US20190139909A1 - Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security - Google Patents

Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20190139909A1
US20190139909A1 US15/808,573 US201715808573A US2019139909A1 US 20190139909 A1 US20190139909 A1 US 20190139909A1 US 201715808573 A US201715808573 A US 201715808573A US 2019139909 A1 US2019139909 A1 US 2019139909A1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
magnetized particles
integrated circuit
circuit chip
particles
substrate
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US15/808,573
Inventor
Stephen P. Bush
Gary A. Denton
James Paul Drummond
Kelly Ann Killeen
Carl E. Sullivan
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Lexmark International Inc
Original Assignee
Lexmark International Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Lexmark International Inc filed Critical Lexmark International Inc
Priority to US15/808,573 priority Critical patent/US20190139909A1/en
Assigned to LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC. reassignment LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: BUSH, STEPHEN P, DRUMMOND, JAMES PAUL, KILLEEN, KELLY ANN, Denton, Gary A, SULLIVAN, CARL E
Priority to US15/809,081 priority patent/US10566296B2/en
Publication of US20190139909A1 publication Critical patent/US20190139909A1/en
Priority to US17/225,941 priority patent/US20210242141A1/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/57—Protection from inspection, reverse engineering or tampering
    • H01L23/573—Protection from inspection, reverse engineering or tampering using passive means
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/57—Protection from inspection, reverse engineering or tampering
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/28—Encapsulations, e.g. encapsulating layers, coatings, e.g. for protection
    • H01L23/29—Encapsulations, e.g. encapsulating layers, coatings, e.g. for protection characterised by the material, e.g. carbon
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/28—Encapsulations, e.g. encapsulating layers, coatings, e.g. for protection
    • H01L23/29—Encapsulations, e.g. encapsulating layers, coatings, e.g. for protection characterised by the material, e.g. carbon
    • H01L23/293—Organic, e.g. plastic
    • H01L23/295—Organic, e.g. plastic containing a filler
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/28—Encapsulations, e.g. encapsulating layers, coatings, e.g. for protection
    • H01L23/31—Encapsulations, e.g. encapsulating layers, coatings, e.g. for protection characterised by the arrangement or shape
    • H01L23/3107—Encapsulations, e.g. encapsulating layers, coatings, e.g. for protection characterised by the arrangement or shape the device being completely enclosed
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/28—Encapsulations, e.g. encapsulating layers, coatings, e.g. for protection
    • H01L23/31—Encapsulations, e.g. encapsulating layers, coatings, e.g. for protection characterised by the arrangement or shape
    • H01L23/3107—Encapsulations, e.g. encapsulating layers, coatings, e.g. for protection characterised by the arrangement or shape the device being completely enclosed
    • H01L23/3135—Double encapsulation or coating and encapsulation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/544—Marks applied to semiconductor devices or parts, e.g. registration marks, alignment structures, wafer maps
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L2223/00—Details relating to semiconductor or other solid state devices covered by the group H01L23/00
    • H01L2223/544—Marks applied to semiconductor devices or parts
    • H01L2223/54433—Marks applied to semiconductor devices or parts containing identification or tracking information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L2223/00—Details relating to semiconductor or other solid state devices covered by the group H01L23/00
    • H01L2223/544—Marks applied to semiconductor devices or parts
    • H01L2223/54473—Marks applied to semiconductor devices or parts for use after dicing
    • H01L2223/54486—Located on package parts, e.g. encapsulation, leads, package substrate
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L2224/00—Indexing scheme for arrangements for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies and methods related thereto as covered by H01L24/00
    • H01L2224/01—Means for bonding being attached to, or being formed on, the surface to be connected, e.g. chip-to-package, die-attach, "first-level" interconnects; Manufacturing methods related thereto
    • H01L2224/02—Bonding areas; Manufacturing methods related thereto
    • H01L2224/04—Structure, shape, material or disposition of the bonding areas prior to the connecting process
    • H01L2224/04042—Bonding areas specifically adapted for wire connectors, e.g. wirebond pads
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L2224/00—Indexing scheme for arrangements for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies and methods related thereto as covered by H01L24/00
    • H01L2224/01—Means for bonding being attached to, or being formed on, the surface to be connected, e.g. chip-to-package, die-attach, "first-level" interconnects; Manufacturing methods related thereto
    • H01L2224/42—Wire connectors; Manufacturing methods related thereto
    • H01L2224/47—Structure, shape, material or disposition of the wire connectors after the connecting process
    • H01L2224/48—Structure, shape, material or disposition of the wire connectors after the connecting process of an individual wire connector
    • H01L2224/481—Disposition
    • H01L2224/48151—Connecting between a semiconductor or solid-state body and an item not being a semiconductor or solid-state body, e.g. chip-to-substrate, chip-to-passive
    • H01L2224/48221—Connecting between a semiconductor or solid-state body and an item not being a semiconductor or solid-state body, e.g. chip-to-substrate, chip-to-passive the body and the item being stacked
    • H01L2224/48245—Connecting between a semiconductor or solid-state body and an item not being a semiconductor or solid-state body, e.g. chip-to-substrate, chip-to-passive the body and the item being stacked the item being metallic
    • H01L2224/48247—Connecting between a semiconductor or solid-state body and an item not being a semiconductor or solid-state body, e.g. chip-to-substrate, chip-to-passive the body and the item being stacked the item being metallic connecting the wire to a bond pad of the item
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/48—Arrangements for conducting electric current to or from the solid state body in operation, e.g. leads, terminal arrangements ; Selection of materials therefor
    • H01L23/488—Arrangements for conducting electric current to or from the solid state body in operation, e.g. leads, terminal arrangements ; Selection of materials therefor consisting of soldered or bonded constructions
    • H01L23/495—Lead-frames or other flat leads
    • H01L23/49541—Geometry of the lead-frame
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L24/00—Arrangements for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies; Methods or apparatus related thereto
    • H01L24/01—Means for bonding being attached to, or being formed on, the surface to be connected, e.g. chip-to-package, die-attach, "first-level" interconnects; Manufacturing methods related thereto
    • H01L24/02—Bonding areas ; Manufacturing methods related thereto
    • H01L24/04—Structure, shape, material or disposition of the bonding areas prior to the connecting process
    • H01L24/06—Structure, shape, material or disposition of the bonding areas prior to the connecting process of a plurality of bonding areas
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L24/00—Arrangements for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies; Methods or apparatus related thereto
    • H01L24/01—Means for bonding being attached to, or being formed on, the surface to be connected, e.g. chip-to-package, die-attach, "first-level" interconnects; Manufacturing methods related thereto
    • H01L24/42—Wire connectors; Manufacturing methods related thereto
    • H01L24/44—Structure, shape, material or disposition of the wire connectors prior to the connecting process
    • H01L24/46—Structure, shape, material or disposition of the wire connectors prior to the connecting process of a plurality of wire connectors

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates generally to anti-counterfeit systems and more particularly to physical unclonable functions.
  • ICCs Counterfeit integrated circuit chips
  • Such counterfeit ICCs are impacting many industrial sectors, including computers, printing, telecommunications, automotive electronics, medical, banking, energy/smart-grid, aerospace, and military systems.
  • the consequences can be dramatic when critical systems begin to fail or act maliciously due to the use of counterfeit or low-quality components causing minor, major, or mission failures, including health or safety concerns.
  • NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
  • Hardware intrinsic security is a mechanism that can provide security based on inherent properties of an electronic device.
  • a physical unclonable function (“PUF”) belongs to the realm of hardware intrinsic security.
  • counterfeit printer supplies including ICCs are a problem for consumers. Counterfeit supplies may perform poorly and may damage printers. Printer manufacturers use authentication systems to deter counterfeiters. PUFs are a type of authentication system that implements a physical one-way function. Ideally, a PUF cannot be identically replicated and thus is difficult to counterfeit. Incorporating a PUF in electronic device packaging, including ICCs, deters counterfeiters.
  • magnetic field characteristics of randomly placed magnetized particles are exploited by using the magnetic field fluctuations produced by the particles as measured by a sensor, such as a Hall-effect sensor, or an array of such sensors.
  • the invention consists of an ICC encased in or over-molded by a substrate that contains magnetic particles.
  • the magnetized particles generate a complex magnetic field near the surface of the ICC that can be used as a “fingerprint.”
  • the positioning and orientation of the magnetized particles is an uncontrolled process, and thus the interaction between the sensor and the particles is complex. Thus, it is difficult to duplicate the device such that the same magnetic pattern and particle physical location pattern will arise.
  • the randomness of the magnetic field magnitude and direction near the surface of the material containing the magnetic particles can be used to obtain a unique identifier for an item such as an integrated circuit chip carrying the PUF. Further, the placement of the device in the top layer of an integrated circuit chip protects the underlying circuits from being inspected by an attacker, e.g., for reverse engineering. When a counterfeiter attempts to remove all or a portion of the coating, the magnetic field distribution must change, thus destroying the original unique identifier.
  • the invention in one form thereof, is directed to an integrated circuit chip overlain or encapsulated by a PUF comprising randomly placed magnetic particles.
  • the invention in another form thereof, is directed to an integrated circuit chip used in a printer or printer supply component, such as a toner cartridge, that is overlain or encapsulated by a PUF comprising randomly placed magnetic particles.
  • the invention in yet another form thereof, is directed to an EMV (Europay, Mastercard, Visa) transaction chip or embedded microchip on a bank card overlain by a PUF comprising randomly placed magnetic particles.
  • EMV Europay, Mastercard, Visa
  • the invention in yet another form thereof, is directed to an apparatus having an EMV transaction chip mounted on substrate that forms the body of a bank card, where a plurality of magnetized particles are dispersed in the substrate to form a PUF.
  • FIG. 1 is a view of an integrated chip.
  • FIG. 2 is a view of an integrated chip with magnetized particles molded into the housing.
  • FIG. 3 is a view of an integrated chip with an array of sensors formed above the chip with magnetized particles molded into the housing.
  • FIG. 4 is an orthogonal view of a substrate containing magnetic and non-magnetic particles.
  • FIG. 5 is a side view of a PUF and PUF readers.
  • FIG. 6 is a view of the front of a bank card with an EMV transaction chip.
  • FIG. 7 is a view of the back of a bank card with a magnetic strip.
  • FIG. 8 is a bank card chip reader device.
  • FIG. 9 is an end view of the bank card chip reader device.
  • FIG. 10 is a flowchart of a method of making a secure device.
  • FIG. 11 is a magnetic field profile along a defined path.
  • FIGS. 12 a , 12 b , and 12 c are three-dimensional representations of the magnetic flux density measured across the area resolved into three coordinate components, B x , B y , and B z .
  • an ICC 1001 when manufactured, it is typically packaged by being attached to a metal lead frame 1008 that is connected to solder pads 1002 and 1003 by a wire bonds 1004 and 1005 , and then enclosed in an encapsulant 1006 which is then cured. The encapsulated chip is then molded into a plastic housing 1007 .
  • the molded plastic housing 1007 is replaced with the molded plastic housing or substrate 2007 where dispersed in the substrate is a plurality of magnetized particles 4014 .
  • the particles are distributed randomly such that it is extremely difficult to reproduce the exact distribution and alignment of particles.
  • the particles are magnetized before dispersion in the substrate to add further randomness to the resulting magnetic field profile.
  • the substrate 2007 and the particles 4014 form a physical unclonable function out of the molded plastic housing.
  • the magnetic field profile near the surface of the ICC may be measured by an external magneto-resistive sensor (not shown), a Hall-effect sensor (not shown), or an array of such sensors, in close proximity to the top surface of the ICC. Since the sensing elements are typically around 0.3-0.5 mm below the surface of the sensing device, the average particle size diameter using Hall-effect sensor or magneto-resistive sensor is preferably greater than 0.1 mm. Note that the diameter of a non-spherical particle is the diameter of the smallest sphere that encloses the particle. Other sensor options include magneto-optical sensor technology, which is capable of working with smaller magnetic particle sizes, but is more costly to implement and subject to contamination problems.
  • the magnetic field profile measurements may be taken within a defined area or along a defined path: straight, circular, or any arbitrarily selected and defined path, and recorded at the ICC foundry.
  • FIG. 11 shows a magnetic field profile along a defined path where the magnetic flux density has been resolved into three coordinate components B x , B y , and B z .
  • FIG. 12 shows a magnetic field profile measured over a rectangular area as would be exhibited by the defined area overlaying an ICC. The profile is a three-dimensional representation of the magnetic flux density measured across the area.
  • the magnetic flux density vector has been resolved into three coordinate components, B x , B y , and B z , shown separately in FIGS. 12 a , 12 b , and 12 c .
  • the magnetic field profile data would be signed by a private key and written to the ICC's non-volatile memory (“NVM”) during programming.
  • NVM non-volatile memory
  • the magnetic “fingerprint” is once again read by an external magneto-resistive sensor and the magnetic profile is compared to the values stored on the chip to authenticate the ICC.
  • This system would make it very difficult for counterfeit ICCs to make their way into high value applications.
  • the system would be fairly inexpensive to implement with almost instantaneous authentication of the PUF over-molded ICCs.
  • the use of magnetized particles 4014 creates a unique magnetic fingerprint that can be applied to the manufacture of ICCs by over-molding the encapsulated chip 1001 with a substrate containing magnetized particles 2007 .
  • the term “over-molded” is used here broadly to mean anything from adding a partial surface layer over the ICC to completely encasing the ICC.
  • One or more sensors, such as a Hall-effect sensor 3001 is formed above the chip body and encased within the housing 2007 . In this embodiment, the sensor(s) 3001 can record a series of analog magnetic intensity readings, in various locations along the substrate, in one, two, or three coordinate directions.
  • Such an “internal” Hall-effect sensor can measure average particle size diameters that are less than 0.1 mm. Since these measurements are analog voltages, with a sufficient number of measurements and sufficient analog to digital resolution, unique values can be derived from the measurements. These values can be used for private keys, seeds, etc. which are not stored in the device's memory. Instead, they are read and derived by the device “in flight” (i.e., during operation), thus rendering ineffective any probing attacks by counterfeiters on the chip itself. If a counterfeiter were to attempt to extract the private key from the ICC, it is highly probable that the over-molded magnetic layer will be disturbed and the private key would be lost.
  • inventions may, for example, be implemented on an integrated circuit chip on a printer or printer supply component, such as a toner cartridge, that is used to authenticate the toner cartridge for whatever purpose, as well as to perform other functions such as toner level monitoring, sheet count, etc.
  • a printer or printer supply component such as a toner cartridge
  • a third embodiment of the invention is the application of the PUF authentication technology to bank cards and identification cards with an EMV transaction chip.
  • Bank cards 6001 for example, are under constant attack by counterfeiters. For this reason an EMV transaction chip 6002 mounted on a substrate 6003 that replaced the easily counterfeited magnetic strip 7001 shown in FIG. 7 , the back of the bank card 6001 .
  • the EMV transaction chip may be used with a personal identification number (“PIN”), but many cards lack this extra protection for convenience of the customer, to reduce data requirements in transactions, and to avoid software upgrades for the PIN operation.
  • PIN personal identification number
  • Bank cards with EMV transaction chips are mostly used in a contact-based form: the card is inserted into a reader, which creates a circuit that allows handshaking between the card and the payment terminal. A unique transaction is created that involves cryptographic data embedded in the chip.
  • NFC near-field communications
  • a unique magnetic PUF signature of the analog magnetic intensity readings could replace the PIN requirement to authenticate the bank card.
  • the PUF signature would be a second factor authentication for the bank card.
  • the substrate of a bank card may be fabricated where dispersed in the substrate is a plurality of magnetic particles.
  • the particles are distributed randomly such that it is extremely difficult to reproduce the exact distribution and alignment of particles.
  • the substrate and the particles of the bank card form a physical unclonable function.
  • the magnetic field profile may be measured by an external sensor, such as a Hall-effect sensor (not shown) in close proximity to the bank card surface. Other sensor options include magneto-optical sensor technology.
  • the magnetic field profile measurements may be taken within a defined area or along a defined path: straight, circular, or any arbitrarily selected and defined path, and recorded during manufacture of the bank card.
  • the magnetic field profile data would be written to the EVM transaction chip's non-volatile memory.
  • the reader When inserted into a card reader 8001 , the reader could sweep a sensor arm across a portion of the bank card and one or more sensors, such as Hall-effect sensors, located on the sensor arm would measure the magnetic field in a defined area or along the defined path.
  • sensors such as Hall-effect sensors
  • a simple mechanical configuration with a drive cam would determine the path of the sensor arm sweep.
  • the sensor or sensor array could be at a fixed location where the bank card slides across the sensors 8003 , 8004 , 8005 , and 8006 as the bank card is inserted into the reader slot 8002 .
  • This invention does not require the user to remember a PIN, and the card reader can perform the validation locally.
  • the card reader could be configured to transmit the magnetic “fingerprint” to the bank card company server or cloud location for remote authentication when high value transactions are taking place.
  • Data that is stored in a cloud location is stored in an accessible network such as the Internet on physical storage devices such as computer servers and storage networks.
  • the EMV transaction chip on the card could contain information that would guide the card reader to read the magnetic “fingerprint” in a specific location on the bank card. This location could be different for different cards and would add yet another layer of complexity to the task of counterfeiting a bank card.
  • a varying position of the magnetic “fingerprint” could also be configured to act as a rotating encryption key. This rotating key could change on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis.
  • the rotating key could be as simple as two keys in which data is read off the “fingerprint” in a forward or reverse motion, which would be the least disruptive to current card reader configurations.
  • Known algorithms could be utilized to determine when the “fingerprint” rotates.
  • the bank card substrate to which the EMV transaction chip is mounted could be the location of a magnetic “fingerprint” such that removal or alteration of the EMV transaction chip would distort the substrate and thus alter the magnetic “fingerprint,” rendering the authentication inoperable.
  • the bank card could be implemented in such a way as to cause tearing to the fingerprint if the chip is removed.
  • the card reader may initiate the bank card authentication by sending a request to the EMV transaction chip on the bank card for data.
  • the bank card EMV transaction chip may challenge the card reader and wait for a proper response (authenticating the reader) before the bank card security chip transmits the magnetic “fingerprint” authentication data to the reader.
  • This challenge and response protocol makes it more difficult for counterfeiters to acquire data from the bank card.
  • capacitive sensing technology may be used to detect the presence of the randomly distributed magnetized particles in the bank card, which could provide yet another authentication step for validating the bank card.
  • the presence of the magnetized particles could be detected optically by a digital camera chip or by an optical sensor. Similar to capacitive sensing, this could provide an additional authentication step for the bank card.
  • This technology could also be used in the same manner described above to authenticate access badges for secure facilities, or for other applications such as passports, government identification cards, driver licenses, etc.
  • the PUF technology could stand alone as a security device, or in combination with a integrated circuit chip on the identification card or other security device having non-volatile memory.
  • FIG. 4 shows a region of a substrate 4010 .
  • Dispersed in the substrate is a plurality of magnetized particles 4014 .
  • the particles are distributed randomly such that it is extremely difficult to reproduce the exact distribution and alignment of particles.
  • the substrate 4010 and the particles 4014 form a PUF.
  • FIG. 5 shows a side view of the substrate 4010 containing the magnetized particles 4014 .
  • the field data may be measured while moving the PUF relative to a stationary magnetic field sensor(s) 5001 , 5002 , 5003 or by moving the magnetic field sensor(s) 5001 , 5002 , 5003 next to a stationary PUF, etc.
  • the sensors are shown in varying orientations, but such a varied orientation is not necessary. Multiple sensors may be used to reduce the movement and time required to measure the magnetic field over a desired area.
  • FIG. 10 shows an example of a method of making a secure device, such as an integrated circuit chip with a PUF overlay or a bank card with an EMV transaction chip with a PUF substrate.
  • the magnetizable particles may be of any shape, and may contain neodymium and iron and boron. Alternatively, the magnetizable particles may contain samarium and cobalt. Preferably, the magnetized particles generate a sufficiently strong magnetic field to be detected with a low-cost detector.
  • Suitable substrate materials are used that allow formed aggregate pellets of the substrate material and particles to be magnetized.
  • the magnetizable particles are magnetized by, for example, subjecting the pellets to a strong magnetic field. After magnetization, the magnetic particles do not clump together because the pellet carrier material is a solid. During the molding process, the pellets are heated and melted prior to molding.
  • the substrate carrier is then solidified in an ICC, overlaying an ICC, encasing an ICC, in the body of a bank card, or in the section of a bank card beneath the section of a bank card beneath the position of an EVM transaction chip.
  • the carrier may be, for example, a liquid that is caused to become solid by adding a chemical, subjecting to ultraviolet light, increasing its temperature, etc. Causing the carrier to become solid locks the distribution and orientation of the particles.
  • a high viscosity liquid is preferred so that the particles may be magnetized shortly before the material is molded. The high viscosity retards the movement of the magnetic particles toward each other while the material is in a liquid state and minimizes clumping of the magnetized particles. Clumping could cause failures of the over-molding process.
  • Magnetizing the particles in pellet form yields a more random magnetic field pattern, and is therefore more difficult to clone. Further, the application of a magnetizing field with patterned or randomized orientation may be applied to a formed substrate with random particle positions in order to cause greater diversity of magnetic field orientation.

Abstract

In the invention described, magnetic field characteristics of randomly placed magnetized particles are exploited by using the magnetic field fluctuations produced by the particles as measured by a sensor. The magnetized particles generate a complex magnetic field near the surface of an integrated circuit chip that can be used as a “fingerprint.” The positioning and orientation of the magnetized particles is an uncontrolled process, and thus the interaction between the sensor and the particles is complex. The randomness of the magnetic field magnitude and direction near the surface of the material containing the magnetic particles can be used to obtain a unique identifier for an item such as an integrated circuit chip carrying the PUF.

Description

    CROSS REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
  • None.
    • BACKGROUND 1. Field of the Disclosure
  • The present disclosure relates generally to anti-counterfeit systems and more particularly to physical unclonable functions.
    • 2. Description of the Related Art
  • Counterfeit integrated circuit chips (“ICCs”) are a major concern in the electronic component supply industry because of reliability and security issues. Such counterfeit ICCs are impacting many industrial sectors, including computers, printing, telecommunications, automotive electronics, medical, banking, energy/smart-grid, aerospace, and military systems. The consequences can be dramatic when critical systems begin to fail or act maliciously due to the use of counterfeit or low-quality components causing minor, major, or mission failures, including health or safety concerns.
  • The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2012, for example, is focused on defense contractors who do not screen their equipment for counterfeit parts. There can be civil and criminal liability for contractors who do not eliminate counterfeit electronic parts in military equipment, according to the Forbes article, “NDAA May Put Defense Contractors In Prison For Counterfeit Parts,” Feb. 14, 2012.
  • The tools and technologies utilized by counterfeiters have become extremely sophisticated and well financed. In turn, this also calls for more sophisticated methods to detect counterfeit electronic parts that enter the market. Hardware intrinsic security is a mechanism that can provide security based on inherent properties of an electronic device. A physical unclonable function (“PUF”) belongs to the realm of hardware intrinsic security.
  • In the printer industry, counterfeit printer supplies including ICCs are a problem for consumers. Counterfeit supplies may perform poorly and may damage printers. Printer manufacturers use authentication systems to deter counterfeiters. PUFs are a type of authentication system that implements a physical one-way function. Ideally, a PUF cannot be identically replicated and thus is difficult to counterfeit. Incorporating a PUF in electronic device packaging, including ICCs, deters counterfeiters.
    • SUMMARY
  • In the invention described, magnetic field characteristics of randomly placed magnetized particles are exploited by using the magnetic field fluctuations produced by the particles as measured by a sensor, such as a Hall-effect sensor, or an array of such sensors. The invention consists of an ICC encased in or over-molded by a substrate that contains magnetic particles. The magnetized particles generate a complex magnetic field near the surface of the ICC that can be used as a “fingerprint.” The positioning and orientation of the magnetized particles is an uncontrolled process, and thus the interaction between the sensor and the particles is complex. Thus, it is difficult to duplicate the device such that the same magnetic pattern and particle physical location pattern will arise. The randomness of the magnetic field magnitude and direction near the surface of the material containing the magnetic particles can be used to obtain a unique identifier for an item such as an integrated circuit chip carrying the PUF. Further, the placement of the device in the top layer of an integrated circuit chip protects the underlying circuits from being inspected by an attacker, e.g., for reverse engineering. When a counterfeiter attempts to remove all or a portion of the coating, the magnetic field distribution must change, thus destroying the original unique identifier.
  • The invention, in one form thereof, is directed to an integrated circuit chip overlain or encapsulated by a PUF comprising randomly placed magnetic particles.
  • The invention, in another form thereof, is directed to an integrated circuit chip used in a printer or printer supply component, such as a toner cartridge, that is overlain or encapsulated by a PUF comprising randomly placed magnetic particles.
  • The invention, in yet another form thereof, is directed to an EMV (Europay, Mastercard, Visa) transaction chip or embedded microchip on a bank card overlain by a PUF comprising randomly placed magnetic particles.
  • The invention, in yet another form thereof, is directed to an apparatus having an EMV transaction chip mounted on substrate that forms the body of a bank card, where a plurality of magnetized particles are dispersed in the substrate to form a PUF.
    • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • The accompanying drawings incorporated in and forming a part of the specification, illustrate several aspects of the present disclosure, and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 1 is a view of an integrated chip.
  • FIG. 2 is a view of an integrated chip with magnetized particles molded into the housing.
  • FIG. 3 is a view of an integrated chip with an array of sensors formed above the chip with magnetized particles molded into the housing.
  • FIG. 4 is an orthogonal view of a substrate containing magnetic and non-magnetic particles.
  • FIG. 5 is a side view of a PUF and PUF readers.
  • FIG. 6 is a view of the front of a bank card with an EMV transaction chip.
  • FIG. 7 is a view of the back of a bank card with a magnetic strip.
  • FIG. 8 is a bank card chip reader device.
  • FIG. 9 is an end view of the bank card chip reader device.
  • FIG. 10 is a flowchart of a method of making a secure device.
  • FIG. 11 is a magnetic field profile along a defined path.
  • FIGS. 12a, 12b, and 12c are three-dimensional representations of the magnetic flux density measured across the area resolved into three coordinate components, Bx, By, and Bz.
    •  DETAILED DESCRIPTION
  • In the following description, reference is made to the accompanying drawings where like numerals represent like elements. The embodiments are described in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the art to practice the present disclosure. It is to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized and that process, electrical, and mechanical changes, etc., may be made without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. Examples merely typify possible variations. Portions and features of some embodiments may be included in or substituted for those of others. The following description, therefore, is not to be taken in a limiting sense and the scope of the present disclosure is defined only by the appended claims and their equivalents.
  • Referring now to the drawings and particularly to FIG. 1, when an ICC 1001 is manufactured, it is typically packaged by being attached to a metal lead frame 1008 that is connected to solder pads 1002 and 1003 by a wire bonds 1004 and 1005, and then enclosed in an encapsulant 1006 which is then cured. The encapsulated chip is then molded into a plastic housing 1007.
  • Referring now to FIG. 2, in one embodiment of the invention, the molded plastic housing 1007 is replaced with the molded plastic housing or substrate 2007 where dispersed in the substrate is a plurality of magnetized particles 4014. The particles are distributed randomly such that it is extremely difficult to reproduce the exact distribution and alignment of particles. Preferably, the particles are magnetized before dispersion in the substrate to add further randomness to the resulting magnetic field profile. Thus, the substrate 2007 and the particles 4014 form a physical unclonable function out of the molded plastic housing.
  • The magnetic field profile near the surface of the ICC may be measured by an external magneto-resistive sensor (not shown), a Hall-effect sensor (not shown), or an array of such sensors, in close proximity to the top surface of the ICC. Since the sensing elements are typically around 0.3-0.5 mm below the surface of the sensing device, the average particle size diameter using Hall-effect sensor or magneto-resistive sensor is preferably greater than 0.1 mm. Note that the diameter of a non-spherical particle is the diameter of the smallest sphere that encloses the particle. Other sensor options include magneto-optical sensor technology, which is capable of working with smaller magnetic particle sizes, but is more costly to implement and subject to contamination problems.
  • The magnetic field profile measurements may be taken within a defined area or along a defined path: straight, circular, or any arbitrarily selected and defined path, and recorded at the ICC foundry. FIG. 11 shows a magnetic field profile along a defined path where the magnetic flux density has been resolved into three coordinate components Bx, By, and Bz. FIG. 12 shows a magnetic field profile measured over a rectangular area as would be exhibited by the defined area overlaying an ICC. The profile is a three-dimensional representation of the magnetic flux density measured across the area. The magnetic flux density vector has been resolved into three coordinate components, Bx, By, and Bz, shown separately in FIGS. 12a, 12b, and 12c . The magnetic field profile data would be signed by a private key and written to the ICC's non-volatile memory (“NVM”) during programming. After installation of the ICC onto a circuit card, the magnetic “fingerprint” is once again read by an external magneto-resistive sensor and the magnetic profile is compared to the values stored on the chip to authenticate the ICC. This system would make it very difficult for counterfeit ICCs to make their way into high value applications. The system would be fairly inexpensive to implement with almost instantaneous authentication of the PUF over-molded ICCs.
  • Referring now to FIG. 3, in a second embodiment of the invention, the use of magnetized particles 4014 creates a unique magnetic fingerprint that can be applied to the manufacture of ICCs by over-molding the encapsulated chip 1001 with a substrate containing magnetized particles 2007. The term “over-molded” is used here broadly to mean anything from adding a partial surface layer over the ICC to completely encasing the ICC. One or more sensors, such as a Hall-effect sensor 3001 is formed above the chip body and encased within the housing 2007. In this embodiment, the sensor(s) 3001 can record a series of analog magnetic intensity readings, in various locations along the substrate, in one, two, or three coordinate directions. Such an “internal” Hall-effect sensor can measure average particle size diameters that are less than 0.1 mm. Since these measurements are analog voltages, with a sufficient number of measurements and sufficient analog to digital resolution, unique values can be derived from the measurements. These values can be used for private keys, seeds, etc. which are not stored in the device's memory. Instead, they are read and derived by the device “in flight” (i.e., during operation), thus rendering ineffective any probing attacks by counterfeiters on the chip itself. If a counterfeiter were to attempt to extract the private key from the ICC, it is highly probable that the over-molded magnetic layer will be disturbed and the private key would be lost.
  • These embodiments may, for example, be implemented on an integrated circuit chip on a printer or printer supply component, such as a toner cartridge, that is used to authenticate the toner cartridge for whatever purpose, as well as to perform other functions such as toner level monitoring, sheet count, etc.
  • A third embodiment of the invention is the application of the PUF authentication technology to bank cards and identification cards with an EMV transaction chip. Bank cards 6001, for example, are under constant attack by counterfeiters. For this reason an EMV transaction chip 6002 mounted on a substrate 6003 that replaced the easily counterfeited magnetic strip 7001 shown in FIG. 7, the back of the bank card 6001. To avoid fraud, the EMV transaction chip may be used with a personal identification number (“PIN”), but many cards lack this extra protection for convenience of the customer, to reduce data requirements in transactions, and to avoid software upgrades for the PIN operation.
  • Bank cards with EMV transaction chips are mostly used in a contact-based form: the card is inserted into a reader, which creates a circuit that allows handshaking between the card and the payment terminal. A unique transaction is created that involves cryptographic data embedded in the chip.
  • For cards that require PINS, the transaction can't be completed without the code, which is not transmitted remotely as with debit and ATM transactions. Some cards are equipped with near-field communications (NFC) radios for contactless EMV transaction, and will work with point-of-sale systems.
  • A unique magnetic PUF signature of the analog magnetic intensity readings could replace the PIN requirement to authenticate the bank card. The PUF signature would be a second factor authentication for the bank card.
  • The substrate of a bank card may be fabricated where dispersed in the substrate is a plurality of magnetic particles. The particles are distributed randomly such that it is extremely difficult to reproduce the exact distribution and alignment of particles. Thus, the substrate and the particles of the bank card form a physical unclonable function. The magnetic field profile may be measured by an external sensor, such as a Hall-effect sensor (not shown) in close proximity to the bank card surface. Other sensor options include magneto-optical sensor technology. The magnetic field profile measurements may be taken within a defined area or along a defined path: straight, circular, or any arbitrarily selected and defined path, and recorded during manufacture of the bank card. The magnetic field profile data would be written to the EVM transaction chip's non-volatile memory.
  • When inserted into a card reader 8001, the reader could sweep a sensor arm across a portion of the bank card and one or more sensors, such as Hall-effect sensors, located on the sensor arm would measure the magnetic field in a defined area or along the defined path. A simple mechanical configuration with a drive cam would determine the path of the sensor arm sweep. Alternatively, as shown in FIG. 9, the sensor or sensor array could be at a fixed location where the bank card slides across the sensors 8003, 8004, 8005, and 8006 as the bank card is inserted into the reader slot 8002. Data corresponding to the magnetic intensity readings along the sensing path stored in the EMV transaction chip's non-volatile memory and used to validate the magnetic “fingerprint” detected by the card reader at time of the transaction. This invention does not require the user to remember a PIN, and the card reader can perform the validation locally. Alternatively, the card reader could be configured to transmit the magnetic “fingerprint” to the bank card company server or cloud location for remote authentication when high value transactions are taking place. Data that is stored in a cloud location is stored in an accessible network such as the Internet on physical storage devices such as computer servers and storage networks.
  • As an added layer of security, the EMV transaction chip on the card could contain information that would guide the card reader to read the magnetic “fingerprint” in a specific location on the bank card. This location could be different for different cards and would add yet another layer of complexity to the task of counterfeiting a bank card. A varying position of the magnetic “fingerprint” could also be configured to act as a rotating encryption key. This rotating key could change on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis. The rotating key could be as simple as two keys in which data is read off the “fingerprint” in a forward or reverse motion, which would be the least disruptive to current card reader configurations. Known algorithms could be utilized to determine when the “fingerprint” rotates.
  • In another embodiment, the bank card substrate to which the EMV transaction chip is mounted could be the location of a magnetic “fingerprint” such that removal or alteration of the EMV transaction chip would distort the substrate and thus alter the magnetic “fingerprint,” rendering the authentication inoperable. In a further embodiment, the bank card could be implemented in such a way as to cause tearing to the fingerprint if the chip is removed.
  • The card reader may initiate the bank card authentication by sending a request to the EMV transaction chip on the bank card for data. The bank card EMV transaction chip may challenge the card reader and wait for a proper response (authenticating the reader) before the bank card security chip transmits the magnetic “fingerprint” authentication data to the reader. This challenge and response protocol makes it more difficult for counterfeiters to acquire data from the bank card. In addition to using the magnetic “fingerprint” or signature of the bank card, capacitive sensing technology may be used to detect the presence of the randomly distributed magnetized particles in the bank card, which could provide yet another authentication step for validating the bank card.
  • If at least one face of the bank card is non-opaque, the presence of the magnetized particles could be detected optically by a digital camera chip or by an optical sensor. Similar to capacitive sensing, this could provide an additional authentication step for the bank card.
  • This technology could also be used in the same manner described above to authenticate access badges for secure facilities, or for other applications such as passports, government identification cards, driver licenses, etc. The PUF technology could stand alone as a security device, or in combination with a integrated circuit chip on the identification card or other security device having non-volatile memory.
  • FIG. 4 shows a region of a substrate 4010. Dispersed in the substrate is a plurality of magnetized particles 4014. The particles are distributed randomly such that it is extremely difficult to reproduce the exact distribution and alignment of particles. Thus, the substrate 4010 and the particles 4014 form a PUF.
  • FIG. 5 shows a side view of the substrate 4010 containing the magnetized particles 4014.
  • The field data may be measured while moving the PUF relative to a stationary magnetic field sensor(s) 5001, 5002, 5003 or by moving the magnetic field sensor(s) 5001, 5002, 5003 next to a stationary PUF, etc. The sensors are shown in varying orientations, but such a varied orientation is not necessary. Multiple sensors may be used to reduce the movement and time required to measure the magnetic field over a desired area.
  • FIG. 10 shows an example of a method of making a secure device, such as an integrated circuit chip with a PUF overlay or a bank card with an EMV transaction chip with a PUF substrate.
  • The magnetizable particles may be of any shape, and may contain neodymium and iron and boron. Alternatively, the magnetizable particles may contain samarium and cobalt. Preferably, the magnetized particles generate a sufficiently strong magnetic field to be detected with a low-cost detector.
  • Suitable substrate materials are used that allow formed aggregate pellets of the substrate material and particles to be magnetized. The magnetizable particles are magnetized by, for example, subjecting the pellets to a strong magnetic field. After magnetization, the magnetic particles do not clump together because the pellet carrier material is a solid. During the molding process, the pellets are heated and melted prior to molding.
  • The substrate carrier is then solidified in an ICC, overlaying an ICC, encasing an ICC, in the body of a bank card, or in the section of a bank card beneath the section of a bank card beneath the position of an EVM transaction chip. In an alternate embodiment the carrier may be, for example, a liquid that is caused to become solid by adding a chemical, subjecting to ultraviolet light, increasing its temperature, etc. Causing the carrier to become solid locks the distribution and orientation of the particles. In this case a high viscosity liquid is preferred so that the particles may be magnetized shortly before the material is molded. The high viscosity retards the movement of the magnetic particles toward each other while the material is in a liquid state and minimizes clumping of the magnetized particles. Clumping could cause failures of the over-molding process.
  • Magnetizing the particles in pellet form yields a more random magnetic field pattern, and is therefore more difficult to clone. Further, the application of a magnetizing field with patterned or randomized orientation may be applied to a formed substrate with random particle positions in order to cause greater diversity of magnetic field orientation.
  • The foregoing description illustrates various aspects and examples of the present disclosure. It is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, it is chosen to illustrate the principles of the present disclosure and its practical application to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to utilize the present disclosure, including its various modifications that naturally follow. All modifications and variations are contemplated within the scope of the present disclosure as determined by the appended claims. Relatively apparent modifications include combining one or more features of various embodiments with features of other embodiments.

Claims (18)

What is claimed is:
1. An apparatus comprising:
a substrate;
a plurality of pre-magnetized particles that have random orientations of magnetization and are randomly dispersed in the substrate; and
an integrated circuit chip,
wherein the substrate containing the plurality of pre-magnetized particles is formed into a housing that encapsulates the integrated circuit chip.
2. The apparatus of claim 1, further comprising a non-volatile memory on the integrated circuit chip, wherein the non-volatile memory contains magnetic field profile data measured from the pre-magnetized particles.
3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the pre-magnetized particles contain neodymium and iron and boron.
4. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the pre-magnetized particles contain samarium and cobalt.
5. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the average particle size diameter of the pre-magnetized particles is greater than 0.1 mm.
6. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the average particle size diameter of the pre-magnetized particles is greater than 0.001 mm.
7. An apparatus comprising:
a substrate;
a plurality of pre-magnetized particles that have random orientations of magnetization and are randomly dispersed in the substrate;
an integrated circuit chip; and
at least one sensor positioned in contact with the integrated circuit chip,
wherein the substrate containing the plurality of pre-magnetized particles is formed into a housing that encapsulates the integrated circuit chip and the at least one sensor.
8. The apparatus of claim 7, further comprising a non-volatile memory on the integrated circuit chip, wherein the non-volatile memory contains magnetic field profile data measured from the pre-magnetized particles.
9. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the pre-magnetized particles contain neodymium and iron and boron.
10. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the pre-magnetized particles contain samarium and cobalt.
11. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the average particle size diameter of the pre-magnetized particles is greater than 0.1 mm.
12. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the average particle size diameter of the pre-magnetized particles is less than 0.1 mm.
13. An apparatus comprising:
a substrate;
a plurality of pre-magnetized particles that have random orientations of magnetization and are randomly dispersed in the substrate;
an integrated circuit chip; and
a non-volatile memory on the integrated circuit chip, wherein the integrated circuit chip is over-molded with the substrate containing the pre-magnetized particles, and the non-volatile memory contains magnetic field profile data measured from the pre-magnetized particles.
14. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the pre-magnetized particles contain neodymium and iron and boron.
15. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the pre-magnetized particles contain samarium and cobalt.
16. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the average particle size diameter of the pre-magnetized particles is greater than 0.1 mm.
17. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the average particle size diameter of the pre-magnetized particles is less than 0.1 mm.
18. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the integrated circuit chip is used in a printer or printer supply component, such as a toner cartridge.
US15/808,573 2017-11-09 2017-11-09 Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security Abandoned US20190139909A1 (en)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US15/808,573 US20190139909A1 (en) 2017-11-09 2017-11-09 Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security
US15/809,081 US10566296B2 (en) 2017-11-09 2017-11-10 Physical unclonable functions in bank cards or identification cards for security
US17/225,941 US20210242141A1 (en) 2017-11-09 2021-04-08 Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US15/808,573 US20190139909A1 (en) 2017-11-09 2017-11-09 Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security

Related Child Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US15/809,081 Continuation US10566296B2 (en) 2017-11-09 2017-11-10 Physical unclonable functions in bank cards or identification cards for security
US17/225,941 Continuation US20210242141A1 (en) 2017-11-09 2021-04-08 Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20190139909A1 true US20190139909A1 (en) 2019-05-09

Family

ID=66327529

Family Applications (3)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US15/808,573 Abandoned US20190139909A1 (en) 2017-11-09 2017-11-09 Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security
US15/809,081 Active 2038-02-16 US10566296B2 (en) 2017-11-09 2017-11-10 Physical unclonable functions in bank cards or identification cards for security
US17/225,941 Abandoned US20210242141A1 (en) 2017-11-09 2021-04-08 Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security

Family Applications After (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US15/809,081 Active 2038-02-16 US10566296B2 (en) 2017-11-09 2017-11-10 Physical unclonable functions in bank cards or identification cards for security
US17/225,941 Abandoned US20210242141A1 (en) 2017-11-09 2021-04-08 Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security

Country Status (1)

Country Link
US (3) US20190139909A1 (en)

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2021050713A1 (en) * 2019-09-10 2021-03-18 Lexmark International, Inc. Cryptoanchor reader
WO2021194606A1 (en) * 2020-03-25 2021-09-30 Raytheon Company System and method for authenticating physical objects with randomized embedded information
US11356287B2 (en) 2015-10-09 2022-06-07 Lexmark International, Inc. Injection-molded physical unclonable function
US20220176727A1 (en) * 2020-12-04 2022-06-09 Lexmark International, Inc. Tag System to Mitigate Maliciously Tainted and Counterfeit Products
US20220343091A1 (en) * 2021-04-26 2022-10-27 Semikron Elektronik Gmbh & Co. Kg Device having functional component and a plastic housing element, and method for verifying the authenticity of such a device
EP4045927A4 (en) * 2019-10-16 2024-02-21 Lexmark Int Inc Multidirectional magnetic field area reader system with features

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2021096635A1 (en) * 2019-10-16 2021-05-20 Lexmark International, Inc. Multidirectional magnetic field area reader system with features

Family Cites Families (79)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3675367A (en) 1970-07-27 1972-07-11 Raymond D Amburn Apparatus for magnetically treating seeds
US4218674A (en) 1975-09-09 1980-08-19 Dasy Inter S.A. Method and a system for verifying authenticity safe against forgery
DE2736642A1 (en) 1977-08-13 1979-02-15 Max Baermann PLASTIC-BONDED PERMANENT MAGNET AND PROCESS FOR ITS MANUFACTURING
JPS58171802A (en) 1982-04-02 1983-10-08 Sumitomo Bakelite Co Ltd Ferromagnetic resin compound
US4734695A (en) 1984-10-04 1988-03-29 Light Signatures, Inc. Secure card and sensing system
JPH0817221B2 (en) * 1990-11-13 1996-02-21 株式会社東芝 Semiconductor device and semiconductor wafer mounting method
JPH04257203A (en) 1991-02-08 1992-09-11 Kanebo Ltd Plastic magnet composite
US5602381A (en) 1993-05-19 1997-02-11 Nhk Spring Co., Ltd. Objects to be checked for authenticity, and method and apparatus for checking whether or not objects are authentic
US5451759A (en) 1993-06-24 1995-09-19 Nhk Spring Co., Ltd. Using high-permeability magnetic elements randomly scattered in the objects
US5981053A (en) 1993-10-05 1999-11-09 Sandia Corporation Tamper resistant magnetic stripes
US5434917A (en) * 1993-10-13 1995-07-18 Thomson Consumer Electronics S.A. Unforgeable identification device, identification device reader and method of identification
DE19653178A1 (en) 1996-12-19 1998-06-25 Inventa Ag Thermoplastic processable molding compound, process for producing the molding compound and use thereof
US5792380A (en) 1997-04-30 1998-08-11 Eastman Kodak Company Ink jet printing ink composition with detectable label material
US5857129A (en) 1997-11-10 1999-01-05 Xerox Corporation Toner container with foolproof adaptor
US6063647A (en) 1997-12-08 2000-05-16 3M Innovative Properties Company Method for making circuit elements for a z-axis interconnect
US7005733B2 (en) 1999-12-30 2006-02-28 Koemmerling Oliver Anti tamper encapsulation for an integrated circuit
US6432559B1 (en) 2000-06-12 2002-08-13 Applied Technologies & Fabrication, Inc. Tamper-proof identification of solid objects
JP3893861B2 (en) 2000-08-18 2007-03-14 富士ゼロックス株式会社 Image forming apparatus and replacement parts used therefor
GB0031016D0 (en) 2000-12-20 2001-01-31 Alphafox Systems Ltd Security systems
US20030040129A1 (en) 2001-08-20 2003-02-27 Shah Haresh P. Binding assays using magnetically immobilized arrays
US7137000B2 (en) 2001-08-24 2006-11-14 Zih Corp. Method and apparatus for article authentication
US6812707B2 (en) 2001-11-27 2004-11-02 Mitsubishi Materials Corporation Detection element for objects and detection device using the same
DE60331427D1 (en) 2002-04-09 2010-04-08 Nxp Bv METHOD AND ARRANGEMENT FOR PROTECTING A CHIIP AND VERIFYING ITS AUTHENTICITY
US6766119B2 (en) 2002-12-16 2004-07-20 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Toner cartridge identifying apparatus for an image forming apparatus
EP1475242B1 (en) 2003-04-30 2008-10-08 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Authentication method and system
US7865722B2 (en) 2003-07-22 2011-01-04 Agency For Science, Technology And Research Method of identifying an object and a tag carrying identification information
US7218589B2 (en) 2003-11-24 2007-05-15 General Electric Company Authenticable optical disc, system for authenticating an optical disc and method thereof
MXPA06010402A (en) 2004-03-12 2007-01-19 Ingenia Technology Ltd Authenticity verification methods, products and apparatuses.
IL162063A0 (en) 2004-05-19 2005-11-20 Samuel Kosolapov Method of authentication using inexpensive unique optical key which can not be duplicatied and inexpensive optical key reader providing
US7106198B2 (en) 2004-05-20 2006-09-12 Xerox Corporation Control of programmable modules
US7408707B2 (en) 2004-08-04 2008-08-05 Fusion Optix Inc. Multi-region light scattering element
EP1841819A1 (en) 2004-12-07 2007-10-10 Yissum Research Development Company Of The Hebrew University Of Jerusalem Spherical composites entrapping nanoparticles, processes of preparing same and uses thereof
WO2006078220A1 (en) 2005-01-19 2006-07-27 Agency For Science, Technology And Research Identification tag, object adapted to be identified, and related methods, devices and systems
WO2007031908A2 (en) 2005-09-14 2007-03-22 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Improved device, system and method for determining authenticity of an item
US20080231418A1 (en) 2005-10-17 2008-09-25 Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. Integrated Physical Unclonable Function (Puf) with Combined Sensor and Display
EP2110776B1 (en) 2005-12-23 2012-10-31 Ingenia Holdings Limited Optical authentication
US7642916B2 (en) 2006-03-23 2010-01-05 Xerox Corporation RFID bridge antenna
CN101479750A (en) 2006-05-11 2009-07-08 奇异编号有限公司 Method of identifying an object, an identification tag, an object adapted to be identified, and related device and system
US9794247B2 (en) 2006-08-22 2017-10-17 Stmicroelectronics, Inc. Method to prevent cloning of electronic components using public key infrastructure secure hardware device
US20080199667A1 (en) 2007-02-16 2008-08-21 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Magnetic field controlled active reflector and magnetic display panel comprising the active reflector
JP2010520945A (en) 2007-03-13 2010-06-17 テヒニッシェ ウニヴェルシテート アイントホーフェン Inkjet polymerizable liquid crystal mixture
MY162937A (en) 2007-10-09 2017-07-31 Sicpa Holding Sa Security marking authentication device
JP2009140952A (en) 2007-12-03 2009-06-25 Fujitsu Ltd Cpp structure magnetoresistive element, method of manufacturing the same and storage apparatus
US7704438B2 (en) 2008-04-25 2010-04-27 Barlog Plastics Gmbh Process for producing a permanently magnetic molding
JP5328230B2 (en) 2008-06-10 2013-10-30 キヤノン株式会社 Cartridge and electrophotographic image forming apparatus using the cartridge
JP2011526113A (en) 2008-06-27 2011-09-29 コーニンクレッカ フィリップス エレクトロニクス エヌ ヴィ Apparatus, system, and method for verifying authenticity, integrity, and / or physical state of an item
US8742891B2 (en) 2008-07-16 2014-06-03 Morton Greene System and method for identifying a genuine printed document
JP4613234B2 (en) 2008-09-09 2011-01-12 シャープ株式会社 Toner cartridge and image forming apparatus using the same
WO2010067592A1 (en) 2008-12-12 2010-06-17 愛知製鋼株式会社 Rare earth-based bonded magnet
JP4688938B2 (en) 2009-01-30 2011-05-25 シャープ株式会社 Developing device, image forming apparatus, and developing device cleaning method
JP2010197870A (en) 2009-02-26 2010-09-09 Fuji Xerox Co Ltd Developing device and image forming apparatus using the same
SG177518A1 (en) 2009-07-09 2012-02-28 Bilcare Technologies Singapore Pte Ltd A reading device able to identify a tag or an object adapted to be identified, related methods and systems
JP5434869B2 (en) 2009-11-25 2014-03-05 Ｔｄｋ株式会社 Manufacturing method of rare earth sintered magnet
GB201001603D0 (en) 2010-02-01 2010-03-17 Rue De Int Ltd Security elements, and methods and apparatus for their manufacture
JP5140694B2 (en) 2010-03-17 2013-02-06 京セラドキュメントソリューションズ株式会社 Toner dispersion member and toner dispersion mechanism provided with the same
US8331806B2 (en) 2010-07-20 2012-12-11 Xerox Corporation Empty bottle detection using a one time foil seal
GB201013432D0 (en) 2010-08-11 2010-09-22 Univ Bristol Method of authentication
BR112013007504A2 (en) 2010-09-08 2017-08-08 Bilcare Tech Singapore Pte Ltd integrated identification information reading unit based on inherent disturbance
US8478169B2 (en) 2010-09-29 2013-07-02 Eastman Kodak Company Development station with dual drive
US9292717B2 (en) 2010-12-16 2016-03-22 Peter Malcolm Moran Apparatus for forming and reading an identification feature and method thereof
JP5175923B2 (en) 2010-12-28 2013-04-03 シャープ株式会社 Developing device, image forming apparatus, and developer stirring and conveying method
US8831625B2 (en) * 2011-08-03 2014-09-09 Spectrum Bridge, Inc. Systems and methods for processing spectrum coexistence information to optimize spectrum allocation
DE102012204708A1 (en) 2012-03-23 2013-09-26 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Device and method for authenticating an object
US8714442B2 (en) 2012-04-19 2014-05-06 Zortag Inc System for and method of securing articles along a supply chain
ITMI20120706A1 (en) 2012-04-27 2013-10-28 St Microelectronics Srl AN INTEGRATED CIRCUIT CARD FOR AUTHENTICATION AND A METHOD FOR THE AUTHENTICATION OF THE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT CARD
US8892008B2 (en) 2013-03-12 2014-11-18 Xerox Corporation Method and apparatus for reducing residual toner in a rotating container
US9430680B2 (en) 2013-03-14 2016-08-30 Seagate Technology Llc Tamper sensor
US20150071432A1 (en) 2013-09-09 2015-03-12 Qualcomm Incorporated Physically unclonable function based on resistivity of magnetoresistive random-access memory magnetic tunnel junctions
US8761639B1 (en) 2013-11-20 2014-06-24 Lexmark International, Inc. Replaceable unit for an electrophotographic image forming device having a latching mechanism
KR102282717B1 (en) 2014-10-14 2021-07-27 삼성전자주식회사 A NFC Card Reader, system including the same, and method there-of
KR101873855B1 (en) 2015-02-23 2018-07-03 한국전자통신연구원 Triaxial sensor and device including the same for measuring magnetic field
US9502356B1 (en) 2015-03-12 2016-11-22 Maxim Integrated Products, Inc. Device and method with physical unclonable function
US9553582B1 (en) 2015-10-09 2017-01-24 Lexmark International, Inc. Physical unclonable functions having magnetic and non-magnetic particles
US9929864B2 (en) 2015-10-09 2018-03-27 Lexmark International, Inc. Rotating magnetic measurements of physical unclonable functions
US9917699B2 (en) 2015-10-09 2018-03-13 Lexmark International, Inc. Physical unclonable function imaged through two faces
US9454125B1 (en) 2015-12-21 2016-09-27 Lexmark International, Inc. Systems and methods for reincorporating waste toner with fresh toner within a toner cartridge
US9542576B1 (en) 2016-08-03 2017-01-10 Lexmark International, Inc. Magnetic helical physical unclonable function measured above flight
US9665748B1 (en) 2016-08-03 2017-05-30 Lexmark International, Inc. Magnetic helical physical unclonable function measured adjacent to flight
US9524456B1 (en) 2016-08-03 2016-12-20 Lexmark International, Inc. Manufacturing a helical physical unclonable function

Cited By (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US11356287B2 (en) 2015-10-09 2022-06-07 Lexmark International, Inc. Injection-molded physical unclonable function
WO2021050713A1 (en) * 2019-09-10 2021-03-18 Lexmark International, Inc. Cryptoanchor reader
US20230030797A1 (en) * 2019-09-10 2023-02-02 Lexmark International, Inc. Cryptoanchor Reader
EP4045927A4 (en) * 2019-10-16 2024-02-21 Lexmark Int Inc Multidirectional magnetic field area reader system with features
WO2021194606A1 (en) * 2020-03-25 2021-09-30 Raytheon Company System and method for authenticating physical objects with randomized embedded information
US11635746B2 (en) 2020-03-25 2023-04-25 Raytheon Company System and method for authenticating physical objects with randomized embedded information
US20220176727A1 (en) * 2020-12-04 2022-06-09 Lexmark International, Inc. Tag System to Mitigate Maliciously Tainted and Counterfeit Products
US20220343091A1 (en) * 2021-04-26 2022-10-27 Semikron Elektronik Gmbh & Co. Kg Device having functional component and a plastic housing element, and method for verifying the authenticity of such a device

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US20190157219A1 (en) 2019-05-23
US20210242141A1 (en) 2021-08-05
US10566296B2 (en) 2020-02-18

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US20210242141A1 (en) Physical Unclonable Functions in Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging for Security
US9292717B2 (en) Apparatus for forming and reading an identification feature and method thereof
EP3577851B1 (en) Methods and systems for securely storing sensitive data on smart cards
US7309017B2 (en) Secure physical documents, and methods and apparatus for publishing and reading them
Drimer et al. Thinking inside the box: system-level failures of tamper proofing
US9117126B2 (en) Tamper resistant 3D magnetic stripe reader integrated circuit
AU2019202240A1 (en) Physical Unclonable Functions In Bank Cards Or Identification Cards For Security
Ferradi et al. When organized crime applies academic results: a forensic analysis of an in-card listening device
CN111783919A (en) Physically unclonable function for security in bank cards or identity cards
JP7013385B2 (en) Systems and methods for identifying users using graphical barcodes and payment card authentication read data
US20160162676A1 (en) Method, apparatus and system for gesture based security
EP3720043A1 (en) Physical unclonable functions in integrated circuit chip packaging for security
EP3719705A1 (en) Physical unclonable functions in bank cards or identification cards for security
CA3038543A1 (en) Physical unclonable functions in bank cards or identification cards for security
CA3038545A1 (en) Physical unclonable functions in integrated circuit chip packaging for security
AU2019202239A1 (en) Physical Unclonable Functions In Integrated Circuit Chip Packaging For Security
US10854251B2 (en) Physical identifiers for authenticating an identity of a semiconductor component
CN111783171A (en) Physically unclonable function for security in integrated circuit chip packages
BR102019006593A2 (en) PHYSICAL NON-CLONABLE FUNCTIONS ON BANK CARDS OR SECURITY IDENTIFICATION CARDS
BR102019006559A2 (en) NON-CLONABLE PHYSICAL FUNCTIONS IN AN INTEGRATED CIRCUIT CHIP PACKAGE FOR SECURITY
JP5929513B2 (en) Metal embedded RFID tag and data reader
Kreft et al. Cocoon-PUF, a novel mechatronic secure element technology
CN103182884B (en) Bankbook and data read-write processing method thereof
CN111951032A (en) Third-party article anti-counterfeiting authentication method
Mayes et al. An introduction to smart cards and rfids

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC., KENTUCKY

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:BUSH, STEPHEN P;DENTON, GARY A;DRUMMOND, JAMES PAUL;AND OTHERS;SIGNING DATES FROM 20171106 TO 20171109;REEL/FRAME:044085/0588

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: FINAL REJECTION MAILED

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: DOCKETED NEW CASE - READY FOR EXAMINATION

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: NON FINAL ACTION MAILED

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: RESPONSE TO NON-FINAL OFFICE ACTION ENTERED AND FORWARDED TO EXAMINER

STPP Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general

Free format text: FINAL REJECTION MAILED

STCB Information on status: application discontinuation

Free format text: ABANDONED -- FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICE ACTION