US20180317086A1 - Secondary Authentication of a User Equipment - Google Patents

Secondary Authentication of a User Equipment Download PDF

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Publication number
US20180317086A1
US20180317086A1 US15/761,835 US201715761835A US2018317086A1 US 20180317086 A1 US20180317086 A1 US 20180317086A1 US 201715761835 A US201715761835 A US 201715761835A US 2018317086 A1 US2018317086 A1 US 2018317086A1
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Prior art keywords
eap
user equipment
authentication
smf
request
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Inventor
Noamen Ben Henda
David Castellanos Zamora
Vesa Torvinen
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Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB
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Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB
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Assigned to TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL) reassignment TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL) ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: CASTELLANOS ZAMORA, DAVID, BEN HENDA, Noamen
Assigned to TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL) reassignment TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL) ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: OY L M ERICSSON AB
Publication of US20180317086A1 publication Critical patent/US20180317086A1/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0884—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by delegation of authentication, e.g. a proxy authenticates an entity to be authenticated on behalf of this entity vis-à-vis an authentication entity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0892—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by using authentication-authorization-accounting [AAA] servers or protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/164—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the network layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/062—Pre-authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/068—Authentication using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H04W76/11—Allocation or use of connection identifiers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/20—Manipulation of established connections
    • H04W76/25—Maintenance of established connections
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W80/00—Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
    • H04W80/08—Upper layer protocols
    • H04W80/10—Upper layer protocols adapted for application session management, e.g. SIP [Session Initiation Protocol]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/02—Terminal devices
    • H04W88/022—Selective call receivers
    • H04W88/023—Selective call receivers with message or information receiving capability
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/082—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying multi-factor authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities

Definitions

  • the present application relates generally to a wireless communication network, and relates specifically to secondary authentication of a user equipment configured for use in a wireless communication network.
  • a wireless communication network conventionally authenticates a user equipment based on credentials that are pre-provisioned by the network operator and that are securely stored with the user equipment.
  • Support for alternative ways to authenticate a user equipment would enable the wireless communication network to in turn support a variety of possible use cases. For example, this would allow factory owners or enterprises to leverage their own identity and credential management systems for authentication and access network security.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • EAP extensible authentication protocol
  • SMF session management function
  • EAP extensible authentication protocol
  • Such authentication may be for instance secondary authentication that is performed in addition (e.g., after) primary authentication of the user equipment.
  • EAP in this way may prove advantageous in that it supports different types of authentication methods, is not reliant on IP connectivity or a particular type of access network, and/or is control plane based so as to keep separation between the control plane and the user plane.
  • inventions herein include a method for secondary authentication of a user equipment.
  • the method may comprise receiving, by the user equipment, an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) request from a session management function (SMF) that serves as an EAP authenticator for secondary authentication of the user equipment, wherein the secondary authentication is authentication of the user equipment in addition to primary authentication of the user equipment.
  • EAP extensible authentication protocol
  • SMF session management function
  • the method may also comprise, responsive to the EAP request, transmitting an EAP response from the user equipment to the SMF.
  • Embodiments herein also include a method for secondary authentication of a user equipment.
  • the method may comprise transmitting an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) request from a session management function (SMF) to a user equipment, wherein the SMF serves as an EAP authenticator for secondary authentication of the user equipment, wherein the secondary authentication is authentication of the user equipment in addition to primary authentication of the user equipment.
  • the method may further comprise, responsive to the EAP request, receiving at the SMF an EAP response from the user equipment.
  • the SMF also serves as an EAP server that executes an EAP authentication method for the secondary authentication of the user equipment.
  • the SMF is configured to forward the EAP request and the EAP response between the user equipment and an EAP server that executes an EAP authentication method for the EAP authenticator.
  • Still further embodiments herein include a method for secondary authentication of a user equipment.
  • the method may comprise transmitting an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) request from an EAP server to a user equipment via a session management function (SMF), wherein the SMF serves as a pass-through EAP authenticator for secondary authentication of the user equipment, wherein the secondary authentication is authentication of the user equipment in addition to primary authentication of the user equipment and wherein the EAP server is configured to execute an EAP authentication method for the EAP authenticator.
  • the method may further comprise, responsive to the EAP request, receiving at the EAP server via the SMF an EAP response from the user equipment.
  • the user equipment and the SMF are configured for use in a wireless communication network
  • the EAP server is in a data network with which the user equipment requests a user plane session
  • the secondary authentication of the user equipment is authentication of the user equipment to establish the user plane session
  • the secondary authentication is delegated by the wireless communication network to the data network.
  • the EAP request and the EAP response are transmitted between the SMF and the EAP server via a user plane function selected by the SMF.
  • the user plane function serves as a proxy for the EAP server.
  • the user plane function serves as a router via which the EAP request and EAP response are transmitted transparently to the user plane function.
  • the EAP request and the EAP response may be encapsulated within respective non-access stratum (NAS) protocol messages between the SMF and the UE.
  • NAS non-access stratum
  • the transmitting and receiving are performed after the primary authentication of the user equipment by a security anchor function in a core network.
  • a core network comprises multiple different network slices respectively dedicated to different services, wherein the secondary authentication of the user equipment comprises slice-specific authentication of the user equipment for accessing a specific network slice of the core network.
  • the method further comprises, based on successful secondary authentication of the user equipment, obtaining a security key shared between the user equipment and the SMF.
  • a session establishment request transmitted from the user equipment triggers the secondary authentication of the user equipment.
  • the session establishment request includes a secondary identity of the user equipment used for the secondary authentication.
  • a session establishment response transmitted to the user equipment includes either an EAP success message indicating success of the secondary authentication or an EAP failure message indicating failure of the secondary authentication.
  • the method further comprises binding the secondary authentication of the user equipment to a channel over which the secondary authentication is performed.
  • the method further comprises deriving, based on successful secondary authentication of the user equipment, a security key shared between the user equipment and the SMF, wherein said deriving comprises deriving the security key as a function of binding information associated with a channel over which the secondary authentication is performed.
  • said binding information comprises one or more of: information identifying a type of an access network via which the user equipment accesses a wireless communication network; information identifying a type of a core network of the wireless communication network; information identifying a core network slice to which the user equipment is requesting access; and information identifying a type of a core network slice to which the user equipment is requesting access.
  • the SMF is included in a 5G network.
  • Embodiments also include corresponding apparatus, computer programs, and carriers.
  • EAP rfc3748
  • UE user equipment
  • AAA authentication, authorization, and accounting
  • EAP payloads may be carried by the non-access stratum (NAS) protocol between the UE and the SMF.
  • NAS non-access stratum
  • the NAS protocol is the highest stratum of the control plane.
  • the NAS protocol may be split between NAS Mobility Management (NAS-MM), and NAS Session Management (NAS-SM), and the NAS-SM messages are carried over NAS-MM in a transparent container.
  • NAS-MM NAS Mobility Management
  • NAS-SM NAS Session Management
  • the SMF interacts with a backend AAA server possibly located in an external domain.
  • the EAP packets may be transported over AAA between the SMF and this external server in direct communication as for the Protocol Configuration Options (PCO) option or alternatively transparently over the user plane function (UPF).
  • PCO Protocol Configuration Options
  • UPF user plane function
  • EAP EAP Transport Layer Security
  • EAP-AKA EAP Authentication and Key Agreement
  • EAP-TTLS EAP Tunneled TLS
  • EAP Protected EAP EAP-PEAP
  • One or more embodiments are based on the encapsulation of the EAP messages in the NAS protocol and thus agnostic to the type of access network (AN).
  • Some embodiments are control plane based and therefore agnostic to the type of PDU session, i.e. Internet Protocol (IP), non-IP etc.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • non-IP Internet Protocol
  • EAP exchange would benefit from the protection of over the air interfaces provided by the NAS protocol. Additionally, the EAP exchange may result in the establishment of security keys to be used for e.g. the protection of the user plane towards the established Data Network.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a wireless communication network according to one or more embodiments.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a 5G network according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 3 is a call flow diagram for secondary authentication of a UE according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a protocol stack for exchanging EAP messages between a UE and AAA server according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of a protocol stack for exchanging EAP messages between an SMF and AAA server according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 6 is a logic flow diagram of a method performed by a user equipment according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 7 is a logic flow diagram of a method performed by a control plane function (e.g., SMF) according to some embodiments.
  • a control plane function e.g., SMF
  • FIG. 8 is a logic flow diagram of a method performed by an EAP server according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 9A is a block diagram of a user equipment according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 9B is a block diagram of a user equipment according to other embodiments.
  • FIG. 10A is a block diagram of control plane equipment according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 10B is a block diagram of control plane equipment according to other embodiments.
  • FIG. 11A is a block diagram of an EAP server according to some embodiments.
  • FIG. 11B is a block diagram of an EAP server according to other embodiments.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a wireless communication network (e.g., a 5G network) according to one or more embodiments.
  • the network includes an access network 12 and a core network.
  • the core network includes one or more control plane functions, one of which is shown as control plane function 14 .
  • the core network may include for instance one control plane function in the form of a session management function (SMF) responsible for session management and a separate control plane function in the form of an access and mobility management function (AMF) responsible for mobility management.
  • SMF session management function
  • AMF access and mobility management function
  • the core network also includes a user plane function 16 .
  • a user equipment 18 may request a session 20 (e.g., a user plane session or a packet data unit, PDU, session) with a data network 22 (e.g., that provides network operator services, Internet access, or 3 rd party services).
  • the data network 22 may be internal or external to the wireless communication network.
  • the user plane function 16 is configured to forward user plane traffic for this session, whereas the control plane function(s) are configured to control that session (e.g., via control signaling for that session).
  • One or more embodiments concern authentication of the user equipment 18 , e.g., authentication of the user equipment 18 to establish the session 20 with the data network 22 .
  • the authentication may be secondary in nature, in the sense that it is authentication that occurs in addition to other so-called primary authentication of the user equipment (e.g., which may use pre-provisioned credentials and/or be performed by a security anchor function).
  • the user equipment 12 requesting the session 20 with the data network 22 triggers such secondary authentication, e.g., after primary authentication. This secondary authentication may even be performed by, controlled by, and/or delegated to that data network 16 .
  • One or more embodiments herein exploit an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) between the user equipment 18 and a control plane function 14 (e.g., a session management function, SMF) in the core network, in order to provide the secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 .
  • the control plane function 14 in this regard may serve as an EAP authenticator 24 for the secondary authentication.
  • the user equipment 18 may in turn serve as a peer for EAP authentication.
  • control plane function 14 also serves as an EAP server that actually executes an EAP authentication method for the secondary authentication.
  • an EAP server 26 separate from the control plane function 14 executes an EAP authentication method for the EAP authenticator.
  • the EAP server 26 may for instance be located in the data network 22 as shown in FIG. 1 .
  • An EAP server 26 separate from the EAP authenticator may be referred to as a backend authentication server or simply authentication server.
  • EAP flexibly allows the control plane function 14 to act as a pass-through for some or all authentication methods that are supported by the EAP server 26 . This in turn allows secondary authentication to be delegated to the data network 22 in some embodiments.
  • the user equipment 18 may perform an authentication method or procedure with the EAP server 26 via, or as provided by, the control plane function 14 .
  • Such an EAP-based approach may prove advantageous in that it supports different types of authentication methods, is not reliant on IP connectivity or a particular type of access network, and/or is control plane based so as to keep separation between the control plane and the user plane.
  • the user equipment 18 and control plane function 14 may engage in an EAP authentication exchange. As shown in FIG. 1 , that exchange may involve the control plane function 14 transmitting an EAP request 28 to the user equipment 18 , and the user equipment 18 in turn receiving the EAP request 28 from the control plane function 14 .
  • This EAP request 28 may request any one of multiple different possible types of requestable information from the user equipment 18 (e.g., an identity, an MD5-challenge, etc.). The requested type of information may be indicated by a type field in the request 28 . In any event, the EAP request 28 may request information as part of negotiating which authentication method is to be used for secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 .
  • the user equipment 18 may transmit an EAP response 30 to the control plane function 14 (as EAP authenticator 24 ).
  • the EAP response 30 may for instance include the type of information indicated by the type field in the EAP request 28 .
  • One or more additional sequences of requests and responses may continue in a similar manner. Such may continue until the control plane function 14 as EAP authenticator cannot authenticate the user equipment 18 (e.g., due to an unacceptable EAP response to one or more EAP requests), or until the control plane function 14 as EAP authenticator determines that successful authentication has occurred.
  • the user equipment's transmitting of a request for establishment of the session 20 triggers the secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 .
  • a session establishment response may in turn be transmitted to the user equipment and include either an EAP success message indicating success of the secondary authentication or an EAP failure message indicating failure of the secondary authentication.
  • the EAP request 28 and EAP response 30 may be encapsulated within respective non-access stratum (NAS) protocol messages.
  • NAS in this regard may be the highest stratum of the control plane. So encapsulated, the EAP request 28 and EAP response 30 may be communicated between the user equipment 18 and the control plane function 14 no matter the type of the access network 12 .
  • the control plane function 14 may forward the EAP request 28 and EAP response 30 between the user equipment 18 and the EAP server 26 .
  • the control plane function 14 may for instance inspect EAP messages transmitted or received, in order to determine whether or where to forward those messages.
  • the EAP server 26 may transmit the EAP request 28 to the user equipment 18 via the control plane function 14 as EAP authenticator, and, responsive to the EAP request, may receive via the control plane function 14 the EAP response 30 from the user equipment 18 .
  • the EAP request 28 and the EAP response 30 are transmitted between the control plane function 14 and the EAP server 26 via the user plane function 16 , e.g., which may be selected by the control plane function 14 .
  • the user plane function 16 may serve as a proxy for the EAP server 26 .
  • the user plane function 16 serves as a router via which the EAP request 28 and EAP response 30 are transmitted transparently to the user plane function 16 .
  • These and other embodiments may therefore allow the wireless communication network to delegate to the data network 22 the secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 (e.g., for authenticating the user equipment's establishment of the session 20 with the data network 22 ).
  • the data network 22 implements the EAP server 26 that actually executes the authentication method used for such authentication, this may mean that the wireless communication network generically and flexibly supports different authentication methods.
  • the core network in some embodiments may comprise multiple different network slices respectively dedicated to different services.
  • the secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 may comprise slice-specific authentication of the user equipment 18 for accessing a specific network slice of the core network.
  • the wireless communication network may generically and flexibly support different authentication methods (e.g., which may be different for different network slices).
  • 5G aims (among other things) to separate the control plane from the user plane.
  • the control plane is responsible for control and transmission of signaling information, while the user plane is responsible for forwarding user traffic. Separating the control plane involves extracting the control plane functions from a gateway to leave a simpler, user-plane node.
  • a gateway thus is “split” into S/PGW-U and S/PGW-C components that can that can scale independently, where SGW-U is the component of a serving gateway (SGW) that handles user plane functions, PGW-U is the component of a packet gateway (PGW) that handles user plane functions, SGW-C is the component of a SGW that handles control plane functions, and PGW-C is the component of a PGW that handles control plane functions.
  • SGW-U serving gateway
  • PGW-U packet gateway
  • SGW-C is the component of a SGW that handles control plane functions
  • PGW-C is the component of a PGW that handles control plane functions.
  • 5G enables network function virtualization and software defined networking.
  • the 5G system architecture shall leverage service-based interactions between Control Plane (CP) network functions where identified.
  • CP Control Plane
  • 5G aims to modularize function design, e.g., to enable flexible and efficient network slicing. Further, wherever applicable, procedures (i.e., the set of interactions between network functions) are defined as services, so that their re-use is possible.
  • FIG. 2 in this regard depicts a baseline architecture for NG.
  • the architecture includes various network functions.
  • Control plane functions include a session management function (SMF), an access and mobility management function (AMF), a policy control function (PCF), an authentication server function (AUSF), and unified data management (UDM).
  • SMF session management function
  • AMF access and mobility management function
  • PCF policy control function
  • AUSF authentication server function
  • UDM unified data management
  • the SMF may include some or all of the following functionality. Some or all of the SMF functions may be supported in a single instance of an SMF.
  • SMF functionality includes session management (e.g. session establishment, modify and release, including tunnel maintain between UPF and access network node), UE IP address allocation & management (including optional authorization), selection and control of the UP function, configuration of traffic steering at UPF to route traffic to proper destination, termination of interfaces towards policy control functions, control of part of policy enforcement and quality of service (QoS), lawful intercept (for SM events and interface to lawful intercept system), termination of SM parts of NAS messages, downlink data notification, initiation of AN specific SM information, sent via AMF over N2 to AN, determination of service and session continuity (SSC) mode of a session (for IP type PDU session), roaming functionality, handling of local enforcement to apply QoS service level agreements (SLAs) (Visited public land mobile network, VPLMN), charging data collection and charging interface (VPLMN), lawful intercept (in
  • the Access and Mobility Management function may include some or all of the following functionality.
  • Some or all of the AMF functions may be supported in a single instance of a AMF: termination of radio access network (RAN) CP interface (N2), termination of NAS (N1), NAS ciphering and integrity protection, registration management, connection management, reachability management, mobility Management, lawful intercept (for AMF events and interface to LI System), transparent proxy for routing SM messages, access Authentication, access Authorization, security Anchor Function (SEA or SEAF), and security Context Management (SCM) which receives a key from the SEA that it uses to derive access-network specific keys.
  • RAN radio access network
  • N1 termination of NAS
  • NAS ciphering and integrity protection Registration management
  • connection management reachability management
  • mobility Management lawful intercept (for AMF events and interface to LI System)
  • transparent proxy for routing SM messages
  • SEA or SEAF security Anchor Function
  • SCM security Context Management
  • the SEA interacts with the authentication server function (AUSF) and the UE, and receives the intermediate key that was established as a result of the UE authentication process.
  • the AMF retrieves the security material from the AUSF.
  • a user plane function may include some or all of the following functionality. Some or all of the UPF functions may be supported in a single instance of a UPF: anchor point for Intra-/Inter-radio access technology (RAT) mobility (when applicable), external PDU session point of interconnect to Data Network, packet routing & forwarding, packet inspection and User plane part of Policy rule enforcement, lawful intercept (UP collection), traffic usage reporting., uplink classifier to support routing traffic flows to a data network, branching point to support multi-homed PDU session, QoS handling for user plane, e.g. packet filtering, gating, uplink/downlink rate enforcement, uplink Traffic verification (SDF to QoS flow mapping), transport level packet marking in the uplink and downlink, and downlink packet buffering and downlink data notification triggering.
  • RAT Intra-/Inter-radio access technology
  • UP collection lawful intercept
  • uplink classifier to support routing traffic flows to a data network
  • branching point to support multi-homed PDU session
  • Any of these network functions can be implemented either as a network element on a dedicated hardware, or as a software instance running on a dedicated hardware, or as a virtualized function instantiated on an appropriate platform, e.g. on a cloud infrastructure.
  • a Network Slice is basically an instance of a core network dedicated to providing a particular service. This will allow operators to handle this wide variety of new use cases each with different service requirements in terms of Quality of Service (QoS).
  • QoS Quality of Service
  • an operator could be running a slice for usual mobile broadband (MBB) services, in parallel with a mission critical slice for public safety services (mission critical push to talk, MCPTT) requiring very low latency and in parallel with an internet-of-things (IoT) slice for electricity meters with very low bandwidth.
  • MBB mobile broadband
  • IoT internet-of-things
  • Network slices To support diverse service types, operators will use multiple core networks deployed as “network slices” on a common IP services infrastructure.
  • the idea, shown in FIG. 2 is to create virtual core network instances (or “slices”) dedicated to different services.
  • Each slice can be optimized for the traffic profile and the commercial context of the associated service—for example, IoT, public safety, mobile virtual network operator (MVNO), connected car, voice over WiFi or enterprise services.
  • Network slices can be two dimensional in the sense that they can be both service- and customer-specific
  • NG Systems will provide connectivity to a wide range of new devices such as sensors, smart wearables, vehicles, machines, etc. Flexibility would be then a key property in NG Systems. This is reflected in the security requirement for network access that are mandating the support of alternative authentication methods and different types of credentials than the usual AKA credentials pre-provisioned by the operator and securely stored in the universal integrated circuit card (UICC). This would allow factory owners or enterprises to leverage their own identity and credential management systems for authentication and access network security.
  • UICC universal integrated circuit card
  • 5G may decouple the authentication and authorization procedures for accessing different network slices (NSs).
  • NSs network slices
  • One possible scenario is the following. In order for a NG-UE to access a particular NS, the operator may first run the primary (usual) authentication for initial network access towards AUSF/UDM via AMF, followed by a secondary NS-specific authentication possibly under the control of a 3rd party. This is assuming trust between the 3rd party service provider and the mobile network operator (MNO) who for example is offering access and transport services to this 3rd party in a dedicated network slice instance.
  • MNO mobile network operator
  • a so called Ciphered Option Request and the use of an information element called the Protocol Configuration Options (PCO) could be relevant for the scenario described above.
  • the PCO could transfer password authentication protocol (PAP)/challenge handshake authentication protocol (CHAP) usernames and passwords to the packet data network gateway (PDN-GW) which then runs them through an AAA server (potentially located in an external domain) for access authorization. Since this information is sensitive and needs to be protected, if the UE intends to send PCO which require ciphering (e.g., PAP/CHAP usernames and passwords), the UE shall set the Ciphered Options Transfer Flag in the Attach Request message and send the PCO only after authentication and NAS security setup have been completed.
  • PAP password authentication protocol
  • CHAP challenge handshake authentication protocol
  • AAA server potentially located in an external domain
  • EAP is specified in IETF RFC 3748.
  • EAP is an authentication framework which supports multiple authentication methods.
  • EAP is used to select a specific authentication mechanism, typically after the authenticator requests more information in order to determine the specific authentication method to be used. Rather than requiring the authenticator to be updated to support each new authentication method, EAP permits the use of a backend authentication server, which may implement some or all authentication methods, with the authenticator acting as a pass-through for some or all methods and peers.
  • the EAP protocol can support multiple authentication mechanisms without having to pre-negotiate a particular one.
  • an EAP authenticator is the end of the link initiating EAP authentication.
  • a peer is the end of the link that responds to the authenticator.
  • a backend authentication server is an entity that provides an authentication service to an authenticator. When used, this server typically executes EAP methods for the authenticator.
  • An EAP server is the entity that terminates the EAP authentication method with the peer. In the case where no backend authentication server is used, the EAP server is part of the authenticator. In the case where the authenticator operates in pass-through mode, the EAP server is located on the backend authentication server.
  • Successful authentication is an exchange of EAP messages, as a result of which the authentication decides to allow access by the peer, and the peer decides to use this access.
  • the authenticators decision typically involves both authentication and authorization aspects; the peer may successfully authenticate to the authenticator, but access may be denied by the authenticator due to policy reasons.
  • the EAP authentication exchange proceeds as follows.
  • the authenticator sends a Request to authenticate the peer.
  • the Request has a Type field to indicate what is being requested. Examples of Request Types include Identity, MD5-challenge, etc.
  • Request Types include Identity, MD5-challenge, etc.
  • the authenticator will send an initial Identity Request; however, an initial Identity Request is not required, and MAY be bypassed.
  • the peer sends a Response packet in reply to a valid Request.
  • the Response packet contains a Type field, which corresponds to the Type field of the Request.
  • the authenticator sends an additional Request packet, and the peer replies with a Response.
  • the sequence of Requests and Responses continues as long as needed.
  • the conversation continues until the authenticator cannot authenticate the peer (unacceptable Responses to one or more Requests), in which case the authenticator implementation MUST transmit an EAP Failure (Code 4).
  • the authentication conversation can continue until the authenticator determines that successful authentication has occurred, in which case the authenticator MUST transmit an EAP Success (Code 3).
  • an authenticator When operating as a “pass-through authenticator”, an authenticator performs checks on the Code, Identifier, and Length fields. It forwards EAP packets received from the peer and destined to its authenticator layer to the backend authentication server; packets received from the backend authentication server destined to the peer are forwarded to it.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates the flow of messages involving both a primary and a secondary authentication, using EAP, according to some embodiments.
  • Step 1 The UE sends a registration request.
  • Step 2 The primary authentication procedure is executed between the UE and the SEAF. Upon successful authentication, the primary identity (e.g. international mobile subscriber identifier, IMSI) is verified, and the next steps are executed.
  • the primary identity e.g. international mobile subscriber identifier, IMSI
  • Step 3 The NAS Security is set up, i.e., CP security. From now on all NAS messages are confidentiality and integrity protected.
  • Step 4 The handling of PDU session establishment request is done in two steps.
  • the UE sends the PDU session establishment request to AMF.
  • This message contains the primary identity and may optionally carry the secondary identity used later in the EAP secondary authentication.
  • the request is integrity and optionally confidentiality protected between the UE and AMF.
  • AMF verifies that the message originates from the UE that was authenticated in step 2 , and forwards it including the verified identity information.
  • the SMF receives a PDU session establishment request from the AMF. If the SMF has not run secondary authentication for the primary identity, and it has a local policy for authenticating the UEs, SMF must initiate the secondary authentication procedure.
  • the SMF also maintains a re-authentication policy, and if the received primary identity was authenticated by the SMF a very long time ago, it may need to initiate re-authentication.
  • Step 5 The secondary authentication procedure is performed between the UE and the external AAA via the SMF.
  • the SMF serves as EAP authenticator and the external AAA serves as EAP server.
  • the EAP messages are transported over the NAS-SM protocol, transparently to AMF. This may require the specification of new NAS-SM messages that may carry SM-EAP packets, e.g. SM-authentication-request and SM-authentication-response. If the PDU session establishment request carried the secondary identity of the UE, the SMF can skip the EAP-Identity request, and initiate the EAP authentication directly with the AAA server.
  • the EAP exchange over the air interface benefits from the protection at the NAS layer.
  • the secondary EAP authentication may optionally need to be bound to the channel it was run over, or otherwise there is a risk that a Man-in-the-middle tunnels EAP packets between the channels (e.g. if the same EAP method and credentials are used over various channels).
  • Channel binding can be done by taking channel related information (e.g. the primary identity used in step 2 assuming it may include information related to the access type or core network type or the network slice related information).
  • the channel related information is either used directly in the cryptographic operations within the secondary EAP authentication, or later when using the master key (i.e. master session key, MSK, or extended MSK, EMSK) created from the secondary authentication for some purposes.
  • the channel information may be one of the following: access network type (e.g. 5G radio, wireless local access network WLAN), the core network type (e.g. 5G core network) or the network slice type or identifier (e.g. Network Slice Selection Assistance Information NSSAI, SM-NSSAI or Data Network Name DNN).
  • MSK and EMSK master key
  • This key is used to create session keys e.g. integrity protection key or ciphering key.
  • Step 6 As the part of the AAA exchange, the external AAA server may indicate to the SMF a re-authentication policy. This could be e.g. the maximum time after which a new authentication is required.
  • the AAA exchange may also include the exchange of service/session authorization information to the SMF.
  • the AAA may provide the SMF with a service authorization profile (or service authorization profile identifier/token) from which the SMF will be able to determine if the requested service is authorized for the user, and if authorized in which way the service shall be offered in terms of e.g. Quality of Service, Quality of experience, charging, etc.
  • Step 7 The SMF optionally makes binding between primary identity and secondary identity, and stores that locally. When SMF sees a new request from AMF that carries the primary identity, it may trust that the messages originate from the same UE that has the secondary identity.
  • Step 8 After successful authentication and authorization, the SMF will select a User Plane Function, UPF, for the user plane related to the service being requested.
  • UPF User Plane Function
  • Step 9 The SMF sends back a PDU session establishment response depending on the outcome of the secondary authentication.
  • This message may carry the final EAP message, i.e. PDU session establishment accept may carry EAP Success or PDU session establishment failure may carry EAP Failure.
  • the SMF endorses the role of the EAP authenticator and may rely on a backend AAA server in the data network, possibly in another security domain, e.g. controlled by a 3rd party. Then it is left open how the AAA messages are transported between the SMF and the AAA server. Different possibilities exist.
  • the AAA messages are transported via a direct interface between SMF and the AAA similarly as in the EPC PCO solution. This interface is established based on business agreements when the AAA is controlled by a 3rd party.
  • FIG. 4 shows the protocol architecture for the support of the EAP based secondary authentication with a direct interface between the SMF and the AAA server (called XX). On the UE to SMF side, it shows a possibility on how the EAP messages are carried over the NAS protocol.
  • the AAA messages are transferred transparently over NG4-NG6 interfaces through the UPF.
  • the UPF could endorse the role of a AAA proxy or even simpler, an IP router.
  • the SMF will execute step 8 before the AAA exchange in step 5 of FIG. 3 so it is possible to handle the AAA exchange via the selected UPF.
  • FIG. 5 shows the support of the EAP based secondary authentication where the EAP messages are transported through the UPF over the NG4-NG6 interfaces. That is, NG4-NG6 interfaces are used transparently to carry AAA messages between SMF and AAA server.
  • the UPF could act as an IP router so that the AAA exchange between the SMF and the AAA server is transparent to the UPF.
  • the UPF may actually act as an AAA proxy.
  • the SMF may act as the EAP server and in such case there is no need for interaction with an external AAA server at all.
  • the primary identity and secondary identity are the same or related to each other e.g. (a part of) the primary identity is encoded into the secondary identity.
  • the credentials used for authentication can still be different.
  • the secondary authentication could be used for an additional authorization controlled by an external party upon the UE's request for the establishment of specific or additional PDU sessions.
  • Other use cases related to the UP protection and slicing are described in the following clauses.
  • User plane protection First, should protection of the UP traffic be terminated in an UPF, the following assumption is made. A user plane protection between the UE and an UPF is implemented via an additional protocol layer independently of the protection over the NGU interface between the UE and the access network.
  • the secondary authentication could be used to establish the necessary keys.
  • the resulting MSK key shared between the SMF (EAP authenticator) and the UE (peer) could be used for this particular purpose.
  • the secondary authentication could be used for Network Slice specific authorization.
  • the UE upon successful primary authentication via a certain AMF, the UE could potentially be provided services via all the Network Slices served by that particular AMF. It could be the case that the UE is automatically authorized to access all or some of the slices based on subscriptions information.
  • the authorization could be enforced on a slice specific basis using the secondary authentication during the creation of a PDU session for a particular slice.
  • FIG. 6 illustrates a method for secondary authentication of a user equipment 18 configured for use in a wireless communication network, e.g., that comprises an access network 12 and a core network, according to some embodiments.
  • the method is performed by the user equipment 18 .
  • the method may comprise receiving, by the user equipment 18 , an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) request 28 from a control plane function 14 that is in the core network (e.g., an SMF) and that is serving as an EAP authenticator 24 for secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 (Block 100 ).
  • the secondary authentication may be authentication of the user equipment 18 in addition to primary authentication of the user equipment 18 .
  • the method may also comprise, responsive to the EAP request 28 , transmitting an EAP response 30 from the user equipment 18 to the control plane function 14 (e.g., SMF) (Block 110 ).
  • the control plane function 14 e.g., SMF
  • FIG. 7 illustrates a corresponding method performed by the control plane function 14 (S.f., SMF).
  • the method may comprise transmitting an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) request 28 from a control plane function 14 (e.g., SMF) to a user equipment 18 , wherein the control plane function 14 is in the core network and is serving as an EAP authenticator 24 for secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 (Block 200 ). Again, the secondary authentication may be authentication of the user equipment 18 in addition to primary authentication of the user equipment 18 .
  • the method may also comprise, responsive to the EAP request 28 , receiving at the control plane function 14 an EAP response 30 from the user equipment 18 (Block 210 ).
  • control plane function 14 is also serving as an EAP server that executes an EAP authentication method for the secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 .
  • control plane function 14 may serve as a pass-through-authenticator that forwards the EAP request 28 and the EAP response 30 between the user equipment 18 and an EAP server 26 (separate from the EAP authenticator) that executes an EAP authentication method for the EAP authenticator.
  • FIG. 8 in this regard illustrates a method performed by an EAP server 26 for secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 .
  • the method may comprise transmitting an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) request 28 from an EAP server 26 to a user equipment 18 via a control plane function 14 (e.g., SMF) (Block 300 ).
  • the control plane function in this regard is in the core network and is serving as a pass-through EAP authenticator for secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 .
  • the secondary authentication may be authentication of the user equipment 18 in addition to primary authentication of the user equipment 18 .
  • the EAP server 26 may be configured to execute an EAP authentication method for the EAP authenticator 24 .
  • the method may further comprise, responsive to the EAP request 28 , receiving at the EAP server 26 via the control plane function 14 an EAP response 30 from the user equipment 18 (Block 310 ).
  • the EAP server 26 is in a data network 22 with which the user equipment 18 requests a user plane session.
  • the secondary authentication of the user equipment 18 may be authentication of the user equipment 18 to establish the user plane session 20 .
  • the secondary authentication is delegated by the wireless communication network to the data network 22 .
  • a network node herein is any type of node in the AN 14 (e.g., a base station) or core network. Where the network node is a radio network node in the AN, the node may be capable of communicating with another node over radio signals.
  • a wireless device is any type device capable of communicating with a radio network node over radio signals.
  • a wireless device may therefore refer to a machine-to-machine (M2M) device, a machine-type communications (MTC) device, a NB-IoT device, etc.
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • MTC machine-type communications
  • NB-IoT device a NB-IoT device
  • the wireless device may also be a UE, however it should be noted that the UE does not necessarily have a “user” in the sense of an individual person owning and/or operating the device.
  • a wireless device may also be referred to as a radio device, a radio communication device, a wireless terminal, or simply a terminal—unless the context indicates otherwise, the use of any of these terms is intended to include device-to-device UEs or devices, machine-type devices or devices capable of machine-to-machine communication, sensors equipped with a wireless device, wireless-enabled table computers, mobile terminals, smart phones, laptop-embedded equipped (LEE), laptop-mounted equipment (LME), USB dongles, wireless customer-premises equipment (CPE), etc.
  • LOE laptop-embedded equipped
  • LME laptop-mounted equipment
  • CPE wireless customer-premises equipment
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • MTC machine-type communication
  • wireless sensor and sensor may also be used. It should be understood that these devices may be UEs, but are generally configured to transmit and/or receive data without direct human interaction.
  • a wireless communication device as described herein may be, or may be comprised in, a machine or device that performs monitoring or measurements, and transmits the results of such monitoring measurements to another device or a network.
  • machines are power meters, industrial machinery, or home or personal appliances, e.g. refrigerators, televisions, personal wearables such as watches etc.
  • a wireless communication device as described herein may be comprised in a vehicle and may perform monitoring and/or reporting of the vehicle's operational status or other functions associated with the vehicle.
  • the user equipment 18 herein may perform the processing herein by implementing any functional means or units.
  • the user equipment 18 comprises respective circuits configured to perform the steps shown in FIG. 6 .
  • the circuits in this regard may comprise circuits dedicated to performing certain functional processing and/or one or more microprocessors in conjunction with memory.
  • memory which may comprise one or several types of memory such as read-only memory (ROM), random-access memory, cache memory, flash memory devices, optical storage devices, etc.
  • the memory stores program code that, when executed by the one or more microprocessors, carries out the techniques described herein. That is, in some embodiments memory of the user equipment 18 contains instructions executable by the processing circuitry whereby the user equipment 18 is configured to carry out the processing herein.
  • FIG. 9A illustrates additional details of a user equipment 18 in accordance with one or more embodiments.
  • the user equipment 18 includes processing circuitry 410 and communication circuitry 420 (e.g., one or more radio circuits).
  • the communication circuitry 420 may be configured to transmit via one or more antennas, which may be internal and/or external to the user equipment 18 .
  • the processing circuitry 410 is configured to perform processing described above, e.g., in FIG. 6 , such as by executing instructions stored in memory 430 .
  • the processing circuitry 410 in this regard may implement certain functional means or units.
  • FIG. 9B in this regard illustrates additional details of a user equipment 18 in accordance with one or more other embodiments.
  • the user equipment 18 may include a receiving unit or module 440 for receiving the EAP request 28 and a transmitting unit or module 450 for transmitting the EAP response 30 .
  • These units or modules may be implemented by the processing circuitry 410 in FIG. 9A .
  • control plane function 14 may be provided or implemented by control plane equipment in the control plane.
  • Control plane equipment in this regard may include one or more control plane nodes. Multiple distributed control plane nodes may for instance host or implement the control plane function 14 in a distributed manner. Alternatively, a single control plane node may host or implement the control plane function 14 in a centralized manner.
  • Control plane equipment herein may perform the processing herein of control plane function 14 by implementing any functional means or units.
  • the control plane equipment comprises respective circuits configured to perform the steps shown in FIG. 7 .
  • the circuits in this regard may comprise circuits dedicated to performing certain functional processing and/or one or more microprocessors in conjunction with memory.
  • memory which may comprise one or several types of memory such as read-only memory (ROM), random-access memory, cache memory, flash memory devices, optical storage devices, etc.
  • the memory stores program code that, when executed by the one or more microprocessors, carries out the techniques described herein. That is, in some embodiments memory of the control plane equipment contains instructions executable by the processing circuitry whereby the control plane equipment is configured to carry out the processing herein.
  • FIG. 10A illustrates additional details of control plane equipment 500 in accordance with one or more embodiments.
  • the control plane equipment 500 includes processing circuitry 510 and communication circuitry 520 .
  • the communication circuitry 520 may be configured to communicate with user equipment 18 , e.g., via one or more defined interfaces.
  • the processing circuitry 510 is configured to perform processing described above, e.g., in FIG. 7 , such as by executing instructions stored in memory 530 .
  • the processing circuitry 510 in this regard may implement certain functional means or units.
  • FIG. 10B in this regard illustrates additional details of control plane equipment 500 in accordance with one or more other embodiments.
  • the control plane equipment 500 may include a receiving unit or module 540 for receiving the EAP response 30 and a transmitting unit or module 5 for transmitting the EAP request 28 .
  • These units or modules may be implemented by the processing circuitry 510 in FIG. 10A .
  • the EAP server 26 (also referred to as a backend authentication server or authentication server) herein may perform the processing herein by implementing any functional means or units.
  • the EAP server 26 comprises respective circuits configured to perform the steps shown in FIG. 8 .
  • the circuits in this regard may comprise circuits dedicated to performing certain functional processing and/or one or more microprocessors in conjunction with memory.
  • memory which may comprise one or several types of memory such as read-only memory (ROM), random-access memory, cache memory, flash memory devices, optical storage devices, etc.
  • the memory stores program code that, when executed by the one or more microprocessors, carries out the techniques described herein. That is, in some embodiments memory of the EAP server 26 contains instructions executable by the processing circuitry whereby the authentication server 26 is configured to carry out the processing herein.
  • FIG. 11A illustrates additional details of an a EAP server 26 in accordance with one or more embodiments.
  • the EAP server 26 includes processing circuitry 610 and communication circuitry 620 .
  • the communication circuitry 620 may be configured to communicate with the user equipment 18 and/or the control plane function 14 , e.g., via one or more defined interfaces.
  • the processing circuitry 610 is configured to perform processing described above, e.g., in FIG. 8 , such as by executing instructions stored in memory 630 .
  • the processing circuitry 610 in this regard may implement certain functional means or units.
  • FIG. 11B in this regard illustrates additional details of an EAP server 26 in accordance with one or more other embodiments.
  • the EAP server 26 may include a receiving unit or module 640 for receiving the EAP response 30 and a transmitting unit or module 650 for transmitting the EAP request 28 .
  • These units or modules may be implemented by the processing circuitry 610 in FIG. 11A .
  • a computer program comprises instructions which, when executed on at least one processor (e.g., of a user equipment 18 , control plane equipment 500 , or EAP server 26 ), cause the processor to carry out any of the respective processing described above.
  • a computer program in this regard may comprise one or more code modules corresponding to the means or units described above.
  • Embodiments further include a carrier containing such a computer program.
  • This carrier may comprise one of an electronic signal, optical signal, radio signal, or computer readable storage medium.

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