GB2387702A - Method of access control using PIN codes - Google Patents

Method of access control using PIN codes Download PDF

Info

Publication number
GB2387702A
GB2387702A GB0208787A GB0208787A GB2387702A GB 2387702 A GB2387702 A GB 2387702A GB 0208787 A GB0208787 A GB 0208787A GB 0208787 A GB0208787 A GB 0208787A GB 2387702 A GB2387702 A GB 2387702A
Authority
GB
United Kingdom
Prior art keywords
access control
encryption table
user
encryption
pin
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
GB0208787A
Other versions
GB0208787D0 (en
GB2387702B (en
Inventor
Eithan Ephrati
Amir Langer
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Cellectivity Ltd
Original Assignee
Cellectivity Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Cellectivity Ltd filed Critical Cellectivity Ltd
Priority to GB0208787A priority Critical patent/GB2387702B/en
Priority to GB0209602A priority patent/GB2387704B/en
Publication of GB0208787D0 publication Critical patent/GB0208787D0/en
Publication of GB2387702A publication Critical patent/GB2387702A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of GB2387702B publication Critical patent/GB2387702B/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Fee Related legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/02—Marketing; Price estimation or determination; Fundraising
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B15/00—Arrangements or apparatus for collecting fares, tolls or entrance fees at one or more control points
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/21—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass having a variable access code
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/30—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/32—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check
    • G07C9/33—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check by means of a password
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code
    • G07F7/1033—Details of the PIN pad
    • G07F7/1041—PIN input keyboard gets new key allocation at each use
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
    • G07C2209/60—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00174 - G07C9/00944
    • G07C2209/62—Comprising means for indicating the status of the lock

Landscapes

  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Development Economics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Game Theory and Decision Science (AREA)
  • Entrepreneurship & Innovation (AREA)
  • Economics (AREA)
  • Marketing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Abstract

A method of access control using PIN codes in which an access control device transiently stores and displays to an end user an encryption table, the table pairs each character which is potentially in the end user's PIN code with a randomly generated character in the table. This enables a user to enter an encrypted version of the PIN code by entering or selecting, using an input to the device, the corresponding randomly generated character in the table. Hence, if a user 's PIN code is 6935, the user may be shown the following encryption table on the access control device (e.g display on a mobile handset, ATM etc.): 1Y 2G 3K 4L 5P 6F 7E 8R 9D 0T The user then enters the FDKP on a keypad of the device in order to be authenticated. The access control device may be a mobile telephone and the encryption table may be sent as a SMS (short message service) message. The method may also be used to access ATM's, POS terminals. The method may be used as part of an authentication scheme which enables secure, mobile-commerce transactions. There is also disclosed an access control apparatus using PIN codes.

Description

METHOD OF ACCESS CONTROL USING PIN CODES
5 Field of the Invention
This invention relates to a method of access control using PIN (Personal Identification Number) codes. PIN codes are typically 4 numeric digits and are widely used for access control, such as to unlock a mobile telephone, gain the use of ATMs (automatic teller machines) etc. Description of the prior art
Mobile commerce initiated from a mobile handset (e.g. cellular telephone, laptop computer, PDAs etc.) is in its infancy. One of the major hurdles slowing down mass consumer acceptance is the lack of trust many consumers feel about using mobile handsets for mobile 15 commerce. One component of this lack of trust is the high rate of mobile telephony theft and the very real risk that a stolen handset could be used to make unauthorised purchases.
One approach to addressing this is to require a user to enter a unique PIN code when initiating a m-commerce transaction. The combination of unique PIN code and the mobile 20 handset telephone number is enough to allow a user to be authenticated. The PIN code is conventionally sent unencrypted as a message over the SMS (short message service) bearer.
However, because SMS messages are stored in the SMS outbox of a conventional handset, a stolen handset can quite readily divulge the PIN used and hence can be used to make authenticated transactions. Because of this limitation, m-commerce systems which rely on 25 PIN codes sent over SMS have been thought inherently unsafe. In fact, the policy of several
l en- r r. '. e A' c me _ r À S mobile telephone operators is to not offer any m-commerce systems in which PIN codes are sent over SMS. Whilst it would theoretically be possible to encrypt PIN codes, that solution is not economic for the current generation of cellular handsets and in any event is theoretically insecure since it requires a crypto-engine to be placed in the handset, where it is 5 vulnerable.
Summary of the present invention
In a first aspect, there is a method of access control using PIN codes in which an access control device transiently stores and displays to an end user an encryption table, the table 10 pairing each character which is potentially in the end user's PIN code with a randomly generated character in the table, enabling a user to input an encrypted version of its PIN code by entering or selecting, using an input to the device, the corresponding randomly generated characters in the table.
15 Hence, if a user's PIN code is 6935, he may be shown the following encryption table on the access control device (e.g. display on a mobile handset, ATM etc.): 1Y 2G 3K 4L 5P GF 7 E 8R 9D (IT
The user then enters the FDKP on a keypad of the device (this may be a convenuona 20 numeric keypad in which each key codes for several letters). This code is then sent for authentication by a remote server. The encryption table therefore allows a 1:1 mapping between characters normally used in a PIN and randomly generated characters: the characters normally used in a PIN can be mapped to a sub-set of the randomly generated
l if:.. À ,.. r -
" ' A O
At,. characters present in the table. As well as entering the encrypted code using a keypad, other input approaches are possible; for example, he could select the appropriate characters on a touch screen, or speak them to a device enabled with voice recognition.
5 The encryption table is displayed for only a short time and then selfdeletes or is caused to be deleted, leaving no trace. The encryption table can therefore be thought of as a 'one time pad'. The table may for example timeout on an end user's device after a short, Redefined time period: if the end-user fails to enter his PIN within 10 seconds of the encryption table being displayed, the table may be deleted from memory and hence will cease to be displayed.
10 The encryption table is typically generated using a pseudo-random generator using conventional encryption technology in a secure environment and sent to the access control device for display whenever an end-user wishes to be authenticated - e.g. prior to initiating a m- commerce transaction.
15 The advantages of the present invention are that at no time is the PIN code itself entered into the device or stored in the device: it is therefore at least as secure as a PIN code system itself. Further, the user feels that the transaction is more secure since at no time is it explicit what actual PIN is being entered by the user. Hence, at ATM machines or POS (point of sale) terminals which adopt the present invention, there will be no purpose in a thief trying 20 to watch the PIN code entered by a lawful user: even if a credit or cash card is stolen, the encryption table presented to the thief when he comes to withdraw cash from an ATM using that card will have changed so that merely re- entering the same sequence as before will not work.
ea. r.. f.. In a mobile telephone implementation, PINGuardTM from Cellectivity Limited of London, United Kingdom, the encryption table is sent as a SMS message of a specific type (i.e. one of type 1 - 7 in the TP Protocol ID scheme in GSM). The advantage of defining the type is 5 that a subsequent message of the same type will overwrite the encryption table. Hence, if the encryption table is sent as a type 1 SMS, the user can then send the encrypted version of the PIN code as a reply SMS of any type (e.g. the FDI(P sequence represented by numeric 3357). The recipient system (e.g. authentication center etc.) then immediately sends back an acknowledgment of type 1, which completely overwrites the encryption table originally sent 10 as a type 1 SMS. If the user fails to send a reply within a short time period, a type 1 message is automatically sent to the device to overwrite the table.
As an alternative to SMS over GSM, communication may use any other protocol/bearer, such as http, WAP, HITPS, GPRS, 3G etc. Encryption tables and/or encrypted PIN codes 15 can also be sent over a secure encrypted channel for added security.
The server which generates the encryption tables can be hosted by mobile telephone operator or other entity which needs to control the security aspects of the m-commerce chain. The encryption tables can be sent via a third party such as a m-services ASP etc to 20 the end-users; the encrypted versions of the PIN codes (plus mobile telephone number) can be simply routed by these third parties back to the operators, where decryption and authentication occurs. Decryption requires that the encryption table most recently sent to an
eve À e 1 r À À À C À À
r cr À r i: e À À -
. it À À-e end-user be retained with the mobile telephone number (or other non-transient ID) of that user; hence, many operators will wish to retain full control of this sensitive information...DTD: The encryption table may also be generated and stored locally on the access control device 5 itself; hence, a SIM card for a mobile handset may itself include a simple crypto-engine which can generate the encryption tables; when a user wishes to authenticate himself to the mobile telephone device, he does not directly enter his PIN but is instead shown a newly generated encryption table; he then enters an encrypted version of his PIN as described above. This approach is valuable for mobile telephones as many users have only a single 10 PIN which they re-use for many different circumstances; any open use of this master PIN can be seen by a thief who may then assume that the same PIN is needed to authenticate m-
commerce transactions etc. In overview, the present invention finds application in any context where a simple PIN 15 based access control system is needed, but it is useful to conceal what a particular PIN is and for the PIN never to be stored on the device. For the purposes of interpreting this specification, a PIN should be regarded as any password using characters, including
numbers, letters and symbols.
20 In one implementation, the encryption table includes randomly generated numbers and not simply letters: inputting these numbers is faster than inputting letters using standard 10 key alphanumeric keypads.
ee. me: r e e en À e e e-. e À e r 0 6 r ^ I- I
In many implementations, the character keypad used to enter the encrypted PIN is a hardware keypad and hence the value of each key is fixed. However, where the character keys displayed on the access control device can be altered (e.g. are generated by software and then shown on a touch screen display), it is possible, as an alternative to the above invention, 5 to instead randomly re-order the character positions. A 10 digit pad could for example be re-
ordered as follows: 9 4 8 2 0 3 1 65 10 0 for a short period of time (e.g. 10 seconds) during which a user would then enters his PIN (unencrypted) using the keypad; a thief observing the user's hand movements from a rlitnr rnillrl not he hle to lefts them PIN . _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. .

Claims (1)

  1. r À 0 À r c À A r C 0 À À C r e r À .., CLAIMS
    1. A method of access control using PIN codes in which an access control device transiently stores and displays to an end user an encryption table, the table pairing each 5 character which is potentially in the end user's PIN code with a randomly generated character in the table, enabling a user to input an encrypted version of its PIN code by entering or selecting, using an input to the device, the corresponding randomly generated characters in the table.
    10 2. The method of Claim 1 in which the access control device is a mobile telephone,
    and in which the encryption table is sent as a SMS message of a specific type so that a subsequent message of the same type can be sent to rapidly overwrite the encryption table stored on the device.
    15 3. The method of Claim 2 when used as part of a user authentication scheme which enables secure, m-commerce transactions.
    4. The method of Claim 1 in which the access control device is a point of sale terminal or ATM.
    5. The method of any of Claims 1 - 4 in which the encryption table is a one time pad.
    r.. e e e e e e -...' t e e e 6. The method of any of Claims 1- 4 in which the encryption table stored on the access control device self deletes or is caused to be deleted within a short period after first being displayed on the device.
    5 7. The method of Claim 1 - 6 in which the encryption table is generated locally at the access control device.
    8. The method of Claim 1 - 6 in which the encryption table is generated at a remote, secure location.
    9. An access control apparatus using PIN codes, the apparatus transiently storing and displaying to an end user an encryption table, the table pairing each character which is potentially in the end user's PIN code with a randomly generated character in the table, enabling a user to input an encrypted version of its PIN code by entering or selecting the 15 corresponding randomly generated characters in the table using an input to the apparatus.
    10. The apparatus of Clang 9 being a mobile telephone, in which the encryption table is sent as a SMS message of a specific type so that a subsequent message of the same type can be sent to the apparatus to rapidly overwrite the encryption table stored on the apparatus.
    _ 11. The apparatus of Claim 10 when used as part of a user authentication scheme which enables secure, m-commerce transactions.
    tee e e À e i Àe e , ee r À À r r 0 e À e r lo À À -
    12. The apparatus of Claim 9 in which the apparatus is a point of sale terminal or ATM.
    13. The apparatus of any of Clatrns 9 - 12 in which the encryption table is a one time pad. 14. The apparatus of any of Claims 9 -13 in which the encryption table stored on the apparatus self deletes or is caused to be deleted within a short period after first being displayed on the apparatus.
    10 15. The apparatus of any of Claims 9 -14 in which the encryption table is generated locally at the apparatus.
    16. The apparatus of any of Claims 9 -14 in which the encryption table is generated at a remote, secure location.
GB0208787A 2002-04-17 2002-04-17 Method of access control using PIN numbers Expired - Fee Related GB2387702B (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0208787A GB2387702B (en) 2002-04-17 2002-04-17 Method of access control using PIN numbers
GB0209602A GB2387704B (en) 2002-04-17 2002-04-26 Time sensitive messages for mobile handsets

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0208787A GB2387702B (en) 2002-04-17 2002-04-17 Method of access control using PIN numbers

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
GB0208787D0 GB0208787D0 (en) 2002-05-29
GB2387702A true GB2387702A (en) 2003-10-22
GB2387702B GB2387702B (en) 2005-06-01

Family

ID=9934999

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
GB0208787A Expired - Fee Related GB2387702B (en) 2002-04-17 2002-04-17 Method of access control using PIN numbers
GB0209602A Expired - Fee Related GB2387704B (en) 2002-04-17 2002-04-26 Time sensitive messages for mobile handsets

Family Applications After (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
GB0209602A Expired - Fee Related GB2387704B (en) 2002-04-17 2002-04-26 Time sensitive messages for mobile handsets

Country Status (1)

Country Link
GB (2) GB2387702B (en)

Cited By (9)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2397680A (en) * 2003-01-21 2004-07-28 Howard Williams Computer security device
EP1615181A1 (en) * 2004-07-09 2006-01-11 Tricerion Ltd A method of secure data communication
WO2006095203A1 (en) * 2005-03-07 2006-09-14 Tricerion Ltd A method of secure data communication
GB2424736A (en) * 2005-04-01 2006-10-04 Lloyds Tsb Bank Plc A user authentication system
US8249920B2 (en) 2000-04-07 2012-08-21 Zyzeba Holding Limited Interactive marketing system using short text messages
GB2503227A (en) * 2012-06-19 2013-12-25 Swivel Secure Ltd Method and system for authenticating messages
US8977559B2 (en) 2000-04-07 2015-03-10 Zyzeba Holding Limited Interactive marketing system
US9552465B2 (en) 2012-07-20 2017-01-24 Licentia Group Limited Authentication method and system
US10592653B2 (en) 2015-05-27 2020-03-17 Licentia Group Limited Encoding methods and systems

Families Citing this family (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US11195163B2 (en) 2006-09-01 2021-12-07 Mastercard International Incorporated Methods, systems and computer readable media for over the air (OTA) provisioning of soft cards on devices with wireless communications capabilities
US10992817B2 (en) * 2009-03-18 2021-04-27 Mastercard International Incorporated Methods, systems and computer readable media for selecting and delivering electronic value certificates using a mobile device
CN109005102B (en) * 2018-06-21 2022-10-11 Oppo（重庆）智能科技有限公司 Information processing method and device and electronic device

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5177789A (en) * 1991-10-09 1993-01-05 Digital Equipment Corporation Pocket-sized computer access security device
FR2751459A1 (en) * 1996-07-22 1998-01-23 Mathieu Jean Marc Encoding system for encrypting secret digital codes
US5832087A (en) * 1994-03-23 1998-11-03 Chantilley Corporation Limited Apparatus for generating encryption/decryption look-up tables using a session key

Family Cites Families (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
IL127748A0 (en) * 1998-12-27 1999-10-28 Greenberg Hanan Electronic coupon and methods for creation and use of same
AU2001231260A1 (en) * 2000-02-14 2001-08-27 Bpass, Inc. Accessing information for multiple financial accounts via the internet
IL134741A (en) * 2000-02-27 2003-11-23 Adamtech Ltd Mobile transaction system and method
AUPQ790100A0 (en) * 2000-06-01 2000-06-22 Telstra R & D Management Pty Ltd A validation system

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5177789A (en) * 1991-10-09 1993-01-05 Digital Equipment Corporation Pocket-sized computer access security device
US5832087A (en) * 1994-03-23 1998-11-03 Chantilley Corporation Limited Apparatus for generating encryption/decryption look-up tables using a session key
FR2751459A1 (en) * 1996-07-22 1998-01-23 Mathieu Jean Marc Encoding system for encrypting secret digital codes

Cited By (25)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8249920B2 (en) 2000-04-07 2012-08-21 Zyzeba Holding Limited Interactive marketing system using short text messages
US8977559B2 (en) 2000-04-07 2015-03-10 Zyzeba Holding Limited Interactive marketing system
GB2397680A (en) * 2003-01-21 2004-07-28 Howard Williams Computer security device
GB2397680B (en) * 2003-01-21 2004-12-15 Howard Williams Computer security device
EP1615181A1 (en) * 2004-07-09 2006-01-11 Tricerion Ltd A method of secure data communication
GB2438988A (en) * 2004-07-09 2007-12-12 Tricerion Ltd Security in data communication
GB2416058B (en) * 2004-07-09 2008-01-23 Tricerion Ltd A method of secure data communication
EP1912183A1 (en) * 2004-07-09 2008-04-16 Tricerion Ltd A method of secure data communication
GB2438988B (en) * 2004-07-09 2009-07-15 Tricerion Ltd A method of secure data communication
US9224272B2 (en) 2004-07-09 2015-12-29 Tricerion Ltd. Method of secure data communication
WO2006095203A1 (en) * 2005-03-07 2006-09-14 Tricerion Ltd A method of secure data communication
GB2424736A (en) * 2005-04-01 2006-10-04 Lloyds Tsb Bank Plc A user authentication system
EP2862117A1 (en) * 2012-06-19 2015-04-22 Swivel Secure Limited Method and system for authenticating messages
GB2503227A (en) * 2012-06-19 2013-12-25 Swivel Secure Ltd Method and system for authenticating messages
EP2862117B1 (en) * 2012-06-19 2020-05-06 Swivel Secure Limited Method and system for authenticating messages
US9552465B2 (en) 2012-07-20 2017-01-24 Licentia Group Limited Authentication method and system
US10366215B2 (en) 2012-07-20 2019-07-30 Licentia Group Limited Authentication method and system
US10565359B2 (en) 2012-07-20 2020-02-18 Licentia Group Limited Authentication method and system
US11048783B2 (en) 2012-07-20 2021-06-29 Licentia Group Limited Authentication method and system
US11048784B2 (en) 2012-07-20 2021-06-29 Licentia Group Limited Authentication method and system
US11194892B2 (en) 2012-07-20 2021-12-07 Licentia Group Limited Authentication method and system
US10592653B2 (en) 2015-05-27 2020-03-17 Licentia Group Limited Encoding methods and systems
US10740449B2 (en) 2015-05-27 2020-08-11 Licentia Group Limited Authentication methods and systems
US11036845B2 (en) 2015-05-27 2021-06-15 Licentia Group Limited Authentication methods and systems
US11048790B2 (en) 2015-05-27 2021-06-29 Licentia Group Limited Authentication methods and systems

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
GB2387704A (en) 2003-10-22
GB0208787D0 (en) 2002-05-29
GB2387702B (en) 2005-06-01
GB0209602D0 (en) 2002-06-05
GB2387704B (en) 2005-02-02

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
JP6818679B2 (en) Secure host card embroidery credentials
US7231372B1 (en) Method and system for paying for goods or services
US9531548B2 (en) Security system for handheld wireless devices using time-variable encryption keys
US6990586B1 (en) Secure data transmission from unsecured input environments
US8365988B1 (en) Dynamic credit card security code via mobile device
JP4874251B2 (en) Method and apparatus for authenticating a transaction using a dynamic authentication code
EP1554834B1 (en) Secure communications
US20020066039A1 (en) Anti-spoofing password protection
US20020097876A1 (en) Communication methods, communication systems and to personal communication devices
US20180308097A1 (en) Bankcard Password Protection Method and System
US20150006404A1 (en) Cryptographic Authentication And Identification Method Using Real-Time Encryption
WO2015065249A1 (en) Method and system for protecting information against unauthorized use (variants)
GB2387702A (en) Method of access control using PIN codes
CN104408363A (en) Safe password system
Gandhi et al. Advanced online banking authentication system using one time passwords embedded in QR code
US7177425B2 (en) Device and method for securing information associated with a subscriber in a communication apparatus
JP4665352B2 (en) Customer authentication system, customer authentication method, and control program for implementing the method
CA3044991A1 (en) Secure transactional cryptocurrency hardware wallet
JP2005208841A (en) Communication system, portable terminal and program
CN107889102B (en) Method and device for encrypting and decrypting information in short message
Segoro et al. Implementation of two factor authentication (2FA) and hybrid encryption to reduce the impact of account theft on android-based instant messaging (IM) applications
JP2005084846A (en) Automatic individual identification of ic card
EP3979556B1 (en) Electronic communication device for performing an authentication operation
CN114819936A (en) Method and device for acquiring transfer information, electronic equipment and storage medium
WO2005003932A1 (en) External cipher and authentication device for use with keyboard units

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PCNP Patent ceased through non-payment of renewal fee

Effective date: 20140417