WO2011032389A1 - 一种寻呼过程中用户标识的保密方法及装置 - Google Patents
一种寻呼过程中用户标识的保密方法及装置 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2011032389A1 WO2011032389A1 PCT/CN2010/072577 CN2010072577W WO2011032389A1 WO 2011032389 A1 WO2011032389 A1 WO 2011032389A1 CN 2010072577 W CN2010072577 W CN 2010072577W WO 2011032389 A1 WO2011032389 A1 WO 2011032389A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- data
- paging
- user
- ciphertext
- user identifier
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
- H04L63/0414—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden during transmission, i.e. party's identity is protected against eavesdropping, e.g. by using temporary identifiers, but is known to the other party or parties involved in the communication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
- H04W12/72—Subscriber identity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W68/00—User notification, e.g. alerting and paging, for incoming communication, change of service or the like
Definitions
- the present invention belongs to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a method and device for securing a user identity in a paging process of an LTE (Long Term Evolution) system. Background technique
- the 3GPP Evolved Packet System consists of an Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (EUTRAN) and an Evolved Packet Core (EPC).
- EUTRAN Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network
- EPC Evolved Packet Core
- the evolved UTRAN, the base station device is an evolved Node-B (eNB), and is mainly responsible for wireless communication, wireless communication management, and mobility context management.
- eNB evolved Node-B
- the Mobility Management Entity needs to initiate a paging process in order to actively connect to the User Terminal (UE). Normally, the MME performs paging by using the temporary s-TMSI (temporary mobile subscriber identity), but in the case of an MME abnormality, it is required to use the Global Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) for paging.
- TMSI temporary mobile subscriber identity
- the paging message is transmitted in clear text on the air interface.
- the IMSI number may be leaked in the air interface, resulting in a security risk.
- the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method and a device for securing user identification in several paging processes, so as to realize the confidentiality of the user identity in the paging process.
- the method for encrypting a user identifier in the first paging process includes the following steps:
- Step A using the key generated by the user identifier of the called user terminal to identify the user After the line is encrypted, the ciphertext SI is generated, and the ciphertext S 1 is used for paging;
- Step B After receiving the paging message, the called user terminal encrypts the user identifier by using the key generated by the user identifier to generate the ciphertext S2. If the ciphertext S1 and the ciphertext S2 are the same, the user is considered to be the ciphertext S1. That is, the called user terminal of the paging.
- the security device for identifying the user in the first paging process includes a paging originating device and a called user terminal;
- the paging initiating device is configured to encrypt the user identifier by using a key generated by the user identifier of the called user terminal, generate a ciphertext S1, and use the ciphertext S1 to perform paging;
- the user terminal is configured to obtain the ciphertext S2 by using the key generated by the user ID to encrypt the ciphertext S2, and determine whether the ciphertext S1 and the ciphertext S2 in the paging message are consistent. I identify myself as the called user terminal for this page.
- the method for encrypting a user identifier in the second paging process includes the following steps:
- Step A Generate random data X, combine the random data X with the user identifier of the called user terminal into data Y, and encrypt the data Y by using a key generated by the user identifier of the called user terminal to generate a secret.
- S1 and using the ciphertext S1 and the random data X for paging;
- Step B After receiving the paging message, the called user terminal compares the random data X with the user identifier into the data Y in step A, and uses the random data X with the user. The identifiers are combined into one plaintext data, and then the plaintext data is encrypted by using the key generated by the user identifier to obtain the ciphertext S2. If the ciphertext S1 and the ciphertext S2 are consistent, the user is deemed to be the paging. Called user terminal.
- step A the method of combining the random data X and the user identifier into the data Y may be:
- the security device for identifying the user in the second paging process includes a paging initiating device and a called user terminal;
- the paging initiating device is configured to generate random data X, combine the random data X with a user identifier of the called user terminal into data, and use the key pair generated by the user identifier of the called user terminal.
- ⁇ encrypting to generate ciphertext S1, and using the ciphertext S1 and the random data X to perform paging;
- the called user terminal after receiving the paging message, according to the same method as the method of combining the random data X and the user identifier into the data , the random data X and The user ID is combined into a plaintext data, and then the plaintext data is encrypted by using the key generated by the user identifier to obtain the ciphertext S2. If the ciphertext S1 and the ciphertext S2 are identical, the user is deemed to be the ciphertext S1.
- the called user terminal of the secondary page after receiving the paging message, according to the same method as the method of combining the random data X and the user identifier into the data , the random data X and The user ID is combined into a plaintext data, and then the plaintext data is encrypted by using the key generated by the user identifier to obtain the ciphertext S2. If the ciphertext S1 and the ciphertext S2 are identical, the user is deemed to be the ciphertext S1.
- the called user terminal of the secondary page after receiving
- the method for encrypting the user identity in the third paging process includes the following steps:
- Step ⁇ randomly generating a data ⁇ , combining the random data ⁇ with a user identifier of the called user terminal into a data ⁇ , and the data ⁇ includes the user identifier at a specific location, where the specific location is Describe a location where the user identifier appears in the data frame, and is only related to the user identifier;
- Step ⁇ encrypt the data ⁇ by using a key generated by the user identifier, and use the obtained ciphertext to perform paging;
- Step C After receiving the ciphertext in the paging message, the called user terminal decrypts the ciphertext by using a key generated by its own user identifier to obtain plaintext data, and then view the plaintext data. Whether the location of the same location as the specific location includes its own user identifier, and if it contains its own user identifier at the same location as the specific location, it considers itself to be the called user terminal of the paging. Further, in step A, the method of combining the random data Z and the user identifier into the data Y may be:
- the user identifier is placed in front of the random data Z to directly obtain the data Y; or, the random data Z is placed in front of the user identifier to directly obtain the data Y.
- the security device for identifying the user in the third paging process includes a paging originating device and a called user terminal;
- the paging initiating device is configured to randomly generate a data ⁇ , combine the random data ⁇ with a user identifier of the called user terminal into a data ⁇ , and the data ⁇ includes the user identifier at a specific location, where The specific location is a location where the user identifier appears in the data ,, and is only related to the user identifier; then the data ⁇ is encrypted using a key generated by the user identifier, and used Ciphertext for paging;
- the called user terminal after receiving the ciphertext in the paging message, decrypts the ciphertext by using a key generated by its own user identifier, obtains plaintext data, and then views the Whether the plaintext data includes its own user identifier at the same location as the specific location, and if it contains its own user identifier at the same location as the specific location, it considers itself to be the called user terminal of the paging.
- the paging process is initiated by the mobility management entity to the called user terminal, and the user identity is the Global Mobile Subscriber Identity IMSI.
- the method and device for securing a user identifier in a paging process encrypts a user identifier when a page is initiated to a user terminal, thereby overcoming the security risk caused by directly using plaintext paging in the prior art. Provides the security of the communication system.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a process of confidentiality of a user identity in a paging process according to a first embodiment
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the process of securing the user identity in the paging process of the second embodiment
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the process of securing the user identity in the paging process of the third embodiment.
- the present invention provides three methods and apparatus for secrecy of user identification in a paging process, and three embodiments are respectively given below.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the user identity security process in the paging process of the first embodiment.
- the IMSI is used as the user identifier.
- the user identity privacy method in the paging process of the present invention specifically includes the following steps:
- S110 The MME determines that paging by using IMSI is required
- S120 The MME encrypts the IMSI by using the IMSI as a key to obtain the ciphertext S1;
- S130 The MME sends the ciphertext S1 to the eNB;
- S140 The eNB performs paging by using the ciphertext S I;
- the UE receives the paging message, encrypts the IMSI number of the UE by using the IMSI of the UE as a key, and obtains the ciphertext S2, and compares whether the ciphertext S1 and the ciphertext S2 are consistent. Calling yourself.
- the user identifier may be deformed, and the modified data is used as a key to generate the S 1 and S 2 . It should be noted that the deformation algorithm used by the MME and the UE should be consistent.
- the ciphertext is always the same. To avoid this, the following processing can be performed:
- a data X is randomly generated, and the random data X and the IMSI are combined into plaintext data Y. Then, the data Y is encrypted by using the IMSI as a key to obtain a ciphertext.
- Random data X The method of combining the IMSI into the plaintext data Y may be to place the user identifier in front of the random data X, thereby directly obtaining the data Y, or to place the random data X in front of the user identifier, thereby directly obtaining the data Y. Of course, other combinations can be used here.
- the UE After receiving the ciphertext and the random data X, the UE generates a ciphertext according to the random data X and the IMSI of the UE according to the same method as generating the ciphertext, that is, first combining the random data X and the IMSI into the plaintext.
- the random data X is combined with the IMSI of the UE into a plaintext data, and then the plaintext data is encrypted by using the IMSI of the UE as a key to obtain a ciphertext. Then compare the two ciphertexts, if they are consistent, then think that they are calling themselves.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the user identity security process in the paging process of the second embodiment.
- the user identity security method in the paging process of the present invention specifically includes the following steps: S210: The MME determines that the IMSI needs to be used. Paging;
- the MME uses the IMSI as a key to encrypt the plaintext data Y combined with the IMSI and the random data X to obtain the ciphertext S1.
- the MME sends the ciphertext S1 to the eNB for paging.
- S240 The eNB performs paging by using the ciphertext SI
- the UE receives the paging message, and according to the received random data X and its own IMSI, obtains the ciphertext S2 according to the same method as the MME generates the ciphertext, that is, first combines the random data X and the IMSI into the plaintext data Y. In the same manner, the random data X is combined with the IMSI of the UE into a plaintext data, and then the plaintext data is encrypted by using the IMSI of the UE as a key to obtain a ciphertext S2, and then the ciphertext S1 and S2 are compared. If the two ciphertexts are the same, the page is considered to be itself.
- the user identifier may be deformed, and the modified data is used as a key to generate the S 1 and S2, which should be described by the MME and the UE.
- the shape algorithm should be consistent.
- a data Z is randomly generated, and the IMSI and the random data Z are combined into a plaintext data.
- the data Y must contain the complete IMSI number at a specific location, which refers to the location where the subscriber identity appears in the data Y.
- the location of the subscriber identity appearing in the data Y should only be associated with the IMSI number.
- the method of combining the random data Z and the IMSI into the plaintext data Y may be to place the user identifier in front of the random data Z, thereby directly obtaining the data Y, or placing the random data Z in front of the user identifier, thereby directly obtaining Data Y.
- other combinations can be used here.
- the plaintext data is then encrypted with the IMSI number to obtain the ciphertext.
- the ciphertext is sent out.
- the called UE After receiving the ciphertext, the called UE decrypts with its own IMSI number to obtain plaintext data, and determines whether the plaintext data includes its own user identifier at the same location as the specific location, if it meets the same location as the specific location. Include your own user ID and think that you are paging yourself.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the user identity security process in the paging process of the third embodiment.
- the user identity security method in the paging process of the present invention specifically includes the following steps: S310: The MME determines that the IMSI needs to be used. Paging;
- S320 The MME uses the IMSI as a key to encrypt the plaintext data Y combined with the IMSI and the random data Z to obtain a ciphertext S1, where the plaintext data Y includes a complete IMSI number at a specific location;
- S330 The MME sends the ciphertext S1 to The eNB performs paging;
- S340 The eNB performs paging by using the ciphertext SI.
- S350 The UE receives the paging message, uses its own IMSI as a key, and decrypts S1, and determines whether the obtained plaintext includes the IMSI number at the same location as the specific location, if it is in the same location as the specific location. If the IMSI number is included, the page is considered to be itself.
- the user identifier may be modified, and the modified data is used as a key to generate the SI, and the UE also deforms its own user identifier by using the same deformation algorithm as the MME, and The deformed data is decrypted as a key pair S1 to obtain plaintext.
- the security device for identifying a user in the first paging process includes a paging originating device and a called user terminal.
- the paging initiating device is configured to encrypt the user identifier by using the user identifier of the called user terminal as a key, and use the obtained ciphertext to perform paging;
- the called user terminal is configured to use the user identifier as a key. Encrypting the user identifier to obtain a ciphertext, determining whether the ciphertext is the same as the ciphertext in the paging message received by the ciphertext, and if the same, determining that the ciphertext is the called user terminal of the paging.
- the security device for the user identification in the second paging process includes a paging initiating device and a called user terminal; wherein the paging initiating device is configured to randomly generate a data X, and the random data X and the called user terminal The user ID is combined into data Y, the user ID is used as a key, the data Y is encrypted, and the obtained ciphertext and random data X are used for paging; after the called user terminal receives the paging message, according to Combining the random data X with the user identifier into the same method as the data Y, combining the random data X with its own user identifier into a plaintext data, and then encrypting the plaintext data with the user identifier as a key, if the obtained ciphertext The same as the ciphertext in the received paging message, it is determined that it is the called user terminal of the paging.
- the security device for identifying the user in the third paging process of the present invention includes a paging initiating device and a called user terminal; wherein the paging initiating device is configured to randomly generate a data Z, and the random data Z and the called user terminal
- the user identifier is combined into data Y, and the data Y includes the user identifier at a specific location, wherein the specific location is the user identifier in the data Y
- the location of the occurrence, and only related to the user identifier then encrypting the data Y with the user identifier as a key, and using the obtained ciphertext for paging
- the called user terminal is used to: receive After paging the ciphertext in the message, decrypt it with its own user ID to obtain the plaintext data, and then check whether the plaintext data contains its own user identifier at the same location as the specific location, if it is included in the same location as the specific location.
- the user ID of the user considers himself to be the called user
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- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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JP2012529100A JP5613768B2 (ja) | 2009-09-17 | 2010-05-10 | 呼び出しプロセスのユーザ識別子の暗号化方法及び暗号化装置 |
US13/258,218 US20120170745A1 (en) | 2009-09-17 | 2010-05-10 | Method and device for encrypting user identity during paging procedure |
EP10816593.7A EP2479921A4 (en) | 2009-09-17 | 2010-05-10 | Method and device for encrypting user identity during paging procedure |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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CN200910177021.X | 2009-09-17 | ||
CN200910177021.XA CN102026174B (zh) | 2009-09-17 | 2009-09-17 | 一种寻呼过程中用户标识的保密方法及装置 |
Publications (1)
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WO2011032389A1 true WO2011032389A1 (zh) | 2011-03-24 |
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PCT/CN2010/072577 WO2011032389A1 (zh) | 2009-09-17 | 2010-05-10 | 一种寻呼过程中用户标识的保密方法及装置 |
Country Status (5)
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US (1) | US20120170745A1 (zh) |
EP (1) | EP2479921A4 (zh) |
JP (1) | JP5613768B2 (zh) |
CN (1) | CN102026174B (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2011032389A1 (zh) |
Cited By (1)
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US10721619B2 (en) | 2014-05-13 | 2020-07-21 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Methods and network nodes for managing wireless device associated information in a wireless communication network |
CN105142136B (zh) * | 2014-06-03 | 2018-11-16 | 展讯通信(上海)有限公司 | 一种防伪基站攻击的方法 |
US10149168B2 (en) * | 2015-12-16 | 2018-12-04 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Secured paging |
US10873464B2 (en) | 2016-03-10 | 2020-12-22 | Futurewei Technologies, Inc. | Authentication mechanism for 5G technologies |
KR102425368B1 (ko) * | 2016-05-02 | 2022-07-27 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 가상 sim 운용 방법 및 그 장치 |
WO2017207017A1 (en) | 2016-05-30 | 2017-12-07 | Telecom Italia S.P.A. | Protection of privacy in wireless telecommunication networks |
JP7049462B2 (ja) * | 2018-01-12 | 2022-04-06 | テレフオンアクチーボラゲット エルエム エリクソン(パブル) | 識別子プライバシーの管理 |
CN112134831B (zh) * | 2019-06-25 | 2023-02-21 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 接入请求的发送、处理方法及装置 |
CN113395697B (zh) * | 2020-03-12 | 2023-09-22 | 华为技术有限公司 | 传输寻呼信息的方法和通信装置 |
WO2023039871A1 (zh) * | 2021-09-18 | 2023-03-23 | 海能达通信股份有限公司 | 一种数据监听方法、装置、设备以及*** |
CN117675214A (zh) * | 2022-08-26 | 2024-03-08 | 维沃移动通信有限公司 | 寻呼消息处理方法、装置、通信设备及可读存储介质 |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN102026174B (zh) | 2014-03-12 |
US20120170745A1 (en) | 2012-07-05 |
CN102026174A (zh) | 2011-04-20 |
JP5613768B2 (ja) | 2014-10-29 |
EP2479921A4 (en) | 2017-07-12 |
JP2013504955A (ja) | 2013-02-07 |
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