WO2005112338A1 - Procede de distribution de cles - Google Patents

Procede de distribution de cles Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2005112338A1
WO2005112338A1 PCT/CN2005/000133 CN2005000133W WO2005112338A1 WO 2005112338 A1 WO2005112338 A1 WO 2005112338A1 CN 2005000133 W CN2005000133 W CN 2005000133W WO 2005112338 A1 WO2005112338 A1 WO 2005112338A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
registration
message
terminal
protocol
response message
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2005/000133
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Jun Yan
Dongjun Wu
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority to AT05706573T priority Critical patent/ATE440416T1/de
Priority to US10/589,177 priority patent/US7813509B2/en
Priority to DE602005016080T priority patent/DE602005016080D1/de
Priority to EP05706573A priority patent/EP1717986B1/en
Publication of WO2005112338A1 publication Critical patent/WO2005112338A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/1066—Session management
    • H04L65/1073—Registration or de-registration
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/76—Proxy, i.e. using intermediary entity to perform cryptographic operations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/10—Architectures or entities
    • H04L65/102—Gateways
    • H04L65/1043—Gateway controllers, e.g. media gateway control protocol [MGCP] controllers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/1066—Session management
    • H04L65/1101—Session protocols
    • H04L65/1104—Session initiation protocol [SIP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W60/00—Affiliation to network, e.g. registration; Terminating affiliation with the network, e.g. de-registration
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to security management technology in communication, and in particular, to a key distribution method applied in NGN (Next Generation Network).
  • NGN Next Generation Network
  • NGN is a comprehensive and open network architecture that can provide various services including voice, data, and multimedia, and provides users with real-time conversation services.
  • Its network equipment includes a small number of core equipment and a large number of user terminals.
  • PSTN / PLMN public telecommunication network / public land mobile network
  • the interaction between other network equipment Both are based on the packet core network and various packet access networks for transmission.
  • the NGN network is extremely vulnerable to various illegal attacks, especially the large number of packet terminals existing in the NGN network, and it is easy to become the initiator of illegal attacks.
  • the key agreement method defined by the network layer security standard IPSec is the key agreement method of the IKE protocol (Internet Key Exchange Protocol) and the transport layer security standard TLS (Transport Layer Security), which is regulated by TLS
  • the defined Handshake is used to complete the key encryption exchange of the IKE protocol using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, which defines five parameter groups of the DH algorithm (that is, the prime number p and the base number g).
  • the encryption algorithm has high strength Features of large key length.
  • IKE is a very rigorous and quite complex key exchange protocol
  • the Handshake protocol implements one-party (mainly server) or two-way authentication between the client and server, and the encryption algorithm used in the negotiation protocol and
  • the key, the authentication algorithm and the key, and the negotiated session parameters are used by the recording protocol for multiple connections, avoiding the overhead of negotiating new session parameters for each connection.
  • the protocol guarantees that the negotiation process is reliable.
  • the shared secret is secure.
  • the NGN network is a relatively closed network. It consists of a series of network-side servers (such as softswitches, application servers, and various gateways) and a large number of access terminals. The terminals and network equipment are under the jurisdiction and control of an operator. There is a management domain that manages devices in the domain and assists in completing inter-domain user communication. At the same time, all terminals need to register in the management domain. These network characteristics of NGN determine that NGN is suitable for centralized keys.
  • the technical problem solved by the present invention is to provide a secure and efficient key distribution method, which can implement centralized key distribution, adapt to the network characteristics of NGN, and be flexible in use.
  • the present invention provides a key distribution method, which is applied to a next-generation network including a terminal, a softswitch, and an authentication center.
  • the method includes the following steps: a) the terminal sends a registration request message to the softswitch to request registration;
  • the softswitch sends an authentication request message to the authentication center to request the authentication of the terminal; c) the authentication center authenticates the terminal, and simultaneously generates a session key between the terminal and the softswitch, and passes the registration to the softswitch after passing the registration authentication The session key is distributed to the terminal.
  • step c) the authentication center uses the following steps to authenticate the terminal: cl) The authentication center generates a first certificate for the terminal according to the shared key Kc with the terminal, and then uses the shared key Kc to authenticate the terminal. Session key encryption, returning the encrypted session key and the first certificate to the softswitch;
  • the softswitch returns a registration failure response message to the terminal to notify the terminal of the registration failure; c3) the terminal generates a second certificate according to the shared key Kc with the certification center, and then sends a registration message containing the second certificate to the softswitch to re-register Register
  • step c) The soft switch authenticates the terminal according to the first certificate and the second certificate.
  • step c) the softswitch distributes the session key to the terminal by using the following steps:
  • the softswitch returns a registration success response message to the terminal, where the registration success response message includes the session key encrypted by the shared key Kc, and the softswitch sends a terminal authentication success message to the certification center;
  • the terminal ⁇ decrypts the session key encrypted by the authentication center according to the shared key Kc.
  • the method further includes: the terminal sending to the softswitch a list of security capabilities supported by the terminal and priority information of each security capability;
  • the soft switch selects an appropriate security capability for communication according to the security capability list of the terminal and priority information of each security capability.
  • the registration request message and the registration message are both SIP protocol registration messages
  • the registration failure response message is a SIP protocol response message
  • the registration success response message is a SIP protocol registration request success message.
  • the registration request message is an MGCP protocol system restart message and a response message thereof
  • the registration failure response message and a registration success response message are both an MGCP protocol notification request message and a response message thereof
  • the registration message is an MGCP protocol Notification messages and their response messages.
  • the registration request message is a H.248 protocol system service status change message and a response message thereof
  • the registration failure response message and the registration success response message are both H.248 protocol attribute change messages and response messages
  • the registration message is an H.248 protocol notification message and a response message.
  • the registration request message is an H.323 protocol gatekeeper request message
  • the registration failure response message is an H.323 protocol gatekeeper rejection message
  • the registration message is an H.323 protocol registration request message
  • the The registration success response message is the H.323 protocol registration success message.
  • the present invention also discloses another key distribution method, which is applied to a next-generation network including a terminal, a signaling agent, a softswitch, and an authentication center.
  • the method specifically includes the following steps:
  • the terminal sends a registration request message to the softswitch through a signaling agent to request registration;
  • the softswitch sends an authentication request message to the authentication center to request authentication of the terminal; c) The authentication center authenticates the terminal, and simultaneously generates a session key between the terminal and the signaling agent, and passes the softswitch to distribute the session key to the terminal through the signaling agent after the registration authentication is passed.
  • step C) the authentication center uses the following steps to authenticate the terminal: C1) the authentication center generates a first authentication word for the terminal according to the shared key Kc with the terminal and the shared key Ksp * with the signaling agent, Then encrypt the session key with the shared key Kc and the shared key Ksp respectively, and return the encrypted session key and the first face certificate to the soft exchange;
  • the softswitch returns a registration failure response message to the terminal through the signaling agent to notify the terminal of the registration failure;
  • the terminal generates a second certificate according to the shared key Kc with the certification center, and then sends a registration message containing the second certificate to a signaling agent, and the signaling agent forwards the registration message to the softswitch Re-register
  • the soft switch authenticates the terminal according to the first certificate and the second certificate.
  • step C the softswitch uses the following steps to distribute the session key to the terminal:
  • the softswitch forwards a terminal registration success response message to the signaling agent, where the registration success response message includes the session key encrypted by the authentication center with the shared key Kc and Ksp, and the signaling agent decrypts the authentication with the shared key Ksp The session key encrypted by the center via the shared key Ksp, and using the session key obtained by the decryption to calculate a message verification word for the registration success response message, and then the signaling agent forwards the registration success response message to the terminal, said The registration success response message includes the session key encrypted by the shared key Kc and the message authentication word;
  • the terminal decrypts the session key encrypted by the authentication center according to the shared key Kc, and uses the session key obtained after decryption to verify the message authentication word returned by the signaling agent to verify the identity of the signaling agent, At the same time, verify the integrity of the message and whether the terminal's own security capability parameters returned by the signaling agent are correct.
  • the terminal will contain a list of security capabilities it supports and the The registration message of the priority information is sent to the signaling agent, and the signaling agent selects an appropriate security capability for communication according to the security capabilities supported by the terminal and priority information of each security capability.
  • the registration request message and the registration message are both SIP protocol registration messages
  • the registration failure response message is a SIP protocol response message
  • the registration success response message is a SIP protocol registration request success message.
  • the registration request message is an MGCP protocol system restart message and a response message thereof
  • the registration failure response message and a registration success response message are both an MGCP protocol notification request message and a response message thereof
  • the registration message is an MGCP protocol Notification messages and their response messages.
  • the registration request message is a H.248 protocol system service status change message and a response message thereof, and the registration failure response message and the registration success response message are both H.248 protocol attribute change messages and response messages,
  • the registration message is an H.248 protocol notification message and a response message.
  • the registration request message is a H.323 protocol gatekeeper request message
  • the registration failure response message is H.323, a gatekeeper rejection message
  • the registration message is an H.323 protocol registration request message
  • the registration success response message is that the H.323 protocol registration is successfully canceled.
  • the present invention has the following advantages:
  • the softswitch communicates with the terminal, and the key is distributed during the registration and authentication process.
  • the communication volume is small, and the characteristics of the NGN network can be tightly combined.
  • the efficiency of solving the security problem of the entire system is greatly improved.
  • the terminal The centralized registration and authentication and key distribution are more suitable for the actual situation of NGN networks.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an NGN network environment to which the key distribution method of the present invention is applied;
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a communication process of a specific embodiment of the key distribution method of the present invention in the network environment shown in FIG.
  • FIG. 1 Schematic diagram of an NGN network environment with a signaling agent applied to the invention of the key distribution method
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the communication process of a specific embodiment of the key distribution method of the present invention in the network environment shown in FIG. 3
  • FIG. 5 is an SJDP protocol
  • Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the communication process in the embodiment of key distribution during the registration and authentication process
  • Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the communication process in the embodiment of the key distribution during the MGCP protocol registration and authentication process
  • Figure 7 is the implementation of the secret during the H.248 protocol registration and authentication process The schematic diagram of the communication process in the embodiment of key distribution
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a communication process of an embodiment in which key distribution is implemented in the H.323 protocol registration and authentication process.
  • NGN networks network security is an important issue encountered in the actual operation of NGN networks at present. If NGN network security problems cannot be solved well, NGN networks will not be able to get large-scale applications.
  • FIG. 1 is a simple single-domain networking diagram of NGN, that is, there is only one softswitch (also known as a media gateway controller) device. The actual networking There may be multiple softswitch devices.
  • the softswitch communicates with the relay media, the physical gateway, and the Initial protocol), H.323 and H.248 terminals are connected, where the relay media gateway is connected to analog phones T1, T2, and the softswitch is also connected to the authentication center AuC.
  • each network device, terminal, and authentication center AuC have a shared key.
  • the network device can be manually configured or delivered by the network management.
  • the terminal device is assigned by the system or entered by the user when the device is opened.
  • the session key between the terminal and the softswitch is generated by the authentication center AuC.
  • the invention combines the characteristics of the NGN network, and combines the registration and authentication process with the session key distribution process. After the terminal initiates registration with the softswitch, and the softswitch requests authentication from the certification center, the certification center generates a session key between the terminal and the softswitch. After the registration authentication is passed, the softswitch distributes the session key to the terminal. Because the session key distribution is completed during the registration and authentication process, subsequent communications do not need to negotiate the key again, which makes the registration and authentication of the terminal and the key distribution process simpler, improves the efficiency and performance of the system, and requires more terminals. Low, the terminal does not need to support a complex key distribution protocol, but only needs to extend the existing call protocol.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a simple key distribution communication process, which is described as follows:
  • the terminal first initiates a registration request to the softswitch.
  • the specific message is related to the protocol supported by the terminal.
  • After the softswitch receives the registration request message, it sends
  • the authentication center requests authentication of the terminal.
  • the authentication center generates a corresponding certificate (which is convenient for distinguishing hereinafter referred to as the first certificate) and a session key according to the terminal information, and then returns an authentication response message to the softswitch.
  • the authentication response message contains the authentication response message. Describe the first certificate and session key.
  • the softswitch After receiving the authentication response message, the softswitch sends a registration failure response message to the terminal, asking the terminal to re-register, and the terminal generates a certificate (to facilitate the distinction later referred to as the second certificate) Then, the registration request is re-initiated to the softswitch.
  • the softswitch compares the first certificate and the second certificate submitted by the authentication center and the terminal. If they are not the same, a registration failure response message is returned to the terminal, and the terminal is required to re-register.
  • the authentication is passed, and a registration success response message is sent to the terminal, where The registration success response message includes a session key, and the terminal can obtain the session key after receiving the message.
  • the softswitch when the softswitch returns a registration failure response message to the terminal, the softswitch also requires the terminal to feedback the list of supported security capabilities. In this way, when the terminal initiates registration with the softswitch again, it further adds Including the list of security capabilities supported by the terminal and priority information of each security capability, the softswitch can select appropriate security capabilities for communication based on this.
  • the network environment to which the present invention is applied may further include a signaling agent (SP).
  • SP signaling agent
  • the network environment to which the present invention is applied may further include a signaling agent (SP).
  • SP signaling agent
  • communication between network devices above the signaling agent is reliable, that is, it needs to be on a network. Ensure that these network devices are in a trusted zone, the terminal is untrusted, and the communication between the terminal and the signaling agent is insecure, that is, the terminal and the signaling agent are in an untrusted zone, and the signaling agent is a trusted zone and a non-trusted zone. The boundaries of the trust zone.
  • the signaling agent in the present invention may be a network device: a broadband access gateway or a Session Border Controller (SBC).
  • SBC Session Border Controller
  • it may be integrated into an IP gateway as a functional module together with a module that handles media forwarding. It is also possible to adopt an architectural manner in which signaling is separated from the media, and become an independent signaling proxy entity, which will be described below in a specific embodiment.
  • FIG. 3 is a network environment in which a signaling agent is integrated into an IP gateway.
  • a terminal implements communication with a softswitch through a signaling agent, and a session key between the terminal and the softswitch is in the network environment.
  • Medium is the session key between the terminal and the signaling agent.
  • FIG. 4 is a communication process for implementing key distribution in the network environment with the signaling agent shown in FIG. 3, which is described as follows:
  • step si the terminal sends a registration request message to the signaling agent according to the protocol flow.
  • the normal protocol registration message the specific message message is related to the protocol supported by the terminal, and the message is registered for a common protocol.
  • the message is not encrypted and authenticated. Processing, the registration request message includes the following information:
  • -N1 a random number or sequence number, used to identify the current message, the returned response message needs to include this number to prevent retransmission of the message (the number in the subsequent messages has the same meaning)
  • -TS1 used by the signaling agent to verify whether the clock of the terminal is synchronized with the clock of the signaling agent
  • step s2 the signaling agent forwards the registration request message of the terminal to the softswitch, and the message message includes the following information:
  • step s3 the softswitch does not have the terminal's authentication information, and sends an authentication request for the terminal to the authentication center (AuC), providing the terminal identification ID and the signaling agent identification ID.
  • the message includes the following information:
  • -IDsp Signaling agent that identifies the terminal's access to the network
  • the authentication center obtains the shared key Kc with the terminal, the shared key Ksp with the signaling agent, and other authentication information according to the terminal identification ID, the signaling agent identification ID, and generates a challenge word random number Rand.
  • the IDc and the shared key Kc together generate a first authentication key Aiithenticatorc for the terminal, and simultaneously generate a session key Kc, sp between the terminal and the signaling agent, and the shared key Kc and Ksp respectively secret the session.
  • the key Kc, sp is encrypted, and Rand, the authentication key, and the encrypted session key Kc, sp are returned to the softswitch as a response to the softswitch authentication request.
  • the authentication response message includes the following information:
  • Identification Signaling Agent -Rand random number, used by the certification center to calculate the certificate, the certification center sends Rand to the softswitch, the softswitch then sends it to the signaling agent, and then the signaling agent sends it to the terminal
  • step 5 The softswitch returns a registration failure response message to the signaling agent. If the registration fails, the terminal needs to be authenticated.
  • the registration failure response message includes the challenge word Rand in the parameters. The message contains the following information:
  • step 6 the signaling agent returns a registration failure response message to the terminal. If the registration fails, the terminal needs to be authenticated. Similarly, the registration failure response message includes the challenge word Rand. At the same time, the terminal is required to send back a list of supported security capabilities and each type of security.
  • the priority information of the capability, the ⁇ : gen text contains the following information:
  • -Rand a random number generated for the certificate authority
  • step 7 The terminal returns the shared key Kc, the client segment ID ID, and the signaling agent.
  • the returned random number Rand recalculates the authentication key, and re-initiates registration with the signaling agent.
  • the registration message includes the newly calculated second authentication key Authenticatorc, and the registration message includes the list of security capabilities supported by the terminal (such as the network Layer security IPSec, transport layer security TLS or application layer security, etc.), and priority information of each security capability, the signaling agent will select an appropriate security capability for communication based on the security capability and priority information of the terminal, the registration
  • the message contains the following information:
  • -Security mechanism list the security capability and priority list of the terminal; in step 8. the signaling agent forwards the registration message of the terminal to the softswitch.
  • the security capability and priority information parameters of the terminal can be forwarded or not. Softswitch does not need this information.
  • the registration message contains the following information:
  • step 9 the soft switch compares the second authentication word in the registration message message sent by the signaling agent with the first authentication word from the authentication center, and verifies the terminal. If the two are inconsistent, the risk certificate fails.
  • the registration failure response message can be resent. If they are the same, it indicates that the authentication of the terminal is successful, and a registration success response message message is returned to the signaling agent.
  • the message message also includes two respectively generated by the authentication center.
  • the session key Kc, sp between the Kc and Ksp encrypted terminal and the signaling agent contains the following information:
  • IDc II IDsp II EKc [Kc, sp]
  • the signaling agent receives the registration response success message of the softswitch, and forwards the registration success response message to the terminal.
  • the message message includes the session key Kc encrypted by the terminal's shared key Kc generated by the authentication center , sp,
  • the registration success response message includes the security capability item selected by the signaling agent based on the security capability parameters of the terminal and the security capability parameter list and priority information of the terminal.
  • the shared key Ksp is used to decrypt the Ksp encrypted session key Kc, sp generated by the certification center, to obtain Kc, sp, and use Kc, sp to the entire response message
  • the message calculates the message authentication word MAC, which is used to ensure the integrity of the message and the terminal to authenticate the signaling agent.
  • the message contains the following information:
  • IDc II IDsp II Nl
  • -Security mechanism list The terminal's own security capabilities and priority list, used by the terminal to confirm that the security capability list received by the signaling agent has not been modified Correct
  • Kc, sp, message Use the session key Kc, sp to authenticate the source and integrity of the entire message.
  • the terminal unlocks the session key and successfully authenticates the message to implement the signaling agent. Identity authentication, otherwise the signaling agent cannot obtain the session key Kc, sp issued by the authentication center;
  • the softswitch sends a terminal authentication success message to the authentication center, updates the relevant information of the terminal, and at the same time, the terminal decrypts the Ksp encrypted session key generated by the authentication center to obtain Kc, sp, and uses the Kc, sp face authentication letter.
  • the agent return the MAC of the message to implement the identity verification of the signaling agent, and verify the integrity of the message, and whether the security capability parameters of the terminal returned by the signaling agent are correct. If it is correct, then the message returned by the signaling agent is explained. The selected security capability is correct, and subsequent communications will perform message security processing according to this security capability. If the terminal fails to authenticate the signaling agent or the security capability parameters are incorrect, the registration can be re-initiated.
  • the terminal authentication success message includes the following: Information:
  • IPc The IP address registered by the terminal, which may be the ⁇ address after the signalling proxy conversion process.
  • FIG. 5 is a specific communication process of the present invention using SIP protocol for registration and authentication.
  • the network environment is still taken as an example with a signaling agent.
  • the registration and response messages in the general process are detailed into specific SIP
  • the parameters carried in the messages at each step in the process are consistent with the definitions in the general process described above.
  • the registration request message is a registration message in the SIP protocol
  • the registration failure response message is a response message code in the SIP protocol
  • 401 Is the response message code in the SIP protocol, which means that the terminal needs to be authenticated
  • 407 is the response message code in the SIP protocol, which means that the proxy needs to be authenticated
  • the re-register message is also SIP Registration message in the protocol; in step s9, step slO, registration N2005 / 000133
  • the success response message is the response message code in the SIP protocol, indicating that the request was successful, that is, OK; and the messages in steps s3, s4, and sll are not related to the specific call protocol, and can be a general authentication protocol. Different applications can adopt different protocols, such as Radius, Diameter, and so on.
  • FIG. 6 is a specific communication process of the present invention using MGCP (Media Gateway Control Protocol) protocol for registration and authentication.
  • MGCP Media Gateway Control Protocol
  • the network environment still has a signaling agent as an example.
  • the registration and response messages in the above general process are used.
  • the parameters carried by the messages at each step in the process are consistent with the definitions in the general process described above.
  • the registration request message is the system restart message command RSIP and its response message in the MGCP protocol; in step s5 and step s6, the registration failure response message is the MGCP protocol
  • the notification request message command RQNT in the command indicates that the system needs to authenticate the terminal.
  • the re-register message is the notification message command NOTIFY in the MGCP protocol, which indicates that the terminal initiates authentication.
  • register The success response message is the notification request message command RQNT in the MGCP protocol, which informs the terminal that the authentication is successful.
  • the messages in steps s3, s4, and sll are not related to the specific calling protocol, and can be a general-purpose authentication protocol. Different protocols can be adopted, such as Radius, Diameter, etc.
  • FIG. 7 is a specific communication process of the present invention using H.248 protocol for registration and authentication.
  • the network environment still has a signaling agent as an example.
  • the communication process only the registration and response messages in the above general process are detailed.
  • H.248 protocol message the parameters carried in the message at each step in the process are consistent with the definitions in the above general process.
  • the registration request message is the system service status change message command SERVICE CHANGE and its response message Rsp in the H.248 protocol, which indicates that the system has started to enter the service state.
  • the registration failure response message is the attribute change message command MODIFY in the H.248 protocol, indicating that the system needs to authenticate the terminal.
  • the re-registration message is H.248.
  • Notification message commands in the protocol NOTIFY indicates that the terminal initiates authentication; in steps s9 and step 10, the registration success response message is the attribute change message command MODIFY in the H.248 protocol to notify the terminal that the authentication is successful; and the messages in steps s3, s4, and sll are related to the specific
  • the calling protocol does not matter. It can be a universal authentication protocol. Depending on the application, different protocols can be adopted, such as Radius, Diameter, and so on.
  • FIG. 8 is a specific communication process of the present invention using H.323 protocol for registration and authentication.
  • the network environment still has a signaling agent as an example.
  • a signaling agent as an example.
  • H.323 protocol message the parameters carried by the message at each step in the process are consistent with the definitions in the above general process.
  • the registration request message is a GK request message in the H.323 protocol, which means who is my GK; in step s5 and step s6, a registration failure response message It is a GK rejection message in the H.323 protocol, which means that the GK does not register the terminal. This indicates that authentication is required.
  • the re-registration message is a registration request message in the H.323 protocol. The authentication information will be carried, indicating that the terminal initiates authentication.
  • the registration success response message is a registration success message in the H.323 protocol to notify the terminal that the authentication was successful; and the messages in steps s3, s4, and sll are related to The specific calling protocol does not matter. It can be a universal authentication protocol. Depending on the application, different protocols can be adopted, such as Radius s Diameter.

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Description

密钥分发方法
技术领域
本发明涉及通信中的安全管理技术， 尤指一种应用于 NGN (下 一代网络） 中的密钥分发方法。
背景技术
NGN是可以提供包括话音、数据和多媒体等各种业务在内的综合 开放的网络构架， 为用户提供实时的会话业务。 其网络设备包括少量 的核心设备和大量的用户终端， 网络中除了与 PSTN/PLMN (公众电 信网 /公众陆地移动网） 的交互是基于电路方式而比较安全外， 其它 网络设备之间的交互，都是基于分组核心网络及各种分组接入网络来 传送。 在开放的 IP网络上， NGN网络极易受到各种非法的攻击， 特别 是 NGN网络中存在的大量的分组终端， 很容易成为非法攻击的发起 者。
针对 NGN网络安全， 目前还没有较好的解决方案， 而作为网络 安全基础的密钥分发过程如何和 NGN网络的特点结合起来， 还是一 个空白。 现有技术中网络层安全标准 IPSec (网络层安全） 定义的密 钥协商方式是 IKE协议（因特网密钥交换协议） 、 传输层安全标准 TLS (传输层安全） 的密钥协商方式， 由 TLS规范定义的 Handshake (握手协议） 来完成， 其中 IKE 协议的密钥加密交换采用 Diffie-Hellman算法， 该算法定义了 5个 D-H算法的参数组 (即素数 p和底数 g ) , 该加密算法具有强度高、 密钥长度大的特点。 从上可 知， IKE是一个非常严谨、 同时也是一个相当复杂的密钥交换协议， 而 Handshake协议实现客户和服务器之间的一方（主要对服务器）或 双向认证， 协商协议中用到的加密算法和密钥以及验证算法和密钥， 协商得到的会话参数供记录协议为多个连接重复使用，避免每个连接 协商新的会话参数所带来的开销， 同时协议保证协商过程是可靠的、 协商得到的共享密钥是安全的。
尽管上述这些密钥分发协议都很规范、 严谨， 但都存在无法和 NGN网络的实际特点相结合的缺点。 NGN网络是一个较为封闭的网 络， 由一系列网絡侧服务器（如软交换、 应用服务器和各种网关）以 及大量的接入终端组成，终端和网络设备在一个运营商的管辖和控制 范围内， 存在一个管理域对域内设备进行管理， 以及协助完成跨域之 间用户互通的特点， 同时所有的终端需要在该管理域内进行注册， NGN的这些网络特点决定了 NGN适合于采用集中式的密钥分发方 式，而上述密钥分发协议都是终端之间或两台主机直接进行密钥的协 商， 最终导致***中的通信量呈几何数的增长， 使***密钥分发效率 较低， 给整个网络***和密钥的管理都带来了很大的不便， 不适应 NGN网络的实际特点。
发明内容 本发明解决的技术问题是提供一种安全、 高效的密钥分发方法， 可实现集中密钥分发， 适应 NGN的网络特点、 使用方式灵活。
为解决上述问题， 本发明提供一种密钥分发方法， 应用于包括终 端、 软交换及认证中心的下一代网络中， 该方法包括如下步驟： a ) 终端向软交换发送注册请求消息请求注册；
b )软交换向认证中心发送认证请求消息请求对终端的认证； c )认证中心对终端进行认证， 同时生成所述终端与软交换的会 话密钥，并在注册认证通过后，交由软交换向终端分发所述会话密钥。
其中， 步骤 c ) 中， 认证中心采用下述步驟对终端进行认证： cl )认证中心根据与终端的共享密钥 Kc生成对终端的第一验证 字， 然后以所述共享密钥 Kc对所述会话密钥加密， 将加密后的会话 密钥和第一验证字返回给软交换；
c2 )软交换向终端返回注册失败响应消息通知终端注册失败； c3 )终端根据与认证中心的共享密钥 Kc生成第二验证字， 然后 向软交换发送包含所述第二验证字的注册消息重新进行注册；
. c4 )软交换根据所述第一验证字和所述第二验证字对所述终端进 行认证。 其中， 步骤 c ) 中， 所述软交换采用下述步骤向终端分发所述会 话密钥：
c5 )软交换向终端返回注册成功响应消息， 所述注册成功响应消 息中包含经共享密钥 Kc加密后的会话密钥， 同时软交换向认证中心 发出终端认证成功消息；
c6 )终端^ ^据所述共享密钥 Kc解密认证中心加密过的会话密钥。 另外， 所述方法还包括： 所述终端向软交换发送本终端支持的安 全能力列表及每种安全能力的优先级信息；
所述软交换根据所述终端的安全能力列表及每种安全能力的优 先级信息选择一个合适的安全能力进行通信。
可选的， 所述注册请求消息和注册消息均为 SIP协议注册消息， 所述注册失败响应消息为 SIP协议响应消息，所述注册成功响应消息 为 SIP协议注册请求成功消息。 '
可选的， 所述注册请求消息为 MGCP协议***重启消息及其响 应消息， 所述注册失败响应消息和注册成功响应消息均为 MGCP协 议通知请求消息及其响应消息， 所述注册消息为 MGCP协议通知消 息及其响应消息。
可选的，所述注册请求消息为 H.248协议***服务状态变化消息 及其响应消息 , 所述注册失败响应消息和注册成功响应消息均为 H.248协议属性更改消息及其响应消息， 所述注册消息为 H.248协议 通知消息及其响应消息。
可选的， 所述注册请求消息为 H.323协议网守请求消息， 所述注 册失败响应消息为 H.323协议网守拒绝消息， 所述注册消息为 H.323 协议注册请求消息，所述注册成功响应消息为 H.323协议注册成功消 息。
本发明还公开了另一种密钥分发方法， 应用于包括终端、信令代 理、 软交换及认证中心的下一代网络中， 该方法具体包括如下步骤：
A ) 终端通过信令代理向软交换发送注册请求消息请求注册；
B )软交换向认证中心发送认证请求消息请求对终端的认证； c )认证中心对终端进行认证， 同时生成所述终端与所述信令代 理的会话密钥， 并在注册认证通过后， 交由软交换通过信令代理向终 端分发所述会话密钥。
其中， 步骤 C ) 中， 认证中心采用下述步骤对终端进行认证： C1 )认证中心根据与终端的共享密钥 Kc以及与信令代理的共享 密钥 Ksp*生成对终端的第一验证字， 然后以所述共享密钥 Kc和所述 共享密钥 Ksp分别对会话密钥进行加密，将加密后的会话密钥和所述 第一脸证字返回给软交换；
C2 )软交换通过信令代理向终端返回注册失败响应消息通知终端 注册失败；
C3 )终端根据与认证中心的共享密钥 Kc生成第二验证字， 然后 将包含所述第二验证字的注册消息发送给信令代理， 由所述信令代理 向软交换转发所述注册消息重新进行注册；
C4 )软交换根据所述第一验证字和所述第二验证字对所述终端进 行认证。
其中， 步骤 C ) 中， 所述软交换采用下述步骤向终端分发所述会 话密钥：
C5 )软交换向信令代理转发终端注册成功响应消息，所述注册成 功响应消息中包含认证中心分别以共享密钥 Kc和 Ksp加密后的会话 密钥， 信令代理用共享密钥 Ksp解密认证中心经共享密钥 Ksp加密 过的会话密钥，并以所述解密获取的会话密钥对注册成功响应消息报 文计算报文验证字， 然后信令代理向终端转发注册成功响应消息， 所 述注册成功响应消息中包含经共享密钥 Kc加密过的会话密钥以及所 述报文验证字；
C6 )终端根据所述共享密钥 Kc解密认证中心加密过的会话密钥， 并利用解密后获取的会话密钥，验证信令代理返回报文的报文验证字 以猃证信令代理身份，同时验证报文的完整性以及信令代理返回的终 端自己的安全能力参数是否正确。
其中，终端将包含自身支持的安全能力列表以及每种安全能力的 优先级信息的注册消息发送给信令代理，信令代理根据终端支持的安 全能力和每种安全能力的优先级信息选择一个合适的安全能力进行 通信。
可选的， 所述注册请求消息和注册消息均为 SIP协议注册消息， 所述注册失败响应消息为 SIP协议响应消息，所述注册成功响应消息 为 SIP协议注册请求成功消息。
可选的， 所述注册请求消息为 MGCP协议***重启消息及其响 应消息， 所述注册失败响应消息和注册成功响应消息均为 MGCP协 议通知请求消息及其响应消息， 所述注册消息为 MGCP协议通知消 息及其响应消息。
可选的，所述注册请求消息为 H.248协议***服务状态变化消息 及其响应消息， 所述注册失败响应消息和注册成功响应消息均为 H.248协议属性更改消息及其响应消息， 所述注册消息为 H.248协议 通知消息及其响应消息。 可选的， 所述注册请求消息为 H.323协议网守请求消息， 所述注 册失败响应消息为 H.323 ¼、议网守拒绝消息， 所述注册消息为 H.323 协议注册请求消息，所述注册成功响应消息为 H.323协议注册成功消
与现有技术相比， 本发明具有以下优点：
1、 本发明中由软交换与终端通信， 在注册认证过程中实现密钥 的分发， 通信量小， 能紧密的结合 NGN网络的特点、 同时又大大提高 了整个***解决安全问题的效率，终端的注册认证与密钥的集中分发 更适合于 NGN网络的实际情况。
2、 本发明中可实现将 SIP、 MGCP. H.248 H.323等多个协议注 册过程与会话密钥分发过程结合起来，在终端认证过程中完成会话密 钥分发， 后续的通信不需要再协商密钥， 从而保证了密钥分发效率。
3、 本发明中还可实现将 SIP, MGCP, 1-1.248、 H.323 等多个协 议注册过程与安全能力协商过程结合起来，在密钥分发的过程中同时 完成安全能力协商， 后续的通信不需要再协商安全能力， 安全能力不 需要进行静态配置， 可动态协商， 灵活扩展， 因此使用方式灵活。 附图说明 图 1是本发明密钥分发方法应用的一种 NGN网络环境示意图； 图 2是在图 1所示的网络环境下本发明密钥分发方法具体实施例 通信过程示意图； 图 3是本发明密钥分发方法应用的具有信令代理的一种 NGN网 络环境示意图； 图 4是在图 3所示的网络环境下本发明密钥分发方法具体实施例 通信过程示意图； 图 5是在 SJDP协议注册认证过程中实现密钥分发的实施例通信过 程示意图； 图 6是在 MGCP协议注册认证过程中实现密钥分发的实施例通 信过程示意图； 图 7是在 H.248协议注册认证过程中实现密钥分发的实施例通信 过程示意图；
图 8是在 H.323协议注册认证过程中实现密钥分发的实施例通信 过程示意图。
具体实施方式 在 NGN网络中， 网络安全是目前 NGN网络实际运营中碰到的 一个重要问题， 如果不能很好的解决 NGN网络的安全问题， NGN网 络将无法得到大规模的应用。
在 NGN网络中， 网絡设备主要包括终端、 网关及软交换等， 图 1是 NGN—种简单的单域組网图， 即只有一个软交换（也称为媒体 网关控制器）设备， 实际组网可能有多个软交换设备。 如图 1所示的 NGN网络环境中，软交换通过 IP网络分别与中继媒、体网关、 SIP (会 话初始协议）终端， H.323终端和 H.248终端相连， 其中中继媒体网 关接模拟电话 Tl、 Τ2, 另外软交换还与认证中心 AuC相连。
本发明中所有网络设备、 终端和认证中心 AuC之间各有一个共 享密钥， 网络设备可以采用手工配置或网管下发， 终端设备在设备开 户时由***分配或用户输入；
所有与认证中心 AuC共享密钥为整个***的基本密钥， 需要得 到妥善的保管，要求网络设备及终端具有不向第三方泄漏此密钥， 以 及具有抗非法盗取此密钥的能力；
另外， 终端和软交换之间的会话密钥则由认证中心 AuC生成。 本发明结合 NGN网络的特点， 通过将注册认证过程与会话密钥 分发过程结合起来， 在终端向软交换发起注册， 软交换向认证中心请 求认证后， 认证中心生成终端与软交换的会话密钥， 并在注册认证通 过后， 由软交换向终端分发会话密钥。 由于在注册认证过程中完成会 话密钥分发， 后续的通信不需要再协商密钥， 可使终端的注册认证和 密钥的分发过程更简捷， 提高了***的效率和性能， 对终端的要求较 低， 终端不需要支持复杂的密钥分发协议， 而只需在现有的呼叫协议 上扩展即可。
图 2是一种筒单的密钥分发通信过程示意图， 说明如下： 终端首先向软交换发起注册请求，具体消息报文与终端支持的协 议相关， 软交换收到所述注册请求消息后， 向认证中心请求对终端进 行认证， 认证中心根据终端信息生成相应验证字（便于区别以后称为 第一验证字）以及会话密钥， 然后向软交换返回认证响应消息， 所述 认证响应消息中包含所述笫一验证字及会话密钥，软交换在收到所述 认证响应消息后，向终端发送注册失败响应消息，要求终端重新注册， 终端生成验证字 （便于区别以后称为第二验证字）， 然后向软交换重 新发起注册请求，软交换比较认证中心与终端提交的第一验证字和第 二验证字， 若不相同， 则向终端返回注册失败响应消息， 要求终端重 新注册， 若相同， 则认证通过， 向终端发送注册成功响应消息， 所述 注册成功响应消息中包含会话密钥，终端在收到所述消息后即可获取 会话密钥。
为了进一步提高网络的安全性，在软交换向终端返回注册失败响 应消息时， 软交换还要求终端反馈支持的安全能力列表， 这样， 终端 重新向软交换发起注册时，在注册消息报文中进一步包括终端支持的 安全能力列表以及每种安全能力的优先级信息等，软交换可据此选择 合适的安全能力进行通信。
事实上为了通信的安全，本发明应用的网络环境中还可包括信令 代理 （ SP )， 整个网络环境中， 信令代理以上的网络设备之间的通信 是可信的， 即需要在组网上保证这些网络设备是处于一个信任区内， 终端是不可信的， 终端和信令代理之间的通信是不安全的， 即终端和 信令代理位于非信任区， 信令代理为信任区和非信任区的边界。
本发明中信令代理可以是网络设备：宽带接入网关或边界会话控 制器（SBC, Session Border Controller ), 具体实现时， 可以作为一个 功能模块与处理媒体转发的模块一起集成在 IP 网关中， 也可以采用 信令与媒体分离的架构方式， 独立出来成为一个单独的信令代理实 体， 下面以具体实施例进行说明。
图 3是一种信令代理集成在 IP网关的网络环境， 在所述的网络 环境中， 终端通过信令代理实现与软交换通信， 上述终端与软交换的 会话密钥在所述的网络环境中也即终端与信令代理的会话密钥。
图 4是图 3所示具信令代理的网络环境中实现密钥分发的通信过 程， 说明如下：
在步骤 si.终端按协议流程向信令代理发送注册请求消息， 正常 的协议注册消息， 具体消息报文与终端支持的协议相关， 为一个普通 的协议注册 4艮文， 报文未经加密认证处理， 所述注册请求消息报文中 包含如下信息：
IDc || IDsp || Nl||TSl
- IDc: 标识终端 - IDsp: 标识信令代理
- N1: 随机数或序列号， 用于标识本次 4艮文， 返回的响应报文 中需包含此数， 用于防止报文重发（后续消息中的此数含义 相同 )
- TS1 : 用于信令代理验证终端的时钟与信令代理的时钟是 否同步；
在步骤 s2.信令代理向软交换转发终端的注册请求消息， 该消息 报文中包含如下信息：
IDc II IDsp
- IDc: 标识终端
- IDsp: 标识信令代理；
在步骤 s3.软交换没有终端的鉴权信息， 向认证中心 （AuC )发 出对终端的鉴权认证请求消息， 提供终端标识 ID 和信令代理标识 ID, 该消息报文中包含信息如下：
IDc II IDsp
- IDc: 标识终端；
- IDsp: 标识终端接入网络的信令代理；
在步骤 s4.认证中心根据终端标识 ID、 信令代理标识 ID， 获取 与终端的共享密钥 Kc以及与信令代理的共享密钥 Ksp及其它认证信 息， 生成一个挑战字随机数 Rand, 由 Rand, IDc和共享密钥 Kc等一 起生成对终端的第一验证字 Aiithenticatorc, 同时生成终端和信令代 理之间的会话密钥 Kc,sp, 并分别由共享密钥 Kc和 Ksp对所述会话 密钥 Kc,sp加密， 将 Rand、 验证字、 加密后的会话密钥 Kc,sp作为软 交换认证请求的响应返回给软交换，该认证响应消息报文中包含如下 信息：
IDc I) IDsp II Rand || Aiithenticatorc || EKc [Kc,sp] || EKsp [ c,sp]
其中： Aiithenticatorc - f m(Kc, Rand, IDc)
- IDc: 标识终端
- IDsp： 标识信令代理 - Rand: 随机数， 用于认证中心计算验证字， 认证中心将 Rand 发给软交换， 软交换再发给信令代理， 再由信令代理发给终 端
- Authenticatorc:验证字， 用于软交换验证终端， 认证中心生 成后发给软交换
- EKc [Kc,sp]: 认证中心以共享密钥 Kc加密过的会话密钥 Kc,sp
― EKsp [Kc,sp]: 认证中心以共享密钥 Ksp加密过的会话密钥 Kc,sp
在步驟 5.软交换向信令代理返回注册失败响应消息， 注册失败， 需要对终端进行认证， 注册失败响应消息报文参数中包括挑战字 Rand, 该消息报文中包含如下信息：
IDc II IDsp II Rand
- IDc: 标识终端
- IDsp: 标识信令代理
- Rand: 为认证中心发给信令代理的随机数；
在步驟 6.信令代理向终端返回注册失败响应消息， 注册失败， 需 要对终端进行认证， 同样注册失败响应消息报文中包括挑战字 Rand, 同时要求终端反馈支持的安全能力列表和每种安全能力的优先级信 息， 该^ :艮文中包含如下信息：
IDc II IDsp II Nl || N2 || TS2 || Rand
- IDc: 标识终端
- IDsp: 标识信令代理
- N1 : 同终端发给信令代理的注册消息报文中的 N1 , 用于对 注册 ^艮文的回应
- N2: 用于标识本次 ^艮文
- TS2: 用于终端验证时间戳
- Rand: 为认证中心生成的随机数；
在步骤 7.终端通过共享密钥 Kc、 客户段标识 IDc及信令代理返 回的随机数 Rand重新计算验证字， 向信令代理重新发起注册， 注册 消息报文中包括新计算得到的第二验证字 Authenticatorc, 同时注册 消息报文中包含终端支持的安全能力列表（如网络层安全 IPSec、 传 输层安全 TLS或应用层安全等），以及每一种安全能力的优先级信息， 信令代理将根据终端的安全能力和优先级信息选择一个合适的安全 能力进行通信， 该注册消息报文中包含如下信息：
IDc I] Nl|| N2 || TS3 || Authenticatorc|| Security mechanism list 其中： Autlienticatorc = f (Kc, Rand, IDc)
- IDc: 标识终端；
- Nl : 新的随机数或序列号， 用于标识本次报文
- N2: 用于标识对信令代理上一个 4艮文的回应
- TS3： 让信令代理验证时间戳
- Autlienticatorc: 验证字， 由终端生成
- Security mechanism list: 终端的安全能力及优先级列表； 在步骤 8.信令代理向软交换转发终端的注册消息报文，对于终端 的安全能力和优先级信息参数可以转发， 也可以不转发， 软交换不需 该信息， 该注册消息报文中包含如下信息：
IDc II IDsp| I Autlienticatorc
- IDc: 标识终端
- IDsp: 标识信令代理
- Autlienticatorc: -险证字， 由终端生成；
在步骤 9.软交换将信令代理发过来的注册消息报文中的第二验 证字和认证中心发过来的第一验证字进行比较， 对终端进行验证， 若 两者不一致， 则险证失败， 可重发注册失败响应消息， 若两者一致， 则表明对终端的验证成功， 向信令代理返回注册成功响应消息报文， 该消息报文中同时包括两个由认证中心生成的分别经过 Kc和 Ksp加 密后的终端与信令代理之间的会话密钥 Kc,sp, 该消息报文中包含如 下信息：
IDc II IDsp II EKc[Kc,sp] || EKsp[Kc,sp] - IDc: 标识终端
- IDsp: 标识信令代理
- EKc[Kc5sp]:为认证中心用共享密钥 Kc加密的终端与信令代 理之间的会话密钥 Kc,sp
- EKsp[ c,sp]:为认证中心用共享密钥 Ksp加密的终端与信令 代理之间的会话密钥 Kc，sp;
在步驟 10.信令代理收到软交换的注册响应成功消息， 向终端转 发注册成功响应消息，该消息报文中包含由认证中心生成的经过终端 的共享密钥 Kc加密后的会话密钥 Kc,sp, 同时注册成功响应消息中 包括信令代理依据终端的安全能力参数选定的后续通信釆用的安全 能力项以及终端的安全能力参数列表和优先级信息（用于终端确认这 些参数是否在网络传输中被第三者修改）， 最后用共享密钥 Ksp对由 认证中心生成的经过 Ksp加密后的会话密钥 Kc,sp进行解密处理，得 到 Kc,sp, 并用 Kc，sp对整个响应消息报文计算报文验证字 MAC, 用 于保证报文的完整性， 以及终端对信令代理的认证， 报文中包含如下 信息：
IDc II IDsp II Nl || N2 || TS4 || EKc[Kc,sp] || || Security mechanism || Security mechanism list(c) || fm ( Kc,sp, 报文 ) - IDc: 标识终端
- IDsp: 标识信令代理
- Nl : 用于标识对终端注册报文的回应
- N2: 用于标识本次报文
- TS4: 用于终端险证时间戳
- EKc[Kc，sp]:为认证中心用共享密钥 Kc加密的终端与信令代 理之间的会话密钥 Kc,sp
- Security mechanism: 信令代理根据终端的安全能力及优先级 列表选定的安全能力
- Security mechanism list: 终端自己的安全能力及优先级列表， 用于终端确认信令代理收到的安全能力列表没有被 ^法修 改过
- fm ( Kc,sp, 报文）： 用会话密钥 Kc,sp对整个报文进行源和 完整性认证， 终端通过解开会话密钥， 并对报文进行成功鉴 别来实现对信令代理的身份认证， 否则信令代理无法得到由 认证中心签发的会话密钥 Kc,sp;
在步骤 11.软交换向认证中心发出终端认证成功消息， 更新终端 的相关信息，同时终端对由认证中心生成的经过 Ksp加密后的会话密 钥解密得到 Kc，sp, 并用 Kc,sp脸证信令代理返回报文的 MAC, 实现 对信令代理的身份验证， 同时验证报文的完整性， 以及信令代理返回 的终端自身的安全能力参数是否正确， 如果正确， 则说明信令代理返 回的选定的安全能力正确，后续通信将按此安全能力进行报文安全处 理， 如果终端对信令代理认证失败或安全能力参数不正确， 可重新发 起注册， 该终端认证成功消息报文中包含如下信息：
IDc II IDsp II IPc II ...
- IDc: 标识终端
- IDsp: 标识信令代理
IPc: 终端注册的 IP地址， 可能是经过信令代理变换处理后 的 ΓΡ地址。
下面以具体的应用协议环境对本发明密钥分发方法进行说明。 图 5是本发明采用 SIP协议进行注册认证的具体通信过程，仍以 网络环境为具有信令代理为例，所述通信过程中只是将上述通用流程 中的注册和响应消息细化为具体的 SIP协议消息，流程中每一步骤的 消息所携带的参数与上述通用流程中的定义是一致的。
所述通信过程中具体的协议消息， 在步骤 sl、 步骤 s2， 注册请 求消息为 SIP协议中的注册消息； 在步骤 s5、 步骤 s6， 注册失败响 应消息为 SIP协议中的响应消息代码， 其中 401 : 为 SIP协议中的响 应消息代码， 含义为需要对终端进行认证， 407: 为 SIP协议中的响 应消息代码， 含义为需要对代理进行认证， 在步骤 s7、 步驟 s8, 重 新注册消息也为 SIP协议中的注册消息； 在步驟 s9、 步骤 slO, 注册 N2005/000133
- 14- 成功响应消息为 SIP协议中的响应消息代码，表示请求成功， 即 OK; 而步骤 s3、 s4、 sll中的消息， 则与具体的呼叫协议没有关系， 可以 是通用的认证协议， 根据应用场合的不同， 可以采取不同的协议， 如 Radius、 Diameter等。
图 6是本发明采用 MGCP (媒体网关控制协议）协议进行注册认 证的具体通信过程， 仍以网络环境为具有信令代理为例， 所述通信过 程中只是将上述通用流程中的注册和响应消息细化为具体的 MGCP 协议消息，流程中每一步驟的消息所携带的参数与上述通用流程中的 定义是一致的。
所述通信过程中具体的协议消息， 在步骤 sl、 步骤 s2, 注册请 求消息为 MGCP协议中的***重起消息命令 RSIP及其响应消息；在 步骤 s5、 步骤 s6, 注册失败响应消息为 MGCP协议中的通知请求消 息命令 RQNT, 表示***需要对终端进行认证， 在步驟 s7、 步骤. s8, 重新注册消息为 MGCP协议中的通知消息命令 NOTIFY, 表示终端 发起认证； 在步驟 s9、 步骤 sl0， 注册成功响应消息为 MGCP协议中 的通知请求消息命令 RQNT, 通知终端认证成功； 而步骤 s3、 s4、 sll 中的消息， 则与具体的呼叫协议没有关系， 可以是通用的认证协议， 根据应用场合的不同， 可以采取不同的协议， 如 Radius、 Diameter 等。
图 7是本发明采用 H.248协议进行注册认证的具体通信过程，仍 以网络环境为具有信令代理为例，所述通信过程中只是将上述通用流 程中的注册和响应消息细化为具体的 H.248协议消息，流程中每一步 驟的消息所携带的参数与上述通用流程中的定义是一致的。
所述通信过程中具体的协议消息， 在步驟 sl、 步驟 s2, 注册请 求消息为 H.248 协议中的***服务状态变化消息命令 SERVICE CHANGE及其响应消息 Rsp, 此时表明***开始进入服务状态， 发 起注册； 在步骤 s5、 步職 s6, 注册失败响应消息为 H.248协议中的 属性更改消息命令 MODIFY, 表示***需要对终端进行认证， 在步 骤 s7、 步骤 s8 , 重新注册消息为 H.248 协议中的通知消息命令 NOTIFY, 表示终端发起认证； 在步骤 s9、 步骤 slO, 注册成功响应 消息为 H.248协议中的属性更改消息命令 MODIFY,通知终端认证成 功； 而步骤 s3、 s4、 sll中的消息， 则与具体的呼叫协议没有关系， 可以是通用的认证协议，根据应用场合的不同，可以采取不同的协议， 如 Radius、 Diameter等。
图 8是本发明采用 H.323协议进行注册认证的具体通信过程，仍 以网络环境为具有信令代理为例，所述通信过程中只是将上述通用流 程中的注册和响应消息细化为具体的 H.323协议消息，流程中每一步 骤的消息所携带的参数与上述通用流程中的定义是一致的。
所述通信过程中具体的协议消息， 在步骤 sl、 步骤 s2, 注册请 求消息为 H.323协议中的 GK请求消息， 含义为谁是我的 GK; 在步 驟 s5、 步骤 s6, 注册失败响应消息为 H.323协议中的 GK拒绝消息， 含义为 GK不对终端进行注册， 此处表示需要认证， 在步骤 s7、 步驟 s8, 重新注册消息为 H.323协议中的注册请求消息， 此时消息中将携 带认证信息， 表示终端发起认证； 在步骤 s9、 步骤 slO, 注册成功响 应消息为 H.323协议中的注册成功消息， 通知终端认证成功； 而步骤 s3、 s4、 sll 中的消息， 则与具体的呼叫协议没有关系， 可以是通用 的认证协议，根据应用场合的不同，可以采取不同的协议，如 Radius s Diameter等。
以上所 仅为本发明的优选实施例而已， 非因此即局限本发明的权 利范围， 凡运用本发明说明书及附图内容所为的等效变化， 均理同包 含于本发明的权利要求范围内。

Claims

权 利 要 求
1、 一种密钥分发方法， 应用于下一代网络中， 所述下一代网络 包括终端、 软交换及认证中心， 其特征在于， 包括如下步驟：
a )终端向软交换发送注册请求消息请求注册；
b )软交换向认证中心发送认证请求消息请求对终端的认证； c )认证中心对终端进行认证， 同时生成所述终端与软交换的会 话密钥，并在注册认证通过后，交由软交换向终端分发所述会话密钥。
2、 据权利要求 1 所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 步骤 c ) 中， 认证中心采用下述步驟对终端进行认证：
cl )认证中心根据与终端的共享密钥 Kc生成对终端的第一验证 字， 然后以所述共享密钥 Kc对所述会话密钥加密， 将加密后的会话 密钥和第一验证字返回给软交换；
c2 )软交换向终端返回注册失败响应消息通知终端注册失败； c3 )终端根据与认证中心的共享密钥 Kc生成第二验证字， 然后 向软交换发送包含所述第二验证字的注册消息重新进行注册；
c4 )软交换根据所述第一验证字和所述第二验证字对所述终端进 行认证。
3、 才 居权利要求 2所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 步骤 c ) 中， 所述软交换采用下述步骤向终端分发所述会话密钥：
c5 )软交换向终端返回注册成功响应消息， 所述注册成功响应消 息中包含经共享密钥 Kc加密后的会话密钥， 同时软交换向认证中心 发出终端认证成功消息；
c6 )终端才艮据所述共享密钥 Kc解密认证中心加密过的会话密钥。
4、 根据权利要求 3所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 所述方法 还包括：所述终端向软交换发送本终端支持的安全能力列表及每种安 全能力的优先级信息；
所述软交换根据所述终端的安全能力列表及每种安全能力的优 先级信息选择一个合适的安全能力进行通信。
5、 根据权利要求 1-4任一项所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 所述注册请求消息和注册消息均为 SIP协议注册消息，所述注册失败 响应消息为 SIP协议响应消息， 所述注册成功响应消息为 SIP协议注 册请求成功消息。
6、 根据权利要求 1-4任一项所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 所述注册请求消息为 MGCP协议***重启消息及其响应消息， 所述 注册失败响应消息和注册成功响应消息均为 MGCP协议通知请求消 息及其响应消息， 所述注册消息为 MGCP协议通知消息及其响应消
7、 根据权利要求 1-4任一项所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 所述注册请求消息为 Η.248协议***服务状态变化消息及其响应消 息，所述注册失败响应消息和注册成功响应消息均为 Η.248协议属性 更改消息及其响应消息，所述注册消息为 Η.248协议通知消息及其响 应消息。
8、 根据权利要求 1-4任一项所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 所述注册请求消息为 Η.323协议网守请求消息，所述注册失败响应消 息为 Η.323协议网守拒绝消息，所述注册消息为 Η.323协议注册请求 消息， 所述注册成功响应消息为 Η.323协议注册成功消息。
9、 一种密钥分发方法， 应用于下一代网络中， 所述下一代网络 包括终端、 信令代理、 软交换及认证中心， 其特征在于， 包括如下步 骤：
A )终端通过信令代理向软交换发送注册请求消息请求注册；
B )软交换向认证中心发送认证请求消息请求对终端的认证；
C )认证中心对终端进行认证， 同时生成所述终端与所述信令代 理的会话密钥， 并在注册认证通过后， 交由软交换通过信令代理向终 端分发所述会话密钥。
10、根据权利要求 9所述的密钥分发方法，其特征在于，步骤 C ) 中， 认证中心采用下述步骤对终端进行认证：
C1 )认证中心根据与终端的共享密钥 Kc以及与信令代理的共享 密钥 Ksp生成对终端的第一验证字， 然后以所述共享密钥 Kc和所述 共享密钥 Ksp分别对会话密钥进行加密，将加密后的会话密钥和所述 第一验证字返回给软交换；
C2 )软交换通过信令代理向终端返回注册失败响应消息通知终端 注册失败；
C3 )终端根据与认证中心的共享密钥 Kc生成第二验证字， 然后 将包含所述第二睑证字的注册消息发送给信令代理，由所述信令代理 向软交换转发所述注册消息重新进行注册；
C4 )软交换根据所述第一脸证字和所述第二验证字对所述终端进 行认证。
11、 根据权利要求 10所述的密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 步驟 C ) 中， 所述软交换采用下述步骤向终端分发所述会话密钥：
C5 )软交换向信令代理转发终端注册成功响应消息，所述注册成 功响应消息中包含认证中心分別以共享密钥 Kc和 Ksp加密后的会话 密钥， 信令代理用共享密钥 Ksp解密认证中心经共享密钥 Ksp加密 过的会话密钥，并以所述解密获取的会话密钥对注册成功响应消息报 文计算报文脸证字， 然后信令代理向终端转发注册成功响应消息， 所 述注册成功响应消息中包含经共享密钥 Kc加密过的会话密钥以及所 述报文验证字；
C6 )终端才艮据所述共享密钥 Kc解密认证中心加密过的会话密钥， 并利用解密后获取的会话密钥，脸证信令代理返回报文的报文验证字 以验证信令代理身份，同时验证报文的完整性以及信令代理返回的终 端自己的安全能力参数是否正确。
12、 根据权利要求 11所述的密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 所述 方法还包括：终端将包含自身支持的安全能力列表以及每种安全能力 的优先级信息的注册消息发送给信令代理，信令代理根据终端支持的 安全能力和每种安全能力的优先级信息选择一个合适的安全能力进 行通信。
13、 根据权利要求 9-12任一项所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 所述注册请求消息和注册消息均为 SIP协议注册消息，所述注册失败 响应消息为 SIP协议响应消息， 所述注册成功响应消息为 SIP协议注 册请求成功消息。
14、 根据权利要求 9-12任一项所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 所述注册请求消息为 MGCP协议***重启消息及其响应消息， 所述 注册失败响应消息和注册成功响应消息均为 MGCP协议通知请求消 息及其响应消息， 所述注册消息为 MGCP协议通知消息及其响应消 ii
15、 根据权利要求 9-12任一项所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 所述注册请求消息为 H.248 协议***服务状态变化消息及其响应消 息，所述注册失败响应消息和注册成功响应消息均为 H.248协议属性 更改消息及其响应消息，所述注册消息为 H.248协议通知消息及其响 应消息。
16、 根据权利要求 9-12任一项所述密钥分发方法， 其特征在于， 所述注册请求消息为 H.323协议网守请求消息，所述注册失败响应消 息为 H.323协议网守拒绝消息，所述注册消息为 H.323协议注册请求 消息， 所述注册成功响应消息为 H.323协议注册成功消息。
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