JPS6156537A - Distribution system for multi-drop open key - Google Patents
Distribution system for multi-drop open keyInfo
- Publication number
- JPS6156537A JPS6156537A JP59178597A JP17859784A JPS6156537A JP S6156537 A JPS6156537 A JP S6156537A JP 59178597 A JP59178597 A JP 59178597A JP 17859784 A JP17859784 A JP 17859784A JP S6156537 A JPS6156537 A JP S6156537A
- Authority
- JP
- Japan
- Prior art keywords
- address
- key
- terminal
- dcp
- public key
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
Abstract
Description
【発明の詳細な説明】
〔産業上の利用分野〕
本発明は、回線暗号装置を組み入れたマルチドロップ回
線の公開鍵配送方式に関し、特に各端末側回線暗号装置
にアドレスを付与して認証性をもたせようとするもので
ある。[Detailed Description of the Invention] [Field of Industrial Application] The present invention relates to a public key distribution system for multi-drop lines that incorporates a line encryption device, and in particular, a method for assigning an address to each terminal-side line encryption device to ensure authentication. It is something that we try to maintain.
米国商務省標準局制定のデータ暗号化規格（ＤＢＳ）に
従い公開鍵配送を行う暗号通信方式は、公開鍵の配送を
データ伝送と同一の伝送路を使用し且つ暗号通信開始時
に行なうので、鍵管理から開放される利点がある。第４
図はこの一例で、ホストコンビエータ１と１台のデータ
端末７との間でデータ伝送するポイントッーポイント方
式を例としたものである。３，５はモデム、４は回線で
、ホスト１とモデム３との間およびモデム５と端末７と
の間にそれぞれ回線暗号装置（ＤＣＰ）２゜６を介在さ
せである。Encrypted communication methods that perform public key distribution in accordance with the Data Encryption Standard (DBS) established by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Standards use the same transmission path as data transmission and are performed at the start of encrypted communication, so key management is required. This has the advantage of being freed from Fourth
The figure shows an example of this, which uses a point-to-point method for transmitting data between a host combinator 1 and one data terminal 7. 3 and 5 are modems, and 4 is a line, with a line encryption device (DCP) 2.6 interposed between the host 1 and the modem 3 and between the modem 5 and the terminal 7, respectively.
ホスト１から端末７へ平文（暗号化していないデータ）
を送る場合はＤＣＰ ２で暗号化し、その暗号文をモデ
ム３、回線４、モデム５を通して端末側へ送り、ＤＣＰ
２で元の平文に復号化する。Plaintext (unencrypted data) from host 1 to terminal 7
When sending data, encrypt it with DCP 2, send the encrypted text to the terminal side through modem 3, line 4, and modem 5, and then
Step 2 decrypts it to the original plaintext.
このときＤＣＰ２．６は共通の基本鍵にと呼ばれる暗号
鍵を使用して暗号化および復号化するので、回線４上の
暗号文を盗用してもその解読は不可能に近い、つまり、
この基本鍵には、ＤＣＰ ６ではＤＣＰ２から送られる
公開鍵Ｘ ＝ １１” ｍｏｄ ｎ （Ｍ。At this time, DCP2.6 encrypts and decrypts using a common basic key called an encryption key, so even if the ciphertext on line 4 is stolen, it is almost impossible to decrypt it.
In DCP 6, this basic key includes the public key X = 11'' mod n (M.
ｎは定数、αは秘密の鍵、ｎｒｏｄは法）に自己の秘密
の鍵βを加味して作成した、またＤＣＰ ２ではＤＣＰ
６から送られる公開５３１ Ｙ ＝ Ｍβｍｏｄ ｎに
自己の秘密の鍵αを加味して作成したに＝Ｍａβｍｏｄ
ｎなる形を持つもので、これ以外の方法では仮に、伝
送路上でＸ、Ｙを検出してもそれからα、βを求めるこ
とは不可能に近く、従って基本鍵Ｋを作成することはで
きない。n is a constant, α is a secret key, nrod is a modulus), and is created by adding own secret key β, and in DCP 2, DCP
The public 531 sent from 6 is created by adding own private key α to Mβmod n = Maβmod
By any other method, even if X and Y are detected on the transmission path, it is nearly impossible to obtain α and β from them, and therefore the basic key K cannot be created.
ところで、マルチドロップ回線では第５図のようにホス
ト側ＤＣＰ２に対し複数の端末ＩＩＪ Ｄ ＣＰ６１．
６２．・・・・・・が対向する。この場合ＤＣＰ２゜と
ＤＣＰ６１間の公開鍵が第４図と同様ＸとＹであれば相
互の通信は基本鍵に＝Ｍ“βＩＩＩｏｄ ｎを用いて行
われる。またＤＣＰ２とＤＣＰ６２間の公開鍵が前記Ｘ
とＺ ＝Ｍ’ ｍｏｄ ｎ （ｒは秘密の１りとすれば
相互の通信は基本鍵ＫＡ＝Ｍｃｔｒｍｏｄ ｎ ヲ用い
て行われる。これらのことはどの端末もホストと交信で
きるということであり、マルチドロップ回線では好まし
いこと或いは当然のことであるが、盗用される危険性を
持っている。即ち端末６１に関するデータを端末６２が
盗用しようとするときはセンタとの回線を成立させて上
記操作を行なえばよく、ホスト側では送られてきた暗号
文はＤＣＰ６１からのものか或いはＤＣＰ６２からのも
のかの区別はできないから、要求されたものを送ってし
まう。なお秘密の鍵α、β、γは乱数発生させたもので
あり、ホスト又は端末に固有のものではない。ＤＣＰは
量産されるものであり、同一仕様のものが多数ある。即
ち定数Ｍ＋ ｎは各ＤＣＰに共通であり、α、β、γ
は固有てないので、この従来方式は認証性がない（通信
相手を特定する、指定したものしか解読できない、とい
う性質がない）。By the way, in a multi-drop line, as shown in FIG. 5, a plurality of terminals IIJ D CP61.
62. ...is facing you. In this case, if the public keys between DCP2° and DCP61 are X and Y as in FIG. X
and Z = M' mod n (assuming r is a secret number, mutual communication is performed using the basic key KA = Mctr mod n. These things mean that any terminal can communicate with the host, and Although it is preferable or natural to use a drop line, there is a risk of the data being stolen.In other words, when the terminal 62 attempts to steal data related to the terminal 61, it must establish a line with the center and perform the above operations. If the host side is unable to distinguish whether the sent cipher text is from DCP 61 or DCP 62, it will send the requested one.The secret keys α, β, and γ are random numbers. It is generated by the DCP and is not unique to the host or terminal.DCPs are mass-produced, and there are many with the same specifications.In other words, the constant M+n is common to each DCP, and α, β, γ
Since the information is not unique, this conventional method has no authentication properties (it does not have the characteristics of identifying the communication partner or being able to decipher only specified information).
それ故本発明はホストと端末間に認証性を持たせ、盗用
を一層確実に阻止可能にしようとするものである。Therefore, the present invention aims to provide authentication between the host and the terminal, thereby making it possible to more reliably prevent theft.
本発明は、マルチドロップ回線に回線暗号装置を組込み
、且つ各端末側回線暗号装置にはそれぞれアドレスを付
し、そしてホスト側回線暗号装置から特定の端末側回線
暗号装置に公開鍵を配送するときは該公開鍵と共にその
アドレスを暗号化して伝送し、各端末側回線暗号装置で
はそれを復号してアドレスの一致した端末側回線暗号装
置のみが自己宛の公開鍵を取り出し使用することを特徴
とするものである。The present invention incorporates a line encryption device into a multidrop line, assigns an address to each terminal side line encryption device, and distributes a public key from the host side line encryption device to a specific terminal side line encryption device. is characterized in that the address is encrypted and transmitted together with the public key, each terminal-side line encryption device decrypts it, and only the terminal-side line encryption device with a matching address extracts and uses the public key addressed to itself. It is something to do.
ホスト側ＤＣＰから配送される公開鍵の復号化にアドレ
スの一致という条件を付与することで、ＤＣＰ相互間に
認証性を持たせることができる。By adding a condition that the addresses match to the decryption of the public key delivered from the host-side DCP, it is possible to provide authentication between the DCPs.
そして、アドレスを付加することで低下する暗号強度を
、アドレスの暗号化で補強する。以下、図示の実施例を
参照しながらこれを詳細に説明する。Then, the encryption strength, which decreases by adding an address, is strengthened by encrypting the address. This will be explained in detail below with reference to illustrated embodiments.
第１図は本発明の一実施例を示すマルチドロップ回線の
概略ブロック図で、５１〜５３は各端末側のモデム、６
１〜６３は各端末側のＤＣＰ （回線暗号装置）、７１
〜７３は複数のデータ端末である。これらの端末７１〜
７３は共通の伝送路４を通してホストコンピュータ１と
の間でデータ伝送をする。２はホスト側のＤＣＰ、３は
モデムである。本例では端末側のＤＣＰ６１，６２，６
３にそれぞれ固有の複数ビットアドレスＡ ａ −Ａ
ｎ ＋Ｂｏ〜Ｂｎ、Ｃｏ〜Ｃｎを付与しである。FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a multidrop line showing an embodiment of the present invention, in which 51 to 53 are modems on each terminal side, 6
1 to 63 are DCP (line encryption device) on each terminal side, 71
73 are a plurality of data terminals. These terminals 71~
73 transmits data to and from the host computer 1 through the common transmission path 4. 2 is a DCP on the host side, and 3 is a modem. In this example, DCP61, 62, 6 on the terminal side
3, each unique multi-bit address A a −A
n +Bo to Bn and Co to Cn are added.
第２図は端末側ＤＣＰ６１（他も同様）の詳細ブロック
図で、８１はモデム５１からの入力データを取り込む入
力レジスタである。この入力データはホスト１から各端
末に向けて送られるもので、ホスト側のＤＣＰ２におい
て秘密の認証用の鍵Ｋ。FIG. 2 is a detailed block diagram of the terminal-side DCP 61 (and others as well), and 81 is an input register that takes in input data from the modem 51. This input data is sent from the host 1 to each terminal, and a secret authentication key K is sent to the DCP 2 on the host side.
を用いて暗号化されている。第３図は該入力データのフ
ォーマットで、各端末側ＤＣＰ６１〜６３に付与された
アドレス１．２．３．・・・・・・の次にその公開鍵１
，２，３．・・・・・・が続く形でシリアルに伝送され
てくる。上記の鍵Ｋｏはホスト側の鍵管理者だけが知っ
ていて、各ＤＣＰに内密に設定されている。is encrypted using FIG. 3 shows the format of the input data, with addresses 1, 2, 3, . Next to that public key 1
, 2, 3. It is transmitted serially in the form of... The above-mentioned key Ko is known only to the key administrator on the host side and is secretly set in each DCP.
ＤＣＰ６１にはキーバッドよりアドレスが設定されてお
り、入力データのアドレスと一致したとき入力データと
しての公開鍵が復号化され、ＤＥＳ演算のための鍵デー
タとなる６入力データとしての公開鍵は、所定回、本例
では（アドレス数＋１）回り鉦Ｓ演算が行われ復号化さ
れる。すなわち、ホスト側ではＫｏによって本例では（
各端末のアドレス数＋１）回だけＤＢＳ演算を施し公開
鍵を配送する。これに対しアドレスは１回だけＫ。An address is set in the DCP61 from the keypad, and when the address matches the address of the input data, the public key as the input data is decrypted, and the public key as the input data becomes the key data for the DES calculation. In this example, (number of addresses + 1) round trip S operation is performed and decoded. In other words, on the host side, Ko is used in this example (
The public key is distributed by performing DBS calculations as many times as the number of addresses of each terminal + 1). On the other hand, the address is K only once.
によってＤＢＳ演算を施す。A DBS operation is performed by.
具体的に説明すると、ＤＣＰ６１ではキーボード（キー
バッド）８６によって自己のアドレスＡ。To be more specific, the DCP 61 inputs its own address A using the keyboard (keypad) 86.
〜Ａｎを設定してあり、これをアドレス記憶回路８５に
記憶している。そして、必要時に制御回路９０によって
記憶回路８５から該アドレスをシフトレジスタ８８に読
出し、比較回路８９によってシフトレジスタ８７の内容
と比較する。シフトレジスタ８７の内容は入力データに
含まれるアドレスＡ＋を８１〜８３の系で１回ＤＢＳ演
算して復号したものであり、これがシフトレジスタ８８
内のアドレスと一致すると比較回路８９は一致出力を生
じてゲート９１を開き、後続の公開鍵だけを通過させる
。つまり、入力レジスタ８１には第３図の入力データの
全てが取込まれ、さらに出力レジスタ８３にはそれがＤ
ＢＳ演算部８２で１回または（アドレス数＋１）回ＤＥ
Ｓ演算され復号された形でセットされる。帰還回路８４
は出力レジスタ８３の内容を入力レジスタ８１へ戻し、
この戻す回数は制御回路９０によりアドレス数回にされ
る。従って出力レジスタ８３の内容は帰還回数に応じた
複数回のＤＢＳ演算結果になる。入力データのうちどれ
がアドレスでどれが公開鍵かは先頭からのビット数など
で識別可能なので、制御回路９０ば各アドレス部で１回
ＤＢＳ演算させ、その結果が自己のアドレスと一致した
とき自己のアドレス数＋１回のＤＢＳ演算をさせ、自己
宛の公開鍵を得る。~An is set and stored in the address storage circuit 85. Then, when necessary, the control circuit 90 reads the address from the storage circuit 85 to the shift register 88, and the comparison circuit 89 compares it with the contents of the shift register 87. The contents of the shift register 87 are obtained by decoding the address A+ included in the input data by performing one DBS operation on the system of 81 to 83, and this is the content of the shift register 88.
When there is a match with the address within, comparator circuit 89 produces a match output and opens gate 91, allowing only subsequent public keys to pass through. In other words, the input register 81 receives all the input data shown in FIG.
BS calculation unit 82 DE once or (number of addresses + 1) times
It is set in the S-operated and decoded form. Feedback circuit 84
returns the contents of the output register 83 to the input register 81,
The number of times this return is made is the number of addresses by the control circuit 90. Therefore, the contents of the output register 83 are the results of a plurality of DBS calculations depending on the number of times of feedback. Since it is possible to identify which of the input data is an address and which is a public key by the number of bits from the beginning, etc., the control circuit 90 performs a DBS operation once in each address part, and when the result matches its own address, it The number of addresses + 1 DBS operation is performed to obtain the public key addressed to the self.
そこで１回目のＤＢＳ演算結果で復号、化されたアドレ
スを出力レジスタ８３からシフトレジスタ８７に移し、
その後（自己のアドレス数＋１）回のＤＢＳ演算を行っ
て復号化した公開鍵を出力レジスタ８３に保持しておく
。そして、比較回路８９でシフトレジスタ８７．８８の
アドレスを比較し、一致したらその出力でゲート９１を
開く。Therefore, the address decoded and converted by the first DBS operation result is transferred from the output register 83 to the shift register 87,
Thereafter, the public key decrypted by performing the DBS operation (number of own addresses + 1) times is held in the output register 83. Then, the comparator circuit 89 compares the addresses of the shift registers 87 and 88, and if they match, the output opens the gate 91.
第３図の例ではアドレス１で比較回路８９の一致出力が
生じ、これにより （アドレス数＋１）回のＤＢＳ演算
が行なわれて後続の公開鍵１が復号され、これがゲート
９１を通過して鍵データ出力（前述した例のＸ等に相当
する）となる。尚、入力データのうちアドレス２と公開
１！２は他のＤＣＰのものであり、またアドレス３と公
開鍵３は更に異なるＤＣＰのものである。このようにア
ドレスを付し、ホストからはそれを暗号化して送って、
そのアドレスを持つ端末のみが自己宛の公開鍵を復号で
きるようにすると、アドレスの異なる端末がホストから
のデータを盗用することは不可能になる。In the example of FIG. 3, a matching output from the comparator circuit 89 occurs at address 1, which causes (number of addresses + 1) DBS calculations to decrypt the subsequent public key 1, which passes through the gate 91 and becomes the key. It becomes a data output (corresponding to X etc. in the above example). Note that among the input data, address 2 and public key 1!2 belong to another DCP, and address 3 and public key 3 belong to an even different DCP. The address is attached in this way, and the host encrypts it and sends it.
If only the terminal with that address can decrypt the public key addressed to itself, it becomes impossible for terminals with different addresses to steal data from the host.
鍵Ｋｏによる暗号化関数をＥ （Ｘ）とすると、入力デ
ータのうちアドレス１に相当するものはアドレスＡ ａ
−Ａ ｎをＫｏで１回だけ暗号化した形Ａ ＋ ＝Ｅ
（Ａ Ｏ’・’・’Ａｎ）であり、公開ｓ３！１はＥ
（Ｘ）ＡＩ で示される。、Ａ２．Ａコはアドレス２゜
３の暗号化したものであり、またＥ（Ｘ）Ａ２゜Ｅ （
Ｘ）Ａ３は公開鍵２，３の暗号化したものである。なお
第２図は公開鍵の受信部分のみを示し、アドレスＡＩは
１回のＤＢＳ演算（復号）だけでシフトレジスタ８７に
取込み、公開鍵Ｅ（Ｘ）ＡＩは（アドレス数＋１）回の
ＤＢＳ演算で復号化する、などを示す。実際の通信は第
４図で説明したようにか＼る公開鍵（Ｘ、Ｙ）の授受を
して基本鍵Ｋを得、これによ、り行なう、ＤＢＳ演算の
回数は上記の例に限定されるものではなく、一般的にア
ドレスについてはＸ回、公開鍵については（アドレス数
＋ｙ）回という形をとり得る。このようにアドレスを暗
号化するのは、アドレスそれ自体の盗用を防止するため
である。If the encryption function using the key Ko is E (X), then the input data that corresponds to address 1 is address A a
−A The form A + = E in which n is encrypted only once with Ko
(A O'・'・'An), and public s3!1 is E
Indicated by (X)AI. , A2. A is the encrypted version of address 2゜3, and E(X)A2゜E (
X) A3 is the encrypted version of public keys 2 and 3. Note that FIG. 2 shows only the reception part of the public key, where the address AI is taken into the shift register 87 with just one DBS operation (decryption), and the public key E(X)AI is taken into the shift register 87 with (number of addresses + 1) DBS operations. Indicates, for example, decrypting with In actual communication, as explained in Figure 4, the public keys (X, Y) are exchanged to obtain the basic key K, and the number of DBS operations is limited to the above example. In general, addresses may be sent X times and public keys may be sent (number of addresses + y) times. The purpose of encrypting the address in this way is to prevent the address itself from being stolen.
以上述べたように本発明によれば、ホスト側回線暗号装
置と端末側回線暗号装置との間にアドレスによる認証性
があるので、マルチドロップ回線で各端末がすべてホス
トに接続された状態でも盗用の恐れな（公開鍵の配送が
可能であり、同じ回線暗号装置を有する端末でも、ホス
ト側でアドレス指定した特定の端末でしか受信電文を復
号化できないので、通信の秘密性を一層向上させること
ができる利点がある。As described above, according to the present invention, there is address-based authentication between the host-side line encryption device and the terminal-side line encryption device, so even if all terminals are connected to the host on a multi-drop line, theft can be prevented. (The public key can be distributed, and even if the terminal has the same line encryption device, the received message can only be decrypted by a specific terminal that is addressed by the host side. This further improves the confidentiality of communication. It has the advantage of being able to
第１図は本発明の一実施例を示す概略ブロック図、第２
図は端末側回線暗号装置の詳細ブロック図、第３図はそ
の動作を説明するタイムチャート、第４図および第５図
に従来の公開鍵配送方式を示すブロック図である。
・ 図中、１はホストコンピュータ、２はホスト側ＤＣ
Ｐ （回線暗号装置）、６１〜６３は端末側Ｄｃｐ、７
１〜７３はデータ端末、８２はＤＥＳ演算部、８５はア
ドレス記憶回路、８９はアドレス比較回路である。FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram showing one embodiment of the present invention, and FIG.
FIG. 3 is a detailed block diagram of the terminal-side line encryption device, FIG. 3 is a time chart explaining its operation, and FIGS. 4 and 5 are block diagrams showing the conventional public key distribution system. - In the figure, 1 is the host computer, 2 is the host side DC
P (line encryption device), 61 to 63 are terminal side Dcp, 7
1 to 73 are data terminals, 82 is a DES calculation section, 85 is an address storage circuit, and 89 is an address comparison circuit.
Claims (1)
末側回線暗号装置にはそれぞれアドレスを付し、そして
ホスト側回線暗号装置から特定の端末側回線暗号装置に
公開鍵を配送するときは該公開鍵と共にそのアドレスを
暗号化して伝送し、各端末側回線暗号装置ではそれを復
号してアドレスの一致した端末側回線暗号装置のみが自
己宛の公開鍵を取り出し使用することを特徴とするマル
チドロップ公開鍵配送方式。A line encryption device is installed in the multi-drop line, each terminal side line encryption device is assigned an address, and when a public key is delivered from the host side line encryption device to a specific terminal side line encryption device, the public key is The multi-drop public key is characterized in that the address is encrypted and transmitted, each terminal-side line encryption device decrypts it, and only the terminal-side line encryption device with a matching address extracts and uses the public key addressed to itself. Key distribution method.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP59178597A JPS6156537A (en) | 1984-08-28 | 1984-08-28 | Distribution system for multi-drop open key |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP59178597A JPS6156537A (en) | 1984-08-28 | 1984-08-28 | Distribution system for multi-drop open key |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| JPS6156537A true JPS6156537A (en) | 1986-03-22 |
Family
ID=16051236
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP59178597A Pending JPS6156537A (en) | 1984-08-28 | 1984-08-28 | Distribution system for multi-drop open key |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| JP (1) | JPS6156537A (en) |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPS6398236A (en) * | 1986-10-15 | 1988-04-28 | Nec Corp | Digital information transmission system |
| US10431817B2 (en) | 2017-03-24 | 2019-10-01 | Sumitomo Osaka Cement Co., Ltd. | Electrode material for lithium-ion secondary battery and method for manufacturing the same, electrode for lithium-ion secondary battery, and lithium-ion secondary battery |
Citations (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPS59146242A (en) * | 1983-02-09 | 1984-08-22 | Fujitsu Ltd | Ciphering communication system |
-
1984
- 1984-08-28 JP JP59178597A patent/JPS6156537A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPS59146242A (en) * | 1983-02-09 | 1984-08-22 | Fujitsu Ltd | Ciphering communication system |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPS6398236A (en) * | 1986-10-15 | 1988-04-28 | Nec Corp | Digital information transmission system |
| US10431817B2 (en) | 2017-03-24 | 2019-10-01 | Sumitomo Osaka Cement Co., Ltd. | Electrode material for lithium-ion secondary battery and method for manufacturing the same, electrode for lithium-ion secondary battery, and lithium-ion secondary battery |
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