US10831919B2 - Method for confidentially querying an encrypted database - Google Patents
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- US10831919B2 US10831919B2 US15/767,885 US201615767885A US10831919B2 US 10831919 B2 US10831919 B2 US 10831919B2 US 201615767885 A US201615767885 A US 201615767885A US 10831919 B2 US10831919 B2 US 10831919B2
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 30
- 239000011159 matrix material Substances 0.000 claims description 35
- 230000014509 gene expression Effects 0.000 claims description 12
- 239000000654 additive Substances 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000000996 additive effect Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000010276 construction Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000005192 partition Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000000605 extraction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 description 1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
- G06F21/6227—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database where protection concerns the structure of data, e.g. records, types, queries
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of confidential querying an encrypted database.
- the invention uses the fully homomorphic encryption or FHE (full homomorphic encryption) or the partially homomorphic encryption or SWHE (somewhat homomorphic encryption). It applies more particularly to a cloud computing environment.
- a fully homomorphic encryption or FHE is an asymmetric encryption
- Enc pk public key pk
- X is the space of clear messages (called simply clear space)
- Y is the space of encrypted messages (called simply space encrypted)
- a cryptosystem is defined by a pair of an encryption function Enc(.) and a decryption function Dec(.).
- a fully homomorphic encryption is used to calculate any combination of addition and multiplication operations on plain messages from corresponding operations on encrypted messages.
- the additive operation is an exclusive OR and a multiplicative AND operation. It is then possible to perform logical operations on Boolean values from corresponding operations on their numerical values.
- the article by S. Wang cited proposes calculating an encrypted Boolean for each record in the database, this Boolean indicating whether the record in question satisfied or not at the request of the user.
- the server does not know the number of records satisfying the query, the user provides it an upper bound M′, the number of records that can be returned to him, as well as a result of quality parameter ⁇ .
- the server uses a fixed size buffer B proportional to ⁇ M′ wherein it stores records, each record of the buffer being stored randomly among ⁇ positions of the buffer.
- a record that does not meet the request is stored as a null numerical value ( 0 ) and therefore has no influence on decryption.
- a record corresponding to the request is stored and can be decrypted if it does not collide with another record.
- This probabilistic approach is however not entirely satisfactory since the server response may not be exhaustive, the degree of completeness depending on the quality parameter ⁇ .
- the M. Mani et al. article entitled “Enabling secure database as a service using fully homomorphic properties: challenges and opportunities” published in arXiv preprint, 13 Feb. 2013, pp. 1-13 proposes calculating an encrypted Boolean for each record in the database, as above, and then to proceed in two steps.
- the service provider server determines the number M of records corresponding to the query (number of “hits”) by summing the encrypted Booleans, and transmits it to the user.
- the latter decrypts the number and requests the server to transmit M′>M first records.
- the number M′ is transmitted in plaintext.
- the server orders as confidential records according to the values quantified Boolean, i.e. M′ first records of the table and ordered contain M satisfying records to the query. This method allows to hide the number M of records corresponding to the result.
- This method of confidential querying preserves confidentiality of results but has the disadvantage of requiring a schedule of the whole database for each request.
- the object of the present invention is therefore to provide a confidential querying method of a database encrypted by encryption homomorphic totally or partially homomorphic, which overcomes all or part of the aforementioned drawbacks, in particular having a high degree privacy without significant increase in computational complexity.
- the present invention is defined by a method of confidential querying a database hosted by a server, records the database containing a table, each record being obtained by means of a homomorphic encryption totally or partially of homomorphic clear values, in which:
- the user receives the container, decrypts the contents of each location, and determines whether the container is full or not;
- step (f2) if the container is not full, the user gets the response to said query from the records stored in the containers received and decrypted in step(s) (e).
- the table of records is advantageously represented by a matrix T with a size of N ⁇ P where N is the number of records in the table and P the number of fields of these records, an encrypted element ⁇ of the matrix being obtained from the plaintext value
- the predicate is evaluated on various records, typically by means of additive ⁇ and multiplicative ⁇ operations on the encrypted elements.
- the database is partitioned into portions with a size of N/L with the possible exception of a portion, steps (c), (d), (e), (f1)-(f2) being carried out in series or in parallel, on each of said base portions.
- the fully homomorphic encryption method can use such a Brakerski cryptosystem.
- FIG. 1 schematically illustrates the implementation of a confidential querying method according to one embodiment of the invention
- FIG. 2 shows a flow chart of the construction of containers for confidential querying method according to one embodiment of the invention
- FIG. 3 schematically shows a flow chart of the confidential querying method of a database according to an embodiment of the invention.
- the encryption method is fully homomorphic. It will be understood, in fact, that one can always choose a method for partially homomorphic encryption insofar as it can calculate combinations of operations of multiplication and addition on plaintext elements with sufficient depth.
- a server is shown in 110 , for example a cloud service provider.
- This server hosts a database 130 , such as a relational database.
- the database includes a table T (e.g., a relationship in a relational database) consisting of N encrypted records. More specifically, each record includes fields P and each field is encrypted by means of a completely homomorphic cryptosystem as explained below.
- Each record can be considered a P-uple numerical values or equivalently as a vector of size P whose elements are encrypted.
- the table T can be considered as a matrix of size N ⁇ P of encrypted elements, rows corresponding to different records and columns to different fields.
- Each bit a q is encrypted using the aforementioned completely homomorphic cryptosystem, e.g. the Brakerski cryptosystem of which a description is found in the article by Z. Brakerski et al. entitled “(Leveled) fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping” published in Proc. of ITCS 2012, pp. 309-325.
- Dec( ⁇ ) will be called, in a stretch of the meaning of the term, “decrypted” of ⁇ .
- a user transmits to the server a request, R, such as a SQL (Structured Query Language) query generally comprising a predicate, i.e. a logical expression involving one or more field(s) of the table T and can take, according to the records, a true or false value.
- R such as a SQL (Structured Query Language) query generally comprising a predicate, i.e. a logical expression involving one or more field(s) of the table T and can take, according to the records, a true or false value.
- the server evaluates the predicate (i.e. calculates its logical value) on the different records of the table T and forms a vector r with a size of N the elements of which are Boolean elements representing logical values thus obtained. It is essential to note that the evaluation of predicates is performed on encrypted and plaintext elements, and that the Boolean elements yielding logic values of different records are encrypted. In other words, the server cannot distinguish in the table the records corresponding to a true value and those corresponding to a false value of the predicate. Note that the server has more access to the number of results, that is to say the number of M records resulting in a true value of the predicate.
- the method of confidential querying implements a container, also known as bucket of fixed size, which may contain up to K records, by means of which the results of the query are returned to the user.
- the server examines all the records in the table and transfers blindly to the container those that satisfy the query, that is, those for which the value of the predicate is true.
- the blind transfer is done by means of a detailed allocation operation further along. It ensures that the server (or a malicious third party making an attack on the server) cannot determine the actual records transferred into the container.
- the locations of the container in which a record has not been transferred contain numerical values 0 (conventionally indicating that the slot is empty).
- the server can determine in advance the number ⁇ tilde over (m) ⁇ of containers since the M number of results is not revealed to him. For each container B m received, the user decrypts the content on different locations of the container. If the user reaches a place containing only 0 it then knows that it has obtained all the results. Otherwise, if such a location is not detected, the user back to the server a continuation request, RC m .
- the transfer of results is thus by passage of containers (or buckets) on user request.
- the server indirectly knows the number of containers transferred to a query, i.e. the value ⁇ tilde over (m) ⁇ but only knows the number of results within a number K ⁇ 1 of records.
- the initial request R to the user and its successive continuation requests RC m , m 1, . . . , ⁇ tilde over (m) ⁇ 1.
- the server evaluates the predicate on all the records of the table T .
- ⁇ and ⁇ may be used.
- the logic of a predicate value can be obtained from ⁇ and ⁇ operations on the encrypted elements of a record. For example, we found the calculation of a comparison predicate in the aforementioned article by M. Mani et al.
- the codeword ⁇ is assigned to V if c is a number between 1 and the codeword B is assigned to V if c is an encrypted element of 0. It is important to note that this allocation is performed blindly, that is to say that the server calculating the expression (7) has no way to determine which of the words ⁇ and B is effectively assigned to V . Indeed, in the absence of the decryption key, the server does not know if c is a number from 1 or 0.
- the codeword assigned is changed by calculating the expression (7), n is not possible to infer the assignment of a simple comparison of V with ⁇ and B .
- the server performing the calculation of the expression (9) would not know which element to determine the vector v the encrypted word ⁇ would be assigned.
- the assignment may concern an entire row or entire column of matrix H .
- the assignment operation Aff_row makes it possible for the server to blindly extract records satisfying the user query and load them in successive containers as explained in relation to FIG. 2 .
- This container can be considered as a matrix B with a size of K ⁇ P.
- K is the number of records that can be stored in the container and P the number of fields.
- the matrix B is initialized by the matrix 0 K ⁇ p all the elements of which are null.
- the index n last (m ⁇ 1) ⁇ K the index of the last record transmitted to the user is determined.
- the server knows indeed that it has already sent records satisfying the query to the user. It should be noted, however, that the server does not know where the last record is found in the table T .
- the index k is only increased (in a hidden manner) to the extent that the i th record is both a satisfactory recording to the application and is intended to be stored in the current container.
- the user request R here is to retrieve all records from the base starting from byte (encrypted) 192 .
- table T is composed of five records composed of four fields, namely:
- the first column provides the indices of the records, the penultimate contains the encrypted Boolean r i and the last encrypted Boolean i dx .
- the first container returned by the server is as follows:
- the user Upon receipt of this container, the user decrypts the (fields of the) different records stored therein. As the user does not detect any null row, it transmits a first continuation request of the RC 1 server. It rescans the five records in the table and only transfers to the second container those that have not already been stored in the first. The server then constructs the second container:
- the user decrypts the (field of the) different recordings and detects a null row, i.e. comprising only encrypted null values. It is concluded therefrom that all records satisfying the query have already been transmitted to it.
- the above described container construction method ensures that the server has access to an upper bound on the number of results ( ⁇ tilde over (m) ⁇ K).
- the ambiguity about the number of results would be the maximum but the number of records transmitted unnecessarily would also be a maximum (N ⁇ M). However, in a small-sized K container, the ambiguity on the number of results would be lower but the number of unnecessarily transmitted recordings would also be smaller ( ⁇ tilde over (m) ⁇ M).
- each container required the entire table T to be scanned.
- the extraction procedure is applied to each portion of the table.
- the complexity of constructing a container is reduced by a factor L.
- the transfer of results mobilizes at least L times more communication resources to the extent that the L table portions will be scanned at least once each.
- K container size and partition factor L is a compromise between the required degree of ambiguity, available computing resources and communications resources.
- FIG. 3 A flowchart is schematically shown in FIG. 3 of a confidential querying method of a database according to an embodiment of the invention.
- the user transmits a request (R) comprising a predicate to the server.
- the server constructs a container B m comprising a predetermined number K of locations and blindly stores at these locations the records satisfying the predicate not previously transmitted to the user.
- the construction of the container is carried out as explained above in relation to FIG. 2 .
- the server transmits to the user the container B m .
- the user decrypts the content of each location of the container B m , in other words, each element of the matrix B .
- step 360 the user determines if a null row is present or not in the container B m . It is thus deduced whether the container is full or not.
- the processing of the request ends in 375 .
- the user transmits to the server a continuation request RC m in 380 and increments the index of the container, m, in 385 before returning to step 330 .
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Abstract
Description
Enc pk : X→Y
∀a,b∈X,Enc pk(a+b)=Enc pk(a)⊕Enc pk(b) (1-1)
∀a,b∈X,Enc pk(a·b)=Enc pk(a)⊗Enc pk(b) (1-2)
where X is the space of clear messages (called simply clear space) and Y is the space of encrypted messages (called simply space encrypted), + and are respectively an additive and a multiplicative operation in space clear giving X a ring structure (X, +, ·), ⊕ and ⊗ are corresponding operations in space encrypted giving a structure of (Y, ⊕, ⊗). It is understood from the expressions (1-1) and (1-2) that the application Encpk of (X, +, ·) in (Y, ⊕, ⊗) is a ring homomorphism.
Dec sk(Enc pk(m,r))=m (2)
Dec[ā⊕
Dec[ā⊗
wherein aq, q=0, . . . , Q−1 are the plaintext value bits and aq, q=0, . . . , Q−1 are their corresponding encrypted obtained by said totally or partially homomorphic encryption.
indiscriminately affecting the
the space of the plaintext consisting of binary values {0,1}, in other words X=Z/2Z. Each bit aq is encrypted using the aforementioned completely homomorphic cryptosystem, e.g. the Brakerski cryptosystem of which a description is found in the article by Z. Brakerski et al. entitled “(Leveled) fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping” published in Proc. of ITCS 2012, pp. 309-325. The encrypted value
Ā≡
Ā will be called, in a stretch of the meaning of the term, “encrypted” of A.
Dec(
Dec(
Dec(
where
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Claims (10)
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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FR1559774 | 2015-10-14 | ||
FR1559774A FR3042625B1 (en) | 2015-10-14 | 2015-10-14 | METHOD OF CONFIDENTIAL INTERROGATION OF A DATABASED DATABASE |
PCT/EP2016/074386 WO2017064085A1 (en) | 2015-10-14 | 2016-10-12 | Method for confidentially querying an encrypted database |
Publications (2)
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US20180300497A1 US20180300497A1 (en) | 2018-10-18 |
US10831919B2 true US10831919B2 (en) | 2020-11-10 |
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US15/767,885 Active 2037-04-23 US10831919B2 (en) | 2015-10-14 | 2016-10-12 | Method for confidentially querying an encrypted database |
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US (1) | US10831919B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP3363143B1 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2800038T3 (en) |
FR (1) | FR3042625B1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2017064085A1 (en) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US11461551B1 (en) * | 2018-10-23 | 2022-10-04 | Private AI Inc. | Secure word search |
Families Citing this family (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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EP3270321B1 (en) * | 2016-07-14 | 2020-02-19 | Kontron Modular Computers SAS | Technique for securely performing an operation in an iot environment |
US10546032B2 (en) * | 2017-11-21 | 2020-01-28 | International Business Machines Corporation | System and method for association rule mining from encrypted databases |
US11032061B2 (en) * | 2018-04-27 | 2021-06-08 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Enabling constant plaintext space in bootstrapping in fully homomorphic encryption |
US11764940B2 (en) | 2019-01-10 | 2023-09-19 | Duality Technologies, Inc. | Secure search of secret data in a semi-trusted environment using homomorphic encryption |
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US20160283728A1 (en) * | 2015-03-26 | 2016-09-29 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Database server and client for query processing on encrypted data |
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-
2015
- 2015-10-14 FR FR1559774A patent/FR3042625B1/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2016
- 2016-10-12 EP EP16784814.2A patent/EP3363143B1/en active Active
- 2016-10-12 WO PCT/EP2016/074386 patent/WO2017064085A1/en active Application Filing
- 2016-10-12 US US15/767,885 patent/US10831919B2/en active Active
- 2016-10-12 ES ES16784814T patent/ES2800038T3/en active Active
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Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US11461551B1 (en) * | 2018-10-23 | 2022-10-04 | Private AI Inc. | Secure word search |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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EP3363143B1 (en) | 2020-03-18 |
EP3363143A1 (en) | 2018-08-22 |
FR3042625B1 (en) | 2017-12-15 |
FR3042625A1 (en) | 2017-04-21 |
WO2017064085A1 (en) | 2017-04-20 |
US20180300497A1 (en) | 2018-10-18 |
ES2800038T3 (en) | 2020-12-23 |
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