WO2009107351A1 - 情報セキュリティ装置および情報セキュリティシステム - Google Patents
情報セキュリティ装置および情報セキュリティシステム Download PDFInfo
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- WO2009107351A1 WO2009107351A1 PCT/JP2009/000761 JP2009000761W WO2009107351A1 WO 2009107351 A1 WO2009107351 A1 WO 2009107351A1 JP 2009000761 W JP2009000761 W JP 2009000761W WO 2009107351 A1 WO2009107351 A1 WO 2009107351A1
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Definitions
- the present invention relates to a technique for migrating secret data between security terminals.
- TCG Trusted Computing Group
- TPM Trusted Platform Module
- Non-Patent Document 1 relating to the TCG standard discloses a method for safely backing up data to be concealed and a technique for migrating (data movement) to another terminal using the Protected Storage technology.
- both devices use the same encryption algorithm, and both devices comply with the same standard and have received the same level of security authentication. Since it is premised, if both of these devices are different, it is not possible to cope with it sufficiently.
- the present invention solves the conventional problems, and provides a migration device, a migration system, a migration and a security terminal that can safely migrate data between devices having different encryption algorithms and different security authentication levels. It is intended to provide.
- a migration apparatus is a migration apparatus that moves data protected in a first terminal to a second terminal.
- Receiving means for receiving secret data protected by a first encryption algorithm in a security module in the first terminal and receiving a download request for the secret data from the second terminal; and sending from the first terminal Identifying means for identifying the first cryptographic algorithm from the received certificate and identifying the second cryptographic algorithm used by the security module in the second terminal from the certificate sent from the second terminal; , Holding means for holding a security policy table in which the first encryption algorithm and the second encryption algorithm are associated with each other
- the secret data is re-protected from the first encryption algorithm with the second encryption algorithm according to the security policy table and transmitted to the second terminal.
- control means is configured to transmit the secret data prior to transmitting the secret data re-protected from the first encryption algorithm with the second encryption algorithm to the second terminal.
- control means uses the lowest evaluation level required by the first terminal for the device that is the destination of the secret data, and the second terminal is suitable as the destination of the secret data. Judge whether there is.
- the minimum evaluation level is considered to be determined by the user of the first terminal in consideration of the importance of the secret data. Therefore, there is an excellent effect that it is possible to avoid a situation in which the secret data is unintentionally migrated to a device that cannot ensure the level of safety intended by the user of the first terminal.
- the secret data is protected again according to the security policy table, even if the encryption algorithm employed by each of the first terminal and the second terminal is different, depending on the encryption algorithm employed by each device, There is also an effect that the secret data can be transmitted and received safely.
- the figure which shows the result of having regenerated the Migration Package in Embodiment 1 of the present invention given the encryption parameter 1302 The figure which shows the result of having regenerated the Migration Package in Embodiment 1 of the present invention given the encryption parameter 1402
- the figure which shows the result of having regenerated the Migration Package in Embodiment 1 of the present invention given the encryption parameter 1502 The figure which showed the structure of the content management table 1601 and the content management table 1602 in Embodiment 2 of this invention.
- movement procedure at the time of the DRM application of the 1st electronic terminal 102 in Embodiment 2 of this invention uploading secret data with respect to Migration Authority 101 The figure which shows the whole structure in Embodiment 3 of this invention.
- Migration Authority 102 1st electronic terminal 103 2nd electronic terminal 201 TrustedPlatformModule 202 TCGSoftwareStack 203 Local Migration Services 204 Controlling Application 205 LocalApplication 206 I / O Means 207 Storage Area 210 AIK Certificate 211 Information Management Certificate 212 Conformance Certificate 215 Secret Data 500 Data Receiving Means 501 Attestation Processing Means 502 Certificate Analysis Means 503 Migration Package Registration Means 504 Migrate Acceptability Determining Means 505 Migration Means Regeneration Means 506 Data transmission means 507 Storage area 601 Migration Package management table 701 Encryption strength table 801 Authentication level determination table 1201 Encryption parameter 1301 Regeneration example 1302 Encryption parameter 1401 Regeneration example 1402 Encryption parameter 1501 Regeneration example 1502 Encryption parameter 1601 Contents Management table 1602 Content management Buru 1701 right management table 1702 right protection key table 1703 at variable key 1704 right management table 1705 right protection key table 1706 at varying key 1801 movement key 1802 movement for the
- a migration apparatus is a migration apparatus that moves data protected in a first terminal to a second terminal, and the migration apparatus moves from the first terminal to the first terminal. Receiving the secret data protected by the first encryption algorithm in the security module and receiving the secret data download request from the second terminal, and the certificate sent from the first terminal.
- Identifying means for identifying the first cryptographic algorithm and identifying a second cryptographic algorithm used in a security module in the second terminal from a certificate sent from the second terminal; Holding means for holding a security policy table in which an encryption algorithm and the second encryption algorithm are associated; and Control that, when a request is received from the second terminal, re-protects the secret data with the second encryption algorithm instead of the first encryption algorithm in accordance with the security policy table, and transmits it to the second terminal And the control means is configured to transmit the secret data prior to transmitting the secret data re-protected from the first encryption algorithm with the second encryption algorithm to the second terminal.
- the secret data mended and transmits to the second terminal.
- the migration apparatus wherein the first terminal realizes an execution environment that performs processing using the secret data by a virtual machine, and the execution environment. And moving means for removing the secret data from the virtual machine and moving the virtual machine from which the secret data has been removed to the second terminal through a route different from the secret data.
- the Virtual Machines 2604 and 2605 in the following embodiment correspond to the virtual machine.
- a virtual machine virtualizes a computer's physical resources, such as a CPU and memory, and the physical resources, making it appear that a plurality of platforms exist in parallel, or an application that does not originally operate on the computer It is a group of programs that realize a platform that can operate.
- the virtual machine when moving the entire virtual machine including secret data, the total data size becomes considerably large.
- the technique concerning a virtual machine is already well-known, and it is thought that many programs mentioned above need to be kept secret. For this reason, if the secret data is not included, the virtual machine may be moved by another high-speed moving method without using the migration apparatus.
- the control unit removes the secret data from the virtual machine, and moves the virtual machine from which the secret data has been removed to the second terminal through a route different from the secret data. Therefore, the migration apparatus safely moves only the secret data that needs to be protected from the first terminal to the second terminal, and transfers the virtual machine from the first terminal to the second terminal. Of these, it is possible to simultaneously move parts other than secret data.
- the correspondence relationship between the first encryption algorithm and the second encryption algorithm indicated by the security policy table is an encryption strength of the second encryption algorithm. Including a case where the level is lower than the level of the first encryption strength.
- the second security policy stores a first security authentication level of the first terminal and a second security authentication level of the second terminal.
- a table is provided, and the control means includes the second terminal according to the second security policy table even when the second encryption algorithm corresponding to the first encryption algorithm exists according to the security policy table. If the difference between the second security authentication level of the first terminal and the first security authentication level of the first terminal is greater than or equal to a predetermined value, it is prohibited to protect the secret data with the second encryption algorithm.
- the second security policy stores a first security authentication level of the first terminal and a second security authentication level of the second terminal.
- a table is provided, and the control means includes the second terminal according to the second security policy table even when the second encryption algorithm corresponding to the first encryption algorithm exists according to the security policy table. If the difference between the second security authentication level of the first terminal and the first security authentication level of the first terminal is greater than or equal to a predetermined value, the secret data is re-protected with the second encryption algorithm and the second terminal is protected. It is characterized by prohibiting transmission to.
- the level of the cryptographic strength of the first cryptographic algorithm is represented by a length of a key used in the first cryptographic algorithm
- the first The encryption strength level of the second encryption algorithm is represented by a key length used in the second encryption algorithm.
- the migration apparatus identifies a type of the first cryptographic algorithm and a key length, identifies a type of the second cryptographic algorithm, and the holding Means for indicating the key length of the cryptographic algorithm type corresponding to the second cryptographic algorithm such that the cryptographic strength level is the same as the cryptographic algorithm type and key length corresponding to the first cryptographic algorithm; Holds a policy table,
- the control means when reprotecting the secret data with the second encryption algorithm instead of the first encryption algorithm according to the security policy table, the second corresponding to the key length of the first encryption algorithm. It is characterized by reprotecting using the key length of the encryption algorithm.
- the migration apparatus wherein the identification unit identifies a type and a key length of the first cryptographic algorithm, identifies a type of the second cryptographic algorithm, and holds the data.
- Means holds the security policy table in which key lengths having the same encryption strength level are associated among a plurality of encryption algorithms, and the control means transfers the secret data to the first encryption algorithm according to the security policy table
- the encryption corresponding to the second encryption algorithm has the same encryption strength level as the type and key length of the encryption algorithm corresponding to the first encryption algorithm.
- a key length of an algorithm type is searched and the first key corresponding to the key length of the first cryptographic algorithm is searched. And wherein the re-protected with a key length of the cryptographic algorithm.
- the security policy table is transmitted from the first terminal to the migration apparatus.
- the receiving means encrypts using the master key from the second terminal, information indicating an encryption algorithm when using the master key, and the master key.
- Information indicating a range to be transmitted, and the control means uses the received parent key and an encryption algorithm when the parent key is used, based on the information indicating the range to be encrypted using the parent key, Only the top data of the secret data is protected.
- the receiving means receives a parent key and information indicating an encryption algorithm when using the parent key from the second terminal, and the control means A second key different from the received parent key is generated, and the secret data is protected by using an encryption algorithm when the second key and the parent key are used.
- control unit generates a second key different from the received parent key in a layer below the parent key.
- the receiving means receives a public key and information indicating an encryption algorithm when using the public key from the second terminal, and the control means The secret data is protected by using the received public key and a cryptographic algorithm when the public key is used.
- the receiving means receives a secret key and information indicating an encryption algorithm when the secret key is used from the second terminal, and the control means The secret data is protected by using the received secret key and an encryption algorithm when the secret key is used.
- the receiving means receives a master key from the second terminal, and the control means is a level of encryption strength indicated by the received master key. The entire secret data is protected at the same level.
- the migration apparatus wherein the receiving means receives information indicating a cryptographic strength level from the second terminal, and the control means indicates the received information.
- the secret data is protected at the same level as the encryption strength level.
- the receiving means requests information at the same level as the encryption strength level when the first terminal protects the secret data. From the second terminal, and the control means protects the secret data at the same level as the encryption strength when the first terminal protected the secret data based on the received information. It is characterized by doing.
- the migration device includes a migration server.
- a migration device is included in the first terminal.
- a migration system is a migration system that moves secret data to be concealed from a first terminal device to a second terminal device via a migration device.
- the first terminal includes a first execution unit that implements an execution environment for performing the processing used by a virtual machine, a transmission unit that securely transmits the secret data to the migration apparatus, and a virtual machine that implements the execution environment.
- the receiving means for securely receiving the secret data and the evaluation level relating to the security of the second terminal are Judgment means for judging whether or not the device for acquiring the secret data is equal to or higher than the lowest evaluation level, and when the evaluation level is equal to or higher than the lowest evaluation level, the secret data is suitable for the second terminal.
- the terminal of 2 receives the virtual machine from the receiving means for securely receiving the secret data, an execution environment for acquiring a virtual machine from the first terminal and performing processing using the received secret data. And a second execution means realized by using the second execution means.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an overall configuration of a system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- the migration authority 101 communicates with an electronic terminal via a network to provide a secret data migration service.
- the Migration Authority 101 is a server that manages the migration of secret data between electronic terminals.
- the first electronic terminal 102 is a computer system composed of components such as a CPU and a RAM. Generally, it is realized by a PC, a mobile phone, a PDA, or the like, but is not limited thereto.
- the first electronic terminal 102 includes a secure platform centered on a security module called Trusted Platform Module (TPM) defined by TCG.
- TPM Trusted Platform Module
- the TPM supports a technology for securely storing secret data called Protected Storage.
- Protected Storage data is managed in a tree structure, and data assigned to a leaf of the tree structure is hierarchically encrypted and protected with a node and a key assigned to the root from the root to the leaf.
- a public key encryption key (root key) called asymmetric SRK (Storage Root Key) is assigned to the root of the tree structure.
- the second electronic terminal 103 is a computer system composed of components such as a CPU and a RAM. Generally, it is realized by a PC, a mobile phone, a PDA, or the like, but is not limited thereto. Similar to the first electronic terminal 102, the second electronic terminal 103 includes a secure platform centered on a security module called Trusted Platform Module (TPM) defined by TCG. Like the first electronic terminal 102, the second electronic terminal 103 supports the Protected Storage technology and manages data in a tree structure. However, the root key is not a public key encryption key but a secret key encryption key called symmetric SRK.
- TPM Trusted Platform Module
- FIG. 2 is a diagram showing the configuration of the first electronic terminal 102 and the second electronic terminal 103.
- TrustedPlatformModule 201 is a security module defined by TCG. It has a cryptographic engine and non-volatile memory. The details are described in “TPM Main Part 1, 2, 3 Design Principles”, and thus the description is omitted.
- TPM Trusted Platform Module
- Mobile Trusted Module in TCG Mobile PhoneWG
- the mounting method is generally realized by hardware using a semiconductor, but may be realized by software.
- the TCGSoftwareStack 202 is a software library group that provides services to various applications on a secure platform including the Trusted Platform Module 201. For details, refer to “TCG Software Stack (TSS) Specification Version 1.2. Since it is described in “Level 1 Errata A”, the description is omitted.
- the Local Migration Services 203 is a module on the client side for realizing a data migration service. Since details are described in Non-Patent Document 1, description thereof is omitted.
- the Controlling Application 204 is a module on the client side for controlling the migration process in the client. Since details are described in Non-Patent Document 1, description thereof is omitted.
- LocalApplication 205 is a general application that uses a data migration service. Examples include a Digital Rights Management (DRM) application for managing rights of digital contents such as music and video, an application such as an address book, and credit payment, but is not limited thereto.
- DRM Digital Rights Management
- the input / output unit 206 transmits / receives data to / from the migration authority 101.
- the storage area 207 stores the AIK certificate 210, the information management certificate 211, and the like. Generally, it is realized by an HDD, a flash memory, or the like, but is not limited to this as long as it has a function of storing information.
- the AIK certificate 210 is a certificate called Attestation Identity Key Credential. In this embodiment, it is assumed that it is issued by the Migration Authority 101. The AIK certificate 210 is used for confirming that the TPM has an AIK (Attestation Identity Key). Details are described in “TCG Specification Architecture Overview”, and thus description thereof is omitted.
- the information management certificate 211 is used for confirming the management method of the secret data 215. In this embodiment, it is assumed that it is issued by the Migration Authority 101. Details are described in “TCG Specification Architecture Overview”, and thus description thereof is omitted.
- the conformance certificate 212 is an attribute certificate that proves compliance with the TCG evaluation standards. Generally issued by the organization that performs the evaluation. In the present embodiment, it is assumed that it is issued by the Migration Authority 101.
- AIK certificate 210 the information management certificate 211, and the confirmation certificate 212 have been described as separate certificates, these may be combined into one certificate.
- the secret data 215 is a set of secret data managed using SRK (Storage Root Key). This includes AIK (Attestation Identity Key).
- SRK Storage Root Key
- AIK Attestation Identity Key
- the secret data protected by the SRK defined by the TCG is generally managed in a tree structure, but the details are described in “TCG Specification Architecture Overview”, and thus the description thereof is omitted.
- the secret data includes a key, but a parameter indicating the generation time and lifetime of the key may be included.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram showing the configuration of the information management certificate 211.
- the information management certificate 211 has a data structure including four data.
- the first is SRKType. This is data of data type indicating whether a method using public key encryption or a method using secret key encryption is used as a method for managing secret data.
- CihperType This is data of the data type shown for the encryption algorithm used in the secret data management method.
- cryptographic algorithms include, but are not limited to, RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman) cipher, ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem) cipher, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) cipher, and the like.
- the third is Key Length. This is data of the data type indicating the key length of the encryption key used in the secret data management method.
- the fourth is a digital signature. Data obtained by encrypting digest values of data types 1 to 3 with the secret key of the migration authority 101 is entered.
- the information management certificate 211 may include data indicating whether or not the key management function is provided.
- FIG. 4 is a diagram showing the configuration of the conformance certificate 212.
- the conformance certificate 212 has a data structure including nine pieces of data. The first is data indicating the Evaluate level. It is expressed by a level certified based on a security evaluation standard defined by ISO / IEC15408. EAL is an abbreviation for Evaluation Assurance Level. The larger the number given behind, the higher the level of assurance requirements. Also, since a level such as “EAL4 +” has been established, data added according to changes in the times may be added as data handled in this area. In addition, this area is not necessarily an area used only for the level certified based on ISO / IEC15408, but is an area where a trader such as a communication carrier can arbitrarily determine the level and use it.
- the second is data for specifying the specification of the security evaluation standard used for the Evaluate level.
- ISO / IEC15408 also includes ISO / IEC15408: 1999 formulated in 1999 and ISO / IEC15408: 2005 formulated in 2005, and the target specification of the evaluation standard is specified with reference to this area.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram showing the configuration of the Migration Authority 101.
- the data receiving means 500 receives data necessary for uploading and downloading of a migration package and various processes from the electronic device 102 and the electronic device 103.
- the attestation processing means 501 performs the attestation processing when the electronic terminal accesses the migration authority 101. If the electronic terminal is fraudulent by the Attestation process, the fraud can be discovered. Since Attestation is described in “TCG Specification Architecture Overview”, a detailed description thereof is omitted. The result of the Attestation is sent to the electronic terminal through the data transmission means 506.
- the certificate analysis unit 502 analyzes whether the certificate sent from the electronic device serving as the migration source or the electronic device serving as the migration destination is valid. It is assumed that a public key and a secret key pair used in the RSA cryptographic calculation function, the RSA cryptographic calculation function, and a SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) 1 calculation function are provided.
- the verification method using the public key encryption defined by the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used for verifying the validity of the certificate. Since verification using PKI is common, a description thereof will be omitted. Note that the method is not limited to this as long as the method can prove the validity of the certificate.
- some certificates may be issued by other than Migration Authority 101, in the present embodiment, all certificates are issued by other than Migration Authority 101, and description of cases where the certificate is issued by other than Migration Authority 101 is omitted. To do.
- the result of the certificate verification is sent to the electronic terminal through the data transmission means 506.
- the migration package registration unit 503 registers the migration package storing the secret data sent from the electronic device 102 or the electronic device 103 in the migration package management table 601 described later, and saves it in the storage area 507.
- the migration permission determination unit 504 responds to a migration package transmission request sent from the electronic device 102 or the electronic device 103, a migration package ID described later, an encrypted parent key described later, an encryption parameter 1201 described later, and a configuration certificate 212. Then, it is determined from the information management certificate 211 whether migration is possible. For the determination, an encryption strength table 701 described later, an authentication level determination table 801 described later, and a migration package management table 601 described later are used. When it is determined that migration is possible, a migration package regeneration request is issued to the migration package regeneration unit 505.
- the migration permission determination unit 504 determines based on the migration package management table 601, a method may be used in which the determination is performed by directly accessing the certificate information.
- the migration package regeneration unit 505 When the migration package regeneration unit 505 receives the migration package ID, the encrypted parent key, the encryption parameter, the configuration certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211 together with the migration package regeneration request from the migration rate determination unit 504, the migration package regeneration unit 505 performs the encryption conversion of the migration package. And regenerate. Details of the regeneration procedure will be described later.
- the regenerated migration package is sent to the data transmission unit 506.
- the data transmission unit 506 When the data transmission unit 506 receives the migration package from the migration permission determination unit 504, the data transmission unit 506 extracts the migration package from the storage area 507 and transmits the migration package to the electronic device 102 or the electronic device 103.
- FIG. 6 is a diagram showing the configuration of the Migration Package management table 601.
- the table includes data such as a migration package ID for specifying the migration package in the migration authority 101, and a full path file name of the storage area 507 in which the migration package is stored.
- the other parameters are the same as the evaluation levels of the information management certificate 211 and the configuration certificate 212, and thus the description thereof is omitted.
- FIG. 7 is a diagram showing the configuration of the encryption strength table 701.
- the table includes parameters such as strength level, secret key encryption algorithm key length, RSA algorithm key length, and ECC algorithm key length.
- the key length when using the secret key encryption algorithm is 80 bits
- the key length when using the RSA algorithm is 1024 bits
- the key length when using the ECC algorithm Indicates 160 bits.
- the cryptographic strength table 701 is based on the assumption that no vulnerability has been found in the cryptographic algorithm. If a vulnerability is discovered by an encryption algorithm, an additional key length is required, so the encryption strength table 701 changes with time. Therefore, the encryption strength table 701 may be updated as appropriate from a third party such as a certificate authority. By updating, it becomes possible to evaluate the latest encryption strength and to support encryption algorithms.
- Migrate availability determination means 504 uses this encryption strength table 701 to make a determination according to a determination algorithm that permits migration when the strength level of the electronic device to be migrated is equal to or higher than that of the migration source. This is to prevent the strength from being lowered by the Migrate.
- the Migrate destination is permitted if one or more authentication levels are lowered, or is not permitted unless one or more authentication levels are higher.
- the configuration may be such that the migration source can specify the determination algorithm used by the migration permission determination unit 504. Further, the configuration may be such that the encryption source can send the encryption strength table 701 and the authentication level determination table 801 used for determination to the migration authority 101 and specify them.
- FIG. 8 is a diagram showing the configuration of the authentication level determination table 801.
- the authentication level semi-established indicates a security policy regarding when the migration authority permits the migration.
- the table is composed of parameters such as the Migrate source authentication level and the Migrate destination authentication level.
- the authentication level determination table 801 indicates that when the migration source authentication level is EAL1, the migration destination authentication level may be any (ANY).
- EAL2 requires EAL1 or higher
- EAL3 requires EAL2 or higher
- EAL4 requires EAL3 or higher.
- EAL5 and above the same authentication level is required even at the migration destination. As long as it is other than EAL1-7, any Migrate destination authentication level may be used.
- the migration destination may be one lower than the authentication level, but it may be equal or higher.
- FIG. 9 is a diagram illustrating an operation procedure when the first electronic terminal 102 uploads secret data to the migration authority 101. Hereinafter, this operation procedure will be described.
- the first electronic terminal 102 prepares to upload the secret data.
- One or a plurality of secret data to be uploaded is aggregated to generate a set of data called a migration package.
- the details of the migration package are described in Non-Patent Document 1, and thus the description thereof is omitted.
- the first electronic terminal 102 uses a function called “Integrity Measurement” defined by the TCG, and all or part of software such as a boot loader, OS, device driver, and application constituting the first electronic terminal 102.
- the digest value calculated for the target is taken out from a register called Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) in the Trusted Platform Module 201. Then, the digest value is digitally signed in the Trusted Platform Module 201 using the AIK included in the secret data 215.
- PCR Platform Configuration Registers
- a request for uploading the migration package is made from the first electronic terminal 102 to the migration authority 101.
- the first electronic terminal 102 sends the digest value, the digital signature, and the AIK certificate 210 to the Migration Authority 101 together with the request.
- Integrity Reporting Sending the digest value and digital signature is called Integrity Reporting. Since Integrity Reporting is described in “TCG Specification Architecture Overview”, detailed description thereof is omitted.
- the migration authority 101 receives the upload request for the migration package from the first electronic terminal 102.
- the digest value, digital signature, and AIK certificate 210 received at the same time are sent to the attestation processing means 501.
- the attestation processing means 501 verifies whether or not the first electronic terminal 102 is an unauthorized terminal by executing the attestation attestation process.
- An unauthorized terminal is a terminal that has been falsified by a malicious user or a virus and that operates unexpectedly.
- the first electronic terminal 102 performs the following operation in accordance with the information received from the Migration Authority 101.
- the migration package is encrypted using MApubKey.
- the method is not particularly limited as long as the migration package is handled safely. For example, after mutual authentication between the first electronic terminal 102 and the migration authority 101, a shared key called a session key used temporarily may be held, and encrypted communication may be performed using the session key.
- the first electronic terminal 102 sends the migration package, the conformance certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211 encrypted in (S905) to the migration authority 101.
- the migration package, the configuration certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211 are handled as separate data, but each certificate may be included in the migration package.
- the migration authority 101 receives the migration package, the conformance certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211.
- the data receiving unit 500 sends the data to the certificate analyzing unit 502.
- the certificate analysis unit 502 verifies the validity of these certificates, and performs the following operation according to the verification result.
- the migration package registration unit 503 When the migration package registration unit 503 receives the migration package, the configuration certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211 from the certificate analysis unit 502, the migration package registration unit 503 generates a migration package ID that uniquely identifies the migration package with the migration authority 101, and saves the migration package 50 in the storage area 50. Also, data is extracted from the storage destination and each certificate and registered in the migration package management table.
- FIG. 10 is a diagram illustrating an operation procedure when the second electronic terminal 103 downloads secret data from the migration authority 101. Hereinafter, this operation procedure will be described.
- the second electronic terminal 103 prepares to download the Migration Package. Specifically, the second electronic terminal 103 uses all of the software such as a boot loader, an OS, a device driver, and an application constituting the second electronic terminal 103 by using a function called Integrity Measurement defined by TCG or The digest value calculated for a part is extracted from a register called Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) in the Trusted Platform Module 201. Then, the digest value is digitally signed in the Trusted Platform Module 201 using the AIK included in the secret data 215.
- PCR Platform Configuration Registers
- a request (Download request) to download the Migration Package is made from the second electronic terminal 103 to the Migration Authority 101.
- the second electronic terminal 103 sends the digest value, the digital signature, and the AIK certificate 210 to the Migration Authority 101 along with the request.
- the migration authority 101 receives a download request for the migration package from the second electronic terminal 103.
- the digest value, digital signature, and AIK certificate 210 received at the same time are sent to the attestation processing means 501.
- the attestation processing unit 501 verifies whether or not the second electronic terminal 103 is an unauthorized terminal by executing the attestation attestation process.
- the Migration Authority 101 sends OK of the Attestation result and the public key (MApubKey) of the Migration Authority 101 to the second electronic terminal 103.
- the Migration Authority 101 sends NG of the Attestation result to the second electronic terminal 103.
- the second electronic terminal 103 performs the following operation according to the information received from the Migration Authority 101.
- the second electronic terminal 103 encrypts the parent key with the MApubKey received at the same time.
- the parent key is a key for encrypting secret data at the top in the tree structure that is created when the Migration Package is expanded.
- the MApubKey is used to encrypt the parent key.
- the method is not particularly limited to this method as long as the parent key is handled safely. For example, after mutual authentication between the second electronic terminal 103 and the migration authority 101, a shared key called a session key that is temporarily used may be held, and encrypted communication may be performed using the session key.
- the second electronic terminal 103 receives the migration package ID of the migration package to be downloaded, the parent key encrypted in (S1005), the encryption parameter used when regenerating the migration package, the configuration certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211. Send to Migration Authority 101.
- the migration authority 101 receives the migration package ID, the encrypted parent key, the encryption parameter, the conformance certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211.
- the data receiving unit 500 sends the data to the certificate analyzing unit 502.
- the certificate analysis unit 502 verifies the validity of these certificates, and performs the following operation according to the verification result.
- the certificate analysis unit 502 determines whether the migration package ID, the encrypted parent key, the encryption parameter, the configuration certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211 can be migrated. Send to means 504.
- the certificate analysis unit 502 If fraud is found in any of the certificates, the certificate analysis unit 502 returns NG through the data transmission unit 506.
- the migration permission determination unit 504 receives the migration package ID, the encrypted parent key, the encryption parameter 1201, the configuration certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211 from the certificate analysis unit 502. The determination operation of the migration permission determination unit 504 will be described later with reference to FIG. Depending on the result of this determination, the migration permission determination unit 504 performs the following operation.
- a migration package regeneration request is sent to the migration package regeneration unit 505 together with the migration package ID, the encrypted parent key, the encryption parameter, the configuration certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211.
- the migration package regeneration unit 505 When the migration package regeneration unit 505 receives the migration package regeneration request, the migration package ID, the encrypted parent key, the encryption parameter, the configuration certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211, the migration package regeneration unit 505 regenerates the migration package specified by the migration package ID. Do. The regeneration operation will be described later with reference to FIG.
- the second electronic terminal 103 may decrypt the migration package in the trusted platform module 201 and check whether the data is valid using a certificate. In this case, when the data is not valid, processing for requesting the re-transmission of the migration package to the migration authority 101 may be performed.
- FIG. 11 is a diagram illustrating an operation procedure of the migration permission determination unit 504 of the migration authority 101.
- the designated Migration ID is 001
- the evaluation level of the configuration certificate 211 is EAL4
- the SRKType of the information management certificate 211 is symetric
- CipherType is AES
- KeyLength is 128.
- the migration permission determination unit 504 acquires the entry information indicated by the received migration ID 001 from the migration package management table 601.
- the migration permission determination means 504 first compares and determines the evaluation level. For the determination, an authentication level determination table 801 is used.
- the evaluation level of the conformance certificate 211 is EAL4. Since the value of the Evaluate level specified by the Migration ID 001 is EAL4, the respective authentication levels are the same. According to the authentication level determination table 801, if it is EAL3 or higher, migration is possible, so the determination is OK.
- Migrate availability determination means 504 compares and determines the encryption strength.
- the SRKType of the information management certificate 211 is symmetric, CipherType is AES, and KeyLength is 128.
- the SRKType specified by the Migration ID 001 is asymmetric, the CipherType is RSA, and the KeyLength is 2048.
- the encryption strength table 701 is used for determining the strength level.
- the strength level of the cipher specified by the migration ID 001 is strength level 2 from the cipher strength table 701.
- the encryption strength level designated by the information management certificate 211 is strength level 3 from the encryption strength table 701.
- FIG. 12 is a diagram showing the configuration of the encryption parameter 1201 sent from the electronic terminal when it is desired to download the Migration Package.
- the encryption parameter 1201 has a data structure including six data.
- the first is (A) the parent key Length. This is data indicating the key length of the parent key sent in (S1006).
- the second is (B) the master key algorithm.
- This is data indicating an encryption algorithm when using the parent key sent in (S1006). RSA, ECC, AES, etc. are specified.
- the third is (C) Change method. This is data indicating what kind of migration package is regenerated by the migration package regeneration unit 505. The following three can be specified.
- Parameter 1 All encryption algorithms for secret data included in the migration package are unified to the algorithm specified by the parent key algorithm.
- Parameter 2 Change the secret key algorithm among the secret data encryption algorithms included in the Migration Package to the algorithm specified by (D) the specified secret key algorithm. Further, the algorithm of the public key method is changed to an algorithm designated by (E) designated public key algorithm.
- the fourth is (D) designated secret key algorithm.
- a secret key algorithm is specified. This is referred to when the parameter 2 is designated by the change method (C).
- the fifth is (E) designated public key algorithm.
- a public key algorithm is specified. This is referred to when the parameter 2 is designated by the change method (C).
- the sixth is (F) change intensity level.
- Parameter 0 The migration package is regenerated at the same strength level as the parent key.
- Parameter 1 The migration package is regenerated at the same strength level as the information management certificate 211.
- Parameter 2 The migration package is regenerated at the same intensity level as the current migration package.
- FIGS. 13 to 15 are diagrams showing examples of the regeneration operation when a certain encryption parameter 1201 is given to the migration package regeneration unit 505 of the migration authority 101, respectively.
- FIG. 13 is a diagram showing the result after regeneration when the migration parameter has the tree structure shown on the left side of the regeneration example 1301 and the encryption parameter 1302 is given.
- the Migration Package regeneration unit 505 performs only encryption with the parent key.
- the migration package regeneration unit 505 uses the private key corresponding to the MApubKey of the migration authority 101. Decrypt with. Then, encryption is performed with a 128-bit parent key represented by (B) parent key algorithm and (A) parent key Length, and the parent key of the tree structure shown on the right side of the regeneration example 1301 is obtained. The part of the wavy line that has been removed is regenerated as a Migration Package.
- FIG. 14 is a diagram showing a result after regeneration when the migration parameter has the tree structure shown on the left side of the regeneration example 1401 and the encryption parameter 1402 is given.
- the migration package regeneration unit 505 changes the entire encryption algorithm.
- Step 1 First, since the data at the top when the Migration Package is expanded indicates a 2048-bit public / private key pair of the encryption algorithm RSA, the Migration Package regeneration unit 505 uses the secret corresponding to the MApubKey of the Migration Authority 101. Decrypt with key. Then, the RSA 1024-bit key pair and data 1 are decrypted using the RSA 2048-bit secret key. Then, the data 2 is decrypted using the RSA 1024-bit secret key.
- Step 2 (F) Since the change intensity level is parameter 2, the migration package regeneration unit 505 performs regeneration at the same intensity level as that of the current migration package.
- the key length of the secret key algorithm corresponding to RSA 1024 bits is 80 bits from the encryption strength table 701.
- the minimum key length taken by AES is 128 bits, a 128-bit key is generated and data 2 is encrypted using the AES algorithm.
- the key length of the secret key algorithm corresponding to RSA 2048 bits is 112 bits from the encryption strength table 701.
- the minimum key length taken by AES is 128 bits, a 128-bit key is generated and an AES 128-bit key and data 1 are encrypted using an AES algorithm.
- the tree structure parent key shown on the right side of the regeneration example 1301 is obtained by encrypting with the 128-bit parent key represented by (B) AES and (A) parent key Length. The part of the wavy line that has been removed is regenerated as a Migration Package.
- FIG. 15 is a diagram illustrating a result after regeneration when the migration package has the tree structure shown on the left side of the regeneration example 1501 and the encryption parameter 1502 is given.
- (C) parameter 2 is specified by the changing method
- (D) AES is specified by the designated secret key algorithm
- (E) ECC is specified by the specified public key algorithm. Therefore, the Migration Package regeneration unit 505 The entire secret key algorithm and public key algorithm are changed.
- Step 1 First, since the data at the top when the Migration Package is expanded indicates a 2048-bit public / private key pair of the encryption algorithm RSA, the Migration Package regeneration unit 505 uses the secret corresponding to the MApubKey of the Migration Authority 101. Decrypt with key. Then, using the RSA 2048-bit secret key, the DES (Data Encryption Standard) 56-bit key pair and data 1 are decrypted. Then, data 2 is decrypted using a DES 56-bit secret key.
- DES Data Encryption Standard
- Step 2 Since the change strength level is parameter 0, regeneration is performed at the same strength level as the current parent key. Since DES is a secret key encryption, it is changed to (A) 128 bits specified in the (D) designated secret key algorithm. Therefore, a 128-bit key is generated and data 2 is encrypted using the AES algorithm. Next, since RSA is public key cryptography, it is changed to ECC by (E) designated public key algorithm. The ECC key length corresponding to AES 128 bits, which is the parent key, is 256 bits from the encryption strength table 701. Therefore, a 256-bit key is generated and an AES 128-bit key and data 1 are encrypted using an ECC algorithm.
- the tree structure parent key shown on the right side of the regeneration example 1301 is obtained by encrypting with the 128-bit parent key represented by (B) AES and (A) parent key Length.
- the part of the wavy line that has been removed is regenerated as a Migration Package.
- the parent key is sent from the second electronic terminal that downloads the Migration Package, but may be generated on the Migration Authority 101 side.
- LocalApplication 205 is a DRM application.
- the DRM application is an application that handles digital contents such as music and moving images, and realizes copyright protection of these.
- it is an application that realizes fine rights management such as the number of times, the time limit, and the time limit for the use of digital content.
- FIG. 16 is a diagram showing the configuration of the content management table 1601 and the content management table 1602.
- the content management table 1601 manages the storage destination of the content handled by the DRM application.
- the presence of two content management tables means that the DRM application manages a certain number of contents or more and exceeds the number of contents handled by one content management table.
- the content management table 1601 is configured by a list of content IDs that specify content and file names indicated by full paths that can specify storage locations.
- the content management table 1601 can specify the storage position of the content stored in the storage area 207 from the content ID.
- the content management table 1602 has the same configuration as the content management table 1601.
- FIG. 17 is a diagram showing a configuration for the DRM application in Embodiment 2 of the present invention to realize copyright protection and rights management.
- the rights management table 1701 is a table for managing rights of contents handled by the DRM application. Each is an example showing the state.
- the entry information on each line includes a content ID, a content key, rights information, and the like. Each entry information is registered in the right management table at the time of receiving the content right information or at a timing determined by the electronic terminal, but in this embodiment, the procedure for the registration is omitted.
- Content ID is identification information for specifying content. Number information that matches the content ID sent from the decryption request sending means 112 is registered, and entry information can be searched using the number information as a key.
- the content key is a decryption key for the encrypted content indicated by the content ID.
- the key length is 128 bits or 192 bits, but this embodiment is not limited to this.
- Rights information is information that specifies what kind of rights the content indicated by the content ID is managed. The details of the right information will be omitted.
- the movement flag is a flag indicating whether or not the content has been uploaded to the Migration Authority 101. “0” indicates a state where uploading is not performed. “1” indicates an uploaded state. In the state where the flag “1” is indicated, the user cannot reproduce or move the content.
- the rights management table 1704 has the same configuration as the rights management table 1701 and corresponds to the rights management table 1704.
- the right protection key table 1702 is a table for managing a right protection key for encrypting each entry information in the right management table 1701. Information other than the content ID of the entry information is encrypted and protected by the right protection key.
- the right protection key table 1705 has the same configuration as the right protection key table 1702.
- the time variable key 1703 is a key for encrypting the right protection key table 1702.
- the key value changes with time.
- the purpose of using such a key is that, in rights management in a DRM application, the malicious user backs up the rights before consuming the rights and backs up the rights before consuming the rights after consuming the rights. This is in order to prevent a backup / restoration attack in which rights are not consumed forever by restoring.
- the time-varying key is generated by secure time information and counters that are not tampered by the user, but the details of the generation method are omitted.
- the time variable key 1706 has the same characteristics as the time variable key 1703 and corresponds to the right protection key table 1705.
- FIG. 18 is a diagram in which the DRM application manages the time-varying key 1703 and the time-varying key 1706, the right protection key table 1702 and the right protection key table 1705 in a tree structure (left side), and the content upload is specified by the user. It is a figure (right side) of the tree structure which the generated MigrationPackage has.
- the state of the tree on the left shows a state in which the right protection key table 1702 is encrypted with the time variable key 1703 and the right protection key table 1705 is encrypted with the time variable key 1706.
- AES is used as the encryption algorithm, and the key length of each time-varying key is 128 bits.
- the time variable key 1703 and the time variable key 1706 are encrypted with the DRM key corresponding to the DRM application.
- RSA is used as the encryption algorithm, and the key length of the DRM key is 2048 bits.
- the state of the tree on the right side shows the result after creating the Migration Package.
- a right protection key that encrypts the entry information in the right management table 1701 or right management table 1704 corresponding to the content ID of the content specified by the user is extracted to generate a transfer right protection key table 1802, and a 128-bit transfer key 1801 is generated and the transfer right protection key table is encrypted.
- AES is used as the encryption algorithm.
- FIG. 19 is a diagram illustrating an operation procedure when the DRM application of the first electronic terminal 102 uploads secret data to the migration authority 101.
- the DRM application retrieves entry information corresponding to the content ID of the specified content from the right management table 1701 or the right management table 1704.
- the DRM application directly sends the encrypted content data and the transfer right management table generated in (b) to the second electronic terminal 103 that is the migration destination.
- the method of passing the content data and the transfer right management table to the second electronic terminal may be through a recording medium or through a server via the Migration Authority 101.
- the DRM application decrypts the right protection key table 1702 and the right protection key table 1705 using the time variable key 1703 and the time variable key 1706 in the Trusted Platform Module 201. Further, the right protection key corresponding to the content ID of the designated content is extracted, and a transfer right protection key table 1802 is generated.
- the DRM application generates a 128-bit transfer key 1801 in the Trusted Platform Module 201 and encrypts the transfer right protection key table 1801.
- AES is used as the encryption algorithm.
- the DRM application generates a migration package from the transfer key 1801 and the encrypted transfer right protection table 1801.
- the details of the migration package are described in Non-Patent Document 1, and thus the description thereof is omitted.
- (S1906) In the first electronic terminal 102, (A) The DRM application decrypts the right protection key table 1702 and the right protection key table 1705 using the time variable key 1703 and the time variable key 1706 in the Trusted Platform Module 201, and the right corresponding to the content ID of the specified content Take out the protection key.
- the DRM application uses the right protection key extracted in (a) to enter the entry information of the content ID “001” in the right management table 1701 in which the user designates Upload and the content ID “00a” in the content management table 1602 Is decrypted.
- the DRM application encrypts the entry information of the content ID 001 of the right management table 1701 and the content ID 00a of the content management table 1602 in which the user designates Upload again using the right protection key extracted in (a). .
- the DRM application updates the time variable key 1703 and the time variable key 1706, and encrypts the interest protection key table 1702 and the right protection key table 1705 again.
- the TCG includes information indicating that the content has been deleted in order for the migration authority 101 to recognize that the first electronic terminal 102 has deleted all information related to the content.
- the digest process may be performed to generate a digest value and perform the Attestation process.
- the migration authority 101 can take measures to prevent access from the first electronic terminal 102 as long as the attestation process is not performed after the download by the second electronic terminal 103.
- a domain is a concept of capturing a plurality of terminals as the same group, and is used for sharing digital contents such as music and videos.
- the migrating of the secret data described above may be limited to a domain. In that case, the migration authority 101 determines whether the first electronic terminal 102 and the second electronic terminal 103 are in the same domain.
- FIG. 20 is a diagram showing an overall configuration of a system according to the third embodiment of the present invention.
- Migration Authority 2001 communicates with a third electronic terminal via a network to provide a secret data migration service. Since the detailed configuration is the same as that of the Migration Authority 101, the description thereof is omitted.
- the basic configuration of the third electronic terminal 2002 is the same as that of the first electronic terminal 102 and the second electronic terminal 103, and the data is managed in a tree structure. Hierarchically encrypting and protecting with keys assigned to nodes and roots leading up to the leaf. A difference from the first electronic terminal 102 and the second electronic terminal 103 is that the first electronic terminal 102 is connected to the first storage device 2004.
- FIG. 21 is a diagram showing a configuration of the third electronic terminal 2002. Since the configuration other than the Storage Application 2101 and the Storage certificate 2103 is the same as that of the first electronic terminal 102 and the second electronic terminal 103, a description thereof will be omitted.
- the Storage Application 2101 is software that controls the first storage device 2004 and communicates with the Migration Authority 2001.
- the StorageApplication 2101 defines “TCG” that defines a protocol such as secure data communication between the host and the Storage Device.
- TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification
- TCG Storage Workgroup Class: Optical satisfy the Host Application specification of the Real Application 215 of the secret data device 215 managed by the SRK.
- the storage certificate 2103 is a certificate issued by a certificate authority called ORG Certificate. In the present embodiment, it is assumed that it is issued by the Migration Authority 101.
- ORG Certificate describes what Template is used to characterize the function of the first storage device 2004. Since Template describes the encryption algorithm supported by the first storage device 2004, this embodiment uses this as information indicating the encryption strength supported by the first storage device 2004.
- Software in the first storage device 2004 that holds a storage area and prepares a function called “Method” that provides a function to the outside is called “ServiceProvider”. The function of ServiceProvider is determined by Template.
- ORG Certificate Other contents include the issuing organization, version number of supported specifications, algorithm used for signature, signature information, etc., but details are described in “TCG Storage Workgroup Certificate Profile 1.0”. Therefore, the description is omitted. The description of Template is omitted in “TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification” and “TCG Storage Workgroup Security Class: Optical”.
- the storage certificate 2103 is further expanded and data for specifying the specifications of the evaluation level and the security evaluation standard described in the configuration certificate 212 is added.
- the storage certificate 2103 is used as information indicating how much evaluation certification the first storage device 2004 has received.
- the evaluation index is represented by a level certified based on a security evaluation standard defined by ISO / IEC15408, as in the evaluation level of the conformance certificate 212.
- Storage certificate 2103 is ORG Certificate
- the data is not limited to this as long as it has equivalent information such as encryption strength and Evaluate level.
- FIG. 22 is a diagram illustrating the relationship between the configuration of the first storage device 2004 and the third electronic terminal.
- the Trusted Peripheral 2200 manages the function of the first storage device 2004 and the data structure of the data stored in the storage area 2206.
- a secure communication path is constructed with the storage application 2101 of the third electronic terminal 2002, and access control to data is realized.
- TCG Storage The description is omitted because it is described in “Architecture Core Specification” and “TCG Storage Workgroup Security System Class: Optical”.
- AdminSP2202 is a SecurityProvider that always exists in TrustedPeripheral 2200. Method is prepared, and StorageApplication 2101 calls it. Details are described in “TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification” and “TCG Storage Workgroup Security System Class: Optical”, and thus the description thereof is omitted.
- CryptoSP 2204 is a Security Provider that provides a Method for encrypting data stored in the storage area 2206. Details are described in “TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification” and “TCG Storage Workgroup Security System Class: Optical”, and thus the description thereof is omitted.
- data is stored through AdminSP2202 or CryptoSP2204 of the Trusted Peripheral 2200.
- AdminSP2202 or CryptoSP2204 of the Trusted Peripheral 2200.
- it is realized by an optical disk such as an HDD, a flash memory, a BD, a DVD, or a CD.
- FIG. 23 is a diagram illustrating an operation procedure when the third electronic terminal 2002 downloads secret data from the migration authority 2001. Hereinafter, this operation procedure will be described.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 prepares to download the Migration Package.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 targets all or part of software such as a boot loader, an OS, a device driver, and an application constituting the third electronic terminal 2002 by using a function called Integrity Measurement defined by the TCG.
- the calculated digest value is extracted from a register called Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) in the Trusted Platform Module 201. Then, the digest value is digitally signed in the Trusted Platform Module 201 using the AIK included in the secret data 215.
- PCR Platform Configuration Registers
- a request (Download request) for downloading the Migration Package from the third electronic terminal 2002 to the Migration Authority 2001 is made.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 sends the digest value, the digital signature, and the AIK certificate 210 to the Migration Authority 2001 together with the request.
- the migration authority 2001 receives a download request for the migration package from the third electronic terminal 2002.
- the digest value, digital signature, and AIK certificate 210 received at the same time are sent to the attestation processing means 501.
- the attestation processing unit 501 verifies whether the third electronic terminal 2002 is an unauthorized terminal by executing the attestation process.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 performs the following operation according to the information received from the Migration Authority 101.
- the master key is encrypted with the MApubKey received at the same time.
- the parent key is a key for encrypting secret data at the top in the tree structure created when the Migration Package is expanded.
- the MApubKey is used to encrypt the parent key.
- the method is not particularly limited to this method as long as the parent key is handled safely. For example, after mutual authentication between the third electronic terminal 2002 and the migration authority 2001, a shared key called a session key that is temporarily used may be held, and encrypted communication may be performed using the session key.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 sends the Migration Package ID of the Migration Package to be downloaded, the parent key encrypted in (S2305), the encryption parameters used when regenerating the Migration Package, and the Storage certificate 2103 to the Migration Authority 2001.
- the Migration Authority 2001 receives the Migration Package ID, the encrypted parent key, the encryption parameter, and the Storage certificate 2103.
- the data receiving unit 500 sends the data to the certificate analyzing unit 502.
- the certificate analysis unit 502 verifies the validity of the storage certificate 2103 and performs the following operation according to the verification result.
- the migration permission determination unit 504 receives the migration package ID, the encrypted parent key, the encryption parameter 1201, and the storage certificate 2103 from the certificate analysis unit 502. .
- the determination operation of the migration permission determination unit 504 will be described later with reference to FIG.
- the migration permission determination means 504 performs the following operation.
- the migration package regeneration request is sent to the migration package regeneration unit 505 together with the migration package ID, the encrypted parent key, the encryption parameter, and the storage certificate 2103.
- the migration package regeneration unit 505 receives the migration package ID, the encrypted parent key, the encryption parameter, and the storage certificate 2103 together with the migration package regeneration request.
- the migration package specified by the migration package ID is regenerated.
- (S2308) When the operation of (S2307) is completed, the migration authority 2001 sends the result OK and the migration package to the third electronic terminal 2002 through the data transmission unit 506, and the third electronic terminal 2002 performs a predetermined method.
- the migration package is recorded in the first storage device 2004.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 may decrypt the migration package in the trusted platform module 201 and check whether the data is valid data using a certificate. In this case, when the data is not valid, a process for requesting the migration authority 2001 to retransmit the migration package may be performed.
- FIG. 24 is a diagram showing the operation procedure of the migration determination in the migration permission determination unit 504 of the migration authority 2001.
- the Migration ID is 001
- the Evaluate level of the Storage certificate 2103 is EAL4
- CipherType is AES
- KeyLength is 128.
- the migration permission determination unit 504 acquires the entry information indicated by the received migration ID 001 from the migration package management table 601.
- the migration permission determination unit 504 first compares and determines the evaluation level. For the determination, an authentication level determination table 801 is used.
- the evaluation level of the storage certificate 2103 is EAL4. Since the value of the Evaluate level specified by the Migration ID 001 is EAL4, the respective authentication levels are the same. According to the authentication level determination table 801, if it is EAL3 or higher, migration is possible, so the determination is OK.
- Migrate availability determination means 504 compares and determines the encryption strength.
- CipherType of the Storage certificate 2103 is AES and KeyLength is 128.
- the SRKType specified by the Migration ID 001 is asymmetric, the CipherType is RSA, and the KeyLength is 2048.
- the encryption strength table 701 is used for determining the strength level.
- the strength level of the cipher specified by the migration ID 001 is strength level 2 from the cipher strength table 701.
- the encryption strength level specified by the storage certificate 2103 is strength level 3 from the encryption strength table 701.
- the Storage Application 2101 is described as a host-side application that manages the first storage device 2004 installed in the third electronic terminal 2002. However, the Storage Application 2101 is installed in an electronic terminal different from the third electronic terminal 2002, and passes through the Migration Authority 2001. Data migration may be performed.
- the Migration Authority 2001 does not need to be a device different from the third electronic terminal 2002, and is installed in the third electronic terminal 2002 as an application, and performs a migration while communicating between the Storage Application 2101 and the third electronic terminal 2002. There may be.
- FIG. 30 is a diagram illustrating an operation procedure when the third electronic terminal 2002 uploads secret data from the migration authority 2001. Hereinafter, this operation procedure will be described.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 prepares for the upload of the migration package of the data in the first storage device 2004.
- One or a plurality of secret data to be uploaded is aggregated to generate a set of data called a migration package.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 uses all or part of software such as a boot loader, an OS, a device driver, and an application constituting the third electronic terminal 2002 by using a function called Integrity Measurement defined by the TCG.
- the digest value calculated for the target is taken out from a register called Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) in the Trusted Platform Module 201. Then, the digest value is digitally signed in the Trusted Platform Module 201 using the AIK included in the secret data 215.
- PCR Platform Configuration Registers
- a request (Upload request) for uploading the Migration Package from the third electronic terminal 2002 to the Migration Authority 2001 is performed.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 sends the digest value, the digital signature, and the AIK certificate 210 to the Migration Authority 2001 together with the request.
- the Migration Authority 2001 receives the Migration Package Upload request from the third electronic terminal 2002.
- the digest value, digital signature, and AIK certificate 210 received at the same time are sent to the attestation processing means 501.
- the attestation processing unit 501 verifies whether the third electronic terminal 2002 is an unauthorized terminal by executing the attestation process.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 performs the following operation according to the information received from the Migration Authority 101.
- the migration package is encrypted using MApubKey.
- the method is not particularly limited as long as the migration package is handled safely. For example, after mutual authentication between the third electronic terminal 2002 and the migration authority 2001, a shared key called a session key that is temporarily used may be held, and encrypted communication may be performed using the session key.
- the third electronic terminal 2002 sends the migration package and storage certificate 2103 encrypted in (S3005) to the migration authority 2001.
- the Migration Package and the Storage certificate 2103 are handled as separate data, the certificate may be included in the Migration Package.
- the Migration Authority 2001 receives the Migration Package and the Storage certificate 2103.
- the data receiving unit 500 sends the data to the certificate analyzing unit 502.
- the certificate analysis unit 502 verifies the validity of the storage certificate 2103 and performs the following operation according to the verification result.
- the migration package registration unit 503 When the migration package registration unit 503 receives the migration package and the storage certificate 2103 from the certificate analysis unit 502, the migration package registration unit 503 generates a migration package ID that uniquely identifies the migration package with the migration authority 101, and stores the migration package in the storage area 507. Also, data is extracted from the storage destination and each certificate and registered in the migration package management table.
- FIG. 25 is a diagram showing an overall configuration of a system according to the fourth embodiment of the present invention.
- a migration authority 2501 communicates with an electronic terminal via a network, and provides a virtual environment and secret data migration service in the electronic terminal. Since the detailed configuration is the same as that of the Migration Authority 101, the description thereof is omitted.
- the basic configuration of the fourth electronic terminal 2502 and the fifth electronic terminal 2503 is the same as that of the first electronic terminal 102 and the second electronic terminal 103, a plurality of OSs can coexist with the introduction of virtualization technology. ing. Details will be described later with reference to FIG.
- FIG. 26 is a diagram showing the configuration of the fourth electronic terminal 2502 and the fifth electronic terminal 2503.
- Hypervisor 2602 is a module that implements a virtualization technology that abstracts resources in a computer. Typical examples include XEN and VMWare that control a plurality of OSs, and Java (registered trademark) Virtual Machine that demonstrates the portability of applications.
- Management unit 2603 realizes Migrate of Virtual Machine in cooperation with Management unit 2603 of another electronic terminal.
- the object of migration is secret data, but in this embodiment, the virtual machine is migrated.
- “Migration of Virtual Machine” refers to a technology for moving and executing each Virtual Machine including an OS and applications from one electronic terminal to another electronic terminal in the virtualization technology.
- the AIK certificate 2610 is a certificate called Attestation Identity Key Credential. In this embodiment, it is assumed that it is issued by the Migration Authority 101.
- the AIK certificate 210 is used for confirming that the TPM has an AIK (Attestation Identity Key). Details are described in “TCG Specification Architecture Overview”, and thus description thereof is omitted.
- the information management certificate 2611 describes a method of managing the secret data 215 supported by the fourth electronic terminal 2502 and the fifth electronic terminal 2503.
- a plurality of information management certificates 2611 may be recorded in the storage area 2607.
- it is assumed that it is issued by the Migration Authority 2501. Details are described in “TCG Specification Architecture Overview”, and thus description thereof is omitted.
- the conformance certificate 2612 is an attribute certificate that proves compliance with the TCG evaluation standards. Generally issued by the organization that performs the evaluation. In this embodiment, it is assumed that it has been issued by the Migration Authority 2501.
- AIK certificate 210 the information management certificate 211, and the confirmation certificate 212 have been described as separate certificates, these may be combined into one certificate.
- FIG. 27 is a diagram showing the configuration of the Virtual Machine 2604 and the Virtual Machine 2605.
- Each Virtual Machine virtually implements one entire device. Therefore, each Virtual Machine has the same configuration as the first electronic terminal 102 and the second electronic terminal 103. Since the configuration other than the MachineMigrate control unit 2701 and the basic certificate 2703 is the same as that of the first electronic terminal 102 and the second electronic terminal 103, description thereof will be omitted.
- the MachineMigrate control unit 2701 performs migration of the VirtualMachine in cooperation with the management unit 2603 and the Migration Authority 2501.
- the base certificate 2703 is a certificate called Platform Credential. In this embodiment, it is issued by the Migration Authority 2501, but may be generated inside the fourth electronic terminal 2502 or the fifth electronic terminal 2503.
- “TCG Virtualized Platform WG” “Minimum Trust Level” that describes the minimum level required for the electronic terminal that is the migration destination of the Virtual Machine is added to the conventional Platform Credential. The description of Minimum Trust Level is performed in the same way as the evaluation level and evaluation specification of the conformance certificate 212.
- the base certificate 2703 also includes information about the manufacturing company of Virtual Machine and the type on which Virtual Machine is based. For details, please refer to “TCG Specification Architecture Overview” and “TCG VirtualWrited”. The description will be omitted because it is described in the specification.
- the virtual machine when migrating a virtual machine between terminals, the virtual machine itself is not moved via the migration authority, but the secret data used by the virtual machine is moved via the migration authority. Further, the Virtual Machine main body is moved separately after removing the secret information.
- FIG. 28 is a diagram showing an operation procedure when the fourth electronic terminal 2502 uploads secret data to the migration authority 2501 when migrating a virtual machine from the fourth electronic terminal 2502 to the fifth electronic terminal 2503. It is. Hereinafter, this operation procedure will be described.
- the fourth electronic terminal 2502 prepares for migrating the Virtual Machine.
- One or a plurality of secret data to be uploaded to the migration authority 2501 are aggregated to generate a group of data called a migration package.
- the details of the migration package are described in Non-Patent Document 1, and thus the description thereof is omitted.
- Integrity Measurement defined by the TCG
- the digest value calculated for all or part of the software necessary to operate the Virtual Machine such as the boot loader, Hypervisor 2602, etc. constituting the fourth electronic terminal 2502 is described as TrustedPlatformModulation201. It is taken out of a register called Platform Configuration Registers (PCR). Then, a digital signature is applied to the digest value in the Trusted Platform Module 201 using the AIK included in the secret data 2615.
- PCR Platform Configuration Registers
- (S2802) A request for migrating the Virtual Machine from the fourth electronic terminal 2502 to the migration authority 2501 is sent to the fifth electronic terminal 2503.
- the fourth electronic terminal 2502 sends the digest value, the digital signature, the AIK certificate 2610, and the basic certificate 2703 together with the request to the Migration Authority 2501.
- Integrity Reporting Sending digest values and digital signatures is called Integrity Reporting. Since Integrity Reporting is described in “TCG Specification Architecture Overview”, detailed description thereof is omitted.
- the Migration Authority 2501 receives a request for migrating the Virtual Machine from the fourth electronic terminal 2502 to the fifth electronic terminal 2501. At this time, the digest value, digital signature, and AIK certificate 2610 received simultaneously are sent to the Attestation processing means 501.
- the attestation processing unit 501 verifies whether or not the fourth electronic terminal 2502 is an unauthorized terminal by executing the attestation process.
- An unauthorized terminal is a terminal that has been falsified by a malicious user or a virus and that operates unexpectedly.
- the fifth electronic terminal 2503 prepares for migration in response to the request received from the migration authority 2501.
- the digest value calculated for all or part of the software necessary to operate the Virtual Machine such as the boot loader, Hypervisor 2602, etc. constituting the fifth electronic terminal 2502 is used as the TrustedPlatformModulation201. It is taken out of a register called Platform Configuration Registers (PCR). Then, a digital signature is applied to the digest value in the Trusted Platform Module 201 using the AIK included in the secret data 2615.
- PCR Platform Configuration Registers
- the fifth electronic terminal 2503 sends the digest value, digital signature, AIK certificate 2610, and conformance certificate 2612 to the Migration Authority 2501 together with the request.
- Integrity Reporting Sending digest values and digital signatures is called Integrity Reporting. Since Integrity Reporting is described in “TCG Specification Architecture Overview”, detailed description thereof is omitted.
- the Migration Authority 2501 sends the digest value, the digital signature, and the AIK certificate 2610 from the fifth electronic terminal 2503 to the Attestation processing means 501.
- the attestation processing unit 501 verifies whether or not the fourth electronic terminal 2502 is an unauthorized terminal by executing the attestation process.
- An unauthorized terminal is a terminal that has been falsified by a malicious user or a virus and that operates unexpectedly.
- the base certificate 2703 and the conformance certificate 2612 received in (S2803) are sent to the certificate analysis unit 502.
- the certificate analysis unit 502 verifies the validity of these certificates, and performs the following operation according to the verification result.
- each certificate is sent to the Migrate availability determination means 504.
- the migration permission determination unit 504 receives the basic certificate 2703 and the conformance certificate 2612 from the certificate analysis unit 502, and receives “Minimum Trust” of the basic certificate 2703.
- the “Level” and the “Evaluate level” of the conformance certificate 2612 are compared, and the following operation is performed.
- “Minimum Trust Level” indicates the minimum level required for the Migrate destination. Therefore, in (S2807), if the Evaluate level of the fifth electronic terminal that is the migration destination is higher than “Minimum Trust Level”, it is determined that migration is permitted. Also, if Evaluate Level is lower than “Minimum Trust Level”, it means that the fifth electronic terminal does not have a sufficient level as a migration destination, and therefore migration is not permitted.
- the fourth electronic terminal 2502 performs the following operation in accordance with the information received from the Migration Authority 2501.
- the migration package is encrypted using MApubKey.
- the method is not particularly limited as long as the migration package is handled safely. For example, after mutual authentication between the fourth electronic terminal 2502 and the migration authority 2501, a shared key called a session key used temporarily may be held, and encrypted communication may be performed using the session key.
- the fourth electronic terminal 2502 sends the Migration Package, the Conformance certificate 2612, and the information management certificate 2611 encrypted in (S2809) to the Migration Authority 2501.
- each certificate may be included in the Migration Package.
- the Migration Authority 2501 receives the Migration Package, the Conformance certificate 2612, and the information management certificate 2611.
- the data receiving unit 500 sends the data to the certificate analyzing unit 502.
- the certificate analysis unit 502 verifies the validity of these certificates, and performs the following operation according to the verification result.
- the migration package registration unit 503 When the migration package registration unit 503 receives the migration package, the configuration certificate 212, and the information management certificate 211 from the certificate analysis unit 502, the migration package registration unit 503 generates a migration package ID that uniquely identifies the migration package with the migration authority 2501, and stores the migration package ID in the migration area 50. Also, data is extracted from the storage destination and each certificate and registered in the migration package management table.
- the Migration Authority 2501 does not have to be a device different from the fourth electronic terminal 2502.
- a configuration in which the application is installed in the fourth electronic terminal 2502 as an application and performs migration while communicating with the fifth electronic terminal 2503 may be employed.
- management means 2603 has been described as having the configuration of the hypervisor 2602, it may be outside the hypervisor 2602 and implement the same function within the electronic terminal.
- the migration authority 101 checks the security authentication levels of the first electronic terminal 102 that is the migration source of the secret data and the second electronic terminal 103 that is the migration destination, and based on a predetermined algorithm. Therefore, it is possible to safely handle the secret data without erroneously migrating the secret data to the Migrate destination that is significantly inferior in the authentication level compared to the Migrate source.
- the migration authority 101 checks the encryption strength level in the information management of the first electronic terminal 102 that is the migrating source of the secret data and the second electronic terminal 103 that is the migrating destination, and determines whether migration is possible based on a predetermined algorithm Therefore, the secret data is not mistakenly migrated to the Migrate destination that is significantly inferior in authentication level compared to the Migrate source, and the secret data can be handled safely.
- the second electronic terminal 103 can regenerate the secret data management structure with the desired encryption algorithm and encryption strength when the secret data is downloaded, the second electronic terminal 103 can use the latest encryption algorithm and encryption strength according to the era.
- the secret data can be managed by the electronic terminal 103.
- the user purchases the second electronic terminal 103 equipped with the latest encryption algorithm, and manages secret data using a high-speed and high-strength encryption algorithm according to the era. It becomes possible.
- the migration authority 2001 checks the encryption strength level in the information management of the third electronic terminal 2002 that is the migration source of the secret data and the first storage device 2004 that is the migration destination, and determines whether migration is possible based on a predetermined algorithm. Therefore, the secret data is not mistakenly migrated to the Migrate destination that is significantly inferior in authentication level compared to the Migrate source, and the secret data can be handled safely.
- the management structure of the secret data can be regenerated with a desired encryption algorithm and encryption strength.
- the secret data can be managed by the second electronic terminal 103 using the latest encryption algorithm and encryption strength according to the response.
- the user purchases the first storage device 2004 equipped with the latest encryption algorithm, and manages secret data using a high-speed and high-strength encryption algorithm according to the era. It becomes possible.
- the migration authority 2501 migrates the execution environment from the fourth electronic terminal 2502 to the fifth electronic terminal 2503, the fourth electronic terminal 2502 that is the source of the migrating secret data and the fifth electronic terminal 2503 that is the migration destination Since the encryption strength level in information management is confirmed and whether or not migrating is possible is determined based on a predetermined algorithm, secret data is not mistakenly migrated to a migrating destination that is significantly inferior in authentication level compared to the migrating source. , Secret data can be handled safely.
- the fifth electronic terminal 2503 can regenerate the secret data management structure with a desired encryption algorithm and encryption strength when the secret data is downloaded, the fifth electronic terminal 2503 uses the latest encryption algorithm and encryption strength according to the era.
- Secret data can be managed by the electronic terminal 2503.
- the user purchases the fifth electronic terminal 2503 equipped with the latest encryption algorithm, so that it is easy to use the Migrate technology of the virtualization technology, and high speed and high strength according to the times. It becomes possible to shift to secret data management using an encryption algorithm.
- the first terminal uploads a part or all of secret data protected by a key held by a security module
- the second terminal is a security module.
- a part or all of the secret data protected by the held key is downloaded, and the server holds a security policy table describing the security policy, and each time data is transferred from the second terminal to the first terminal. Whether or not it is possible is determined based on the attribute information of the terminal and the security policy table.
- the migration server is transmitted from the terminal, receiving means for receiving data, transmitting means for transmitting data, verification means for verifying whether the accessed terminal has been tampered with, and a terminal authenticator.
- Analyzing means for analyzing whether a certificate is valid, a package management table for managing a package of secret data managed in the migration server, and the secret uploaded from the migration source terminal
- Package registration means for registering a package of data in a package management table, and when the download request for the package is received from the migration destination terminal, the attribute information of the terminal sent simultaneously is certificate information, Based on the certificate information, whether to migrate is determined according to the security policy table.
- a migration permission determination unit determining, the package so that it can be used in the migration destination terminal, characterized in that it comprises a package regeneration unit for regenerating the package.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal that has been tampered with.
- the migration server includes a package management table for managing the secret data package, a security authentication level of the migration source terminal, and a security authentication level of the migration source terminal.
- Package registration means for registering the uploaded secret data in a package management table
- the security policy table includes a security authentication level of the migration source terminal and a security authentication of the migration destination terminal. It is a level correspondence table.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal below the security authentication level determined by the security policy.
- the migration server includes a package management table for managing the secret data package and the migration source secret data, a cryptographic algorithm and a key length, and a secret data management method for the migration source terminal.
- a package registration means for registering an encryption algorithm, a key length and the uploaded secret data in a package management table, and the security policy table is realized by any key length in the case of various encryption algorithms. It is characterized by being expressed in a table showing the above.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal having a management method lower than the encryption strength level determined by the security policy.
- the migration server includes a package regeneration unit that performs cryptographic conversion of the package and regenerates the package according to an encryption parameter configured by an encryption algorithm and encryption strength requested from the migration destination terminal. It is characterized by providing.
- a package subjected to cryptographic conversion can be migrated in response to the encryption return request of the second terminal. For example, if the second terminal has the latest encryption algorithm, the user can obtain the latest secret data management method.
- the first terminal which is one of the embodiments of the present invention is a terminal intended for receiving means for receiving data, transmitting means for transmitting data, the security module, and the module of the first terminal.
- a terminal authenticator generating means for generating an authenticator; secret data protected by a key held by the security module; a key for signing a terminal authenticator of the second terminal; and the second terminal.
- a data storage means for storing a key certificate for signing the terminal authenticator and security feature information describing information related to security in the second terminal, and a part or all of the secret data Package generating means for packaging, and digital signature generating means for generating a digital signature with a key for signing the terminal authenticator are provided.
- the first terminal can request the protection level of the secret data in accordance with the security policy from the migration destination second terminal via the migration server.
- the first terminal is characterized in that the security feature information is a security authentication level of the first terminal.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal below the security authentication level determined by the security policy.
- the first terminal is characterized in that the security feature information is a management method, encryption algorithm, and key length of the secret data of the migration source.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal having a management method lower than the encryption strength level determined by the security policy.
- the first terminal includes a deletion unit that deletes the uploaded package when notified by the migration server that the package has been downloaded.
- the package of the first terminal that is the migration source can be deleted.
- the second terminal which is one of the embodiments of the present invention expands the package including the receiving means for receiving data, the transmitting means for transmitting data, the security module, and the secret data.
- Package deployment means terminal authenticator generation means for generating a terminal authenticator for the module of the second terminal, a key for signing the terminal authenticator of the second terminal, and the second terminal Data storage means for storing a certificate of a key for signing the terminal authenticator and security feature information describing information related to security in the second terminal, and a key stored in the security module.
- Secret data digital signature generation means for generating a digital signature with the key for signing the terminal authenticator, and the encryption algorithm and encryption strength.
- the second terminal can download the package by designating a desired encryption parameter.
- the second terminal is characterized in that the security feature information is a security authentication level of the first terminal.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal below the security authentication level determined by the security policy.
- the second terminal is characterized in that the security feature information is a management method, encryption algorithm, and key length of the migration destination secret data.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal having a management method lower than the encryption strength level determined by the security policy.
- the second terminal includes the security module that decrypts the package received from the migration server and confirms whether the data is valid data using a certificate.
- the secret data upload method includes a package generation step in which the first terminal generates a package from a part or all of secret data, and the first terminal is the terminal. Generating the digital signature using a key for signing from an authenticator; and the first terminal sends the terminal authenticator, the digital signature, and a certificate of the key for signing to the migration server. And verifying whether the first terminal has been tampered with based on the terminal authenticator, the digital signature, and the certificate of the key for signing received from the first terminal by the migration server. And when the migration server confirms that there is no falsification at the first terminal, the OK result and the public key are sent to the first terminal.
- a step of sending ii) a step of sending an NG result to the first terminal when tampering is confirmed at the first terminal, and a step of i) sending the OK result to the first terminal. If received, encrypting the package with a public key; ii) if receiving an NG result, taking any of the steps of ending the process; and Sending the security feature information to the migration server; registering the encrypted package received by the migration server from the first terminal; and the security feature information in a package management table; The migration server generates a package ID and an OK result generated when registering the encrypted package. Characterized in that it comprises the step of sending to the first terminal.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal below the security authentication level determined by the security policy.
- the secret data download method includes a package generation step in which the second terminal generates a package from a part or all of secret data, and the second terminal has the terminal authenticator.
- the migration server i) sends an OK result and a public key to the second terminal when it is confirmed that the second terminal has not been tampered with.
- the data migration apparatus includes a receiving means for receiving data, a transmitting means for transmitting data, the security module, and a terminal authenticator for checking whether the accessed terminal has been tampered with.
- Verification means for verifying, analysis means for analyzing whether the certificate sent from the terminal is valid, a package management table for managing a package of secret data managed in the migration server, and Package generating means for packaging a part or all of secret data, a key for signing a terminal authenticator of the first terminal, and a certificate for a key for signing the terminal authenticator of the first terminal Security data describing secret data protected by the key held by the security module and information related to security.
- Data storage means for storing information, and when the download request for the package is received from the migration destination terminal, the attribute information of the terminal sent at the same time is certificate information, and the security feature information and the certification Migrating availability judging means for judging whether migration is possible or not based on the information on the certificate according to the security policy table, and package reproduction for regenerating the package so that the package can be used at the migration destination terminal Forming means.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal that has been tampered with.
- the data migration device reproduces the package by performing cryptographic conversion of the package in the security module according to an encryption parameter configured by an encryption algorithm and encryption strength requested from the terminal of the migration destination. It comprises a package regenerating means to be formed.
- a package subjected to cryptographic conversion can be migrated in response to the encryption return request of the second terminal. For example, if the second terminal has the latest encryption algorithm, the user can obtain the latest secret data management method.
- an integrated circuit is characterized in that it includes an encryption unit having two or more encryption algorithms for performing encryption conversion, and a storage unit used at the time of encryption conversion of the package.
- This configuration enables cryptographic conversion in a safe environment without unauthorized access.
- a content management / playback apparatus which is a terminal authenticator for a receiving means for receiving data, a sending means for transmitting data, the security module, and a module of the content management / playback apparatus.
- a terminal authenticator generating means a content management table for managing a recording destination of content data, a content right management table for managing content rights, and a right protection key for encrypting the content rights A right protection key management table; a time variable key whose value changes in synchronization with an increment of a counter; the secret data protected by a key held by the security module; Key for signing terminal authenticator of content management / playback apparatus, and content management / playback apparatus
- Data storage means for storing a key certificate for signing a terminal authenticator and security feature information describing information related to security in the content management / playback apparatus, and a part or all of the secret data in a package
- Package generating means for converting, package expanding means for expanding the package including the secret data, and digital signature generating means for generating a digital signature
- the content management / playback apparatus includes a deletion unit that deletes the content information related to the uploaded package and the secret information included in the package when notified from the migration server that the package has been downloaded. It is characterized by providing.
- This configuration can prevent duplicate rights when migrating copyright-protected content.
- the first module uploads a part or all of secret data protected by a key held by a security module
- the second module A part or all of the secret data uploaded to the first module is downloaded
- the server holds a security policy table describing the security policy, and when data is moved from the second module to the first module Whether or not it is possible is determined based on attribute information of each module and the security policy table.
- a data migration terminal which is one embodiment of the present invention is connected to a secure storage, and the data migration terminal is connected to a secure storage, receiving means for receiving data, transmitting means for transmitting data, and the security module;
- a terminal authenticator generating means for generating a terminal authenticator for one or more modules of the data migration terminal, secret data protected by a key held by the security module, and a terminal of the data migration terminal
- the second module for writing the protected data received by the data receiving means to the secure storage, the first security feature information describing information related to security in the data migration terminal, and the secure storage Data storage means for storing second security feature information describing information related to security is provided.
- the data migration terminal can request the protection level of the secret data in accordance with the security policy from the migration destination secure storage via the migration server.
- the data migration terminal is characterized in that the first security feature information is a security authentication level of the data migration terminal.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to secure storage below the security authentication level determined by the security policy.
- the data migration terminal is characterized in that the first security feature information is a secret data management method, an encryption algorithm, and a key length.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to secure storage with a management method that is less than the encryption strength level determined by the security policy.
- the data migration terminal is characterized in that the second security feature information is a security authentication level of the data migration terminal.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to secure storage below the security authentication level determined by the security policy.
- the second security feature information is an encryption algorithm and a key length.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to secure storage with a management method that is less than the encryption strength level determined by the security policy.
- the method for downloading secret data includes a step in which the data migration terminal generates the digital signature using a key for signing from the terminal authenticator, and the data migration A terminal sending the terminal authenticator, the digital signature, and a certificate of the key for signing to the migration server; the terminal authenticator and the digital signature received by the migration server from the data migration terminal; The step of verifying whether or not the first terminal is falsified based on the certificate of the key for signing, and the migration server i) if it is confirmed that the data migration terminal is not falsified, Step for sending OK result and public key to the data migration terminal Ii) When tampering is confirmed at the data migration terminal, a step of sending an NG result to the data migration terminal, and when the data migration terminal receives i) an OK result, A step of encrypting a terminal key for encrypting the package with a public key; ii) a step of ending the process when an NG result is received; and the data migration terminal Sending the terminal key
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal that has been tampered with.
- the data migration system is a data migration system that migrates to a fifth terminal via a migration server, the server holding a security policy table that describes a security policy, and from the fourth terminal to the fifth terminal. Whether data migration is possible is determined based on attribute information of each terminal and the security policy table when data is transferred to the fifth terminal.
- the fourth terminal signs the security module, the secret data protected by the key held by the security module, and the terminal authenticator of the fourth terminal.
- the execution environment control means for controlling comprises migration control means for controlling the execution of migration, and the execution environment controlled by the execution environment control means comprises a receiving means for receiving data, a sending means for sending data, A security module; a terminal authenticator generating means for generating a terminal authenticator for the execution environment module; and the security Secret data protected by a key held by a module, a key for signing a terminal authenticator of the execution environment, a certificate of a key for signing a terminal authenticator of the execution environment, and the secret data Package generation means for packaging a part or all of the above, a digital signature generation means for generating a digital signature with the key for signing the terminal authenticator, and an execution environment describing information related to security
- the fourth terminal can request the protection level of the secret data in accordance with the security policy from the migration destination fifth terminal via the migration server.
- the fourth terminal is characterized in that the execution environment security characteristic information is a security authentication level of the fourth terminal.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to the fifth terminal below the security authentication level determined by the security policy.
- the security characteristic information of the execution environment is a secret data management method, an encryption algorithm, and a key length.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to the fifth terminal having a management method lower than the encryption strength level determined by the security policy.
- the fourth terminal is characterized in that the terminal security feature information is a security authentication level of the fourth terminal.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to the fifth terminal below the security authentication level determined by the security policy.
- the fourth terminal is characterized in that the terminal security feature information is a secret data management method, an encryption algorithm, and a key length.
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to the fifth terminal having a management method lower than the encryption strength level determined by the security policy.
- the security level information is a security authentication level of the fourth terminal.
- the secret data upload method includes a package generation step in which the data migration terminal generates a package from a part or all of secret data, and the data migration terminal includes the terminal authenticator. Generating the digital signature using the key for signing from the data migration terminal, the data migration terminal, the terminal authenticator, the digital signature, the certificate of the key for signing, and the execution environment security characteristic information Sending to the migration server, and whether or not the data migration terminal has been tampered with based on the terminal authenticator, the digital signature and the certificate of the key for signing received from the data migration terminal by the migration server.
- Step to verify and The migration server i) when the data migration terminal confirms that there is no falsification, the step of sending a migration request from the fourth terminal to the fifth terminal; ii) falsification at the data migration terminal Is confirmed, the step of sending an NG result to the fourth terminal is taken, and the fifth terminal uses the key for signing the digital signature from the terminal authenticator.
- the migration server confirms that there is no falsification at the data migration terminal and that the determination of whether migration is possible is OK, sends the OK result to the fifth terminal, Sending the OK result and the public key to the terminal of ii) whether the tampering is confirmed at the data migration terminal or the migration If it is confirmed that the determination of acceptability is NG, the step of sending an NG result to the fifth terminal and the fourth terminal, and the fourth terminal i) an OK result Step ii) encrypting a terminal key for encrypting the package with a public key when receiving the NG result when receiving an NG result;
- the terminal sends the encrypted package and the execution environment security feature information to the migration server, the encrypted package received from the fourth terminal by the migration server, and the execution environment Registering security feature information in the package management table, and generating the encrypted package when the migration server registers the encrypted package. Characterized in that the package ID and OK result of including the step of the migration execution environment to said fifth terminal from the said and the step of sending one to the terminal a
- This configuration can prevent secret data from being migrated to a second terminal below the security authentication level determined by the security policy.
- the migration authority 101 and the first electronic terminal 102 are described as different configurations.
- the first electronic terminal 102 has the function of the migration authority 101 and the migration package of the second electronic terminal 103
- requirement may be sufficient.
- the first electronic terminal 102 of Migrate source is provided with asymmetric SRK
- the second electronic terminal 103 of Migrate destination is provided with Symmetric SRK.
- the electronic terminal 103 may have an asymmetric SRK.
- the AIK certificate 210, the information management certificate 211, and the conformance certificate 212 are issued by the migration authority 101. However, those issued by a third party certificate authority (certificate authority) It may be. At this time, the migration authority 101 verifies the AIK certificate 210, the information management certificate 211, and the configuration certificate 212 using a certificate issued from the certificate authority.
- the entire managed secret data tree is migrated.
- the user may selectively migrate part of the tree structure.
- the entire migration package is regenerated at one time by the migration authority 101.
- the hierarchy is divided into several stages and the second generation is performed. You may repeat sending to the electronic terminal 103.
- the migration permission determination unit 504 is determined based on the parameters included in the encryption strength table 701 and the authentication level determination table 801. However, in the first electronic terminal and the second electronic terminal, The determination may be made based on the key update function or the lifetime of the key.
- each of the above devices is a computer system including a microprocessor, a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk unit, a display unit, a keyboard, a mouse, and the like.
- a computer program is recorded in the RAM or hard disk unit.
- Each device achieves its functions by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program.
- the computer program is configured by combining a plurality of instruction codes indicating instructions for the computer in order to achieve a predetermined function.
- Each device is not limited to a computer system including all of a microprocessor, a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk unit, a display unit, a keyboard, a mouse, and the like, and may be a computer system including a part of them. .
- a part or all of the constituent elements constituting each of the above devices may be constituted by one system LSI (Large Scale Integration).
- the system LSI is an ultra-multifunctional LSI manufactured by integrating a plurality of components on a single chip, and specifically, a computer system including a microprocessor, ROM, RAM, and the like. .
- a computer program is recorded in the RAM.
- the system LSI achieves its functions by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program.
- each part of the constituent elements constituting each of the above devices may be individually made into one chip, or may be made into one chip so as to include a part or all of them.
- the system LSI is used here, it may be called IC, LSI, super LSI, or ultra LSI depending on the degree of integration. Further, the method of circuit integration is not limited to LSI's, and implementation using dedicated circuitry or general purpose processors is also possible.
- An FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
- a reconfigurable processor that can reconfigure the connection and setting of circuit cells inside the LSI may be used.
- a part or all of the constituent elements constituting each of the above devices may be configured as an IC card or a single module that can be attached to and detached from each device.
- the IC card or the module is a computer system including a microprocessor, a ROM, a RAM, and the like.
- the IC card or the module may include the super multifunctional LSI described above.
- the IC card or the module achieves its function by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program. This IC card or this module may have tamper resistance.
- the present invention may be the method described above. Further, the present invention may be a computer program that realizes these methods by a computer, or may be a digital signal composed of the computer program.
- the present invention also provides a computer-readable recording medium such as a flexible disk, hard disk, CD-ROM, MO, DVD, DVD-ROM, DVD-RAM, BD (Blu-ray Disc). ), Recorded in a semiconductor memory or the like. Also, the digital signal recorded on these recording media may be used.
- a computer-readable recording medium such as a flexible disk, hard disk, CD-ROM, MO, DVD, DVD-ROM, DVD-RAM, BD (Blu-ray Disc).
- the computer program or the digital signal may be transmitted via an electric communication line, a wireless or wired communication line, a network represented by the Internet, a data broadcast, or the like.
- the present invention may also be a computer system including a microprocessor and a memory, in which the memory stores the computer program, and the microprocessor operates according to the computer program.
- the program or the digital signal is recorded on the recording medium and transferred, or the program or the digital signal is transferred via the network or the like, and executed by another independent computer system. It is good.
- the electronic terminal according to the present invention and the migration authority are used, even in a situation where there are electronic terminals having different security authentication levels and strength levels, it is possible to safely migrate secret data between the electronic terminals. Also, if the user obtains an electronic terminal equipped with the latest encryption algorithm, the user can obtain safe data management at a higher speed than the conventional electronic terminal.
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Abstract
Description
Interoperability Specification for Backup and Migration Services Version1.0,Revision1.0(TCG Published)
102 第一の電子端末
103 第二の電子端末
201 TrustedPlatformModule
202 TCGSoftwareStack
203 LocalMigrationSevices
204 ControllingApplication
205 LocalApplication
206 入出力手段
207 保存領域
210 AIK証明書
211 情報管理証明書
212 Conformance証明書
215 秘密データ
500 データ受信手段
501 Attestation処理手段
502 証明書解析手段
503 MigrationPackage登録手段
504 Migrate可否判定手段
505 MigrationPackage再生成手段
506 データ送信手段
507 保存領域
601 MigrationPackage管理表
701 暗号強度表
801 認証レベル判定表
1201 暗号化パラメータ
1301 再生成例
1302 暗号化パラメータ
1401 再生成例
1402 暗号化パラメータ
1501 再生成例
1502 暗号化パラメータ
1601 コンテンツ管理テーブル
1602 コンテンツ管理テーブル
1701 権利管理テーブル
1702 権利保護鍵テーブル
1703 時変鍵
1704 権利管理テーブル
1705 権利保護鍵テーブル
1706 時変鍵
1801 移動鍵
1802 移動用権利保護鍵テーブル
2001 MigrationAuthority
2002 第三の電子端末
2004 第一の記憶装置
2101 StorageApplication
2103 Storage証明書
2200 TrustedPeripheral
2202 AdminSP
2204 CryptoSP
2206 記憶領域
2501 MigrationAuthority
2502 第四の電子端末
2503 第五の電子端末
2602 Hypervisor
2603 Management手段
2604 VirtualMachine
2605 VirtualMachine
2610 AIK証明書
2611 情報管理証明書
2612 Conformance証明書
2615 秘密データ
2701 MachineMigrate制御手段
2703 基盤証明書
前記制御手段は、前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルに従って前記秘密データを前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムに代えて前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムで保護し直す際、前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムの鍵長に対応する前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムの鍵長を用いて保護し直すことを特徴とする。
以下、本発明の実施の形態1について、図面を参照しながら説明する。
Level1 ErrataA”において記載されているため、説明を省略する。
まず、MigrationPackageを展開したときの最上位にあるデータが暗号アルゴリズムRSAの2048ビットの公開鍵と秘密鍵のペアを示しているため、MigrationPackage再生成手段505は、これらをMigrationAuthority101のMApubKeyに対応する秘密鍵で復号化する。そして、そのRSA2048ビットの秘密鍵を用いて、RSA1024ビットの鍵ペアとデータ1を復号化する。そして、RSA1024ビットの秘密鍵を用いてデータ2を復号化する。
(F)変更強度レベルがパラメータ2であるため、MigrationPackage再生成手段505は、現在のMigrationPackageと同一の強度レベルで再生成を行う。RSA1024ビットに相当する秘密鍵アルゴリズムの鍵長は、暗号強度表701より80ビットである。
まず、MigrationPackageを展開したときの最上位にあるデータが暗号アルゴリズムRSAの2048ビットの公開鍵と秘密鍵のペアを示しているため、MigrationPackage再生成手段505は、これらをMigrationAuthority101のMApubKeyに対応する秘密鍵で復号化する。そして、そのRSA2048ビットの秘密鍵を用いて、DES(Data Encryption Standard)56ビットの鍵ペアとデータ1を復号化する。そして、DES56ビットの秘密鍵を用いてデータ2を復号化する。
(F)変更強度レベルでパラメータ0であるため、現在の親鍵と同一の強度レベルで再生成を行う。DESは秘密鍵暗号であるので、(D)指定秘密鍵アルゴリズムに指定されているAES128ビットに変更される。よって、128ビットの鍵を生成しAESアルゴリズムを用いてデータ2を暗号化する。次に、RSAは公開鍵暗号であるため、(E)指定公開鍵アルゴリズムでECCに変更される。親鍵であるAES128ビットに相当するECCの鍵長は、暗号強度表701より256ビットである。よって、256ビットの鍵を生成しECCアルゴリズムを用いてAES128ビットの鍵とデータ1を暗号化する。最後に(B)親鍵アルゴリズムで示されたAES、(A)親鍵Lengthで表される128ビットの親鍵で暗号化して、再生成例1301の右側に示されたツリー構造の親鍵を除いた波線の部分が、MigrationPackageとして再生成される。
続いて、本発明の実施の形態2について、図面を参照しながら説明する。
(a)DRMアプリケーションは、TrustedPlatformModule201の中で時変鍵1703、時変鍵1706を用いて、権利保護鍵テーブル1702および権利保護鍵テーブル1705を復号化し、指定されたコンテンツのコンテンツIDで対応する権利保護鍵を取り出す。
続いて、本発明の実施の形態3について、図面を参照しながら説明する。
Storage Architecture Core Specification”や“TCG Storage Workgroup Security Subsystem Class:Optical”のHost Application仕様を満たしている。SRKで管理されていた秘密データ215の第一の記憶装置2004へのMigrateを実現する。
Architecture Core Specification”や“TCG Storage Workgroup Security Subsystem Class:Optical”において記載されているため、説明を省略する。
続いて、本発明の実施の形態4について、図面を参照しながら説明する。
ii)“Minimum Trust Level” > “Evaluateレベル”の場合、判定はNG、
をそれぞれ生成する。
以上にて述べたように、本発明では、MigrationAuthority101が秘密データのMigrate元である第一の電子端末102とMigrate先の第二の電子端末103のセキュリティ認証レベルを確認し、所定のアルゴリズムに基づいてMigrateの可否を判定するため、Migrate元に比べて著しく認証レベルで劣るMigrate先に誤って秘密のデータがMigrateされることがなく、秘密のデータを安全に取扱うことができる。
以下に本発明に係る各種の実施態様について、説明する。
なお、本発明を上記実施の形態に基づいて説明してきたが、本発明は、上記の実施の形態に限定されないのはもちろんである。以下のような場合も本発明に含まれる。
Claims (22)
- 第1の端末内で保護されたデータを第2の端末に移動するマイグレーション装置であって、
前記第1の端末から前記第1の端末内のセキュリティモジュールにおいて第1の暗号アルゴリズムで保護された秘密データを受信し、前記秘密データのダウンロード要求を前記第2の端末から受信する受信手段と、
前記第1の端末から送られた証明書から前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムを識別し、前記第2の端末から送られた証明書から前記第2の端末内のセキュリティモジュールで用いられる第2の暗号アルゴリズムを識別する識別手段と、
前記第1の暗号アルゴリズム及び前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムを対応付けたセキュリティポリシーテーブルを保持する保持手段と、
前記ダウンロード要求を前記第2の端末から受けたとき、前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルに従って前記秘密データを前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムに代えて前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムで保護し直して前記第2の端末に送信する制御手段とを備え、
前記制御手段は、前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムから前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムで保護し直した秘密データを前記第2の端末に送信するに先立って、前記秘密データが送信される宛先である端末が備えている評価レベルとして前記第1の端末が要求する最低評価レベルを前記第1の端末から受信し、前記第2の端末の評価レベルを前記第2の端末から受信し、前記第2の端末の評価レベルが前記最低評価レベル以上か否かを判断し、前記第2の端末の評価レベルが前記最低評価レベル以上の場合に、前記保護し直した秘密データを前記第2の端末に送信する
ことを特徴とするマイグレーション装置。 - 前記第1の端末は、
前記秘密データを用いた処理を行う実行環境を仮想マシンによって実現する実行手段と、
前記実行環境を実現する仮想マシンから前記秘密データを取り除き、前記秘密データが取り除かれた仮想マシンを前記秘密データとは異なる経路で前記第2の端末へ移動する移動手段とを備える
ことを特徴とする請求項1記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルが示す前記第1の暗号アルゴリズム及び前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムの対応関係は、前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムの暗号強度のレベルが前記第1の暗号強度のレベルより低い場合を含む
ことを特徴とする請求項1記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記第1の端末の第1のセキュリティ認証レベルと前記第2の端末の第2のセキュリティ認証レベルとを格納した第2のセキュリティポリシーテーブルを設け、
前記制御手段は、前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルに従って前記第1の暗号アルゴリズに対応する第2の暗号アルゴリズムが存在する場合であっても、前記第2のセキュリティポリシーテーブルに従って前記第2の端末の第2のセキュリティ認証レベルと前記第1の端末の第1のセキュリティ認証レベルとの差が所定値以上の場合は、前記秘密データを前記第2暗号アルゴリズムで保護し直すことを禁止する
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記第1の端末の第1のセキュリティ認証レベルと前記第2の端末の第2のセキュリティ認証レベルとを格納した第2のセキュリティポリシーテーブルを設け、
前記制御手段は、前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルに従って前記第1の暗号アルゴリズに対応する第2の暗号アルゴリズムが存在する場合であっても、前記第2のセキュリティポリシーテーブルに従って前記第2の端末の第2のセキュリティ認証レベルと前記第1の端末の第1のセキュリティ認証レベルとの差が所定値以上の場合は、前記秘密データを前記第2暗号アルゴリズムで保護し直して前記第2の端末に送信することを禁止する
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムの暗号強度のレベルは、前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムで用いられる鍵の長さで表され、また、前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムの暗号強度のレベルは、前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムで用いられる鍵の長さで表される
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記識別手段は、前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムの種類と鍵長とを識別し、第2の暗号アルゴリズムの種類を識別し、
前記保持手段は、前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムに対応する暗号アレゴリズムの種類及び鍵長と同一暗号強度レベルとなるような、前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムに対応する暗号アレゴリズムの種類の鍵長を示した前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルを保持し、
前記制御手段は、前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルに従って前記秘密データを前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムに代えて前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムで保護し直す際、前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムの鍵長に対応する前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムの鍵長を用いて保護し直す
ことを特徴とする請求項1記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記識別手段は、前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムの種類と鍵長とを識別し、第2の暗号アルゴリズムの種類を識別し、
前記保持手段は、複数の暗号アルゴリズム間で、同一暗号強度レベルとなる鍵長を対応付けた前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルを保持し、
前記制御手段は、前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルに従って前記秘密データを前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムに代えて前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムで保護し直す際、前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムに対応する暗号アレゴリズムの種類及び鍵長と同一暗号強度レベルとなるような前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムに対応する暗号アレゴリズムの種類の鍵長を検索し、前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムの鍵長に対応する前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムの鍵長を用いて保護し直す
ことを特徴とする請求項1記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルは、前記第1の端末から前記マイグレーション装置に送信されたものである
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記受信手段は、前記第2の端末から親鍵、前記親鍵を用いるときの暗号アルゴリズムを示す情報及び前記親鍵を用いて暗号する範囲を示す情報を受信し、
前記制御手段は、前記受信した親鍵及び前記親鍵を用いるときの暗号アルゴリズムを用いて、前記親鍵を用いて暗号する範囲を示す情報に基づいて、前記秘密データの最上位のデータのみを保護する
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記受信手段は、前記第2の端末から親鍵及び前記親鍵を用いるときの暗号アルゴリズムを示す情報を受信し、
前記制御手段は、前記受信した親鍵とは異なる第2の鍵を生成して、前記第2の鍵及び前記親鍵を用いるときの暗号アルゴリズムを用いて、前記秘密データを保護する
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記制御手段は、前記受信した親鍵とは異なる第2の鍵を前記親鍵より下の階層に生成する
ことを特徴とする請求項11記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記受信手段は、前記第2の端末から公開鍵及び前記公開鍵を用いるときの暗号アルゴリズムを示す情報を受信し、
前記制御手段は、前記受信した公開鍵及び前記公開鍵を用いるときの暗号アルゴリズムを用いて、前記秘密データを保護する
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記受信手段は、前記第2の端末から秘密鍵及び前記秘密鍵を用いるときの暗号アルゴリズムを示す情報を受信し、
前記制御手段は、前記受信した秘密鍵及び前記秘密鍵を用いるときの暗号アルゴリズムを用いて、前記秘密データを保護する
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記受信手段は、前記第2の端末から親鍵を受信し、
前記制御手段は、前記受信した親鍵が示す暗号強度のレベルと同一レベルで、前記秘密データ全体を保護する
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記受信手段は、前記第2の端末から暗号強度のレベルを示した情報を受信し、
前記制御手段は、前記受信した情報が示す暗号強度のレベルと同一レベルで、前記秘密データを保護する
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記受信手段は、前記第1の端末が秘密データを保護した際の暗号強度のレベルと同一レベルでの保護を要求する旨の情報を前記第2の端末から受信し、
前記制御手段は、前記受信した情報に基づいて、前記第1の端末が秘密データを保護した際の暗号強度のレベルと同一レベルで、前記秘密データを保護する
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記マイグレーション装置は、マイグレーションサーバを含む
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 前記マイグレーション装置は前記第1の端末の内部に含まれる
ことを特徴とする請求項3記載のマイグレーション装置。 - 第1の端末内で保護されたデータを第2の端末に移動するマイグレーション方法であって、
前記第1の端末から前記第1の端末内のセキュリティモジュールで第1の暗号アルゴリズムで保護された秘密データを受信する受信ステップと、
前記第1の端末から送られた証明書から前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムを識別する識別ステップと、
前記第1の暗号アルゴリズム及び前記第2の端末内のセキュリティモジュールで用いられる第2の暗号アルゴリズムを対応付けたセキュリティポリシーテーブルを保持する保持ステップと、
前記秘密データのダウンロード要求を前記第2の端末から受信する受信ステップと、
前記第2の端末から送られた証明書から前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムを識別する識別ステップと、
前記ダウンロード要求を前記第2の端末から受けたとき、前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルに従って前記秘密データを前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムに代えて前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムで保護し直して前記第2の端末に送信する送信ステップとを含み、
前記送信ステップにおいて、前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムから前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムで保護し直した秘密データを前記第2の端末に送信するに先立って、前記秘密データが送信される宛先である端末が備えている評価レベルとして前記第1の端末が要求する最低評価レベルを前記第1の端末から受信し、前記第2の端末の評価レベルを前記第2の端末から受信し、前記第2の端末の評価レベルが前記最低評価レベル以上か否かを判断し、記第2の端末の評価レベルが前記最低評価レベル以上の場合に、前記保護し直した秘密データを前記第2の端末に送信する
ことを特徴とするマイグレーション方法。 - 第1の端末内で保護されたデータを第2の端末に移動するマイグレーション装置において読取可能なプログラムを格納した記憶媒体であって、
前記プログラムは、前記マイグレーション装置に、
前記第1の端末から前記第1の端末内のセキュリティモジュールで第1の暗号アルゴリズムで保護された秘密データを受信する処理と、
前記第1の端末から送られた証明書から前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムを識別する処理と、
前記第1の暗号アルゴリズム及び前記第2の端末内のセキュリティモジュールで用いられる第2の暗号アルゴリズムを対応付けたセキュリティポリシーテーブルを保持する処理と、
前記秘密データのダウンロード要求を前記第2の端末から受信する処理と、
前記第2の端末から送られた証明書から前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムを識別する処理と、
前記ダウンロード要求を前記第2端末から受けたとき、前記セキュリティポリシーテーブルに従って前記秘密データを前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムから前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムに保護し直して前記第2の端末に送信する処理とを実行させ、
前記第1の暗号アルゴリズムから前記第2の暗号アルゴリズムで保護し直した秘密データを前記第2の端末に送信する処理に先立って、前記秘密データが送信される宛先である端末が備えている評価レベルとして前記第1の端末が要求する最低評価レベルを前記第1の端末から受信し、前記第2の端末の評価レベルを前記第2の端末から受信し、前記第2の端末の評価レベルが前記最低評価レベル以上か否かを判断し、記第2の端末の評価レベルが前記最低評価レベル以上の場合に、前記保護し直した秘密データを前記第2の端末に送信する処理を実行させる
ことを特徴とする記録媒体。 - マイグレーション装置を介して、第1の端末装置から第2の端末装置へ秘匿すべき秘密データを移動するマイグレーションシステムであって、
前記第1の端末は、
前記秘密データを用いた処理を行う実行環境を、仮想マシンによって実現する第1実行手段と、
前記秘密データを安全に前記マイグレーション装置へ送信する送信手段と、
前記実行環境を実現する仮想マシンから前記秘密データを取り除き、前記秘密データが取り除かれた仮想マシンを前記秘密データとは異なる経路で前記第2の端末へ移動する移動手段とを備え、
前記マイグレーション装置は、
前記第1の端末から、前記秘密データを安全に受信する受信手段と、
前記第2の端末のセキュリティに係る評価レベルが、前記秘密データを取得する装置が有するべき最低評価レベル以上であるか否かを判断する判断手段と、
前記評価レベルが前記最低評価レベル以上である場合、前記秘密データを、前記第2の端末に適した方法で、前記第2の端末へ安全に送信する送信手段と、
前記評価レベルが前記最低評価レベル以上である場合、前記第1の端末へ前記移動を許可する許可手段とを備え、
前記第2の端末は、前記秘密データを安全に受信する受信手段と、
前記第1の端末から前記仮想マシンを取得し、受信した前記秘密データを用いた処理を行う実行環境を、取得した前記仮想マシンを用いて実現する第2実行手段と
を備える
ことを特徴とするマイグレーションシステム。
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JP2010500555A JP5281074B2 (ja) | 2008-02-25 | 2009-02-23 | 情報セキュリティ装置および情報セキュリティシステム |
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JP2022043279A (ja) * | 2021-01-06 | 2022-03-15 | バイドゥ ユーエスエイ エルエルシー | 仮想化環境内の人工知能アクセラレータ・ステータス確認を用いる仮想マシン移行のための方法 |
JP7290708B2 (ja) | 2021-01-06 | 2023-06-13 | バイドゥ ユーエスエイ エルエルシー | 仮想化環境内の人工知能アクセラレータ・ステータス確認を用いる仮想マシン移行のための方法 |
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JP5281074B2 (ja) | 2013-09-04 |
EP2249511A1 (en) | 2010-11-10 |
JPWO2009107351A1 (ja) | 2011-06-30 |
US8489873B2 (en) | 2013-07-16 |
CN101953112A (zh) | 2011-01-19 |
US20100332820A1 (en) | 2010-12-30 |
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