TW201117136A - Tamper-proof secure card with stored biometric data and method for using the secure card - Google Patents

Tamper-proof secure card with stored biometric data and method for using the secure card Download PDF

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Publication number
TW201117136A
TW201117136A TW98137763A TW98137763A TW201117136A TW 201117136 A TW201117136 A TW 201117136A TW 98137763 A TW98137763 A TW 98137763A TW 98137763 A TW98137763 A TW 98137763A TW 201117136 A TW201117136 A TW 201117136A
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Taiwan
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card
biometric data
security card
cardholder
security
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TW98137763A
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Chinese (zh)
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TWI410899B (en
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Ming-Yuan Wu
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Ming-Yuan Wu
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Abstract

The present invention provides a tamper-proof secure card with stored biometric data and method for using the secure card, with which the biometric data of a person is employed to confirm the identity and the authorization right of the person. The biometric data of a cardholder is stored in a transparent biometric data area of the secure card, and the biometric data of the cardholder stored in the secure card is employed to generate a unique card number. When the secure card is used to input the biometric data of the cardholder, the inputted biometric data is compared with that stored in the secure card. If the inputted biometric data is consistent with the biometric data stored in the secure card, the identity of the cardholder is confirmed and the unique card number can be accessed; otherwise, the unconfirmed unique card number cannot be accessed. In addition, the secure card further includes a transparent input area for separating the cardholder from an identity verification machine.

Description

201117136 六、發明說明: 【發明所屬之技術領域】 本發明係有關一種身分及付款卡片以及確認卡片持有人身分之方 法,特別是指一種存有生物特徵資料之防盜用安全卡且生物特徵資料 無法修改或複製。 【先前技術】 按,***在全世界被廣泛使用,使產品購買及服務更加便利, ***讓使用者在購買時不需隨身攜帶現金。 然而’***竊盜及詐編已漸漸變成***持卡人及金融機構之 主要問題’若***被盜,竊賊僅需偽造持卡人之簽名,而自從簽名 需顯示在***之背面後,偽造簽名便相當容易’因此竊賊可輕易使 用該張***,造成持卡人必須負擔並未購買之商品的費用,有時金 融機構需承擔該筆消費,不論哪一種都是造成持卡人或金融機構的損 失0 再者,竊賊可透過讀取***背面磁條而複製出其中儲存之持卡 人資訊’並將持卡人資訊儲存在另—張新卡中,這些複製的卡片並被 竊賊使用或賣出。 任何使職齡用卡之H買行為皆會記錄在持卡人峨單中直 到持卡人通知金融機構***被竊之事實並停卡。 在部分複製之偽卡案例巾,持卡人料到τ個月的鮮寄 發現此狀況,因鱗卡人之帳單金齡被綱最大祕之額度。 用買金融機構二者其中之一必須為購買產生之費 用貝單而&成持卡人或金融機構之損失^ 圖’其為先前技射傳統***之正面示意圖。 如第Μ圖所*,傳統***1〇〇之 圖 之-金融機構之商標(丨咖)彳 匕㈣仃抓用卡1〇〇 位在卡100之下方Q而持卡人姓名12G及帳號伽則 201117136 1為先前技術中傳統***之反面示意圖。 ***條14G,其巾包括_構在將 用卡100 存於磁條140中之帳戶資訊。傳統信 ^卡1QQ之糾性讓竊賊有機會讀取並· 160 i 簽名條伽_讓持卡人簽上名字 竊賊練習簽名直到片敝則接受顧卡片。簽名之範例讓 音圖請211C圖’其為先前技術中傳統透過網路確認***之示 意圖姑及第1D圓為先前技術中使用***之傳統方法之流程圖。 使用卡之傳統方法18〇及傳統系統仍包括—客戶提供信用 ,’。收銀員’步驟181中收銀員透過―卡片掃瞒器I”掃瞒信用 片掃晦H 171 ||取儲存在***磁條中之帳戶資料,接著步驟 182將帳戶資料透過電話線172傳送到具有帳戶資料庫之—中央概 器173中,·步驟183中,中央伺服器173確認帳戶是否有足夠額度支 付/肖費並在步驟184申發出一確認通知給卡片掃猫器pi。 在步驟185中印出消費明細,步驟186使用者並在消費明細上簽 名’接著步驟187收銀員比對卡片背面之簽名與消費明細上之簽名, 若收銀員感覺這兩者相符,則將消交給客戶費明細的副本及***,如 步驟188所述’由於收銀員為主觀意識判斷簽名之真偽,因此常常產 生錯誤。 傳統卡片及系統之另一缺點在於資料係儲存於一中央飼服器,因 此駭客若侵入伺服器便可偷取資訊,在部分案例包括本發明中,在中 央伺服器上儲存了如帳號、客戶號碼等資訊’個人資料如生物特徵等 則未儲存在中央伺服器中。 因此,本發明即提出一種存有生物特徵資料之防盜用安全卡及其 使用方法,可防止***被修改或複製,並可確認使用者個人身分以 避免竊賊盜用,具體架構及其實施方式將詳述於下。 4 201117136 【發明内容】 為達到本發明中所述之優點並克服先前技術之缺點,本發明提供 一種存有生物特徵資料之防盜用安全卡,其係可防止修改、複製及^ 經許可使用,包括一持卡人之生物特徵資料,可用以確認持卡人之唯 一身分。 生物特徵資料舉例而言可包括指靜脈紋、關節紋、指紋、虹膜或 眼睛、掌紋、臉部、DNA資料、或上述之組合。 、 在安全卡中包含使用者之生物特徵資訊之樣本,並央生物特徵資 訊儲存在安全卡之記憶體中,當安全卡使用時,儲存在安全卡中之生 物特徵資料穢語使用者提供之生物特徵資料進行比較,舉例而言,若 生物特徵資料為右手中指之指紋,使用者將其右手中指放置於一驗證 機器上,而資料即開始比對,因此,縱使安全卡遺失或被偷,由於= 有任何他人之生物特徵資料與持卡人相符,因此沒人可使用。 安全卡包含持卡人之唯一卡號,此唯一卡號係由使用者之生物特 徵資料所產生,若輸入之生物特徵資料與持卡人之生物特徵資料不 符,則無法存取該卡號。 要達到「防盜用」之方法係基於使用者本身擁有之生物特徵資料 所產生之唯一-^號,反之則所有存取皆會失敗,而安全卡則無法修改 和變更。舉例而言’若沒有唯一·^號之保護’竊賊可取用一張偽卡並 在記憶體中輸入他的生物特徵資料、在生物特徵資料區域上刻入生物 資料樣板’則所有東西都變成他的資料,而他的身分則會被驗證成功。 由於唯一·^號係由持卡人之生物特徵資料所產生,不同的人產生的卡 號必定不相同故無法被他人盜用,並且可相應於記憶體中之生物特徵 資料,且在安全卡上刻入生物資料樣板,防止濫用卡片之修改或回復, 因此,本發明提供一防盜用安全卡。 再者,唯一卡號係由雷射刻畫或其他方法在卡片上或卡片内,並 可只使用一部份資料來進行比對驗證過程。 更甚者,唯一·號不可由生物特徵資料而倒推算出或被解碼。 201117136 在本發明之一實施例中安全卡為***,當持卡人消費時,持卡 人將安全卡提供給收銀員進行交易,接著持卡人透過掃瞄、查核等方 法提供一個或一組具唯一性之身體特徵之生物特徵資料,收銀員再透 過掃瞄或將卡片***讀卡機或驗證機器中之方式以取得安全卡中之生 物特徵資料,裝置從安全卡中讀取或掃瞄出生物特徵資料後與持卡人 現場提供之生物特徵資料進行比對,若兩者相符,則身分確認完成。 本發明之一優點在於當某些資料或資訊透過網路交換時,沒有個 人身分認證或生物特徵資料可透過網路傳送出去,身分確認係在本地 端之驗證機器執行,可避免身分被竊或持卡人之資料被竊。 在本發明之另一實施例中安全卡為一身分證,持卡人將身分證插 入一驗證機器中並提供其生物特徵資料,亦如靜脈紋或指紋,驗證機 器比對儲存在身分證中之生物特徵資料與持卡人提供之生物特徵資 料,若資料相同則驗證機器確認持卡人之身分。 本發明之另一優點在於僅有持卡人知道需提供之生物特徵資料為 何’由於可能輸入的生物特徵範圍相當廣泛,因此安全性更高,即使 被偷,竊賊也不知道該使用哪一種生物特徵資料。 本發明之安全卡中包含一樣板、導電線路或其他以避免包含生物 特徵資料之晶片被置換’此晶片不可從安全卡上移動並換成其他晶 片’在安全卡上做任何修改都會被偵測到,因此安全卡除了原始持卡 人無法再行使用。 底下藉由具體實施例詳加說明,當更容易瞭解本發明之目的、技 術内容、特點及其所達成之功效。 【實施方式】 本發明提供存有生物特徵資料之防盜用安全卡及其使用方法,該 安全卡包含了一個每一個持卡人的唯一·^號,此唯一-號是由發卡機 構使用該使用者個人生物特徵資料所建立,不同的人產生的卡號必定 不相同,故無法被他人盜用。在輸入的生物特徵資料被驗證為和持卡 6 201117136 和 用來達到「防盜用」的方法基於此藉由使用者自己的生物特徵資 料所建立轉譯(丨nte_)的唯—卡㈣和輸人料㈣徵資料符 合’否則所有的程序將會失敗,且該卡片無法被更動或修改,舉例來 說’沒有唯-卡號的保護’ 一個小偷能使用一張空白的卡片然後放入 他們自己的生物魏㈣到記㈣内,並且在生物概資料區域餘刻 生物^料樣板(patten),而且所有的東西都是他們自己的資料,而他們 的身分也會被成功確認,誠由於唯—卡號是由持卡人之生物特徵資 料來建立的’小偷本身的生麟徵㈣無法符合這唯—卡號,置換記 憶體中的生物龍資料和侧生物特徵樣㈣卡上依舊不足藉由更改 或干擾來胃料張卡片,因此本發明真正可以提供—個防盜用的安全 卡0 除此之外,此唯-卡號可以被雷射侧進去其他方法建立到 卡片上面或裡面,並且可以使用—部分作為生㈣料的比對之用。 更進-步來說,此唯-卡號無法被推測或是自生物特徵資料中解 碼。 請參考第2A圖,此為本發明之一實施例所示之安全卡之正面示意 圖。 在第2A圖之實施例中本發明之安全卡2〇〇包含一個商標21〇或 安全卡發卡者的名稱’該商標舉例來說可以為金融機構的名字或是公 司的名字’安全卡2GG的前面也包含了持卡人的姓名22Q和帳號23〇 或疋使用者號碼’且有-個記憶體晶片240連接或是後入到安全卡2〇〇 内’當使用者ΐ請這張安全卡2GG時’該使用者提供某些生物特徵資 訊的樣本或是例子,此生物特徵資訊能辨別唯—的使用者,因為沒有 兩個人擁有同樣的生物特徵’該生物特徵f訊被存放在安全卡2〇〇的 記憶體240内’當該安全卡2QG被使用的時候,持卡人提供或輸入他 們的生物特徵f料’而此輸人將會與存放在記,_ 24Q内的生物特徵 201117136 資料進行比對,若兩個吻合’持卡人的身分就得以被確認。 請參考第2B圖,此為本發明之一實施例所示之安全卡之背面示意 圖’在第2B圖的實施例中示之本發明之安全卡2〇〇之背面包含了一 個磁條250和-個簽名區域26〇,資訊被存放在磁條25〇内,該資訊 當安全卡被使用時會被讀取出來,簽名區域26Q允許使用者簽上他們 自己的姓;δ 270,該持卡人的資訊包含帳號資訊、帳舰碼、個人辨 識號碼、員X號、安全等級、階級、金峨構辨識、卡片號碼、發卡 機構辨識、公司名稱或以上的組合。 請參考第2C圖’此為本發明之一實施例所示之安全卡之背面示 意圖,在另外-個實關巾,該簽名區域沒有出現,因域卡人的簽 名無法被看到,這增加了安全性,在此實施例中,當安全卡被使用的 時候,持卡者的簽名會與存放在安全卡的記憶體内部之簽名資料進行 比對,此過程可以說較收銀人員用肉眼比對來說相對精確,在此實施 例中,生物特徵輸入和存放在該卡片中的生物特徵會先行比對,如果 驗證過後兩者均相同,那麼存放在該卡片中的簽名會與持卡者提供的 簽名再進行比對,所有的資料只會在確認生物特徵資料後才會自卡片 中讀出’這用以避免比對存放的簽名並且複製此簽名,這樣做的話小 偷就無法複製存放於其中的簽名。 在另外一個實施例中沒有簽名的區域,當使用安全卡的時候不需 要簽名,因為生物特徵要更為複雜,而且不可能複製,比對卡片記憶 體中的生物特徵資料和使用者所提供的生物特徵資料就能提供足夠的 安全性。 請參考第2D圖,此為本發明之一實施例所示之安全卡之背面示 意圖,在第2D圖中示的實施例,磁條和簽名區域均未出現,在該實 施例中,一般會存放在磁條的這些資訊會與生物特徵資料一同存放在 安全卡的記憶體内,這更加增加了安全性,因為這些資訊必須要生物 特徵的確認後才能進行讀取,相對來說現有的情形是存放在磁條内的 資訊可以不需持卡人相對的輸入就可被一台刷卡機讀取。 201117136 请參考第2D圖,此為本發明之一實施例所示之安全卡之正面示 意圖’在本發明之另一實施例中,安全卡2〇〇的正面包含了商標21〇、 持卡人姓名220和記憶體240與持卡人存放的生物特徵資料,在此實 施例中面,安全卡200不會顯示持卡人的帳號或是識別號碼。 請參考第2F圖’此為本發明之一實施例所示之安全卡之正面示意 圖,在第2F圖所示之實施例中,持卡人的姓名和帳號不會被顯示在安 全卡200上,這更增加了安全性,因為除了持卡人外,沒人知道這張 安全卡屬於誰,持卡人的姓名和帳號資料均無法被存取,直到存放的 生物特徵資料和輸入的生物特徵資料已經被驗證過為符合之後才可 以。 請參考第2G圖,此為本發明一實施例之使用安全卡方法之流程 圖。 如第2G圖所示’一種使用安全卡280的方法包含步驟281*** 安全卡到驗證機器中,接著步驟282持卡人要提供生物特徵輸入,在 步驟283中驗證機器比對生物特徵輸入與存放在安全卡中的生物特徵 資料,若資料符合,該驗證機器在步驟284確認使用者的身分,一旦 持卡人的身分被確認,帳戶資訊在步驟285中被送到一個帳戶確認中 心,而且確認中心會在步驟286傳回一個確認到驗證機器中,然後步 戰287會提供一個收據給持卡人。 在此實施例中,持卡人的帳號資訊沒有被送出去,直到持卡人的 身分被確認,這樣提供了相較於帳號資訊在使用者身分與簽名作確認 前就被送出去下的傳統作法絕佳的安全性。 請參考第2H圖,此為本發明中使用安全卡方法之一實施例之流 程圖。 —如第2G圖所示,一個使用安全卡280的方法包含步驟281*** 安全卡到驗證機器中,接著步驟282持卡人要提供生物特徵輸入,在 步驟283中驗證機器比對生物特徵輸入與存放在安全卡甲的生物特徵 資料’若資料符合,該驗證機器在步驟284確認使用者的身分,在此 201117136 實施例巾面,沒有任何訊息透過網路傳輸,而且確認程序在驗證機器 的本地發生’輯射人祕了最佳贼纽,縣沒有任何持卡人 的資料被械麵職糾難上,料人_難紐餘取或溢 用。 請參考第21圖,此為本發明之一實施例所示之安全卡之正面示意 圖’在第2I圖中示的實施例中,安全卡2〇〇的包含了商標21〇、記憶 體240與-個透明的輸入區域讓持卡人輸入他們的生物特徵資料,舉 例來說,在安全卡涵人麻證顧後,持卡人練—根細到這塊 透明輸入區域29G上,驗證機ϋ掃描缺並且與存放在安全卡2〇〇内 的記憶體240中的指紋資料進行比對。 在此實施例中因為指頭不會直接碰觸驗證機器,該指紋無法被轉 印,舉例而言,若該驗證機器的表面是玻璃,而且該持卡人為了掃描 ^紋’按壓他們的手制玻璃上,職有可能會有魏的指紋留在玻 璃上’雖細難,但小偷還是有可能自玻璃上竊取_份指紋的副本, 然而在此實施例中’持卡人按壓他們的指紋到透明的輸人區域29〇 上,其介於持卡人的手指和驗證機器的表面間,若指紋被轉印,它會 留在透明輸人區域290上_驗證機ϋ上,該透明輸人區域29〇可以 輕鬆的被擦拭乾淨來移除指紋的痕跡。 請參考第2J圖’此為本發明之一實施例所示之安全卡之正面示意 圖’在本發明之實施例中,安全卡200 &含了複數的透明輸入區域, 在=2」@示的實施例中’安全卡2〇〇 &含了一第一透明輸入區域29〇 和一第二透明輸入區域291,這允許兩份生物特徵資料同時一起輸 入由於要求複數的各自生物特徵輸入,安全性就增加了,舉例來說, 包3 了四個透明輸入區域的安全卡讓兩隻手的四個手指可以同時輸 入。 請參考第2Κ圖,此為本發明之一實施例所示之安全卡之正面示意 圖,在此實施例中,沒有任何資訊顯示在安全卡200上,安全卡200 只包含了記憶體240,其中持卡人的生物特徵資料被存放在此,該實 201117136 在卡片上顯示,料張持卡人的簽名、姓名、帳號號碼都不會 標不會被顯示出來,沒有’此外,發卡人或公司的商 任何訊息可以被看到卡f麼被使用,因為沒有 邊或如何使帛。除了料人本料,沒人知道賊卡可以在哪 全卡的3·^個實施例中,一個個人識別號碼或密碼被存放到安 徵資料i完成確認2奴會輸人個人識舰碼或密碼伴隨著生物特 請參考第3圖 例方法之流程圖。 此為本發明中使用安全卡來辨識持卡人之一實施 =方法3GD起始於在步驟⑽存放—個持卡人的生物雜資料到 二坎内’接下來步驟320當卡片被使用的時候,持卡人會輸入生物 次徵_貝料’且在步驟330該輸入之生物特徵資料會與儲存的生物特徵 ^料作比對來確認持卡人身分,若職料符合,麟卡人的身分就被 破Μ 〇 請參考第4Α圖’此為本發明中使用安全卡之一實施例方法之流程 圖。 該方法400起始於在步驟41〇中***或放入該安全卡到一個驗證 機器上,在步驟411Α中’該使用者提供或輸入複數個錄特徵輸入, 舉例來說’該者放置右手食指進去或放在_個靜脈紋路讀取機 (vein reader)上’當讀取機掃描使用者放置之右手食指的靜脈紋路後, 舉例來說,接著放入左手拇指進去或放在該靜脈紋路讀取機上,該驗 證機器比對輸入的生物特徵資料,在此例子中,右手食指和左手拇指 靜脈紋路和該生物特徵在步驟412中存放在該安全卡中,若輸入的生 物特徵資料符合存放的生物特徵資料,則在步驟413中該使用者身分 就被確認或驗證,並且適當的行動或程序就會被執行,比方說若該安 全卡被用來開一道門’那門就會解鎖,被驗證過的使用者就能進入, 201117136 或著另外一個例子,若該安全卡被用來使用一台自動提款機,該確認 後之使用者就能進行存取他們的帳戶。 在本發明之一個實施例中,複數個生物特徵輸入是不同的,舉例 而言輸入可以是一個手掌靜脈紋路和一個指紋,這允許該使用者來建 立一個唯一碼作為次序(sequence)而且輸入型態只有該使用者知道, 這對該使用者和安全卡提供者提供了高度安全性,舉例來說,使用者 選擇左手的手掌靜脈紋路是第一個輸入,然後右手拇指是第二個輸 入,左手食指指紋是第三個輸入,並將其存放到安全卡内,若這些輸 入的次序不正確或是輸入不符合安全卡中存放的生物特徵資料,那麼 存取就會被拒絕且該使用者無法繼續處理。 請參考第4B圖,此為本發明使用安全卡之一實施例方法之流程 圖。 該方法400起始於在步驟41〇中***或放入該安全卡到一個驗證 機器上,接下來在步驟411B中該使用者提供一手指或是手掌進行靜 脈紋路掃描,該驗證機器在步驟412中比對輸入靜脈紋路與存在在安 全卡上的生物特徵資料,若輸入的生物特徵資料與存放的生物特徵資 料吻合,則在步驟413中該使用者之身分就被確認或是驗證,並且適 當的行動或程序就會被執行。 »月參考第4C圖,此為本發明使用安全卡之一實施例方法之流程 圖。 該方法400起始於在步驟41〇中***或放入該安全卡到一個驗證 機器上,接下來在步驟411C中該使用者提供一手指或是手掌來進行 靜脈紋路掃描,該驗證機器在步驟412中比對輸入靜脈紋路與存在在 安全卡上的生物特徵資料,若輸入的生物特徵資料與存放的生物特徵 資料吻合,則在步驟413中該使用者之身分就被確認或是驗證,在步 驟414該認證過的使用者選擇銀行帳戶來存取,且轉帳、提款或存款 一數量的金額,舉例而言,該安全卡被用來當做自動提款卡或是信用 卡,當正在進行購物的時候,該認證過後的使用者可以進行電子交易 12 201117136 將錢轉給零售商店,由於只有認證過後的使用者可以存取帳號,是故 本發明之安全卡提供傳統***或簽帳卡更為高的安全性,在步驟 415中,該金額被轉帳、提款或存款。 請參考第4C圖,此為本發明使用安全卡之一實施例方法之流程 圖。 在第4D圖中所述之方法400與第4C圖的實施例類似,然而在此 實施例中,安全卡用來作為簽帳卡或是電子錢包卡,一旦使用者被認 證,他們可以轉帳進去、自裡面扣款、自裡面提款或是存錢到該安全 卡。 在本發明之一個實施例中,該安全卡有複數的使用情形,舉例來 說’張文全卡可以用來作為***、簽帳卡、門禁卡和駕驶執照, 如此提供使用者更為彈性和便利的使用情境,此外多個銀行帳戶和不 同銀行的帳號可以透過一張卡就能存取。 在本發明之一實施例中,如果一個單一卡片要存取多個銀行,有 一些資料存放在這些銀行,且這張卡的作用會像是鑰匙可以開啟許多 個門,但是在這些門被打開前,銀行需要進行生物確認,在一實施例 中,一旦門打開了,資料正確性將會被確認和被一個銀行行員如主管 來背書或是雙重生物確認,舉例來說,該持卡人和主管確認一起打開 這道門,這避免駭客有辦法可以存取此銀行帳號,除此之外,在門安 全的打開後’ 一台自動提款機指會在生物資料和生物特徵資料確認後 建立並傳送一唯一帳號’持卡人就可以繼續進行剩下的程序。 請參考第4E圖,此為本發明中使用安全卡之一實施例方法之流程 圖。 在第4E圖中描述的方法4〇〇與第4D圖的實施例類似,然而在此 實施例中,若安全卡被通報失竊或遺失,該卡的金額就會被退回原本 的銀行帳號,且該卡片就會在步驟416中被取消,不像一般的簽帳卡 將使用者存放的錢記錄在卡片中。 在本發明之一實施例中’一個銀行或是金融機構對該安全卡維護 201117136 了一個交易記錄,當該卡片被使用或是進行購物時,該銀行會被通知 自卡片中提出的金額數目和卡片的結餘金額,如此一來,若卡片被遺 失,卡片内剩餘的金額就會被退回到該使用者的銀行帳號内,且卡片 就會失效並且取消該卡片的剩餘金額。 在本發明之一個實施例中,一個交易伺服器維護多個帳號的交易 記錄,舉例來說一使用者擁有三家銀行的三個帳號,不同數量的金額 可以被傳輸到安全卡中,若被通報遺失或是被竊取,該交易伺服器就 會退回正確的金額到每個銀行的對應帳戶去。 請參考第4F圖,此為本發明之一個實施例所示使用安全卡之方法 的流程圖。 該方法400起始於在步驟410中***或放入該安全卡到一個驗證 機器上,接下來在步驟411D中該使用者提供或是輸入一生物特徵資 料或是多個生物特徵資料,該驗證機器在步驟412中比對輸入的生物 特徵資料與存在在安全卡上的生物特徵資料,在步驟413B中,若輸 入的生物特徵資料與存放在安全卡中的緊急碼符合,適當的保全或是 相關當局就會被通知,並且該卡片就會失效,舉例說明,該使用者存 放在卡片的次序是右手食指靜脈紋路、左手母指紋、右手手掌靜脈紋 路作為正確的生物特徵組合和次序,在一緊急的狀況下,如遭遇搶劫, 使用者可哺人另外-種龍組合或糊,紐警察齡被通知有搶 案正在發生。 請參考第4G圖,此為本發明中使用安全卡之一實施例方法之流 程圖。 在第4G圖中所述之方法400與第4F圖的實施例類似,然而在此 實施例中,該安全卡作為一個自動提款卡、簽帳卡或是***,在步 驟413C裡面’若輸入的生物特徵資料吻合存放在安全卡中的緊急碼, 相關备局或是保全就會被通知,且會顯示一個假的帳戶餘額,舉例來 說該使用者目前擁有一萬元在他們的帳戶内,且該使用者被搶指著威 脅要存取他們的帳戶,若使用傳統的自動提款卡該使用者將會面臨著 201117136 暴露目前帳戶餘額和冒著損失所有餘額的風險,或是面臨如果拒絕存 取此帳戶可能的人身傷害,然而,若使用本發明,使用者可以用緊急 碼組合和相來存取雜號,—個假_號餘額就會顯示在螢幕上, 舉例來說,自動提款機將不會顯示正確的餘額一萬元,而是顯示任意 或疋事先選取的金額如三十二塊,如此—來,該仙者雜安全的存 取帳號並且只能提出三十二塊錢;P需要胃著人身傷害的赚,因為搶 匪只能看到該帳號只剩下這些錢。 晴參考第5A圖’此為本發明中使用安全卡之一實施例方法之流 圖》 第5A圖中所述之方法500,該使用者先在步驟511a中提供一個 簽名,在步驟512A中該驗證機器或是收銀人員比對該輸入的簽名與 存放在安全卡内的簽名作比對,若存放的簽名和輸入的簽名不符合、 那麼卡片就會被拒絕,且若他們符合,該使用者在步驟513A中提供 一個生物特徵輸入或是多個輸入,如前所述,資料只在生物資料被; 認後才從記憶體内被讀取出來,比方說,現在的情形是非卡片使用者 的其他人可以在生物資料確認前比對簽名,在用其他讀取器刷卡簽名 前看到該簽名,然後複製其寫法,以f用卡片。而透過先確認生物特 徵資料然後再比對簽名的方法,除了授權持卡人外無人可使用這張卡 片。 在步驟514A中該驗證機器比對輸入的生物特徵資料與存放的生 物特徵資料,在步驟515A若輸人符合存放的資料該使用者被授權或 驗證,若兩組資料不合,那麼卡片就會被拒絕。 在此實施例中,該使用者必須在提供生物特徵資料前先提供一個 簽名,該實施例提供增強的安全性,因為存放的生物特 卡片中被讀取出來直到提供-個正確的簽名,存放任何 到卡片中的一個危害疋為了要確認此輸入吻合存放的資料此存放的 資料必須先被取出,然而此實施例中,重要的資料不能被讀取或是存 取,一直到生物特徵輸入和生物特徵存放資料被確認而且該簽名也被 15 201117136 確認過後才行。 請參考第5B圖,此為本發明中使用安全卡之一實施例之方法之流 程圖。 第5B圖所述之方法500與第5A圖之實施例類似,然而在本發明 之此實施例中,在生物特徵確認前或後,多個不同程度的生物特徵資 料輸入是必須的,然後重要資料才可以從卡片中讀取出來,舉例來說, 在步驟511B甲該使用者輸入一個密碼或是個人識別碼,而且如果正 確’使用者在步驟513B中輸入第二個資料如右手食指靜脈紋路,若 再步驟514B中也符合此存放的資料,該使用者接著會輸入另外一個 生物特徵資料如左手手掌靜脈紋路,如果這也與存放的資料符合,則 在步驟515B該使用者就可以被允許來存取或是進行一個活動。 在本發明之一實施例中,該使用者自動提供資訊,舉例來說,當 使用者試著要使用安全卡時,該使用者的體重會被一個磅秤測量其 他的資訊可以取得,如身高、·、赠速路、脈搏、視網膜掃描和 鞋子尺寸等等’進-步增加安全性,舉例而言,若遭遇搶案時,一個 搶匪就站在使用者旁if或賴,由於制者和搶匪的财總和一定大 於使用者自己的體重,當存放的使用者體重不符合目前的狀況,相對 應的程序就會進行。 也藉由偵測在一塊區域内每個人的體重,同時間只有一個人可以 允許進入-個區域,舉例而言-個高度安全的機構,避免多個人使用 一張安全卡進入同一個區域。 在本發明之-實施例中,輸入資料進-步包含節奏和旋律, 來說存放的資料根據歌曲或是片語的節奏來選取,當使用者提供其 物特徵資料時、按鍵_次料找碼,這些資料傾紅確^ 或是旋律輸入,在此實施例中,為了要使用該安全卡,使用者必^揾 供用正確的次序和正確的節奏與旋律來正確的輸入。 ' 在本發明之此實施例中’該驗證機器進一步包含一個平板 為輸入之用,在此實施例中’該使用者輸入一個圖案、形狀、形狀序 201117136 列、字母、簽名、單字、顏色或是以上的組合,舉瘌來說,使用者可 以選擇一個藍色圓圈接著一個黃色三角形和一個單字"textb〇〇k"作為 正確的序列和組合來使用這張安全卡。 在本發明之部分實施例中,需要複數個生物特徵資料輸入,舉例 來說,一個指紋和紅膜被掃描並與存放在卡片内的生物特徵資料做比 對。 在本發明之另一實施例中,生物特徵資料為依序輸入,舉例來說, 先是一個右手食指指紋做輸入,再來左手的中指指紋然後接著是右手 拇指指紋,在此實施例中面,此序列增加了嘗試濫用此安全卡的複雜 度’只有持卡人知道需要依照怎樣的輸入序列。 在本發明之實施例中,該安全卡包含了 一張***、身分辨識卡、 駕駛#<照、門禁卡、員工證、護照、醫療保險卡、自動提款卡、銀行 卡、簽帳卡、運輸卡、大眾交通卡、全國識別卡、會員資格卡、或是 一個保險櫃或是鎖櫃的鑰匙。 如上所述,此發明提供一張帶有持卡人的生物特徵資料之安全 卡’ f這張安全卡被使用時,該持卡人提供—生物特徵輸人,這些輸 入接著與存放在安全卡中的資料進行比對,如果吻合,該持卡人的身 分就被確認’如此-來’ κ有鱗卡人才能使料張安全卡,即便這 張卡被偷了’小偷也無法㈣它,此外,只㈣卡人知道怎樣的生物 特徵資料需要被輸入。 請參考第6Α圖,其為本發明中防盜用安全卡之一實施例示意圖, 第6B-6C圖為本發明中防盜用安全卡之—實施例之側面剖視圖。 在第6A-6C圖所示之實施例中’本發明之防盜用安全卡6〇〇包含 了-個透明的生物特徵資料區域咖在卡片本體⑽上,在這些實施 例中個Ba片或疋s己憶體不需要存放該使用者的生物特徵資料該 使用者的生㈣《㈣歧印在透_生㈣师料區域 620 ’舉例來說該生物特徵資料被雷射_、墨水影印、熱轉印印壓 膜、雕刻、電腦數值控制加工等等放到卡片本體61〇上賊透明的生 17 201117136 物特徵資料樣板區域620。 在第6B圖所示之實施例中,該生物特徵資料樣板被姓刻或是印在 該透明生物特徵資料區域620的上層表面上。 在第6C圖所示之實施例中’生物特徵資料樣板被雷射蝕刻、墨 水影印、熱轉印、印壓膜、雕刻、電腦數值控制加工到該透明生物特 徵資料樣板區域620的内部區域,這樣避免蝕刻或是影印因磨損所造 成的影響,也連帶避免任何直接干擾此生物特資料的任何嘗試。 在本發明之實施例中,若當生物特徵資料樣板產生時,僅建立生 物特徵資料樣板之-部份,舉綱言,财-核3Q%之指紋生物特 徵資料樣板被建立,可更增加保護之隱密性及安全性。 若生物特徵資料被修改的生物特徵資料重複刻入或修改,例如企 圖將透明生物特徵資_域置換掉,讀卡機可輕㈣測到此意圖,例 如讀卡機可偵測到透明區域及卡片本體不完整,或出現異常的痕跡。 由於在這些實施例中並未使用晶片,因此生物特徵資料無法從積 雜電路中被讀取或偷竊,再者,使用晶片產品之成本會增加。 在本發明之部分實施例中提供複數透明生物特徵資料區域,以接 受數種型態或量測之生物特徵資料儲存在安全卡中。 在使用時,使用者將卡片給讀卡機並提供一生物特徵輸入到讀卡 機或生物特徵掃瞄器、讀取器中,接著讀卡器比較使用者之生物特徵 輸入與安全卡上透明生物特徵資料區域中所儲存之生物特徵資料。 若輸入之生物特徵資料與儲存之生物特徵資料相符,則使用者之 身分確認,並授權使用該卡片,反之若兩者不相符,則安全卡會被拒 絕,授權不被接受。 請參考第6D圖,其為本發明中防盜用安全卡之一實施例示意圖。 在第6D圖所示之實施例中,防盜用安全卡6〇〇更包括一透明生 物特徵資料輸入區域630 ’使用時’使用者提供安全卡6〇〇給讀卡機, 並透過透明生物特徵資料輸入區域630提供一生物特徵資料輸入,身 分確認及授權程序接著如第6A圖中所述執行。 201117136 凊參考第6E圖’其為本發明中防盜用安全卡之另一實施例示意 圖。 在第6E ®所示本㈣之防㈣安全卡實關巾,祕透明生物特 徵資料輸人區域及透物特徵資·域在卡片本體61G上合併成一 透明輸入及儲存資料區段625,透明輸人及儲存資料區段625之功能 與第6D圖中之二透明元件相似,但只有一個透明輸入及儲存資料區 段625便可同時完成兩個目的。 清參考第6F圖’其為本發明中防盜用安全卡之另一實施例示意 圖。 在第6F圖所示本發明之防盜用安全卡實施例中更包括一積體電 路晶片64G,其制以齡使用者之生物特徵資料,在此實施例中使 用者之生㈣«财_存於卡林體⑽之透批祕徵資料區 域620中,還儲存在晶片640中。 使用時,使用者提供安全卡6〇〇給讀卡機,並提供生物特徵輸入, 右生物特徵輪人與儲存在透明生物特徵資料區域62()中之生物特徵資 料相符’讀卡機讀取儲存在晶片64G中之生物特徵㈣;若輸入之生 物特徵資料無存在“ 64Q巾之生物概龍相符,射認使用者 之身分,並授權使用者可以使用安全卡6〇〇。 若輸入之生物特徵資料、儲存在卡片透明生物特徵請區域之生 物特徵資料細存在"中之生物特师料有任何_者與其他二者不 符’則讀卡機拒職安全卡,使时無法使肋張卡片。 ,實施例提供了更進階的安全性,有輸人之生物特徵資料 及儲存在卡片之透明生物資料區域中之生物特相 =取及_,观f _—侧概細4機讀取 貧料。 广说在f實施例令’生物特徵輸入、儲存在卡片透明生物特徵資料 A =物特徵資料或儲存在晶片中之生物特徵資料係同時被比較。 透過比較三個生物特徵資料,由於三個生物特徵資料必須要相 201117136 符,因此晶片無法被複寫以免與另二者不符β 請參考第7圖’其為本發明中防盜用安全卡之另一實施例示意圖。 在第7圖所示本發明之防盜用安全卡實施例中利用偵測卡片60Q 熱處理或修改之功能提供更進階之安全性,在此實施例中卡片本體 610之透明生物特徵資料區域620延伸到卡片本體610之每一邊,舉 例而言,若竊賊企圖置換成透明生物特徵資料區域62〇,例如將原始 的生物特徵钮刻切割下來換成另一個新的生物特徵钮刻,則透明生物 特徵資料區域之任何痕跡或不完整都會輕易被偵測到,而使卡片被拒 絕使用,而企圖置換晶片同樣容易被偵測到。 此外,若竊賊試圖將整個透明區域換掉,卡片本體之其他三 個區域會被分離,難以將卡片本體之四個區域重組成一個區塊,若將 這些區域焊接則容易被偵測到而拒絕接受卡片。 請參考第8圖,其為本發明中具有一導電片之防盜用安全卡之一 實施例之示意圖。 在第8圖之實施例中’本發明之防錢安全卡6⑽更包括複數導 電片650’此些導電片650讓安全卡6⑻之功能近似於大型積體電路, 導電片650為輸丨且/或輸人接點,使讀卡機可對插人之安全卡進 行存取之動作。201117136 VI. Description of the Invention: [Technical Field] The present invention relates to an identity and payment card and a method for confirming the identity of a card holder, in particular to a security card with biometric data and biometric data Cannot be modified or copied. [Prior Art] Press, credit cards are widely used all over the world, making product purchase and service more convenient. Credit cards allow users to carry cash without having to carry them. However, 'credit card theft and fraud has gradually become the main problem for credit card holders and financial institutions.' If a credit card is stolen, the thief only needs to forge the cardholder’s signature, and the signature must be displayed on the back of the credit card. It is quite easy. Therefore, the thief can easily use the credit card, causing the cardholder to bear the cost of the unpurchased goods. Sometimes the financial institution has to bear the consumption, whichever is the result of the cardholder or financial institution. Loss 0 In addition, the thief can copy the cardholder information stored therein by reading the magnetic strip on the back of the credit card and store the cardholder information in another new card. The copied card is used or sold by the thief. Out. Any H-purchase of the card for the service age will be recorded in the cardholder's order until the cardholder informs the financial institution that the credit card has been stolen and the card is stopped. In the partial copy of the fake card case towel, the cardholder expects that the tau month of the fresh mail found this situation, because the scale card holder's bill is the most secret amount of the class. One of the purchase financial institutions must be a purchase of the cost of the purchase and the loss of the cardholder or financial institution is a front view of the traditional technology credit card. As shown in the figure below, the traditional credit card 1 〇〇 之 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融 金融Then 201117136 1 is a reverse view of a conventional credit card in the prior art. The credit card strip 14G includes the account information of the credit card 140 stored in the magnetic strip 140. The traditional letter card 1QQ's correctiveness allows the thief to have the opportunity to read and · 160 i signature strip gamma _ let the card holder sign the name thief practice signature until the film accepts the card. An example of a signature is 211C, which is a flow chart of the conventional method of confirming a credit card through the Internet in the prior art, and the 1D circle is a conventional method of using a credit card in the prior art. The traditional method of using cards and traditional systems still includes - customers provide credit, '. In the cashier's step 181, the cashier passes the "card scanner I" broom credit chip broom H 171 || takes the account data stored in the credit card magnetic strip, and then proceeds to the account data via the telephone line 172 to have In the central database 173 of the account database, in step 183, the central server 173 confirms whether the account has a sufficient amount of payment/branch fee and sends a confirmation notification to the card scanner pi in step 184. Print out the purchase details, step 186 the user and sign the purchase details. Then step 187, the cashier compares the signature on the back of the card with the signature on the purchase details. If the cashier feels that the two match, the customer fee will be dissipated. A detailed copy and invoice, as described in step 188 'Because the cashier's subjective awareness judges the authenticity of the signature, it often produces errors. Another disadvantage of traditional cards and systems is that the data is stored in a central feeding device, so 骇If the guest invades the server, the information can be stolen. In some cases, including the present invention, information such as an account number, a customer number, and the like are stored on the central server. The biometrics and the like are not stored in the central server. Therefore, the present invention provides a security card for anti-theft with biometric data and a method of using the same, which can prevent the credit card from being modified or copied, and can confirm the personal identity of the user. To avoid theft of thieves, the specific architecture and its implementation will be described in detail below. 4 201117136 [Invention] In order to achieve the advantages described in the present invention and overcome the disadvantages of the prior art, the present invention provides an anti-theft device with biometric data. The security card, which is protected against modification, copying, and use, including a cardholder's biometric data, can be used to confirm the cardholder's unique identity. Biometric data may include, for example, vein patterns and joint patterns. , fingerprint, iris or eye, palm print, face, DNA data, or a combination of the above. The security card contains a sample of the user's biometric information, and the biometric information is stored in the memory of the security card. When the security card is used, the biometric data stored in the biometric data stored in the security card is used by the user. For example, if the biometric data is the fingerprint of the right middle finger, the user places his right middle finger on a verification machine, and the data is initially compared. Therefore, even if the security card is lost or stolen, because there is any The biometric data of others is consistent with the cardholder, so no one can use it. The security card contains the cardholder's unique card number, which is generated by the user's biometric data, if the biometric data and card are entered. If the biometric data of the person does not match, the card number cannot be accessed. The method to achieve "anti-theft" is based on the unique -^ number generated by the user's own biometric data. Otherwise, all accesses will fail. Security cards cannot be modified or changed. For example, if there is no unique protection of the ^ number, the thief can use a fake card and enter his biometric data in the memory, and engrave the biological data template in the biometric data area. Then everything becomes his. The information, and his identity will be verified successfully. Since the unique number is generated by the biometric data of the cardholder, the card number generated by different people must be different and cannot be stolen by others, and can be corresponding to the biometric data in the memory and engraved on the security card. The biometric data template is used to prevent modification or reply of the abuse card. Therefore, the present invention provides a security card for anti-theft. Furthermore, the unique card number is either laser-engraved or otherwise applied to the card or card, and only a portion of the data can be used for the verification process. What's more, the unique number cannot be calculated or decoded by biometric data. In one embodiment of the present invention, the security card is a credit card. When the cardholder consumes, the cardholder provides the security card to the cashier for transaction, and then the cardholder provides one or a group through scanning, checking, and the like. With unique biometric characteristics of the physical characteristics, the cashier can then read or scan the biometric data in the security card by scanning or inserting the card into the card reader or verifying the machine. The biometric data is compared with the biometric data provided by the cardholder at the site. If the two match, the identity confirmation is completed. One of the advantages of the present invention is that when certain materials or information are exchanged through the network, no personal identity authentication or biometric data can be transmitted through the network, and identity verification is performed on the local verification machine to avoid identity theft or The cardholder’s information was stolen. In another embodiment of the present invention, the security card is an identity card, and the cardholder inserts the identity card into a verification machine and provides biometric information, such as vein patterns or fingerprints, to verify that the machine is stored in the identity card. The biometric data and the biometric data provided by the cardholder, if the information is the same, verify that the machine confirms the identity of the cardholder. Another advantage of the present invention is that only the cardholder knows which biometric data to provide. 'Because of the wide range of biometrics that may be input, the security is higher, and even if stolen, the thief does not know which organism to use. Characteristic data. The security card of the present invention contains the same board, conductive traces or other means to avoid the replacement of the wafer containing the biometric data. 'This wafer cannot be moved from the security card and replaced with another wafer'. Any modification made on the security card will be detected. So, the security card can no longer be used except the original cardholder. The purpose, technical contents, features and effects achieved by the present invention will become more apparent from the detailed description of the embodiments. [Embodiment] The present invention provides a security card for anti-theft with biometric data and a method for using the same, the security card includes a unique number of each card holder, and the unique number is used by the card issuing institution. The personal biometric data is established, and the card numbers generated by different people must be different, so they cannot be stolen by others. The input biometric data is verified as and the card 6 201117136 and the method used to achieve the "anti-theft" based on the user's own biometric data to establish a translation (丨nte_) of the only card (four) and input (4) The data is met. Otherwise, all the programs will fail, and the card cannot be changed or modified. For example, 'no card-protection'. A thief can use a blank card and put it into their own creature. Wei (4) to Ji (4), and in the bio-data area, the biometric sample (patten), and all things are their own information, and their identity will be successfully confirmed, since the only card number is The thief's own sacred sign (4), which is established by the cardholder's biometric data, cannot meet this unique card number, and the biological dragon data and side biological characteristics in the replacement memory (4) are still insufficient on the card to change or interfere. Stomach sheet, so the present invention can really provide - a security card for anti-theft 0 In addition, this only card number can be added to the card by the laser side to other methods Or inside surface, and can be used - as part of the ratio of raw material to (iv) use. Further, the card-only number cannot be guessed or decoded from the biometric data. Please refer to FIG. 2A, which is a front elevational view of the security card shown in one embodiment of the present invention. In the embodiment of FIG. 2A, the security card 2 of the present invention includes a trademark 21 〇 or the name of the security card issuer 'the trademark may be the name of the financial institution or the name of the company' security card 2GG, for example. The front also contains the cardholder's name 22Q and the account number 23〇 or the user number 'and has a memory chip 240 connected or back into the security card 2' when the user requests this security card 2GG when 'the user provides a sample or example of some biometric information, this biometric information can identify the only user, because no two people have the same biometrics' In the memory 240 of the card 2', when the security card 2QG is used, the cardholder provides or inputs their biometrics, and the input will be stored with the biometrics stored in the note, _ 24Q 201117136 The data is compared, and if the two match 'cardholders' identity can be confirmed. Please refer to FIG. 2B, which is a schematic diagram of the back side of the security card shown in an embodiment of the present invention. The back side of the security card 2 of the present invention shown in the embodiment of FIG. 2B includes a magnetic strip 250 and - a signature area 26〇, the information is stored in the magnetic stripe 25〇, the information will be read when the security card is used, the signature area 26Q allows the user to sign their own last name; δ 270, the card The person's information includes account information, account code, personal identification number, member X number, security level, class, gold structure identification, card number, card issuer identification, company name or a combination of the above. Please refer to FIG. 2C. FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the back side of the security card shown in one embodiment of the present invention. In another-one real towel, the signature area does not appear, because the signature of the domain card person cannot be seen, which increases. Security, in this embodiment, when the security card is used, the cardholder's signature is compared with the signature data stored in the memory of the security card, which can be said to be more visual than the cashier. Relatively precise, in this embodiment, the biometric input and the biometrics stored in the card are first compared. If both are the same after verification, the signature stored in the card will be the same as the cardholder. The provided signatures are compared and all the information will only be read from the card after confirming the biometric data. This is used to avoid comparing the stored signatures and copying the signatures. In doing so, the thief cannot copy and store them. The signature of it. In another embodiment, there is no signature area, and no signature is required when using the security card, because the biometrics are more complicated and impossible to copy, comparing the biometric data in the card memory with the user's Biometric data provides sufficient security. Please refer to FIG. 2D, which is a schematic diagram of the back side of the security card shown in an embodiment of the present invention. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 2D, neither the magnetic strip nor the signature area appears. In this embodiment, generally The information stored on the magnetic strip will be stored in the memory of the security card together with the biometric data, which further increases the security, because the information must be confirmed after the biometrics are confirmed, relatively existing situations. The information stored in the magnetic strip can be read by a card reader without the relative input of the card holder. 201117136 Please refer to FIG. 2D, which is a front view of a security card according to an embodiment of the present invention. In another embodiment of the present invention, the front side of the security card 2 includes the trademark 21〇, the card holder. The name 220 and the memory 240 are stored with the biometric data stored by the cardholder. In this embodiment, the security card 200 does not display the cardholder's account number or identification number. Please refer to FIG. 2F, which is a front view of a security card according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 2F, the cardholder's name and account number are not displayed on the security card 200. This adds security, because no one knows who this security card belongs to, except for the cardholder. The cardholder's name and account information cannot be accessed until the biometric data stored and the biometrics entered. The data has been verified to be in compliance. Please refer to FIG. 2G, which is a flow chart of a method for using a security card according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 2G, a method of using the security card 280 includes the step 281 of inserting a security card into the verification machine, then step 282 the cardholder provides a biometric input, and in step 283, verifying the machine comparison biometric input and storage. The biometric data in the security card, if the data is met, the verification machine confirms the identity of the user in step 284. Once the identity of the cardholder is confirmed, the account information is sent to an account confirmation center in step 285, and the confirmation is made. The center will return a confirmation to the verification machine in step 286, and then step 287 will provide a receipt to the cardholder. In this embodiment, the cardholder's account information is not sent until the identity of the cardholder is confirmed, thus providing a tradition of being sent out before the user identity and signature are confirmed compared to the account information. Excellent safety. Please refer to FIG. 2H, which is a flow chart of an embodiment of a method for using a security card in the present invention. - As shown in Figure 2G, a method of using the security card 280 includes the step 281 of inserting the security card into the verification machine, then step 282 the cardholder provides the biometric input, and in step 283, the verification of the machine comparison biometric input and The biometric data stored in the security card 'If the data is met, the verification machine confirms the user's identity in step 284. In this 201117136 embodiment, no message is transmitted through the network, and the confirmation program is verifying the locality of the machine. The occurrence of 'the shooting of the secret of the best thief New Zealand, the county does not have any cardholders' information is being corrected by the mechanics, and it is expected that the _ difficult to take or overflow. Please refer to FIG. 21, which is a front view of a security card according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 2, the security card 2 includes the trademark 21〇, the memory 240 and - A transparent input area allows cardholders to enter their biometric data. For example, after the security card has been checked, the cardholder practices the roots to the transparent input area 29G. The scan is missing and compared to the fingerprint data stored in the memory 240 in the security card 2〇〇. In this embodiment, since the finger does not directly touch the verification machine, the fingerprint cannot be transferred, for example, if the surface of the verification machine is glass, and the card holder presses their hand for scanning On the glass, the job may have Wei's fingerprint left on the glass. 'Although it is difficult, but the thief may still steal a copy of the fingerprint from the glass, but in this embodiment, the cardholder presses their fingerprint to The transparent input area is 29 inches, which is between the cardholder's finger and the surface of the verification machine. If the fingerprint is transferred, it will remain on the transparent input area 290. Area 29〇 can be easily wiped clean to remove fingerprints. Please refer to FIG. 2J, which is a front view of a security card according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the embodiment of the present invention, the security card 200 & includes a plurality of transparent input areas, at =2"@ In the embodiment, the 'safety card 2〇〇& includes a first transparent input area 29〇 and a second transparent input area 291, which allows two biometric data to be simultaneously input together due to the requirement for a plurality of respective biometric inputs, Security has increased. For example, a security card with four transparent input areas allows the four fingers of both hands to be simultaneously input. Please refer to FIG. 2, which is a front view of a security card according to an embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, no information is displayed on the security card 200, and the security card 200 only includes the memory 240. The biometric data of the cardholder is stored here. The actual 201117136 is displayed on the card. The signature, name and account number of the cardholder will not be displayed. There is no 'in addition, the card issuer or the company's Any message can be seen when the card is used, because there is no edge or how to make it. In addition to the material, no one knows where the thief card can be in the full 3. In one embodiment, a personal identification number or password is stored in the security information i to confirm 2 slaves to lose personal identification code or The password is accompanied by a bio-specific flow chart referring to the method of Figure 3. This is a method for identifying a cardholder using a security card in the present invention. The method 3GD starts from storing the biometric data of the cardholder in the step (10) into the second ridge. The next step 320 is when the card is used. The cardholder will enter the bio-subsequence_bee material and the biometric data input in step 330 will be compared with the stored biometrics to confirm the cardholder identity. If the material meets, the cardholder's identity The identity is broken. Please refer to Figure 4 for a flow chart of a method for using a security card in the present invention. The method 400 begins by inserting or placing the security card into a verification machine in step 41, and in step 411, the user provides or inputs a plurality of recorded feature inputs, for example, the person places the right index finger. Go in or put on a vein reader. (When the reader scans the vein pattern of the right index finger placed by the user, for example, then put the left thumb into it or put it in the vein pattern. On the pick-up, the verification machine compares the input biometric data. In this example, the right index finger and the left thumb vein vein and the biometric feature are stored in the security card in step 412, if the input biometric data is in accordance with the storage. The biometric data is then confirmed or verified in step 413, and the appropriate action or procedure is executed, for example, if the security card is used to open a door, the door will be unlocked. The authenticated user can enter, 201117136 or another example, if the security card is used to use an automatic teller machine, the confirmed user can Line access to their accounts. In one embodiment of the invention, the plurality of biometric inputs are different. For example, the input can be a palm vein pattern and a fingerprint, which allows the user to create a unique code as a sequence and input type. Only the user knows that this provides a high degree of security for the user and the security card provider. For example, the user selects the palm vein pattern of the left hand as the first input, and then the right thumb is the second input. The left index finger fingerprint is the third input and is stored in the security card. If the order of these inputs is incorrect or the input does not match the biometric data stored in the security card, the access will be denied and the user will be denied. Unable to continue processing. Please refer to FIG. 4B, which is a flow chart of a method for using one of the security cards of the present invention. The method 400 begins by inserting or placing the security card into a verification machine in step 41, and then in step 411B the user provides a finger or palm for vein pattern scanning, the verification machine is in step 412. Comparing the input vein pattern with the biometric data existing on the security card, if the input biometric data matches the stored biometric data, the identity of the user is confirmed or verified in step 413, and appropriate The action or program will be executed. »Month Referring to Figure 4C, this is a flow diagram of an embodiment of a method of using a security card of the present invention. The method 400 begins by inserting or placing the security card into a verification machine in step 41, and then in step 411C the user provides a finger or palm for vein scanning, the verification machine is in the step Comparing the input vein pattern with the biometric data existing on the security card in 412, if the input biometric data matches the stored biometric data, the identity of the user is confirmed or verified in step 413. Step 414: The authenticated user selects a bank account to access, and transfers, withdraws, or deposits a quantity amount, for example, the security card is used as an ATM card or a credit card when shopping is in progress At the time, the authenticated user can conduct electronic transactions 12 201117136 to transfer the money to the retail store. Since only the authenticated user can access the account, the security card of the present invention provides a traditional credit card or a charge card. With high security, in step 415, the amount is transferred, withdrawn or deposited. Please refer to FIG. 4C, which is a flow chart of a method for using one of the security cards of the present invention. The method 400 described in FIG. 4D is similar to the embodiment of FIG. 4C, however in this embodiment, the security card is used as a charge card or an e-wallet card, and once the user is authenticated, they can transfer the money into it. Deduct from the inside, withdraw money from the inside or save money to the security card. In one embodiment of the present invention, the security card has a plurality of use cases. For example, the Zhang Wenquan card can be used as a credit card, a charge card, an access card, and a driver's license, thus providing users with more flexibility and convenience. Use the situation, in addition to multiple bank accounts and accounts of different banks can be accessed through a single card. In an embodiment of the present invention, if a single card accesses a plurality of banks, some data is stored in the banks, and the card functions as a key to open a plurality of doors, but the doors are opened. Previously, the bank needed to perform biological confirmation. In one embodiment, once the door is opened, the correctness of the data will be confirmed and endorsed by a bank member such as the supervisor or double biometric confirmation, for example, the cardholder and The supervisor confirms that the door is opened together, which prevents the hacker from having access to the bank account. In addition, after the door is opened safely, an ATM will be established after the confirmation of the biological data and biometric data. And send a unique account 'cardholders can continue the rest of the program. Please refer to FIG. 4E, which is a flow chart of a method for using an embodiment of a security card in the present invention. The method 4 described in FIG. 4E is similar to the embodiment of FIG. 4D, however, in this embodiment, if the security card is notified of theft or loss, the amount of the card is returned to the original bank account number, and The card will be cancelled in step 416, unlike the usual charge card, which records the money deposited by the user in the card. In an embodiment of the present invention, a bank or financial institution maintains a transaction record for the security card 201117136. When the card is used or purchased, the bank is notified of the amount of money presented in the card and The balance of the card, in this way, if the card is lost, the remaining amount in the card will be returned to the user's bank account, and the card will be invalidated and the remaining amount of the card will be cancelled. In one embodiment of the present invention, a transaction server maintains transaction records of multiple accounts. For example, if a user has three accounts of three banks, a different amount of money can be transmitted to the security card, if notified. Lost or stolen, the transaction server will return the correct amount to the corresponding account of each bank. Please refer to FIG. 4F, which is a flow chart of a method for using a security card according to an embodiment of the present invention. The method 400 begins by inserting or placing the security card into a verification machine in step 410, and then in step 411D the user provides or inputs a biometric material or a plurality of biometric data for verification. The machine compares the input biometric data with the biometric data stored on the security card in step 412. In step 413B, if the input biometric data matches the emergency code stored in the security card, the appropriate security or The relevant authority will be notified and the card will be invalid. For example, the order in which the user is stored in the card is the right hand index vein vein, the left hand fingerprint, the right palm vein pattern as the correct biometric combination and order, in one In an emergency situation, if a robbery occurs, the user can feed another combination or paste, and the policeman is notified that a robbery is taking place. Please refer to Fig. 4G, which is a flow chart of a method for using an embodiment of a security card in the present invention. The method 400 described in FIG. 4G is similar to the embodiment of FIG. 4F, however, in this embodiment, the security card is used as an ATM card, a charge card or a credit card, and is input in step 413C. The biometric data matches the emergency code stored in the security card. The relevant backup or security will be notified and a fake account balance will be displayed. For example, the user currently has 10,000 yuan in their account. And the user is rushed to threaten to access their account. If a traditional ATM card is used, the user will face the risk of exposing the current account balance and risking the loss of all balances, or facing Refusing to access the personal injury of this account, however, if the invention is used, the user can use the emergency code combination and the phase to access the hash, and a false _ balance will be displayed on the screen, for example, automatically The cash machine will not display the correct balance of 10,000 yuan, but will display any or pre-selected amount such as thirty-two pieces, so that the fairy will have a secure access account and can only The thirty-two dollars; P needs to make the stomach a personal injury because of bandits rob only see the account only the money. Clearly referring to FIG. 5A 'This is a flow diagram of an embodiment of a method for using a security card in the present invention," the method 500 described in FIG. 5A, the user first provides a signature in step 511a, in step 512A. The verification machine or the cashier compares the signature of the input with the signature stored in the security card. If the stored signature and the entered signature do not match, then the card is rejected, and if they match, the user In step 513A, a biometric input or a plurality of inputs are provided. As described above, the data is only read from the memory after being recognized by the biometric data. For example, the current situation is non-card user. Others can compare the signatures before the biometric data is confirmed, see the signature before swiping the signature with other readers, and then copy the signature to f with the card. By first confirming the biometric information and then comparing the signatures, no one other than the authorized cardholder can use the card. In step 514A, the verification machine compares the input biometric data with the stored biometric data, and in step 515A, if the input meets the stored data, the user is authorized or verified, and if the two sets of data do not match, the card is Refuse. In this embodiment, the user must provide a signature prior to providing the biometric material. This embodiment provides enhanced security because the stored bio-card is read until a correct signature is provided. Any harm to the card in order to confirm that the input matches the stored data. The stored data must be taken out first. However, in this embodiment, important data cannot be read or accessed until biometric input and The biometric storage data was confirmed and the signature was confirmed by 15 201117136. Please refer to Figure 5B, which is a flow diagram of a method of using one of the embodiments of the security card of the present invention. The method 500 described in FIG. 5B is similar to the embodiment of FIG. 5A. However, in this embodiment of the invention, multiple degrees of biometric data input are necessary before and after biometric confirmation, and then important. The data can be read from the card. For example, in step 511B, the user enters a password or a personal identification number, and if correct, the user inputs a second data such as the right hand index finger vein pattern in step 513B. If the stored data is also met in step 514B, the user will then enter another biometric data such as the left hand palm vein pattern. If this also matches the stored data, then the user can be allowed in step 515B. To access or conduct an activity. In an embodiment of the invention, the user automatically provides information. For example, when the user tries to use the security card, the user's weight is measured by a scale, such as height, ·, speed road, pulse, retina scan and shoe size, etc. 'Step-by-step increase safety. For example, if a robbery is encountered, a robber will stand next to the user if or Lai, because of the maker and The total amount of money that is stolen must be greater than the user's own weight. When the weight of the stored user does not meet the current situation, the corresponding procedure will proceed. It also detects the weight of each person in an area, while only one person can allow access to an area, for example, a highly secure mechanism, preventing multiple people from using a security card to enter the same area. In the embodiment of the present invention, the input data further includes a rhythm and a melody, and the stored data is selected according to the rhythm of the song or the phrase. When the user provides the feature information, the button is used to find the data. The code, which is red or melody input, in this embodiment, in order to use the security card, the user is provided with the correct order and the correct rhythm and melody for correct input. 'In this embodiment of the invention' the verification machine further comprises a tablet for input, in this embodiment 'the user enters a pattern, shape, shape sequence 201117136 column, letter, signature, word, color or In the above combination, the user can select a blue circle followed by a yellow triangle and a single word "textb〇〇k" as the correct sequence and combination to use the security card. In some embodiments of the invention, a plurality of biometric data inputs are required. For example, a fingerprint and red film are scanned and compared to biometric data stored in the card. In another embodiment of the present invention, the biometric data is sequentially input. For example, a right hand index finger fingerprint is used as input, and then the left middle finger fingerprint is followed by the right thumb fingerprint. In this embodiment, This sequence increases the complexity of trying to abuse this security card 'only the cardholder knows what sequence of input to follow. In an embodiment of the invention, the security card includes a credit card, identification card, driving # <photo, access card, employee ID, passport, medical insurance card, ATM card, bank card, charge card, transport card, mass transit card, national identification card, membership card, or a safe or The key to the locker. As described above, the present invention provides a security card with cardholder biometric data. When the security card is used, the cardholder provides a biometric input, which is then stored with the security card. The data in the comparison is matched. If the match is matched, the cardholder's identity is confirmed. 'So-to' κ scaly card talent can make a security card, even if the card is stolen, the thief can't (4) it, In addition, only (four) card people know what biometric data needs to be entered. Please refer to FIG. 6 , which is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of a security card for anti-theft according to the present invention, and FIG. 6B-6C is a side cross-sectional view of an embodiment of a security card for anti-theft according to the present invention. In the embodiment shown in Figures 6A-6C, the security security card 6 of the present invention comprises a transparent biometric data area on the card body (10), in these embodiments a Ba piece or a cymbal. The biometric data of the user does not need to store the user's biometric data. (4) "(4) The fingerprint is in the transparent (four) material area 620 ' For example, the biometric data is laser _, ink photocopying, heat The transfer printing film, engraving, computer numerical control processing, etc. are placed on the card body 61, and the thief is transparent. 17 201117136 The material characteristic data sample area 620. In the embodiment shown in Fig. 6B, the biometric data template is pasted or printed on the upper surface of the transparent biometric data area 620. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 6C, the biometric data template is processed into the inner region of the transparent biometric data template area 620 by laser etching, ink photocopying, thermal transfer, printing film, engraving, and computer numerical control. This avoids the effects of etch or photocopying due to wear and tear, and also avoids any attempt to directly interfere with this biometric material. In the embodiment of the present invention, if the biometric data template is generated, only the part of the biometric data template is established, and the fingerprint biometric data template of the financial-nuclear 3Q% is established, which can further enhance the protection. The privacy and security. If the biometric data of the biometric data is repeatedly engraved or modified, for example, an attempt is made to replace the transparent biometric domain, the card reader can lightly (4) detect the intent, for example, the card reader can detect the transparent area and The card body is incomplete or has an abnormal trace. Since the wafer is not used in these embodiments, the biometric data cannot be read or stolen from the integrated circuit, and the cost of using the wafer product is increased. In some embodiments of the invention, a plurality of transparent biometric data regions are provided to receive a plurality of types or measurements of biometric data stored in a security card. In use, the user gives the card to the card reader and provides a biometric input to the card reader or biometric scanner, reader, and then the card reader compares the biometric input of the user with the transparency on the security card. Biometric data stored in the biometric data area. If the entered biometric data matches the stored biometric data, the user's identity is confirmed and the card is authorized to be used. If the two do not match, the security card will be rejected and the authorization will not be accepted. Please refer to FIG. 6D, which is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the anti-theft security card of the present invention. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 6D, the anti-theft security card 6 further includes a transparent biometric data input area 630 'when used', the user provides a security card 6 to the card reader, and transmits the transparent biometric feature. The data entry area 630 provides a biometric data entry, and the identity confirmation and authorization process is then performed as described in FIG. 6A. 201117136 凊Reference to Fig. 6E' is a schematic view of another embodiment of the security card for anti-theft according to the present invention. In the 6th (4), the (4) security card, the secret transparent biometric data input area and the transmissive feature domain are merged into a transparent input and storage data section 625 on the card body 61G, transparently The function of the person and stored data section 625 is similar to the two transparent elements of Figure 6D, but only one transparent input and storage section 625 can accomplish two purposes simultaneously. Reference is made to Fig. 6F, which is a schematic view of another embodiment of the security card for theft prevention in the present invention. In the embodiment of the anti-theft security card of the present invention shown in FIG. 6F, an integrated circuit chip 64G is further included, which is made of the biometric data of the user of the age, and in this embodiment, the user's life (4) Also in the transmissive secret data area 620 of the Carlin body (10), it is also stored in the wafer 640. In use, the user provides a security card to the card reader and provides biometric input, and the right biometric wheel person matches the biometric data stored in the transparent biometric data area 62(). The biometrics stored in the wafer 64G (4); if the input biometric data does not exist, the "64Q towel's biological dragons match, the identity of the user is recognized, and the user can be authorized to use the security card." Characteristic data, stored in the card transparent biometrics, please select the biometric data of the area. "The biotech special material has any _ who does not match the other two." The card reader refuses the security card, so that the ribs cannot be made. Card. The embodiment provides more advanced security, with biometric data of the input and biometrics stored in the transparent biometric area of the card = _, view f _ - side profile 4 machine readable Take the poor material. It is said that the biometric input data stored in the card transparent biometric data A = object feature data or the biometric data stored in the wafer are simultaneously compared. For the three biometric data, since the three biometric data must be in accordance with the 201117136, the wafer cannot be overwritten to avoid being inconsistent with the other two. Please refer to FIG. 7 'which is another embodiment of the anti-theft security card of the present invention. In the embodiment of the anti-theft security card of the present invention shown in Fig. 7, the function of detecting or modifying the card 60Q is used to provide more advanced security. In this embodiment, the transparent biometric data area of the card body 610 is provided. 620 extends to each side of the card body 610. For example, if the thief attempts to replace the transparent biometric data area 62, for example, the original biometric button is cut and replaced with another new biometric button, the transparency is transparent. Any traces or incompleteness of the biometric data area will be easily detected, and the card will be rejected, and the attempt to replace the wafer is also easily detected. In addition, if the thief tries to replace the entire transparent area, the card body The other three areas will be separated, and it is difficult to recombine the four areas of the card body into one block. If these areas are welded It is easy to be detected and refuses to accept the card. Please refer to Fig. 8, which is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the anti-theft security card having a conductive sheet in the present invention. In the embodiment of Fig. 8, the invention is protected The money security card 6 (10) further includes a plurality of conductive sheets 650'. The conductive sheets 650 allow the function of the security card 6 (8) to approximate a large integrated circuit. The conductive sheets 650 are connected and/or input contacts, so that the card reader can be inserted. The action of the human security card to access.

啼絡豸分階段轨行複數測試,舉例而言 舉例而言’當使用者輸入之生物特徵資 20 201117136 料已確定與儲存在卡>;巾之生物特徵賴相符後,讀卡機透過卡片上 導電片之輸出及輸人讀取卡片,由於每—安全卡包含_者之不 同導電片功能,因此讀卡機依據複數測試可輕易接受或拒絕卡片此 實施例中每-安全卡餘據侧卡肢帛者之唯__功驗行編碼。 在本發明之一實施例中,晶片係用以辅助功能測試。 在本發明之一實施例中,多種電子元件係位在安全卡之内部。 由於有電子測試之實行,無法修改或得知電路、功能、或密碼, 因此竊賊更無法復寫或修改卡片》 在本發明之一實施例中,晶片上所提供之導電片係儲存有使用者 之生物特徵資料,且在此實施例中安全卡需通過多種電子測試後讀卡 機才可存取卡片中之生物特徵資料。 在本發明之一實施例中,若讀卡機判斷使用者為詐騙者或不被授 權使用該卡片,讀卡機會提供一電子訊號如電壓或電流到安全卡上一 適當的導電片中’讓卡片或電路損壞而無法使用。 請參考第9A圖’其為本發明中具有複數積體電路晶片之防盜用安 全卡之一實施例之示意圖。 在第9A圖之實施例中,安全卡6〇〇包括複數積體電路晶片641、 642’在此實施例中晶片641、642執行不同的功能,舉例而言,一晶 片儲存使用者之生物特徵資料而另一晶片儲存安全卡之韌體,因此, 在安全卡通過第二晶片中韌體之安全性測試後,生物特徵資料才可從 第一晶片中被讀取出來,或者’一晶片儲存使用者之一組生物特徵資 料’另一晶片儲存不同組之使用者生物特徵資料,第二組生物特徵資 料在第一組生物特徵資料被確認之前都不可以被讀取。 請參考第9B圖,其為本發明中在一閘控階梯邏輯(gated staircase 丨〇gic)上具有複數積體電路晶片之防盜用安全卡之一實施例之示意圖。 在第9B圖之實施例中,安全卡包括複數積體電路晶片651-656 係排列成一串,在此配置下一晶片中之每一功能在下一晶片被致能並 存取前必須被確認。 21 201117136 每一晶片651-656執行一分離功能’例如安全性韌體、測試、編 碼、儲存生物特徵資料、記憶體、授權層級、存取層級等。 此配置在一閘控階梯邏輯管理中執行,將存取下一階梯(層級) 之存取以一上鎖之閘極封鎖住,直到提供適當的鑰匙才可存取,若在 程序執行中任何時候無法提出適當的餘匙則不允許再有進展,而目前 之晶片無法被存取。 舉例而言’使用者提供一第一生物特徵輸入,而讀卡機確認此第 一生物特徵輸入與儲存在第一晶片中之生物特徵資料吻合,則讀卡機 執行在第二晶片上之多種電子測試,包含安全性韌體或電路,若測試 結果與使用者之唯一碼相符,則將第三晶片致能;接著使用者提供一 第二生物特徵輸入,而讀卡機確認此第二生物特徵輸入與儲存在第三 晶片中之生物特徵資料並不吻合,則讀卡機拒絕卡片或卡片使用失 敗,無法授權。在此方法下,保護了包含在第四、第五、第六晶片中 之資料而無法存取。 請參考第10圖,其為本發明中具有複數導電線路之防盜用安全卡 之一實施例之示意圖。 在第10圖所示之實施例中,本發明提供之安全卡600包括複數 導電線路(conductive traces)l〇〇〇、導電電線、或奈米線(nan〇_wires) 包含在卡片本體610内部。 若試圖對卡片上之元件有任何熱處理、修改、置換或對卡片有任 何切割、變更,卡片上之導電線路1〇〇〇會被破壞而使讀卡機輕易偵測 到這些破壞並拒絕該張卡片,或使卡片失效。 在本發明之另一實施例中,安全卡之卡片本體内包括一導電層, 舉例而言,在卡片之夾層中有一層係由導電金屬構成。 在本發明之一實施例中,測試係用以判斷導電線路是否被破壞。 在本發明之一實施例甲,當有一個生物特徵測試失敗後,安全卡 ,會無效或使其無法做動,在此實施例中使用者必須申請一張新卡或 是實地請求娜,而在其他實關巾於封失效之翁先接受測試失 22 201117136 敗之一預期號碼(predetermined number)。 在本發明之一實施例中安全卡更包括一身分標籤,例如一無線射 頻標籤、一無線射頻身分識別標籤、或一無所不在身分(Ub丨quit〇us丨D) 標籤,使持卡人之位置可被預測或追蹤,並可用以儲存附加的身分資 訊以供身分驗證時使用。 在本發明之複數實施例中組合了不同的晶片、蝕刻區域、透明生 物特徵輸入區域、導電片、導電線路及導電層以提高安全層級及熱處 理偵測。 在本發明之複數實施例中安全卡除了為長方形之外亦包括其他形 狀,舉例而言,安全卡之形狀可為圓形、三角形、多角形或正方形。 在本發明之一實施例中,安全卡放置在讀卡機中的正確位置僅有 使用者一人知道。 在本發明之一實施例中,儲存在卡片本體之透明生物資料區域中 之生物特徵資料係經過加密,舉例而言,生物特徵資料以密碼程式 碼、或其他生物特徵資料來進行加密,例如二生物特徵輸入後利用一 安全性演算法以形成蝕刻在透明區域中之圖案,僅有使用者知道^ 入哪二種生物特徵。 ’ 唯以上所述者,僅為本發明之較佳實施例而已,並非用來限定 發明實施之範圍。故即凡依本發明申請範圍所述之特徵及精神 均等變化或修飾,均應包括於本發明之申請專利範圍内。 μ 【圖式簡單說明】 第1Α圖為先前技術中傳統***之正面示意圖。 第1Β圖為先前技術中傳統***之反面示意圖。 第1C圖為先前技術中傳統透過網路確認***之示意圖。 第1D圖為先前技術中傳統使用***之流程圖。 第2Α圖為本發明中安全卡之一實施例之正面示意圖。 第2Β圖至第2D圖為本發明中安全卡之一實施例之反面示意圖。 201117136 第2E圖至第2F圖為本發明中安全卡之另一實施例之正面示意圖。 第2G圖至第2Η圖為本發明令使用安全卡之一實施例之流程圖。 第21圖至第2J圖為本發明中安全卡之另一實施例之正面示意圖。 第2Κ圖為本發明中安全卡之另一實施例之正面示意圖。 第3圖、第4Α圖至第4G圖及第5Α囷至第5Β圖為本發明中使用安 全卡之一實施例之流程圖。 第6Α圖為本發明中防盜用安全卡之一實施例之示意圖。 第6Β圖至第6C圖為本發明中防盜用安全卡之一實施例之剖視圖。 第6D圖至第6F圖為本發明令防盜用安全卡之一實施例之剖視圖。 第7圖為本發明中防盜用安全卡之一實施例之示意圖。 第8圖為本發明中具有—導電片之防盜用安全卡之—實施例之示意 圖。 第9Α圖為本發明中具有複數積體電路晶片之防盜用安全卡之一實施例之 示意圖。 第9Β圖為本發明中具有複數積體電路晶片之防盜用安全卡之一實施例之 示意圖’其上之複數積體電路晶片係配置於一閘控階梯邏輯。 第10圖為本發明中具有複數導電線路之防盜用安全卡之一實施例之示意 圖0 【主要元件符號說明】 100傳統*** 11〇商標 120持卡人姓名 130帳號 140磁條 150簽名條 160名字 170系統 24 201117136 171卡片掃瞄器 173具資料庫之中央伺服器 200安全卡 210商標 220持卡人姓名 230帳號 240記憶體晶片 250磁條 260簽名區域 270持卡人姓名 290透明輸入區域、第一透明輸入區域 291第二透明輸入區域 600防盜用安全卡 610卡片本體 620生物特徵資料區域、生物特徵資料樣板區域 625透明輸入及儲存資料區段 630透明生物特徵資料輸入區域 640積體電路晶片 641、642積體電路晶片 650導電片 651、652、653、654、655、656 積體電路晶片 1000導電線路 25啼 豸 豸 豸 轨 轨 轨 轨 , , , , , , , , 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 豸 当 当 当 当 当 当 当 当 当 当The output of the upper conductive sheet and the input of the input card, since each security card contains the function of different conductive sheets of the _, the card reader can easily accept or reject the card according to the plural test. The cardinal singer's only __ merit test line code. In one embodiment of the invention, the wafer is used to aid in functional testing. In one embodiment of the invention, a plurality of electronic components are internal to the security card. Because of the implementation of electronic testing, it is impossible to modify or know the circuit, function, or password, so the thief is even less able to rewrite or modify the card. In one embodiment of the invention, the conductive sheet provided on the wafer is stored by the user. The biometric data, and in this embodiment, the security card needs to pass through various electronic test card readers to access the biometric data in the card. In an embodiment of the present invention, if the card reader determines that the user is a fraudster or is not authorized to use the card, the card reader provides an electronic signal such as voltage or current to a suitable conductive sheet on the security card. The card or circuit is damaged and cannot be used. Please refer to FIG. 9A, which is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of an anti-theft security card having a plurality of integrated circuit chips in the present invention. In the embodiment of Figure 9A, the security card 6A includes a plurality of integrated circuit chips 641, 642'. In this embodiment, the wafers 641, 642 perform different functions, for example, a wafer stores the user's biometrics. The other chip stores the firmware of the security card, so that the biometric data can be read from the first wafer after the security card passes the security test of the firmware in the second wafer, or 'a wafer storage One set of user biometric data 'the other wafer stores different sets of user biometric data, and the second set of biometric data cannot be read until the first set of biometric data is confirmed. Please refer to FIG. 9B, which is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of an anti-theft security card having a plurality of integrated circuit chips on a gated staircase logic (gated staircase). In the embodiment of Fig. 9B, the security card includes a plurality of integrated circuit chips 651-656 arranged in a string, where each function in the configuration of the next wafer must be confirmed before the next wafer is enabled and accessed. 21 201117136 Each chip 651-656 performs a separate function 'eg security firmware, testing, encoding, storing biometrics, memory, authorization levels, access levels, and the like. This configuration is performed in a gated ladder logic management, accessing the next ladder (hierarchy) is blocked with a locked gate until the appropriate key is provided for access, if any during program execution When the appropriate margin is not available, no further progress is allowed, and the current wafer cannot be accessed. For example, 'the user provides a first biometric input, and the card reader confirms that the first biometric input matches the biometric data stored in the first wafer, and the card reader performs various kinds on the second wafer. Electronic test, including a security firmware or circuit, if the test result matches the user's unique code, the third chip is enabled; then the user provides a second biometric input, and the card reader confirms the second creature The feature input does not match the biometric data stored in the third chip, and the card reader refuses to use the card or the card and cannot be authorized. Under this method, the data contained in the fourth, fifth, and sixth wafers is protected from access. Please refer to FIG. 10, which is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of a security card for anti-theft having a plurality of conductive lines. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 10, the security card 600 provided by the present invention includes a plurality of conductive traces, conductive wires, or nanowires (nan〇_wires) included in the card body 610. . If any attempt is made to heat-treat, modify, replace, or cut or alter any of the components on the card, the conductive traces on the card will be destroyed and the card reader will easily detect the damage and reject the sheet. Card, or invalidate the card. In another embodiment of the invention, the card body of the security card includes a conductive layer. For example, one of the layers of the card is made of a conductive metal. In one embodiment of the invention, the test is used to determine if the conductive trace is broken. In an embodiment of the present invention, after a biometric test fails, the security card may be invalid or rendered inoperable. In this embodiment, the user must apply for a new card or request the field. In the other real customs towel, the failure to accept the test first lost 22 201117136 lost one expected number (predetermined number). In an embodiment of the invention, the security card further includes an identity tag, such as a radio frequency tag, a radio frequency identification tag, or an ubiquitous identity (Ub丨quit〇us丨D) tag to position the card holder. Can be predicted or tracked and can be used to store additional identity information for identity verification purposes. In the plural embodiments of the present invention, different wafers, etched regions, transparent biometric feature input regions, conductive sheets, conductive traces, and conductive layers are combined to enhance security level and heat treatment detection. In the plural embodiments of the present invention, the security card includes other shapes in addition to the rectangular shape. For example, the shape of the security card may be circular, triangular, polygonal or square. In one embodiment of the invention, the correct location of the security card placed in the card reader is known to the user alone. In an embodiment of the present invention, the biometric data stored in the transparent biological data area of the card body is encrypted. For example, the biometric data is encrypted by a cipher code or other biometric data, for example, The biometric input is followed by a security algorithm to form a pattern etched in the transparent region, and only the user knows which two biometrics to fit into. The above is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of the invention. All changes and modifications of the features and spirits described in the scope of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention. μ [Simple description of the diagram] The first diagram is a front view of a conventional credit card in the prior art. Figure 1 is a schematic illustration of the reverse side of a conventional credit card in the prior art. Figure 1C is a schematic diagram of a conventional credit card confirmation over the network in the prior art. Figure 1D is a flow chart of a conventional use of a credit card in the prior art. Figure 2 is a front elevational view of one embodiment of a security card in the present invention. 2D to 2D are schematic views of the reverse side of an embodiment of the security card of the present invention. 201117136 Figures 2E through 2F are front elevational views of another embodiment of a security card of the present invention. 2G through 2D are flow diagrams of an embodiment of the invention for using a security card. 21 to 2J are front elevational views showing another embodiment of the security card of the present invention. Figure 2 is a front elevational view of another embodiment of the security card of the present invention. Fig. 3, Fig. 4 to Fig. 4G and Figs. 5 to 5 are flowcharts showing an embodiment of the use of a security card in the present invention. Figure 6 is a schematic view showing an embodiment of the security card for anti-theft according to the present invention. 6A to 6C are cross-sectional views showing an embodiment of the anti-theft security card of the present invention. 6D to 6F are cross-sectional views showing an embodiment of the security card for anti-theft according to the present invention. Figure 7 is a schematic view showing an embodiment of a security card for anti-theft according to the present invention. Fig. 8 is a schematic view showing an embodiment of a security card for anti-theft of a conductive sheet in the present invention. Fig. 9 is a view showing an embodiment of an anti-theft security card having a plurality of integrated circuit chips in the present invention. Figure 9 is a schematic view showing an embodiment of an anti-theft security card having a plurality of integrated circuit chips in the present invention. The plurality of integrated circuit chips are disposed in a gated logic. Figure 10 is a schematic view of an embodiment of an anti-theft security card having a plurality of conductive lines in the present invention. [Main element symbol description] 100 conventional credit card 11 〇 trademark 120 card holder name 130 account 140 magnetic strip 150 signature strip 160 name 170 system 24 201117136 171 card scanner 173 database central server 200 security card 210 trademark 220 cardholder name 230 account 240 memory chip 250 magnetic strip 260 signature area 270 cardholder name 290 transparent input area, the first A transparent input area 291 second transparent input area 600 anti-theft security card 610 card body 620 biometric data area, biometric data template area 625 transparent input and storage data section 630 transparent biometric data input area 640 integrated circuit chip 641 642 integrated circuit chip 650 conductive sheets 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656 integrated circuit wafer 1000 conductive line 25

Claims (1)

201117136 七、申請專利範圍: 1. 一種確認持卡人身分之防盜用安全卡,包括: 一透明生物特徵資料區段’以儲存生物特徵資料,該生物特徵資料 係唯一可識別持卡人之身分;以及 一唯一^^號,由持卡人之生物特徵資料所產生; 其中’確認一持卡人輸入之生物特徵與儲存在該安全卡中之該生物 特徵資料符合’並符合麟卡人依自身之該生物概資料所建立 和解譯之該唯一·^號後,才可讀取該安全卡。 2. 如申請專利範圍第1項所述之確認持卡人身分之防盜用安全卡,其 中該透明生物特徵資料區域延伸到該安全卡之每一邊。 、 3·如申請專利範圍第i項所述之確認持卡人身分之防盜用安全卡,其 ㈣透明生物資料區域㈣盜用安全卡之一卡片本體為 二不透明區域。 4. =請_棚第彳項職之確職卡人身分之防安全卡 電路⑼,其铜崎存該生物特徵資料,該生物特徵 資枓係唯一可識別持卡人之身分。 5. =請,範圍第】項所述之確認持卡人身分之防盜用安全卡更 匕括-透明輸人區域,以分隔該持卡人與—讀卡機或— 7 身分之_安全卡’其 8 身安全卡,更 包括複數導電片,以使一讀卡人身分之防盜用安全卡,更 10.如申請專利範廳如讀卡機可執订該防盜用安全卡之功能。 述之確認持卡人身分之防盜駐全卡,更 26 201117136 包括一導電元件或複數導電元件,其設於該防盜用安全卡中以防止 更動或修改該防盜用安全卡。 11. 一種確認持卡人身分之防盜用安全卡,包括: 一透明生物特徵資料區段,以儲存一第一組生物特徵資料,該第一 組生物特徵資料係唯一可識別持卡人之身分; 至少一積體電路晶片,以儲存一第二組生物特徵資料,該第二組生 物特徵資料係唯一可識別持卡人之身分;以及 一唯一卡號,由持卡人之生物特徵資料所產生; 其中’確認-持卡人第-次輸入之生物特徵與儲存在安全卡中之該 第-組生物特徵資料符合,且第二次輸入之生物特徵與儲存在安 全卡中之該第二組生物特徵資料符合後,才可存取該唯一_^號, 且該第-次及第二讀人之該生物特徵解譯後符合該唯一卡號 才可使用該安全卡。 13.如申請專利範圍第h 項所述之破認格人直A λ I*201117136 VII. Scope of application for patents: 1. A security card for anti-theft that confirms the identity of the cardholder, including: a transparent biometric data section to store biometric data, which is the only identity that can identify the cardholder. And a unique ^^ number generated by the biometric data of the cardholder; wherein 'confirming that the biometric input by the cardholder is consistent with the biometric data stored in the security card' and conforming to the Linka The security card can only be read after the unique number of the biometric data created and interpreted by itself. 2. The anti-theft security card for confirming the cardholder's identity as described in item 1 of the patent application, wherein the transparent biometric data area extends to each side of the security card. 3. The anti-theft security card for confirming the cardholder's identity as described in item i of the patent application scope, (4) transparent biometric data area (4) The card body of one of the stolen security cards is a two-opaque area. 4. = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 5. = Please, in the scope of the item, the security card for the identity of the cardholder to confirm the cardholder's identity is further included - transparent input area to separate the cardholder and the card reader or - 7 identity _ security card 'The 8 body safety card, including a plurality of conductive sheets, so that the security card for the security of a card reader, 10. If the patent application hall, such as a card reader, can perform the function of the security card for theft prevention. The burglar-proof full-card card for confirming the identity of the card holder further includes a conductive element or a plurality of conductive elements, which are disposed in the anti-theft security card to prevent modification or modification of the anti-theft security card. 11. A security card for security against a cardholder identity, comprising: a transparent biometric data section for storing a first set of biometric data, the first set of biometric data being uniquely identifiable to the identity of the cardholder At least one integrated circuit chip for storing a second set of biometric data, the second set of biometric data is uniquely identifiable to the cardholder; and a unique card number generated by the cardholder's biometric data Where the 'confirmation-cardholder first-input biometrics match the first-group biometric data stored in the security card, and the second biometric input and the second group stored in the security card After the biometric data is met, the unique _^ number can be accessed, and the biometric feature of the first and second readers can be used after the interpretation of the biometric feature. 13. The unidentified person A λ I* as described in item h of the patent application scope 如甲請辱利範圍第1項所述之確認持卡 12.如申請專利範圍第^項所述之確認持卡人身分之防盜用安全卡, 其中該透明生物特徵資料區域延伸到該安全卡之每一邊。 人之資訊。 寺寺 I* It*- TO X L —For example, please confirm the card as described in item 1 of the insulting scope. 12. For the anti-theft security card for confirming the cardholder identity as described in item (2) of the patent application, wherein the transparent biometric data area extends to the security card. Each side. Information about people. Temple Temple I* It*- TO X L — 201117136 片之功能成功執行後才可存取。 18·如申請專利範圍第11項所述之確認持卡人身分之防盜用安全卡, 更包括複數導電片,以使一讀卡機可執行該防盜用安全卡之功能; 以及一導電元件或複數導電元件,其設於該防盜用安全卡中以防止 更動或修改該防盜用安全卡。 19· 一種利用防盜用安全卡確認持卡人身分之方法,包括下列步驟: 接收一使用者之生物特徵資料; 比較輸入之該生物特徵資料與儲存在該防盜用安全卡上一透明生 物特徵資料區域中之生物特徵資料; 若輸入之該生物特徵資料與儲存在該防盜用安全卡上該透明生物 特徵資料區域中之生物特徵資料相符’確認該使用者之身分;以 及 若輸入之生物特徵資料與儲存在該防盜用安全卡上該透明生物特 徵資料區域中之生物特徵資料不相符,則拒絕該防盜用安全卡。 20·如申請專利範圍第19項所述之利用防盜用安全卡確認持卡人身分 之方法,更包括:若輸入之生物特徵資料與儲存在該防盜用安全卡 上該透明生物特徵資料區域中之生物特徵資料不相符,則使該防盜 用安全卡失效無法再使用》 21.—種利用防盜用安全卡確認持卡人身分之方法,包括下列步驟: 依據一持卡人之生物特徵資料產生一唯一·^號; 將該唯一·^號儲存在一安全卡上; 接收由該持卡人所輸入之生物特徵資料; 將輸入之該生物特徵資料與儲存在該安全卡上之該生物特徵資料 進行比對; 若輸入之該生物特徵資料與儲存在該防盜用安全卡上該透明生物 特徵資料區域中之生物特徵資料相符,則確認該輸入之該生物特 徵資料解譯後是否符合該唯一"^號;以及 若符合該唯一卡號,則允許該安全卡之存取。 28The function of the 201117136 film is only accessible after it has been successfully executed. 18. The anti-theft security card for confirming the identity of the cardholder as described in claim 11 of the patent application, further comprising a plurality of conductive sheets, such that a card reader can perform the function of the security card for theft prevention; and a conductive element or A plurality of conductive elements are disposed in the anti-theft security card to prevent modification or modification of the anti-theft security card. 19. A method for confirming a cardholder identity using a security card for anti-theft, comprising the steps of: receiving biometric data of a user; comparing the biometric data input with a transparent biometric data stored on the anti-theft security card Biometric data in the region; if the biometric data input is consistent with the biometric data stored in the transparent biometric data area of the anti-theft security card, 'confirm the identity of the user; and if the biometric data is input The anti-theft security card is rejected if it does not match the biometric data stored in the transparent biometric data area on the anti-theft security card. 20. The method for confirming the identity of the cardholder by using the security card for anti-theft according to claim 19, further comprising: if the input biometric data is stored in the transparent biometric data area on the security card for theft prevention If the biometric data does not match, the security card for theft prevention cannot be used again. 21. A method for confirming the identity of the cardholder by using the security card for anti-theft, including the following steps: According to the biometric data of a cardholder a unique number; storing the unique number on a security card; receiving biometric data input by the cardholder; and inputting the biometric data and the biometric stored on the security card The data is compared; if the biometric data input is matched with the biometric data stored in the transparent biometric data area of the anti-theft security card, it is confirmed whether the input biometric data is in conformity with the unique "^ number; and if the unique card number is met, access to the security card is allowed. 28
TW98137763A 2009-11-06 2009-11-06 Tamper-proof secure card with stored biometric data and method for using the secure card TWI410899B (en)

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TWI578247B (en) * 2012-12-20 2017-04-11 英特爾公司 Method and system for authentication

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TWI623848B (en) * 2016-01-18 2018-05-11 由田新技股份有限公司 Identity verification method, apparatus and system and computer program product

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RU2195020C2 (en) * 2000-01-11 2002-12-20 Многопрофильное предприятие ООО "Элсис" Method and device for user identification
GB0400428D0 (en) * 2004-01-09 2004-02-11 Kinderguard Ltd An identification card and a method of identifying a card holder using the card
TW200723119A (en) * 2005-12-09 2007-06-16 Univ Cheng Shiu Non-contact recognition device for recognizing personal identification
TWM337935U (en) * 2008-01-30 2008-08-01 Univ Kun Shan Identity authentication device

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
TWI578247B (en) * 2012-12-20 2017-04-11 英特爾公司 Method and system for authentication

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