TWI254204B - Method of confirming the identity/act of dynamic security - Google Patents
Method of confirming the identity/act of dynamic security Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- TWI254204B TWI254204B TW91103120A TW91103120A TWI254204B TW I254204 B TWI254204 B TW I254204B TW 91103120 A TW91103120 A TW 91103120A TW 91103120 A TW91103120 A TW 91103120A TW I254204 B TWI254204 B TW I254204B
- Authority
- TW
- Taiwan
- Prior art keywords
- password
- identity
- digits
- security
- host
- Prior art date
Links
Landscapes
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
Abstract
Description
1254204 1月6日修(¾正替换頁 .. .案號 91103120 一一年-^·-β~^ 修正 五、發明說明(1) 〔本發明所涉及之領域〕 本發明有關於一種動態安全之身份/行為確認方法, 它可以使歹徒無法竊取完整的密碼而達到防止盜錄及竊奪 的目的,大幅提高身份/行為確認上之安全性。 〔發明之動機〕 自從早期的人類發明以物易物的方式換取自己生活所 需物品以來,人類開始進入商業貿易的時代,後來發明了 貨幣’更讓商業的行為由以物易物的時代進入以金易物的 時代。隨著貨幣型式的演進,逐漸發展到以鈔易物的今 曰二但是以鈔易物的方式產生了大筆鈔票攜帶上的不便與 才皮指奪的危險。此外,不論政府的鈔票製版技術與印刷技 ί如:的進步,同樣地,歹徒也能利用相同的進步技術偽 k出成可亂真的偽鈔,造成社會的恐慌與交易秩序的大 亂0 與金融業 的時代進 易的方式 然而 安全性不 弱點與馨 發卡銀行 例如 設偽裝的 來電腦 者發展 入塑膠 ’人類 不論是 足的問 覺性不 與持卡 新聞曾 提款機 網路的發展 出金融卡與 貨幣的時代 更將逐漸進 金融卡與信 題。歹徒始 足的持卡者 者造成極大 經報導過的 ,警覺性不 *** 。最近 入電子 用卡, 終有辦 ’遂行 的損失 盜卡事 足的持 大的便捷性,銀行業者 ’人類的交易又從鈔票 幾年來更發展出網路交 化交易的時代。 在使用上仍然都存在著 去利用目前交易系統的 其不法掠奪之能事,讓 〇 Μ ’歹徒在超市旁邊偷 卡者誤以為是真實的提1254204 January 6th repair (3⁄4 positive replacement page ..... Case number 91103120 one year - ^·-β~^ Amendment 5, invention description (1) [Field of the invention] The present invention relates to a dynamic security The identity/behavior confirmation method, which can prevent the gangsters from stealing the complete password to prevent theft and theft, and greatly improve the security of identity/behavior confirmation. [Motion of invention] Since the early human invention Since the exchange of things in exchange for the items needed for their own lives, humans began to enter the era of commercial trade, and later invented the currency's more commercial behavior from the era of barter to the era of gold barter. With the currency type The evolution has gradually evolved to the point where the banknotes are easy to use, but in the way of banknotes, the inconvenience of carrying large amounts of banknotes and the dangers of the skins are in danger. In addition, regardless of the government's banknote making technology and printing technology, : The progress, in the same way, the gangsters can also use the same progressive technology to make false counterfeit banknotes, causing social panic and chaos in the trading order. The way, however, the security is not weak and the Xinfa card bank, for example, the camouflage come to the computer to develop into the plastic 'humanity, regardless of the foot's questioning ability, not with the card card, the cash machine network, the development of the financial card and currency era will be more Gradually enter the financial card and the letter of the letter. The cardholders who started the gangsters have caused great reports, and they are not aware of credit cards. Recently, they have entered the electronic card, and they have the convenience of doing the loss of the card. Sex, the banker's human transaction has evolved from the banknotes to the era of Internet transactions in the past few years. In use, there are still some unscrupulous abilities to use the current trading system, so that the 歹 歹The card reader next to the supermarket mistakenly thought it was a real mention.
1254204 五、發明說明(2) 款機,將金融 致使偽裝的提 开欠岔碼,輕 將持卡者的存 時何地被盜錄 事件發生,除 外,一旦被盜 被盜領。 目前最常 使用過程中被 或不肖員工在 簽帳卡刷過刷 錄下,並據此 銀行與持卡者 ’肖費場所、商 題十分嚴重而 事後也難以追 加密碼的確認 樣可以利用偷 在許多政 特殊場所,須 者進出管制場 等等方法以確 方法也同樣會 案號 91103120 修正1254204 V. INSTRUCTIONS (2) The machine will cause the financial to cause the disguise to raise the owing weight, and lightly arrest the cardholder's whereabouts, and then, if stolen, the stolen collar. At present, the most frequently used or unscrupulous employees have swiped the credit card in the charge card, and according to the bank and the cardholders, the location of the business is very serious, and it is difficult to add a password afterwards. Many political special places, those who need to enter and exit the control field, etc., will also be corrected by the case number 91103120.
卡***其中, 款機輕鬆地盜 易地偽造出一 款盜走,持卡 ,只誤認為是 了持卡者的警 錄’目前的金 知情地輸入提款密碼, =|融卡之+號與持卡者的 真的偽卡,並輕易: 描±…、不知其卡號與密竭何 i::故障而已。,防犯此種 ^提兩,以避免被盜錄以 融糸統無法阻止持卡者的存款 發生的 盜錄〔 刷卡機 卡機時 偽造^— 之雙方 店,在 且難以 查到真 t是徒 骏的側 府、機 對所有 所,也 1忍進出 產生密 問題還 即側錄 上偷裝 ,同時 張簽帳 才貝失。 監管不 防犯, 凶。此 勞無功 錄機輕 關、研 進出人 不外乎 人員之 碼被盜 是在簽 〕的問 側錄機 將簽帳 卡,任 由於刷 易的限 即使偽 外,縱 。因為 易地錄 究機構 員進行 是以刷 身份, 錄的問 帳卡[ 題最為 ,在銷 卡上之 意消費 卡機普 制下, 刷消費 使在信 不肖廢 下持卡 或民營 管制, 卡方式 以便加 題,導 "ίσ 用卡 嚴重。 貨員將 秘密資 簽帳, 遍設置 加裝側 行為已 用消費 商或不 者的密 機構等 以防止 、輸入 以管制 致其安The card is inserted into it, the machine easily pirates and falsifies a stolen, card, and only mistakenly believes that the cardholder's police record 'current gold informed input of the withdrawal password, =| the card + number With the card holder's true fake card, and easy: tracing ± ..., I do not know the card number and exhaustion of what i:: failure only. In order to avoid being pirated, it is impossible to prevent the cardholder’s deposit from being stolen (when the card machine is falsified), it is difficult to find the true t Jun's side government, the machine to all the places, but also forbearing in and out of the secret problem, that is, the side record on the smuggling, while the Zhang signed the loss. Supervision is not a crime. This laborless recorder is lightly closed, and the research and development of the person is nothing more than the code of the person being stolen. The question is signed. The side recorder will charge the card, regardless of the limit of the brush, even if it is false, vertical. Because the easy-to-receive institutional staff is carrying out the identity of the account, the account card is recorded [the most, under the general intention of the consumer card machine under the card, the consumption of the card makes the card or private control in the letter, card The way to add questions, the guide " ίσ with the card is serious. The cargo clerk will secretly charge the account, set up the installation side of the consumer or the secret organization of the consumer, etc. to prevent, input, and control.
第7頁 〕在刷卡 不肖廠商 持卡者-之 料完整地 造成發卡 於加盟的 錄機之問 經發生, 過程中增 肖員工同 碼。 較重要之 未被授權 密碼方式 。惟前述 全性不足 1254204 顧 五、發明說明(3) 的問題。 再者,目 求行為者輸入 身份的技術。 為都會導致密 〔本發明之目 有鑑於前 之身份/行為 1 ·本發明所提 主機知悉有 以亂數方法 碼單元,形 不輸入任何 局部密碼欄 待確認者所 進行授權範 圍内之行為 整的密碼而 身份/行為 2 ·本發明所挺 身份待確逐 過是每次必 數輸入局部 3 ·本發明所提 月 修正 前正立 代表其 同樣的 碼被竊 的〕 述之問 確認方 供之動 一位處 決定身 成動態 密碼單 位輸入 輪入之 圍内之 〔例如 達到例 確認上 供之動 者而言 須按照 岔碼而 供之動 法中之「電子簽章法」也涉及利用要 身份之密碼,以便確認行為者之真命 ’目前凡是在電子網路輸入密碼的行 錄之問題。 題,本發明 法,它能夠 態安全之身 於工作站的 份待確認者 隨機密碼, 元。身份待 對應之密碼 動態隨機密 行為〔例如 停止交易〕 如防止盜錄 〔例如提款 態安全之身 ,同樣只需 提款機或刷 已,使用習 態安全之身 旨在於提 達成下列 份/行為 身份待確 應該輸入 至於主機 確認者只 單元,並 碼是否正 繼續交易 。從而使 及竊奪等 交易等〕 份/行為 記住一組 卡機所指 慣改變不 份/行為 供一種動態安全 發明目的: 確認方法, 認者之後, 哪幾個攔位 未選取之攔 要按照所指 經主機確認 確,以決定 〕或停止授 歹徒無法竊 問題’大幅 之安全性。 確認方法, 密碼即可, 示之密碼所 大’谷易推 確認方法, 係在 主機 的密 位則 不之 身份 繼續 權範 取完 4·曰 山 提鬲 對於 只不 在位 行。 應用Page 7 〕 In the card card, the cardholder - the material is completely responsible for the issue of the card in the joining machine. More important is the unauthorized password method. However, the above-mentioned problems are insufficient. 1254204 Gu 5, the invention description (3). Furthermore, the technology that seeks the actor to enter identity. In order to cause confidentiality (the object of the present invention is in view of the former identity/behavior 1) The host of the present invention knows that there is a random number of code units, and the behavior is not within the authorization range of any local password column to be confirmed. Password and identity/behavior 2 · The identity of the invention is confirmed by the fact that each time the number is entered locally. 3. The positive code of the invention is correct before the correction of the month. It is determined that one of the dynamic ciphers is entered into the encirclement of the dynamic cipher (for example, the "electronic signature law" that is required to be provided in accordance with the weight of the stipulations of the stipulations is also involved in the use of the electronic signature method. The password of the identity is to confirm the true meaning of the actor's current problem of entering the password on the electronic network. The method of the present invention, which can be safely stored on the workstation, is a random password, yuan. The identity of the password to be corresponding to the dynamic random secret behavior (such as stop trading), such as the prevention of piracy (such as the withdrawal of the safe body, also only need a cash machine or brush, the use of the mental security body is intended to reach the following / The behavioral identity should be entered into the host confirmer only unit and whether the code is continuing to trade. In order to make and smuggle transactions, etc., the memory/behavior remembers that a group of card machines are used to change the infringement/behavior for a dynamic security invention purpose: confirmation method, after the identification, which blocks are not selected According to the instructions confirmed by the host to determine, or to stop the smugglers can not steal the problem 'substantial security. Confirmation method, password can be, the password is large, the valley easy to push the confirmation method, the secret location of the host is not the identity to continue the right to take the 4. 曰 鬲 鬲 For the only in place. application
1254204 案號 91103120 年 月 修正 五、發明說明(4) 在提款機作業時,只需加掛執行本發明動態安全之身份 /行為確認方法所編寫之程式即可,既不需改變主機之 硬體設備,也不需要改寫主機之軟體程式,而且也不需 要改變工作站〔例如提款機〕的硬體設備與軟體設備, 最易實施,變更成本最低。 4.本發明所提供之動態安全之身份/行為確認方法,應用 在***刷卡機作業時,只需要求***持卡者記住一 組密碼即可,而裝在各消費單位之刷卡機只要加裝密碼 輸入按鍵即可。縱使偷裝在刷卡機旁之側錄機所竊得的 密碼,也是不完整的局部密碼,無法在下一次刷卡行為 φ 中盜刷。徹底防杜猖獗的盜刷問題,大幅提高刷卡交易 之安全性。 〔本發明之技術内容〕 本發明旨在於提供一種動態安全之身份/行為確認方 法,係在主機設定全部N位數的完整密碼欄位,並在每一 密碼欄位各自設定一個密碼單元,並在主機知悉有一位處 於工作站的身份待確認者之後,執行下列手段,以便確認 身份待確認者之身份/行為,前述主機係定義為確定密碼 正確與否之設備,而上述工作站係定義為人機介面: 第一手段: # 主機自全部N位數完整密碼欄位中的任意密碼欄位,選出 總共X位數的局部密碼欄位,作為待確認之動態隨機密 碼,其中:X及N均為正整數,而且〔N— 1〕- X-1254204 Case No. 91103120 Rev. 5, Invention Description (4) When the cash machine is in operation, it is only necessary to add the program written by the dynamic security identity/behavior confirmation method of the present invention, and it is not necessary to change the hard disk of the host. The device does not need to rewrite the host software program, and it does not need to change the hardware and software devices of the workstation (such as the cash machine). It is the easiest to implement and has the lowest change cost. 4. The dynamic security identity/behavior confirmation method provided by the present invention, when applied to a credit card credit card machine, only requires the credit card holder to remember a set of passwords, and the credit card machine installed in each consumer unit only needs to add Just enter the password input button. Even if the password stolen by the side recorder hidden by the credit card machine is an incomplete partial password, it cannot be stolen in the next card swipe behavior φ. Thoroughly prevent the problem of stolen brushing of cuckoo, and greatly improve the security of card transactions. [Technical Content of the Invention] The present invention is directed to providing a dynamic and secure identity/behavior confirmation method, in which a full password field of all N digits is set in a host, and a password unit is set in each password field, and After the host knows that there is a person in the workstation to be confirmed, the following means are performed to confirm the identity/behavior of the identity to be confirmed. The host is defined as a device for determining whether the password is correct or not, and the workstation is defined as a human machine. Interface: First means: # Host from any N-digit complete password field, select a total of X-digit local password field as the dynamic random password to be confirmed, where: X and N are Positive integer, and [N-1]-X-
j 虎 91103120 修正j Tiger 91103120 Fix
1254204 t 五、發明說明(5) 弟一手段: 主機將上述待確認之動能 站,要求位於工作站的碼:所在攔位傳送至工作 所呈現之局部密碼欄位白2 5忍者依照該動態隨機密碼 及 自輪入正確的對應密碼單元; 第三手段:1254204 t V. Description of invention (5) A means of the younger brother: The host will use the above-mentioned kinetic energy station to be confirmed, requesting the code located at the workstation: the location of the interception is transmitted to the local password field presented by the work. White 5 5 Ninja according to the dynamic random password And the correct corresponding password unit from the wheel; the third means:
主機判斷位於工作站的I 對應於每一密碼欄位之密二:確,者所輸入之密碼欄位與 續進行被授權範圍内之盏早70疋否正確,如正確,則繼 止授權範圍内之行為。丁 "、、,如錯誤,則按照設定條件停 别文所述之動離·伞八 機自全部N位“ J身”為確認方法’其中主 密碼ί位之…係心= 出總共X位數的局部 如文所述之動賤取八 、 機自全部N位數的士敕1身份/行為確認方法,其中主 密碼欄位之方法,二!:攔位中選出總共X位數的局部 前文所述之動法選擇。 主機自全部N位數的*二身份/行為確涊方法,其中自 部密碼襴位之方、、扣r凡正铪碼襴位中選出總共X位數的局 ~步雜下列方例如以亂數方法或隨機方法〕,係進 /错下列方法提高其安全 在設定時段内,使至小加1 · ^ 輪入兮穷牌捫# / 一個密碼欄位不要求身份待確認者 位所對應之密碼單元。 月1J文所迹之私能& λ 亂數方法自主機白IΓ王之身份/行為確認方法,其中以 、自王4 Ν位數的完整密碼攔位中選出總共The host judges that the I located in the workstation corresponds to the password of each password field: indeed, the password field entered is not as good as 70 degrees in the authorized range, and if it is correct, the authorization is within the scope of authorization. Behavior. Ding ",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, The number of digits is as described in the text. Eight, the machine from all N digits of the gentry 1 identity / behavior confirmation method, the main password field method, two!: the total number of X digits in the block Part of the dynamic method described above. The host has all the N-digit *two identity/behavior confirmation methods, in which the part of the self-password is clamped, and the deduction of the total number of digits is selected. Number method or random method], the following methods to improve its security within the set time period, so that the small plus 1 · ^ wheel into the poor card 扪 # / a password field does not require the identity to be confirmed Password unit. The private energy & λ random number method of the 1J article is from the host white I Γ Wang's identity/behavior confirmation method, in which the total number of passwords from the 4th digit of the king is selected.
第10頁 月 1254204 ^^9H〇3L20 五、發明說明(6) X位數的局部密碼攔位之 法〕,係進一步藉下列方 在設定時段内,使至少保 待確認者輸入該密碼欄位 雨文所述之動態安全 主機自全部N位數的完整 部密碼欄位之方法〔例如 一步藉下列方法提高其安 在設定時段内,使所要求 之密碼攔位不重複要求。 前文所述之動態安全 主機自全部N位數的完整 部密碼攔位之方法〔例如 一步藉下列方法提局其安 在設定時段内,身份待確 達到設定之次數時’則按 為。 〔本發明之實施例〕 本發明可以應用在凡 例如:特殊場所的人員進 卡交易、線上交易〔網路 助密碼確認身份/行為之 銀行的提款、轉帳’及信 說0 修正 方法〔例如以亂數方法或 法提高其安全性: 邊一個密碼襴位始終不要 所斟應之密碼單元。 之身份/行為確認方法, 在碼欄位中選出總共X位 以I數方法或隨機方法〕 全性: 身份待確認者輸入對應密 之身份/行為確認方法, 密碼攔位中選出總共X位 以亂數方法或隨機方法〕 全性: 認者所輸入之動態隨機密 照設定條件停止授權範圍 是需要確認身份或行為之 出管制、銀行提款或轉帳 交易〕、電子簽章······等 場合。為了便於說明,以 用卡交易等行為作為實例 隨機方 求身份 其中自 數的局 ,係進 碼單元 其中自 數的局 ,係進 碼錯誤 内之行 場合, 、信用 等需藉 下僅以 加以解Page 10 Month 1254204 ^^9H〇3L20 V. Invention Description (6) The method of partial password blocking of X digits is to further enter the password field by at least the confirmed person within the set time period by the following party The method of the dynamic security host described in Yu Wen from all the N-digit full-part password fields (for example, one step is to increase the security time within the set time period by the following method, so that the required password block is not repeated. The dynamic security host described above uses the method of all the N-digit full password blocking (for example, one step by one of the following methods to estimate the number of times when the identity is to be set to the set number of times). [Embodiment of the Invention] The present invention can be applied to, for example, a person entering a card transaction in a special place, an online transaction (a network assistance password confirming the identity/behavior bank withdrawal, transfer, and a letter 0 correction method) [for example] Improve the security by random numbers or methods: Never use a password unit with one password. The identity/behavior confirmation method selects a total of X bits in the code field by the I number method or the random method.] Fullness: The identity to be confirmed enters the corresponding identity/behavior confirmation method, and the total number of X bits is selected in the password block. Random number method or random method] Fullness: The dynamic random contact entered by the recognizer sets the condition to stop the authorization range from the need to confirm the identity or behavior of the control, bank withdrawal or transfer transaction], electronic signature ····· · Etc. For the convenience of explanation, the card transaction is used as an example to find the identity of the self-numbered office, which is the number of the units in the code unit, and the line in the error code, credit, etc. need to be borrowed only to solution
第11頁 修正 曰 J254204 案!虎 _312〇 五、發明說明(7) 請參閱第一圖所示,當身份牧 卡***工作站時,工作站首=確:者將提款卡或信用 料,並傳送到金融系統的主機,tc用卡讀取資 有無此-客戶。如無,則退:並;=到此資料號判斷 本發明所提供之動態安全之身份;:::J ’則進入 在主:態安全之身方法,俜 在主桡a又疋全部Ν位數的完整宓 f、 位各自設定-個密碼單元,;;;:立2在每-密碼欄 站的身份待確認者之後,執行=心有一位處於工作 碟認者之身份/行為,前述 :2便確認身份待 否之設備,而上述工作+ 確定密碼正確與 第一手段·· 乍站係疋義為人機介面·· 主機自王口 P N位數完整密石^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 選出總共X位數的局部贫碼們’:中f卜碼攔位’隨意 密瑪,其中:χ及心;:=,作為待確認之動態隨機 2 ; 勺為正整數,而且〔Ν — i^ χ ^ 第二手段: :機:隨機密碼的所在攔位傳送至工作 戶斤呈規之局部密碼襴位身=認::照該動態隨機密碼 及 各自輸入正確的對應密碼單元; 第三手段: 主機列斷位於工作站的 _ 於每一密@ & ^ 别入之密碼欄位與 封應 4欄位之密碼單元是否正確,如正確,則繼 第12頁 1254204 五、發明說明(8) 續進行被授權範圍内之行為,如錯誤,則按照設定條件停 止授權範圍内之行為。 / W述主機自全部N位數的完整密碼攔位中選出她共χ 位數的局部密碼搁位之方法’係以亂數方法選擇。~ 前述主機自全部Ν位數的完整密碼攔位中選出城共χ 位數的局部密碼欄位之方法,係以隨機方法選擇。 上述之動態安全之身份/行為確認方法,纟中以亂數 方法或隨機方法自主機自全部Ν位數的完整密碼攔位中選 出總共X位數的局部密碼攔位之方法,係進一步藉下列方 法提高其安=:在設定時段内,使至少保留一“碼攔 位始終不要求身份待確認者輸入該密碼攔位所對應之密碼 單元。例如在7天内保留一個密碼攔位不出現。 山 上述之動態安全之身份/行為確認方法’其中 方法或隨機方法自主機自全部Ν位數的完整密碼攔位中選 出總共Χ位數的局部密碼欄位之方法’係進一 法提高其安全性:在設定時段内’使所要求身 J者 輸入對應密碼單元之密碼攔位不重複要求。例如24 =内 不出現同一密碼欄位。 π 上述之動態安全之身份/行為確認方法,其 方法或隨機方法自主機自全部Ν位數的完整密碼攔位中選 出總共χ位數的局部密碼欄位之方法,係進一 法提高其安全j生:在設定日:段内,身份待確認者;輪二之 動態隨機密碼錯決達到设疋1次數時,則按照設定 止权松犯圓 要衣持卡者前往發卡Page 11 amend 曰 J254204 case! Tiger _ 312 发明 five, invention description (7) Please refer to the first figure, when the identity card is inserted into the workstation, the workstation first = indeed: the card or credit material, and The host that is transferred to the financial system, tc uses the card to read whether there is this - customer. If not, then retreat: and; = to this data number to determine the dynamic security identity provided by the present invention;:::J 'is entered in the main: state security method, now in the main a and all positions The complete 宓f of the number, the bit is set to a crypto unit,;;;: 2 after the identity of the per-password column to be confirmed, the execution = the identity of a person who is in the working disc, the foregoing: 2 will confirm the identity of the equipment to be no, and the above work + determine the correct password and the first means · · 乍 疋 为 为 为 为 · · · 主机 主机 PN PN PN PN PN PN PN PN ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ The total number of X-digit local poor codes ': in the f-code block' random Marma, where: χ and heart;: =, as the dynamic random 2 to be confirmed; scoop is a positive integer, and [Ν - i^ χ ^ The second means: : Machine: The location of the random password is transmitted to the local password of the working household. The body name is recognized:: According to the dynamic random password and the corresponding corresponding password unit are input respectively; Third means: Host Column breaks the password of the workstation _ at each secret @ & ^ Whether the cipher unit of the four fields of the block and the seal is correct, if correct, then the 1254 page of the 1254204 V. Invention Description (8) Continue the behavior within the authorized scope. If the error occurs, stop the authorization within the specified conditions. behavior. /W The method of selecting the local password for her total number of bits from the complete password block of all N digits is selected by random number method. ~ The method of selecting the local password field of the total number of bits in the whole host from the complete password block of all digits is selected by random method. The above-mentioned dynamic security identity/behavior confirmation method, in which a method of randomly selecting a total number of X-digit local password blocks from a complete password block of all digits by a random number method or a random method is further borrowed from the following The method improves its security =: within the set time period, so that at least one "code block is always required to not require the identity to be confirmed to input the password unit corresponding to the password block. For example, retaining a password block within 7 days does not appear. The dynamic security identity/behavior confirmation method described above, wherein the method or the random method selects a total number of digits of the local password field from the complete password block of all digits of the host's method to improve its security: During the set time period, the password block of the required password unit is not repeated. For example, the same password field does not appear within 24 = π The dynamic security identity/behavior confirmation method described above, the method or random The method selects the total password field of the total number of digits from the complete password block of all the digits of the host, and improves the security by the method. Health: In the set day: the segment, the identity to be confirmed; the second random dynamic random password is set to 疋1 times, then according to the set stop right, the card holder will go to the card issuer.
案號 91103120 五、發明說明(9) 1254204 曰 月 II .1 單位重新換卡,以確保拄上 -切盜竊行為。Μ卡者及發卡單位之權益,以杜絕 使用者可視需要進一I 、、 再加強本發明之安全效果述3種限制方法’以便 以下舉例說明本發明之 主機設定□□口□總共4個ί敫穷=如持卡者原先於交易 此4個完整密碼攔位中對:ς G X:今假設分別在 組,其中m4分別二完ff瑪 對應的4個密碼單元。如交县± ^ 4個凡整岔碼攔位一一 數完整密碼攔位〔N二4 ==數方法自全部4位 總共2位數的局部密碼欄位趙碼:位,隨意選出 態隨機密碼。假如第一次所 作為待確認之動 「*□*;“ A所選出之動態隨機密碼為: Λ〔 ΐ · 「*」為不需輸入任何密碼之欄位,「Π Α待輸 攔位的右Hi 攔位為第一欄位,緊鄰於第一 位,最女iPU 4 ,緊郇於弟二欄位的右邊為第三攔 狀態: 刀另J輸入2及4 ,而形成下列 「氺2氺4」 假如第二次所選出之動態隨機密 此日才持卡者必須按日召指示在 _ 2^q & 女”仕弟一攔位及第三攔位分別輸入 匕及3 ,而形成下列狀態:Case No. 91103120 V. INSTRUCTIONS (9) 1254204 曰 II II.1 Units are re-exchanged to ensure theft-cutting. The interests of the Leica and the card issuer are set to eliminate the user's need to enter the I and enhance the security effect of the present invention. The following is an example of the host setting of the present invention. Poor = If the cardholder originally traded the 4 complete passwords in the pair: ς GX: This is assumed to be in the group, where m4 is the second of the four cryptographic units corresponding to ff. Such as Jiaoxian County ± ^ 4 where the entire code block one by one complete password block [N two 4 == number method from all 4 bits total 2 digits of the local password field Zhao code: bit, random selection random state password. If the first time is the action to be confirmed "*□*;" The dynamic random password selected by A is: Λ[ ΐ · "*" is a field that does not require any password, "Π Α Α 输The right Hi block is the first field, next to the first place, the most female iPU 4, next to the right side of the second field is the third block state: Knife enters J input 2 and 4, and forms the following "氺2氺4" If the second time selected dynamic random secret card holders on this day, the card holder must enter the _ and 3 in the _ 2^q & Form the following states:
第14頁 案號 91103120 1254204 五、發明說明(10) 「氺2 3氺」 由以上實例可知,第:r / —铪 7 ^ ^ 和一襴位在弟一次交易行為中未曾出 現,但在第二次交易杆盔欠n丨」也 …斤 圳/ η 一 订為部出現。若歹徒透過側錄僅能竊 付第一攔位及第四攔位的金 σσ — ^ . ^ ^ ^ 的搶碼早兀,但在第二次交易行為 提高了交易的安全::用的岔碼。藉此隨機動態密碼有效 争得々2 碼位數改成6位時’則變化更多,歹徒 同曰内勿在同發卡單位可藉勸說持卡者 可以大幅度地提:餐〔工作站〕重複刷卡,則安全性 、為I 了體a兒明本發明的動態安全之身份/行為確認方 U二將透過所列舉之程式作範例性的說明。但此說明 一 ς本發明的動態安全之身份/行為確認方法中的其中 種例而已’而且此一實施例並不能作為限定本發明 之動:安全,身份/行為確認方法的技術内容。 清茶閱第二圖所示,設定密碼為〇 、1 、2 、3 、 4、5、6、7、8、9等1 〇個***數字。假設密碼位 數共有4位數。並假設隨機動態密碼一次只取2位數。今 以培基(B A S I C )程式語言為例〔當然也可使用其它任何 程式語言〕。其程式步驟如下: 宣告 A、B、C、D=整數 AnserOK, RdKey,Keyl,Key2 =整數 〔主機的程式〕 程序:主機從資料庫中讀取客戶密碼4位Page 14 Case No. 91103120 1254204 V. Description of Invention (10) “氺2 3氺” From the above example, the first: r / —铪7 ^ ^ and one niche did not appear in the transaction of the brother, but in the first The second trading helmet owes n丨" also... Jinzhen/ η is ordered to appear. If the gangster can only steal the gold σσ — ^ . ^ ^ ^ of the first and fourth blocks through the side record, the rush code is earlier, but the second transaction improves the security of the transaction:: code. By using this random dynamic password to effectively win the 々2 code digits and change to 6 digits, then the change is more, and the thieves should not be in the same card-issuing unit to persuade the cardholders to mention: the meal [workstation] repeated card swiping The security, identity, and behavior of the present invention will be exemplified by the listed program. However, this description is one of the examples of the dynamic security identity/behavior confirmation method of the present invention, and this embodiment is not intended to limit the technical content of the security, identity/behavior confirmation method of the present invention. Read the tea in the second picture, set the password to 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and so on. Assume that the password digits have a total of 4 digits. And assume that the random dynamic password takes only 2 digits at a time. Today, the B A S I C programming language is used as an example (of course, any other programming language can be used). The program steps are as follows: Announcement A, B, C, D = integer AnserOK, RdKey, Keyl, Key2 = integer [host program] Program: The host reads the customer password from the database 4 digits
第15頁 1254204 案號 91103120 Λ_R_ 曰 修正 五、發明說明(11) A =密碼1 B =密碼2 C =密碼3 D =密碼4 程序 使用亂數程式選擇一值〔或以隨機程式〕Page 15 1254204 Case No. 91103120 Λ_R_ 曰 Correction V. Invention Description (11) A = Password 1 B = Password 2 C = Password 3 D = Password 4 Program Use a random number program to select a value (or random program)
RdKey = Int(Ran *6) +1 附註: 因為Ran是0〜1之間的隨機值,但每次都不同。 若* 6可得0〜6之隨機值,I n t則是只取整數位。 所以R d K e y會得到1〜6之隨機值。RdKey = Int(Ran *6) +1 Remarks: Because Ran is a random value between 0 and 1, but it is different each time. If *6 can get a random value of 0~6, I n t only takes an integer number. So R d K e y will get a random value of 1~6.
列表:i f RdKey =1 then AnserOK =AB if RdKey =2 then AnserOK =AC if RdKey =3 then AnserOK =AD if RdKey =4 then AnserOK =BC if RdKey =5 then AnserOK =BD if RdKey =6 then AnserOK =CD 程序:主機將RdKey的值傳輸至工作站 工作站收到R d K e y的值。 〔工作站的程式〕 if RdKey if RdKey if RdKey if RdKey if RdKey 1 then Pr i n 2 then Pr i n 3 then Pr i n 4 then Pr i n 5 then Pr i n 請輸入第1 請輸入苐1 請輸入弟1 請輸入苐2 請輸入第2 2位" 3位π 4位” 3位" 4位"List: if RdKey =1 then AnserOK =AB if RdKey =2 then AnserOK =AC if RdKey =3 then AnserOK =AD if RdKey =4 then AnserOK =BC if RdKey =5 then AnserOK =BD if RdKey =6 then AnserOK =CD Program: The host transmits the value of RdKey to the workstation station and receives the value of R d K ey . [Program of workstation] if RdKey if RdKey if RdKey if RdKey if RdKey 1 then Pr in 2 then Pr in 3 then Pr in 4 then Pr in 5 then Pr in Please enter 1 Please enter 苐1 Please enter 1 Please enter 苐2 Please enter the 2nd digit " 3 digits π 4 digits 3 digits " 4 digits"
第16頁 1254204案號911〇31四__年月 日_修正 五、發明說明(12) if RdKey =6 then Print "請輸入第3、4 位" 程序:工作站讀取輸入資料Page 16 1254204 Case No. 911〇31 Four__年月日日_Amendment V. Invention Description (12) if RdKey =6 then Print "Please enter the 3rd and 4th digits " Program: Workstation reads input data
Keyl =第一次按下數字鍵 Key2 =第二次按下數字鍵 程序:工作站將Keyl、Key2傳回主機 〔主機的程式〕Keyl = first press the number key Key2 = press the number key a second time Program: Workstation will transfer Keyl, Key2 back to the host [host program]
程序:主機收到工作站所傳來之Keyl、Key2 if Keyl +Key2 =AnserOK then密碼正確、繼續交易 e 1 s e 密碼錯誤,重新輸入 以上所述係以培基(BAS I C )程式語言為例〔當然也 可用其它任何程式語言〕所作之範例性的說明。但此範例 性之說明僅僅,本發明之動態安全之身份/行為確認方法 中的其中一種貫施例而已,且此一實施例並不能作為限定 本發明之動恶安全之身份/行為確認方法的技術内容。 〔本發明之功效及特點〕 根據以上所述’本發明所提供之動態安全之 為確認方法具有下而丨丄 ,士 „ 八,下列功效及特點: 1.本餐明所提供之勒能Program: The host receives the Keyl, Key2 if Keyl + Key2 = AnserOK then the password is correct, and continues to trade the e 1 se password error. Re-enter the above-mentioned BAS IC programming language as an example. An exemplary description of any other programming language can also be used. However, this exemplary description is only one of the dynamic security identity/behavior confirmation methods of the present invention, and this embodiment is not intended to limit the identity/behavior identification method of the present invention. Technical content. [Effects and Features of the Invention] According to the above description, the dynamic safety method provided by the present invention has the following methods: ‧ 八, the following functions and features: 1. The energy provided by the meal
主機知悉有-位二:女全之身份/灯為確認方法’係在 以氣數方法決定ΐ於工作站的身份待確認者之後’主機 说留-W、、又身份待確認者應該輸入哪幾個攔位的密 碼早兀,形成動能 不輸入任何穷碼‘r^機密碼,至於主機未選取之攔位則 局部密碼欄位輪。身份待確認者只要按照所指示之 則八對應之密碼單元,並經主機確認身份The host knows that there is a bit-two: the identity of the female person/light is the confirmation method'. After determining the identity of the workstation to be confirmed by the gas number method, the host says to stay-W, and the identity to be confirmed should be entered. The password of the block is early, and the kinetic energy is not input into any poor code 'r^ machine password. As for the block that is not selected by the host, the local password field wheel. The identity confirmer only needs to correspond to the cipher unit corresponding to the eight, and confirm the identity by the host.
第17頁Page 17
正確,以決定繼續 易〕或停止授權範 使歹徒無法竊取完 等問題,大幅提高 〕之安全性。 為確認方法,對於 組密碼即可,只不 指示之密碼所在位 不大,容易推行。 為確認方法,應用 明動態安全之身份 既不需改變主機之 程式,而且也不需 设備與軟體設備, 2.Correct, to decide to continue or to stop the authorization, so that the criminals can not steal the problem, and greatly improve the security. In order to confirm the method, the password for the group can be used, and the password that is not indicated is not large, and it is easy to implement. In order to confirm the method, the application of the dynamic security identity does not need to change the host program, and does not require equipment and software devices.
待確認者所輸入之 進行授權範圍内之 圍内之行為〔例如 整的密碼而達到例 身份/行為確認上 本發明所提供之動 身伤待確認者而言 過是每次必須按照 數輸入局部密碼而 本發明所提供之動 在提款機作業時, /行為確認方法所 硬體設備,也不需 要改變工作站〔例 最易實施,變更成 本發明所提供之動 在***刷卡機作 加記一組密碼即可 裝密碼輪入按鍵即 的密碼也是不完整 中盜刷。徹底防杜 之安全性。 動態隨機密碼是;^ 行為〔例如繼續交 停止交易〕。從而 如防止盜錄及竊奪 〔例如提款交易等 態安全之身份/行 ’同樣只需記住— 提款機或刷卡機戶斤 已’使用習慣改變 態安全之身份//行 只需加掛執行本發 編寫之程式即可, 要改寫主機之軟體 如提款機〕的硬體 本最低。 態安全之身份/行 業時,只需要求信 ,而裝在各消費單 可。偷裝在刷卡機 的局部密碼,無法 猖獗的盜刷問題, 為確認方法,應用 用卡身份待確認者 位之刷卡機只要加 旁之側錄機縱竊得 在下一次刷卡行為 大幅提高刷卡交易If the person to be confirmed enters the behavior within the scope of the authorization (for example, the entire password and the identity/behavior confirmation, the person who is confirmed by the present invention has to enter the local password every time. However, the hardware device provided by the present invention during the operation of the cash dispenser, the behavior confirmation method does not need to change the workstation (the example is the easiest to implement, and the change of the cost provided by the invention is added to the credit card swipe machine for a set of credits. The password can be installed in the password wheel key, that is, the password is also incomplete. Completely prevent the safety of Du. The dynamic random password is ;^ the behavior (for example, continue to stop the transaction). Thus, such as the prevention of piracy and theft (such as the withdrawal of the identity of the security transaction / line of the same - just remember - cash machine or credit card machine has been "have the habit of changing the state of security" / / line only Hanging the program written in this script can be used to rewrite the hardware of the host such as the cash machine. When you are in the status of security/business, you only need to request a letter, but you can install it on each purchase order. The partial password of the card reader can not be stolen. For the confirmation method, the card reader is confirmed by the card. The card reader only needs to add the side recorder to steal the next card swipe.
第18頁 1254204 _ 案號91103120_年月日__ 圖式簡單說明 〔圖式之簡單說明〕 第一圖:為本發明之動態安全之身份/行為確認方法的流 程圖。 第二圖:為本發明之動態安全之身份/行為確認方法的具 體實施例之流程圖。 第三圖:為習知靜態存取方法之流程圖。Page 18 1254204 _ Case No. 91103120_年月日日__ Simple description of the drawing [Simplified description of the drawing] First figure: A flow chart of the dynamic security identity/behavior confirmation method of the present invention. Second Figure: Flowchart of a specific embodiment of the dynamic security identity/behavior confirmation method of the present invention. Figure 3: Flow chart for a conventional static access method.
第19頁Page 19
Claims (1)
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
TW91103120A TWI254204B (en) | 2002-02-22 | 2002-02-22 | Method of confirming the identity/act of dynamic security |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
TW91103120A TWI254204B (en) | 2002-02-22 | 2002-02-22 | Method of confirming the identity/act of dynamic security |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
TWI254204B true TWI254204B (en) | 2006-05-01 |
Family
ID=37587242
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
TW91103120A TWI254204B (en) | 2002-02-22 | 2002-02-22 | Method of confirming the identity/act of dynamic security |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
TW (1) | TWI254204B (en) |
-
2002
- 2002-02-22 TW TW91103120A patent/TWI254204B/en not_active IP Right Cessation
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US7593896B1 (en) | Credit card system and method | |
US4295039A (en) | Method and apparatus for achieving secure password verification | |
US4965568A (en) | Multilevel security apparatus and method with personal key | |
US4214230A (en) | Personal identification system | |
US6779112B1 (en) | Integrated circuit devices with steganographic authentication, and steganographic authentication methods | |
US20030208449A1 (en) | Credit card fraud prevention system and method using secure electronic credit card | |
US20090144162A1 (en) | Transaction Security Method and Apparatus | |
JPS62189593A (en) | Ic card using system | |
US20090287937A1 (en) | Identity verification | |
CN105279478A (en) | Fingerprint sequential composition password authentification system | |
US20100306106A1 (en) | Apparatus system and method of Payment identification means using pulse and fingerprints | |
JPS6061863A (en) | Method and system for managing code key | |
EA036720B1 (en) | Protection for unauthorized copying (anti-cloning) method and system | |
US7934640B2 (en) | Method, system, and computer program product for implementing pin-based data transfer activities | |
US10503936B2 (en) | Systems and methods for utilizing magnetic fingerprints obtained using magnetic stripe card readers to derive transaction tokens | |
TWI254204B (en) | Method of confirming the identity/act of dynamic security | |
JP2007072766A (en) | Personal authentication system and method | |
CN102930646B (en) | Authentication technology based on stock market quotation | |
WO2001015094A2 (en) | Secure system for conducting electronic transactions and method for use thereof | |
US20240242220A1 (en) | Systems and methods for generation and use of biometric-based account numbers | |
JP2006235694A (en) | Password code authentication system | |
JP2007065727A (en) | Ic card use system | |
CA2627108A1 (en) | A pin number security system for debit card and credit card | |
Puri et al. | ID Based Encryption in Modern Cryptography | |
TW588290B (en) | New credit card's low cost anti-fraud mechanism |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
MM4A | Annulment or lapse of patent due to non-payment of fees |