WO2011020487A1 - Entité de réseau central, station de base de desserte, station de base cible et procédés configurés pour effectuer un contrôle d'accès pendant un transfert de communication dans un réseau de communications - Google Patents

Entité de réseau central, station de base de desserte, station de base cible et procédés configurés pour effectuer un contrôle d'accès pendant un transfert de communication dans un réseau de communications Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2011020487A1
WO2011020487A1 PCT/EP2009/060615 EP2009060615W WO2011020487A1 WO 2011020487 A1 WO2011020487 A1 WO 2011020487A1 EP 2009060615 W EP2009060615 W EP 2009060615W WO 2011020487 A1 WO2011020487 A1 WO 2011020487A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
base station
subscriber group
closed subscriber
access control
target base
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2009/060615
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English (en)
Inventor
Angelo Centonza
Original Assignee
Nokia Siemens Networks Oy
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nokia Siemens Networks Oy filed Critical Nokia Siemens Networks Oy
Priority to PCT/EP2009/060615 priority Critical patent/WO2011020487A1/fr
Publication of WO2011020487A1 publication Critical patent/WO2011020487A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/104—Grouping of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/76—Group identity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
    • H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
    • H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks
    • H04W84/042—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems
    • H04W84/045—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems using private Base Stations, e.g. femto Base Stations, home Node B

Definitions

  • Core network entity serving base station, target base station, and methods configured for performing access control during handover in a communications network
  • the present invention relates to access control during hand- over in a communications network.
  • the present invention refers to a core network entity configured for performing said access control, a serving base station supporting performing said access control, a target base station configured for performing said access control, and corre- sponding methods, a computer program product, and a data carrier used for said access control.
  • the present invention addresses access control during handover in a communications network.
  • CSG cell A cell supporting CSGs is called a CSG cell, and each CSG cell has an associated CSG Identifier (CSG ID), identifying the cell's CSG.
  • CSG cells can be spanned by different kinds of base stations, amongst them 3rd Generation (3G) Home NodeBs (HNBs), Long Term Evolution (LTE) Home eNodeBs (HeNBs), or macro NBs / macro eNBs .
  • 3G 3rd Generation
  • HNBs Home NodeBs
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • HeNBs Long Term Evolution
  • macro NBs macro / macro eNBs
  • HNBs / HeNBs can be served by an HNB Gateway / HeNB Gateway (HNB GW / HeNB GW) .
  • An HNB GW / HeNB GW is a node arranged between HNBs / HeNBs and the Core Network (CN) , masking the CN from any information concerning the HNBs / HeNBs connected to the HNB GW / HeNB GW.
  • the CN does not know of the existence of HNBs / HeNBs if they are connected to a HNB GW / HeNB GW. This is to avoid scalability issues at the CN due to very large numbers of HNBs / HeNBs deployed.
  • the HNB GW / HeNB GW is mandatory in the 3G case and optional in the LTE case.
  • a CSG cell only accepts mobile terminals that have been subscribed for the cell's CSG.
  • the respective access control procedure needs to be carried out in the CN, namely in the Mobility Management Entity (MME) in case of LTE, or in the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) .
  • Access control here means that the CN takes steps to make sure that a mobile terminal requesting handover to a CSG cell is actually subscribed to that CSG cell and therefore allowed to enter that CSG cell.
  • the message sent from the serving cell to the CN which requires for a handover (i.e. RELOCATION REQUIRED MESSAGE for 3G and HO REQUIRED MESSAGE for LTE) , identifies the target cell by cell identification parameters.
  • the target cell is identified within the Target ID Informa- tion Element with a Cell Global ID (CGI) and with a Tracking Area Identifier (TAI) .
  • CGI Cell Global ID
  • TAI Tracking Area Identifier
  • the latter assumption is incorrect if the HNBs / HeNBs are served by a HNB GW / HeNB GW.
  • the purpose of deploying a HNB GW / HeNB GW is that of hiding to the CN any detail about the HNBs / HeNBs served by the HNB GW / HeNB GW.
  • the CN does not know the mapping between CGI, TAI, or Location Area Code (LAC) and CSG ID of the HNB / HeNB cells connected to a HNB GW / HeNB GW.
  • CGI CGI
  • TAI Location Area Code
  • the mobile terminal could report a CSG ID for which it has access despite the target CSG cell is not accessible for the mobile terminal.
  • the result of an access control carried out by CN would therefore be positive, while the handover would fail as the mobile terminal is not a member of the target cell's CSG. This would lead to degraded quality of service or even call loss.
  • Object of the present invention is improving access control during handover in a communications network.
  • the object of the present invention is achieved by a method, said method configured for performing access control in a communications network during handover of a mobile terminal from a serving base station to a target base station, said target base station spanning a closed subscriber group cell, said method comprising
  • said first access control step comprises checking if said mobile terminal is associated to said first closed subscriber group identifier, and wherein said first access control step further comprises forwarding said first closed subscriber group identifier to said target base station from said core network entity if said mobile terminal is associated to said first closed subscriber group identifier; - performing a second access control step by said target base station, wherein said second access control step comprises accepting a request for said handover of said mobile terminal by said target base station if said first closed subscriber group identifier is equal to a second closed subscriber group identifier supported by said target base station.
  • the CN is able to perform access control for mobile terminals that are attempting to access a target cell which is a CSG cell spanned by the target base station, and which is served, e.g., by a Home NodeB or Home eNodeB connected to a Home NodeB Gateway or a Home eNodeB Gateway despite the fact that the Home NodeB Gateway or Home eNodeB Gateway hides any detail about the connected Home NodeBs or Home eNodeBs .
  • the object of the present invention is achieved by a computer program product comprising a code, the code being configured to implement and/or perform said method.
  • the object of the present invention is achieved by a data carrier comprising said computer program product.
  • the computer program product is configured to perform said method when the computer program product is executed by a processing unit like a processor, for example.
  • said second access control step further comprises rejecting a request for said handover of said mobile terminal by said core network entity, if said first closed subscriber group identifier is not equal to a second closed subscriber group identifier supported by said target base station.
  • the invention allows to reject a request for handover in case the signalled CSG ID is not supported by the target base station, e.g. due to erroneous or fake transmission of the CSG ID.
  • said signalling further comprises sending of a handover request message from said serving base station to said core network entity of said communications network, said handover request message comprising said first closed subscriber group identifier .
  • the invention allows signalling the CSG ID from the serving base station to the CN using the RELOCATION REQUIRED message in case of 3G or the HO message in case of LTE.
  • identi- bomb in said signalling said first closed subscriber group identi- bomb is signalled in a TARGET ID information element and in a Source to Target Transparent Container information element, said TARGET ID information element and said Source to Target Transparent Container information element being comprised in said handover request message.
  • the Source to Target Transparent Container IE By including the CSG ID in the Source to Target Transparent Container IE which is forwarded to the target base station, one can resolve the case where a mobile terminal provides a fake or erroneous target CSG ID, as in both the case of 3G and LTE the Source to Target Transparent Container IE is an IE sent from the serving base station to the target base station, transparently to the CN. This means that the CN does not access this IE nor it modifies it, which ensures that the target base station is able to perform access control based on the CSG ID reported by the mobile terminal.
  • said first closed sub- scriber group identifier is obtained from said TARGET ID information element by said core network entity.
  • said first closed sub- scriber group identifier is obtained from said Source to Target Transparent Container information element by said target base station.
  • the object of the present invention is achieved also by a serving base station in a communications network, said serving base station configured for signalling a closed subscriber group identifier to a core network entity of said communications network. Further, the object of the present invention is achieved by a method performed by a serving base station in a communications network, said method comprising signalling a closed subscriber group identifier to a core network entity of said communications network.
  • the object of the present invention is achieved also by a target base station, said target base station spanning a closed subscriber group, and said target base station configured to perform access control in a communications network during handover of a mobile terminal from a serving base station to said target base station, and said target base sta- tion further configured for:
  • the object of the present invention is achieved by a method performed by a target base station, said target base station spanning a closed subscriber group, said method configured for performing access control in a communications network during handover of a mobile terminal from a serving base station to said target base station, said method comprising
  • the object of the present invention is achieved also by a core network entity, said core network entity configured for performing access control in a communications network during handover of a mobile terminal from a serving base station to a target base station, said target base station spanning a closed subscriber group cell, said core network entity further configured for:
  • said access control step comprises checking if said mobile terminal is associated to said closed subscriber group identifier, and wherein said access control step further comprises forwarding said closed subscriber group identifier to said target base station if said mobile terminal is associated to said first closed subscriber group identifier.
  • the object of the present invention is achieved by a method performed by a core network entity, said method configured for performing access control in a communications network during handover of a mobile terminal from a serving base station to a target base station, said target base station spanning a closed subscriber group cell, said method comprising:
  • said access control step comprises checking if said mobile terminal is asso- ciated to said closed subscriber group identifier, and wherein said access control step further comprises forwarding said closed subscriber group identifier to said target base station if said mobile terminal is associated to said first closed subscriber group identifier.
  • said core network entity is a Mobility Management Entity or a Serving GPRS Support Node.
  • said invention is applicable in a 3G or LTE communications system.
  • said target base station is a Home NodeB, or a Home eNodeB, or a macro NodeB, or a macro eNodeB.
  • the proposed methods, serving base station, target base station, and core network entity have several advantages.
  • the invention allows the CN to perform access control for mobile terminals that are attempting to access a CSG cell served, e.g., by a Home NodeB or Home eNodeB connected to a Home NodeB Gateway or a Home eNodeB Gateway.
  • the invention enables the target base station to check if the CSG ID reported by the mobile terminal as part of the target base station measurement report is correct or fake/erroneous. In case of an incorrect CSG ID, the handover request is rejected, and an appropriate cause value is provided in the handover rejection message, allowing a controlled failure of the handover request instead of, e.g., a complete call loss.
  • the present invention further allows maintaining the perceived quality of service while the mobile terminal is moving, as well as performing cell changes during active services/calls by avoiding transitions to target CSG cells which are no longer accessible due to, e.g., network reconfigurations .
  • Home NodeBs / Home eNodeBs connected to a Home Node B Gateway / Home eNodeB Gateway benefit from this inven- tion, since the core network, i.e. the core network entity
  • MME or SGSN are not able to perform CSG cell access control properly in those cases, as Home NodeB / Home eNodeB specific information is hidden by the Home NodeB Gateway /Home eNodeB Gateway, with the core network assuming any kind of RNC.
  • Fig. 1 shows an implementation of the present invention according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Fig. 1 shows an implementation of the present invention ac- cording to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the CSG ID associated to the target base station, said target base station spanning a CSG cell is included in the TARGET ID Information EIe- ment (IE) as specified for LTE in 3GPP specification document TS 36.413.
  • IE TARGET ID Information EIe- ment
  • the proposed modification of said TARGET ID IE can be seen in table 1 :
  • Table 1 Example of modified TARGET ID IE for LTE HO REQUIRED messages
  • the SGSN responsible for carrying out the access control during handover is able to find all the information needed on the target cell within the same IE.
  • Such information comprises identity parameters (such as CGI and TAI) and CSG ID.
  • identity parameters such as CGI and TAI
  • CSG ID the CSG ID of the target CSG cell is included in the Source to Target Transparent Container IE.
  • the Source to Target Transparent Container IE is an IE sent from the serving base station to the target base station, transparently to the CN. This means that the CN does not access this IE nor does the CN modify the IE.
  • the IE is generated by the serving base station and included in the HO / RELOCATION REQUIRED message from the serving base station to the CN. Once the message reaches the CN, the Source to Target Transparent Container IE is extracted and included in the subsequent HO / RELOCATION REQUEST message from the CN to the target cell.
  • the format of the Source to Target Transparent Container IE changes depending on whether the handover is an inter- or an intra-system handover.
  • the container shall be encoded according to the definition of the Source eNB to Target eNB Transparent Container IE.
  • the in- formation in the Source to Target Transparent Container IE shall be encoded according to the Source RNC to Target RNC Transparent Container IE definition (defined in 3GPP specification documents TS 36.413 and TS 25.413).
  • the CSG ID of the target CSG cell available to the serving base station is derived from measurements reports provided by the mobile terminal.
  • the CSG ID in the Source to Target Transparent Container IE one can resolve the case where a mobile terminal provides a fake or erroneous target CSG ID.
  • the handover procedure is carried out towards the target cell, spanned by the target base station.
  • the CSG ID provided by the mobile terminal is included in the Source to Target Transparent Container IE. If the CSG ID reported by the mobile terminal does not correspond to the CSG ID of the target cell, this can be detected once the HO / RELOCATION REQUEST message (from CN to the target base station) reaches the target CSG cell.
  • This message includes the Source to Target Transparent Container IE, and if the target base station realises that the CSG ID contained in the Source to Target Transparent Container IE is different from the one supported by the target base station, the handover procedure is rejected.
  • Fig. 1 shows an exemplary access control procedure carried out according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the figure represents the case where the CSG ID included in the Source to Target Transparent Container IE is different from that supported by the target CSG cell.
  • the communications system in this example can be a 3G or an LTE communications system.
  • the present invention is not restricted to these kinds of communications networks only and that the present invention can be used accordingly also in further communications networks providing access control during handover of a mobile terminal.
  • the communications system according to Fig. 1 comprises a mobile terminal 11, a serving base station 12, a target base station 13, and a core network entity 14.
  • the target base station 13 spans a CSG cell, with a CSG ID associated to the CSG cell, the CSG ID identifying a CSG, and with the CSG comprising subscribers, i.e. mobile terminals, allowed to access the CSG cell spanned by the target base station 13.
  • Said measurement report comprises a CSG ID and a CGI associated to the target base station 13.
  • the serving base station 12 performs a signalling 16 to the core network entity 14.
  • the core network entity 14 might be an SGSN.
  • the core network entity 14 might be an MME.
  • the signalling 16 comprises sending of a handover request message, with the handover request message comprising, besides other data necessary for the handover, the CGI ID.
  • the handover request message is a RELOCATION REQUIRED MESSAGE in case of 3G and HO REQUIRED MESSAGE in case LTE.
  • This handover request message identifies the target base station 13 (or the respective target cell) by cell identification parameters comprised in the handover request message .
  • the CSG ID is signalled in a TARGET ID information element and in a Source to Target Transparent Container information element, said TARGET ID information element and said Source to Target Transparent Container information element being comprised in said handover request mes- sage.
  • This first access control step comprises checking if the mobile terminal 11 requesting handover is associated to the CSG ID contained in the handover request message. In case the mobile terminal 11 is associated to the signalled CSG ID, i.e. if the mobile terminal 11 is subscribed to the corresponding CSG, the core network entity 14 forwards the handover request message to the target base station 13.
  • the CSG ID used for the first access control step 17, 18 is obtained from the TARGET ID information element in the handover request message.
  • the CSG ID comprised in the Source To Target Transparent Container is not equal to the current CSG ID of the target base station 13. Therefore, the target base station 13 performs rejecting 19, 20 of a request for said handover by sending a HO / RELOCATION FAILURE message to the core network en- tity 14.
  • the core network entity 14 finally performs a handover failure procedure 21 by sending a HO / RELOCATION
  • PREPARATION FAILURE message to the serving base station 12, signalling within the HO / RELOCATION PREPARATION FAILURE message the reason for the failure of the requested handover, i.e. the wrong CSG ID comprised in the handover request message .
  • the CSG ID comprised in the Source To Target Trans- parent Container is equal to the current CSG ID of the target base station 13. Therefore, the target base station 13 performs accepting a request for said handover. Consequently, the core network entity 14 initiates further handover procedures to accomplish the handover of the mobile terminal 11 to the target base station 13 (not shown in Fig. 1) .
  • the present invention is explained by use of embodiments referring in particular to performing access control during handover in 3G and LTE communications networks.
  • the present invention can be implemented accordingly also in further types of communications networks, in which access control during handover is performed.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention se rapporte à un contrôle d'accès pendant un transfert de communication dans un réseau de communications. La présente invention concerne un procédé, ledit procédé étant configuré pour effectuer un contrôle d'accès dans un réseau de communications pendant le transfert de communication d'un terminal mobile depuis une station de base de desserte vers une station de base cible, ladite station de base cible couvrant une cellule d'un groupe fermé d'abonnés, ledit procédé comprenant une première étape de contrôle d'accès effectuée par ladite entité de réseau central et une seconde étape de contrôle d'accès effectuée par ladite station de base cible. Si l'identifiant dudit premier groupe fermé d'abonnés est égal à l'identifiant d'un second groupe fermé d'abonnés pris en charge par ladite station de base cible, une demande pour ledit transfert de communication est acceptée par la station de base cible, sinon la demande pour ledit transfert de communication est rejetée. La présente invention fait en outre référence à une entité de réseau central, à une station de base de desserte, à une station de base cible et à des procédés correspondants, des produits-programmes informatiques et supports de données utilisés pour ledit contrôle d'accès.
PCT/EP2009/060615 2009-08-17 2009-08-17 Entité de réseau central, station de base de desserte, station de base cible et procédés configurés pour effectuer un contrôle d'accès pendant un transfert de communication dans un réseau de communications WO2011020487A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/EP2009/060615 WO2011020487A1 (fr) 2009-08-17 2009-08-17 Entité de réseau central, station de base de desserte, station de base cible et procédés configurés pour effectuer un contrôle d'accès pendant un transfert de communication dans un réseau de communications

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PCT/EP2009/060615 WO2011020487A1 (fr) 2009-08-17 2009-08-17 Entité de réseau central, station de base de desserte, station de base cible et procédés configurés pour effectuer un contrôle d'accès pendant un transfert de communication dans un réseau de communications

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Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
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CN113676972A (zh) * 2016-08-10 2021-11-19 日本电气株式会社 无线接入网节点及其方法
WO2023070587A1 (fr) * 2021-10-29 2023-05-04 Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 Procédé et appareil de commutation d'accès au réseau, ainsi que dispositif et support de stockage
US11979787B2 (en) 2016-08-10 2024-05-07 Nec Corporation Radio access network node, radio terminal, and method therefor

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Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN113676972A (zh) * 2016-08-10 2021-11-19 日本电气株式会社 无线接入网节点及其方法
US11979787B2 (en) 2016-08-10 2024-05-07 Nec Corporation Radio access network node, radio terminal, and method therefor
WO2023070587A1 (fr) * 2021-10-29 2023-05-04 Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 Procédé et appareil de commutation d'accès au réseau, ainsi que dispositif et support de stockage

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