WO2011100949A1 - Passive sicherheitsschaltung - Google Patents
Passive sicherheitsschaltung Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2011100949A1 WO2011100949A1 PCT/DE2011/000115 DE2011000115W WO2011100949A1 WO 2011100949 A1 WO2011100949 A1 WO 2011100949A1 DE 2011000115 W DE2011000115 W DE 2011000115W WO 2011100949 A1 WO2011100949 A1 WO 2011100949A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- smart actuator
- actuator
- smart
- control unit
- data line
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F16—ENGINEERING ELEMENTS AND UNITS; GENERAL MEASURES FOR PRODUCING AND MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF MACHINES OR INSTALLATIONS; THERMAL INSULATION IN GENERAL
- F16D—COUPLINGS FOR TRANSMITTING ROTATION; CLUTCHES; BRAKES
- F16D48/00—External control of clutches
- F16D48/06—Control by electric or electronic means, e.g. of fluid pressure
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F16—ENGINEERING ELEMENTS AND UNITS; GENERAL MEASURES FOR PRODUCING AND MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF MACHINES OR INSTALLATIONS; THERMAL INSULATION IN GENERAL
- F16D—COUPLINGS FOR TRANSMITTING ROTATION; CLUTCHES; BRAKES
- F16D2500/00—External control of clutches by electric or electronic means
- F16D2500/50—Problem to be solved by the control system
- F16D2500/51—Relating safety
- F16D2500/5108—Failure diagnosis
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F16—ENGINEERING ELEMENTS AND UNITS; GENERAL MEASURES FOR PRODUCING AND MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF MACHINES OR INSTALLATIONS; THERMAL INSULATION IN GENERAL
- F16D—COUPLINGS FOR TRANSMITTING ROTATION; CLUTCHES; BRAKES
- F16D2500/00—External control of clutches by electric or electronic means
- F16D2500/50—Problem to be solved by the control system
- F16D2500/51—Relating safety
- F16D2500/5114—Failsafe
Definitions
- the invention relates to a passive safety circuit.
- Safety circuits can be found e.g. in the field of clutch transmissions, in particular dual clutch transmissions and even more particularly in parallel manual transmissions (PSG).
- PSG parallel manual transmissions
- the PSG (Parallel Manual Transmission) is a dual-clutch transmission.
- Even and odd gears are stored separately on mutually supported shafts. These two shafts are coupled separately by two nested couplings.
- Actuation is either with electric motors or via an electro-hydraulic control.
- Safety circuits are already known from the prior art. Such a system is disclosed for example in DE 10 2008 061 564.
- actuators are monitored by a controller and in case of a detected error, the affected actuator, e.g. by switching off the power amplifier, deactivated.
- a second actuator is thus enabled to restore a safe system state, e.g. in which he opens his clutch.
- a disadvantage of this arrangement is that in the case of a fault in the control unit or in a reset state or in a faulty connection of the control unit to the actuators monitoring can not be performed. If both actuators were switched off in this case, a safe system state could not be achieved.
- smart actuators which have an actuator-internal control unit with extended logic, compared with conventional actuators.
- inventive smart actuators for actuating a clutch have an actuator-internal control unit and a communication interface for connection to a higher-level control unit and at least one data line for connection to the higher-level control unit.
- the smart actuator is set up so that it can detect a fault in the higher-level control device and / or an associated second smart actuator, and has means for driving, which are suitable in the event of a fault to transfer the controlled system in a safe system state.
- the controlled system can be transferred to a safe system state.
- a smart actuator widely has means for delayed shutdown when the communication to the higher-level control unit is faulty.
- the means for delayed shutdown are designed as RC element.
- This embodiment is cost-effective and also particularly easy to adapt to predetermined boundary conditions.
- the time for the delayed shutdown is greater than or equal to the time that is necessary to convert the first smart actuator in a safe state between error occurrence and shutdown of the monitored second smart actuator. It is particularly advantageous that even in the event of a cable break on a dedicated smart actuator, a controlled system can be converted into the safe system state.
- the time for delayed shutdown is greater by one or more orders of magnitude than the switching time of an active shutdown caused by a control unit.
- the invention proposes to solve the disadvantages also presented a method of control.
- the smart actuator has a communication interface for connection to a higher-level control unit and at least one data line for connection to the higher-level control unit.
- the method comprises the step of detecting an error at the higher-level control device and / or an associated second smart actuator and the step of activating - in the event of a detected error - the clutch in order to bring the controlled system into a safe system state.
- the method comprises the step of receiving a message that the assigned second smart actuator is faulty.
- the invention proposes a control system which has a control device and a smart actuator according to the invention, which are connected via at least one data line and a communication interface.
- the smart actuator provides a method according to the invention.
- the invention will be explained in more detail below with reference to the figures. In these figures shows:
- FIG. 1 shows schematically a control system
- FIG. 2a an embodiment of a part of a smart actuator according to the invention during
- FIG. 3 a shows an embodiment of part of a smart actuator according to the invention in the event of a loss of communication
- FIG. 3 b shows associated voltage-time profiles
- Figure 4 is a partial aspect of an embodiment of a smart actuator according to the invention.
- a control system 1 is shown schematically.
- This control system 1 comprises a first smart actuator 5, e.g. for actuating a clutch.
- the control system 1 has a higher-level control unit 10.
- Both the higher-level control unit 10 and the smart actuator 5 have a
- Communication interface 20 for connection to each other.
- the communication interface 20 may be a vehicle bus system used to exchange control and / or status information, e.g. a CAN bus.
- both the higher-level control unit 10 and the smart actuator 5 data line 6, 21 for connection to each other.
- the data line 6 can carry an emergency stop signal.
- This emergency signal can for example be designed so that the interruption of the data line 6 is equal to an active signaling an emergency stop. This can be achieved, for example, by signaling the emergency stop signal by signaling a low voltage level, while the operating case is signaled by a high voltage level.
- an enablement / disablement signal can also be transported via a data line 21.
- Such an enablement / disablement signal may, for example, be derived from the starting of an engine connected to the controlled transmission. Also this signal can be configured as before the emergency stop signal, ie, that the
- Interruption of the data line 6 is equal to an active signaling an emergency stop. This can be accomplished, for example, by signaling the Disablement Signal by signaling a low voltage level, while signaling the Enfallment Signal by a high voltage level.
- a smart actuator 5 has means 7 for driving, which are suitable for converting the controlled system into a safe system state in the event of a detected fault.
- These means 7 for driving can be the same means that are otherwise used for switching operations of the clutch.
- the smart actuator 5 is set up so that it can detect errors on the higher-level control unit 10.
- Such an error is e.g. the loss of communication via the communication interface 20.
- Such a loss of communication may occur when the higher-level control unit 10 is in reset mode or the communication interface of the parent control unit is defective or a connector drop separates the physical connection of the communication interface 20.
- the smart actuator 5 e.g. by a timeout of a corresponding counter, recognize that the communication is disturbed.
- the timeout is based on the typically expected time within which communication with the higher-level control unit can be expected.
- different modes may be provided, e.g. passive monitoring or active monitoring in which heartbeat messages are transmitted.
- heartbeat messages e.g. be provided that after a certain number of unsuccessful heartbeat prompts it is assumed that the communication is disturbed.
- the first smart actuator 5 can continue to be set up so that it can detect a fault in the associated second smart actuator 15.
- a second smart actuator 15 with corresponding data lines 16 for emergency stop and 21 for an enablement / Disablement signal as well as a communication interface 20 is also shown in Figure 1.
- Such an error is e.g. The loss of communication via the communication interface 20 from the controller 10 to the second associated smart actuator 15. Such communication loss can occur when the communication interface 20 of the parent controller to the smart actuator 15 is defective or a connector drop separates the physical connection of the communication interface 20.
- the first smart actuator 5 can either via a message on the
- Communication interface 20 are informed by the parent control unit 10 that such a loss of communication to the associated smart actuator 15 has occurred, or the first smart actuator 5 and the associated smart actuator 15 have another data line 22, with the loss of communication to the parent control unit 10th can be signaled directly.
- the signals may be e.g. be linked by a logical AND function, so that only in the case of the simultaneous occurrence of the signals, the transfer of the controlled system in the safe system state is caused.
- the means 7 for driving are activated so that the transmission is transferred to a safe system state, e.g. by opening a clutch.
- a smart actuator according to the invention also has means for delayed shutdown 107; 117, when the communication to the parent controller 10 is faulty.
- FIG. 2a shows an embodiment of a part of a smart actuator according to the invention while Figure 2b shows associated voltage-time profiles.
- the higher-level control unit 10 sends a signal, for example via the data line 6 or 21, to a smart actuator 5.
- ÜSG_out This is referred to at the output as ÜSG_out and represented in a corresponding manner in Figure 2b as V (ÜSG_out).
- the corresponding signal received by the smart actuator 5 via the data line 6 or 21 is denoted by smartActorJn in FIG. 2a and in a corresponding manner by V (smartActorJn) in FIG. 2b.
- the signal evaluated by the smart actuator 5 is denoted by amplifier_disable in FIG. 2a and in a corresponding manner by V (amplifier_disable) in FIG. 2b.
- an active shutdown is initiated at time 2 s, e.g. in which the emergency signal is given.
- the emergency stop signal is shown by an active pulling of the voltage V (ÜSG_out) to a low potential, here by way of example 0 V, in the left half of FIG. 2b.
- V ÜSG_out
- This exemplary pulling leads almost immediately to a voltage change at V (smartAktor_in), which is likewise pulled to a low potential, here 0 V by way of example.
- the output signal V (amplifier_disable) is also pulled from a higher voltage to a lower voltage, and thus the shutdown of the Smart Actuator is effected by the output signal V (amplifier_disable).
- the emergency stop signal is shown by an active pulling of the voltage V (ÜSG_out) to a higher potential, here exemplified 5 V, in the right half of FIG. 2b.
- V ÜSG_out
- This exemplary pulling leads almost immediately to a voltage change at V (smartActorJn), which is also pulled up. After a finite but short time of less than 2 ms, the output signal becomes
- V also pulled from a low voltage to a higher voltage and thus the output signal V (amplifier_disable) causes the connection of the smart actuator.
- the temporal behavior during the active shutdown is determined essentially by the resistor R3 and the capacitor C1. It is obvious to the person skilled in the art that the presented behavior can also be achieved with other signals, eg the enablement / disablement signal, via a data line 21.
- FIG. 3 a shows an embodiment of part of a smart actuator according to the invention in the case of a loss of communication while FIG. 3 b shows associated voltage-time characteristics.
- the circuit now has an interruption-indicated by an arrow-of the exemplary data line 6.
- the parent controller 10 outputs a signal, e.g. via the data line 6 or 21 to a smart actuator 5 given. Since subsequently only the signal after the cable break is of interest, this is referred to as a cable break and represented in a corresponding manner in Figure 3b as V (broken cable).
- the corresponding signal received by the smart actuator 5 via the data line 6 or 21 is denoted by smartActor n in FIG. 3a and in a corresponding manner by '(smartActorJn) in FIG. 3b.
- the evaluated by the smart actuator 5 signal is with amplifier_disable in Figure 3a and in a corresponding manner with
- V amplifier_disable
- an interruption of the communication e.g. by a cable break or drop of the plug or the like on.
- a passive shutdown is initiated.
- the signal is shown by a passive pulling of the voltage V (cable break) to a low potential, here by way of example 0 V, in the left half of FIG. 2b.
- V voltage change at V (smartActorJn), which is also pulled with delay to a lower voltage.
- the output signal V (amplifier_disable) is also pulled from a higher voltage to a lower voltage, and thus the shutdown of the smart actuator is effected by the output signal V (amplifier_disable).
- the smart actuator has means for delayed shutdown 107,117.
- the Smart Actuator 5,15 is able to detect its own cable break and this via other data lines or via a communication interface other, assigned Smart Actors 5.15 and / or the parent controller 10 as an input signal available. As a result, they can be put into a position to bring the controlled system in a safe state, for example by opening a clutch.
- the delayed shutdown means 107, 117 are implemented as RC elements. In this case, determines the size of the resistor R4 and the capacitor C1 in Figure 3a, the switching behavior. In an advantageous manner, the time for the delayed shutdown should be greater than or equal to the time it takes to convert this smart actuator 5, 15 into a safe state between error occurrence and shutdown of the monitored smart actuator 5, 15.
- delay elements may also be used. These can also be more complex circuits based on special monitoring modules or a shutdown can be delayed on the software side. Suitable circuits will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, or from the relevant literature, e.g. Tietze Schenck, semiconductor circuit technology known.
- the time for the delayed shutdown is greater than the switching time of an active, brought about by the control unit 10, shutdown.
- the switch-off delay is based on the time that is necessary to transfer a coupling system between a fault occurrence and switch-off of the actuator to a safe state.
- the switch-off delay is greater than the switching times of an active switch-off brought about by a control unit.
- the switch-off delay of the evaluation is greater by one or more orders of magnitude than the switching time of an active switch-off brought about by a control unit.
- the off delay of the evaluation by 3 or more orders of magnitude greater than the switching time of an active brought about by a control unit shutdown.
- the passive safety circuit can have means for signaling, so that the detected error can be evaluated and / or provided to other components as a switching or information signal.
- switching states within the control system can now be identified by way of example according to Table 1 below.
- Cable break Info OFF (time ON power stage OFF clutch open delayed) Smart 1 cable break actuator 1
- the first column indicates a possible situation
- the other columns indicate whether a data exchange takes place and what content this data exchange
- the states of the data line 6 alternatively or additionally the data line 21 with respect to a first smart actuator 5 and the states of Data line 16 alternatively or additionally the data line 21 with respect to a second smart actuator 15.
- the reaction of the respective smart actuators is shown on the error event.
- the superordinate control unit 10 is abbreviated to ÜSG.
- an error occurs on the first smart actuator 5, it can be transmitted from the smart actuator 5 via the communication interface 20 to the higher-level control unit 10 as well as to further smart actuators, e.g. an associated second smart actuator 15 are signaled as "Info: Error actuator 1".
- this message can also be exchanged via a separate data line 22 alternatively or additionally between the associated smart actuators.
- a fault occurs on the second smart actuator 15, it can be transmitted from the smart actuator 15 via the communication interface 20 to the higher-level control device 10 as well as to further smart actuators, e.g. an associated first smart actuator 5 are signaled as "Info: Error actuator 2".
- this message can also be exchanged via a separate data line 22 alternatively or additionally between the associated smart actuators.
- the respective other Smart Actuator will now be able to open the clutch while the respective faulty Smart Actuator is actively switched off.
- the associated Smart Actuators In the event of an error or a reset at the higher-level control unit 10 (ÜSG), no data exchange takes place on the communication interface. In this case, the associated Smart Actuators according to the invention automatically recognize, on the basis of the Missing Communication, that monitoring by the higher-level controller 10 is not possible and convert the controlled system into a secure state, for example. by opening a respective clutch.
- an error occurs on a data line to the first smart actuator 5, e.g. Data line 6 or 21, it may be from Smart Actuator 5 via the communication interface 20 to the higher-level control unit 10 as well as to other Smart Akoren, e.g. an associated second smart actuator 15 are signaled as "Info: cable break actuator 1".
- this message can also be exchanged via a separate data line 22 alternatively or additionally between the associated smart actuators.
- this message can also be exchanged via a separate data line 22 alternatively or additionally between the associated smart actuators.
- both mechanisms interlock, namely, the system is brought into a safe state, for example by opening an associated clutch, and then the shutdown of the smart actuators 5, 15 is effected by the delayed shutdown.
- FIG. 4 shows a partial aspect of an embodiment of a smart actuator 5, 15 according to the invention.
- a smart actuator 5, 15 may also have means for monitoring a data line 108, 118.
- these means for monitoring a data line 108, 118 may monitor the voltage on the data line 6, 16, 21 so that the smart actuator 5, 15 can detect the breakage of a monitored data line 6, 16, 21 without further communication.
- the smart actuator 5.15 then report this detected error to the higher-level control unit 10, for example via the communication interface 20. Furthermore, the detected error can also be reported to an associated second smart actuator 5, 15, eg directly via a data line 22 or indirectly via the higher-level control unit 10. Now, as described above, the first actuator can be switched off with a time delay while the associated second smart actuator is on Based on the information the system can transfer to the safe state.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Fluid Mechanics (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
- Hydraulic Clutches, Magnetic Clutches, Fluid Clutches, And Fluid Joints (AREA)
- Control Of Transmission Device (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2012553176A JP5698270B2 (ja) | 2010-02-18 | 2011-02-07 | パッシブ型安全回路 |
DE112011100582.2T DE112011100582B4 (de) | 2010-02-18 | 2011-02-07 | Smart Aktor,Verfahren und Steuerungssystem zur Betätigung einer Kupplung |
US13/584,301 US8571775B2 (en) | 2010-02-18 | 2012-08-13 | Passive safety switch |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102010008441 | 2010-02-18 | ||
DE102010008441.7 | 2010-02-18 |
Related Child Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US13/584,301 Continuation US8571775B2 (en) | 2010-02-18 | 2012-08-13 | Passive safety switch |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2011100949A1 true WO2011100949A1 (de) | 2011-08-25 |
Family
ID=44121529
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/DE2011/000115 WO2011100949A1 (de) | 2010-02-18 | 2011-02-07 | Passive sicherheitsschaltung |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8571775B2 (de) |
JP (1) | JP5698270B2 (de) |
DE (2) | DE102011010512A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2011100949A1 (de) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2016501152A (ja) * | 2012-11-22 | 2016-01-18 | シェフラー テクノロジーズ アー・ゲー ウント コー. カー・ゲーSchaeffler Technologies AG & Co. KG | トルク伝達装置を制御するための方法 |
Families Citing this family (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102012003328A1 (de) | 2012-02-15 | 2013-08-22 | Getrag Getriebe- Und Zahnradfabrik Hermann Hagenmeyer Gmbh & Cie Kg | Verfahren und Steuergerät für eine Antriebsstrang-Komponente |
DE102014210710A1 (de) * | 2014-06-05 | 2015-12-17 | Schaeffler Technologies AG & Co. KG | Vorrichtung zur aktiven Selbsthaltung eines elektromotorischen Aktors |
DE112016002963A5 (de) | 2015-06-30 | 2018-03-15 | Schaeffler Technologies AG & Co. KG | Aktoreinheit für ein Fahrzeug |
DE102015113110B4 (de) * | 2015-08-10 | 2019-03-14 | MAQUET GmbH | Ansteuervorrichtung mindestens einer Antriebseinrichtung eines Operationstisches und Verfahren zum Ansteuern |
DE102015226351A1 (de) | 2015-12-21 | 2017-06-22 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Smart Aktor System für ein Kraftfahrzeug und Antriebseinheit mit einem solchen |
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EP0798497A1 (de) * | 1996-03-29 | 1997-10-01 | MAGNETI MARELLI S.p.A. | Steuereinrichtung und Steuerverfahren für ein Getriebe |
EP1672777A2 (de) * | 2004-12-18 | 2006-06-21 | LuK Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG | Betätigungsvorrichtung für Kraftfahrzeugkomponenten |
DE102008061564A1 (de) * | 2008-01-02 | 2009-07-09 | Luk Lamellen Und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs Kg | Kupplungsaktor und Verfahren zu dessen Steuerung |
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US4790225A (en) * | 1982-11-24 | 1988-12-13 | Panduit Corp. | Dispenser of discrete cable ties provided on a continuous ribbon of cable ties |
JPS6173437U (de) * | 1984-10-22 | 1986-05-19 | ||
JPS61130654A (ja) * | 1984-11-29 | 1986-06-18 | Aisin Seiki Co Ltd | 自動変速制御方法 |
US4922425A (en) * | 1986-04-18 | 1990-05-01 | Eaton Corporation | Method for controlling AMT system including throttle position sensor signal fault detection and tolerance |
DE4005609B4 (de) * | 1990-02-22 | 2004-04-29 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Funktionsüberwachung eines elektrischen Verbrauchers |
US6181066B1 (en) * | 1997-12-02 | 2001-01-30 | Power Circuit Innovations, Inc. | Frequency modulated ballast with loosely coupled transformer for parallel gas discharge lamp control |
US6548996B2 (en) * | 2001-06-01 | 2003-04-15 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Optimized on/off control circuit |
DE112007000453A5 (de) * | 2006-03-08 | 2008-11-27 | Luk Lamellen Und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs Kg | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Steuern des Betriebs eines Parallelschaltgetriebes |
DE102006054253A1 (de) * | 2006-11-17 | 2008-05-21 | Zf Friedrichshafen Ag | Verfahren zur Notbetätigung eines automatisierten Fahrzeug-Doppelkupplungsgetriebes |
-
2011
- 2011-02-07 JP JP2012553176A patent/JP5698270B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2011-02-07 DE DE102011010512A patent/DE102011010512A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 2011-02-07 WO PCT/DE2011/000115 patent/WO2011100949A1/de active Application Filing
- 2011-02-07 DE DE112011100582.2T patent/DE112011100582B4/de not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2012
- 2012-08-13 US US13/584,301 patent/US8571775B2/en active Active
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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EP0798497A1 (de) * | 1996-03-29 | 1997-10-01 | MAGNETI MARELLI S.p.A. | Steuereinrichtung und Steuerverfahren für ein Getriebe |
EP1672777A2 (de) * | 2004-12-18 | 2006-06-21 | LuK Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG | Betätigungsvorrichtung für Kraftfahrzeugkomponenten |
DE102008061564A1 (de) * | 2008-01-02 | 2009-07-09 | Luk Lamellen Und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs Kg | Kupplungsaktor und Verfahren zu dessen Steuerung |
Cited By (1)
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JP2016501152A (ja) * | 2012-11-22 | 2016-01-18 | シェフラー テクノロジーズ アー・ゲー ウント コー. カー・ゲーSchaeffler Technologies AG & Co. KG | トルク伝達装置を制御するための方法 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US8571775B2 (en) | 2013-10-29 |
DE102011010512A1 (de) | 2011-08-18 |
JP5698270B2 (ja) | 2015-04-08 |
DE112011100582B4 (de) | 2022-02-24 |
JP2013519850A (ja) | 2013-05-30 |
US20120310500A1 (en) | 2012-12-06 |
DE112011100582A5 (de) | 2013-01-24 |
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