息, 则所述 BRAS设备会重新发 送第三 CAP P消息给所述 AC。 如果重新发送了预设次数的所述第三 CAPWAP消 息给所述 AC , 例如, 所述 BRAS设备重新发送了三次所述第三 CAPWAP消息给所 述 AC , 仍然没有收到第四 CAPWAP消息, 所述 BRAS设备会从站点信息表中删除 所述 WLAN站点的信息, 并检测所述 BRAS设备与 AC之间的 CAPWAP控制通道是 否处于连接状态, 例如可以根据 KEEPAL I VE消息检测出 CAPWAP控制通道处于连
接状态还是处于断开状态。 在确认所述 CAPWAP控制通道处于连接状态时, 向所 述 AC发送第七 C AP P消息, 以通知 AC该 WL AN站点信息已被删除, 示例性的, 所述第七 CAP P消息可以是扩展 CAPWAP协议报文得到的新消息, 携带有所述 WLAN站点 MAC地址。 所述 AC收到第七 CAPWAP消息后, 根据该 WLAN站点的 MAC 地址从本地存储的站点信息表获得与该 WLAN站点关联的 AP的 IP地址, 通知所 述 AP与该 WLAN站点解除关联, 并将该 WLAN站点从本地存储的站点信息表中删 除。
可选的, AC也可以检测到所述 CAPWAP控制通道当前所处的状态。 实际应 用过程中, 如果 BRAS设备在确认所述 CAPWAP控制通道处于断开状态时, 此时 BRAS设备无法向所述 AC发送第七 CAPWAP消息。 而是由 AC在确认所述 CAPWAP 控制通道处于断开状态后, 从本地存储的站点信息表获得与该 BRAS设备对应的 所有 WLAN站点及该 WLAN站点关联的 AP的 IP地址, 通知所述所有 WLAN站点各 自的 AP分别与其关联的 WLAN站点解除关联, 并将所述所有 WLAN站点从本地存 储的站点信息表中删除。
在所述 AC接收到的第三 CAPWAP消息后, 所述 AC可以从第三 CAPWAP消息 获得所述 WLAN站点的主密钥 ,并与所述 WLAN站点进行四次握手协商获得该 WLAN 站点的临时密钥 PTK。 然后, 所述 AC将临时密钥 PTK通知上述 AP, 所述 WLAN 站点和 AP均釆用临时密钥 PTK加解密无线数据。 面具体介绍一下所述 AC在接收到第三 CAPWAP消息后, 获得所述 WLAN站点的主 密钥并触发 "四次握手" 与所述 WLAN站点协商出临时密钥 PTK的过程, 如图 4 所示, 包括:
201、 所述 AC向 WLAN站点发送第一 EAPoL-KEY报文(KEY of Extensible Authentication Protocol over Local Area Network, 局域网的可扩展鉴定十办 议的 KEY 报文), 该第一 EAPoL-KEY 报文携带有所述 AC 的 MAC 地址和第一 AC-NONCE (Access Control NONCE, AC设备的 NONCE随机值)。
202、 所述 WLAN站点收到第一 EAPoL-KEY报文后, 利用所述 AC的 MAC地址 和第一 AC—N0NCE、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址和 STA—應 CE ( STATION NONCE, 站点的 NONCE随机值 ), 以及本地存储的主密钥 PMK, 计算第一临时密钥 PTK。
例如, 计算出的第一临时密钥 ΡΤΚ可以为 64字节, 可选的, 可以将第一临 时密钥 ΡΤΚ中的特定 16字节作为第一消息完整码, 另外的特定 16字节作为该 WLAN站点和 ΑΡ的无线数据加密密钥。
203、所述 WLAN站点向 AC返回第二 EAPoL-KEY报文,该报文携带有所述 WLAN 站点的 MAC地址、 STA-N0NCE和第一消息完整码。
204、 所述 AC收到该第二 EAPoL-KEY报文, 利用报文中 WLAN站点的 MAC地 址和 STA-N0NCE, 并利用所述 AC的 MAC地址和第一 AC_N0NCE、 以及从所述第三 CAPWAP消息中获取的 WLAN站点的主密钥 PMK, 计算第二临时密钥 PTK。
与第一临时密钥 ΡΤΚ相类似的, 第二临时密钥 ΡΤΚ也可以是 64字节。 可选 的, 上述 AC设备也可以从第二临时密钥 PTK中取出特定 16字节作为第二消息 完整码, 将第二消息完整码与上述第一消息完整码比较, 如果两者一致, 则所 述 AC核实所述 WLAN站点确实知道主密钥 PMK。
205、 所述 AC重新生成第二 AC-N0NCE, 并利用所述 AC的 MAC地址和新生成 的第二 AC-N0NCE, 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址和 STA-N0NCE, 以及所述 WLAN站 点的主密钥 PMK,计算第三临时密钥 PTK。 类似的, 第三临时密钥 ΡΤΚ也可以是
64字节, 可选的, 也可以从第三临时密钥 PTK中取出特定 16字节作为第三消息 完整码, 另外的特定 1 6字节的准备安装和使用数据加密密钥。
206、 所述 AC设备向 WLAN站点返回第三 EAPoL-KEY报文, 该报文携带 AC 的 MAC地址和新生成的第二 AC_N0NCE、 新生成的第三消息完整码、 准备安装和 使用数据加密密钥。
207、 所述 WL AN站点收到该第三 EAPoL-KEY报文, 同样校验报文的消息完 整码, 核实 AC已经知道主密钥 PMK后, 所述 WLAN站点返回第四 EAPoL-KEY报 文, 通知 AC已经核实主密钥、 准备安装和使用数据加密密钥, 握手过程结束。
当 "四次握手" 协商成功后, AC釆用 CAPWAP协议报文向 AP下发临时密钥 PTK , CAPWAP协议报文釆用 DTLS加密传输。
可选的, 在本发明实施例提供的无线局域网中密钥的发送方法的执行过程 中, 还可能出现如下应用情形:
情形一:
所述 BRAS设备在 1 01 中将 WLAN站点信息存储在站点信息表之后, 还可以 为保存在所述站点信息表中的每一个站点信息设置生命周期, 如果 WLAN站点信 息的生命周期到期, 所述 BRAS设备会从站点信息表中取出与所述 WLAN站点关 联的 AC的 I P地址, 通过 CAP P控制通道向上述 AC发送第五 CAP P消息, 以 通知 AC该 WL AN站点的生命周期已到, 示例性的, 该第五 C AP P消息可以是扩 展 C AP P协议报文得到的新消息, 携带有所述 WL AN站点的 MAC地址。
所述 AC接收到该第五 CAP P消息后, 经过检查如果得知 WLAN站点仍然在 线时, 向所述 BRAS设备重新发送第一 CAP P消息, 以通知所述 AC该 WLAN站 点在线。 否则, 所述 AC不发送任何消息, 所述 BRAS设备会将该 WLAN站点信息
从所述站点信息表中进行删除。
情形二:
在 WLAN站点和 AP解除关联后 ,所述 AC会主动向 BRAS设备发送第六 CAPWAP 消息,以通知 BRAS设备该 WLAN站点和 AP已经解除关联,示例性的,该第六 CAPWAP 消息可以是扩展 CAPWAP协议报文得到的新消息, 携带有 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。 此时, 本发明实施例中的所述 BRAS设备会根据所述第六 CAPWAP消息, 从所述 站点信息表中删除所述 WLAN站点信息, 并使得该 WLAN站点下线, 无法访问互 联网。
情形三:
在所述 WLAN站点主动下线后, 本发明实施例的上述 BRAS设备从所述站点 信息表中主动删除所述 WLAN站点信息, 并向与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC发送第 七 CAPWAP消息,以通知 AC该 WL AN站点信息已被删除,示例性的,所述第七 CAPWAP 消息可以是扩展 CAPWAP协议报文得到的新消息, 携带有所述 WLAN站点 MAC地 址。 所述 AC收到此消息后, 根据该 WLAN站点的 MAC地址从本地存储的站点信 息表获得与该 WLAN站点关联的 AP的 IP地址, 通知所述 AP与该 WLAN站点解除 关联, 并将该 WLAN站点从本地存储的站点信息表中删除。
情形四:
如果所述 AC与 WLAN站点 "四次握手" 协商临时密钥 PTK失败时, 上述 AC 会主动向 BRAS设备发送第六 CAPWAP消息, 以通知 BRAS设备 AC与 WLAN站点临 时密钥协商失败, 此时, BRAS设备根据所述第六 CAPWAP消息从所述站点信息表 中删除所述 WLAN站点信息, 并使得该站点下线, 无法访问互联网。
优选的, 在上述第四 CAPWAP消息 /第五 CAPWAP消息 /第六 CAPWAP消息 /第
七 C APWAP消息中还可以携带所述 WL AN站点的虚拟局域网标识 VL AN I D。
本发明的实施例提供一种无线局域网中密钥的发送装置, 如图 5 所示, 包 括:
第一接收单元 11用于接收接入控制器 AC发送的第一无线接入点的控制和 配置 CAPWAP消息, 所述第一 CAPWAP消息中携带接入点 AP的英特网协议 IP地 址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 无线局域网 WLAN站点的媒体接入控制 MAC地址;
处理单元 12用于从所述第一 CAP P消息中获取所述 AP的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 I P地址、 所述 WL AN站点的 MAC地址, 并保存到站点信息表中;
第一发送单元 1 3用于向所述 AC发送第二 CAP P消息, 以触发所述 AC向 所述 WLAN站点发送关联成功信息, 所述第二 CAP P消息携带所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址;
第二接收单元 14 , 用于接收从所述 AC转发来的所述 WL AN站点的认证请求 报文, 向认证、 授权、 计费 AAA服务器发起认证;
查找单元 15 ,用于当接收到所述 AAA服务器下发的所述 WLAN站点的主密钥 时, 在所述站点信息表中查找与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC的 IP地址;
第二发送单元 16 , 用于向所述 AC发送第三 CAPWAP消息, 以指示所述 AC与 所述 WLAN站点进行四次握手协商临时密钥,所述第三 CAP P消息携带所述 WLAN 站点的主密钥、 四次握手触发比特位、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。
可选的, 如图 6所示, 该装置还可以包括: 链路建立单元 17 , 用于接收所 述 AC发送的 CAP P链路请求, 并与所述 AC之间建立 CAP P控制通道。
可选的, 如图 7所示, 当所述第二发送单元 16向所述 AC发送第三 CAPWAP 消息后, 所述装置还可以包括:
第三接收单元 18 , 用于接收所述 AC发送的携带有所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地 址的第四 C AP P消息, 以确认所述 AC已经收到所述第三 C AP P消息。
可选的, 在可以为所述站点信息表中保存的每一个站点信息设定生命周期。 如图 8所示, 该装置还包括:
第三发送单元 19 , 用于当如果所述 WLAN站点信息的生命周期到期时, 向与 所述指点站点关联的 AC发送携带有所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址的第五 CAP P消 息, 以通知所述 AC所述 WL AN站点的生命周期已到。
可选的,如图 9所示,该装置还可以包括:第四接收单元 20和删除单元 21。 其中, 在 WLAN站点和 AP解除关联后, 或者当所述 AC与 WLAN站点 "四次 握手" 协商临时密钥 PTK失败时, 所述第四接收单元 20用于接收所述 AC发送 的携带有所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址的第六 CAP P消息, 所述删除单元 21用于 根据所述第六 CAP P消息从所述站点信息表中删除所述 WLAN站点信息。
进一步地, 如果所述 WLAN站点主动下线时, 也会触发所述删除单元 21从 所述站点信息表中删除所述 WLAN站点信息; 如图 10所示, 该装置还包括: 第 四发送单元 22。
所述第四发送单元 22用于向与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC发送第七 CAPWAP 消息, 以通知所述 AC所述 WL AN站点信息已被删除, 所述第七 C APWAP消息携带 有所述 WLAN站点 MAC地址。
具体地, 所述无线局域网中密钥的发送装置可以为 BRAS设备, 所述 WLAN 站点可以为移动终端。
可选的, 在上述第一 CAP P消息 /第二 CAP P消息 /第三 CAP P消息 /第 四 CAP P消息 /第五 CAP P消息 /第六 CAP P消息 /第七 CAP P消息中还可以
携带所述 WLAN站点的虚拟局域网标识 VLAN ID , 此时, 在上述获取单元 1 1也会 保存所述第一 CAPWAP消息中携带的所述 WLAN站点的 VLAN ID。
与现有技术相比,在 BRAS设备与 AC分离的场景中, 本发明实施例中, BRAS 设备可以向 AC发送所述 WLAN站点的主密钥, 触发该 AC与所述 WLAN站点进行 协商临时密钥。 从而可以保证 WLAN网络中的站点在认证通过后, 仍然可以釆用 WAP2标准实现与 AP之间的无线链路数据加密, 充分保证 WLAN网络的安全性和 可靠性。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解: 实现上述方法实施例的全部或部分处理可 以通过程序指令相关的硬件来完成, 前述的程序可以存储于一计算机可读取存 储介质中, 该程序在执行时, 执行包括上述方法实施例的处理; 而前述的存储 介质包括: ROM、 RAM, 磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述, 仅为本发明的具体实施方式, 但本发明的保护范围并不局限于 此, 任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本发明揭露的技术范围内, 可轻易想到 变化或替换, 都应涵盖在本发明的保护范围之内。 因此, 本发明的保护范围应 以所述权利要求的保护范围为准。
Claims
1、 一种无线局域网中密钥的发送方法, 其特征在于, 包括:
接收接入控制器 AC发送的第一无线接入点的控制和配置 CAPWAP消息, 所 述第一 CAPWAP消息中携带接入点 AP的英特网协议 IP地址、所述 AC的 IP地址、 无线局域网 WLAN站点的媒体接入控制 MAC地址;
从所述第一 CAP P消息中获取所述 AP的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 所 述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址, 并保存到站点信息表中;
向所述 AC发送第二 CAPWAP消息, 以触发所述 AC向所述 WLAN站点发送关 联成功信息, 所述第二 CAPWAP消息携带所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址;
接收从所述 AC转发来的所述 WLAN站点的认证请求报文, 向认证、 授权、 计费 AAA服务器发起认证;
当接收到所述 AAA服务器下发的所述 WLAN站点的主密钥时, 在所述站点信 息表中查找与所述 WL AN站点关联的 AC的 IP地址;
向所述 AC发送第三 CAPWAP消息, 以指示所述 AC与所述 WLAN站点进行四 次握手协商临时密钥, 所述第三 CAPWAP消息携带所述 WLAN站点的主密钥、 四 次握手触发比特位、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。
2、 根据权利要求 1所述的无线局域网中密钥的发送方法, 其特征在于, 在 接收接入控制器 AC发送的第一无线接入点的控制和配置 CAP P消息之前, 该 方法还包括: 接收所述 AC发送的建立 CAPWAP链路请求, 并与所述 AC之间建立 CAPWAP控制通道。
3、 根据权利要求 1所述的无线局域网中密钥的发送方法, 其特征在于, 在 向所述 AC发送第三 CAPWAP消息之后, 该方法还包括: 接收所述 AC发送的携带 有所述 WL AN站点的 MAC地址的第四 C AP P消息, 以确认所述 AC已经收到所述 第三 CAPWAP消息。
4、 根据权利要求 1、 2或 3所述的无线局域网中密钥的发送方法, 其特征 在于, 所述站点信息表中保存的每一个站点信息对应有生命周期, 在从所述第 一 CAPWAP消息中获取所述 AP的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 所述 WLAN站点 的 MAC地址, 并保存到站点信息表中之后, 还包括:
如果所述 WLAN站点信息的生命周期到期, 向与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC发 送携带有所述 WL AN站点的 MAC地址的第五 CAPWAP消息,以通知所述 AC所述 WL AN 站点的生命周期已到。
5、 根据权利要求 1、 2或 3所述的无线局域网中密钥的发送方法, 其特征 在于,在从所述第一 CAPWAP消息中获取所述 AP的 IP地址、所述 AC的 IP地址、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址, 并保存到站点信息表中之后, 还包括:
接收所述 AC发送的携带有所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址的第六 CAPWAP消息; 根据所述第六 CAPWAP消息从所述站点信息表中删除所述 WLAN站点信息。
6、 根据权利要求 1、 2或 3所述的无线局域网中密钥的发送方法, 其特征 在于,在从所述第一 CAPWAP消息中获取所述 AP的 IP地址、所述 AC的 IP地址、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址, 并保存到站点信息表中之后, 还包括:
从所述站点信息表中删除所述 WLAN站点信息;
向与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC发送第七 CAPWAP消息, 以通知所述 AC所述 WLAN站点信息已被删除,所述第七 CAPWAP消息携带有所述 WLAN站点 MAC地址。
7、 一种无线局域网中密钥的发送装置, 其特征在于, 包括:
第一接收单元(11 ), 用于接收接入控制器 AC发送的第一无线接入点的控 制和配置 CAPWAP消息,所述第一 CAP P消息中携带接入点 AP的英特网协议 IP 地址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 无线局域网 WLAN站点的媒体接入控制 MAC地址; 处理单元( 12 ), 用于从所述第一 CAP P消息中获取所述 AP的 IP地址、 所述 AC的 IP地址、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址, 并保存到站点信息表中;
第一发送单元(13 ), 用于向所述 AC发送第二 CAPWAP消息, 以触发所述 AC 向所述 WLAN站点发送关联成功信息, 所述第二 CAP P消息携带所述 WLAN站点 的 MAC地址;
第二接收单元(14 ), 用于接收从所述 AC转发来的所述 WLAN站点的认证请 求报文, 向认证、 授权、 计费 AAA服务器发起认证;
查找单元( 15 ), 用于当接收到所述 AAA服务器下发的所述 WLAN站点的主 密钥时, 在所述站点信息表中查找与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC的 IP地址;
第二发送单元(16 ), 用于向所述 AC发送第三 CAPWAP消息, 以指示所述 AC 与所述 WLAN站点进行四次握手协商临时密钥, 所述第三 CAP P消息携带所述 WLAN站点的主密钥、 四次握手触发比特位、 所述 WLAN站点的 MAC地址。
8、 根据权利要求 7所述的无线局域网中密钥的发送装置, 其特征在于, 该 装置还包括: 链路建立单元(17 ), 用于接收所述 AC发送的建立无线接入点的 控制和配置 CAP P链路请求, 并与所述 AC之间建立 CAP P控制通道。
9、 根据权利要求 7所述的无线局域网中密钥的发送装置, 其特征在于, 该 装置还包括: 第三接收单元(18 ), 用于接收所述 AC发送的携带有所述 WLAN站 点的 MAC地址的第四 CAP P消息, 以确认所述 AC已经收到所述第三 CAP P消 息。
10、 根据权利要求 7、 8或 9所述的无线局域网中密钥的发送装置, 其特征 在于, 还包括:
第三发送单元(19 ), 用于当所述 WLAN站点信息的生命周期到期时, 向与 所述指点站点关联的 AC发送携带有所述 WL AN站点的 MAC地址的第五 CAP P消 息, 以通知所述 AC所述 WL AN站点的生命周期已到。
1 1、 根据权利要求 7、 8或 9所述的无线局域网中密钥的发送装置, 其特征 在于, 还包括:
第四接收单元( 20 ), 用于接收所述 AC发送的携带有所述 WLAN站点的 MAC 地址的第六 C AP P消息;
删除单元(21 ), 用于根据所述第六 CAPWAP 消息从所述站点信息表中删除 所述 WLAN站点信息。
12、 根据权利要求 1 1所述的无线局域网中密钥的发送装置, 其特征在于, 该装置还包括: 第四发送单元(22 ), 用于向与所述 WLAN站点关联的 AC发 送第七 CAP P消息, 以通知所述 AC所述 WLAN站点信息已被删除, 所述第七 CAPWAP消息携带有所述 WL AN站点 MAC地址。
1 3、 一种无线局域网中密钥分发***, 其特征在于, 包括: 接入控制器 AC、 认证、 授权、 计费 AAA服务器, 以及根据权利要求 7-1 2中任一项所述的无线局 域网中密钥的发送装置。
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US8842830B2 (en) | 2014-09-23 |
EP2432265B1 (en) | 2014-11-12 |
CN102404720B (zh) | 2014-10-08 |
US20120110324A1 (en) | 2012-05-03 |
CN102404720A (zh) | 2012-04-04 |
EP2432265A1 (en) | 2012-03-21 |
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