WO2008068078A1 - Remote controller having an rfid tag - Google Patents

Remote controller having an rfid tag Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008068078A1
WO2008068078A1 PCT/EP2007/060319 EP2007060319W WO2008068078A1 WO 2008068078 A1 WO2008068078 A1 WO 2008068078A1 EP 2007060319 W EP2007060319 W EP 2007060319W WO 2008068078 A1 WO2008068078 A1 WO 2008068078A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
remote control
control device
distant equipment
rfid tag
user
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2007/060319
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Arnaud Lund
Original Assignee
International Business Machines Corporation
Compagnie Ibm France
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by International Business Machines Corporation, Compagnie Ibm France filed Critical International Business Machines Corporation
Publication of WO2008068078A1 publication Critical patent/WO2008068078A1/en

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
    • G06F21/35—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards communicating wirelessly
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/305—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals by remotely controlling device operation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6209—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08C—TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR MEASURED VALUES, CONTROL OR SIMILAR SIGNALS
    • G08C17/00—Arrangements for transmitting signals characterised by the use of a wireless electrical link
    • G08C17/02—Arrangements for transmitting signals characterised by the use of a wireless electrical link using a radio link
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/4104—Peripherals receiving signals from specially adapted client devices
    • H04N21/4126—The peripheral being portable, e.g. PDAs or mobile phones
    • H04N21/41265—The peripheral being portable, e.g. PDAs or mobile phones having a remote control device for bidirectional communication between the remote control device and client device
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/422—Input-only peripherals, i.e. input devices connected to specially adapted client devices, e.g. global positioning system [GPS]
    • H04N21/42204—User interfaces specially adapted for controlling a client device through a remote control device; Remote control devices therefor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/422—Input-only peripherals, i.e. input devices connected to specially adapted client devices, e.g. global positioning system [GPS]
    • H04N21/42204—User interfaces specially adapted for controlling a client device through a remote control device; Remote control devices therefor
    • H04N21/42206—User interfaces specially adapted for controlling a client device through a remote control device; Remote control devices therefor characterized by hardware details
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/422—Input-only peripherals, i.e. input devices connected to specially adapted client devices, e.g. global positioning system [GPS]
    • H04N21/42204—User interfaces specially adapted for controlling a client device through a remote control device; Remote control devices therefor
    • H04N21/42206—User interfaces specially adapted for controlling a client device through a remote control device; Remote control devices therefor characterized by hardware details
    • H04N21/42221—Transmission circuitry, e.g. infrared [IR] or radio frequency [RF]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/441—Acquiring end-user identification, e.g. using personal code sent by the remote control or by inserting a card
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2149—Restricted operating environment
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/436—Interfacing a local distribution network, e.g. communicating with another STB or one or more peripheral devices inside the home
    • H04N21/4367—Establishing a secure communication between the client and a peripheral device or smart card
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/45—Management operations performed by the client for facilitating the reception of or the interaction with the content or administrating data related to the end-user or to the client device itself, e.g. learning user preferences for recommending movies, resolving scheduling conflicts
    • H04N21/4508—Management of client data or end-user data
    • H04N21/4532—Management of client data or end-user data involving end-user characteristics, e.g. viewer profile, preferences
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/47—End-user applications
    • H04N21/475—End-user interface for inputting end-user data, e.g. personal identification number [PIN], preference data
    • H04N21/4751—End-user interface for inputting end-user data, e.g. personal identification number [PIN], preference data for defining user accounts, e.g. accounts for children

Definitions

  • the present invention is in the field of remote controllers and more particularly relates to a remote controller using Radio Frequency IDentification technology.
  • the remote controllers send data messages to the distant electronic equipment to initiate actions.
  • the remote controllers need an additional battery or an equivalent power device to sufficiently power the electronic components, the processors, the InfraRed diodes and/or the High Frequency partitions.
  • the existing remote controllers are suitable to respond to a large range of applications, the necessity to include a battery to power the electronic elements is a major inconvenient which among other drawbacks limit the size of those remote controllers. Moreover, the existing remote controllers do not offer the possibility to be individually customized in order to restrict its usage to one person.
  • the present invention offers a solution to solve the aforementioned problems.
  • RFID Radio Frequency IDentification
  • the basic concept of Radio Frequency IDentification consists in identifying and tracking devices mainly for system management purposes, using devices called RFID tags or transponders.
  • the RFID tag picks up signals from and sends signals to a reader machine.
  • the tag contains a unique serial number that identifies the device handling it but may have additional information, such as for example a customers' account number.
  • Tags may come in many forms, such as smart labels that can have a barcode printed on it.
  • RFID tags can be active, passive or semi-passive. Beyond the common application of tracking, RFID also suits for high technology wireless electronic systems based on message identification.
  • Those wireless systems allow a readable machine to pick up messages stored on the tag device.
  • the readable machine reads the notification message, identifies the device and then a preferred action which is indicated in the stored message is initiated. Bursts of electromagnetic waves are sent to the distant device located in a limited vicinity in order to power the RFID component.
  • the RFID device replies to the incoming signals by providing the necessary information about its identity.
  • the readable machine operates like a remote controller of a mobile device on which is attached a RFID tag.
  • this normal mode is reversed in the invention, which reverse mode was not obvious to determine for implementation in a remote controller.
  • the Programmable Secure Remote Controller allows transmission of a user' s selection after a decision-making identification process is performed.
  • the decision-making identification program consist in a large variety of predefined dinosaurri to deal successfully with the various equipments that need to be controlled.
  • the predefined dinosaurri are set up during the chip design configuration and depend on application domain where the remote controller is to be used. Moreover, for security purposes, the strigri may be encrypted into an identification memory.
  • the identification memory that interacts with a RFID tag device may be a non-volatile memory such as a Read Only Memory or a Flash Memory (which can be easily updated in case of necessity) .
  • a sensitive board included in the remote controller allows the user selection of the desired predefined scenario.
  • the sensitive board contains a matrix of functional key strokes allowing a user to select an action by hitting the adequate button (s).
  • the remote controller associates one dedicated action to one button selection or to one sequence of buttons selection, and a predefined scenario stored in the internal memory of the remote controller is operated.
  • the remote controller of the present invention is based on the RFID technology.
  • the RFID tags of the present inventions are included in the remote controller while the electromagnetic beam transmitter is included in the equipment that needs to be managed.
  • Such reverse mode allows the remote controller to be energy-less in regards to the usual RFID devices.
  • such arrangement offers the real advantage of a reduced implementation on small card format like credit card and thus a real cost manufacturing reduction.
  • the present invention may be adapted to cash machines.
  • a user may directly enter his pin code on the credit card without inserting the credit card in any device and then the card transaction may be granted in a secure and confidential mode.
  • a remote controller as defined in the appended independent claim 1
  • a program storage device as defined in the appended independent claim 11
  • a method as defined in the appended claim 11.
  • Figure 1 shows a block diagram of a preferred implementation of the present invention
  • Figure 2 details the logical operations to manage the data transfer initiated by the remote controller
  • Figure 3 illustrates a user selection process
  • a "Programmable Secure Remote Controller -PSRC-" based on RFID technology is provided.
  • the transmission of a user's action selection is performed using a compact energy-less and contact-less mechanism associated to a decision-making identification process.
  • the present invention may be used in various industrial and/or banking areas.
  • the PSRC contains one or more RFID tag devices depending on the functions implemented within the remote controller.
  • the RFID tag device receives the electromagnetic beam from the transmitter that is integrated in the equipment that needs to be controlled.
  • the disclosed RFID system is fully compliant with the EPCglobal Network convention and application guidelines that use the "ISO15693", the "ISO18000” and the anti-collision protocols.
  • the EPCglobal Network provides the conventions about the EPC (Electronic Product Code) arrangement, the ID System (EPC tags and Reader) , the Object Name Services (ONS), the Physical Markup Language (PML) and finally the Savant that represents the engine of the data management based on software technology.
  • FIG. 1 a general block diagram of the present system (100) is shown having two main components, a "Programmable Secure Remote Controller” -PSRC- (102) and a distant equipment (104) to be operated. Once powered, via a "Programmable Secure Remote Controller" -PSRC- (102) and a distant equipment (104) to be operated. Once powered, via a "Programmable Secure Remote Controller" -PSRC- (102) and a distant equipment (104) to be operated. Once powered, via a
  • the distant equipment (104) transmits an electromagnetic beam (106) to drive an antenna (108) located on the PSRC that is located within a limited radius (represented by circle arch) .
  • the electromagnetic beam (106) to drive an antenna (108) located on the PSRC that is located within a limited radius (represented by circle arch) .
  • a decision-making identification circuit (114) coupled to the Reflecting Logic initiates one or several built-in encrypted predefined dinosaurri
  • the remote controller further includes a matrix of push buttons (118) to enable the user to enter the appropriate selection to operate the remote equipment. Going now to figure 2, a logical diagram of the operations processed at the PSRC (200) are described.
  • the process starts when an energy flow (issued from the RFID tag) initiates a Request (202) that needs to be granted by the Reflecting Logic.
  • the Reflecting Logic represents the RFID tag identity that needs to be detected and identified by the distant equipment.
  • the tag identification is conformed to the Electronic Product Code (EPC Global) standard.
  • the tag identity is generally the concatenation of several fields that provide the content of a message header (Version 8 bits) , the EPC Manager (Manufacturer 28 bits), the Object Class (Product 24 bits) and the Serial Number (Serial Number 24 bits) .
  • the Decision-Making Identification function (218) identifies the user by validating a password code via a Password Code Validation block function (208).
  • the password code is typed via a Matrix Buttons (204) located on a Sensitive Board (206) .
  • the user is then identified as being authorized via an Identified Password code block function (210).
  • the combination of the Identified Password code block function with the 24 bits Electronic Product Code -EPC- (212) (EPC usually provides unique key and content for a tag) allows the PSRC to operate in a flexible secure protocol by having the possibility to use multiple user passwords. Such arrangement combines the 24 bits serial number code of the EPC
  • PSRC to be handled by various authorized user group or service provider that want to access to the distant equipment.
  • the validation of the password and the user identification enables the validation of the requested operation via a Requested Operation Validation block function (216) .
  • the Decision-making Identification block (218) generates an Internal Security Key (block 220) to decode the corresponding Predefined Scenari that is encrypted in block 212.
  • the predefined strigri are stored in a Memory block (224) .
  • the Encrypted Predefined Scenari are encrypted for security reasons and need to be decoded before transmission. According to the user application, several algorithms are stored in the memory.
  • the algorithm checks that the desired channel of the TV is authorized to be watched by young people.
  • the user can activate various operations by using the Matrix Buttons located on the Sensitive Board without typing his/her password again, such as for example, a TV user desiring to change the current TV channel to another one.
  • the Failure Password code block (226) locks and inhibits the PSRC remote controller via a "Locked System till Password reset" block (228) as long as the undesirable situation persists.
  • a recovery password reset is necessary to reset the PSRC remote controller. It has to be applied by a security people in charge of restoring the remote controller via the logic chain consisting to blocks 204,206,208 and 210.
  • An additional security function is to authorize the massive destruction of the PSRC remote controller, via the RFID tag by using an appropriate electromagnetic beam that would erase the content of a dedicated register.
  • the data transfer is initiated from either the PSRC to the distant equipment or the reverse.
  • the data packets related to the user' s preferred wireless message are encrypted by using a protected key that is hard coded in the memory (not shown in Figure 2) .
  • This key is provided to the distant equipment at the leading data message transfer to protect the global transmission allowing the entire transmission to be locked between the two elements until transfer completion. Transfer completion is indicated to the distant equipment via a dedicated operating code that is stored in the memory (224) .
  • This feature allows the wireless communication to be initiated as a robust and secure safeguard protocol, keeping a data coherency of the wireless message all along the transfer.
  • an energy flow is detected: During the energy detection phase the passive RFID tag permanently receives the energy contained in the electromagnetic beam transmitted from the distant equipment. The detection of this energy initiates a Reflecting Logic Activation phase (step 302) . On step 302, the power transmitted from the distant equipment energies the Reflecting Logic block. This latter is powered on and initiates a User Password Identification phase (step 303) .
  • the User Password Identification phase checks that the user' s password is correct before granting the Requested Operation.
  • the user's password is entered using the Matrix Buttons and the password checking procedure is initiated via the User Password Validation phase (step 304).
  • step 304 the user's password is checked and validated and the user is identified in order to authorize the Requested Operation to start the data transmission.
  • the user's password is compared (step 312) to a password table that was preliminary defined by the PSRC owner during the PSRC configuration phase. The way the password table is coded and how the PSRC configuration phase is established are not described in this document, as being normal configuration operations for remote controllers. If the password is not correct (branch No) , the User Password Failure phase (step 305) is initiated.
  • step 305 the failure Password Code is activated and leads the PSRC to be locked until a password reset is applied.
  • the Requested Operation then fails and the PSRC is locked (lock procedure 228) .
  • the process loops back to step 303.
  • step 306 if the password is correct (Branch Yes), then the user password is accepted on step 306.
  • the system identifies the user as an authorized person to operate the PSRC and thus the necessary access is given to run the desired Requested Operation.
  • step 307 allows to combine the user's password with the Electronic Product Code -EPC- to create a resultant polynomial that is used to generate a signature key based on a Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC) concept.
  • CRC Cyclic Redundancy Checks
  • step 308 the requested operation is granted thereby allowing the data transmission to start.
  • a Security Key is generated to allow the corresponding encrypted predefined scenario to be decoded on step 310.
  • the Security Key is generated by any well-known key generator that is not described in this document.
  • the key is like a polynomial formula that allows the Encrypted Predefined Scenari to be decrypted all along the current data transfer. Both the PSRC and the distant equipment are locked together until the current data transfer is completed thereby avoiding any undesirable parasitic communication issued from another system.
  • the present remote controller can offer various features to be used in card service concept, like a portable digital code that allows removing the apparent device near to the door, which can be vandalized or used by hackers.
  • the activation of the card can be customized by using a personal password that is different for each others allowing setting different codes to different people as well as setting different code for different doors.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • Child & Adolescent Psychology (AREA)
  • Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)

Abstract

A remote control device based on RFID technology is disclosed. The remote controller comprise a RFID tag to receive RF signals from a distant equipment and decoding means to determine if the distant equipment is authorized to be controlled by the remote controller. The remote controller further allows to check the identity of the user to activate the remote control.

Description

REMOTE CONTROLLER HAVING AN RFID TAG
Technical Field
The present invention is in the field of remote controllers and more particularly relates to a remote controller using Radio Frequency IDentification technology.
Background of the invention
Nowadays industries use high technology remote controllers, particularly the industries having the need to control distant equipment like robotics, mechatronics, automotive, numeric systems, camera, VCR, sound system or television and any other electronic devices that need specific commands to operate. The remote controllers send data messages to the distant electronic equipment to initiate actions. In order to operate safely and correctly the remote controllers need an additional battery or an equivalent power device to sufficiently power the electronic components, the processors, the InfraRed diodes and/or the High Frequency partitions.
Whereas the existing remote controllers are suitable to respond to a large range of applications, the necessity to include a battery to power the electronic elements is a major inconvenient which among other drawbacks limit the size of those remote controllers. Moreover, the existing remote controllers do not offer the possibility to be individually customized in order to restrict its usage to one person.
Finally, the existing remote controllers do not offer the possibility to check the identity of a person.
The present invention offers a solution to solve the aforementioned problems.
Summary of the invention
Therefore there is a need for a battery-free remote controller that allows to control electronic equipment.
There is also a need for a secure remote controller which can be programmed to operate different equipments once the identity of the owner is checked.
The above mentioned needs are achieved by the present invention which provides a secure remote control unit based on the RFID technology. The basic concept of Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) consists in identifying and tracking devices mainly for system management purposes, using devices called RFID tags or transponders. The RFID tag picks up signals from and sends signals to a reader machine. The tag contains a unique serial number that identifies the device handling it but may have additional information, such as for example a customers' account number. Tags may come in many forms, such as smart labels that can have a barcode printed on it. Moreover, RFID tags can be active, passive or semi-passive. Beyond the common application of tracking, RFID also suits for high technology wireless electronic systems based on message identification. Those wireless systems allow a readable machine to pick up messages stored on the tag device. The readable machine reads the notification message, identifies the device and then a preferred action which is indicated in the stored message is initiated. Bursts of electromagnetic waves are sent to the distant device located in a limited vicinity in order to power the RFID component. The RFID device replies to the incoming signals by providing the necessary information about its identity. In this RFID use, the readable machine operates like a remote controller of a mobile device on which is attached a RFID tag. However, as it will be detailed herein below, this normal mode is reversed in the invention, which reverse mode was not obvious to determine for implementation in a remote controller.
Thus, it is an object of the present invention to provide a compact energy-less programmable apparatus, herein named Programmable Secure Remote Controller (PSRC in short) to operate distant equipments located in a limited vicinity. By using in an innovative manner some of the RFID principles, the Programmable Secure Remote Controller allows transmission of a user' s selection after a decision-making identification process is performed.
The decision-making identification program consist in a large variety of predefined scenari to deal successfully with the various equipments that need to be controlled.
The predefined scenari are set up during the chip design configuration and depend on application domain where the remote controller is to be used. Moreover, for security purposes, the scenari may be encrypted into an identification memory.
The identification memory that interacts with a RFID tag device may be a non-volatile memory such as a Read Only Memory or a Flash Memory (which can be easily updated in case of necessity) .
A sensitive board included in the remote controller allows the user selection of the desired predefined scenario. The sensitive board contains a matrix of functional key strokes allowing a user to select an action by hitting the adequate button (s).
Before granting a requested selection, several identification routines are run at the Remote Controller side to check the validity of the transaction by identifying the owner. Once identified, the user selects the intended action by hitting the appropriate button or sequence of keys.
The remote controller associates one dedicated action to one button selection or to one sequence of buttons selection, and a predefined scenario stored in the internal memory of the remote controller is operated.
As early mentioned, the remote controller of the present invention is based on the RFID technology. However, contrary to the known use of RFID tags, the RFID tags of the present inventions are included in the remote controller while the electromagnetic beam transmitter is included in the equipment that needs to be managed. Such reverse mode allows the remote controller to be energy-less in regards to the usual RFID devices. Moreover, such arrangement offers the real advantage of a reduced implementation on small card format like credit card and thus a real cost manufacturing reduction.
Several extended applications of the present invention may become apparent while reading the following description. For example, the present invention may be adapted to cash machines. A user may directly enter his pin code on the credit card without inserting the credit card in any device and then the card transaction may be granted in a secure and confidential mode. According to the present invention there is provided a remote controller as defined in the appended independent claim 1, a program storage device as defined in the appended independent claim 11, and a method as defined in the appended claim 11.
Further embodiments of the invention are provided in the appended dependent claims.
Brief description of the drawings
The above and other items, features and advantages of the invention will be better understood by reading the following more particular description of the invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings wherein:
Figure 1 shows a block diagram of a preferred implementation of the present invention;
Figure 2 details the logical operations to manage the data transfer initiated by the remote controller;
Figure 3 illustrates a user selection process.
Detailed description of the invention
Going now into details of the present invention, a "Programmable Secure Remote Controller -PSRC- " based on RFID technology is provided. The transmission of a user's action selection is performed using a compact energy-less and contact-less mechanism associated to a decision-making identification process. The present invention may be used in various industrial and/or banking areas.
The PSRC contains one or more RFID tag devices depending on the functions implemented within the remote controller. The RFID tag device receives the electromagnetic beam from the transmitter that is integrated in the equipment that needs to be controlled.
In a preferred implementation, the disclosed RFID system is fully compliant with the EPCglobal Network convention and application guidelines that use the "ISO15693", the "ISO18000" and the anti-collision protocols. The EPCglobal Network provides the conventions about the EPC (Electronic Product Code) arrangement, the ID System (EPC tags and Reader) , the Object Name Services (ONS), the Physical Markup Language (PML) and finally the Savant that represents the engine of the data management based on software technology.
Even if some solutions can be integrated by using a wide variety of different RFID standards the preferred implementation is based on using passive tags that do not need battery powering. In addition, the data treatment and speed transmission do not require fast-growing data performance to achieve a sufficient read range in a limited radius.
Referring first to Figure 1, a general block diagram of the present system (100) is shown having two main components, a "Programmable Secure Remote Controller" -PSRC- (102) and a distant equipment (104) to be operated. Once powered, via a
Power Supply input (not shown), the distant equipment (104) transmits an electromagnetic beam (106) to drive an antenna (108) located on the PSRC that is located within a limited radius (represented by circle arch) . The electromagnetic beam
(106) powers a passive RFID tag (110), and a resultant energy allows a Reflecting Logic (112) to be sufficiently self-powered for the whole data transfer. A decision-making identification circuit (114) coupled to the Reflecting Logic initiates one or several built-in encrypted predefined scenari
(116) . The remote controller further includes a matrix of push buttons (118) to enable the user to enter the appropriate selection to operate the remote equipment. Going now to figure 2, a logical diagram of the operations processed at the PSRC (200) are described.
The process starts when an energy flow (issued from the RFID tag) initiates a Request (202) that needs to be granted by the Reflecting Logic. The Reflecting Logic represents the RFID tag identity that needs to be detected and identified by the distant equipment. The tag identification is conformed to the Electronic Product Code (EPC Global) standard. The tag identity is generally the concatenation of several fields that provide the content of a message header (Version 8 bits) , the EPC Manager (Manufacturer 28 bits), the Object Class (Product 24 bits) and the Serial Number (Serial Number 24 bits) . In order to be fully decoded by the distant equipment, the Decision-Making Identification function (218) identifies the user by validating a password code via a Password Code Validation block function (208). The password code is typed via a Matrix Buttons (204) located on a Sensitive Board (206) . The user is then identified as being authorized via an Identified Password code block function (210). The combination of the Identified Password code block function with the 24 bits Electronic Product Code -EPC- (212) (EPC usually provides unique key and content for a tag) allows the PSRC to operate in a flexible secure protocol by having the possibility to use multiple user passwords. Such arrangement combines the 24 bits serial number code of the EPC
(16 million combinations) with a CRC signature key logic (214) and with the Identified Password code (210) . This allows the
PSRC to be handled by various authorized user group or service provider that want to access to the distant equipment. The validation of the password and the user identification enables the validation of the requested operation via a Requested Operation Validation block function (216) .
The Decision-making Identification block (218) generates an Internal Security Key (block 220) to decode the corresponding Predefined Scenari that is encrypted in block 212. The predefined scenari are stored in a Memory block (224) .
The Encrypted Predefined Scenari are encrypted for security reasons and need to be decoded before transmission. According to the user application, several algorithms are stored in the memory.
For example, when using the PSRC in a TV set application, the algorithm checks that the desired channel of the TV is authorized to be watched by young people.
Other applications may be to use the PSRC to monitor the setting of a coherency VCR recording sequence in terms of date, duration, tape free space and so on...
To summarize, once the Identified Password Code is correct and the Encrypted Predefined Scenari are decoded by the adequate Security Key, then the Requested Operation is granted and the data messages are transferred from the PSRC to the distant equipment.
As far as the Requested Operation is validated the user can activate various operations by using the Matrix Buttons located on the Sensitive Board without typing his/her password again, such as for example, a TV user desiring to change the current TV channel to another one.
If the Password Code Validation block detects individual swindling or unauthorized accessing, like a password failure or an equipment aggression or a system violation , the Failure Password code block (226) locks and inhibits the PSRC remote controller via a "Locked System till Password reset" block (228) as long as the undesirable situation persists.
A recovery password reset is necessary to reset the PSRC remote controller. It has to be applied by a security people in charge of restoring the remote controller via the logic chain consisting to blocks 204,206,208 and 210.
An additional security function is to authorize the massive destruction of the PSRC remote controller, via the RFID tag by using an appropriate electromagnetic beam that would erase the content of a dedicated register.
Once the RFID wireless communication is established between the two elements, the data transfer is initiated from either the PSRC to the distant equipment or the reverse.
For each data transmission the data packets related to the user' s preferred wireless message are encrypted by using a protected key that is hard coded in the memory (not shown in Figure 2) . This key is provided to the distant equipment at the leading data message transfer to protect the global transmission allowing the entire transmission to be locked between the two elements until transfer completion. Transfer completion is indicated to the distant equipment via a dedicated operating code that is stored in the memory (224) .
This feature allows the wireless communication to be initiated as a robust and secure safeguard protocol, keeping a data coherency of the wireless message all along the transfer.
Referring now to Figure 3, a flow chart of the operation for a data transfer between the PSRC and the distant equipment is detailed.
At a first step (301), an energy flow is detected: During the energy detection phase the passive RFID tag permanently receives the energy contained in the electromagnetic beam transmitted from the distant equipment. The detection of this energy initiates a Reflecting Logic Activation phase (step 302) . On step 302, the power transmitted from the distant equipment energies the Reflecting Logic block. This latter is powered on and initiates a User Password Identification phase (step 303) .
On step 303, the User Password Identification phase checks that the user' s password is correct before granting the Requested Operation. The user's password is entered using the Matrix Buttons and the password checking procedure is initiated via the User Password Validation phase (step 304).
On step 304, the user's password is checked and validated and the user is identified in order to authorize the Requested Operation to start the data transmission. The user's password is compared (step 312) to a password table that was preliminary defined by the PSRC owner during the PSRC configuration phase. The way the password table is coded and how the PSRC configuration phase is established are not described in this document, as being normal configuration operations for remote controllers. If the password is not correct (branch No) , the User Password Failure phase (step 305) is initiated.
On step 305, the failure Password Code is activated and leads the PSRC to be locked until a password reset is applied. The Requested Operation then fails and the PSRC is locked (lock procedure 228) . The process loops back to step 303.
Going back to step 312, if the password is correct (Branch Yes), then the user password is accepted on step 306. The system identifies the user as an authorized person to operate the PSRC and thus the necessary access is given to run the desired Requested Operation. Next step 307 allows to combine the user's password with the Electronic Product Code -EPC- to create a resultant polynomial that is used to generate a signature key based on a Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC) concept.
Next, on step 308, the requested operation is granted thereby allowing the data transmission to start.
On step 309, a Security Key is generated to allow the corresponding encrypted predefined scenario to be decoded on step 310. The Security Key is generated by any well-known key generator that is not described in this document. The key is like a polynomial formula that allows the Encrypted Predefined Scenari to be decrypted all along the current data transfer. Both the PSRC and the distant equipment are locked together until the current data transfer is completed thereby avoiding any undesirable parasitic communication issued from another system.
It has to be appreciated that while the invention has been particularly shown and described with reference to a preferred embodiment, various changes in form and details may be made therein without departing from the spirit, and scope of the invention, as illustrated in the following alternate embodiments :
The present remote controller can offer various features to be used in card service concept, like a portable digital code that allows removing the apparent device near to the door, which can be vandalized or used by hackers. The activation of the card can be customized by using a personal password that is different for each others allowing setting different codes to different people as well as setting different code for different doors.

Claims

Claims
1. A remote control device (102) comprising:
- a short range receiver (108) for receiving RF signals (106) from at least one distant equipment (104); - a RFID tag (110) activated by the received RF signals for generating information indicative of the at least one distant equipment;
- decoding means (112,114) coupled to the RFID tag for identifying the at least one distant equipment through the information received by the RFID tag; and processing means (116,118) coupled to the decoding means for activating a remote control of the at least one distant equipment.
2. The remote control device of claim 1 wherein the decoding means comprise:
- means (112) for determining if the at least one distant equipment is authorized to be controlled by said remote control device.
3. The remote control device of claim 1 or 2 wherein the decoding means further comprise means (114) for identifying a user of the remote control device.
4. The remote control device of claim 3 wherein the identification means comprise password control means.
5. The remote control device of claim 4 further comprises means for inputting a user password.
6. The remote control device of anyone of claims 1 to 5 wherein the processing means comprise means for retrieving a predefined process among a plurality of predefined processes to control the at lest one distant equipment.
7. The remote control device of claim 6 further comprising memory means for storing the plurality of predefined processes .
8. The remote control device of anyone of claims 1 to 7 further comprising means for allowing a user to select a predefined process.
9. The remote control device of anyone of claims 1 to 8 further comprising means for deactivating the remote control device.
10. The remote control device of anyone of claims 1 to 9 wherein the RFID tag is a passive tag.
11. A program storage device readable by machine, tangibly embodying a program of instructions executable by the machine to perform method steps for remotely controlling a distant equipment, said method comprising the steps of:
- detecting the reception of short range RF signals from at least one distant equipment;
- upon reception of the RF signals, activating a RFID tag to generate information indicative of the at least one distant equipment;
- decoding the information generated by the RFID tag for identifying the at least one distant equipment; and
- activating a remote control process of the at least one distant equipment.
PCT/EP2007/060319 2006-12-07 2007-09-28 Remote controller having an rfid tag WO2008068078A1 (en)

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